

# A Cost-Effective FPGA-based Fault Simulation Environment

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## Outline



- 1. Motivation
- 2. FPGA-Based Fault Simulation Environment
- 3. ECC Case Study

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**Fault attacks** - Attackers inject faults to recover secrets.

- Glitches in power or clock supply.
- Optical attacks (e.g., laser).



Powerful threat for cryptographic implementations.

# Countermeasures Motivation



Cryptographic implementations must be protected.



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   E.g. point validity check for ECC.

#### Countermeasures must be verified.

## Verification of Countermeasures



### Laboratory.

- Late in design flow.
- Highly complicated.
- Difficult to reach high coverage.

# Verification of Countermeasures




#### Laboratory.

- Late in design flow.
- Highly complicated.
- Difficult to reach high coverage.

#### Simulation.

- Earlier in design flow.
- Fault models for abstraction.
- ► High performance and coverage possible.

# Simulation of Faults Motivation



Two choices for hardware simulation.

- 1. Software-based simulation.
  - Performance low for large designs.
- 2. FPGA-based simulation.
  - Performance high.


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
For digital hardware designs of cryptographic algorithms.





### Design-Under-Test (DUT) is modified through script.

- Replace flip-flops.
- Netlist.
- New top-level.
- Additional fault injection control and communication module.



# Modified Design Flip-Flops FPGA-Based Fault Simulation Environment




## Flip-flop cell replacement.






## Flip-flop cell replacement.



## Design Flow Integration



FPGA-Based Fault Simulation Environment



# Supported Fault Model FPGA-Based Fault Simulation Environment



Fault model specific for fault attacks.



#### Fault model specific for fault attacks.

- Complete timing control.
- Complete location control.
   All single or multi-bit faults.
- Bit flip effect.
- ► Transient (one cycle) fault duration.

Fault model can be further restricted.

## Generation of Fault Testcases FPGA-Based Fault Simulation Environment



### Fault-case generation automated.

- Requires list of fault-injectable flip-flops.
- Requires fault configuration.
- Outputs list of fault test cases.If space to large, random choice of subset.



#### Simulation is automated.



- 1. FPGA configured with modified design.
- 2. All fault cases are performed. For every case:



#### Simulation is automated.



- 1. FPGA configured with modified design.
- 2. All fault cases are performed. For every case:
  - ► Fault injection control module re-configuration.
  - Start simulation.
  - Collect output and store testcase outcome.

## Testcase Output Classifications FPGA-Based Fault Simulation Environment



#### Available information.

- DUT output vs. expected output.
- DUT status indication.
- Timing compliance.

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#### Fault case simulation outcome.

- 1. Silent still correct.
- 2. Detected detected fault.
- 3. Fault faulty result output.
- 4. Timeout No response.

## Simulation Environment Conclusion



- FPGA-based for high performance.
- Supports Verilog and VHDL designs.
- Automated modification on netlist no design effort.
- Cost-effective Tooling.

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## ECC Case Study



#### DUT =

Digital hardware design of **Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication**.

- Countermeasure against fault attacks: point validity check at the end of computation.
  - $\rightarrow$  This countermeasure is evaluated.



#### Fault model configuration:

- Derived from fault attacks on ECC.
- Every clock cycle during ECSM.
  - 95,000 cycles.
- Transient (one cycle) faults.
- Bit-flip fault effect.
- Single bit (to simplify case study) faults in all registers. Split simulation in two parts:
  - ▶ 1,600 data-path flip-flops.
  - 90 control-path flip-flops.

# Simulation Results ECC Case Study



Fault injection **hardware overhead** for DUT  $\sim +25\,\%$ .

**Simulation performance** of 16 ms per test-case.

- ▶ DUT at **50** MHz.
- RS232 transmission more than 70%.

# Simulation Results, cont'd ECC Case Study



#### Simulation in two parts:

- ► Control-path flip-flops.
  - $ightharpoonup \sim$  9 million test-cases.
  - ► 100 % coverage.
- Data-path flip-flops.
  - ho  $\sim$  **35** million test-cases.
  - 22 % coverage.



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**9 days of simulation**  $\sim$  46 years in software simulation.

# Simulation Results, cont'd ECC Case Study



#### Control-path.

- ▶ 1 % Timeouts.
- ▶ 38 % Silent faults.
- ▶ 44 % Detected faults.
- ► 18 % Faults.

In most cases program counter was manipulated and intermediate values output.  $\rightarrow$  **Serious problem.**  $\rightarrow$  **Countermeasure required**.

# Simulation Results, cont'd ECC Case Study



#### Control-path.

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#### Data-path.

- ▶ 0 % Timeouts.
- 24 % Silent faults.
- ▶ 77 % Detected faults.
- ▶ 0.02 % Faults.
  Most changed output after point check. → Useless for attacker.

## Case Study Conclusion



- **Speed-up of**  $\sim$  2000 compared to software simulation.
- Point validity check countermeasure proved very effective.
- However, weaknesses were successfully exposed.
  - Control path needs protection.
  - Detected faults can be used for safe-error attacks.