A FOREST OF DISPUTES: STRUGGLES OVER SPACES, RESOURCES, AND
SOCIAL IDENTITIES IN AMAZONIA

By

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To community people in the Lower Tapajós River, for their strong history of resistance.

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Focusing on the creation and implementation of the Tapajós National Forest (Flona Tapajós) in Brazil, this dissertation analyzes on the processes of social and spatial transformation precipitated by state policies that were implemented to exert control over resources and social organizations. Comprising one of the strategies of the geo-political project to expand the Amazon economic frontiers, the establishment of this forest reserve in 1974 altered forest social spaces not only by imposing new forms of thinking about and accessing forest resources, but also by reshaping community social identity.

Flona Tapajós was the first government forest reserve created and implemented in the Amazon region, with the objective of promoting research and planned exploitation of forest resources for timber production. The establishment of this forest reserve led to the eruption of intense conflicts with local social groups, in particular with eighteen peasant communities, due to the encroachment of the reserve's boundaries onto their territories, and government attempts to displace people and impose severe restrictions on their

natural resource management and livelihood strategies. Resistance by these communities to these restrictions and outright expulsions engendered severe conflicts with the government. As a result, two decades later, in 1994, the government changed the legal status of the reserve to admit the permanence of these communities, who started to be designated as "traditional people." Three of these communities, however, did not accept the designation of "traditional people" and this precipitated an indigenous movement to reinstate the Mundurucu ethnic identity, which implied a new arrangement in the reserve's spaces.

Using a combination of structured in-depth interviews, participatory research methods, and archival research, the study examines these three moments related to Flona Tapajós' spaces and community social identities. The results show that the definition of the reserve's spatial composition was dependent on the construction of community social identity. Playing a key role in the reserve's spatial configuration, the construction of community social identity, however, was revealed to be constituted of a remarkable field of disputes, wherein communities, state and multilateral agency ideologies and apparatuses, grassroots organizations, environmental discourses, and economic interests interacted.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Encountering the Subject: Spaces and Social Identities

This dissertation is fundamentally concerned with the processes of social and

natural landscape transformation that ensue from official State policies. The focus of

analysis is the creation and establishment of environmental reserves in the Brazilian

Amazon, specifically the Tapajós National Forest (Flona Tapajós), a forest reserve

created by the federal government in 1974 in the municipality of Santarém, Pará. Flona

Tapajós was the first government forest reserve created and implemented in the Amazon

region, with the objective of promoting research and planned exploitation of the forest

resources for timber production.

My interest in developing a study on this subject sprang from a socio-economic

survey I carried out in 1996 in eighteen long-term resident communities[1] whose

territories overlapped with the Flona Tapajós. The objective of this survey was to

provide information on community land occupation, resource use, and livelihood

strategies to assist in the definition of an area to be designated for these communities,

whose purpose was to serve as a means to resolve conflicts regarding community land

tenure that had dragged on since the creation of the Flona Tapajós. This survey was

carried out as part of the "Pilot Program to Support Forest Management in the Amazônia"

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[1] São Domingos, Maguari, Jamaraquá, Acaratinga, Jaguarari, Pedreira, Piquiatuba, Marituba, Marai, Nazaré, Tauari, Pini, Taquara, Prainha, Itapaiuna, Paraíso, Itapuama, and Jatoarana. The term "community," as used here, refers to local people's definition of village and their social organization. This will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

1

(PROMANEJO PPG-7), a subprogram of the international Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest (PPG-7) launched in 1992 by the Brazilian government, and administrated by the World Bank through the Rain Forest Trust Fund Resolution. As we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, Flona Tapajós was chosen as one site for the implementation of Pilot Program actions.

Despite differences in their history, the majority of these communities was made up of indigenous descendents with a long and close relationship with western society. These communities' social identification had been broadly ascribed as *caboclo(a)*, although most of the people did not recognize themselves by such a term. Rather, when I was carrying out the survey in 1996, people identified themselves in a variety of ways, such as "rural worker," "indigenous descendants," and "Tapajós son" (as a reference to being born along the Tapajós River); or, more frequently, as belonging to a certain community or other: "I am from the Piquiatuba Community"; "I am from the Taquara Community," and so forth. I did not hear people identifying themselves as "*caboclo*" (masculine) or "*cabocla*" (feminine), except for some community leaders who were taking part in meetings to discuss land tenure issues: "We are Tapajós *caboclos.*" In Chapter 3, we will see that in the Amazon region, *caboclo* is a controversial, and multifaceted, social category applied to mixed societies that originated from pre-colonial Amerindian descendants and poor Europeans. Some scholars have used the term *caboclo* to refer to the typically Amazonian peasantry (Harris 1998; Nugent 1993; Parker 1985; Lins e Silva 1980; Ross 1978; Wagley 1976).

The eighteen communities' long history of occupancy in the region was directly threatened by the creation and implementation of the Flona Tapajós on account of

National Forest legislation that did not allow permanent residents in the reserve. Thus, when the implementation of Flona Tapajós was initiated, federal government agencies responsible for the implementation of Flonas (National Forests) started to undertake procedures to dispossess the local communities from their lands. Claming land rights, most people did not accept displacement, and they strongly resisted, which resulted in an endless quarrel between them and the Flona Tapajós administration. There had been some attempts to solve the community land issue in the Flona Tapajós area, but all had been unsuccessful due to disagreements on both sides. In 1996 PROMANEJO was promoting an additional attempt to resolve community land tenure conflicts, considered to be the main obstacle to the project's implementation (Fatheuer 1997).

This initial implementation of PROMANEJO took place at a time when National Forests stipulating the removal of local inhabitants were being reconsidered by environmental governmental agencies, to allow long-term resident communities to stay in the reserve. After some years of discussion, this change was put into legislation in 2000, when the National Congress approved the new version of the law that governs environmental reserves in Brazil (SNUC 2000). According to this new version, National Forests accepted the presence of communities recognized as "traditional people." Therefore, as "traditional people," the communities in the Flona Tapajós acquired legal recognition of their rights to remain in their lands twenty six years after the reserve's creation, and their areas of occupation were incorporated into the reserve's management plan.

Looking at this process in the Flona Tapajós, from initial government attempts to displace people to the change in legislation and the subsequent acceptance of "traditional

people" in the reserve's area, my initial intent in carrying out a study on this case was to understand the different rationales underlying the environmental reserve policies in both situations: the reserve's creation (1974), and the change in legislation (2000). In particular, I wanted to understand the importance of community resistance in precipitating this change in reserve policies, and how the social category of "traditional people" came to play a significant role in transforming the initial reserve's design to allow people to stay in the reserve area. Why had such an identification that had not been even claimed previously by the people been ascribed to them? What were the factors and interests (material and ideological) in the reserve's policies that converged in order to (re)shape such social and landscape units: *National Forest/traditional people*?

The reality I encountered in 1996 had shown itself to be complex and dynamic, indicating the need for solid theoretical tools to understand the course of these changes. However, the complexity was even greater when I arrived in the field in 2002, to initiate my research. There, I learned about the resurgence of indigenous ethnic identities among three communities: Taquara, Bragança and Marituba. Beginning with the Taquara community in 1998, these three communities undertook efforts to revitalize indigenous cultural traditions, and started to recognize themselves as belonging to the Mundurucu ethnicity.

By reclaiming their indigenous identities, which in Brazil gives them a special status and access to health, education, and land rights, these three communities demanded recognition of their land rights from FUNAI (*Fundação Nacional do Índio*), the Brazilian governmental agency for indigenous peoples. In response, FUNAI initiated procedures to demarcate these indigenous lands, and, consequently, the boundaries of the Flona

Tapajós have been in the process of being redefined once again. In the midst of this community land tenure resolution, the indigenous identity movement among these communities challenged again the official intent in relation to Flona Tapajós.

Yet, the indigenous identity movement challenged not only the government-defined arrangements, but also the way I was thinking about my research and seeking to understand the changes that were taking place in Flona Tapajós. It led to new questions, making me reevaluate the earlier versions of my research project. Primarily, why did these three communities take such a stand right in the middle of government efforts to incorporate the category of "traditional people" in reserve policies which would have allowed them to stay on their lands? What were the motivations underlying this movement to reclaim their indigenous identities, and what was its meaning in relation to the category of "traditional people" that was being used by external authorities to define them? Why did they not accommodate themselves to such a categorization and its associated rights?

These new questions emerged during my research at a time when my main concern was to understand what it meant to be "traditional people" in this new context of reserve policies, and how this social category had emerged as a condition for communities' presence in the reserve. Facing these new questions, my first impression was that this indigenous movement had unduly complicated the early version of my research project. However, further examination of the issue suggested that searching for responses to these questions might also help shed light on the social category of "traditional people" that had emerged in the National Forest reserve. Observing indigenous organization toward reinstating an ethnic identity, and how this articulation had promoted a means for they to

redirect the course of land tenure resolution in Flona Tapajós, I started to realize the close relation between community social identity and the successive definitions of the reserve's spaces.

By mapping out the different official identities attributed to these communities in the Flona Tapajós, and their corresponding spatial arrangements in the reserve, I was able to identify three main regions where spaces and social identities overlapped, which showed that the definitions of the reserve's spaces were dependent on the production of community social identity. Playing a key role in the reserve's spatial configuration, the production of community social identity, however, was revealed to be constituted of a remarkable field of disputes, epitomizing the main struggles between community people and governmental agencies responsible for the reserve's administration. This portrait pointed out the importance of this forest reserve not only in terms of forest resources exploitation, but also of social organizations.

The analysis that follows in the next chapters focused on community social identity as the critical issue in the definition of the Flona Tapajós' spatial composition. In Chapter 2, I discuss the main theoretical references employed to examine the changes of spaces and social identities precipitated by the creation and implementation of this forest reserve. Based on the existing literature, Chapter 3 focuses on historical antecedents that shaped the social and identity composition of the Lower Tapajós region, and more specifically the community people in Flona Tapajós. This chapter has two main objectives: 1) to point out the major historical events that since colonial times have taken place in the region, which caused profound alterations in the native socio-cultural and territorial organizations, and shaped the pattern of social organization and land

occupation found among these communities when the reserve was created; and, 2) to discuss the main social identity representations in the literature that have been attributed to this pattern of social and territorial organization, which was characterized as *caboclo*.

In Chapter 4, I also take a historical perspective, tracing the development of forest reserves known as National Forests, which were adopted by the Brazilian government in the late 1960s and, soon after, started to be implemented in the Amazon region, beginning with Flona Tapajós, created in 1974. Highlighting the historical antecedents of the category of National Forest, this chapter first focuses on the emergence of scientific forestry management in the late eighteenth century in Germany, which, later, decisively influenced the movement toward creating and implementing forest reserves in the United States in the late nineteenth century. The objective of the chapter is to show that the emergence of National Forests inaugurated a new model of forest administration, becoming the main instrument of state forest policies that later expanded to several countries. Although in Brazil the category of National Forest was adopted only in the late 1960s, concerns regarding forest reserves had been gradually incorporated in government policies since the beginning of the century. The second part of this chapter explores the development of Brazilian forest policies from the early 1900s to the early 1970s, when forest reserves were first implemented in the Amazon region to promote controlled timber exploitation.

The focus of analysis in Chapter 5 is the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós and the subsequent confrontations that emerged due to attempts to displace the community people whose lands overlapped with the reserve. First, this chapter looks at the creation of this forest reserve in the context of geo-political frontier expansion

implemented by the government in the late 1960s in the Amazon region. In doing so, I aim to clarify the government's stand in relation to this forest reserve and people's displacement from it. Second, the analysis focuses on people's resistance against such a government project, and their strategies for political articulation. The analysis was based on fieldwork data collected from community people; official documents, primarily surveys carried out by the IBAMA offices in Brasília and in Santarém; and interviews carried out with IBAMA employees and forest experts who were involved in the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós. In using these different sources of data, this chapter seeks to understand the emergence of this forest reserve in the broader socio-political context and explore the divergent positions between government and communities, which precipitated the ongoing disputes over resources, territory, and social identity.

Chapter 6 focuses on the efforts to redefine spaces and community social identity in Flona Tapajós, which coincided with the change in reserve policies to permit "traditional people" to live in National Forests. As in the previous chapter, this chapter also looks at the broader socio-political context, this time the late 1980s when the Amazon forest became the center of international environmentalists' concerns. I first seek to discuss the main political pressures that determined the course of environmental policies, and decisively influenced to change the government's relationship with community people, specifically the acceptance of their permanence in the reserve and recognizing them as "traditional people." I also discuss the development of the category of "traditional people," and its official adoption in Brazil in the 1990s, which originated in the encounter between social rights and environmentalist movements that first emerged in the Amazon

region in the middle 1980s. I follow this with an analysis of the significance of this change in Flona Tapajós for community people as well as for reserve policies, which not only established new parameters for and understandings of territory and forest resources, but also re-conceptualized community social identity. The analysis drew on data collected in the field among community people, interviews with governmental employees, and official documents.

In Chapter 7, I focus on the indigenous movement that emerged among the Taquara, Marituba, and Bragança communities, who reclaimed their indigenous ethnic identity by claiming to belong to Mundurucu ethnicity. Based on data collected from interviews and direct observation in these communities, this chapter seeks to show the main internal and external reasons that favored the emergence of this ethnic movement, and challenged government efforts to admit them in the reserve's area as "traditional people." The combination of both types of pressures led these communities to take old cultural references, and claim a different ethnic identity that implied a new form of social identification and reserve spatial composition.

Finally, in the conclusion, I summarize the main points discussed in each of these chapters and assess the achievements reached by the implementation of Flona Tapajós toward disciplining spaces, timber exploitation, and social relations.

1.2 The Research Undertaken

The research that supports this study was carried out at different moments beginning in 1996, when I had my first contact with the communities in Flona Tapajós and with the reserve's administration, and conducted a survey on community land occupation, resource use, and livelihood strategies. As indicated earlier, this survey was part of the "Pilot Program to Support the Forest Management in the Amazônia"

(PROMANEJO PPG-7), which supported efforts to demarcate an area for these communities. The activities of the PROMANEJO program in Flona Tapajós were conducted by IMAFLORA (*Instituto de Manejo e Certificação Florestal e Agrícola*), an NGO located in Piracicaba, in the state of São Paulo, which hired me to carry out the survey. In February 1996, IMAFLORA organized a workshop with several representatives from the communities, and from government and non-governmental organizations, to discuss the methodology to be applied in the survey. The fieldwork was carried out from March to April 1996, during which I visited most of the communities, and the results presented in a workshop in July.

Deciding to continue research on social conflicts in environmental reserves in the Amazon region, I entered the cultural anthropology program of the University of Florida in 1999, and started to define a dissertation research project. In June 2000, I returned to Santarém for a short-term visit to the communities in the Flona Tapajós, with the objective of updating my information and further elaborating the research proposal. The focus of this short-term fieldwork was community land tenure resolution, which had been underway since 1996. Spending a month and a half visiting five communities, I interviewed people who had key positions in the communities, such as representatives of associations and elderly people. Additionally, I interviewed IBAMA employees in Santarém and in Brasília, and representatives of non-governmental organizations, and carried out archival research.

In 2002, I returned to spend a year carrying out fieldwork, which involved collecting different types of data in different sites of inquiry. To conduct the research, I established three fields of investigation.

One was related to the State forest reserve policies, their historical development in Brazil, and the official procedures undertaken to define and implement Flona Tapajós. This field of investigation involved examining documents produced by state agencies related to the creation and maintenance of forest reserves, including laws, regulations, management plans, administrative process, technical cooperation programs, maps, reports, research, and economic projects. The documents were collected from federal government offices in Brasília (capital of Brazil, where most documents were located); at regional state offices in Belém (capital of Pará state, where Flona Tapajós is located); and local state offices in the municipality of Santarém. In addition to an extensive survey of these documents, I also carried out a series of in–depth interviews with the government representatives responsible for protected areas and environmental policies in Brazil, as well as with non-governmental forest experts who were involved in the creation of Flona Tapajós. In Flona Tapajós, I also visited the majority of research projects that were underway. These investigations were undertaken during the months of March, August and December 2002.

The second field of investigation was focused on the communities' stand with the objective to understand their perspectives regarding the creation of this forest reserve. Besides identifying the communities' socio-economic, political and religious structures, I also carried out interviews with people who had key positions in the communities, such as representatives of associations and elders, eliciting their perceptions on and their responses to the creation of the reserve. I gave special attention to the community resistance process, investigating their strategies for political actions that were undertaken through their associations, at the community level, and the Union of the Rural Workers

and other non-governmental agencies, at a regional level. In order to understand this process historically, I worked on oral histories with the most distinguished community agents who had conducted the resistance against displacement from the reserve.

I also mapped the main forms of community land occupation and productive activities, and interviewed people about their changing perceptions and use of forest resources, in order to compare their goals and concerns with the government objectives and management plans of the reserve. Thus, I sought to outline how the communities had used the resources historically and the changes they made in response to being in a National Forest area. With regards to the recent move to allow "traditional people" to reside in the reserve, I focused on the community development projects, their importance to the community social organizations and livelihood strategies, and people's responses to these projects. Finally, I carried out direct observation and in–depth interviews to understand people's social identification, focusing on people's perceptions about the different social identities that had been attributed to them.

The fieldwork among community people was carried out in two moments in 2002: April-July, and September-December. During this time, I selected three communities in which to spend larger periods of time. These were the communities of Piquiatuba, Maguary and Taquara, where I stayed one month each. I chose these three communities because of their geographical location, importance in terms of political resistance, and their location as places where most of the meetings held to solve the land tenure took place. Besides these characteristics, Taquara community was also chosen because of the indigenous movement that emerged there. Among other communities, my visits were shorter, varying from one to two weeks.

The third field of investigation was related to the environmental movement, specifically its discourses and practices that have provided material and ideological support for forest reserve policies, and more specifically for the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós. I analyzed documents of the main non-governmental agencies directly involved with the reserve's issues and carried out interviews with their representatives, as well as representatives of the multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, specifically those who worked on the Pilot Project (PPG-7) in the Flona Tapajós. In addition, I examined texts and documents produced by researchers at various research institutions that were directly or indirectly related to forest policies and that discussed concepts, methods and programs regarding the creation and maintenance of the forest reserves.

Besides investigations directly related to the research project, in 2003 I also carried out two studies on indigenous communities for FUNAI, and have included these data in my research.   The first survey, which I carried out as an "invited anthropologist" for a Working Group (GT), was conducted in May among indigenous communities located along the Arapiuns River, in the Lower Tapajós region. The second study was conducted in August-September, when I coordinated the GT to carry out studies to identify and demarcate indigenous lands of the three indigenous communities, Taquara, Bragança and Marituba, in order to proceed with their legal recognition.

CHAPTER 2
REMODELING FOREST SPACES AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

2.1 Environmental Reserves in the Amazon Region and Social Conflicts

2.1.1   The Emergence of National Forests in the Amazon Region

Although in Brazil there exists a discourse on the conservation of forest resources under the category of National Forests, it has a different connotation from, for example, the National Parks in which the whole area is designated for full-protection and the resources cannot be exploited. Both kinds of reserves are areas under State control, but, as will be seen throughout this dissertation, in Brazil, the primary objective of National Forests is the promotion of management for timber production, along with the protection of watersheds and rivers, and scientific research.

The creation of the Tapajós National Forest (Flona Tapajós) in 1974 represented the establishment of the first state environmental reserve in the Amazon region (see Figure 2.1). At that time, the only forest reserve previously created (in 1961) had not been implemented, and there was no other kind of state reserve in the region. Designated to promote timber production, the creation and implementation of the Flona Tapajós took place in the context of the Amazon frontier expansion policies that started to be undertaken by the military government in the beginning of the 1970s. These policies promoted the establishment not only of forest reserves for timber exploitation but also of several other reserves designated for full-protection, inaugurating for the first time an ample program of reserve policies envisioning a new rationale of forest resource exploitation and environmental conservation in the region.

Figure 2-1. Tapajós National Forest

Although in the south of Brazil forest reserves with analogous objectives had previously been established, it was not until the 1965 Forest Code, which replaced the previous code of 1934, that the term "National Forest" was first applied and defined in legislation. Despite its objective of promoting timber production, the category of National Forest, according to the 1965 Forest Code, was more broadly defined as public areas designated by the government for "economic, technical, or social purposes" (Law n° 4.771, September 15, 1965). This category of reserve could be implemented at the national level, as a National Forest, at the state level, as a State Forest, or at the local level, as a Municipal Forest.

The change that took place in forest legislation was followed by changes in the executive structure. Two years after the 1965 Forest Code was passed, in 1967 the federal government eliminated existing environmental agencies, and created the IBDF (Brazilian Institute of Forest Development), an agency under the Agriculture Ministry responsible for the elaboration, implementation, and administration of environmental policy programs, including the environmental reserves.[1] In 1979, the federal government elaborated the National System of Conservation Units (*Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação*-SNUC) in an attempt to reconceptualize and expand the categories of reserves.[2]

The SNUC categories of reserves were denominated "Conservation Units" (*Unidades de Conservação*), and were classified into two sets of reserves: those

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[1] Later, in 1989, IBDF was replaced by IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of the Environment and of Natural Resources).

[2] The National System of Conservation Units (SNUC) was only passed into law in 2000. More information in Chapter 6.

designated for "Indirect Use," which included National Parks, Biological Reserves, Ecological Station, and Ecological Reserves; and those designated for "Direct Use," which included the National Forests, and Areas of Environmental Protection. The first set of reserves was designated for full protection, which meant that any activity that alters or destroys the preservation of natural resources would be prohibited, and the second set was designated to bring together conservation with restricted economic activities. The configuration of these different categories of reserve implied distinctive objectives and strategies in terms of resource conservation and exploitation. The main objective established for the National Forests was to promote the management of forest resources, with an emphasis on timber production, along with scientific research and resource protection.

These government policies and programs would create the conditions for a significant expansion, beginning in the mid-1970s, of environmental reserves in the Amazon to promote conservation and management of forest resources. Starting in 1974, with the creation of the Flona Tapajós, on the lower Tapajós River, and the Amazônia National Park, in the upper Tapajós River, by ten years later the Amazon region would boast twenty-four federal environmental reserves —five National Parks, five Biological Reserves, twelve Ecological Stations, and two National Forests— covering an area of approximately 12 millions hectares (Ricardo and Capobianco 2001: 246-250).

This extensive program to create and implement the first environmental reserves in the Amazon region was organized under the same development plans that were instituted by the federal government for frontier expansion in the Amazon, which the military government began promoting in the late 1960s (Barretto 2001a; Schmink and Wood

1992, 1984; Foresta 1991; Guimarães 1991). As we will see below, through these frontier expansion policies the military pulled off the most ambitious and extensive government development program to incorporate the Amazon region into the national political economy (Schmink and Wood 1992; 1984; Browder 1988; Bunker 1985; Moran 1983; Hecht 1982; Mahar 1979; Goodland 1975).

2.1.2   Policies for Expanding the Amazon Economic Frontiers

State policies promoting the expansion of the Amazonian frontiers date back to the colonial times. Portuguese Crown policies to possess the region and to push the Amazon frontiers westward were marked by intense disputes, especially with the Spanish Crown. Later, soon after independence, the newly formed Brazilian State defeated the regional separatist movement, known as the *Cabanagem*, which had been trying to separate the Amazon region from the Brazilian political and territorial domain. The rubber boom in the late nineteenth century resulted in the expansion of territorial frontiers, with the creation of the state of Acre, a region that was taken from Bolivia at the beginning of the twentieth century, and with the incorporation of the Amazon economy into the national economy as rubber became Brazil's second export product (Oliveira 1983; Santos 1980).

The prompt decline of the Amazon rubber economy at the beginning of the twentieth century, followed by a small rubber boon during the World War II period, disrupted this process of incorporating the Amazon region into the national political economy. However, starting in the 1950s, the Brazilian government, based on the "national-developmentism" policies of the post-World War II period, started to promote policies to integrate the Amazon region. This was epitomized by the construction of the Belém-Brasília highway concluded in 1960, the same year the new capital, Brasília, was inaugurated.

Yet, despite these initial efforts, it was not until the early 1970s, with the Amazon frontier expansion policies under the military authoritarian regime, that the region came to be effectively incorporated into the national economy. As Becker (1992: 131-133) remarked, the discourse of national integration of Amazônia, first outlined in the 1950s, assumed a more elaborated form in the 1970s, when it "was promoted to maximum priority."[3] In 1970, the Program of National Integration (PIN) was created, promoting an ambitious colonization program and the implementation of an extensive network of roads and ports to facilitate the occupation of the spaces in the Amazon considered to be "empty." As Schmink and Wood (1992:71) noted, "the colonization program was impressive in scope and design." Seeking mainly to lessen the pressures for land reform in the South and Northeastern regions of the country, PIN was delineated to promote development and the establishment of 100,000 farmers in the Amazon region through colonization projects, to be administered by the Brazilian Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). To promote this occupation model, the federal government assumed control over the lands one hundred kilometers on either side of federal roads. This meant, for example, that the federal government controlled over 70 percent of the state of Pará, and the entire state of Acre.

PIN also promoted the improvement of the region's infrastructure, by building an extensive network of roads, port facilities, and airports. During this process of the occupation of the Amazon, the Transamazônica and Santarém-Cuiabá highways had fundamental strategic importance, interconnecting Brazil from east to west, and from south to north. Taking control over all lands lying one hundred kilometers on each side

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[3] All quotations reproduced from texts written in Portuguese, as well as the interviews carried out in this language, were translated by the author.

of these highways, the federal government established most of the colonization projects there. These two highways cross each other at the boundary between the municipalities of Itaituba and Santarém, in the state of Pará. It was not inconsequential that precisely at this location, where the Transamazônica and Santarém-Cuiabá highways cross each other, and thousands of people from various regions of the country were settled into colonization projects, that the Flona Tapajós was established.

In 1974, the Second Amazon Development Plan (PDMAII) replaced PIN, giving a new dimension to government projects in the Amazon region. Continuing the thrust of Amazon frontier expansion policies, PDMAII envisioned the implementation of fifteen economic growth poles called "*Poloamazônia*." Governed by a new and stronger bureaucratic structure, and providing infrastructure and credit and fiscal incentives to the private sector, the growth poles were based on a new political and economic rationality, which was the "redirect(ion of) public and private investment into areas deemed to have economic potential" (Schmink and Wood 1992: 78). Becker (1992: 133) remarked that, from that moment on, the government became more selective, no longer operating at a macro-regional scale but, instead, at a sub-regional scale.

The implementation of all these large projects demanded significant infrastructure to facilitate the installation of the mineral prospecting areas, transportation of production, and energy generation for the mineral processing units. Besides road construction, PDMAII also provided for the construction and modernization of ports and airports in the region, and the building of hydroelectric dams such as Tucuruí and Balbina. All of these economic undertakings significantly impacted the local economy and power relations. The traditional economy, which had been based on forest extractive activities, was

replaced by large-scale capitalist enterprises whose interests were located outside of the region, thereby displacing the local power structure.

The timber sector was similarly impacted. Regional timber production, as we will see later, was considered to be backward, disorganized, and unproductive. Envisioning the modernization of the regional timber industry, the wood sector was contemplated in the PDMA II through the *PoloTapajós* to be implemented in the Tapajós River Valley, as expressed in the "Development Policies for Forest Resources and Rational Use of the Amazônia Soils." Responding to an old claim for a strong and resourceful forest policy that favored the timber export, PDMA II sponsored an ample forest program providing not only fiscal incentives to the timber industry, but also the creation of National Forests in the Amazon region to promote timber exploitation, launched with the creation and implementation of the Flona Tapajós. The opening of new economic frontiers, wherein natural resources became a target for accelerated exploitation, not only re-shaped local social and economic relations, but also re-conceptualized the natural environment, producing areas of forest reserves and other regulations to discipline access to and control over forest resources.

At the same time that the federal government was implementing forest reserves for timber production in the Amazon region, it also established the first reserves designated for full-protection of forest resources. In the same year that Flona Tapajós was created, the federal government also created the first National Park in the Amazon region, also located in the Tapajós River Valley. As some scholars have emphasized, the environmental discourse and practice of the Brazilian State in the Amazon region have been remarkably closely associated with the economic development programs that were

implemented during the expansion policies of Amazon frontiers (Barretto 2001a; Foresta 1991; Guimarães 1991). Analyzing this relation between ecology and development, Guimarães (1991: 130-31) highlighted that "in this period most of the institutional structure to deal with resource management and environmental protection was set in motion," and it "was also the period in which the bulk of Brazilian environmental legislation was enacted."

2.1.3   Social Conflicts in Forest Reserves

"Up to 1974, when the Tapajós National Forest was created, the people here had a very tranquil life, working for their subsistence, planting their field crops, fishing, hunting. Suddenly, someone from IBDF came out saying that we could not work any more, we could not plant our field crops, we should not cut down the trees any more. He said that it was prohibited because a National Forest had been created in the area, which, from now on, was the nation's property… a National Forest that should not have any family residing inside it." With some variations, I heard versions like this regarding the creation of Tapajós National Forest (Flona Tapajós) from practically all the people I interviewed in each community I visited in 1996, when I first carried out a study on the eighteen communities whose lands overlapped with Flona Tapajós.

Listening to people's narratives about Flona Tapajós' creation, I learned about the severe disruptions caused by the reserve's implementation with regards to access to forest resources and common land rights they had developed over a long history of occupancy. As they explained to me, when Flona Tapajós started to be implemented, government attempts to displace people provoked a strong community reaction, and many refused to be removed from their lands. Organizing via the Union of the Rural Workers, community people strongly fought not only to remain on their land, but also to maintain

access and control over their area and the resources they saw as enough to meet their needs. One of the community actions was to demarcate, in 1984, the boundaries of the area they were claiming.

It was not only forced displacement that the government tried to impose on communities, but also restrictions to access to forest resources, the source of their livelihood needs. They were prevented from planting field crops in the most central forest areas, as well from hunting game. According to several people, government employees justified the creation of Flona Tapajós, and the attempts to displace people and to restrict resource, "because it was to protect the forest." Expressing resentment, the people frequently pondered: "Why did they create a National Forest to protect the forest? We have been here forever, as were our grandfathers and great-grandfathers, and we never damaged the forest. This forest still exists because we have been here protecting it."

As I carried out this study, I learned for the first time about the social conflicts over the creation and implementation of environmental reserves in the Amazon region starting in the 1970s. Perhaps from a naïve viewpoint, I had not thought beforehand about environmental protection areas as promoting such extensive social conflicts. Rather, I had seen them as places in which government efforts were undertaken to promote nature conservation. It was remarkable to realize, from the Flona Tapajós case, the extent of social conflicts in rural areas that may have been created as a result of the implementation of environmental reserves in the Amazon region.

The social conflicts in Flona Tapajós did not take place in isolation. Rather, analogous conflicts emerged in most reserves that were created during the 1970s and

1980s in the Amazon region. Although these reserves followed regulations that prohibited the presence of residents inside the reserves' boundaries, regardless of the differences in conservation and resource exploitation purposes, the majority of these reserves overlapped with territories of a huge number of social groups who, according to legislation, had to be removed from the reserve's area. Despite the fact that the creation of these reserves implied their displacement, local people had not had any participation in designing the reserve proposal (Moreira et al. 1996:12), and, as in the Flona Tapajós case, they came to know about its creation only when the government initiated efforts to displace them.

One of the most notorious cases of forced displacement of long-term residents due to the encroachment of reserve boundaries took place among the Afro-Brazilian communities, known as '*Remanescentes de Comunidades de Quilombo,*' [4] whose territory was superposed by the limits of the Trombetas Biological Reserve (Trombetas REBIO), created in 1979, in the state of Pará (Acevedo and Castro 1994). The most restrictive reserve, in terms of the conservation of natural resources, the Trombetas REBIO was responsible for the displacement of several families from their lands, and for cutting their access to resources for their livelihood needs. "Literally, the Biological Reserve took possession over the sources for living production: the fish in the lakes, rivers and tributaries, the seeds and fruits collected in the forest, the vines and the straw to cover houses and make handicrafts, and the wood to fabricate canoes" (Acevedo and Castro 1994: 209).

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[4] *Remanescentes das Comunidades de Quilombos* (Descendents of *Quilombos* Communities) is an historical category to designate the descendants of slaves who escaped to remote places where they founded the *quilombos*. In 1988, the new Brazilian Constitution recognized the legal status of the areas of *Remascentes de Comunidades de Quilombos* (Art. 68), bestowing rights to the *quilombola* people on their territories.

Jaú National Park, created in 1980, and the Anavilhanas Ecological Station, created in 1981, both in the state of Amazonas, also engendered disputes with peasant communities, as Barretto (2001a) showed in his dissertation on the creation and establishment of these two reserves. In these situations, however, people's displacement was not as significant, though that was not the case for restrictions on access to resources. Later, in the 1990s, the Jaú Park changed the relation between the park and the people, "involving the local traditional riverine people in [the reserve's] plan" (FVA 1991: 11, op. cit.: 476), in spite of park legislation. Although there are poorly documented records, most environmental reserves in the Amazon region, both the fully-protected and those for direct use, faced the dilemma of human presence, as was discussed in the "International Seminar about the Presence of Human Population in Protected Areas," which took place in Brasília, in November 1996 (Moreira et al. 1996).

The creation of these reserves brought about a new reality for the people living in those regions: they no longer controlled their territories according to historically constituted relationships, but rather, as federal reserves, it was the State that defined the laws that would regulate the areas' occupation and resource exploitation. This direct State intervention in these areas, through the creation and implementation of these reserves, redefined the rights and means for their appropriation, redefining territorial boundaries in a biased manner that was notably against communities' interests. As a resident from Flona Tapajós area expressed: *from now on, it was the nation's property… a National Forest that should not have any family residing inside it.*

2.2 State Control over Forest Resources and Social Relations

2.2.1   People's Representation in State Planning

Although forest reserve areas under State domain and control have been implemented only recently in the Amazon region, they are not a new phenomenon in terms of reassigning access to forest resources and as a source of social conflicts in rural areas. Early in modern Europe, forests were also remarkable fields of disputes between conflicting conceptions on forest rights, as E.P. Thompson (1975) demonstrated in his examination of the "The Origin of the Black Act" sanctioned in England in 1723, which made deer stalking in disguise at night or cutting down young trees in royal forests offenses subject to the death penalty. In his analysis, E.P. Thompson exposed how 18th century British society battled to redefine the domain and control of the forests, as revealed in the multifaceted struggles over access to its resources that followed the enclosures. Converting certain customary peasant uses of forest resources and game into crimes, the implementation of the Black Act revealed, in fact, attempts to impose a new forest economy by adding new modes of appropriation of the resources and new economic values, and, in the process, breaking down old communal rights over forest areas.

A century later France experienced a similar process with the implementation of the 1827 National Forest Code, which, as Sahlins (1994: X) pointed out, "systematically restricted forest use-rights essential to their [peasants] agricultural and pastoral way of life." Analyzing the peasant resistance movement against such restrictions, whose protagonists played out the drama that came to be known as "the war of the demoiselles," Sahlins also revealed a society undergoing changes in the conception of forest rights and exploitation, refashioning a new forest economy at the expense of old customary uses. In

both cases, in England as well as in France, "Forest conflict was, in origin, a conflict between users and exploiters" (Thompson 1975: 245), between those who had the forest as a source for reproducing cultural and economic lifestyles and those who saw the forest as a source for economic accumulation. Peasant resistance in both cases tried to restore previous access to forested areas, which was being undermined by the inexorable transformations that impinged on old forest rights and resource exploitation by new political and economic relations.

The creation and implementation of environmental reserves in the Amazon region beginning in the mid-1970s also represented an imposition of a new model of forest administration that confronted customary uses of forest resources, generating severe social conflicts. Despite the scope of these social conflicts, there is little knowledge on the dynamics of particular cases. The little that has been written has focused on the conflicts in fully-protected reserves, such as National Parks, Biological Reserves or Ecological Stations (Barretto 2001a; Diegues 1998; Acevedo and Castro 1994). There is practically nothing written about conflicts in National Forests, though records register the encroachment of this type of reserve on territories of various social groups practically everywhere where they have been implemented (Ricardo and Capobianco 2001). Existing studies on National Forest policies have generally overlooked the issues regarding social conflicts in these reserves.

Notwithstanding the absence of studies on these cases, the social conflicts generated by the attempts of outright expulsion from the National Forests, such as in the case of Flona Tapajós, reveal the enormity of the disputes between governmental spheres responsible for forest policies and local people, especially peasant societies. Currently, at

IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of the Environment and of Natural Resources) offices, the measures taken to remove people from the National Forest's areas have been considered mistakes, outcomes of governmental misconception regarding reserve administration. Once, when I asked an IBAMA employee about the initial governmental attempts to displace people from Flona Tapajós, he just answered: "It was absurd." In answer to the same question, another employee, who worked at IBDF at the time Flona Tapajós was created, said: "It was imprudent, but it was the effect of that political moment. We did not know anything about the existence of these people in Amazônia. We just knew that the region was an empty place."

The (false) projection of the Amazon region as an empty place, concealing local forms of social organizations, especially peasant groups, is well discussed in the academic literature. In his book, "*Amazonian Caboclo Society: An Essay on Invisibility and Peasant Economy,*" Nugent (1993) presented an interesting analysis on the Amazonian peasants known as "*Caboclos,*" underlining the historical process that concealed the organization of these regional social groups, who the author called "neo-Amazonians." As the author remarked, "Generally speaking, such societies as have emerged in the interstices of colonial apparatus have never been granted full status as integral social forms" (p. XXI).

Based on fieldwork carried out in the municipality of Santarém, in the Lower Tapajós, the same region this dissertation focuses on, Nugent (1993) discussed the perceptions drawn on Amazon peasants in political or academic spheres. According to him, Amazonian peasants known as *caboclos* have been continuously misrepresented through stereotypes that devalue their social organizations and, as a result, have isolated

them from the benefits of local development policies. The author asserted that in spite of the unprecedented attention to the Amazon region in recent years, Amazon peasants "are not entirely overlooked, but when present they are almost always in the background, heavily shaded by larger, natural features. They are viewable, but rarely viewed… neo-Amazonians are more often depicted as 'populations', migratory trends or inhabitants rather than integral members of real societies" (Nugent 1993: 20).

The main focus of Nugent's analysis was to understand the reasons underlying what he understood as virtual "invisibilities" projected onto Amazon rural populations, reflected in both state policies and Amazonian academic research. Nugent pointed to these invisibilities as being fundamentally rooted in the image projected of Amazônia as a "natural domain in which society is intrusive" (1993: 20), and to a sort of pathology attributed to *caboclos*. He argued that *caboclos* are generally seen as having a kind of *lost link* between civilization and nature, with no ties to their pre-colonial societies and unable to build a new social organization. The author remarked that Amazônia has been portrayed by the West as a universe in which society has been continuously subordinated to nature, while waiting for external and decisive intervention to domesticate it and to replace what are considered *pathological social relations*. According to Nugent (1993: 32), "the creation of modern Amazônia involved the eradication of Amazonian societies and the emergence of Amazônia as primarily a natural space."

For Nugent (1993), the consequences of this discourse of the Amazon, which repeatedly was reinforced by images emphasizing nature's dominance over society, have endorsed "social invisibilities," especially with regards to Amazon peasants. Understanding that such an invisibility is reflected in many national and international

interests, especially economic interests, he pointed out the use of arguments about

"scarcity" of resources and the "global good." As a repository of relatively cheap natural

resources, many of which have been exhausted in other places, Amazônia became a focus

of attention for large-scale entrepreneurs, as well as for environmentalists, with state and

multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, as the most articulate voices. According

to the author, for both environmentalists and donors/investors, Amazonian peasants have

been of marginal interest, and thus kept *off the agenda*. From the environmentalist

perspective, Amazonian peasants have been considered as unable to manage the forest

without destroying it. And, "from the point of view of these large-scale forms of

extraction, Amazonian peasants are at best an irrelevance, hence it is not surprising to

find that they are ignored" (Nugent 1993: 36).

By highlighting how Amazon social groups identified as *caboclo* have been

disqualified as beneficiaries of environmental and development programs, Nugent (1993)

accurately pointed toward the need to rethink the ways in which they have been

represented in academia and by political spheres. The analysis developed by Nugent

represents the most innovative approach to the construction of the category of *caboclo,*

by pointing out the power mechanisms that sustain the repetitive misrepresentation of

Amazonian peasant groups, and the political and economic implications as reflected in

official policies. These can be seen in the case of the communities in Flona Tapajós,

especially during the initial phase of the reserve's implementation, when the government

attempted to displace people. Identified as *caboclos*, these people were also

misrepresented as *squatters*, *occasional occupants* or, even, *intruders*, categories which

ignored or removed any attachments people might have to the land or to a complex social

organization. In the reserve's reports of that period, the communities are frequently

described as "deprived of knowledge about soils" and other activities related to forest

resources.

However, insofar as Nugent's analysis sheds lights on the reasons underlying the

persistent misrepresentations of these Amazonian social groups, the notion of

"invisibility" presents some constraints for analyzing the social conflicts in Flona

Tapajós. The notion of "invisibles" would lead us to understand the social conflicts

caused by the government's attempts to displace people as an outcome of a government

mistake that disregarded them in the reserve's project. Consequently, the change in

legislation permitting "traditional people" to remain in National Forests, and

incorporating community land occupancy into reserve planning, would be understood as

a rectification of initial governmental misconstruction. However, as the emergence of the

indigenous movement among the three communities in Flona Tapajós demonstrates, this

explanation would not elucidate why the social conflicts were not resolved after this

change in legislation had taken place.

The three moments in which forest spaces and social identities were redefined in

Flona Tapajós suggest a more complex process, whose understanding cannot be reached

by the notion of "invisibility." If these communities had been "invisible" to the State,

and neglected in the reserve's planning, the government would not have undertaken such

enormous efforts to displace the people from the area, nor delayed to such an extent to

revert its position, in spite of strong community resistance. Instead, the government

attempted to apply several forms of coercion and restrictions on forest resource access in

order to force the people's removal. This indicated that, in this process, the community

people were not "invisible" or neglected but, rather, that they and their displacement from the area were the target of state planning policies to control forest spaces and social relations. As Malkki (1995: 496) asserted: "Involuntary or forced movements of people are always only one aspect of much larger constellations of sociopolitical and cultural process and practices."

Thus, I analyze the attempts of people's displacement as being an explicit government strategy to control people and spaces, and not because they were "invisible" in the eyes of the government, as Nugent (1994) would argue. Therefore, the government's acceptance, later on, of the local communities in the reserve as "traditional people" cannot be understood as reflecting a minor adjustment. Rather, in the face of community resistance, this acceptance on the part of government was as a strategy to continue to exert control over spaces and social relations. In the same way, I analyze the indigenous movement that emerged in reserve as reflecting people's resistance to these new forms of social and spatial control, embedded in the category of "traditional people" that was imposed by the government.

2.2.2   Modeling the Utopian Dream of the State Modernization Project

It was in reading James Scott's book "Seeing like a State" (1998) that I first started to think about the creation and implementation of the Tapajós National Forest, among other environmental reserves created in the Amazon region beginning in the mid-1970s, as a process of social and natural landscape reconfiguration driven by State governmental planning. Analyzing the implementation and failures of other governmental programs of social engineering that had significant social and environmental impacts —such as collectivization in Russia, the building of modern cities like Brasília, and the creation of compulsory villages in Tanzania— Scott demonstrated how social and landscape

transformations are promoted by state planning policies, or, as he says, "how thoroughly

society and the environment have been refashioned by the state map of legibility" (1998:

3).

By "state map of legibility," the author has in mind the processes by which the state

simplifies nature and society, by trying to fit them into standardized categories that better

adjust to the state cadastral map. These state simplifications, Scott remarked, not only

reduce social realities into a more legible and convenient format for administrative

actions, but "when allied with state power, …enable much of the reality they depicted to

be remade. Thus, a state cadastral map created to designate taxable property-holders

does not merely describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system through its

ability to give its categories the force of law" (Scott 1998: 3).

Exploring the foundation of modern statecraft, Scott highlighted that governance by

the modern state depends on simplified and standardized units that the state can service

and administer. This dependence derives from the need of the modern state to act for

complex and multifaceted social organizations, and modes of resource and spatial

appropriation, which in the eye's of the state look like a cacophony: "The nightmare is

experienced not by those whose particular practices are being represented but by those

state officials who aspire to a uniform, homogenous, national administrative code" (Scott

1998: 35). Therefore, in order to make administrative actions potentially more operable

and to be able to exert control, i.e. to be able to govern, the modern state calls for

dismembering complex social and spatial relations and reshaping them into simple and

uniform units that can be more easily manipulated and controlled. "To the degree that the

subjects can be treated as standardized units, the power of resolution in the planning exercise is enhanced" (Scott 1998: 346).

Scott's perspective was elaborated precisely from the invention of scientific forestry in late eighteenth-century Germany, which, as will be seen in Chapter 4, came to form the basis for forestry schools and National Forests worldwide. Although recognizing its importance in historical terms, Scott, however, treats the invention of scientific forestry as a metaphor. Thus, placing the emergence of scientific forestry in the context of centralized state-making initiatives of the period, when officials became aware of the risk of shortage of wood and the need for more efficient instruments for forest control and planning, Scott pointed out the successive and more precise methods of forest measurements that were developed and gave the forest "legibility." Such legibility allowed state officials not only to exert control over forest resources, but also to manipulate tree species according to economic interests.

The standardizing techniques and utilitarian viewpoint of that moment favored monocropped forest management for the sake of economic productivity, precluding the natural forest that had greater diversity but was less profitable in monetary terms. Additionally, the development of scientific forestry promised substantial compensation for centralized forest management. As Scott (1998: 18) asserted, this "controlled environment of the redesigned,[5] scientific forest promised many striking advantages. It could be synoptically surveyed by the chief forester; it could be more easily supervised and harvested according to centralized, long-range plans; it provided a steady, uniform commodity, thereby eliminating one major source of revenue fluctuation; and it created a

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[5] Scott informed in an endnote (note 16, p. 360) that he adopted the term "redesigned" from C. Maser's book, "The Redesigned Forest" (1988).

legible natural terrain that facilitated manipulation and experimentation." That was the *utopian dream* of scientific forestry for a "perfectly legible forest planted with same-aged, single-species, uniform trees" (Scott 1998: 82).

Thus, applying this perspective of a rationalized and homogeneous forest, with straight rows of uniform trees in large tracts and free of underbrush, Scott unveiled the rationale of modern statecraft in relying on standardization and simplification, essential to the practice of scientific forest management. Just as scientific forestry reduced complex habitats by implementing uniform and replicated units that could be abstracted from reality and expressed in standardized categories, the state modernization project relied on deconstructing complex social and spatial relations and reshaping them into simplified and standardized units, which "will be easiest to monitor, count, assess, and manage" (Scott 1998: 81-2). As the object and instrument of modern state planning, the modeling of simplified and standardized social and landscape units affords legibility and amenability required by state officials.

This synchronized optic of the modern statecraft developed by Scott is evocative of the panoptical modality of power in Foucault's Discipline and Punish (1995). To explain this panoptical modality of power, Foucault took the example of a modern invention that reproduces the homogenization rationale on social and spatial relations underlying the power structures in contemporary western society. The example was Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon prison project, whose architectural structure consisted of a large circular building wherein the prisoners were housed in small individual cells around the circumference of the circle, with an observation tower at the center of the building from

which all cells could be monitored. Just as with scientific forestry, this prison archetype also promised to maximize observation and control through a synchronized optic.

Like the invention of scientific forestry, the panopticon prison project was also used as a laboratory for the design of disciplinary techniques for homogenizing and standardizing spaces and individual behaviors. Foucault (1995: 218) defined the disciplines as specific "techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicity," and applied his panoptical concept of power to the entire social body, that is, to all society's power apparatuses. Thus, this concept of power was not understood as a separate entity, localized in a specific part of the social structure or appropriated by somebody in particular, but rather, was found distributed and exercised at various levels throughout the social chain, not only those pertaining to the State.

Scott, by contrast, applied his perspective on power specifically to the State, which was disseminated through its administrative apparatus as a way to ensure governance. Differently from Foucault, who was concerned in disclosing the *effects of truth that this power produces*, Scott was concerned with revealing the main hindrances that have occurred in contemporary times to great modern government planning, which systematically attempts to deconstruct complex social and spatial relations, and to reshape them into simplified and centralized units.

Thus, Scott's analysis is about a utopian pursuit of perfect state control over spaces and social relations. According to him, this utopian pursuit is moved by a "high-modernist ideology," which he defined as a set of beliefs about scientific and technical progress, and "above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws… It originated, of course, in the West, as a by-

product of unprecedented progress in science and industry" (Scott 1998: 4). Underlining

the need to distinguish high modernism ideology from scientific practice, the author

pointed out that, "high modernism was about *interests* as well as faith" (Scott 1998: 4,

emphasis in the original), thus it was about utopia. The combination of a strong legibility

stratagem with the motivation of high-modernist ideology, shaped the *utopian dream* of

state modernization for administrative interventions and social engineering aspirations.

2.2.3   Disciplinary Practices Toward Forest Spaces and Social Organizations

Scott's analysis of state planning offers a stimulating framework for understanding

the introduction of forest reserves in the Amazon region and the social conflicts that

emerged from this process, of which Flona Tapajós is a part. As will be seen in the next

chapters, the conceptualization and planning of these reserves followed an extensive

program based on rigorous scientific criteria, developed through technical cooperation

with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The program

reinforced scientific and technological premises, which underlined Brazil's military geo-

political project. Thus, pursuing, in Scott's (1998) terms, the *utopian dream of the*

visionary state modernization project, the conceptualization and planning of the forest

reserves followed a high-modernist ideology to impose a "rational planning" of forest

resource exploitation.

In that way, constituting an object and an instrument of the state's modernization

project for the Amazon region, the designation of vast areas as environmental reserves,

with similar and centralized administrative characteristics, reflected those simplified and

homogenized mechanisms Scott identified in the modern state's efforts to exert control

over spaces and social relations. As part of the disciplinary practices used to impose a

new socio-economic and environmental orderliness, the introduction of these forest

reserves in the Amazon region remodeled the forest spaces into categories that could be managed and controlled from central offices. Thus, comprising the strategies that underlined the geo-political project for territorial control of the Amazon, the creation and implementation of forest reserves provided a sophisticated instrument to synoptically exert control over vast areas of forest in the region.

Applying Scott's analytical framework, one can view the Brazilian government's initial attempts to displace people, as in the case of Flona Tapajós, as a strategy to impose social and spatial control. The complex social organization and multiples uses of forest resources of local communities challenged the government proposal to reshape forest spaces into a simplified category of forest reserve. They also challenged the proposal to promote modernization and specialization of forest industry production. Therefore, to convert forest spaces into the category of reserve and ensure the federal government exclusive access over vast areas of forest, necessitated not only the transformation of these forests into administrative units but also the withdrawal of local people, thus, dismembering complex community social and spatial relations. In this manner, the federal government could liberate the reserve from complex intertwined community relations with the land, which, as Scott (1998: 39) discussed, is critical for modern state planning's imposition of "a propriety system in line with its fiscal grid."

Thus, approaching the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós as reflecting disciplinary practices for territorial and social control allows us also to assess the resistance movements that emerged among local people against such a government project. Viewing people's resistance as a challenge to *the utopian dream of the state modernization projects*, Scott (1998: 49) asserted that "we must keep in mind not only

the capacity of state simplifications to transform the world but also the capacity of society to modify, subvert, block, and even overturn the categories imposed upon it."

As previously indicated, in Flona Tapajós one can identify two types of resistance movements that emerged. The first was local people's reaction against the categories of "squatters," "occasional occupants," or "intruders," which were attributed to them when the reserve's initial proposal was to remove them from the area. This local reaction led to the change in legislation that subsequently permitted their presence in the reserve as "traditional people." The second type of resistance movement that emerged was represented by the recognition, among three communities, as having an indigenous identity, and their rejection of the category of "traditional people" attributed to them as a condition for them to remain in the reserve. In both of these types of resistance movements —against being categorized, in the first case, as *squatter* or *occasional occupants,* and, in the second case, as *traditional people*— one sees community people reacting against government attempts to reduce them into categories that were defined by central planning.

However, different from Scott's perspective, I see these resistance movements in Flona Tapajós as more than simply counter-reactions to failures in the state modernization project to recognize them in the initial planning of the reserve. Alluding to the frustration underlying the *utopian dream of scientific forestry* —which disregarded the symbiotic relation among the various elements in nature, seen as hindering the promised results— Scott (1998) attributed the main hindrances to government programs of social engineering to administrative inappropriateness coming from the over-simplification present in the visionary map of state planning, which tends to ignore the

diversity of local social realities. Such understanding would also lead us to explain the conflicts in Flona Tapajós, generated by the attempts to displace the local people from the reserve, as an outcome of the administration's ignorance of local social organizations, and, as such, not elucidating the continuation of them even after the change in legislation that allowed the permanence of community people in the reserve.

By reducing the role of the State to its administrative actions, Scott's analysis also tends to obfuscate the relative importance of other agencies, other than the administrative apparatus, that might also have an influence on the objectives and design of a state project. In addition to local people's resistance, the history of Flona Tapajós demonstrates the importance of the complex interplay among local, national and international governmental and non-governmental agencies, such as the Pilot Program (PPG-7). Although Scott asserted that high-modernism is about "interests," he did not assess how these multiple interests converge and interact to (re)shape social and landscape units, as in the case of Flona Tapajós. In a review of Scott's book, Mann (2001: 1814-15) also pointed out that "Scott exaggerates the independence of the state," and ignores economic interests that run state project planning, as well as the multiple facets that comprise state composition, thereby, overlooking the fact that "even opponents of high modernism inhabit states."

Even though the goals of modern statecraft are identifiable in the Flona Tapajós project, Scott's emphasis on a moderating and coherent state runs the risk of limiting the analysis and ignoring the dynamics of the power relations present in the reserve's creation and implementation, and, especially, with regard to community social identities. As such, the change in National Forest legislation permitting "traditional people" in these

types of reserves, and the indigenous social movements to reclaim an ethnic identity, will

be examined, in the way Foucault (1995: 308) suggests, as an "effect and instrument of

complex power relations," wherein different cultural systems, grassroots organizations,

environmental discourses, economic interests, state and multilateral agency ideologies

and apparatuses interact.

CHAPTER 3
CHANGING SPACES AND NATIVE SOCIAL IDENTITIES IN THE LOWER
TAPAJÓS REGION

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1   Days of Enchantment

It was early June 2002, when I was visiting the Maguari community that we started

to hear comments about the appearance of *"Cobra Grande"* (literally "Big Snake"). It

was said that it had been appearing to some people near the Aramanaí bay, approximately

two hours down the Tapajós River by boat. By then, I had heard several versions from

people who had either seen the *"Cobra Grande,"* or had been involved in different

incidents with this enchanted being (*Encantado*) that lives under the water, but it was the

first time that the local people were experiencing such a phenomenon while I was in the

field. In general, the community's people seemed to be a little apprehensive when talking

about the appearance of *Cobra Grande*, and every story had new information to add to

the occurrence. Some people were afraid of seeing *Cobra Grande* in the river, like Maria

and Madalena,[1] who decided to walk four hours to Belterra to get a bus to Santarém,

instead of taking the boat as they usually would have done.

Cobra Grande was described as a huge snake, with red eyes and a pair of horns on

its forehead, and its appearance that week stimulated recollections of many other similar

accounts that made incredulous people doubt their skepticism about the existence of

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[1] All cited names of community people and official employees who did not hold a position of trust are
fictitious in order to protect their privacy. The only real names are those from officials who were in charge
in an authoritative position.

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Cobra Grande. Pedro, the son-in-law of my host family, was one who had had these

kinds of doubts. Yet, that week, he went with his small boat (called a *rabeta*) to pick up

his uncle, who was coming from Santarém, and when they were coming back, the bottom

of the boat crashed into something underwater that they could not see, almost making the

boat sink. They arrived home very tense; they were quite sure they had crashed into

Cobra Grande. Pedro's uncle was very pale and, after telling us about the crash, he

asked me if he could borrow my camera to take a picture of *Cobra Grande* in case it

appeared in the river that night. Pedro, on the other hand, was very quiet, and when I

asked him about the incident he said that he did not want to talk about it at that moment.

The following day he came to see me and said: "Edviges, now I can talk to you about

what happened yesterday. Look, I'm not saying that I don't believe that *Cobra Grande*

exists, but I don't think that we crashed into it yesterday. I think we crashed into a

treetop" (which stay submersed during the rainy season when the river is rising). Pedro

said that he had gone back early that morning where they had crashed, to reassure himself

about what had occurred.

Tereza, a forty-five-years old woman, however, was much more confident that

Cobra Grande existed. When I was talking with her about the appearance of *Cobra

Grande* she said that she was quite sure that this *Cobra Grande* was '*dona*[2] Ivardina.'

"Who is *dona* Ivardina?" I asked her. She told me that Ivardina was a woman who lived

in Aramanai, and, when she was around forty years old she started to behave in a strange

way. Irvadina used to walk around with a pile of firewood in her arms for days, day after

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[2] *Dona* is a term of reverence used before a married woman's name or before an older single woman's name. It implies respect and courtesy. For men, the term is *seu* (*seu* Pedro). It is equivalent in English to mistress or lady; and mister to men.

day. One day she disappeared completely, and her family searched for her for weeks but they could not find any sign of her. Tereza said that it happened about thirty years ago, and Irvardina's family decided, at that time, to see Saulo, a famous healer from Taquara community, who later died in 1998. According to Tereza, Saulo confirmed that Ivardina had been enchanted, and he instructed Ivardina's family how to perform the disenchantment. He said that a member of Ivardina's family needed to go to a fountainhead at midnight and wait for a big alligator to emerge. The person there did not need to be afraid, and when the alligator emerged he had to strike a piece of wood against the alligator's forehead. "But, you know Edviges," commented Tereza, "no one from Irvadina's family had the courage to do that." Saulo had said that this disenchantment had to be carried out no later than eight years [from the time she disappeared], because this was the amount of time she would stay alive if she had not been enchanted yet. After eight years, Ivardina would stay enchanted forever." She concluded the story, saying: "if it had been me, I would not have been afraid and I would have gone there to beat the alligator. But nobody did, and Ivardina became enchanted forever. That is why I am sure that this *Cobra Grande* is *dona* Ivardina. Saulo had said that if she were not disenchanted, so many things would start happening and Ivardina would come back to get someone from her family to take back to the city where she has lived since then. Last year a big alligator appeared over here; it was so big that it did not seem to be a normal alligator. Now, this *Cobra Grande*. I am sure it is *dona* Ivardina. She is looking for someone to take with her."

* * * * *

The Maguari community is the second village in the Flona Tapajós, going from north to south. It is located in a very pretty place along the Tapajós River, where in the

summer (August to January), when the rainy season ends, its sky-blue waters contrast beautifully with the white, thin sand of the beaches that emerge as the waters go running down to meet the muddy Amazon River in front of Santarém city. At a distance of two hours by boat from Santarém, the black waters of the Arapiuns River enter into the Tapajós River in front of the Alter do Chão bay, enlarging the riverbed to thirteen kilometers (6.2 nautical miles). The immensity of the waters that cover this vast area surrounded by a dense tropical forest[3] has been the site not only of enchanted places — inhabited by supernatural beings who interact with human beings, influencing people's behaviors— but also of successive socio-political events that since colonial times significantly altered native socio-cultural organizations and their respective territories. The story of *Cobra Grande* and her enchanted fellow-beings that took place in Maguari village illustrates this transformation in native culture, which led to "the blurring of ethnic boundaries in much of present-day Amazonian culture" (Slater 2002: 69).

This chapter takes a brief look at the main historical events responsible for these socio-cultural changes in the Lower Tapajós region (see Figure 3.1). In presenting a historical perspective, I have two main objectives: 1) to point out the major events that since colonial times have transformed the native social and spatial compositions in the region, and shaped the pattern of socio-cultural organization and land occupation of the communities whose territories were encroached by the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós; and 2) to perceive the representations in the literature on this pattern of socio-cultural and territorial organization, which was a target to be again altered with the implementation of this reserve project from the middle 1970s.

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[3] Although tropical forest predominate the region, some areas, especially around Alter do Chão, are covered by typical savanna vegetation, called *cerrado* in Brazil.

Figure 3-1. Tapajós National Forest in the region of the lower Tapajós River

3.1.2 Overview on the Santarém Region

The municipality of Santarém is located in the southwestern region of the state of Pará, an area categorized by IBGE[4] as a micro-region of the Middle *Paraense* Amazon (*microregião do Médio Amazonas Paraense*), but more commonly known as the Lower Amazon. The territorial extension of the municipality originally encompassed 26,058 km^2. In 1987, it was reduced to create the municipality of Ruropólis, located alongside the Transamazônica highway. Santarém, the municipality's central city and the second most important city of the state of Pará, is located between Belém, the state's capital, and Manaus, the capital of the state of Amazonas. These three Amazonian cities, connected by the Amazon River, were founded during the Portuguese colonization of the region. The mouth of the Tapajós River, which is formed by the Teles Pires and Juruena Rivers that originate in the state of Mato Grosso, constituted the main entrance to central Brazil.

Santarém was founded on the site of an Indian village whose people were identified as Tapajó, the name bestowed to the river that flows past it. With its location at the confluence of the Tapajós with the Amazon River, Santarém has stood as an important commercial port between the two major Amazonian cities, Belém and Manaus, and throughout its history has been an important political and economical center of the Amazon region. In his book on Santarém's history, A.C. Ferreira Reis (1979: 158), a renowned scholar of Amazonian history and distinguished politician,[5] highlighted that "Santarém, as an active center of commercial enterprise on the Tapajós, benefited

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[4] IBGE (*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*/ Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) is the governmental agency responsible for collecting demographic, social, and economic census data.

[5] Arthur Cezar Ferreira Reis published several books on Amazonian history. He was a professor at the University of Rio de Janeiro, the University Fluminense (Rio de Janeiro), and the Fundação Getúlio Vargas. He was also the first Superintendent of the Economic Valorization Plan for Amazônia (SPVEA), created in 1952; Deputy for Amazonas State; and state governor just after the military coup in 1964.

intensively from its geographic position, representing, for this reason, one of the best economic situations of all the vast Amazonian interior." When the British naturalist Henry W. Bates visited the region in 1851, he viewed Santarém as "the most civilized and important settlement on the banks of the main river from Peru to the Atlantic" (1962: 208), although he noted that it did not have more than 2,500 people.

At that time, Santarém was described as comprising two areas: the urban nucleus, where white people, who consisted basically of merchants,[6] and government representatives lived; and, next to the urban center, the "*Aldeia,*" an indigenous settlement, which today is a neighborhood (*bairro*) in the center of the city. Although this division of the city was described in most accounts by the chroniclers who visited Santarém during the nineteenth century, they did not identify the ethnicity of the *Aldeia*'s Indians. Bates, who observed an indigenous celebration while in Santarém, documented that some costumes indigenous people wore were made by the Mundurucu Indians. However, he did not identify the *Aldeia*'s Indians as pertaining to the Mundurucu ethnic group. This is echoed in most chronicles written at that time not only about Santarém but also about the Lower Tapajós River valley.

In 2004, the municipality of Santarém had a population of 262, 672 inhabitants, of which 186, 518 lived in Santarém and 76,154 in rural areas (GT Interministerial da BR-163, 2004). A significant demographic increase occurred in the mid-1970s, when Santarém city's population reached around 100,000 as a result of an immigration wave, from the south and northeast of the country, promoted by the opening of the Amazon frontiers. In 1970, official census data (IBGE 1973) indicated a total of 132,456 people

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[6] Reis (1979: 160) gave an account of thirty commercial establishments in Santarém by 1868.

living in the municipality. A decade earlier, in 1960, the total municipality's population was 91,954 inhabitants, 87.4% of whom had been born in Pará. These data contrasted with those of a century earlier, when a census carried out in 1862 indicated a population of only 14,730 inhabitants in the Tapajós valley, the great majority of whom were native people (Reis 1979).

3.2 A Historical Overview of the Lower Tapajós Region

3.2.1 The Cross and the Sword: The Colonial Occupation

3.2.1.1 The religious missions: Gathering souls and extending frontiers

When colonial occupation began in the seventeenth century, the region of the Lower Tapajós River sheltered a huge and diverse indigenous population which included the Tapajó, Arapiuns, Tupinambá, Corariense, Iruri, Borary, Matayus, Mawe, to cite a few (Santos 1999; Vaz 1997; Menéndez 1992, 1981; Reis 1979; Nimuendajú 1949). The first written observations of the region were made by the Portuguese explorer Pedro Teixeira in 1626, when, sponsored by the Portuguese Crown, he navigated the Tapajós River for a distance of twelve leagues (thirty-five nautical miles), until he, presumably, reached the Alter do Chão bay. There, Pedro Teixeira negotiated with the Indians, whom he identified as "Tapajó," exchanging goods for forty men who were taken to Belém as slaves. Two years later, Pedro Teixeira, along with Bento Rodrigues de Oliveira, navigated the Tapajós River for the second time. The objective was to capture Indians, and increase the colonial presence in the area. In his ethnographic panorama of the region surrounding the Tapajós and Madeira Rivers, Menéndez (1981) highlighted that by the arrival of colonizers in the middle seventeenth century, Tapajós and Tupinambá predominated numerically and militarily among the other Indian groups.

With its numerous native populations and extraordinary strategic geographical position controlling the entrance to central regions of the Amazon, the mouth of the Tapajós River into Amazon River was critical to the Portuguese occupation, which was still in dispute with the Spanish Crown over the possession of this part of the Amazon region. Yet, the initial movement to assure the Portuguese Crown the possession over this part of Amazon region was undertaken by religion missions, more notably, the Jesuit Order.[7] In 1661 the Jesuits founded the "Tapajó Mission" (*Missão dos Tapajó*), where today is Santarém city. Four years later, Tapajó Mission was considered the most important of the Province of Grão Pará and Maranhão[8] (Santos 1999; Menéndez 1981). Besides Tapajó Indians, in this mission were also assembled Indians of several other ethnicities, such as Tupinambá, Arapiuns, Corarienses, and Comandys. However, according to Menéndez (1992: 318), "thirty years after catechization was initiated, the populous village situated at the mouth of the Tapajós River had been drastically reduced, and by this time, Tupinambá was no longer mentioned as an ethnic group."

The Jesuit actions gained new vigor in the Lower Tapajós River with the royal concession given in 1693, which designated to the Jesuit Order the catechization of the whole area of the right bank of the Amazon River toward the south. The control Jesuits had over Indians was a source of constant conflicts between missionaries and the colonial administration. These conflicts forced the transfer of the Tapajó Mission to the region of the mouth of the Arapiuns River into the Tapajós River, where today is located the village of Vila Franca, under the name of "*Missão de Nossa Senhora da Assunção dos*

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[7] The same process that in Spanish was known as *reducciones.*

[8] The north Province of Grão Pará and Maranhão encompassed the region from current Maranhão State to Amazonas State.

Arapiuns." Nimuendajú (1949: 55) informed that in this transfer were taken "the rest of the Tapajó tribe along with Comandys, Goanacuás, Marxgoaras, Arpuaiá, Arapucús, Andirágoaris (Mawes do Andirá?) and other groups (Moreira Pinto: I). Thus, it seems that the Tapajó and Urucucú no longer existed as tribes."

Expanding the missionary action along the Tapajós River, Jesuits founded three other missions in the period between 1722 and 1740. In 1722 the "*Missão de São José dos Maitapú*" was founded, around twelve hundred miles south of Santarém, where the Pinhel village is currently located, on the right bank of the Tapajós River. In the next year, in 1723, the "*Missão dos Borary*" was founded, where Alter do Chão is now located, on the left bank of the Tapajós River. And, finally, in 1740, the "*Missão de Santo Inácio,*" also called "*Missão dos Tupinambaranas,*" was established where Vila Boim currently is, on the right bank of the Tapajós River. Through these missions, the Jesuits exerted control for almost a century throughout the area that encompasses the basins of the Tapajós and Madeira Rivers, and played "a fundamental role in the occupation of the area [by Portugal] as well as in the dislocation process that the Indians suffered" (Menéndez 1992: 301).

In his study on the transformation of Amazonian Indians by Jesuits, Park (1985: 11-12) pointed out that, "the siting of these mission villages was not arbitrary but instead reflected careful planning on the part of the [Jesuit] Society —villages were located at strategic points along the main channel and major tributaries. Control over village Indians was absolute: settlers were prohibited access to the village common and were obliged to submit formal requests for AmerIndian labor directly to the Society." By transferring Indians of different ethnicities and from different places, not only in the

Tapajós River basin but also in the Madeira River basin, the Jesuit missions were responsible for the main territorial and socio-cultural rearrangements in the region during this first moment of the colonial period. Bringing together several ethnic groups under the same linguistic regime, the *Língua Geral*[9] or *Nhengatu*, and the same work and religious system, Catholicism, the Jesuit mission promoted the abandonment of the native language, and of their specific forms of social and cultural organization, as well as realigned inter-ethnic relations. As Menéndez (1981) remarked, the decline of the Tapajós and Tupinambá Indians opened new spaces for other groups that had been dominated up to then by these two ethnic groups. The mobility of indigenous groups that previously existed was profoundly accelerated, leading to massive dislocations and territorial loss, as well as the disappearance of several other ethnic groups. This mobility was also reinforced by the escapes of indigenous people from the missions, who did not adapt themselves to the work regime.

Therefore, the Jesuits not only helped the Portuguese Crown guarantee the expansion of frontiers toward the west, which was regulated by the Madrid Treaty in 1750, but they were also responsible for the drastic reduction of the native population and the disruption of their social and cultural organizations. Although the Jesuit missions and their relationship with Indians in the Lower Tapajós region still demands further studies to assess more accurately the effects of this process on native people, studies that already exist allow us to assert that current regional patterns of socio-cultural organization and territorial occupation are profoundly rooted in this initial moment of colonization, wherein the Jesuit missions had a distinguished role. The religious celebrations,

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[9] *Língua Geral* is the Tupi-Guarani pidgen promoted by the Jesuits.

especially those honoring Saint Ignacio de Loyola in Vila Boim, that attract people from all over the Tapajós River, express the strong influence the Jesuits exerted on the regional religious system. *Língua Geral* is still a significant linguistic reference for most community people of the Lower Tapajós, which they recurrently recognize as "*língua indígena*" (indigenous language), and also as "*falar feio*" (speak badly). Although *Língua Geral* is no longer spoken at the present time, it is very common for people to say "but my grandparents spoke it." When Nimuendajú visited the Lower Tapajós region in the 1920s, he registered that "the majority of local names of the region belong to *Língua Geral*, which is not completely extinct yet" (Nimuendajú 1949: 98).

After having played a critical role in guaranteeing the expansion of frontiers for the Portuguese Crown, and once it was no longer in the crown's interest for them to control the Indians, the Jesuits lost authority over the natives in 1775, and soon after were expelled from the Americas and forced into exile. Without the Jesuit missions, a new phase was initiated for the Indians of the Lower Tapajós. This was the implementation of the policies of the Indian Directorate (*Diretório dos Índios*), whose prominent politician was the Prime Minister Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, known as Marquis de Pombal.

3.2.1.2 Indian Directorate: Secular dominion over Indians and frontiers

Although the Jesuits had controlled the entire the region of the Lower Tapajós for almost a century, the Portuguese Crown also had undertaken some direct actions. In the same year the Tapajó Mission was founded, in 1661, King João V authorized the building of a fort in the same place where the mission was established. The objective of constructing the fort, completed in 1694, was to gain access to the upper Amazon River, which at that moment belonged to the Spanish Crown, in accordance to the Tordesilhas

Treaty. Between the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century, the

Lusitanian Crown focused on controlling navigation, envisioning the extension of its

frontiers. As previously mentioned, the control the Jesuits had over indigenous

populations was frequently a source of conflict with the interests of the colonizers who

sought to get Indians for labor. Records of several incidents between missionaries and

secular colonizers, as well as of the transfer of the Tapajó Mission to the mouth of

Arapiuns River, attest to the permanent tension between them for control over the

natives.

Starting in the second half of the 1750s, changes in Portuguese policies regarding

the colony resulted in changes in the control over natives, which were laid out in a set of

policies known as the Indian Directorate. Based on the Directorate policies, in 1755 the

Portuguese Crown extinguished the Jesuit religious missions, expelled the Jesuits from

the Americas, and begun to exert direct control over the indigenous population. The

main objective of the Indian Directorate was to incorporate the natives into the regional

economy as labor, of which there was a chronic scarcity in the region. Parker (1985: 28)

highlighted that "The Directorate, while taking into account the necessity to

accommodate the immediate needs of settlers as well as Amerindians, had as a major

long-term goal the creation of an agricultural economy in Amazonia modeled on the

plantation economy of the Northeast."

Besides shutting down the Jesuit missions, the Directorate policies also prohibited

the use of *Língua Geral* and designated Portuguese as the official language. With the

missions gone, the areas where they had been located were transformed into "Villages"

and their control given to secular powers. Designated by the Crown, the Indian Director

had direct control over the entire "Village." In the Villages, "the previous policy of separating Amerindians and Europeans was scrapped. Portuguese settlers were no longer prohibited from residing in American villages, but they were to be submitted to close scrutiny by the director before their petition for residence was granted. Likewise, intermarriage between Portuguese and Amerindians, previously looked upon with disfavor, was now vigorously encouraged by colonial authorities" (Parker 1985: 26).

In the Lower Tapajós these procedures started in 1758, when the new *Grão Pará and Maranhão* Governor, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, Marquis de Pombal's stepbrother, visited the region on a expedition to demarcate the Lusitanian frontiers, and to officially establish the new "Villages" and designate their Directors. Arriving at the Tapajós River, the Governor went initially to Alter do Chão, where the Borary mission had been founded, and there he installed the "Vila de Alter do Chão," on March 6, 1758. Three days later, on March 9, the Governor established the "Vila de Boim," in the place of the Santo Inácio mission; the next day the "Lugar[10] de Pinhel," in the region where the São José dos Maitapu mission had been founded. Returning to the mouth of the Tapajós River, the Governor established the "Vila Franca," in the place of "Nossa Senhora da Assunção dos Arapiuns," and on March 14, the "Vila de Santarém" (Santos 1992). A Vila's administration was comprised of a Director, a Senate overseen by a Judge, and three or four town councilors (*vereador*).

In this new situation, the indigenous became more susceptible to colonizers' actions. The consequences of the Directorate's policies accentuated the disintegration of native social and cultural organizations, which the natives had been enduring since the

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[10] *Lugar* was the designation given to places inhabited by few people, as opposed to *"Vila."*

"wars of captures" (*guerras de captura*) and the religious missions. Parker (1985) estimated that during the Directorate period there was a decline of 39% in the Amazonian native population. In relation to the Lower Tapajós, the weakening of local native groups allowed for the advance of the Mundurucu Indians, whose original territory was located in the upper Tapajós River.

3.2.1.3 The arrival of Mundurucu Indians in the Lower Tapajós Valley

While the Indians of the Lower Tapajós continued to suffer from the effects of the Directorate policies, which failed to increase the Amazon agricultural economy, the last quarter of the eighteenth century also brought about new social relations as a result of the expansion of the territorial basis of the Mundurucu Indians toward the Amazon River valley. The first information on the Mundurucu Indians in the Lower Tapajós region was registered in 1773, when they attacked the fort of Santarém (Ramos 2000; Rodrigues 1993; Menéndez 1981; Murphy and Murphy 1954; Nimuendajú 1949). This attack represented the beginning of the Mundurucu territorial expansion toward the region of Lower Tapajós.

The original Mundurucu territory was located in the central areas of the upper Tapajós River, a region known as the high fields (*campos altos*), which mark the transition from the Amazon forest to the central savannas. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Mundurucu had expanded their territory into a vast area that encompassed the region between the basins of the Tapajós and Madeira Rivers up to the Lower Amazon River. In 1817, Aires de Casal (1947) denominated this area as "Mundurucânia" due to the predominance of Mundurucu he found there. Known for their bellicose propensity, the Mundurucu terrified not only the white population but also

other native groups, and came to "belligerently and culturally dominate the Tapajós River valley during the nineteenth century" (Ramos 2000: 27).

The main motivation underlying this vast expansion of the Mundurucu territory has been attributed to their annual war expeditions in search of enemy heads, which were mummified and exhibited as powerful trophies. Analyzing the significance of these practices to the Mundurucu system of values and cultural representations, anthropologists Murphy and Murphy, who pioneered the study on the Mundurucu's religious system in the early 1950s, asserted that to the headhunters, known as *Dajeboisi*, the trophy was a source of magical power that assured abundance of game animal, and conferred prestige within the group. The headhunters, with their head-trophy, took part in the hunting expeditions as special guests because their simple presence was considered to be enough to please the "*Mãe da caça*" (Mother of Hunting, or Mother of Game Animals). Besides prestige, the warrior who obtained the trophy became responsible for organizing the ceremonies related to it, which occurred during a period of three successive rainy seasons after a war expedition (Murphy 1960; Murphy and Murphy 1954).

It was, thus, during these annual war expeditions that the Mundurucu Indians expanded their territory. By the turn of the eighteenth century, they reached the regions from the central fields of the upper Tapajós River to the Lower Amazon River, between the Tapajós and Madeira Rivers. It is precisely during this Mundurucu expansion down the rivers that the first information on this society started to be noted. Encouraged by the search for head-trophies, Mundurucu were expanding their territory toward lower courses of the rivers at the same time as the local native groups were being undermined and weakened by the advance of colonial power in the Lower Tapajós River. In their

expansion into this region, the Mundurucu found a territory that had been encroached upon for over a century, and native groups who had suffered from strong impacts on both their socio-political organizations and on their demographic composition, as had happened with the Tapajó and Tupinambá who had dominated the region at the beginning of the colonial period.

According to Menéndez (1981), the Mundurucu expansion represented the most important event in the realignment of inter-ethnic relations in the Lower Tapajós region. This was reinforced by the alliance Mundurucu Indians made with the Portuguese colonial administration in 1795, when Mundurucu Indians started to be used in battle front lines against other hostile Indian groups. There is little information on how this alliance was attained. Murphy and Murphy (1954) explained that it was a move made by the Indians, apparently motivated by the desire to obtain manufactured goods, especially those made of iron. Yet, the literature has stressed that as a result of this alliance, the Mundurucu were used by the colonial forces against other native groups who opposed the advance into their territorial occupation.

Therefore, through this alliance with the colonial apparatus, which was able to take advantage of existing intertribal antagonisms, the Mundurucu Indians displaced several other native groups, and came to dominate the whole Tapajós River Valley during the nineteenth century. For the colonial settlers, this alliance with the Mundurucu helped them not only to secure the Lower Tapajós region against hostile Indian groups, but also to expand the occupation toward the northern region of the Tapajós-Madeira River. Such an alliance was again reinforced when the Mundurucu Indians cooperated with the incipient Brazilian independent government (imperial government) against the

"Cabanos," who conducted a separatist movement in the 1830s in the north of the country.

3.2.2   Brazil Independent: Revolts and the Rubber Boom

3.2.2.1 *Cabanagem*: The uprising of native people

Brazil came to be officially independent from Portugal in 1822, when Don Pedro I, son of Portugal's King Don João VI, broke off relations with the Portuguese court and became Brazil's Emperor. His initial efforts to shape the Brazilian national State were challenged not only in the international sphere, but also, and especially, internally. Don Pedro I resigned nine years later, and his five-year-old son Don Pedro II took over nine years later to become the second Brazilian Emperor. Don Pedro II stayed in power for sixty-five years, until the monarchical system was changed to the republican system in 1889, and he was exiled. If troubles were hard for Don Pedro I, for the little boy Emperor the situation during his initial reign was worse for he faced several separatist movements during the 1830s all over the claimed Brazilian territory.

One of the most important separatist movements, which came to be known as the "*Cabanagem,*" took place in the Amazon region, in the states of Pará and Amazonas. Recognized as the most grass-roots among social movements that rebelled against national imperial forces, the *Cabanagem* was largely carried out by indigenous, black and mestizo populations (Di Paolo 1990), who were called *Cabanos*. In the attempt to establish a revolutionary regime in the north, from 1835-36, the *Cabanos* deposed representatives of the imperial government and took over control in Belém, the capital of Pará. The same happened in Santarém, where the *Cabanos* movement constituted one of the main sites of resistance, coming to be an autonomous political center in 1836.

With ample participation by indigenous groups and black populations, *Cabanos* in Santarém confronted and displaced, in 1836-37, the local imperial government and, in the process, assured the establishment of a revolutionary government even after forces loyal to the Crown had retaken control of Belém. Besides Santarém, the vicinities of Vila Franca, Alter do Chão and Ecuipiranga also constituted a strong focus of Cabanos' resistance in the Lower Tapajós region. Ecuipiranga, strategically located on the right bank of the Amazon River, in a place with a connection to the Tapajós River by land, was the main headquarters of the *Cabanos'* militias. However, after a short victorious period, loyal forces defeated the *Cabanos* in 1837, initially retaking control over Santarém and, subsequently, the remainder of the areas occupied by the resistance.

Records indicate that the Mundurucu Indians, who in this period had already expanded their territory to the Lower Amazon River and antagonized most indigenous groups in the region, had an ambiguous participation in this movement, some supporting the *Cabanos*, and others supporting the loyal forces as mercenaries (Menédez 1992). The acknowledgement of Mundurucu Indians as loyal forces was registered by Bates in his journey on the Tapajós in which he affirmed that, "the principal Tushaua of the whole tribe or nation, named Joaquim, was rewarded with a commission in the Brazilian army, in acknowledge of the assistance he gave to legal authorities during the rebellion of 1835-36" (Bates 1962: 274). After retaking control over Santarém, the loyal forces strongly repressed the rebels, persecuting and killing, leading to a population decrease among indigenous groups.

Despite poor records on the number of deaths that occurred during the *Cabanagem* period, it is estimated that 30% of the Amazonian population perished during the combats

and subsequent repression. While visiting the Lower Tapajós region two decades later,

Bates registered several examples of this repression. In Alter do Chão, he noticed that

"the Indians were always hostile to the Portuguese, and during the disorders of 1935-6

joined the rebels in their attack on Santarém. Few of them escaped the subsequent

slaughter, and for this reason there is now scarcely an old or middle-aged man in the

place" (Bates 1962: 241-242). The flight of indigenous people, running away from the

repressions perpetrated by loyal forces, constituted another factor in the continuous

process of indigenous dislocation from their territories, adding to the previous effects

caused by the religion missions and the Directorate. It is still frequent, nowadays, to hear

among the communities in the Flona Tapajós life histories that trace back to the

dislocation and flight of their ancestors on account of the *Cabanagem* movement, as in

the case of Antonio, a ninety-five year old man who lives in Piquiatuba community.

According to Antonio, his grand-grandmother lived in Alter do Chão, where she and her

relatives had a home and planted field crops:

> Antonio: When the *Cabanagem* war was declared, which was a war of the
> Brazilians that got Cabanos to fight against Portuguese people, grand-grandmother and
> her family ran away. My grandmother said that they ran away to be free, because my
> aunt was married to a Portuguese man. The first place they arrived was there, in the
> *Bararoara igarapé*, but that was not good enough and they decided to move again to
> Marai. Afterward, the war came to an end, and they were freed. The people who came
> from Alter do Chão were dispersed in Tauari, some (went) to Marai, some to Pini,
> looking for better lands to work. And we stayed here.

All the locations cited by Antonio —Marai, Tauari, Pini— are at the present time

communities in the area of Flona Tapajós, which reminds us of the long existence of

these populations in this locale. Bates also made reference to these places, as well as to

Acaratinga, Jaguarari and Tapaiuna. The consequences of the *Cabanagem* movement for

native groups of the Lower Tapajós River remain poorly studied to allow us to make any

deeper inferences (also the case for most of the historical events that followed in the region). However, it can surely be said that the *Cabanagem* movement was the most important factor in the dispersion of Indians from their territories and in the reconfiguration of inter-ethnic relations in the post-independence period. Whereas some indigenous groups had to abandon their areas and run away from police repression, the Mundurucu Indians held on tight to their territorial control in the region.

Although the alliance the Mundurucu Indians had made with early settlers favored them, allowing them to settle throughout the Tapajós River valley, the intensified contact with merchants from the middle nineteenth century, especially during the rubber boom, gradually profoundly transformed the Mundurucu socio-cultural organization. The rubber economy more intensively incorporated the Mundurucu, as well the remainder of the indigenous groups of the Lower Tapajós region, into the labor force, thereby intensifying their relationship with the market economy.

3.2.2.2 The development of the rubber economy

The development of the rubber industry in the last quarter of the nineteenth century brought about the economic landscape and spatial occupation that would predominate for over a century in the Lower Tapajós region. Writing on the development of the rubber economy in the Tapajós region, Reis (1979: 167) pointed out that "before the rush that revealed the state of Acre and promoted the occupation of the valley of the Purus and Juruá Rivers, Tapajós was the frontier in the forest conquest to extract the rubber tree's milk." The discovery of vast areas of rubber trees in the upper Tapajós River led to an intensification of commercial establishments in Santarém, which became the center that commanded the commerce and the expedition to the *seringais* of Tapajós and the Lower Amazon River. This process also led to an increase in population growth. Whereas data

in 1883 indicated a population of 8,745 people in the municipality of Santarém, a census

carried out forty years later, in 1920, indicated an increase to 41,546 people (Reis 1979).

Yet, the rubber economy in the Lower Tapajós region was not based on rubber

extraction from native plants (*Hevea brasiliensis*), as in the case of the upper Tapajós

River and the state of Acre, but on trees that were cultivated. The cultivation of rubber

trees was a practice already developed by local Indians, which intensified with increases

in the demand for the latex. It was from this region, more precisely around the Vila de

Boim, where in 1740 the "Missão de Santo Inácio" was founded, that is said that the

English explorer Henry Wickham[11] took rubber seeds to the Kew Garden greenhouses in

London in the1870s, to be subsequently replanted in Malaysia. This was the reason why

the Amazon rubber economy declined five decades later, and created resentment among

Santarém people, as expressed by Paulo Rodrigues dos Santos (1999: 400), an intellectual

from Santarém (who died in 1974), in his writing on "the sordid and brutal rubber history

that bestowed sad celebrity to Santarém."

With the increase in demand for Amazon rubber production, the cultivation of

rubber trees was intensified, encouraged by merchants in Santarém and along the Tapajós

River, including foreign merchants. Such was the case of the Moisés Abrahan Cohen

family, in Vila de Boim. Moisés Abrahan Cohen was a Jewish merchant from Spain,

who arrived in Vila de Boim in 1870 and subsequently installed a commercial

establishment that prospered with the rubber economy. Through the system of providing

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[11] In his *Brazil and the Struggle for Rubber*, Dean (1987) discussed this perspective attributed to Henry
Wickham, understanding it as a "myth" involving the transfer of rubber out of the Brazilian Amazon and its
domestication in Southeast Asia. For the author, "this is the myth of Henry Wickham, the English hero,
bestower of rubber seeds. This is the myth of Henry Wickham, the English rogue, thief of rubber seeds"
(Dean 1987: 7).

supplies in exchange for rubber, which in Amazônia came to be known as the *aviamento* system, native people started to get indebted, and to pay their debts, they gave not only rubber but also rubber trees (local people say "*ponta de seringa*").

In this way, the Cohen family gradually took possession of a great part of the cultivated rubber trees (*seringal*) on the right and left banks of the Tapajós River. In order to continue to obtain goods, local populations then began working for the Cohen family in the collection of the rubber. Taking possession of these *segingais*, the Cohen family controlled a large part of the rubber production in the Lower Tapajós region. This appropriation of the *seringal* took place among several communities that today are in the area of Flona Tapajós, such as the Mundurucu Indians of Bragança and Marituba, and the non-indigenous communities of Nazaré, Marai, Pini and Prainha. With the decline of the rubber economy, most of these *seringais* were later sold to other landlords. However, beginning in the 1970s, many of them were bought back by local community people, including Mundurucu Indians from Bragança and Marituba communities.

Rubber production from these cultivated *seringais* followed in the steps of the general changes that came with the decline of the Amazon rubber economy in the second decade of the twentieth century. From the 1910s onward, Amazon rubber production lost the market to Asian production, until World War II, when Amazonian production of rubber once again increased. However, before the second Amazon rubber boom in the 1940s, the region of the Lower Tapajós experienced a brief moment of increased rubber production with the arrival, in 1927, of the *Companhia Ford Industrial do Brasil*, the Brazilian subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company, which had arrived to establish a rubber plantation in the same way it had been done in Asian forests.

Ford received from the Brazilian government a concession of one million hectares alongside the Tapajós River. The enterprise provided a new spurt in the regional economy, as well as led to demographic growth. In his study on the experience of the Ford Company in Tapajós, Costa (1993: 38) informed us that, "thousands of people were mobilized, vast areas were deforested and cultivated, advanced technology was installed, and two urban nuclei, Belterra and Fordlândia,[12] were equipped to be the operational centers. Millions of dollars were spent. In 1945, after eighteen years of operation, the Company was closed down and all its equipment was transferred to the Brazilian Government based on a symbolic price." Despite the short time of the Ford Company enterprise,[13] it was fundamental for reactivating the cultivation of rubber trees in the region and incrementing the local economy and its demographic density.

There are two main theses that explain the enterprise's bankruptcy. One was developed by Dean (1987), who pointed out technical problems, asserting that the proliferation of diseases prevented rubber production. The second thesis was developed by Costa (1993), who attributed the Ford Company's main problems to labor shortage. According to Costa, although the Ford Company had taken considerable effort to attract workers, such as by paying higher wages than those offered in the region and many other parts of Brazil, the company was unsuccessful in maintaining the workers in a systematic way required for rubber production. Local labor, most of it provided by indigenous descendants, chose to maintain their peasant production structure instead of working full-

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[12] Fordlândia was the place up Tapajós River where the rubber plantation was established; and Belterra was the administrative center from which rubber was exported.

[13] With the collapse of the Ford Company Belterra became an area under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Ministry, and in 1995, it was turned into a municipality in which the Flona Tapajós is inserted.

time on the company's payroll. I met several men from the communities in the Flona Tapajós who had worked for the Ford Company, and they used to say that they just worked a period of time during the year, then returned home to "plant the field crops, go fishing" (*fazer roçado, pegar um peixinho*).

With the Ford Company's liquidation in 1945, and also with the second decline of the Amazon rubber economy on account of the domination of Asian rubber in the international market, the economy of the Lower Tapajós region underwent a new period of stagnation. The increasing devaluation of Amazon rubber led to the collapse of several *seringais* and commercial establishments that existed along Tapajós River. This allowed local community people to reclaim the areas of rubber trees that had been under the control of the merchants, and regain relative autonomy of their social and productive organizations. This peasant pattern of social and economic organization was again altered starting in the late 1960s, when Amazon frontier expansion policies started to be implemented in the region. The more immediate effect of these policies in the communities that are the object of this dissertation was the creation and establishment of the Tapajós National Forest, which will be examined in Chapter 5. For the moment, it is important to understand how these communities, which exhibit a long history of occupancy, intertwined with several forms of encroachment, have been represented in the literature.

3.3 Representations of *Caboclo* Social Identity

3.3.1   Erasing Indians from the Pages on the Lower Tapajós Valley

As mentioned earlier, when I first carried out a study on the communities in the Flona Tapajós, the people were introduced to me as "*caboclo,*" or "*caboclo do Tapajós.*" On the other hand, I did not hear communities' people identifying themselves as

"*caboclo*" (masculine) or "*cabocla*" (feminine), except during some meetings to discuss

land tenure issues, when it was noticeable that they were trying to establish a position

about land rights coming from long-term occupancy: "*We are Caboclo of Tapajós, who*

have been here forever." It was not an identity they claimed every day, and not

infrequently they refused to identify themselves as such, sometimes expressing disgust

with the term. Individually, frequently they (especially men) introduced themselves as a

"rural worker." As a collectivity, it was more common for them to identify themselves as

belonging to a certain community or other. "I am from Piquiatuba Community;" "I am

from Taquara Community," and so on.

The community people's descent was attributed to several origins. Most of them

recognized themselves to be indigenous descendants, although, in general, they did not

specify the ethnic group, just mentioning that "my grandfather or grandmother was

Indian." Sometimes, they named the place of origin of their ancestors, when it was

different from the place where they currently resided: "my grandfather was an Indian

from Arapiuns River," "Indian from Alter do Chão," and so on. Sometimes, they

expressed indigenous origins by saying: "my grandmother spoke only the indigenous

language." It was very common, also, that they attributed mixed origins to themselves:

"my grandfather was the son of an Indian with Portuguese;" "Indian with Cearense."[14]

Maria, from the Piquiatuba community, explained to me: "in my family we have

everything: there are Indian, Portuguese, Cearense, Paraense,[15] it is all mixed." There are

also those people who recognize indigenous descent but no longer claim to be Indian: "It

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[14] People from the state of Ceará, in the northeast region.

[15] People from the state of Pará.

is true that all of us are indigenous descendants, but it no longer is in our blood." The recognition of belonging to a differentiated indigenous ethnic identity began in 1998, when the people of Taquara, Marituba and Bragança communities began to identify themselves as Mundurucu Indians.

Despite these strong, and often ambiguous, references to an indigenous legacy, reinforced presently by the movement to restate indigenous traditions among the three communities, there is an absolute silence in the literature on the Lower Tapajós region since the middle nineteenth century regarding the indigenous population belonging to a diverse ethnic group, except to a small number of Mundurucu settlements. Yet, by the end of the century, even these Indians were no longer cited as a distinct ethnic group, just those Mundurucu inhabiting the region of upper Tapajós River. The British naturalist H. W. Bates,[16] who arrived in Santarém in November 1851, and produced the most detailed and extensive records of the social composition and native lifestyle along Tapajós River during the middle nineteenth century, did not identify any ethnic groups among the several Indians he met, or even among those who worked for him. The exception were the Mundurucu the naturalist visited in the Cupari River, a tributary of the Tapajós River, which currently forms the southern boundary of the Flona Tapajós, as well as the Mundurucu of the upper Tapajós River. Regarding Alter do Chão, Bates informed us that the place "was originally an indigenous settlement, named Burari," yet, at that moment, it was inhabited by "semi-civilized Indians" living in "profound misery" (Bates 1976: 161).

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[16] In his book "The Naturalist on the River Amazons," first published in 1876, Bates (1976) reported on his expedition undertaken from June to October 1852. Bates spent three and half years in the Tapajós region, where he undertook several expeditions up the Tapajós River,

Although referring to most of the places where the community people in the Flona Tapajós are presently located, Bates, however, did not mention the people living there.

By the end of nineteenth century, when the French explorer H. Coundreau (1976) navigated the Tapajós from July 1895 to January 1986 to carry out a "scientific expedition" sponsored by Pará's Governor, he did not mention any indigenous group in the region of the Lower Tapajós. The first settlement after Santarém to which Coundreau made reference was Vila de Boim, where the Santo Inácio Mission was founded, about which he noted that "among these settlements that emerge and disappear after a more or less a brief and happy existence, the first settlement up the river from the mouth, is Boim, on the left bank" (1976: 16). Coundreau remarked that the place already existed a century earlier with the name of "Santo Inácio," but the following decadence had made Boim almost disappear. He estimated that Boim must have had at that moment "a maximum of fifty houses," but was not sure if they were inhabited. Regarding Pinhel, where the *Missão de São José dos Maitapú*" was founded, he only mentioned the existence of "vestiges of an ancient *aldeia.*" In contrast, Coundreau provided detailed information on Mundurucu Indian culture in the upper Tapajós River.

In the 1920s, when the German archeologist Curt Unkel, who adopted the Guarani Indian name of *Nimuendajú*, and became known as Curt Nimuendajú, carried out surveys around the Santarém region, he wrote only about the Tapajó Indians and registered the extinction of this extensive native group as a result of the effects of colonization (Nimuendajú 1949). Subsequent archeological studies, such as those carried out by B. Meggers (1996) also found the extermination of indigenous groups in the Tapajós region. In "Amazonia: Man and Culture in a Counterfeit Paradise," Meggers asserted: "at the

time the Amazon was discovered, the Tapajós region was thickly populated… By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, only a few scattered remnants of the indigenous population survived, the majority having succumbed to slave raiding, missionization, disease, and other introductions of European civilization. Deculturation proceeded so rapidly that the linguistic affiliation of the Tapajós Indians is unknown, except that it was not Tupian" (Meggers 1996: 131-132).

A similar perspective was also shown by Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro in his "*Os Índios e a Civilização*" (Indians and Civilization), first published in 1970, which was comprised of a set of articles initially published in the 1950s in which the author discussed the problem of ethnic extermination and the survival of Brazilian Indians in the twentieth century. With regard to the Indians of Tapajós River, the author pointed out the severe impacts on native demographic and socio-cultural organization since colonial times, and asserted: "Of all tribes, some courageous groups remained in the upper rivers, preferring there to face the attack of hostile tribes instead of being subjugated. The majority, however, was engaged in the new society" (Ribeiro 1979: 41). The publication of this book represented the first important effort to construct a sociological framework to analyze contemporary Brazilian indigenous groups. Ribeiro developed the concept of *ethnic transfiguration* (*transfiguração étnica*) to explain the process of transformation and acculturation of Indian groups who came into contact with more powerful cultures without, however, losing their central ethnic characteristics. The limitations Ribeiro pointed out to complete Indians assimilation into the regional society stemmed from the prejudices that transverse the relationship between these he called "transfigured Indians" and non-Indian people.

Anthropological studies carried out beginning in the late 1940s elucidated the conditions of indigenous descendants whose social and cultural organizations had been strongly impacted by the advance of colonial forces, yet still held elements of vanishing indigenous cultures. Following this perspective, the American anthropologists Robert and Yolanda Murphy developed the first anthropological studies on Mundurucu Indians, carrying out fieldwork among them in the early 1950s. The first article the authors published on the Mundurucu was in Portuguese,[17] in which they presented the initial version of an analysis they subsequently developed on the acculturation process among the Mundurucu Indians (Murphy and Murphy 1954). Contrasting the conditions of the Mundurucu Indians in the 1950s with those in earlier periods, when the headhunters' wars underpinned the main Mundurucu cultural institutions, the anthropologists asserted that among Mundurucu Indians "the loss of culture was generalized, however, the most affected have been those residents of the bank of the Tapajós" (1954: 16).

Murphy and Murphy (1954: 13) distinguished three different Mundurucu Indians groups: 1) those living in the high fields of the upper Tapajós River, called "*campineiros,*" 2) those living along the Cururú River, of the middle Tapajós, a section of the river where there are waterfalls; and 3) those living among the "Brazilian population of Tapajós." Whereas the anthropologists described the cultural and socio-economic organization of the two first groups, regarding the third group, they declared in one paragraph that "little needs to be said about the remaining 200 Mundurucu living among the Brazilian population of Tapajós… These Mundurucu are gradually losing their

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[17] It was published by the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology of Pará, in Belém, under the title "*As condições atuais dos Mundurucu*" (The current conditions of the Mundurucu).

identity and starting to integrate into that amorphous rural Brazilian population, generally

known by the denomination of *caboclos* " (1954: 43).

The perspective on Mundurucu assimilation into the category of *caboclo* reflected

the acculturation theories that predominated in the American anthropological literature in

the 1940-50s. Prioritizing the focus on cultural loss and the absorption of western

cultural traces by ethnic groups in contact with non-indigenous populations, these studies

on the Amazon region pointed to inexorable processes of obliteration of native culture,

and its transformation into a regional *caboclo* culture of the typical Amazonian peasant

(Wagley 1985, 1976; Parker 1985; Anderson 1985; Weinstein 1985; Ross 1978; Wagley

and Galvão 1961; Galvão 1952).

3.3.2 *Companheiros do Fundo*: Emerging from Indian to Caboclo

There is no consensus among scholars about the etymology of the word *caboclo*.

Whereas Costa Perreira (1975) asserts that *caboclo* derives from tupi *caa-boc*, which

means "one who comes from the forest," in the Brazilian dictionary Aurélio Buarque de

Hollanda Ferreira (2000) suggests that the word derives from the tupi word *kari'boka*,

which means "son of white man." The Brazilian dictionary also mentions *caboclo* as

signifying "*mestizo* of white with Indian," and "ancient denomination for Indians," and in

figurative terms as a "distrustful" (*desconfiada*) or "treacherous" (*traiçoiera*) person.

Colloquially in the Amazon region, the term *caboclo* has been largely attributed to rural

social groups, descendants of indigenous people who lost their main ethnic identity

through the effects of colonization, and who are of mixed origins.

As most scholars have pointed out, colloquially *caboclo* was generally not a term

used for self-identification, but rather as used by others to refer to a category of people

whom they see as inferior (Lima 1999; Harris 1998; Nugent 1993; Wagley 1985, 1976;

Lins e Silva 1980). For example, urban people were inclined to identify rural people as *caboclo*, while people from big cities also identified the people from smaller towns as *caboclo*. In the rural areas, class differentiation could also be a criterion to attribute the category of *caboclo* (the higher class attributes *caboclo* to the lower class).[18] With a strong pejorative connotation, the term usually was associated with the adjectives rural, indigenous, rustic, illiterate, and uncivilized, in opposition to urban, white, literate, and civilized, a reason why people tended to reject being identified as *caboclos*, as was found in the Flona Tapajós.

Different from the relational perspective in the colloquial use of the term *caboclo*, in anthropological studies Lima (1999) noted that the concept points toward a fixed social category, the historical Amazonian peasantry that emerged from colonial policies. Pioneering the studies on class *caboclo* formation, the Brazilian anthropologist E. Galvão, a student and colleague of Charles Wagley, carried out the first anthropological study on *caboclo* social organization in his dissertation[19] defended in 1952, at Columbia University. Focusing on the *caboclo* religious system, Galvão's main interest was to understand the transformations that were taking place in native cultural systems under the

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[18] The term *caboclo* is also found in some indigenous contexts, especially related to the rubber economy, to differentiate indigenous populations already contacted by and maintaining a relationship with non-indigenous groups, from isolated indigenous groups, living in the interior of the forest. In these cases, as Lima (1999) remarked, the term *caboclo* is used as self-identification, as was observed in the state of Acre , where the use of this term by indigenous groups meant an attempt to conceal the ethnic origins due to the prejudices against them (Aquino 1981). A similar process also was studied by Cardoso de Oliveira (1972) among the Ticuna Indians in the Amazonas State. There is a large spectrum in which the category of *caboclo* is employed throughout the Amazon region, as well as in other parts of Brazil. It is important to take into account the multiple forms of use and meaning of the category *caboclo,* although this is beyond the scope of this study.

[19] It was published in Brazil under the title "Santos e Visagens: Um Estudo da Vida Religiosa de Ita" (Galvão 1955).

effects of the advance of western colonization, which absorbed them into the regional society constituted by the Amazonian peasant.

Presenting an historical perspective on "the main forces operating in the shaping of the modern caboclo culture," Galvão (1952: 150) pointed toward the emergence of *caboclo* as an outcome of the assimilation of Indians into regional society. He stated that, "the initial process was one of selective acculturation on the part of the mixed society being formed by the Portuguese colonialist and natives, conditioned by the configuration of the two cultures which came into contact and by the dominance of the former. The Indians, for the most part, did not remain integrated within tribal society." Subsequently, the *Cabanagem* movement and, especially, the rubber economy that incorporated the natives more ostensibly into the market system, accentuated this process of assimilation, leading to the formation of the Amazonian peasantry: "The Indian was now definitely a Brazilian peasant, the caboclo" (Galvão1952: 149, emphasis in the original).

Emphasizing the coercive power that forced changes in native cultural patterns and indigenous people's incorporation into regional society as *caboclos*, Galvão, however, also emphasized the indigenous cultural vestiges that permeated this regional *caboclo* mixed culture, expressed mainly in the religious belief system and in local ecological knowledge. The author explored the wide range of folk beliefs derived from indigenous culture that exist alongside Catholicism as an integral part of the *caboclo* religious system, which "answer those emotional needs that Catholicism was not able to satisfy" (Galvão 1952: 151). Therefore, by examining the people's beliefs and practices that incorporate supernatural beings, such as the *Cobra Grande,* analogous to that which occurred in Maguari community, Galvão pointed towards the persistence of indigenous

beliefs and elements, "but no longer as an aboriginal religion. These beliefs and elements were modified and became a part of the caboclo religion without affecting significantly the main superstructure —that is, Catholicism" (1952: 156).

The belief in *Cobra Grande*, as well as in enchanted dolphins (*botos*), were analyzed by Galvão as part of the complex of supernatural beings that inhabit the waters of the rivers and streams in an "enchanted kingdom." Encompassing the shamanism system, these supernatural beings living in the water were named *Companheiros do Fundo* (fellow-beings of deep waters), and they comprised the familiar spirits the shamans (*pajé*) call upon "during their séances. The power of a pajé will depend upon the number of Companheiros at his disposal" (Galvão 1952: 123). A powerful shaman was also distinguished by his capacity to travel under the water, who was then called *sacaca*, and who was believed to use the skin of *Cobra Grande* to undertake this travel. "Sacacas are not thought to die like common people. They disappear, according to general belief, to live forever in the enchanted kingdom of the deep waters" (p. 124).

Alongside the religious symbolic system of the enchanted beings, Galvão (1952) also highlighted the contribution of native knowledge of the environment to shaping the *caboclo* culture. "The indigenous contribution to the new Amazon culture was important because it provided traits which facilitated the control of the environment, such as native agriculture, foods, means of transportation, materials for habitations and diverse crafts. In short, the basic controls of a specialized environment, the tropical forest, to which the Portuguese were foreigners and not adapted, were fundamentally Indian" (p. 150). Although emphasizing the extensive indigenous influence in the new emerging culture,

the author underlined that it followed Iberian patterns, which changed the indigenous production system for local consumption to one for the commercial market.

3.3.3   *Caboclo* Identity: Without Script or History

Galvão's take on *caboclo* culture, along with that presented by Wagley in his "Amazon Town, A Study of Man in the Tropics," published in 1953 and based on fieldwork carried out in collaboration with Galvão, came to be the main references for analyses on the Amazon peasant category. Despite this initial effort to understand the dynamic nature of *caboclo* social organization, few studies were subsequently devoted to the theme. One exception is the collection dedicated to the study of *caboclo*, coordinated by E. P. Parker (1985). Writing the book's preface, Wagley called attention to the neglect of studies on *caboclo* in the ethnology and sociology of the Amazon Valley, which contrasted with a number of studies carried out on indigenous groups despite the fact that the *caboclo* population "outnumbers the tribal Indians many times." Highlighting the problematic "nature of the term *caboclo,*" Wagley pointed out that the book's text helps not only "to clarify our image of life in the Amazon; it also clarifies many ill-conceived stereotypes about the Amazon peasantry" (Wagley 1985: VII).

Despite the concerns in portraying the Amazon peasants in a more positive manner, the collection's texts tended to reproduce the perspective of the acculturation studies in which the social organization of the *caboclo* was characterized by cultural absences and losses, as residues of societies that succumbed under the effects of colonization. Approaching the emergence of *caboclo* class and culture in the Amazon region as a result of the miscegenation between indigenous populations and poor Portuguese descendants, Parker (1985: 35), stated that "what emerged from this destructive period were caboclos: disenfranchised and culturally deprived Amerindians

and mixed-blood offspring engaged in desultory subsistence activities and collection of forest products." In this way, Nugent (1993: XXI) accurately highlighted the misrepresentations projected onto these Amazonian social groups, asserting that: "They are treated as contingent, incomplete, haphazard melding of the detritus of aboriginal social formations and the remnants of European commercial experiments. They are defined in terms of what they are not (aboriginal, national) rather than in positive terms."

As an historical phenomenon, the configuration of the caboclo, or the *caboclization* as Parker referred to it, was presented in most texts of the collection as an effective cultural adaptation to the ecological environment and the conditions engendered by colonization, which accommodated indigenous technology and knowledge to exploit resources alongside social and religious organizations imposed by Iberian-Catholic colonization. As a result, caboclo was characterized as presenting a pattern of nuclear families that live isolated along the rivers and tributaries, where they develop subsistence activities and collect forest products, with occasional production for the market. Spirituality was performed through catholic celebrations, although native beliefs still make up a part of the symbolic universe representing an inheritance of a past that is over. "This transformed AmerIndian was now the caboclo of Amazonia: a solitary actor struggling to adapt without benefit of script or history" (Parker 1985: 39).

This representation of *caboclo* as a "culturally despoiled Indian" was also present in the texts of Anderson and Weinstein in which they emphasized the importance of this social category in the *Cabanagem* revolt, and in the development of the rubber economy. Anderson (1985: 53) identified "precisely these people, once stripped of their cultural

identity and forced to accept the mandates of a foreign culture and religion, who became the foundation of caboclo society."

Notwithstanding the contribution of these studies to the understanding of the transformation that occurred in the native culture, the construction of *caboclo* as a "deculturated Indian" tended to mistakenly decree the complete extinction of any differentiated indigenous ethnic identity, as occurred in relation to the region of the Lower Tapajós. The generalized designation of the category of *caboclo* to vast rural populations in the Amazon region who descended from indigenous peoples, such as those found in the Flona Tapajós, has concealed the varied dynamics that emerged in the post-colonial social landscape. As a template, in Harris's terms (1998), this category qualifies a large population as a historic product that contradictorily removes it from the "benefit" of the history. Without antecedents, the *caboclo* culture can be described only from the nineteenth-century; before that, there is only a trace of destruction and extermination of the indigenous. "Whatever possibilities, if any, that had existed for them to recreate their former sociocultural existence were lost forever" (Parker 1985: 37). Yet, as will be seen in Chapter 7, the resurgence of indigenous identity among the Taquara, Marituba and Bragança community people shows that the possibilities were not over yet.

The important point to be emphasized is that the implications of this *caboclo* construction are not just theoretical, but are also reflected in State policies. It was precisely these people denominated *caboclo —considered without history, without an identity—* who came to be the main target for the displacements promoted by Amazon frontier expansion policies that started to take place in the region in the late 1960s. The creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós epitomizes this, as will be discussed ahead.

3.4 Land Use Pattern and People Identification

This brief look at the major historical events that successively altered the native socio-cultural organizations in the Lower Tapajós, and their subsequent representations, discloses the general frame in which most of the present-day social groups are found in the region, including the communities localized in the Flona Tapajós, the object of the analysis in this dissertation. In the colonial period, it showed the combined impacts of the missions and Directorate led to severe disruption of prior indigenous groups, and favored the Mundurucu expansion and their domination over the region and over indigenous groups that remained. During the period of Independence, the *Cabanagem* and the rubber boom in the last quarter of the nineteenth century came to alter significantly the panorama of these regional social and economic relations that had been forged by the colonial apparatus. The development of the rubber economy, which in the Lower Tapajós displayed a distinguished facet on account of the attempts to implement rubber plantations, precipitated a more intensive occupation of the region and an increase in economic production, molding social and economic relations as well as the forms of land occupation that would be predominant by the late 1960s, when Amazon frontier expansion policies started to be enforced.

In concluding, I would like, first, to point out the main characteristics of the pattern of land occupation that resulted from this process and came to predominate among the eighteen communities localized in the Flona Tapajós; and, second, to clarify the way I am identifying these communities.

3.4.1   Land Occupation Pattern

The land occupation pattern found among the eighteen communities in the Flona Tapajós reproduces the main pattern that was established by the regional native groups in

the post-colonial period, after their prior forms of territorial occupation had been transformed. Shaped, thus, by a larger historical process, this pattern of land occupation is based, as Almeida (1988) defined, on a common system of land use, whose ownership is based directly on the work developed by the nuclei families, with rules that are consensually established.

Identifying this system among the Amazonian peasants, Almeida (1988: 183) remarked that land was not viewed as a permanent individual possession. According to him, this view of the land reflects the peasant right's rules that "prescribe methods for cultivation in extended areas of land that are utilized in accordance with the desire of each family group, without requiring continuous and permanent areas or having a set of productive activities confined in an specific parcel of land. There is no continuation among the cultivation areas of a family group. The crop fields are found distributed in the several places that are consensually designated for cultivation." Among these cultivation areas, which are appropriated individually by the family nucleus, common areas are also established, which do not belong to any family in particular but, rather, are for communal use by all family groups. In this way, this land use system combines communal areas with rules for individual possession. "The house and its adjacent garden are appropriated individually by the respective family groups, in the same way that the harvest's products and other fruits of their crop fields are" (1988: 183).

Thus, shaped from the middle nineteenth century and disseminated among the several social groups throughout Amazon region, this land occupation system is found in the Lower Tapajós region not only among the communities in the Flona Tapajós, but also among other regional peasant groups. These regional social groups also displayed the

configuration of the socio-political and spatial unit called "community." "Community" denotes a set of common rights of residence and the use of the resources over a defined area, as well as in relation to their social organizations, bestowing community autonomy in the internal decisions and over a territorial space. The introduction of the term "community" was attributed to the work of social organization promoted in the 1960s by the Catholic Church through the "*Comunidades Eclesiais de Base*" (CEB) (Ecclesiastic Base Communities) (Lins e Silva 1980; Lima 1999).

As Lins e Silva (1980) explained, these works developed through the CEBs reflected a new posture of the Catholic Church in relation to rural social groups. The Church envisioned the involvement of the villages' residents directly in proselytizing and in developing activities such as alphabetization, health care, and economic projects. These activities were developed through the creation of the "community council" (*conselho comunitário*), which would represent community interests, and promote social projects along with religious functions. The accomplishment of these works, which initially were essentially religious in character, led to the incorporation by rural populations of the ideal of "community" as a group socially organized, coming, gradually, to integrate also the political-administrative and territorial instances.

Each "community," constituted by one or more family nuclei, started to have an official representation composed of a president, a vice-president, a treasurer, and a fiscal council. As a socio-political organization, the "community" also started to have control over a territorial space, whose limits between the "communities" were defined between them and materialized through the clearing of the pathways that interconnected each other. Once a year, each community cleaned part of the pathway that belonged to it.

Despite the variations that can be found among them, these communities developed a complex system of resource use with different levels of appropriation and domains. This system designates areas that were of common domain, as defined internally by the communities, including areas for hunting, fishing, collecting oils, fruits, timber, straw, etc. Other areas were demarcated to be used by individuals of particular family groups. These included agricultural and rubber fields. While the areas in which the forest and aquatic resources were found tended to be shared among communities, especially, those closer to each other, the areas where the residences and the agricultural and rubber fields were located were understood to be the domain of a specific community, and, for these areas, limits between communities were established. In many cases, the limits between communities tended to constitute an object of dispute between them, especially when a new community established itself in the region.

Therefore, despite sharing a similar land occupation pattern, each "community" had autonomy over its internal social organization and over the spaces and the resources understood to be of its domain. However, the domain of a community over such space and resources did not prevent the members of another community to also make use of the resources that were considered to belong to the collectivity. Thus, for example, even recognizing that a certain lake belonged to a particular community, members from other communities could fish in this lake. In these cases, people established rules that did not allow commercial fishing or predatory techniques, in the same way that rules were established for other forest resources. Disrespecting these rules constituted a motive for conflict among the communities.

In short, emerging from a larger historical process that involved most of the native groups in the Lower Tapajós region, this was the predominant pattern of land use found among the communities in the Flona Tapajós when the reserve was created. As will be seen ahead, the superposition of the reserve's limits over community lands imposed a new form of land occupation and resource use that collided directly with this communal pattern of land use.

3.4.2   Identifying the Community People

Although sharing a common historical process and land use pattern, the eighteen communities in the Flona Tapajós cannot be understood as a homogenous unit. There existed differences among the communities that derived from their particular historical and social configurations. There were communities such as Marai, Jaguarari and Pini that have existed for over two centuries, originating as old indigenous villages. The community of Marai came to be dominated by rubber entrepreneurs from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s, when new political and economic forces started to emerge. In the Piquiatuba community, people attributed its origins to the beginning of the twentieth century. By contrast, there were also communities that were established more recently, such as Jamaraqua, which was founded in the early 1990s, when a division within the Maguari community occurred as a result of internal disputes. The same happened with Bragança and Marituba communities, which were formed when they separated from the Marai community.

The populations of some of these communities were also highly diverse. The Tauri community, for example, while an old village, was inhabited by an assorted composition of people from several places, the outcome of an intensive migration that took place during the last two decades, among other factors. The Maguary and São Domingos

communities also showed a varied population composition. By contrast, communities such as Taquara, Jaguarari, or Pini were relatively homogeneous. Differences among communities were also reflected in their religious organizations. While in some communities, all inhabitants considered themselves to be Catholics, in other communities, there were people who also followed the Pentecostal Christian religions, such as *Assembléia de Deus* (Assembly of God) and *Igreja da Paz* (Peace Church).

These differences, besides others, found among the communities in the Flona Tapajós, highlight the need to be cautious when analyzing them. Although sharing general characteristics, the product of a common historical process, each of the communities had their particular histories and internal social organizations. Moreover, prior to the creation of the Flona Tapajós, the eighteen communities had few and dispersed linkages among them, deriving primarily from kinship bonds and participation in community religious festivities and other entertainment activities. It was the process of creation and implementation of this forest reserve, and attempts to displace people, that fostered stronger relationships among these communities. In this process, these communities came to constitute a social unit that started to be identified by the reserve's administration as the *riverine communities of the Flona Tapajós* and, more recently, as *traditional people*.

As discussed earlier, although the community people tended to be categorized by others as *caboclo*, they not only did not identify themselves as such but refused such a category. Thus, for this reason, I do not call them by this term. Additionally, three communities started to claim the Mundurucu ethnic identity, thereby, distinguishing themselves from the others, even in relation to the category of "traditional people."

Therefore, to approach the engagement of these communities in the process of creation and implementation of the Flona Tapajós, I chose to identify them as "communities of resistance."

This choice has in mind two objectives: first, to move away from the categories used by the official environmental agency; and, second, to emphasize the common process of resistance undertaken by these communities to guarantee access to their territories, which initially united them but later separated them. At first, when the "communities of resistance" struggled to avoid being displaced, they constituted a politically organized social unit. However, later, when they won the right to reside in the reserve's area, three of the communities began identifying themselves as Mundurucu Indians. This movement led to the creation of two distinct groups: indigenous and non-indigenous. Thus, the term "community of resistance" is applied to identify them in the resistance process to avoid the dispossession from their lands, and to stress the rupture moment that separated them in distinct arenas in the struggle for the land.

CHAPTER 4
SHAPING THE FRONTIER'S FORESTS INTO NATIONAL FORESTS

4.1 Introduction

Although proposals for forest reserve policies that promoted controlled exploitation of the resources based on principles of scientific forestry were first drawn up at the beginning of the twentieth century in Brazil, it was only in the late 1960s that the country came to adopt National Forests as part of its forest policies. Imbedded in the Amazon frontier expansion policies that started to be undertaken by the military government in the late 1960s, forestry in the Amazon region became an important sector to increase the Amazon's economic value and integrate the region into the national political economy.

This chapter focuses initially on the process of the creation and implementation of forest reserves known as National Forests that were first implemented in the United States in the late nineteenth century. Following the tradition in scientific forestry management generated in Germany to set aside for the State the direct control over the forest resources, the National Forest reserves became the main instrument of State forest policies. The second part of the chapter explores the development of Brazilian forest policies from the beginning of the 20th century up to beginning of the 1970s, when the first forest reserve was created and implemented in the Amazon region to promote systematized and planned timber production.

4.2 Scientific Forestry Management and National Forests:

4.2.1   Reconceptualizing Forests and Modes of Resource Appropriation

4.2.1.1 The emergence of scientific forestry management

The category of National Forests, designating state forest reserves for timber production based on scientific principles, was created at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States, consolidating a movement that had begun three decades earlier for the establishment of reserves for environmental protection (Steen 1992; Worster 1987). The move to create forest reserves under State control to promote timber production, however, stretches back to the late eighteenth century with the emergence of scientific forestry in Germany, which was motivated by the need of the State to guarantee wood supply (Watkins 1998; Lowood 1991). The increasing demand for wood, caused by population growth and incipient industrialization, led the State to take more direct control over forest resources, designating areas to explore based on scientific and technical principles that would make wood exploitation a sustained and profitable economic activity.

In his analysis of the emergence of scientific forestry management in Germany in the second half of the eighteenth-century, Lowood (1991: 315-316) credited the initial establishment of forest science to the "cameral sciences," a term that was "derived from *Kammer* (chamber) in which the prince's advisors traditionally deliberated." The cameral sciences were first introduced in Prussia in 1727 at the universities of Halle and Frankfurt, and soon became part of most university curricula in Germany. Lowood also attributed to these cameral sciences, the *Staatswisssenschaften*, the application of "a variety of economic, administrative, and social practices to rational or *scientific* scrutiny,"

in which professionals were trained in a "body of theory and techniques needed for the administration of the state and its domains" (p. 316, emphasis in the original).

Constituting one of the major sources of revenue for the State economy in central Europe, forests represented an important sector of State administration, thereby requiring special attention from the cameral sciences. In line with the state's concerns, the increasing demand for wood and the risks of wood shortage on account of forest deterioration led the cameral officials to pursue new ways to more efficiently manage and control forest resources, and to make forests subject to careful production. Making reference to the initial publications on the theme, Lowood (1991: 320) remarked that "The first writers on forest science were led by men trained in the cameral sciences-financial officials and chief foresters who expected economic disaster if the condition of the forests continued its downward slide."

The initial steps toward a forest science stumbled on the very concept of the "forest," which by the middle eighteenth-century was ambiguously defined (Kiess 1998; Watkins 1998; Lowood 1991). Discussing this ambiguity, Watkins (1998) pointed out the variety of ways in which the term forest was applied over time, from one country to other. Exemplifying the English case, the author highlighted the different connotations of forest from medieval times to the modern period, explaining that the medieval Royal Forests were areas of special hunting rights for the monarchy. Some of them, such as Exmoor Forest, were comprised of just a few trees: "most were made up of tracts of land which could contain villages, heaths, arable land pasture and woodland" (Watkins 1998: 1). Sherwood Forest included the whole town of Nottingham, and most of it was comprised of agricultural lands and heaths. Watkins observed that at that time, "There

was no direct connection between the idea of forest and the concept of woodland: medieval forests were administrative units more akin to a modern national park than a plantation of trees. With the decline in Crown interest, especially from eighteenth century onwards, the term forest became increasingly associated with those wooded areas, such as New Forest and the Forest of Dean" (Watkins 1998: 2).

Similarly, Kiess (1998: 13) observed the application in Germany of the word *Forst*, which first appeared in the middle seventh-century, in a variety of different contexts: "Smaller woods, but also stretches of open country were called *Forst*." Discussing the possessions of the Abbey of Weissenburg, the author pointed out the "difference between ordinary woods called *silva* and the forest called *forastis*, that is a wood under special right," whose size was "expressed by the number of pigs which can be fed in the particular forest" (p. 15). These different connotations of the term "forest" that were being employed by the middle of the eighteenth-century did not permit a more precise definition of the concept that objectified its field of study. "Beginning in the 1760s, however, better-trained officials, equipped with publication for the exchange of ideas, promoted the notion that the forest could be defined precisely and studied objectively" (Lowood 1991: 320). In the early 1760s, Germany founded the first forestry school, consolidating the principles and practices of sound forest management that promised wood supply.

Emerging from the cameral science, the new forest science was shaping its contours as an independent discipline by disseminating specific rules and procedures to handle issues of forest management that allowed for better fiscal grid attainment. Discussing the emphasis on quantitative forest mathematics in these procedures, which

were aimed at quantifying forest wood production, Lowood (1991: 317) attributed it to "the spirit of quantification" that permeated State fiscal planning, which established "a tradition of quantitative resources management." Embedded in this spirit of quantification, foresters in particular were gradually developing special techniques for systematizing sound forest measurements that would fit into administrative practices and set the basis for the new science.

Examining these progressive techniques, Lowood (1991) pointed to the transition from the approach on area-based systems to one based on wood mass, as a decisive step in quantitative forest management. This wood mass approach was developed by J.G. Beckmann, a forester inspector from Saxony, whose "deep concern for preserving the wood supply led him to construct a system of forest economy that rested on practical technique for measuring the quantity of standing wood in the forest" (Lowood 1991: 325). Distinguishing trees though size category found in intervals of a few yards, Beckmann developed a method to determine the mass of wood for more precise forest assessment and official planning.

Mathematically oriented foresters, such as C.C. Oettelt, who used geometry to estimate volume or mass of wood, gradually improved Beckmann's method by coming up with measurements with such accuracy that they permitted not only to determine wood mass, but also to predict and control it. Shedding light on the mathematical reasoning that formed the basis of other methods to deal with forest management that were elaborated to fulfill fiscal concerns in Germany, Lowood (1991) showed how links were forged between administration and science that led to the formation of a regulated and standardized forest that could be abstracted and more efficiently controlled from

tables on officials' desks. Such an approach to the forest, which the author credited as entirely German, was thus elaborated based on the three quantitative principles that shaped the field of forestry science in Germany: minimum diversity, the balance sheet, and sustained yield. "The result was quantification and rationalization as applied to both the description of nature and the regulation of economic practice" (Lowood 1991: 316).

This German perspective of scientific forestry management produced monocultures of even-age forests, and it "became an archetype for imposing on disorderly nature the neatly arranged constructs of science" (Lowood 1991: 340). In historical terms, this perspective represented the creation of a new conceptualization of forests and modes of resource appropriation that was adopted by other countries, decisively influencing forest policies worldwide: "Theories, practices, and instructional models from Germany provided the starting point for every other national effort in forestry science and management until the end of the nineteenth century" (Lowood 1991: 317). Leading the way was France, which imported scientific forestry management in 1820, seven years before implementing its first National Forest Code. Emigrating to America, scientific forestry management positively influenced the conservation movement and forest policies in the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, led by professionals trained in German and French schools who created the concept of National Forests to designate state forest reserves for sustained timber production.

4.2.1.2 The movement to create American forest reserves

Western frontier expansion, coupled with changes in the land ownership structure and regulations to discipline access to and control over the forest resources, precipitated the creation of the first forest reserves in the West of the United States in the late nineteenth century, which preceded the consolidation of the National Forest System in

the first decade of the twentieth century. Looking at the origins of the national forest

system, Steen (1992: 4) stated that "The national forest story is a story about land…

During the nineteenth century, fully one-half of the nation was transferred from federal

ownership to state and private ownership —countless transactions of quarter-sections,

full sections, or more. Federal land agents dipping quill pens into inkwells and recording

by hand the fruits of three thousands statutes that Congress had passed by 1880 to dispose

of the public domain." According to Steen, the creation of the first forest reserves in the

late nineteenth century reverted the trend forged in Homestead programs, and constituted

"a major exception to the rule" (1992: 4) by providing the State large chunks of land to

maintain under forest cover, instead of for agricultural use.

The appearance of these forest reserves was also associated with the conservation

movement that emerged in the middle of the century, which was epitomized by the

creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872, and the first national forest nine years

later. Remarking on what he sees as a "conservation legacy" of the American forest

reserves, Steen (1992: 3) mentioned that "those who were the architects of the

conservation movement were invariably involved with the national forests." Similarly,

the historian Worster (1993) attributed the emergence of the conservation movement to a

reaction against what was considered a pervasive private land appropriation. Making a

direct relation between forest deterioration and the creation of the reserves, Worster

(1993: 103) emphasized that "beginning about a hundred years ago, the conservation

movement began to take form in the United States, focusing at first on establishing a

community interest in our forested lands, particularly in the western states and territories.

Under private exploitation, abetted by the old federal land disposal policies, American

forests were disappearing at an alarming rate, threatening the long-term security of the

nation."

Scholars such as Limerick (1992: 14-15), however, have questioned such an

assumption. The author observed that, although throughout the 1870s and 1880s, a

number of people used the phrase *timber famine* to express concerns about the prospect

of scarcity and advocated reforestation as a remedy, "the origins of this change in

thinking had surprisingly little to do with the West." Limerick remarked that by that time

in the Western U.S., forest exploitation existed "to support mines, or aboveground to

build and heat houses, the timber business of the Pacific Northwest and the Rockies had

barely began." Depletion of forests, such as that in the Great Lakes was a phenomenon

that had not yet occurred in the Western U.S. The author disagreed with the claim that

the "frontier ended in 1890," a renowned statement made by the historian Frederick J.

Turner in 1893, in which he proclaimed the closing of the "first period of American

history." Turner's statement that "the frontier had gone" came to decisively influence the

ideological basis of the conservation movement, helping to shape what Cronon (1995:

76) regarded as the "myth of the vanishing frontier."

Thus, arguing against the "myth of a vanished West," Limerick (1992: 13-14)

asserted that "the westward movement did not stop at 1890; millions more people moved

into the West in the twentieth century. If one went by numbers, one would have to call

the nineteenth century westward movement the frail prelude to the much more significant

twentieth century westward movement." According to the author, the forest reserves

created in the late nineteenth century in the West were not a response to immediate forest

deterioration caused by overexploitation, but "they came out of some people's genuine shift in mood, orientation, sense of future" (p. 15).

This "genuine shift" also reflected the concerns about the increasing demand for wood and the need to control the market for wood. Mapping out the logging industry in the East, Shands (1992: 23) pointed out that "Commercial logging on a grand scale came to Michigan in the 1860s, and shortly thereafter to Wisconsin and Minnesota. The magnificent white pines were cut first, with the timber sent to build Chicago and other Midwest cities. In 1892 some 9 billion board feet of white pine lumber was produced in the three states. That was the apogee of the white pine era in the Lake States; thereafter, the supply of white pine fell precipitously, and loggers turned to other species —maple, oak, hemlock, cedar, poplar, and jackpine, seeking for opportunistic markets."

The growing development of the timber industry soon motivated the creation of the American Forestry Association, a citizen's organization founded in 1875, whose importance was reflected in the incorporation of forest-based activities in the Executive Branch of the Department of Agriculture a year later, in 1876. The importance of both sectors in shaping American forest policies is highlighted by Steen (1992: 5), who noted that by 1890, the "U.S. Division of Forestry had grown in stature adequate to also be a key player along with the American Forestry Association." Together, these two institutions, representative of the timber industry, led the main efforts to create the first forest reserves in the West and to impose regulations on timber exploitation. As Steen (1992: 5) observed, "it was no coincidence that the driving force in both institutions was Bernhard Eduard Fernow, a German forester engineer who had immigrated to U.S. in 1876," where he became the third head of the Division of Forestry in 1886.

In his analysis of Fernow's importance to American national forest policy, Miller (1992: 289) noted that "he began his apprenticeship in the Prussian Forestry Department, and after that had received advanced training for two and a half years at the department's famed academy at Muenden, where he studied under G. Heyer, among others, and worked at several of the department's forests." Following his American wife, Fernow arrived in America in 1876. In the decade before he became the head of the Division of Forestry, he had only a few jobs in his profession, since, as Miller (1992: 289) noted, "forestry, as it was practiced in much of Europe, was generally unknown in the United States." However, the studies Fernow carried out on North American forests and the economic conditions of the lumber-based industries, promulgated him "as a driving force in the fledgling American Forest Congress" and to succeed Nathaniel Egleston, in 1888, at the Division of Forestry. There, Fernow found a poorly organized office without personnel to assist him, and "no delineation of a federal forest system, no public lands set aside for the practice of his profession" (Miller (1992: 290). Taking on the task to change this situation, Fernow engaged actively in defending the establishment of forest regulations and the adoption of a set of principles of forest management on behalf of the federal government.

Fernow strongly influenced the American Forestry Association (AFA) by disseminating German ideas that "forest growth is to be treated as a crop to be reproduced as soon as harvested," and that the timberlands should be "permanently invested capital, from which only the interest is used" (Fernow 1891, cited in Miller 1992: 291). Based on this perspective of the forest, AFA started to disseminate the "philosophy that timber and other resources should be made available in a rational and

economic manner" and defended the creation of forest reserves and regulations for the use of forest resources (Muhn 1992: 262). It was to the initiatives of the American Forestry Association that scholars have attributed the incorporation of the famous Section 24 in the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which allowed the President "to set apart and reserve… public land bearing forests… whether commercial value or not, as public reservations." A section that Gifford Pinchot, who became the first director of the U.S. Forest Service, defined in his Breaking New Ground (1947: 85) as "the most important legislation in the history of Forestry in America… the beginning and the basis of our whole National Forest system."

Although the Forest Reserve Act authorized the President to create forest reserves, there was no clear definition, regulation, or specification of administrative authority for the implementation and management of the reserves. Arnold (1992: 309) observed that, "the forest reserves had no original primary purpose… Forest reserves were intended to specifically preserve the watersheds, to provide for controlled timber cutting within reserves, to prevent fraud, monopoly… The original forest reserves were intended for both preservation and use." The ambiguity in the definition of the forest reserves was reflected in the creation of the Yellowstone Park Timberland Reserves that took place three weeks after the Forest Reserve Act had been voted on. This forest reserve was created in an area surrounding the southern and eastern limits of Yellowstone National Park, upon the request to expand the park's borders. However, instead, it was turned into the first national forest in the United States (Steen 1992). The current Grand Canyon

National Park[1] also was originally created, in 1893, as a forest reserve, the Grand Canyon

Forest Reserve.

The absence of specific administrative power to administer the forest reserves made

it difficult for the Department of Interior and the General Land Office, responsible for the

forest reserves, to advance beyond simply demarcating the reserves' areas. As Steen

(1992: 7) pointed out, "the job was only half done in 1891; still needed was authorization

to manage the reserves and clarification of the purposes for which they could be

established. Promptly in 1892, Congress began a six-year effort to round out a forest

reserve agenda." The Forest Management Act, passed into law in 1897, provided for the

first management of forest reserves and authorized funds for their administration, opening

the forest reserves to timber cutting, mining, and livestock grazing. Yet, it was just a first

step of a long journey until the National Forest System was established a decade later

with its clear conceptualization and definition of rules for managing the reserves. In this

process, Gifford Pinchot emerged as the most prominent personage, whom Woster (1987:

266) called "the major architect of the Progressive conservation ideology."

Managing national forests for the nation's economy: Gifford Pinchot studied at

the French Forest School at Nancy, where he gained knowledge of model forests not only

in France, but also in Germany and Switzerland. Returning to America in the early

1890s, Pinchot's first job was at Biltmore, to work on a management plan for George

Vanderbilt's project for the first American large-scale experiment in forestry. The

project had been proposed to Vanderbilt by Frederick L. Olmsted, the famous landscape

architect who designed Central Park, Boston's Fens, and Niagara Falls, to cite a few

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[1] In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson signed into legislation a law that transformed the reserve into the Grand Canyon National Park.

(Spirn 1995). In Biltmore, Spirn (1995: 100) noted, Olmsted saw "an opportunity to demonstrate the promise of forestry techniques for the management of land used for recreation." It was also an opportunity for Pinchot, who was anxious to apply the forest management knowledge he had acquired in Europe, as he recorded in his biography: "Here was my chance. Biltmore could be made to prove what America did not yet understand, that trees could be cut and the forest preserved at one and the same time" (Pinchot 1947: 48). Working under Olmsted's supervision at Biltmore, and also as a consulting forester for other jobs, Pinchot gained notoriety in forestry circles, advocating, alongside Fernow, the principles of sustained-yield forest management. Worster (1993: 145) observed that, "for both men, nature was little more than a utilitarian commodity to be managed and harvested for the common good."

Pinchot's political ability also helped him to climb up the power structures. In 1896, he became secretary of the Congress of National Forest Commission, which was established by the National Academy of Sciences at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, to investigate the forest reserve situation in the West and to formulate a call for action. This call had originated within the American Forestry Association meeting in 1895 (Miller 1992), which was worried about the meager results in the implementation of forest reserve policy. Besides Pinchot, the National Academy of Sciences Commission was constituted by Arnold Hague, William Brewer, Alexander Agassiz, Wolcott Gibbs, and John Muir, the last as an unofficial commission member. The Commission was charged to produce a report to present to President Cleveland on Washington's Birthday in 1897.

The Commission's report recommended that remaining American public lands not be excluded from future uses, stating that: "They must be made to perform their part in the economy of the Nation. Unless the reserved lands of the public domain are made to contribute to the welfare and prosperity of the country, they should be thrown open to settlement and the whole system of reserved lands abandoned" (cited in Worster 1987: 266). With this emphasis on the "nation's economy," the report not only led to the enactment of the Forest Management Act, sanctioned in the next year, but also to the President setting aside twenty million acres of forest reserves for the practice of forestry.

During this process, Pinchot replaced, in 1898, Fernow in the U.S. Division of Forestry. Having resigned in the summer of 1898, Fernow moved to the New York State College of Forestry at Cornell University, where he became the head of the newly state-funded school of forestry, the first undergraduate forestry school in the United States. In Baltimore, in the same year, Pinchot was succeeded by Carl A. Schenck, a German forester, who, besides taking charge of managing Vanderbilt's forest experiment, also founded a forestry school at the high school level (Schenck 1974). With Scheck in America, Butler (1974) noted, there were three forestry engineers in the country, each of whom helped establish the base for the implementation of scientific forestry management at academic institutions and in governmental agencies.

In Washington, at the Division of Forestry, Pinchot undertook efforts to apply on a national scale the notions of scientific forestry he had learned in Europe. Following the ideas disseminated by Fernow, Pinchot (1907: 16) defended that, as in the case of agricultural lands, forest reserves also "should be managed to produce the most valuable crops of timber and wood, year after year, without interruption." Examining Pinchot's

achievements, Worster (1987: 267) remarked that "behind Pinchot's conservation philosophy lay an environmental tradition stretching all the way back to the eighteenth century: progressive, scientific agriculture." Pinchot also defended the need for trained professionals, whose absence in the United States led him to donate, with his family, $150, 000 to Yale University to open the first graduate forestry school in 1900, offering a two-year course leading to a master's degree in forestry (Butler 1974). The objective of the Yale Forest School was to provide professional foresters for the government's Division of Forestry, which was being administrated by Pinchot.

To guarantee support to implement his forestry plans for large forest reserves, Pinchot worked alongside the mining industry, which depended heavily on forest resources, but, as Dempsey (1992) noted, was afraid of being prevented from exploring in the forest reserves. Pinchot worked actively with The American Institute of Mining Engineers (AIME), founded in 1871, to disseminate his plan for rational management of forests. At the 1898 AIME meeting, he assured them that mining would not be prevented in forest reserves. This had been the policy of Fernow, the former administrator of the Division of Forestry, who had dedicated part of his career to mining and who, for most of his life, was actively associated with the American Institute of Mining Engineers. Dempsey (1992: 102) noted that Pinchot "built upon Fernow's relationship with the mining industry and used every possible public relations tactic to keep the support of miners and other user groups." In his job, Pinchot worked to reassure miners that "prospecting and mining are unchecked. The resources of the National Forests must be used and the country opened out. Therefore the more mining and prospecting, the better" (Pinchot 1907: 11).

With the support of the mining industry for forestry, Pinchot was able to create an effective governmental agency to administer forest reserves. Under Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, a president who was acclaimed for his achievements in expanding U.S. national parks and forests, Pinchot managed to transfer the forest agencies from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture in 1905, when he established the Bureau of Forestry. Two years later, in 1907, the Bureau of Forestry was renamed the U.S. Forest Service, and all forest reserves under its jurisdiction were renamed as national forests. In that year, the U.S. Forest Service already had a hundred and fifty National Forests established in the West, with a hundred thirty-four of these reserves created just between 1905 and 1907, totaling over 140 millions acres. With these large chunks of forest lands available to manage, Pinchot (1907) could apply his ambitious plans *to prove that trees could be cut and the forest preserved at the same time*.

Following the tradition that originated in Germany to set aside for the State direct control over forest resources, the U.S. Forest Service, under Pinchot's administration, consolidated in America the principles of scientific forestry management, and inaugurated a new model of forest administration, which was soon expanded to Canada and Central America. After World War II, National Forests were also expanded to South America, where they were adopted in Brazil in the late 1960s, and soon after, implemented in the Amazon region. Like in the Western United States, in the Amazon region, the creation and establishment of National Forests was directly associated with State policies for expanding economic frontiers.

4.3 The Political Economy of Brazilian Forests

4.3.1   Initial Proposals to Create National Forests

The most effective voices, at the beginning of the twentieth-century, calling attention to the problem of deforestation and the need for State regulations to protect forests are attributed to scientists employed in the various scientific institutions created in the last quarter of the previous century. Many of them were Europeans, familiar with forest management experiences in their countries, who knew about the creation of forest reserves in America. Their calls for environmentalist protection had them facing what Dean (1996: 232) described as a "structural contradiction," on account of being employed by governmental agencies that were dominated by large landowners who opposed any restriction on propriety rights or access to natural resources resulting from conservationist measures.

Among these scientists, Alberto Loefgren was a pioneering force behind the campaign in Brazil for the implementation of a national forest code, national parks, and a national forest service. Loefgren was a Swedish botanist who arrived in Brazil as part of a botanical expedition and was contracted to direct the Meteorological and Botanical sections of the Geological and Geographical Commission of the state of São Paulo. Dean (1996: 233) credited him to be "the most effective of the first generation of Paulista scientists," observing that, "by 1899, through the force of Loefgren's arguments and his connections with the landed elite, his Botanical Section was redesignated the Forest and Botanical Service, elevated to the same rank as the commission," which was responsible for promoting "conservation, better exploitation, and reforestation of the forests." During the time Loefgren was in charge, he carried out several experiments to test the domestication of imported plants, and he examined numerous varieties of native plants

for their foraging and medicinal potential, and as sources of industrial raw material. He also advocated conservative exploitation of the woodlands through rational forest management, and the implementation of state and national forests similar to those established in the United States.

Another important scientist at that time was the German botanist Hermann von Ihering, who came to Brazil, invited by Landislau de Souza Mello Neto, director of the National Museum, a botanist trained in France. When the Paulista Museum was created in 1895, von Ihering became the director, and, later, in 1910 he founded the Alto da Serra Biological Station. With 500 hectares, Von Ihering donated this Ecological Station to the state, which came to constitute the oldest state park in Brazil. During the time von Ihering spent in Brazil, he developed several studies on tropical forests and he was very engaged in defending governmental programs promoting forest and fauna conservation. In his article on the "devastation and conservation of the forests," written in 1911, von Ihering (1911) pointed out that forest conservation depended on three major problems that were related to firewood, the exploitation of timber resources, and the protection of watersheds and the rivers' course. In this article, he also defended the importance of disseminating silviculture, and proposed a program to organize a forest service in Brazil.

State authorities were not completely unconcerned with forest deterioration, despite the timid efforts to protect forest resources. In 1911, the Horto Florestal do Rio de Janeiro was separated from the Botanical Garden, to produce and distribute seedlings of forest and fructiferous species. In the 1920s, the Horto Florestal was transformed into the federal Forest Service. In his message to Congress in 1920 to set up a Forest Service, President Epitâcio Pessoa declared that "among the civilized countries that have large

extensions of forests and rich lands, probably Brazil is the only one that does not have a

forest code… the need to preserve and restore the country's forest cover must be one of

our major concerns" (cited in Pereira 1950: 14). The Forest Service, thus, was created as

a "special section" of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, but it did not

have substantial official financial support or a code to implement a forest policy, and, as

such, a decade later its activities continued to be limited to the production and

distribution of seedlings, most of them for street beautification. In terms of forest

reserves, the Forest Service was put in charge of managing the forest areas that protected

the water sources that supplied the city of Rio de Janeiro, and it requested that states

donate forested areas to implement reserves.

In the early 1920s, Brazil started to have sporadic contacts with the U.S. Forest

Service, which had begun to demonstrate an interest in forest resources in Latin America

and eventually collaborated with the Brazilian government. Focusing on these initial

contacts, Dean (1996: 284-285) attributed such an interest to the fact that "shortly after

World War I, which had prodigally consumed hardwood reserves, the U.S. Forest Service

became convinced that the industrial countries would soon experience a critical shortage

of hardwoods and that the United States would much increase its imports from Latin

America." Looking at the future, these initial contacts, however, do not seem to have

accomplished much more than to establish a diplomatic relationship. Some American

foresters were sent by the U.S. Forest Service to Brazil, where they alerted government

officials about the need for specialized forest management, as did Roy Nash (1926: 381),

who suggested that Brazilians "should be sent to Nancy or Oxford or Yale to be trained

as tropical foresters." Some foresters were also hired to help organize the newly created

Forest Service (Dean 1996). The major American forestry experience in Brazil in the late 1920s, was not focused on managing timber, but on the large-scale cultivation of rubber trees by the Ford Motor Company in the Amazon region.

4.3.2 The First Forest Code and Forest Reserves

The decade of the 1930s initiated in Brazil the creation and establishment of forest reserves and regulations on resource exploitation, which came into effect through the creation of the first national Forest Code issued in 1934. Several changes in the political and economic spheres precipitated changes in the power structure of the State during the period known as the "Second Republic." At the beginning of the twentieth century, the coffee economy showed signs of the chronic crises that it had been suffering from since the abolition of slavery in 1888. The crisis had worsened with the expansion of the coffee economy to other countries, which led to increased market competition, and with an international crisis that reached its peak in World War I. Several government measures to protect Brazilian coffee prices, such as the prohibition on planting new coffee trees in 1903, and subsidies, were ineffective in preventing the effects caused later by the 1929 financial crisis, which led several great coffee landowners into bankruptcy.

The sectors of the emerging industrial, urban middle-class, and working classes associated with regional elites who were discontented with the privileged coffee landowners from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro who dominated the State at the time, set in motion the "revolution" of 1930, which brought Getúlio Vargas into power, a political chief from the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul who led a populist alliance. The aspirations of these classes for economic liberalization and State democratization called for a new constitution, which was enacted in 1934. The issues surrounding forest resources, which had become the subject of intense debate during the last two decades,

were addressed with the creation of the first national Forest Code. In the same year, in 1934, the Vargas government also created the Federal Forest Council, and several other codes to regulate scientific expeditions, water use, mining, and, later, in 1938, hunting, and in 1943, fishing.

Passed into law on January 23, through the decree n° 23.793, the 1934 Forest Code stated in its first article that "the existing forests in the national territory constitute assets of common interest to all inhabitants of the country, whose property rights are recognized, except for the limitations established by law, especially by this Code." Recognizing forests as a domain of public interest, the 1934 Forest Code gave the State the responsibilities to manage and protect forest resources, denying, for the first time, the absolute right of property by imposing several regulations that prohibited, even on private holdings, deforestation along watercourses, and the cutting of trees sheltering rare species and those protecting watersheds (Dean 1996; Volpato 1981).

The 1934 Forest Code classified forests into four categories, which were defined by the function attributed to them. The first category of forests was called *Floresta Protetora* (Protector Forest), which included forests located in watersheds and along water courses that helped diminish soil erosion, fix dunes, protect sites of rare natural beauty, and/or house rare species of native fauna, and defend nation's borders. The second category of forest, *Floresta Remanescente* (Remaining Forest), included remaining native forests that were considered necessary to be preserved for their biological and aesthetic values. These forests would comprise the national, state, and municipal parks. The third category, *Floresta Modelo* (Model Forest) included forests cultivated by private initiatives for economic purposes. And, finally, the fourth category,

Floresta de Rendimento (Profitable Forest) included all forests that did not fit in the previous three categories.

The Code placed Protector and Remaining Forests under direct State control, which meant that any private property located in these types of forest would be possessed by the State and the owner indemnified. The Federal Forest Service, located in the Ministry of Agriculture, was put in charge of classifying and determining the categories of forests, in addition to creating national parks and the establishment of model forests. It was also responsible for the inspection of the new forest legislation, and the implementation of regional and municipal offices, which were implemented gradually. While the offices were being implemented, the responsibility for enforcing the forest legislation fell to local authorities. This continued, for the most part, up to the late 1960s, when a new Forest Code was created. The large spectrum of the Forest Service's responsibilities, and the vagueness of the forest categories, led to successive redefinitions and restructuring of the governmental apparatus, which had been put into operation in the second half of the1930s, after Getulio Vargas' coup d'état in November of 1937.

With the backing of the army, Getúlio Vargas closed the Congress and established a corporatist dictatorship that not only frustrated the democratic aspirations of some sectors that had helped him come into power, but also, and especially, increased State interventionism. Reorganizing the Ministry of Agriculture in 1938, through decree n° 982, Vargas created new departments and structurally rearranged previous ones. The Forest Service was directly subordinated to the Minister of Agriculture, and it was designated to promote the protection of the country's forests, their inspection and conservation, silviculture, and the organization of the national parks and forest reserves.

The Forest Service was incorporated into the Second Section of the Irrigation, Reforestation, and Colonization Service that was part of the National Department of Vegetable Production. In 1939, this government also created the National Parks Section, which was responsible for the creation of the first three national parks: the Itatiaia National Park in 1937, and Iguaçu and Serra dos Orgãos in 1939, all in the southeast region (Barretto 2001a).

All of these structural changes in the Ministry of Agriculture reflected, in part, government concerns with fuel shortages that had occurred during the pre-wartime period, and led to the promotion of reforestation programs along railroad tracks (Dean 1996: 263). However, the main reason behind the government's direct intervention in wood production was not the fear of shortage, but the surplus of wood and the need to regulate the timber market. In the 1940s, the timber industry, which had its origins in the Southern Brazil Lumber and Colonization Company[2] from the 1910s, and had expanded over the next two decades, started to suffer as a result of a large stock of wood that was not reaching the market due to deficiencies in transportation, which caused the deterioration of two-thirds of the wood production. A second problem was related to the steady decline in wood prices in Buenos Aires, the only export market at the time, on account of the large quantity of wood sent there (Volpato 1981; Gualberto 1949). These

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[2] In 1906, the British *Brazil Railway Company* started to construct a railroad to connect São Paulo to the city of Rio Grande, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. This railroad was administered by the entrepreneur Percival Faquhar, the same man who was in charge of the construction of the Madeira-Mamoré Railway, the first railway built in 1907-1912 in the Amazon region, which linked Santo Antonio in the state of Rondônia to Guajará-Mirin, on the frontier with Bolivia. As part of the accord behind the São Paulo-Rio Grande railroad construction, the Brazilian government gave the Brazil Railway Company lands fifteen kilometers on both sides of the railway. In 1909, the Brazil Railway Company created the Southern Brazil Lumber and Colonization Company, a consortium with American and Canadian capital, to develop colonization programs and to set up the biggest timber enterprise of South America, especially to exploit the pine tree *Araucaria angustifolia*.

claims were taken to the federal government that determined restrictions to timber production, to the establishment of the sawmills, and to the amount of wood to be exported. Additionally, in 1941, the federal government also created the *Instituto Nacional do Pinho* (INP -Pine National Institute), which came to be the operational basis of Brazilian forest policies by the late 1960s.

Initially, the INP was created as the Pine Service, subordinated to the Defense Commission of the National Economy, however, a year later, on October 08, 1942, it was restructured as an institute through decree n° 4.813. On October 28, through decree n° 10.744, the federal government also legalized the *Instituto Nacional do Mate* (INM -Mate National Institute, related to the industry of the *erva-mate* (*Illex paraguaisenses*)), which had been created in 1938. Both institutes were subordinated to the Ministry of Work, Industry, and Commerce, and their main objective was to defend the class interests of entrepreneurs related to, respectively, the pine tree and *erva-mate* industry. Although "national" in their title, these two institutes worked effectively in the four southernmost states of São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul, where the industrial economy of both forest sectors was in operation. By this time, the cellulose industry for paper production had also started to be developed, including the well known Melhoramentos Company and Klabin Paraná Company (Rodrigues 1999).

Constituting the main political instrument of the timber entrepreneur class, INP's president was selected by the country's president, but INP's policies were defined by the Deliberation Commission (*Junta Deliberativa*), composed by eight representatives of the entrepreneur class (producers, industrials and exporters) and of the government of the four southern states, which were responsible for 80% of the national timber production.

The timber entrepreneurs also provided the resources for INP's maintenance expenses, which were obtained from a tax of 1% of the timber produced. This financial independence from the State, certainly, afforded the INP better performance in the activities carried out, and gave the entrepreneur class greater power, particularly with regard to controlling wood prices.

Defending the regulations of wood prices that were set by INP, its president, Virgilio Guadalberto, expressed in the late 1940s: "In relation to prices, the good performance obtained from the control established by INP assured timber commerce and industry such prosperity that it came to be one of the main products for export (4º place)" (Guadalberto 1949: 11). Yet, in the same article, INP's president remarked on the good performance of the rationing measures imposed on sawmill production since the beginning of 1940, which reduced timber production to two-thirds of its capacity: from 45,000 railway wagons of sawn timber down to 15,000, which represented an "equivalent volume to the normal stock required to maintain the regular market supply" (1949: 14). In other words, in order to regulate prices, timber production was operating at a scale much smaller than its real potential.

Yet, INP's strength was not derived only from its capacity to regulate the price of wood, but also from the technical and institutional support it provided to the timber enterprise. Just after being created, in addition to the headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's capital at the time, INP implemented four regional offices in the states of São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul, as well as twenty seven county offices. According to Guadalberto (1949), in 1949, INP's Deliberation Commission dictated that half of its revenue should be applied in silviculture, which led the institute to

implement, over a period of five years, eight forestry experimental stations in the four

states, and one in the state of Minas Gerais, where a plantation of around fourteen million

tree pines (*Araucaria angustifolia*) had been established, and many other native and

exotic species tested. To implement these forestry stations, IPN requested land from the

states, but most of them were purchased, such as in the case of the first Forestry Station,

implemented in São Paulo, in the municipality of Capão Bonito. The land for this Forest

Station was bought in two parts: the first comprised 1,819.6 hectares, and the second,

456,03 hectares, to be reforested with *Araucaria angustifolia*, and, afterward, *Pinus*

elliottii was also introduced. INP's stations were not forested areas, but most of them

were old and unproductive coffee farms. Later, when the IBDF was created in 1967, all

of these INP Forestry Stations were transformed into National Forests (Salomão 1997).

The reforestation program developed by INP built on a similar program that had

been carried out by Edmundo Navarro de Andrade, when he founded the Forest Service

of the Paulista Railroad Company in 1904. By the late 1940s, there were eighteen of

these forestry stations established along the railway, comprised of plantations of thirty-

eight million eucalyptus trees.[3] The dissemination of eucalyptus plantations by the

middle century had been considerable in state of São Paulo, where it was estimated that

over a billion trees had been cultivated (ABEF 1952: 241). Highlighting the

achievements of INP's reforestation efforts, its president attributed to the timber industry

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[3] In 1904, the president of the Paulista Railroad, Antônio Prado, a former minister of agriculture under the Empire, hired his young nephew Edmundo Navarro de Andrade, an agronomist, to establish a forest station. Navarro de Andrade created a number of experimental stations to test several native and exotic species to determine which would provide better profits as fuelwood and fast-growing species. This proved to be the genus *Eucalyptus*, a native of Australia, (Barretto 2001a; Dean 1996). Considered *the father of eucalyptus culture* in Brazil (Macedo and Machado 2003), Navarro de Andrade organized during his administration of the Forest Paulista Railroad Service seventeen forest stations covering an area of 175 square kilometers, with large plantations of distinct eucalyptus varieties.

entrepreneurs "the glory of being provided the financial resources for the decisive implementation of national silviculture" (Guadalberto 1949: 13-14). The president, however, recognized that the timber industry suffered from *difficulties of a technical order*, and advocated the need for further investments in technical scientific knowledge, which was increasingly recognized as being deficient.

By the middle of the 1940s, especially after World War II, the southern timber industry faced several challenges. On the political front, President Getúlio Vargas was overthrown from power in 1945, and democratization was again underway. A year later, the new government created the Araripe-Apodi Forest Reserve in the northeast region, which is considered to constitute the first Brazilian national forest.[4]

4.3.3   Difficulties to Export Brazilian Timber

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the timber industry in the south of Brazil faced problems selling to the external market. These problems were accentuated with the world crisis in the postwar period. Although Argentina continued to be the principal export market, restrictive economic measures implemented overseas directly negatively impacted wood prices. A report written by the Brazilian government and sent to the Provisional Agenda of the Fourth Meeting of the Latin-American Forest Commission that

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[4] This forest reserve was created comprising two parts, one in the Serra do Arararipe, in the states of Ceará, Pernambuco and Piauí, and other, in the Serra do Apodi, between the states of Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte. Not clearly defined, this forest reserve was later classified as a *Floresta de Rendimento,* and its decree (nº 9.226/1946) established that, at the appropriate time, regulations for the area would be defined and the reserve would be administered by the National Parks Section of the Forest Service. Arimatea (1996) attributed the creation of this forest reserve to conservationist concerns related to the protection of the watersheds that irrigated the valleys of the Serra do Arararipe and Serra do Apodi, which, besides comprising islands of forest, also encompassed different ecosystems, such as *cerrado* and *caatinga*. Given the ecological characteristics of the area, Castro (1997) noted that according to the 1934 Forest Code, the Araripe-Apodi Forest Reserve should have been more appropriately classified in the category of Protection or Remaining Forests, which were designated to the national parks. Considering it a mistake, the author remarked that such a misconstruction was kept in the 1965 Forest Code that designated the reserve's area as a national forest, instead of a conservation area.

took place in Buenos Aires in June 1952 (ABEF 1952), informed that the Brazilian timber industry was experiencing a severe crisis as a result of the currency devaluation implemented by England in 1948, and followed by other European countries, which made Brazilian wood prices less competitive. The report also mentioned that a "temporary solution" had been taken through accords that guaranteed the exchange of Brazilian wood for foreign industrialized goods, but it had ceased in 1951, aggravating again the vulnerable situation of the external wood commerce.

The international crisis accentuated existing concerns over competitive prices for wood. The lack of price competitiveness was attributed, mainly, to Brazil's rudimentary methods of timber exploitation and production, as well as to inadequate transportation infrastructure. As mentioned in the 1952 Brazilian report, in general, the felling of trees and the production of planks were done manually with axes or manual saws, and planks were "transported to the sawmills by wagons drawn by oxen, trucks, or tractor" (ABEF 1952: 242). INP's president Guadalberto had discussed the need to improve the Brazilian timber industry in order to be able to offer competitive prices on the international market. He pointed out the need to "improve the industry's technical level and the methods of work in all phases of timber production in order to assure that all types of wood, of uniform quality, have competitive prices" (Guadalberto 1949: 11). For him, this depended fundamentally on the development of scientific research and the promotion of specialized technical training. INP had already put in motion some steps, such as the establishment of the School for Timber Classification and Measurement in Joinvile, in the state of Santa Catarina, and other projects in association with research institutes to

train professionals for the "practice of the rational administration of forests" (Guadalberto 1949: 12).

INP's president's view was to increase Brazilian wood production in the international market, and he was also conscious of the importance of political and technical articulation with international forestry agencies. He advocated that "Brazil cannot remain estranged or secondary in the debates in which forest issues are examined by international congresses" (Guadalberto 1949: 12). Reflecting these concerns, INP participated in 1947 in international conferences on forests in Czechoslovakia and Swaziland, and managed to hold in Brazil the Latin-American Conference on Forests and Forest Products, which took place in Teresópolis, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, in 1948. As a "contribution to the Conference," INP started to publish the *Anuário Brasileiro de Economia Florestal* (ABEF – Brazilian Forest Economy Yearbook), which reported not only INP's activities, but also forest research that was being carried out in Brazil and in other countries, becoming the main publication disseminating scientific knowledge on forest issues.

In 1953, INP also organized the First Brazilian Forest Congress from September 13-19 in Curitiba, capital of the state of Paraná, with the participation of several sectors of the government and the entrepreneur class. Besides several recommendations for the improvement of the timber industry, the Conference also suggested that "studies and research in the realm of forestry be intensified, to obtain, in the shortest time possible, the conservation of forests and the reforestation of devastated areas" (ABEF 1953: 124). To improve forest scientific knowledge, the Conference recommended the creation of a specific discipline of Silviculture in the Agriculture Colleges in Brazil and the National

Forest School. In addition, it recommended establishing "valuable collaborations with the technicians belonging to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations… to foster a continued exchange of national and foreign foresters" (ABEF 1953: 126).

FAO started in 1951 to carry out economic studies in the forests of the Amazon region to gather data of interest for the improvement of regional timber production (Heinsdijk 1963: 197). This collaboration was important not only in terms of having provided the first studies on Amazonian timber potentialities, but also in the implementation of the first undergraduate forestry school in Brazil.

4.3.4 FAO's Collaboration in the Amazon Region and the First Forestry School

FAO's collaboration was initiated in the early 1950s to carry out studies on Amazon forests. In 1951, former President Getúlio Vargas came into power for the second time as Brazil's president. In his new government mandate for "nationalist development," the exploitation of natural resources by State monopolies was made a priority (Guimarães 1991). In his previous government, Vargas had created the National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM) in 1934, the Vale do Rio Doce Company (CVRD) in 1942 for iron ore exploitation, and the National Steel Company in 1945. In his second term, Vargas nationalized, in 1952, the Special Steels Company (ACESITA), founded in 1942, and created the Brazilian Oil Company (PETROBRÁS) and the São Franscisco Hydroelectric Company (CHESF) in 1953.

Brazil depended heavily on forest resources for domestic and industrial energy needs. Estimates indicate that wood and charcoal represented 79 percent of all energy consumed in Brazil in the late 1940s (Dean 1996). This led the Vargas government to turn its attention to the northern region of the country. In his first term, Vargas'

government had been responsible for the short revival of the Amazonian rubber economy during World War II, when approximately fifty-five thousand migrants from the northeast were led to the Amazon region. In his new mandate, the Vargas government created the Superintendency for the Valorization of the Amazon (SPVEA) in 1953 to implement development programs to be sponsored by a special fund. In the same year, in order to proceed with regional economic development planning, the federal government established the geo-political category of "Amazônia Legal" (Legal Amazônia) through Law nº 1806 (Pandolfo 1990). This expanded the frontiers of the Amazon region by incorporating vast areas of the states of Maranhão, Mato Grosso and Goiás (the area that is currently the state of Tocantins, created in 1988).

Following post-war development policies on economic planning, the second Vargas government created new economic sectors, seeking to increase natural resource exploitation, especially mining and timber. The first industry to be established in the region was in the early 1950s, ICOMI, a consortium of Brazilian companies and Bethlehem Steel, put in operation to exploit manganese deposits in Amapá (Schmink and Wood 1992). In this period, FAO provided the Brazilian government with assistance to develop a regional timber industry.

Under the UN/FAO Expanded Technical Assistance Program, signed in April 1951 by the Minister of Agriculture, studies were initially developed by a team of three foresters, Kelvin McGrath, Maurice Gallant, and René Gachot, the team's head, who arrived in the Amazon region in late November. The team was to provide information on three issues: timber exploitation and transportation; the timber industry, sawmills and the preparation of personnel; and, commercial potential and distribution of timber. After a

year, the first report written by FAO's team for the Brazilian government asserted that in

the Amazon basin there was no "true forest exploitation as it is generally conceived.

Wood extraction is just an appendix of the rural economy" (Gachot 1952: 245). The

FAO team also found that timber production was sporadic, based on few species that

were exploited manually, and was not very profitable, due primarily to the large distances

between production centers and the market, and the precarious means of transportation.[5]

The few sawmills found in the area were badly equipped and lacked trained personnel.

FAO's experts also pointed out several ecological and economic problems regarding the

precarious conditions of wood extraction in the region. In their view, unplanned wood

exploitation would inevitably put some species at risk, as was happening with the *Pau

rosa* tree (*Aniba rosaeodora*), which the experts suggested to no longer exploit.

Despite the meager timber production found, the FAO team indicated that there

existed a great potential for the improvement of the timber industry in the Amazon

region, although it would require long-term planning. The team pointed to the immensity

of the region, and emphasized the lack of data as a significant challenge that had to be

overcome in order to produce the information needed to "determine the nature and

importance of the forest industries that should be created and developed. This job will be

inevitably long…" (Gachot 1952: 246). They presented a work plan, which was divided

in two parts. The first part was a short-term program to immediately improve the existing

timber production system, through the introduction of mechanical sawmills and the

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[5] FAO's final report informed that, "one may say that the Amazon Valley is still in a stage of unorganized forest exploitation. Wood is delivered on a contractual basis. This means that it is impossible for anyone wanting wood in quantities of 5 to 10 or 50 m^3 to buy it at a sawmill from existing stocks. A wood contractor would have to be contacted, who would deliver the wood sometime in the future, as the trees would have to be chosen and cut first" (Heinsdijk 1966: 17).

training of personnel. For the training of skilled workers for the wood industry, the FAO team proposed the creation of the Wood Technology Center, which was inaugurated in 1957. Placed under the authority of the SPVEA, this Center was installed in the city of Santarém, and, in 2002, it become the Federal Rural University of Amazônia (UFRA), with an emphasis on forestry.

The second part was a long-term program, which proposed a series of forest inventories to assess the most favorable forested areas for industrial development, and the implementation of research stations to study tropical silviculture and to install a pilot project for the production of pulp paper. The FAO foresters highlighted that without "carrying out a study of the forest and its potential, it will not be possible to think seriously about the elaboration of a rational plan… indispensable to the development of the existing wealth" (Gachot 1952: 247). In order to accomplish this, they considered it crucial that FAO's collaboration and the direct cooperation of Brazilian technicians be continued. The FAO proposed to proceed with extensive forest studies to scientifically determine the ecological characteristics and timber potential before implementing development forest policies. These initial FAO studies set up the basis for further scientific knowledge production on forests, which guided the forest policies implemented by the military government in the region in the late 1960s.

These long-term studies were carried out in the region beginning in 1953 with new technicians sent by FAO. Dammis Heinsdijk, a forester with five years experience in Surinam, supervised and trained the team that undertook forest inventories. Designated as the Forest Inventory Section of the UN-FAO Mission, forest inventories were carried out, by 1961, in ten micro-regions in the state of Pará, two in the state of Amazonas, and

one in Amapá, at the time a territory. Besides supervising the inventory work in the

Amazon Valley, at the request of the Director of the Federal Service, Heinsdijk also

carried out a forest inventory in the south of the country.

The second part of the FAO Mission was related to the silviculture program. John

Pitt, a specialist in silviculture with extensive experience in Africa and Asia, was

designated to establish several research stations to study the dynamics of Amazon forests

in order to elaborate a Technical Plan for Orderliness and Management of the Amazonian

Forest, with the objective "to domesticate, cultivate and exploit economically the forest"

(Pitt 1969). Pitt installed five research stations, one in Curuá-Una, two in Santarém, and

two in Amapá. In Amapá, Pitt carried out experimentations alongside the railway that

transported ICOMI's manganese, where he introduced and studied the behavior of exotic

species. Initiating silvicultural practices in Amazônia, Pitt spent seven years in the

region, up to 1961, when the accord for FAO's technical collaboration terminated, and he

left to teach Tropical Silviculture at Oxford University.

Besides providing access to data collected, the final report of FAO's studies also

provided several recommendations to the Brazilian government for "sound Forest

Administration" (Heinsdijk 1966: 2). Among them, the report recommended a program

of forestry extension to train professionals, the establishment of forest reserves, and a

restructuring of the State forest apparatus. It was "recommended that the present

Department of Renewable Natural Resources and the Instituto Nacional do Pinho be

combined into a single independent Federal Agency called 'The Federal Forest

Administration' to be placed directly under the President of the Republic" (Heinsdijk

1966: 1). The author also recommended that the FAO Forest Inventory Section be

incorporated into a Management Planning Department, which "should be charged with the preparation of management plans for all the Forest Reserves to secure their protection and to place them under proper management to secure their sustained productivity" (Heinsdijk 1966: 2). Based on these recommendations, Brazil created in 1961 the first forest reserve in Amazônia, the Caxuianã Forest Reserve. This forest reserve, however, was only implemented much later by the military government, which also followed the recommendation to unite the dispersed forestry agencies into one single federal administration, creating the Brazilian Institute for Forest Development (IBDF) in 1967.

FAO's Mission also included contributing to create and implement the first forestry undergraduate school in Brazil, which was founded in 1960. The proposal to create a National Forest School had been repeatedly defended in the forestry debates that had been taking place since the first Latin-American Conference in Teresópolis in 1948. Some South American countries had already implemented forestry schools, such as Colombia in 1950, Chile in 1952, and Argentina in 1958. In 1956, when President Jucelino Kubitschek took over, David de Azambuja, an agronomist with a specialization in silviculture, was designated director of the Forest Service and he initiated a campaign to create a forestry school (Macedo and Machado 2003). The proposal to create the National Forest School (ENF) was written in 1958 by Paulo Ferreira de Souza. Upon its publication, the proposal found fertile soil in the environmental movement and helped mobilize public opinion about the problems of forest exploitation. A working group was created to draw up an action plan to deal with forest issues. The group was comprised of David de Azambuja, Wanderbilt Duarte de Barros (Vegetal Production National Department director), Victor A. Farah (Forest National Council president), Armando N.

Sampaio (Forest Council of São Paulo's president), Laércio Osse (Service Forest chief of the Belgo-Mineira Steel Company), and Arthur Miranda Bastos (Head of the Forest Inventory Section of the UN-FAO Mission).

This working group incorporated in their plan Souza's proposal for a National Forest School (ENF), to be installed at the Agronomy National School (ENA) of the Rural University of Brazil, in Rio de Janeiro. Created officially in May 30, 1960, through the decree nº 48.247, the ENF, however, was designated to operate at the State Rural University of Minas Gerais, in Viçosa. According to Macedo and Machado (2003), the President's decision to move the location of ENF was based on his desire to privilege his birth state. Classes at ENF initiated in May 1960, and a new accord with FAO was established to send professors to teach at the school. Yet, the poor installations at Viçosa University, and political problems between the state of Minas Gerais and the federal government, almost ended the accord with FAO. This led to the transfer, in late 1963, of ENF to Curitiba, to Paraná University. Remarking on FAO's cooperation in the creation of this first Brazilian forestry school, Macedo and Machado (2003: 55) asserted that "the FAO's accord had crucial importance for the forest science in Brazil, as well as for shaping the outline of the Brazilian forest professional."

Discontented with the transference of EFN to Curitiba, the state of Minas Gerais created, in February 1964, the Superior School of Forests (ESF), the second Brazilian forestry school. After the military's coup d'état in March 1964, the government promoted a vast reform of the educational system, and several other forestry schools were created, training the professionals hired by the government forest agencies.

4.4 The Geo-Political Project for the Amazon Forest

> "*The day of the tropical hardwoods is at hand.*"
> —R. Nash (1926: 382)

Although government efforts to implement forest policies promoting the modernization of the timber industry in the Amazon region were initiated in the early 1950s, it was not until the early 1970s, with the authoritarian military government, that such a project started to take a more elaborate shape. Inserted in the national program to accelerate the modernization of the industrial sector of the country, wood became a strategic resource, which continued to provide four-fifths of all the energy produced in Brazil (ABEF 1968). Despite this high dependence on forest resources, the Southern region of Brazil was still responsible for 86% of the country's timber production. In the Amazon region, although there was a large diversity of tree species, only a few species were being exploited, of which over 80% were being harvested from floodplain forests (varzea's forests) due to the facility in access and transportation, as was the case of *Virola surinamensis* (Dubois 1967).

However, the military government's plan to expand timber production envisioned not only supplying an increasing internal demand, but also increasing timber exports. As previously discussed, since the 1940s the Brazilian timber industry had been trying to enter the international timber market, but faced difficulties to compete with countries where planned and resourceful forest policies afforded better timber prices and quality production. Although data published by the FAO in 1967 indicated an increase in forest products consumption and production worldwide (ABEF 1968), the precarious conditions of the Brazilian timber industry prevented it to from taking greater advantage of the huge stock of potential wood available, which was simply being burned.

The critiques of Brazil's underutilization of forest resources and, where there was exploitation, the depletion of forests without providing benefits for the nation economy, increased considerably throughout the 1950s and 1960s, motivated, in particular, by FAO's studies. There were several calls for the establishment of an articulated and efficient forest policy that promoted a more intensive and profitable forest resource exploitation, such as Wanderbilt Duarte de Barros, agronomy engineer from the Forest Service, expressed in his article published in 1961. Highlighting the importance of forest resources for the national economy, Barros remarked on the "negative position concerning a forest policy" in Brazil that annihilated the forest potential. Similarly, two years earlier, David de Azambuja, Director of the Forest Service, wrote an article showing the advantages, in the American National Forest System, in converting forest resources to "benefits to the very nation" (Azambuja 1958: 36), and defended the need of Brazil to follow the same direction in order to protect the forest from depletion. These authors proclaimed that although Brazil had an enormous timber potential, without an efficient forest reserve policy the resources would vanish without providing benefits to the country's economy. In his study on Brazilian forests, A. Aubréville (1959: 230), a member of the Overseas Science Academy in France, emphasized that, with regards to the Amazon forest, "it was useless to carry out forest inventories, survey forest maps, promote silviculture, in a forest that has not yet been designated by law to be kept as a permanent forest. All governments that want to preserve part of their forests must guarantee them as permanent public domains… there is no more efficient or more logical forest policy than this one."

The claims of these forestry experts found fertile terrain in the military geo-political project to expand the Amazon's frontiers, in which direct State territorial and resource control was a decisive factor in promoting accelerated modernization and economic development (Becker 1992; Wood and Schmink 1992). Following several bureaucratic and legislation reforms implemented by the new military government, the 1934 Forest Code was replaced in 1965 (Law n° 4771, September 15). The 1965 Forest Code reinforced the position that forests are a public domain under strict control of the federal government, and centralized all actions related to forest policies. Considering the forests as strategic resources, the Forest Code prescribed several laws to discipline and control forest access and exploitation. Different from other regions, in the Amazon region the Code required the preservation of 50% of the forest cover on privately-owned properties, and established that timber exploitation could only be carried out with a management plan following strict technical criteria. As previously indicated, the 1965 Forest Code also established two sets of categories of environmental reserves, to be created by the State: fully-protected reserves which included National, State and Municipal Parks, and Biological Reserves; and "direct-use" reserves which could be managed for economic, technical or social purposes, such as National, State, and Municipal Forests.

The great change introduced in the new Forest Code was the economic valorization of the forests that would come to underlie forest policies. This included fiscal incentives for reforestation. The Code's Article n° 41 stated that the official credit agencies would concede priority to reforestation projects, and designated the National Monetary Council to define the regulations for loans for private reforestation programs. A year later, in 1966, the federal government created the Law of Fiscal Incentives (Law n° 5.106,

September 2, 1966), which offered fiscal incentives to forest enterprises, which were also allowed to deduct 50% from their income tax in the case of reforestation projects. The Law of Fiscal Incentives was sanctioned in the same month that the federal government replaced the SPVEA by the Superintendency for Amazon Development (SUDAM/ Law n° 5.173, October 27), which was created to plan and coordinate actions to promote the development of the Amazon. Endowed with ample resources, SUDAM was also put in charge of formulating and promoting initiatives and resources for economic development in the Amazon region.

It was precisely the fiscal incentives that presented the main justification for the creation, in 1967, of the IBDF (Brazilian Institute for Forest Development), which was put in charge of formulating and executing the forest policies as well as environmental reserves, becoming responsible simultaneously for both forest and conservation policies of all the national territory. The importance of IBDF for the implementation of fiscal incentives was expressed in IBDF's document, called "Letter from Brasília" (*Carta de Brasília*), published soon after the institute's creation. The "Letter from Brasília" established the premises for the forest policy to be implemented by the newly founded IBDF, which was given the task to promote the "rational utilization, protection and conservation of renewable natural resources, and forest development in the country" (IBDF 1968: 25). Explaining the government's interest in expanding private initiatives in reforestation programs, via the 1966 Law of Fiscal Incentives, the document stated that "[the government] had realized that the country needed to create an agency not just to put that Law into practice, but also to establish a normative policy that embraced all the national territory, taking into consideration the complexity and diversity of the multiple

forests, with their specific characteristics" (ABEF 1968: 26-27). Thus, IBDF was designated to execute the fiscal incentive law according to specific legislative measures, supporting reforestation projects by private initiatives.

As indicated in the IBDF document, the fiscal incentives for reforestation programs were directed to the Southern and Southeastern regions. In the period between 1967 and 1968, IBDF received 610 applications, of which 351 were approved for plantations of *Pinus Eliotti, Pinheiro Brasileiro* and eucalyptus in the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. The main objective was to increase the production of cellulose, panel products, and charcoal to supply the steel industry . With this emphasis on reforestation programs, in particular tree farming, it is not surprising that IBDF, replacing the previous environmental agencies, such the Mate National Institute, the Pinho National Institute, and the Department of Renewable Natural Resources, was also placed under the Ministry of Agriculture and had General Sylvio Pinto da Luz as its first president.

A range of the new forest policies for the Amazon region was put in motion in 1970 after the announcement of the impressive Program of National Integration (PIN). Besides promoting an ambitious colonization program and the implementation of an extensive network of roads and ports, PIN also sponsored a vast range of activities related to technical and scientific knowledge aimed at supporting government development programs to accelerate the modernization of the Amazon economy. In her analysis on the military geo-political project to speed up the process of modernization of the Amazon economy, Becker (1992) pointed to the control over the scientific and technological sectors as the landmark that differentiated it from previous government attempts to

integrate the region into the national political economy. According to her, the premises

of the geo-political project were not determined by the country's geography or simply by

the physical appropriation of the territory and the natural resources. Instead, the author

asserted, they resided in the "intentionality in controlling the modern scientific and

technological vector to exert dominion over time and space, understood as a necessary

condition to accelerate the rhythm and the scale of economic growth" (Becker (1992:

132). For her, it also represented a condition to consolidate and increase the role of the

State, which was considered the only actor able to conduct economic changes through

"rational planning."

Therefore, beginning in the 1970s, the federal government began promoting a

number of surveys on natural resources in the Amazon region, involving several research

institutions and governmental and multilateral agencies. Under the supervision of the

newly created SUDAM, the government created in October 29, 1970, the Commission

for the Amazônia *Radargramétrico* Survey to carry out an extensive aerial survey to map

the region's topography, geology, vegetation, soils, and mineral deposits in the

Amazônia, pre-Amazônia, and part of the Northeast region, which was developed

through the Radar Amazônia or RADAR project (RADAMBRASIL 1979). In this initial

phase, the RADAR project involved various national agencies, such as the National

Institute for Space Research (INPE) and the National Department of Mineral Production,

as well as international agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Air Force, which provided the most extensive and

comprehensive inventory of natural resources in the Amazon region.

The federal government also promoted extensive forest resource inventories
through the Forest Development and Research Project (PRODEPEF), a new cooperative
project between the Brazilian government and FAO to build on and intensify the previous
forest surveys. PRODEPEF was created from an agreement established in 1971 between
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Brazilian government to
carry out the Forestry Development and Research Project in Brazil
(PNUD/FAO/IBDF/BRA-45 Project), with the FAO as the executing agency and IBDF
as the government partner agency. PRODEPEF's main objectives were to strengthen
IBDF technically and institutionally, and to make available extensive information on
Brazilian forest potential to support national forest development planning. Given the
diversity of the forest, forest surveys were subdivided in three areas: the Amazon region,
the Central region (*Cerrado* regions), and the Southern region.

Coordinated by IBDF in the Amazon region, PRODEPEF was carried out by the
Amazônia Operation Group (GOA), which was created on February 23, 1972
(Port./IBDF n° 2.708) to "define and control a policy for the rational utilization of natural
resources in the Amazon region," and involved several other agencies, including the
North Region Coordination of the Agricultural Ministry, Agro-pecuaria Research
Institute of the North, Department of Natural Resources of SUDAM, National Institute
for Amazon Research (INPA), INCRA, and INPE. Dr. Jean Debuis, a Belgian FAO
expert, coordinated the Subgroup of Studies and Research that carried out forest surveys
along the Transamazon Highways. Besides providing a database of the forest resources
to support the modernization of the forest industry, especially for timber production,

these surveys also envisioned the definition of forest areas to be designated as reserves (FAO/IBDF 1978).

The team carrying out these initials forest surveys outlined the proposal for the Tapajós National Forest and the Amazônia National Park, the first two federal reserves created in the Amazon region, both in the Tapajós Valley. The creation of these reserves in 1974 foreshadowed the main objective of PDAM II, implemented from 1975 to 1979, for a policy on forest resources in the Amazon region that simultaneously promoted the conservation and management of the forest resources. The concept of growth poles (*Poloamazônia)* in the PDAM II identified the Tapajós Valley for the development of a timber industry "pole." At same time, in the upper Tapajós River, gold mining that had been carried out since the 1950s on a small scale, by *garimpeiros*, also was given a new emphasis and a new gold rush was promoted that attracted thousands of people to the region (Schmink and Wood 1992). It is worthwhile to note, once again, that the first two federal reserves in the Amazon region were created precisely in this valley, specifically, in the Lower and Upper Tapajós River.

The selection of the Tapajós Valley for the establishment of a timber production pole followed the trail opened by the FAO Mission since the early 1950s to support the modernization of the regional timber industry. Besides forest inventories, several experiments promoted by FAO were still underway. In Santarém, the Wood Technology Center began operating in August 1957 under SPEVEA supervision, and was replaced in 1966 by SUDAM, to train professionals in the modern techniques of the timber industry. Additionally, there were experiments in silviculture that had been initiated by John Pitt in the Curuá-Una station, southwest Santarém. The continuation of these initial efforts was

projected in PDAM II's "National Integration and Occupation of the Brazilian Universe,"
which focused on FAO's recommendations to replace what were considered backward
and predatory methods of timber exploitation.

PDAM II's "Policy for Forest Resources Development and Rational Use of the
soils of Amazônia" stated clearly that the main objective was "to transform wood
exploitation into a planned, institutionalized, and permanent activity," putting the
emphasis on exploitation of the forest in *terra-firme* (SUDAM 1974: 24). This focus on
"*terra-firme*" meant replacing the prevailing exploitation in the floodplain areas (*várzea*),
which were dominated by soft woods, with the exploitation of hard woods. PDAM II
also suggested the creation of the category of *Floresta de Rendimento* (Profitable Forest),
which could be exploited by private entities through projects that had to meet technical
criteria including regeneration and reforestation (with high-value species).

As many scholars have pointed out, the *Poloamazônia* program signified a
redirection from small-scale production to large-scale production under monopolistic
enterprises, especially those capable of exporting their production. Schmink and Wood
(1992: 5) observed that, "this perspective saw capital accumulation, foreign investment,
and big economic projects as a means of achieving high rates of growth. Embedded in
such a view was a preference for large, capital intensive investments rather than for
small, labor-oriented projects." Also remarking on the scientific and technological
emphasis embedded in these development plans, the authors underlined that
*Poloamazônia'*s approach "invoked a firm belief in advanced technology as a means to
promote the general welfare and to resolve external difficulties associated with economic
growth, such as environmental degradation and the displacement of people" (Schmink

and Wood 1992: 5). It was especially remarkable that the region's unorganized timber exploitation, and its backward operational and transportation methods, were considered the main obstacles to the development of the timber export sector. Therefore, assuring the control over vast areas of lands and giving priority to private capital and to large-scale development projects that were furnished with massive subsidies and fiscal incentives, the federal government undertook several strategies "designed to consolidate national competitive power" (Guimarães 1991: 182).

The creation of the Tapajós National Forest in 1974, was the first and the most direct product of such a visionary forest policy. Located at the center of Polo Tapajós, Flona Tapajós was created to help promote the modernization of the timber industry and to "consolidate the competitive power" of the regional timber industry. Improvements in transportation infrastructure were also undertaken, with the construction of roads and the expansion and modernization of the port of Santarém.

Alongside IBDF, SUDAM also actively supported a forest policy for the Amazon region that promoted timber exportation. In 1978, SUDAM presented the "Development Program for the Amazonian Timber Sector," defined under Clara Pandolfo's coordination, to "formulate a forest policy *considered adequate for the interests of the region*" (Pandolfo 1978: 5, emphasis added). Under the title "The Brazilian Amazon Forest: Economic-Ecological Approach," the Program remarked on the increasing demand for tropical timber in the international market and the process of forest depletion that was occurring in Africa and Southeast Asia, and called the Amazon region "the last great reserve of tropical timber in the world" (Pandolfo 1978: 22). Defending the need for Brazil to take advantage of the increasing demand for hardwoods in the international

market, the Program proposed the establishment of twelve Profitable Forests across the Amazon region. These forests would be implemented by the State and exploited by private entities through a system of concessions, representing one of the "more vigorous incentives to the entrepreneur class" (Pandolfo 1978: 40).

The Profitable Forests proposed by SUDAM were not implemented, and a "concession system," allowing private entities to exploit timber in state forest reserves, was still being debated in 2005 in governmental forums. On the other hand, starting in 1980, massive subsidies aimed to increase timber exportation were provided by CACEX[6] (currently SECEX), the government agency at the Central Bank responsible for the export sector. These subsidies stimulated a remarkable increase in timber exports, and introduced Amazonian hardwoods to the international market. Analyzing the effect of CACEX subsidies on the timber sector, Browder (1987: 297) pointed out that, "in 1979, prior to the export subsidy programs in question, mahogany (*Sweitenia macrophylla*) lumber exports accounted for less than 10 percent of all Brazilian lumber exports. By 1983, when the subsidy programs were in full operation, mahogany lumber had grown to more than 30 percent of all Brazilian lumber export." It was most visible in relation to the United States, the major importer of Brazilian mahogany. While in 1974 mahogany represented 29 percent of the lumber export to the United States, in 1984 it grew to 67 percent (Browder 1987). Thanks to massive subsidies and institutional support, Brazil finally reached its goal to participate in the international timber market. As Nash anticipated sixty years earlier, *the day of the tropical hardwoods [was] at hand* (Nash 1926: 382).

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[6] Resolutions nº 643 and 674.

It was precisely at the beginning of the 1980s, when Brazilian wood production had securely entered the international market, that the implementation of Flona Tapajós was truly initiated, and several administrative actions were put into motion. These government interventions resulted in confrontation with several groups residing in the reserve, who did not accept the displacement that this forest project implied. As part of the strategies to develop a competitive timber industry, the creation and implementation of the Flona Tapajós imposed on the groups living in the area a new mode of forest economy that favored the export sector at the expense of customary uses of the resources. The conflicts generated by these different conceptions of forest uses pervade Flona Tapajós' history, and have led to significant restructurings of the original project reserve.

CHAPTER 5
THE SCIENTIFIC FOREST AND COMMUNITY SOCIAL CONFLICTS

5.1 Introduction

One time when I was visiting the Maguari village, I talked to Helena and Simão, a couple who had twelve children, about the several projects that had been implemented to technically and economically assist community people. The couple had a strong leadership in the community and had been engaged in the various projects developed by governmental and non-governmental organizations. Upon my request, they explained to me the new methods for cultivation of rubber trees that they were taught by a governmental institution that provided community technical assistance. Then, I asked them what had changed with this technical assistance, and the woman, thinking for a little while, said: "*as tirinhas*" (the straight little rows). Immediately, I looked out the window and I could see that most of the rubber trees in the garden had been planted in straight rows much like those described by Scott (1992) as a product of modern forestry techniques. I asked them what they did before the government technical assistance, and the woman explained: "We used to plant one tree here, another over there, and another over there, all of them mixed with other plants."

In a general way, the community system of production is based on a multiplicity of forest resources, which are managed by incorporating cultivated species with native ones, analogous to the Amazonian agro-forestry system (Anderson 1990; Denevan and Padoch 1988; Padoch et al 1985). The focus of technical assistance on maximizing production by implementing an orderly monocrop system reflects the tendency to overlook

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community knowledge for the sake of scientific principles. Discussing the trend toward homogenizing and standardizing social and economic relations in modern statecraft, Scott (1998: 93) highlighted that the advantages promised by a high- modernist ideology are validated "with the authority of scientific knowledge and its tendency to disallow other competing sources of judgment."

As pointed out, the view that scientific principles were needed to overcome the backward state of the technical and economic development of the Amazon region was firmly embedded in Amazon frontier expansion policies (Barretto 2001a; Becker 1992; Schmink and Wood 1992; Foresta 1991). This was particularly relevant for the timber sector, whose unsystematic methods of exploitation and transportation were considered to be the main causes of the sector's poor performance that depleted forest resources without providing adequate profits. Technical improvements and planned exploitation were, then, viewed as conditions for the acceleration of the modernization of the timber industry, which needed to reduce its wastefulness by promoting a "rational use of resources." The rationale underlying such an assumption, also reflected in many other sectors, soon revealed the intention to reallocate spaces and resources from local social groups in favor of large enterprises, most of which were located outside the region. This reallocation would generate an intense process of social and environmental conflict.

The creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós reflected part of this process. While responding to the government interests to modernize the regional timber industry, the establishment of Flona Tapajós also signified for the community people the strongest interference in their forms of spacial and socio-economic organizations. This pushed communities to organize a remarkable resistance movement, resulting in a conflictual

relationship between community people, whom I call "communities of resistance," and the government agency responsible for the reserve. This chapter focuses on the process of the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós and the conflicting relationship that was established with the "communities of resistance." I focus on the period from the early 1970s, when Flona Tapajós was created, up until the beginning of the 1990s, when negotiations to solve the conflicts over community lands were initiated, and the government agency began taking into consideration the possibility of people's permanence in the reserve.

5.2 Flona Tapajós and the Communities of Resistance

5.2.1   Flona Tapajós in the Context of the "Programmed Network"

When Flona Tapajós was created in 1974, comprising an area of approximately 600,000 hectares, the reserve's limits were practically all located within the municipality of Santarém. In 1996, however, the limits of the municipality of Santarém were redefined with the creation of the municipality of Belterra, a possession of the Ministry of Agriculture since 1945, when the Ford Company donated it back to the Brazilian government. Thus, in this new spatial rearrangement, Flona Tapajós extended into the new municipality of Belterra, encompassing around sixty percent of the municipality's territory.

While it was a territory of the federal government, Belterra was an important base for the development of the PRODEPEF forest surveys that were carried out beginning in the 1970s. Belterra had been very well equipped by the Ford Company, which built a number of houses, offices, and research stations, in addition to several urban facilities. After being given to the Brazilian government, Belterra became a unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, operating under SPVEA supervision as a research station to support, in

particular, rubber cultivation. Belterra was also an important point of reference for the

localization of Flona Tapajós, whose creation, as previously indicated, was proposed and

outlined by the same PRODEPEF team that had carried out the forest surveys. In an

interview with Dr. Jean Dubois, who coordinated the PRODEPEF Subgroup of Studies

and Research, and was present when the borders of Flona Tapajós were outlined, he

explained the importance of Belterra in this process:

Edviges: Why was Flona Tapajós created in such a location?

Dr. Dubois: You know, all the people, IBDF's employees and the forest research
and management team who took part in the PRODEPEF, were housed in Belterra. There
was good infrastructure, with houses and offices that were also financed by FAO.
Actually, you know, there were two areas with very good infrastructure, which were
Belterra and Fordlândia. At the time Flona Tapajós was created, Fordlândia[1] was a very
old place that had very good infrastructure, but Belterra had a much better one. I think
that by this time, there was no other forest area with two such consistent characteristics:
with infrastructure and proximity. These were also the reasons for this choice.

Although infrastructure and proximity to an urban center with port facilities were

important criteria for the localization of Flona Tapajós, the definition of the reserve's

limits turned out to be problematic from several points of views. One of the most serious

aspects was with regards to the overlapping of the reserve's boundaries with those of

lands belonging to a large number of social groups. Although Flona Tapajós had been

created in the context of the planned government actions to expand the Amazonian

economic frontiers, relying on a large database, no population and/or agrarian survey had

been carried out prior to the creation of the reserve, despite the fact that the National

Forest category did not allow people to reside in the area.

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[1] Fordlândia was the other Ford Company base, established in the Middle Tapajós River for rubber
cultivation.

Without a preliminary social and agrarian survey, the Flona Tapajós overlapped

with the lands of not only the eighteen communities[2] located along the Tapajós River, but

also of many other communities. One of these communities was São Jorge, which was

comprised of mostly immigrants from the northeast, and was located along of the

Santarém-Cuibá highway in an area called "*planalto.*" The reserve also overlapped with

the lands belonging to long-term resident families along the Cupari River, in the central

region of Flona Tapajós, which also held part of the municipality of Aveiro, created in

1962. Besides these areas, the borders of Flona Tapajós also extended into part of the

area of the Itaituba Integrated Colonization Project (PIC-Itaituba), which had settled 571

families in 1973 (Ianni 1979:62).

The overlapping of Flona Tapajós with these populations' lands generated several

social, institutional, and administrative conflicts, including in the municipality of Aveiro,

whose administration conflicted with the reserve federal legislation. Moreover, the

region surrounding the Transamazon and Santarém-Cuibá Highways had been primarily

designated for colonization projects that had been implemented under PIN, and the

majority of these lands was under INCRA (National Institute for Colonization and

Agrarian Reform) administration. The creation of Flona Tapajós in the same area that

had been designated for colonization projects also caused an administrative conflict

between INCRA and IBDF, both agencies under the Ministry of Agriculture, which were

responsible for overseeing the colonization projects and Flona Tapajós, respectively. At

the same time that INCRA was settling families in the area, IBDF started to take

measures to displace people from there. The creation of Flona Tapajós in this region,

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[2] São Domingos, Maguari, Jamaraquá, Acaratinga, Jaguarari, Pedreira, Piquiatuba, Marituba, Nazaré, Marai, Tauari, Pini, Taquara, Prainha, Paraiso, Itapaiuna, Jatoarana, and Itapuama.

overlapping with previously established governmental colonization projects, reflected the

changes in the policies for expanding the Amazon economic frontiers, from PIN to

PDAM II, with the original emphasis on colonization projects changed in favor of

intensive exploitation of natural resources by large enterprises.

The creation of Flona Tapajós also turned out to be problematic from a technical

point of view. Although Flona Tapajós had been created to promote planned and

intensive timber production, the reserve had one of the lowest densities of wood in the

region. According to Dr. Dubois, this had occurred because preliminary studies to assess

the wood potential of the area had not been carried out, as he explained in an interview:

Edviges: Are you saying that Flona Tapajós was created without studies, without a
forest survey?

Dr. Dubois: Yeah, without preliminary forest surveys. Perhaps some parcels
studied by Dammis Heinsdijk[3] were in Flona Tapajós area, but more intensive surveys to
provide a precise idea of the wood potential were not carried out. For example, when
Flona Tapajós was created, the identification of the forest typology, of the types of the
forests that existed, had not been yet carried out… I was present when the group with
Wanderbilt decided to create Flona Tapajós. It was he, Wanderbilt Duarte de Barros,
David Azambuja[4], K. Oedekoven from FAO, and me. These four people went to
Belterra, where Wanderbilt said: 'let's go enter into the forest neighboring Belterra'. We
went to this forest, it was a flooded area, and, thus, Wanderbilt said: "let's establish here,
in this region, Flona Tapajós. He took a map and [Debois drew a map in the air with four
sides, reproducing Wanderbilt's hand movements at that moment] Flona Tapajós was
created, without surveys, without studies… It was a misstep; it was created in a hurry,
without accumulating information, without seeing in the field that most of the forest did
not have any timber potential. Without knowing, I presume, that the north of the area is
practically dominated by *babaçú* [palm], a plateau, where there is a scarcity of water, and
the regeneration of the species is very difficult due to the high concentration of roots.
After this area dominated by *babaçú*, there is high-density forest, without *babaçú* and just
a few vines. This part has more water resources, and it is where there are better
conditions for the survival of the communities of forest people. After this region, there is
a progressive gradation from this forest to a forest with an increasing quantity of vines.
Then, at a certain point, you have a forest with high and dispersed canopies, which are

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[3] Dammis Heinsdijk carried out the first forest surveys in the region in the 1950s through the FAO Mission.

[4] Wanderbilt Duarte de Barros and David Azambuja, former Forest Service's administrators.

like towers of vegetation covered with vines, and, then, the vine forest or *cipoal*. Penetration into the *cipoal* is very difficult because the vines injure the people. It covers most of the south of the Flona, where there is no wood, but it was a refuge for game. Yet, despite that, I think the Flona was good because it guaranteed a refuge for hunting.

I did not find any documentation at IBAMA's offices that presented the official justification for the creation and the localization of Flona Tapajós. Although IBAMA's employees informed me that a document spelling out the motives for the reserve's creation should have been written, it was not found, possibly having been lost. The decree that officially created Flona Tapajós only states the reserve's creation, in accordance to the specific legislation for National Forests. The government procedures in the creation of Flona Tapajós seem to have occurred, in a similar fashion, in the case of Amazônia National Park, created in the same year and same valley as Flona Tapajós. As Foresta (1991: 33) points out, "The first major protected natural area in Amazônia, a million-hectare national park on the banks of the Tapajós River in eastern Pará, was established by presidential decree in 1974, but the event was anomalous. The park's location and shape had been decided by regional planners with no input from conservationists, and it was unconnected to any wider conservation plans." The author considered the creation of this national park to be "anomalous," since the rest of the fully-protected reserves created during the period of 1974-84 were drafted using solid scientific data.

The absence of official documentation justifying the creation of Flona Tapajós prevents us from assessing, in more detail, the government's reasons for establishing this forest reserve. As Dr. Dubois described, most of Flona Tapajós was covered by a forest that did not have any timber potential, and it would have served better, in his opinion, to protect wild game. The high-density forest with timber potential covered only a small

part of the reserve, precisely where the community areas of occupation were located. As most of the (commercial) timber is located in this part of the reserve's forest, which the communities depend on for their livelihood needs, it came to constitute the focal point of the conflicts between the communities and the government.

Before I discuss these conflicts in more detail, I would like to return to this central question: why was the first forest reserve for timber exploitation in the Amazon region created without first carrying out forest surveys, which were a central component of the Amazon frontier expansion policies at the time (PDAM II), to assess whether or not the area was appropriate for timber exploitation?

To understand such an apparent contradiction we need to see the problems generated with the creation of the reserve not as simply a mistake coming from the disregard of the technical component, or of the existing social organizations. As Schmink and Wood (1987: 48) remarked about governmental land use planning for the Amazon region: "expertise, although a necessary component of effective project design, is hardly sufficient." To understand the contradictions found in the process of creation and establishment of Flona Tapajós, it might be better to apply the analytical framework developed by Becker (1992), in which she pointed out the "manipulation of the territory" as part of the strategies used to accelerate economic modernization without altering the social hierarchical structure.

Becker (1992) asserted that the military geo-political project represented an imposition on the national territory of a powerful network of double control: technical and political, which was related to governmental programs and projects and to public and private enterprises. She called this "programmed network" (*malha programada*), whose

components were comprised of: the great network of road and ports, urban centers, telecommunications, and hydroelectrical projects, that were designed to integrate the spaces; the creation of new territories with federal administrative units, allowing the federal government to exert direct and absolute authority; fiscal subsidies to large enterprises that encouraged the private appropriation of land; and incentives that stimulated the migration of people, creating a mobile labor force. The imposition of this "programmed network" allowed for an accelerated incorporation of natural resources and the formation of a mobile labor force.

In the region of the Tapajós Valley, several of these components of the "programmed network" can be identified. The region was cut by the construction of both the Transamazon and Santarém-Cuibá Highways; ports were expanded and modernized; colonization projects and gold mining were promoted, triggering large waves of migration; and, with the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós, a new territory was superimposed in the region under absolute state control. In this context, the establishment of Flona Tapajós can be understood as comprising the strategies of the "programmed network," which responded, simultaneously, to the objectives of imposing territorial control and the formation of a mobile labor force by displacing community people.

Thus, analyzing the creation of Flona Tapajós from this perspective, the reserve was less important technically (as a site for implementing scientific forestry for the production of timber) than as an instrument to exert social and territorial control. As Becker (1992: 136) highlighted, "State management of the territory was eminently strategic, involving direct administration not only in economic terms, but also power

relations… The territorial displacement (*desterritorialização*) and the volatilization of the places were implicit goals of the geo-political project, bestowing to the social question a clear environmental dimension and vice-versa, and to Brazil a peculiar position on this issue in the international scenario."

Becker's analytical framework is also useful for understanding the forest conservation discourse on Flona Tapajós that was used to justify the initial attempts to displace people, as discussed in Chapter 2, which was also applied in different ways throughout the reserve's history. Disguised by a forest conservation discourse that conceals the nature of the social conflicts and the reserve's technical failures, the creation and the establishment of Flona Tapajós was one of the strategies of the "programmed network" used to impose a new territory that was less concerned with the principles of scientific forestry management to regulate timber exploitation, than it was with controlling spaces and social relations. This explains why forest surveys had not been carried out prior to the reserve's creation, and why the low timber potential of the area was not a central issue to the reserve's creation.

Manipulating the territory through the "programmed network," the geo-political project altered the center-periphery structure, which, Becker (1992: 136) remarked, did not constitute a clear division line between "the modern and the archaic," but, instead, produced "a hybrid, ambivalent, and unstable structure, yet very dynamic, even at the spatial level." It was, precisely, in the context of the conflicts that emerged between the "programmed network" and what Becker called the "lived space" (*espaço vivido*), that forms of resistance took place to deny the governmental project and to propose alternatives to the state spatial planning.

5.2.2 Displacing People to Make Them Wageworkers

The first information about the communities in Flona Tapajós, whom I am calling "communities of resistance," was recorded by the reserve's administration only in 1978, four years after the reserve's creation, when IBDF started to carry out a survey, a preliminary step in the process to dispossess community people from their respective lands (IBDF 1978). The report on the results of this survey was the only document I found at IBAMA's offices in Brasília and in Santarém, showing the measures and posture adopted by the governmental agency from 1978 to 1983. The report also informed that their work in Flona Tapajós had been initiated in August 1978, when the PoloAmazônia liberated the financial resources for the reserve's implementation. However, some efforts had been taken beforehand, such as the attempt to obtain a "certificate" signed by the people who were located in the areas of the colonization project (PIC-Itaituba) on top of which the reserve had also been superimposed.

The "certificate" constituted a document to be signed by the people, declaring that they had been informed by the forest engineer Rionaldo Rolo de Almeida, who directed Flona Tapajós for many years, and that they were "aware that the area they *intended to occupy* [was} part of the Tapajós National Forest ," and that any deforestation on their lands could constitute a "violation against the Law." No copies of this "certificate" were signed, but there are the signatures of two "witnesses" saying that the dwellers were "aware" of the document and they had refused to sign it.

On the other hand, the communities located along the Tapajós River came to officially know about the creation of Flona Tapajós, and the fact that they would be removed from the area, only when the 1978 survey started to be carried out, as explained by José from Piquiatuba community:

Edviges: How did you find out about Flona Tapajós?

José: First, we started to hear many comments that a Flona had been created, but we did not understand very well what it meant. Later, they arrived here to carry out a survey and they said: "We are from IBDF. IBDF is a government agency and we are authorized to carry out a survey about what you do, what you plant, what you possess, it is a requirement of the government." Nobody here dared to ask them what it meant or what it did not mean. At the time, nobody here knew what IBDF was; it was the first time they came here. They came by boat. There was a citizen named Paulo, who was the person that did the job. Among the community people, nobody knew what IBDF was or knew about the proposal of what they were asking for. We started to tell them about everything we had: how many years we had been here, the size of the area worked, all about these things they asked questions about. Everybody answered them. Then, at a certain point, they said that they were taking these data to indemnify us to leave here. That was the reason we resisted; we thought that it should not be like that!

The 1978 IBDF report presented a long list of the people residing in the reserve, who were identified in different ways. One set of people were called "settled colonists" (*colonos assentados*), people who had been established in the area before the creation of Flona Tapajós, which included sixty-two people's names, as well as "colonists" settled after the reserve's creation, which included seventeen people. The second set was people who had resided in the reserve's area before its creation, including the estimated one thousand people in the Aveiro city, and families existing before the reserve creation and residing along the Tapajós River, including seven hundred and twenty families (IBDF 1978). The report also mentioned people who had received compensation for having to leave their lands, including seventy-one "colonists" along the Santarém-Cuibá Highway, and people from the communities of Igarapé-Tinga, Tabocal, Margem Direita do Rio Tapajós, Itapaiuna, Rio Cuparí, Jaguarary, and São João.

The report concluded with a proposal to exclude four areas from the limits of Flona Tapajós. One was the area of Aveiro city; the second was the area of the colonization settlement (PIC-Itaituba); the third, the area of São Jorge; and finally, the community

area along the Tapajós River, at the time, composed of sixteen communities. Although

the report recommended excluding the community area from the reserve's limits, the

report also included a list of people from these communities to be compensated. It was

not clarified why both of these proposals were made. Except for Aveiro, the proposal to

exclude these areas from Flona Tapajós's limits became a controversial subject of

discussion throughout the reserve's history. Currently, the official proposal states that the

remaining colonization settlements, Aveiro, and São Jorge, are excluded from Flona

Tapajós although the situation of these areas has not yet been officially resolved. Any

change in the reserve's limits must be sanctioned by the Congress.

The community areas along the Tapajós River certainly became the most

controversial among these areas. The proposal has changed directions, from initially

recommending people's displacement from the area and relocation to another region

outside the reserve's limits, to, finally, allowing communities to remain inside the

reserve, as has been sanctioned in the new 2000 SNUC. The 1978 report's proposal to

exclude the areas from the reserve's limits was justified by the great expenditure that

would be necessary to compensate people for taking away their lands, and because the

community areas were "significantly poor in terms of forest resources, and they were

comprised of sandy soils that do not allow mechanized exploitation" (IBDF 1978: 3).

Possibly, this first proposal also took into consideration people's resistance that started to

be articulated at the time. The controversy around the issue of people's displacement was

reflected in an interview with Dr. Dubois, in which he said:

Dr. Dubois: IBAMA [IBDF] created problems on account of being socially
insensitive. Now, what are you going to do? Are you going to take these people out of
there? That was the question, which focused all the attention on Tapajós. I had the
proposal to create enclaves in the Flona to keep the communities. I said to them [IBDF's

employees]: you can train these people to become forest workers (*operários florestais*). If not, you are going to bring lumber enterprises that will bring workers from outside the Flona. But they did not accept.

Edviges: What was the justification for that?

Dr. Dubois: They had no justification, they just did not want to. There was Rionaldo; he wanted the communities out of there. It was a strong struggle; many years passed before protection for the communities was assured.

In an interview with Eleazar Volpato, who worked at IBDF beginning in the 1970s, and currently is a professor at the University of Brasília, he also emphasized that in IBDF there existed internal disputes with regards to the permanence of the communities in Flona Tapajós. Similarly to Dubois, Volpato said: "At that moment there were some people at IBDF who did not accept the idea of keeping the communities in Flona Tapajós, but I said to them that, if we kept the community people, they could work for the enterprises that would exploit the forest." In his dissertation on the fully-protected reserves in the Amazon region, Barretto (2001a) also noted the existence, within the government, of divergences and controversial proposals, which reflected the diverse interests and conceptions regarding environmental conservation issues. The same can be observed in relation to Flona Tapajós, although we can perceive a dominant tendency to exclude people from the reserve, particularly during the initial moment of the implementation of the reserve.

The process of people's displacement from Flona Tapajós was poorly documented, although several nuclei of families were removed from their lands, including some families from the colonization project, all the long-term resident families that were located in the reserve's southern region, and the communities of São João, Terra Rica, and Jacamim in the northeastern region, whose numbers and possessions were described

of timber exploitation, or as Dubois defined, as "forest workers." As pointed out in Chapter 3, the Ford Company, in the 1930s and 1940s, had attempted a similar frustrating attempt and, according to Costa (1993), labor was the major reason behind the enterprise's bankruptcy. Despite offering relatively high wages, the Ford Company was unable to break the historical dependence peasants had with the land and to turn them into wage workers on the company's payroll. Costa identified this as a form of peasant resistance against economic specialization.

Whereas the Ford Company had been unsuccessful in transforming peasant land relations through incentives of high wages, the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós presented a more radical proposal to break off people's ties to the land by forcibly removing people from the area and closing off access to forest spaces. Both of these strategies were important in breaking off people's ties with the land and in transforming them into an available work force, while, at same time, liberating the forest for timber exploitation. The social conflicts that emerged from this process did not occur only in Flona Tapajós, but also on the other side of the Tapajós River, on the left bank, where timber enterprises had been established and had started to exploit timber in forest areas occupied by several long-term residing communities. Facing similar processes of exploitation, these rural communities also strongly resisted the advance of the new forest economy.

5.3 Community Resistance: Land and Political Organization

5.3.1 The Rural Workers' Union and Organizational Power

The beginning of the 1980s was decisive for the expansion of the timber sector in the Tapajós Valley, motivated, especially, by fiscal incentives for export that were made available by the federal government. Following the export policies of the early 1980s to

accelerate economic growth, the federal government implemented two lines of export

credits eligible to producer-exporters, to obtain short-term capital for about 25 percent of

its true cost, called the CACEX Resolution 674 (Browder 1987). These incentives had a

strong impact on the development of the Amazon timber sector, which reached the long-

term objective of exporting hard wood. As Browder (1987: 286) showed, "from 1980 to

1984, a veritable boom in mahogany[6] lumber production ensued, fueled by export

incentives. Mahogany became one of the Amazon's premier export staples, constituting

over 30 percent of all Brazilian lumber export in 1983." Browder's analysis focused,

mainly, on the process that occurred in the state of Rondônia, where logging operations

were intertwined with agricultural activities promoted through colonization projects and

large-scale farms and ranches. The number of sawmills registered in 1980 in the Amazon

region reached five hundred and forty-two, concentrated primarily in the states of

Rondônia (two hundred and thirty sawmills) and Pará (two hundred and seventy

sawmills) (IBDF/ Programa Tapajós 1982).

In the Tapajós Valley, as previously discussed, several governmental efforts,

including the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós, had been undertaken to

promote the development of large-scale timber production. Although the number of

sawmills did not increase significantly in the region, with eighteen sawmills registered in

1981, the export of timber had been initiated, representing sixty percent of the timber

production in the same year. This timber export was triggered, mainly, by the arrival of

large timber enterprises, such as the Amazonex Exportadora Ltda., the Santa Isabel

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[6] *Sweitenia macrophylla.*

Agroflorestal Ltda., and the Comercial Madeiras Exportação S&A (CEMEX), to cite the most prominent.

CEMEX was the only sawmill that came to initially exploit timber in Flona Tapajós, in 1984, in an area of two hundred hectares, and, in the late 1990s, through the ITTO Project, which will be discussed later on. The other two sawmills, Amazonex and Santa Isabel, had selected the forest areas located on the left bank of the Tapajós River, where the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve was later created in 1998. In his analysis on the peasant movement that emerged in the Lower Tapajós region in the earlier 1980s, Leroy (1991: 116) mentioned that these two timber enterprises had been favored with SUDAM's incentives, and "intended to occupy the left bank of the Tapajós River, in a extension of about 60 kilometers in the front, from Cametá, in the municipality of Aveiro, to Arapiuns River, for 100 kilometers in the back." This area was occupied by several long-term residing communities, as in the case of those in Flona Tapajós. The arrival of these two enterprises to exploit timber triggered several conflicts with these communities, which mounted a strong resistance in an attempt to retain their areas of occupation and to limit the extent to which the enterprises could use the forest.

The conflicts that took place among the communities on the left bank of the Tapajós River occurred simultaneously with those in Flona Tapajós, and reflected the advance of governmental policies to consolidate a timber pole in the region, which at the time was "fueled by export incentives" (Browder 1987: 286). Although social conflicts had initially emerged when Flona Tapajós was created in 1974, when I carried out my first study in the reserve in 1996, there was little information available on the issue, with the exception of some official documents. The only reference to these conflicts was

found in Leroy's book (1991), "*Uma Chama na Amazônia*" (A Flame in Amazônia), in

which the author focused on the social rural movements that took place in the region of

Santarém during the 1980s. In this study, Leroy mentioned the resistance movement

mounted by the communities in Flona Tapajós, among other social mobilizations that

occurred in the region, all of which had been articulated mainly through the Union of the

Rural Workers from Santarém (*Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Santarém*).

Among the "communities of resistance" it was common to hear them talk of the

importance of seeking the Union to help them defend their permanence in the area, as

explained Pedro, one of the leaders from the Piquiatuba community:

> Pedro: The Union was very important to us. There was Geraldo Pastana[7], and he
> helped us very much in this battle. We never had participated in the Union, but when this
> Flona started and they started to say that we had to leave, we asked: 'and now, what are
> we going to do? If we left, where would we go?' Then, the people from the Union said
> to us: 'do not leave, you have to resist, and do not sign any document for IBDF'. After
> that, we started to organize through the Union, to organize Union Sections (*Delegacias
> Sindicais*). Therefore, with the Union we were guaranteed to stay here.

The participation of the people of the communities in the Union signified their first

association with a broader political organization. Up to then, community political

organizations existed only at the local level, and 'community Presidents' were the leaders

of these organizations, as discussed in the Chapter 3. The involvement with the Union

added to community representations the new social category of the "rural worker," which

many community people identified themselves as. The Union was the alternative

organization community people had through which they could organize themselves to

defend their lands. It was at the beginning of the 1980s that they experienced the most

active moment, not only because it coincided with the period when the native rural

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[7] Geraldo Pastana was one of the most prominent leaders in the organization of the Rural Workers' Union.
He later became a State Deputy, and, in October 2004, was elected mayor of the municipality of Belterra.

people began to be displaced from their lands by the new economic model, but also with the arrival of those who had been attracted by the colonization projects.

The colonization projects, which began in the 1980s, when PIN was replaced by PDAM II, had started to show the effects of the government's shift from colonization projects to large-scale mining and farming and ranch enterprises. As previously indicated, the region south of Santarém, near where the Transamazon and Santarém-Cuibá highways crossed, had been initially designated as areas to promote intense occupation through colonization projects. Thousand of people had arrived in the region, especially from the South, but also from the Northeast, and new urban nuclei had been created, such as Rurópolis Presidente Médici, inaugurated in 1973 by President Médici himself. However, by the late 1970s, these colonists started to perceive that the dreams of having land to work were closer to a nightmare. As Leroy (1991: 69) remarked, "the colonists thinking they had arrived in the *Promised Land*, found themselves two kilometers from the inferno" (emphasis in the original). The colonists not only did not find any infrastructure, but they also faced diseases, such as malaria, for which they had no medical assistance. They also had no access to markets to sell their production, mainly because, during most parts of the year, the highways were impassable due to heavy rains and lack of maintenance. Moreover, lands that had been designated for colonization projects started to be taken by large farming entrepreneurs, who took advantage of the fiscal incentives available.

The life story of one couple, Anibal and Beatriz, from Rio Grande do Sul, who lived in the Acaratinga community, in Flona Tapajós, is illustrative of the disillusionments found in the colonization projects. Anibal was descendent of a Polish

family that had lived in Rio Grande do Sul for three generations. Beatriz was the

youngest of a Russian family, who lived in Siberia and moved to Brazil at the beginning

of the century, escaping from War World I, and resided in Rio Grande do Sul, in the

municipality of São Luis Gonzaga. According to Beatriz, when the couple had heard

about the colonization projects around the Transamazon Highway, they saw the chance to

have a piece of land again, which they had lost in the South. After taking a week-long

trip by bus, the couple with their four children arrived in 1980 in the region of Rurópolis,

where they had to fight for the land with a farmer who was trying to obtain legal title to it

in his name. The conflict was resolved with the intermediation of INCRA, and after a

year of living in a shelter built with plastic materials, and having planted the first field

crops, the family started to be victimized with malaria. The adopted son was the most

affected, who died in the city of Santarém, after arriving there very weak. The difficult

conditions of the highways prevented them from taking the corpse back home, and he

was buried without the family present. Telling me the story, Beatriz cried for not having

had the chance to see her son for the last time. Although surviving, all of the family's

members have suffered from the same disease, which eventually forced them to abandon

the place. In Beatriz' words:

     Beatriz: Our calamity was malaria. When we arrived here, nobody knew what
malaria was, we did not know the medicine that was necessary to take, and we had no
medical assistance. I liked that place and I did not want to leave. The land was very
good; everything that we planted grew vigorously. But, malaria returned, from time to
time, and made us sick. Soon we recuperated, and malaria came back again. Once, I was
the only one in my house who did not have malaria, and we did not have money to buy
the medicine. We had only our last pig. Then, I took this pig and went to Rurópolis to
sell the pig and buy the medicine. When I arrived there, all the people I found were also
trying to sell something to buy medicine. The man at grocery store told me that he could
not even buy my pig, because everybody had a thing to sell and he had nobody to buy
from him. Thus, I went home and said to my family: Let us go away from here; if not,
we all are going to die. Then, we abandoned the place and we went to live in Santarém

city, but there we had nothing to do and we moved to a place in Vila Amazonas, in the Lower Amazon River. There were so many mosquitoes that it was impossible to stay there, so, after four years we moved again, this time to the left margin of the Tapajós River. We were living there when we found out about this land in Acaratinga, which we bought in 1990, and we came here. Here, it is very good. There is no disease, no mosquito, the land is fine, and now, as my husband and I are retired, we have some financial support to help with our expenses too. I think the only thing left is to be buried here.

This last move by Beatriz and Anibal's family to live in Acaratinga reflected previous ties established with community people in Flona Tapajós during the mobilizations with the Rural Workers' Union that started in the late 1970s and in which people from colonization projects had had an active role. In his analysis on this process, Leroy (1991) summarized the diverse forms of land conflicts that were occurring simultaneously among various sectors of the rural population in the region. He showed that from the moment they unified their struggles, the mobilizations became more effective, which were operated initially through meetings promoted by the Catholic Church, and then, by the Rural Workers' Union. According to the author, although the colonists "were apparently at the periphery of the emerging movement, the tragic saga they were experiencing was itself a training school and made them, in a second moment, the central actors. Moreover, during the catechetic weeks [*semanas catequéticas*] they met rural workers from other regions and started, thus, to create important ties for the future" (Leroy 1991: 68-69). The movement became especially strong when, in the late 1970s, leaders from these diverse rural sectors began organizing an opposition movement against the Union's directors who were seen as representatives of the government, not of the rural workers. The movement, known as the "Union Chain" (*Corrente Sindical*), was victorious in the Union election in 1980, with Geraldo Pastana elected as president.

Three years later, the Union had a new election in 1983, and Avelino Ganzer, a colonist from Rio Grande do Sul who arrived in the region in 1972, was elected as president. Leroy (1991) noted that the attempt to prevent him from taking over the Union led the defeated candidate, associated with local politicians who were against rural workers' interests, to ask that the Union's election be nullified due to irregularities. Even so, the victorious president took over in August 1983, with the presence of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil's current president, and former labor leader. Yet, in December 1983, the Court accepted the petition to nullify the elections, and called for an intervention in the Union. This intervention mobilized thousands of rural people in Santarém who did not allow the court's commissioner, escorted by policemen, to enter the Union's office. Given this resistance, the court revoked the initial decision and cancelled the attempt to intervene in the Union. The community people from Flona Tapajós were very active in this resistance movement, as Pedro from Piquitauba community always liked to enthusiastically recall:

> Pedro: You should have seen when the court's commissioner arrived with so many policemen to pick up the keys to enter the Union. We were four thousand people in front of the Union[8]. Then, Avelino Ganzer asked us: Should I give them the keys? We answered: No, do not give them the keys! Then, we all gathered together, arms linked, and started to push the commissioner and the policemen, who ran away. It was a big victory!

This account of the mobilization to guarantee the Union elections illustrates the organizational power of the several sectors of rural people in the Santarém region, among them the community people in Flona Tapajós, who had mobilized Union support to help them resist against government attempts to displace them from the lands they occupied. As Oliver-Smith (1996: 79) asserted, "resettlement means uprooting people from the

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[8] Leroy (1991) reported that one thousand and five hundred people participated in this event.

environments in which the vast majority of their meaningful activities have taken place and on which much of their understanding of life is based." Challenging the intent of the government to relocate them, communities organized themselves into a resistance movement, which had allies in these several rural sectors. This mobilization took on a dimension that the reserve's administration was not able to deal with.

Since the beginning, Flona Tapajós' administrative structure and, mainly, the personnel team had been too small to adequately manage the extensive problems that emerged during the implementation of the reserve. The 1978 IBDF Report already emphasized that the lack of personnel was making it impossible to "protect the forest against deforestation" and against the invasions in the reserve's area that were taking place. Some of these "invasions," referred to in the 1978 IBDF Report, were occurring in the area of São Jorge, and were being carried out largely by people from the state of Maranhão. They were instigated by the creation of Flona Tapajós and the subsequent government attempts to displace people, as it was explained to me by Ivanor, who was from Maranhão and was one of the community leaders:

Edviges: How did the people arrive in São Jorge?

Ivanor: We were just six families in São Jorge when Flona Tapajós was created. I arrived there in the late 1960s. Before, I was working in the *garimpos* in the upper Tapajós River, but, after three airplane accidents, I gave up exploiting gold and I decided to buy a piece of land. Then, IBDF came to say that we had to leave. We started to think: What are we going to do? Alone, we knew that we would not be strong enough to resist. Thus, we decided to go to Maranhão and to bring more people from there to help us defend our lands. So, we went to Maranhão and brought back two trucks full of people.

In 2003, the São Jorge community had over three hundred families, who were known as "*Maranhenses,*" whose settlement in the region resulted from IBDF's inability to deal with the conflicts generated. Through the years, one can read in the reserve's

reports the repetitive complaints of the administration regarding the insufficient number

of employees to deal with these problems in the reserve. For example, the 1990 DIMAF

Activities Report (DIMAF/IBAMA 1990) on National Forests in the Amazon, stated:

"We must remark that the great difficulties found in the work required for the creation,

implementation and consolidation of the National Forests are caused by human and

financial resource scarcity" (DIMAF/IBAMA 1990: 3). By the early 2000s, the situation

had not changed. When I interviewed Flona Tapajós's director in 2002, Angelo de Lima

Francisco, he complained about the lack of personnel to assist him with the reserve's

administration and audits. His team had only four employees, and none with a college

degree. [9]

The precarious conditions of Flona Tapajós' administrative structure and its

inability to adequately deal with the community issues during the process of the reserve's

implementation, influenced their decision to change their position on people's

displacement from the area. This situation was very different, for example, from that of

the Trombetas Biological Reserve, which had been created in 1979 near the Rio do Norte

Mining, which also had been established in 1979, to extract bauxite. Foresta (1991: 199)

noted that, "as IBDF hoped, the Trobetas reserve received financial support from

Poloamazonia program, enabling most of the caboclos[10] to be removed and most of the

private land to be purchased. … The Trombetas reserve had a staff of ten in 1986, large

by Amazon standards." Without enough institutional and financial support, and facing

strong community resistance, Flona Tapajós' administration had no alternative but to

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[9] In 2003, IBAMA hired four more employees with an undergraduate degree to work in Flona Tapajós; however, this was insufficient for the reserve's administration needs.

[10] The "*caboclos*" the author is making reference are the "*Quilombos* descendents," as seen in Chapter 2.

change their initial plan to displace people to one that designated an area of the reserve

for the "communities of resistance." However, the next step required in defining the

community area, came to be a long and conflictual process that, despite some advances,

has not yet reached a definitive solution.

5.3.2 The Defense of the Community Territorial Area

While the "communities of resistance" were able to mobilize and stop the attempts

at massive displacement and to force IBDF to review the initial boundaries of Flona

Tapajós, the step that followed, which was the definition of the forest area for community

uses, also became a strongly controversial subject between the communities and the

governmental agency. As previously discussed, the first community survey carried out in

1978 had recommended that four population areas be placed outside the reserve's

boundaries, including the area of the "communities of resistance" located along the

Tapajós River. Although not contemplated initially, this recommendation was taken into

consideration when the first Management Plan for Flona Tapajós was defined in 1982.

In 1982, the president of IBDF at the time, Mauro Silva Reis, presented the first

pilot project for forest management, which was called "Tapajós Program: Research and

Experimental Exploitation of the Humid Tropical Forest" (IBDF/Programa Tapajós

1982). The Tapajós Program envisioned the implementation of a pilot project for timber

exploitation in an area of 136 thousand hectares in Flona Tapajós, based on the "rational

management of the tropical forest." This was seen as representing an alternative to the

production of timber from cultivated, homogeneous forests. Echoing the arguments for a

"disciplined" method of forest exploitation, the Program emphasized that although timber

production in the Amazon region had increased, "up to now, methods of timber

exploitation have been characterized by rudimentary extraction techniques that have led

to the reduction of species of economic value… Itinerant timber extraction by autonomous lumber merchants is still accentuated" (IBDF/ Programa Tapajós 1982: 15-16). The Program stressed the excellent conditions for transportation by land or by water that existed, made available by an extensive road network and the improvement of the port in Santarém city, as well as emphasized the existence of "high densities of wood" in the area of Flona Tapajós.

The Management Plan selected an area of Flona Tapajós that was 171,000 hectares, which represented approximately 30 percent of the reserve. Of these 171,000 hectares, 131,000 hectares were set aside for timber management, and the remaining 35,000 hectares were subdivided into five areas, each for a different use: 1) 22,000 hectares for community people, 2) 7,500 hectares for "non-productive forest," 3) 1,000 hectares for research, 4) 3,500 hectares for "biological reserves," and 5) 1,000 hectares for watershed protection. In the area designated for timber management a pilot project was to be implemented that would serve as a model for timber exploitation in the Amazon region, based on the principles of scientific tropical forestry, and with an "entrepreneurial character." With a complex administrative structure, the pilot project was to bring together research institutions, such as EMBRAPA and SUDAM, IBDF, and private entrepreneurs to manage a thousand hectares of forest annually, starting in 1983 or 1984. However, the pilot project was not actually initiated until the late 1990s, in a much smaller area, through the implementation of an ITTO Project.

I was not able to reconstruct all of the dynamics that underlay the initial pilot project to manage timber in an area of Flona Tapajós. In 1984, only CEMEX harvested timber from two hundred hectares, but I did not find any documentation about this.

Possibly, the absence of specific legislation for National Forests, and regulations for private initiatives to exploit timber in the reserve, explain the long delay to put the pilot project in operation.

However, with regards to the area designated for the "communities of resistance," conflicts that emerged also prevented the development of the pilot program for timber management. In the text of the Tapajós Program there is no information about how the size of the area was defined, nor about the terms under which this land would be operated, specifically, whether or not it would be placed outside the reserve's boundaries. The Program only stated, among the objectives of the Management Plan, "to demarcate the areas currently occupied, promoting land tenure regulation," and, in order to create a labor force, "to provide for the engagement of the residents of Tapajós National Forest in agro-silvicultural activities," from which was expected the creation of two hundred new jobs in forestry activities.

On May 09, 1983, IBDF held a meeting in Santarém city to inform the "communities of resistance" of the decision to designate an area of Flona Tapajós for them. The report of this meeting did not state anything about the size of the area proposed. It only says that all the people present at the meeting "were unanimous in agreeing with IBDF's proposal" (IBDF/FLONA Tapajós 1983: 2). However, according to community representatives with whom I spoke, IBDF had held that meeting with community people selected at random, who were not recognized as the representatives of the communities and, hence, who had no legitimacy to negotiate. IBDF representatives, initially, had tried to invite the communities' leaders, but they refused to participate. In

most of the interviews carried out with community leaders, I perceived their refusal in

negotiating with the governmental agency as a political strategy of resistance.

This meeting took place in May; however, one month earlier, in April of 1983,

IBDF already had contracted the 8° *Batalhão de Contrução e Engenharia do Comando*

Militar da Amazônia[11] (8° BEC) to set aside 27,600 ha from Flona Tapajos to give to the

communities. This area extended approximately four kilometers from the Tapajós River

bank to the center of forest, which, as IBDF's 1978 Report asserted, "was poor in its

forest resources and constituted by sandy soils." These forest and soil characteristics

were well known to the community people, whose livelihood production systems and the

modes of forest use were not taken into consideration when this area was demarcated.

Therefore, in September of the same year, when the community people found out that the

8° BEC was demarcating this area, people went there and intercepted the demarcation

work. The tension created by this interruption was reported by the 8° BEC, which stated

that, "due to the state of tension in the area, this Command is very concerned for the

employees of this Unit" (8° BEC, of. N° 11/1983/STR). Due to the resistance by

communities, and the rising tensions, the contract between IBDF and 8° BEC was broken

off the next month.

According to the community people, the demarcation work was intercepted because

the area did not accommodate their real necessities, as highlighted in remarks by Mário

from the Pedreira community, and Pedro from the Piquiatuba community:

Pedro: When the 8° BEC was contracted to make the demarcation, the area was too
small. It would not reach more than twenty hectares per family. Thus, the communities
went there and stopped the demarcation because it would be a big loss for our families. If

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[11] This was a special unit of the Brazilian Army responsible for providing infrastructure to the Amazon
Region.

we were to accept only twenty hectares per family, how would it be twenty years from now? Where would we go to work?

Mário: We did not accept the IBDF demarcation line because we understood that it was too small. It would provide us only with a sandy area and we would lose the opportunity to have fertile lands and a forested area, where we have *andiroba* oil, mahogany, vines, nuts, hunting…

The area that IBDF had designated for the communities had taken into consideration only the areas adjacent to people's residences, and had not taken into account the complexity of community production systems that were based on multiple uses of forest resources. Although most of the permanent community residences were located along the Tapajós River, which the communities called the "*beira,*" the central forested areas, called "*mata*" or "*áreas de mata*" (areas of forest*)*, were important parts of the community productive system and the community symbolic universe. The *mata* areas were fundamental for the family production unit because they provided a significant part of the products that consumed daily, such as game, fruits, oils, and medicines, in addition to the forest resources needed for house and boat construction and maintenance. In these *mata* areas, the community people also established the "*colônias*" or "*sítios,*" agricultural fields that represented an essential component in the constitution and dynamic of family social and productive organization.

Generally, the *colônias* constituted a family production unit that was planted in the most central forest areas, four to seven kilometers from the river's banks. In some communities, they could be located at a greater distance, in areas called "*planalto,*" whose soils were significantly more fertile in contrast with the sandy soils found in the "*beira.*" The "*colônias*" usually encompassed an area of around five hectares, where field crops *(roçados)* were planted that provided daily food and were at the center of

economic transactions, mainly, through the production of the "*farinha*" (manioc flour). The field crops were planted according to a system of shifting cultivation, in which cultivated area were left to rest after three years of use, and other perennial species were planted, especially rubber trees, but also many other varieties. In the "*colônias*" was also installed the "*casa de farinha*" (manioc flour house), which comprised the technical instruments for *farinha* production. The community people commented that in the past, families used to live in the "*colônias*" and in the "areas of *beira*," at different times of the year. During the rainy season, from July to December, they lived in the "*colônias*," and during the dry season, from January to June, in the "areas of *beira*." Over the last decades, however, this has been changing, and, currently, people went daily to the "*colônias*" to work, and returned to their homes, usually located at the *beira*, at the end of the day.

Interfering directly with the community production system, the area that IBDF tried to impose on the communities would have prevented them from having access to better soils for the planting of the "*colônias*," in addition to forest resources that were only found in these central areas. The areas of "*beira*" and "*mata*" were not dissociated but complementary for the community production system, as well as the lakes and rivers, whose resources were managed to allow for a diversity of livelihood strategies that followed norms of reciprocity and several other community regulations. Moreover, the *mata* areas sheltered the *Curupira* and the *Mapinguari*, the *mata*'s guardians, who composed the community symbolic system along with enchanted beings sheltered in the river's waters, such as *Cobra Grande* and *Boto*. Based on a complex system of values, symbols, and beliefs, the community's relation with the "*mata* areas" conferred to them a

distinction in terms of social identity. As Lins e Silva (1980) also observed in her study

on peasant communities in the Santarém region, this distinction expressed an opposition

to other peasant groups that were established in the region, such as colonists from South

(the *Gaúchos*) or Northeast (the *Cearenses*, the *Maranhenses*).

Therefore, the area IBDF was trying to impose on the communities would not just

prevent them from accessing forest resources for their economic activities, but also would

have disrupted their socio-cultural beliefs and practices. In reaction to the IBDF's

attempt to demarcate an area that did not contemplate community forms of forest uses

and values, the community people decided to demarcate an area themselves as a way to

guarantee that they retained access to the lands they considered necessary for their

livelihood strategies. Thus, in May 1984, all sixteen "communities of resistance" jointly

demarcated an area that extended ten kilometers from the Tapajós River bank to the

center of the forest. The demarcation line was named the "***Pico das Comunidades***"

(Communities' Line) in opposition to the "***Pico do IBDF***" (IBDF's Line), which IBDF

had been trying to impose. Pedro explained how this process was achieved:

Pedro: We, all the communities, all together with the support of the (Rural Workers') Union, decided after several meetings that we had to demarcate an area that encompassed ten kilometers [from the bank of the Tapajós River to the center of the forest]. We held meetings in Piquiatuba because here was the most centrally-located community. We had three large assemblies, with the participation of over two hundred people in each meeting to decide what we were going to do. Our thought was ten kilometers, and that was the decision. Then, on the same day, all the communities started the cut the forest to demarcate the area, and, as we had decided, when each community had finished the job, we shot with our shotguns to let them know that the job was done. This demarcation took three weeks because it was so difficult. We went to the center of the forest, where some people made shelters, others made the measurements, and others started to cut the trees. When it was Saturday, we went back home, and when it was Monday, we went up to the forest again. We had a strong feeling of resistance. You should have seen the spirit of resistance we had over here!

The area demarcated by the communities was double in size that of the area that

IBDF had designated for them. The decision of the communities to demarcate their own

area was strongly influenced by the demarcation process undertaken by communities on

the left bank of the Tapajós River two years earlier, when Amazonex Exportadora Ltda

and Santa Isabel Agroflorestal Ltda started to exploit timber on their lands. As

previously discussed, beginning in the 1980s the two timber enterprises came to the

Santarém region and initiated timber exploitation in forested areas occupied by several

communities, which did not accept this and, through strong mobilization, were able to

stop the companies' plans (Leroy 1991). After several meetings of negotiations, the

community people made an accord with the companies' representatives to establish a

limit of thirteen kilometers from the river's bank where the companies could not exploit

timber. These limits were materialized through a boundary line that the community

people demarcated in 1981. The success of these communities inspired the communities

in Flona Tapajós to follow the same strategy.

5.3.3   The Moral Economy of Community Resistance

Both of these forms of community resistance, the first to avoid displacement and,

the second, to demarcate an area the communities claimed to be necessary for their

livelihood strategies, represented part of the same process to defend themselves against

government attempts to transform them into wage workers for the timber industry.

Initially, the attempts of displacement were more radical, since the original plan to move

people out of the reserve, would have totally broken off community people's relation

with the land, leaving no other subsistence alternative other than to become laborers.

Although the government subsequently decided against outright removal, the area IBDF

had initially designated to these "communities of resistance" would have had almost the

same effects as total displacement. The designation of an area that met only part of the

needs to maintain the communities' productive and cultural systems, by leaving out

access to most of the forest resources, would certainly have represented a drastic

reduction in family sources of revenue, which would have forced people to look for

alternative sources of income as laborers.

Therefore, even softening the attempts of induced-displacement, the reduction of

forest areas would not prevent the dismembering of the community production system,

nor those of the complex social relations that regulate the functioning of such a system.

Although the basis of community social and productive organization rested on the family

nuclei, these nuclei did not constitute a self-limited group. Rather, through the annual

agricultural calendar of activities, families established a pattern of mutual cooperation

among themselves to carry out activities such as slash and burning of forest areas to plant

the field crops (*roçados*). It was through these reciprocal relationships that the

community social unit was created and maintained, and the pattern of land use was

established, in which land and forest resources were not understood as the object of

individual appropriation, but were regulated by norms that ensured common use. The

breaking off the production system, as would have occurred if families had been

relocated to the IDBF proposed area, would, inevitably, cause a rupture in these

reciprocal relations that maintain the community social cohesion.

Moreover, without having access to and control over the "*mata* areas," not only

would the community sources of revenue be strongly affected, but so would the

autonomy of the communities in relation to their territories and socio-cultural

organizations. To defend the land was also an act to defend social and spatial relations

that historically had determined the occupation of the territory. As Oliver Smith (1996: 96) pointed out in his analysis on the significance of resistance against forced-displacements, the "voices" that question the development model of modern society "[were] insisting that territory not only consist of resources, but is also the basis of a particular way of life that the people have a right to maintain."

This perspective evokes Scott's (1984) discussion of the moral economy underlying peasant social and political organizations, in which the author analyzed the nature of the "social dynamite" that leads to the eruption of peasant uprisings. Focusing on South Asian rebellions, the author shed light on the moral principles that guide peasant social behavior, and their objections to the dominant political order that might lead to revolt. Under the premise that peasants shape their economic life in order to ensure the "safety-first" of their subsistence, Scott showed peasant subsistence as a moral claim governed by norms of reciprocity. According to him, under the notion that every service received, solicited or not, demands a return, peasants build their relationships based on the assumption that subsistence is an unalienable social right. This, according to the author, provides peasants with the criteria to assess notions of justice and legitimacy in the relationships that are established among the villagers, with "patrons," or with the state. Justice and legitimacy will, then, be "contingent upon the performance of obligation for which it is responsible" (Scott 1984: 181). Disrespect for these obligations, violation of the rules of reciprocity that ensure peasant subsistence was, thus, the breakpoint that produces and justifies uprisings. Not surprisingly, the Asian taxation system imposed by the colonial powers on the peasants was frequently the main fuel, the *dynamite* that detonated historical peasant rebellions. Based on a colonial rationale that

ignored principles of reciprocity that made the basic notion of safety-first effective, the

tax system repeatedly threatened peasant rights to their subsistence, especially in times of

scarcity.

As Scott (1984) stated in the book's preface, his analysis of the moral-economy of

Asian rebellions was intended to demonstrate that "the problem of exploitation and

rebellion is thus not just a problem of calories and income but is a question of peasant

conception of social justice, of rights and obligations, of reciprocity" (p. VII). A similar

idea also had been presented by E.P. Thompson (1971) in his "The Moral Economy of

the English Crowd in the Eighteenth-Century," in which the author asserted that popular

rebellions follow moral principles and were not just a "direct, spasmodic, irrational

response to hunger" (Thompson 1971: 136), as economists generally argued. In both

cases, the authors demonstrated that patterns of moral and ethical values informed

notions of rights, justice, and "reasonable price" underlying social riots. The

infringement of those morals values "was the usual occasion for direct action"(Thompson

1971: 79).

This perspective can also be applied to understand the community political actions

of the communities in Flona Tapajós to defend the land that provided their basic means of

subsistence. Yet, as previously discussed, subsistence did not entail just the acquisition

of material resources, but also an underlying complex social relation system. The

attempts of the government to displace people or their efforts to designate a smaller area,

would have not only prevented the reproduction of the material means for community

subsistence, but also the value system and the forms of social organization that supported

the community subsistence strategies. The resistance mounted by the communities did

not intend to only secure their residence in the area, but also, as Oliver-Smith (1996: 96)
remarked, "a particular way of life."

While the "communities of resistance" demarcated an area that guaranteed them
access to forest resources, IBDF never recognized the area claimed by the communities.
Even later, IBAMA resisted for a long time to accept the area demanded by them. For a
long time, the "communities of resistance" were given unofficial rights to the area they
demarcated, but these were marked by a constant process of dispute and suspicion. As
such, for the communities their relationship with the territory would never be same,
demanding a continuous state of vigilance to maintain relative control of their territory.

5.3.4   The Ongoing Disputes over Territory and Resources

Within the disputes that have defined the relationship between the communities and
IBDF, there were continuous complaints about the restrictions on access and exploitation
of forest resources imposed by the governmental agency. One of these restrictions was
related to the prohibition on hunting. When I first carried out a survey among the
communities in 1996, the theme was practically a taboo. Nobody wanted to talk about it,
and when they did, people spoke with irony. In answers about hunting practices, they
just used to say: "We are prohibited to do that." In the first socio-economic survey
carried out by IBAMA, in 1993, among the communities in Flona Tapajós, the final
report stated that, although community people denied that they hunted, several wild
animals' bones had been seen around the houses. The report also mentioned that the
people declined to talk about the subject because they were afraid of IBAMA's sanctions
(Santos 1993).

Other people's complaints were related to the prohibition on cultivating *roçados* in
forested areas that were over twenty years old. The restriction to cultivate in these forest

areas affected, mainly, the establishment of the *colônias* or *sítios*, which were planted in

the most centrally-located areas of the forest. Many families that lived in these areas had

to move to the areas of *beira*, as had happened with Clara's family in the Piquiatuba

community.

Edviges: Why did you leave your *colônia*?

Clara: We lived there in the *mata*, at the bottom of the mountain, behind the *Vai-quem-quer*, where at that time nobody resided. Then, when the Flona was created, they [IBDF's employees] went there to my house and said that we had to leave. I do not remember for sure the name of the man who came there. But, he said that we had to leave, that we could go to reside in Piquiatuba or in Pedreira. We could choose. They still promised to pay an indemnity, and they said if we did not agree to leave, they would take us out of here anyway. They also said that we could no longer cut trees that were larger, that we could only plant the *roçados* in the *capoeiras*.[12] I did not want to leave because I was not used to living in the middle of the village. I like to raise my hens in the garden, but, in the village, they go to the neighbor's gardens; and the children also go to the neighbors' houses and they touch things that do not belong to us. I prefer more distance, but we had to leave, and I still have a rubber area over there. Then, my husband and I came to Piquiatuba to ask for a place to build our house. The compensation they promised to pay, I never heard anything about that.

A statement by Lauro also illustrates IBDF's position at the time:

Lauro: It was a time when IBDF said that the people who had dwellings located behind the seven kilometers, where they worked and had the fruit trees, where the *sítios* were established, were to be indemnified. Therefore, many of us stopped working in the *planalto* area. But, it was a malevolence of IBDF, because we never received this indemnity; it was just a promise. Now the people are just in the *beira*, where the land is poor; it has only sand, and there are a lot of ants (*saúva*) and production is minimal.

When carrying out the survey in 1996, I interviewed Sebastião Santos da Silva,

who was Flona Tapajós' director at the time, and had worked before as the assistant of

the former director. When I asked him about these prohibitions, he explained that "there

was no prohibition, but an orientation" in relation to the areas that could be cultivated. At

that time, Flona Tapajós had not yet specific official regulations defining the activities

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[12] *Capoeira* is the name given to the vegetation that starts to grow after the *roçado* areas are no longer cultivated. Generally, *capoeiras* are considered to be less than thirty years old.

that could be carried out in the reserve. The restrictions IBDF was imposing on the communities were based on general guidelines outlined in the 1967 Forest Code, and these clearly pointed toward relocating the people to the area IBDF initially had tried to demarcate, where the timber resources were scarce and the soils did not permit mechanical exploitation.

These conflicting conceptualizations, between the communities and the governmental agency, regarding forest resources are reminiscent of those found by Peluso (1992: 11) in her analysis on Java's forests, in which she observed that "coercion has a different effect on laborers extracting resources for the state than it has on other rural dwellers *illegally* extracting resources for themselves" (emphasis in the original). Understanding the increasing use of coercion to exert social and resource control as indicative of declining state power and authority in the face of people's resistance, Peluso asserted that, "coercion is thus not an end in itself but a part of the evolving process in which one side pursues control over the resources claimed by other side" (1992: 11). Although restrictions on access to forest resources, or an "orientation," in the words of the former reserve's director, had been imposed by the reserve's administration, it had difficulty enforcing them due to the continuous lack of personnel to audit the area. This allowed the communities to disregard governmental intervention and, to some extent, keep secret their activities in the forest areas.[13]

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[13] The difficulties the IBDF faced to patrol the reserve's area were reflected also in other sectors, as in the region around the São Jorge community, especially, because of the expansion of the cattle farms by entrepreneurs from Santarém. The expansion of these cattle farms started to occur with intensity from the middle 1980s, representing a vast deforested area at the center of the reserve, which, even presently, the reserve's direction has not been able to stop.

The disputes regarding access to these forest areas were again rekindled when the

government attempted to implement the project called "Tapajós National Forest

Management for Sustainable Industrial Timber Production"[14] (Hernandez Filho et al

1993). More commonly known as the "ITTO Project," it had been elaborated in 1989,

when IBDF was in the process of being replaced by IBAMA. Envisioning the

exploitation of timber in an area of five thousand hectares in Flona Tapajós, the proposal

for the ITTO Project had involved several governmental, multilateral, and non-

governmental agencies. With financial support from the British agency ODA[15] (Overseas

Development Agency), this project resulted from a joint effort of the National Institute

for Space Research (INPE), IBAMA, Pro-Nature Foundation (FUNATURA), and ITTO

(International Tropical Timber Organization), with the collaboration of

EMBRAPA/CPATU[16], UFP/FCAP[17], and SUDAM.

The ITTO Project signified an attempt to develop, once again, the first

Management Plan for Flona Tapajós that had been defined in 1982 to exploit timber in an

area over a hundred thousand hectares. Based on this initial management proposal, the

ITTO Project was to be implemented in a smaller area, encompassing five thousand

hectares, which, however, overlapped with approximately twenty-five percent of the area

claimed by the communities. The community people found out about the project only in

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[14] "*Manejo da Floresta Nacional do Tapajós para Produção Sustentada de Madeira Industrial.*"

[15] UK contribution was £ 1,096.500 spread over five years, half of the Brazilian government contribution (Synnott 1991).

[16] EMBRAPA/CPATU (*Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária/Centro de Pesquisa do Trópico Úmido*, a Brazilian institution for agriculture research).

[17] UFP (Univeridade Federal do Pará)/FCAP (Faculdade de Ciências Agrárias do Pará), Federal University of Pará.

1990, when they met researchers in the field carrying out surveys to identify the tree

species. In the same way that the "communities of resistance" had prevented the

continuation of the demarcation work that was taken by the 8° BEC in 1982, they also

intercepted the ITTO project-related research work. The community reaction worried the

donor agency, which, afraid of negative repercussions that the conflict could cause,

demanded the resolution of the community land tenure conflicts. That new situation

created, for the first time, an opportunity for a negotiation process between the

community and the governmental agency, which was IBAMA at the time, to reach an

accord on community land occupancy.

This process was initiated with a meeting that occurred in April 1992, in which

representatives from the communities participated, as well as IBAMA, and non-

governmental organizations, such as the Rural Workers' Union, the Land Pastoral

Commission (CPT, a Catholic Church organization), and the Health and Happiness

Project (PSA, *Projeto Saúde e Alegria*) that had been working with the communities

since 1987, in addition to other municipal and federal governmental agencies. In this first

meeting, participants decided to create a "work group" that would include representatives

from all the communities and governmental and non-governmental agencies that had a

relationship to Flona Tapajós. This group was named the Flona Tapajós Work Group.

Composed of representatives of the communities and other sectors of civil and

governmental society, the Flona Tapajós Work Group was officially recognized by the

municipality decree n° 18, on April 3, 1992.

In April of 1992, the Work Group organized a workshop that lasted ten days to

decide about the size of the area for the communities. In this workshop, the communities

proposed the demarcation of an area of one hundred hectares per family, but IBAMA did

not agreed with the proposal. Given the differences in opinion, the Work Group decided

to carry out a socio-economic study in order to define the area to be set aside for the

communities. In addition to the socio-economic survey, the Group also decided to

consult all community members about the legal status of the proposed community area.

There were three proposals presented to community members: 1) an area placed outside

the boundaries of Flona Tapajós, 2) an area outside Flona Tapajós and transformed into

an Environmental Protection Area[18] (APA), or 3) an area that would remain in the Flona

Tapajós but the families would have a concession to use it.

Coordinated by C. Santos, a sociologist from IBAMA, the Flona Tapajós Work

Group carried out the socio-economic survey a year later, between June 6 and 29, 1993.

According to the survey report, the area to be designed to the communities should

encompass an area of 60,376 hectares, which actually coincided with the area claimed by

communities and demarcated nine years earlier. After having carried out the socio-

economic survey, the Work Group initiated the process of consultations with the

community people to decide about the three proposals on the legal status of the area.

Although this process had been initiated in 1933, the discussion of the decision of the

community was postponed until February 1996, when the Pilot Program to Conserve the

Brazilian Rainforest (PROMANEJO-PP/G7) was initiated, which will be discussed in the

next chapter.

The long delay in achieving a resolution with regard to the community land tenure

conflicts was due to the difficulty of the disputes revolving around access to and control

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[18] APA (*Área de Proteção Ambiental*) is one of the categories of Conservation Units, included among of the Direct Use sub-category.

of forest resources. For the governmental agency, to accept the area claimed by the communities would have represented the loss of the part of the reserve where most of the timber resources were found, and the ITTO Project. For the communities, the government's proposed area would have meant a severe reduction of their territory, which would have affected not only the communities' sources of income, but also their forms of social and spatial organizations and their autonomy over them. Each with strong reasons to defend their position, both the communities and the government remained locked in their respective standpoint.

The governmental agency, however, started to be pressured by the multilateral agencies financing the ITTO project. They were concerned about the ways in which the conflicts with the communities, which revolved over timber exploitation, might resonate in the larger environmental movement. Regionally, the communities had already articulated with the environmental grassroots organizations that had sprung up in the 1980s, such as the GDA (Amazônia Defense Group). In 1993, several social and environmental non-governmental organizations from Santarém published a document expressing their position against the ITTO Project, which, according to them, was disregarding community interests in favor of private timber enterprises (STR et al 1993). The document also complained about the lack of accountability in the project. Although the project had created a "Consultant Committee" with local agencies to advise on the project's activities, these agencies had never been contacted, and many did not even know about the existence of the project. The document concluded that the project's activities should be stopped until the issues related to community land were defined, and a study on social and environmental impacts was carried out.

The communities' articulation that had started to occur with broader sectors of civil society, mainly with those engaged in environmental issues, brought a new dimension to the community political mobilization. This community association with the environmental movement reflected a larger mobilization that started to take place throughout the Amazon region starting in the middle 1980s, when there were indications that a probable obliteration of the forest was inevitable, termed the "Decade of Destruction." It was an important moment for the Amazon, whose accelerated process of deforestation and land expropriation conflicts caused by the development policies implemented starting in the early 1970, fostered the construction of alliances between social and environmental movements, epitomized by the creation of the "Alliance of the Forest People" (*Aliança dos Povos da Floresta*).[19]

This alliance launched an international campaign, in which they placed the blame on multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, for the social and environmental catastrophe in the Amazon. In doing so, they were able to capture the attention of these agencies on issues related to development plans, as happened with the paving of the 364 Highway, in the western Amazon. Pressured by international mobilization, the World Bank had to review its financial support for the paving of the 364 Highway, and ended up including, as conditions, measures to assure native territories and areas of environmental protection to mitigate social and environmental impacts (Schmink and Wood 1992).

In this context, the community mobilization in Flona Tapajós, which started to take on a broader dimension, also caught the attention of the agencies involved in the implementation of the ITTO Project. This was further bolstered with the introduction of

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[19] For a list of the several governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in Amazon social and environmental issues starting in the 1980s, see Arnt and Schwartzman (1992).

the PROMANEJO project, in 1994, which stipulated that the community land tenure

conflicts be resolved prior to the implementation of the project, as will be discussed in the

next chapter.

CHAPTER 6
SHAPING TRADITIONAL PEOPLE IN NATIONAL FORESTS

6.1 Introduction

When I returned to the field in 2000 for a short-term period of fieldwork to prepare

my doctoral research project, I observed for the first time two new social identification

movements among the communities: 1) toward identifying as "traditional people," and,

2) toward identifying as "Mundurucu Indians," such as in the case of the Taquara

community. Although these forms of social identification started to occur in the late

1990s, they were associated with the major events related to the environmental reserve

policies from a decade earlier. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Amazon forest started to

call the attention of the international environmental movement due to the accelerated

process of deforestation that was occurring in the region, which was attributed to the

economic occupation model that had been implemented since the early 1970s.

Government development policies were being blamed for promoting an irreversible

ecological catastrophe, putting at risk of obliteration the last remaining tropical forest,

thirty three percent of which was located in Brazil. The satellite images from LANDSAT

published by INPE in 1987 showed the largest-scale burning of the forest ever recorded

in the history of the region (Anderson 1990). The global effects such deforestation might

cause in terms of biodiversity impoverishment and climate disequilibrium, led Amazônia

to be at the center of the international environmental debate, mobilizing academic

institutions, grassroots movements, governments, multilateral agencies, and the press

worldwide.

Concurrently, several grassroots movements spread out throughout the Amazon region in reaction to the accentuated territorial and resource degradation promoted by the advance of economic forces. The defense of native territories and the integrity of resources found strong support from the environmental movement, providing the basis for the most significant partnership in terms of mobilization to ensure social rights and maintenance of forest resources. The campaigns, such those that occurred in relation to the Yanomami Indians (Albert 1992), or the *seringueiro* movement in Acre proposing the creation of the extractive reserves (Allegretti 2002), represented part of this mobilization to defend native territories associated with the defense of the Amazon forest.

Social rights and environmentalist agendas found together a "common ground," with internationally voices mobilizing against destructive government social and environmental policies, and turning the preservation of the Amazon forest the center of international concerns. As Hurrell (1992: 414) observed, "the political impact of the social mobilization in the Amazon was largely the result of these transnational ties and their contribution to the international campaign against Brazilian government policies, rather than the result of the direct pressure on the government in Brasilia." The campaign for stopping the alarming Amazon forest degradation gained force with the assassination of the *seringueiro* leader Chico Mendes in December 1988, which had significant coverage in the international media, which portrayed him as the "Rain forest defender hero" (Allegretti 2002).

In this context of international attention on the Amazon, a response emerged both internally and externally. Internally, the Brazilian government launched the *Nossa Natureza* Program (Our Nature Program), characterizing what Schmink and Wood (1992)

called "green geopolitics." Externally, the international community launched the PPG-7

Pilot Program, announced at the UN Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the ECO-92.

Both programs would directly affect National Forest policies regarding community

people, and decisively influenced the negotiation process that was taking place in Flona

Tapajós regarding community land tenure and the incorporation of the category of

"traditional people" in the reserve's program. This chapter focuses on this process that

defined new policies to deal with community territory and forest resource appropriation,

and fostered a re-conceptualization of community social identity.

6.2 The Green Years: The Amazon Social and Conservation Agenda

6.2.1   Our Nature Program: The Makeup of the Social and Environmental Agenda

Responding to international pressures, by the late 1980s, under the civilian New

Republic, the Brazilian government implemented several environmental policy measures,

which were markedly nationalist in character. Barretto (2001a) remarked that the

nationalist reaction of President Sarney's government, expressed both internally and

externally, followed and reinforced the Brazilian government's stand, dating back to the

UN's 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, that developing countries

should not have to sacrifice economic development for environmental issues. Besides

economic growth, the government also had emphasized the suspicion that developed

countries were using environmental conservation to restrain the development of Brazil,

and were interested in taking possession of the Amazon region. Internationally, this

Brazilian government stance was manifested in President Sarney's refusal to participate

in the United Nations General Assembly on global atmosphere protection in 1989, as well

as in the Brazilian delegation's rejection, at this conference, of any reference to

Amazônia in the final report, and of French President Mitterand's proposal to strengthen the United Nations' capacity to intervene on issues concerning the environment.[1]

While seeking to reduce international pressures by counterattacking with nationalist arguments, the Sarney government launched in 1988 a new environmental plan called Program for the Defense of the Legal Amazônia Ecosystem Complex - *Programa Nossa Natureza* (Decree nº 96.944, October 12, 1988). Comprising a number of actions to be implemented on several fronts, the *Nossa Natureza* Program defined as its main objective the establishment of "conditions for the utilization and preservation of the environment and renewable natural resources in Legal Amazônia, which will be implemented through a concentration of efforts among all governmental agencies with the cooperation of other segments of society involved in the preservation of the environment" (PNN 1989: 2). Part of the broader geopolitical strategies designed to ensure military and economic occupation in the Amazon border region, the *Nossa Natureza* Program was subdivided into six Inter-ministerial Work Groups, whose activities were coordinated by the Special Secretariat on National Defense (SADEN) under the command of General Bayma Denis, who was both the military chief of staff and the former general secretary of the National Security Council (which was replaced by SADEN).

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[1] The nationalist reaction against supposed international intervention in the Amazon region was also echoed by the Brazilian Congress, which fueled the debate surrounding the "internationalization of Amazônia." In 1988, congressmen representing government interests organized the second Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) to investigate the threat of internalization of the Amazon region. This CPI, which was called the "CPI on the Internationalization of Amazônia," focused on both the indigenous and international environmental movements, which were accused of orchestrating a campaign to limit Brazilian sovereignty over the Amazon region. Two years earlier, in 1986, when the Congress was drafting the new Brazilian Constitution, approved in 1988, the Camera of Deputies had already created a CPI to investigate the same supposed menaces of an "internationalization of Amazônia," which was known as the "CPI do CIMI" (Missionary Indian Council), the Catholic organization that provided support for the indigenous movement. In fact, this CPI revealed attempts to restrain indigenous land rights that were, at the time, under discussion in the Constitutional Assembly.

One of these Working Groups was the VI Working Group on Environmental Protection, Indigenous Communities, and Extractive Producers, which envisioned promoting measures "to discipline the occupation and the rational exploitation of Legal Amazônia based on territorial orderliness" (PNN 1989: 5). These measures included an Ecological-Economic Zoning (*Zoneamento Ecológico Econômico*) of areas in the Amazon, and the solicitation of international financial resources through bilateral cooperation. Schmink and Wood (1992: 124) remarked that, "this aspect of Nossa Natureza as well as other military policies adopted in the late 1980s relied on the concept of strategic 'set asides'. The zoning approach based on 'ecological expropriations permitted whole territories to be put under military control while ostensibly satisfying environmental pressure groups."

In the context of the *Nossa Natureza* Program, Sarney's government restructured several government agencies related to environmental affairs. This included replacing IBDF by IBAMA, which was created in February 22, 1989 (Law n° 7.735), and was directly subordinated to the Presidential Environmental Secretary. Besides IBDF, IBAMA also took over the responsibilities of SEMA (Special Secretariat for the Environment), SUDEPE (Superintendency for Fishing Development), and SUDHEVEA (Superintendency for Rubber Development). In the same year, in 1989, IBAMA contracted FUNATURA, a non-governmental organization, to draft a first proposal to restructure the National System of Conservation Units (SNUC). It was only after a decade of discussion, in 2000, that SNUC was officially created (Law n° 9.985).

It is during this period that Barretto (2001a) identified what he called the "fourth generation" of fully-protected reserves in Brazil. These initially included five national

parks and four biological reserves, all created by the government in 1989. Among these however, were only two national parks created in the Amazon region, the Serra do Divisor and the Monte Roraima National Parks. These were located, respectively, by the international borders of the states of Acre and Roraima, and represented eighty-four percent of the national park areas created between 1986-1989 in Brazil. While the Sarney government established few fully-protected reserves in the Amazon region, by contrast, it created several reserves of direct use, including national forests. As can be seen in Table 5-1., during the years 1988-90, twenty-three national forests were created, twenty-one in the Amazon region alone. Prior to the establishment of these national forests, only three other national forests had been created. These were Flona Caxuianã in 1961, Flona Tapajós in 1974, and Flona Jamari in 1984.

Despite the increase in the number of national forests in the Amazon region in the late 1980s, their creation had less to do with an increase in forestry policies, as one might assume, than it had with mining interests, and the dismissal of demands from native social groups for control over territories. The controversial governmental measures implemented with regards to the territory of the Yanomami Indians, as well as the territories of the "*Remanescentes de Quilobos*" communities, were illustrative of a two-prong governmental strategy, permitting, as Schmink and Wood (1992: 124) remarked, "these 'protected areas' to be used for particular purposes."

In August 1988, the president of FUNAI (*Fundação Nacional do Índio*, the governmental agency responsible for Indian affairs) announced the Directive 160 for the demarcation of the Yanomami lands, which was redrawn in November of that year as Directive 250. These directives reduced and divided the Yanomami lands into nineteen

Table 6-1. National Forests created in the Amazon Region

National Forest	State	Extension (ha)	Decree number	Date
Altamira	PA	689,012	2.483	02/02/1998
Amapá	AP	412,000	96.630	04/10/1989
Amazonas	AM	1,573.000	97.546	03/01/1989
Bom Futuro	RO	280,000	96.187	06/21/1988
Carajás	PA	411,948	2.486	02/02/1998
Caxiuanã	PA	200,000	239	11/28/1961
Cubate	AM	416,532	99.105	03/09/1990
Cuiari	AM	109,518	99.109	03/09/1990
Humaitá	AM	468,790	2.485	02/02/1998
Içana	AM	200,561	99.110	03/09/1990
Içana Aiari	AM	491,400	99.108	03/09/1990
Itacaiúnas	PA	141,400	2.480	02/02/1998
Itaituba I	PA	220,034	2.481	02/02/1998
Itaituba II	PA	440,500	2.482	02/02/1998
Jamari	RO	215,000	90.224	09/25/1984
Macauá	AC	172,475	96.189	06/21/1988
Mapiá-Inauini	AC	311,000	98.051	08/14/1989
Pari Cachoeira I	AM	18,000	98.440	11/23/1989
Pari Cachoeira II	AM	654,000	98.441	11/23/1989
Pau-Rosa	AM	827,877		08/07/2001
Pirauiara	AM	631,436	99.111	03/09/1990
Purus	AM	256,000	96.190	06/21/1988
Roraima	RR	2,664.685	97.545	03/01/1989
Santa Rosa do Purus	AM	230,257		08/07/2001
São Francisco	AC	21,600		08/07/2001
Saracataquera	PA	429,600	98.704	12/27/1989
Tapajós	PA	600,000	73.684	02/19/1974
Tapirapé Aquiri	PA	190,000	97.720	05/05/1989
Tarauacá I	AM	647,744	99.112	03/09/1990
Tarauacá II	AM	559,504	99.113	03/09/1990
Tefé	AM	1,020.000	97.629	04/10/1989
Uruçú	AM	66,496	99.106	03/09/1990
Xié	AM	407,935	99.107	03/09/1990
Xingu	PA	252,790	2.484	02/02/1998

Source: Ricardo and Capobianco (2001)

separate and disjointed areas that were enclosed within the Amazonas and Roraima

National Forests and the Pico da Neblina National Park (ten within the Roraima National

Forest; five within the Amazon National Forest; and four within Pico da Neblina National

Park) (Albert 1992). Pico da Neblina National Park was created in 1979, while the

Amazonas and the Roraima National Forests were created in 1989, overlapping ninety-

five percent of the Yanonami lands (Ricardo and Capobianco 2001).

By creating these national forests within indigenous lands, the government tried a

legal loophole to undermine indigenous rights to their territory, which had been

safeguarded by the new Brazilian Constitution approved by the National Congress in

1988. Similar situations of converting indigenous lands into national forests also

happened in the upper Rio Negro, and in the states of Acre and Southern Amazonas.

Analyzing these governmental Directives regarding Yanomami lands, Albert

(1992) remarked on their relation with the *Calha Norte* project[2] and military concerns

about the exploitation of the considerable mineral deposits in the state of Roraima and

other regions of the Solimões and Amazon basin, which had significant areas of

indigenous lands, especially Yanomami territory. The author remarked that the federal

government, envisioning taking direct control over these areas, started to promote a

succession of measures, including the creation of the national forests, to "reduce

indigenous territories in order to facilitate the access of large-scale mining companies to

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[2] Made public in October of 1986, *Calha Norte* was formulated by the National Security Council, defining as its objective the establishment of military colonies, an improved communication and transportation network, energy resources and basic services in order to bring economic investments to the region. Alleging threats to national security, *Calha Norte* was justified by the existence of guerrilla movements, narcotics trade networks in neighboring countries, and, remarkably, the danger of indigenous groups becoming independent states, with special emphasis on the Yanomami case. In August 1989, Calha Norte Project was reinforced and extended to western Amazônia (Schmink and Wood 1992, Albert 1992; Oliveira 1990).

the deposits located in the lands" (Albert 1992: 52-3). At the same time that the federal government was converting indigenous lands into National Forests, IBAMA was drafting a law to authorize mining exploitation in these reserves, which was passed in 1989 (Law 7.805, 18 July 1989).

These governmental measures also had a direct effect on the territories of the *Remascentes de Quilombos* communities, in northwestern Pará state, on the border with Venezuela, with the creation, in December 1989, of the Saracá-Taquera National Forest. As previously discussed, in chapter 2, these communities had been displaced from the Trombetas Biological Reserve (Trombetas REBIO), created in 1979, the same year the Rio do Norte mining company started to exploit bauxite from the region (Acevedo and Castro 1998). Consequently, most of the residents left their lands and moved to the other side of the river or to the upper river. The people who moved to the area across from the REBIO area, founding the community of *Boa Vista*, one of the twenty-two *Remascentes de Quilombos* communities in the region, claimed rights to their lands, as sanctioned by the new Constitution that had been created a year earlier, in 1988. However, instead of conceding the *Remascentes de Quilombos* lands, the federal government created Flona Saracá-Taquera in an area of 429,600 hectares, encircling the Boa Vista area. This left the Boa Vista community with only 1,800 hectares, to which the community was given tenure rights in 1995.

Created when these communities were strongly mobilizing to claim land recognition, Flona Saracá-Taquera served to render irrelevant their demands, and to protect the Rio do Norte mining interests in the Flona area, where the mining offices and the bauxite processing units were located. Barretto (2001a) noticed a similar strategy in

the creation of the Monte Roraima National Park, whose boundaries extended into the lands of the Raposa do Sol indigenous peoples in the area of the Contigo River, where the construction of a hydroelectric was planned. The author remarks that while in the late 1970s some sectors of the federal government were against the establishment of national parks in frontier areas, claiming risks to the national sovereignty, in the late 1980s, "in the context of social mobilization and advances in territorial rights of the indigenous people, *seringueiros*, *quilombolas* and others, the ParNas [National Parks] could function as instruments to disallow these social demands and to reinforce the presence of the federal power in the frontier through the establishment of state territories" (Barretto 2001a: 447).

The government's use of National Forests as an attempt to dismiss native demands for territorial control also decisively influenced the community land conflicts in Flona Tapajós. The government's conversion of native territories into National Forests reflected a new policy on how to deal with these rural communities, whose territories would be incorporated in the reserve's plans. The forest reserve policy was no longer one of exclusion, but quite the opposite, of inclusion of communities' territories. However, this was done in order to maintain the reserve under direct state control. It was at this moment that the process of negotiation with the community people in Flona Tapajós was initiated, and their permanence in the reserve was contemplated. This process was also strongly influenced by the *seringueiros'* (rubber tappers) mobilization, in the state of Acre, for the creation of Extractive Reserves, which added new complexities to the debate surrounding community land tenure.

It was in the last month of Sarney's government that the first Extractive Reserve (RESEX)[3] was created in Brazil, the Alto Juruá Extractive Reserve, in the state of Acre, covering an area contiguous to the Serra do Divisor National Park (Decree n° 98.863, January 23, 1990).[4] Prior to the creation of the first RESEX in 1990, INCRA created the first Extractive Settlement Project (*Projeto de Assentamento Extrativista* - PAE) in 1987. Four month later, Chico Mendes was killed by a rancher, who declared himself to be the owner of a forest area in Acre that had been designated for the creation of a PAE. Chico Mendes' death intensified calls to create extractive reserves.

Proclaimed as an alternative land occupation model that reconciled social rights and environmental protection (Allegretti 2002), the rubber tappers' movement and the creation of RESEX influenced the new governmental policy for the communities who resided in Flona Tapajós and were fighting for their own land rights. This process became yet more complex with the appearance of the PPG-7 Pilot Program, which contemplated National Forests in program activities.

6.2.2 The International Pilot Program (PPG-7)

The G-7 Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest (PPG-7 Pilot Program) was formally launched in 1992 by the Rain Forest Trust Fund Resolution. It resulted from an initiative proposed by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in July of 1990

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[3] The proposal to create Extractive Reserves had been initiated in 1985, at the First National Meeting of the *Seringueiros* in Brasilia, as a means for rubber tappers to get possession of forest areas they occupied, that were being also claimed by large cattle ranchers (Allegretti 2002; 1994). Led by Chico Mendes, a rubber tapper leader who traveled to the United States to speak at the BID Annual Meeting, the seringueiros' movement was successful in forcing BID to incorporate rubber tappers' demands in its PMACI program (Mendes 1996).

[4] In the last two days of his government, on March 12 and 13 of 1990, Sarney also created the RESEX Chico Mendes, in Acre; the RESEX Rio Cajari, in Amapá; and the RESEX Ouro Preto, in Rondônia.

at the summit meeting of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial countries in Houston, where participating countries called for a plan to protect the Amazonian tropical forests, in cooperation with the Brazilian government. After this meeting, representatives of the Brazilian Government, the World Bank, and the European Union worked together to outline the first version of the PPG-7 Pilot Program.

This first version, published in April 1991, was severely criticized by several sectors of non-governmental organizations that complained about the lack of integration of the Program with civil society and Amazonian social reality. As Fatheuer (1994) reported, in response, non-governmental organizations working in the Amazon region joined efforts to guarantee the participation of civil society in the planning of the Pilot Program. A new version of the Pilot Program was presented at a meeting with non-governmental organizations in July 1991 in Brasilia, where the Amazonian Work Group (GTA) was created to increase the involvement of civil society in the Program. GTA drafted a document expressing agreement with the Pilot Program's general objectives, yet suggesting modifications as a condition for its approval.

Simultaneously, at the international level, civil society also started to mobilize to guarantee participation in the designing of the Pilot Program. In the first week of July 1991, the NGOs Friends of the Earth and the *Association Solidarite Tiers Monde* organized a meeting in Luxemburg with the participation of representatives of Brazilian, European, and North-American NGOs. At the meeting, participants produced a document that reinforced previous critiques about the lack of participation of civil society and failures in integrating the regional political and economic realities in the Pilot Program proposal.

Despite these coordinated critiques, delegates of the G-7 and the European Union

approved the Pilot Program in December 1991, at the summit meeting that took place in

London, and together with the Netherlands, they pledged some $250 million for program

activities. A Rain Forest Trust Fund was established in 1992 with an initial grant of

approximately $50 million, and the World Bank was designated to coordinate the

program for the donors and the Brazilian government, and to administer the trust fund. In

Brazil, the Pilot Program was instituted on July 5, 1992 (Decree n° 563), at the UN

Summit in Rio de Janeiro, with the following general objectives:

- To demonstrate that sustainable economic development and conservation of the environment can be pursued simultaneously in the tropical rain forests;

- To preserve the biodiversity of the rain forests;

- To reduce the rain forests' contribution to the world's emission of greenhouse gases;

- To set an example of international cooperation between industrial and developing countries on global environmental problems.

International cooperation through the Pilot Program[5] to prevent Amazonian

environmental degradation, which was understood as part of the "global environmental

problem," was synchronized with the international policies of the Collor government.

These policies were brought about as a result of considerable pressure from social and

environmental movements, national and international. As Barretto (2001a) analyzed,

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[5] The Pilot Program was structured to involve several governmental and multilateral agencies, in collaboration with non-governmental organizations, comprising a large and complex network. The Pilot Program's activities were distributed among the several sub-programs and projects that pursued five main lines of action: 1) Experimentation and demonstration (promotion of applied experimentation by local communities and government in conservation, sustainable development and environmental education initiatives); 2) Conservation (improved management of natural resources and protected areas, including environmental reserves and Indian Lands); 3) Institutional strengthening (encouragement of public institutions to shape and enforce sound environmental policies, in cooperation with civic organizations, the private sector and society at large); 4) Scientific research (increase in scientific knowledge about tropical forests and their sustainable management use); and, 5) Lessons learned and dissemination (conclusions and knowledge gained from Program made widely available).

Amazônia and the indigenous and environmental issues occupied a distinct place in the Collor government, which made changes to existing environmental policies to better respond to the broader objectives of international policies. According to the author, these objectives were related to interests to liberalize the economy, and to meet the growing environmental concerns of the industrialized countries as a way to strengthen the ties with these countries that was progressively weakening as a result of the changes that were taking place in Eastern Europe.

It is against this background that Barreto (2001) explained a set of measures implemented by the Collor government, such as the nomination of the internationally known ecologist José Lutzemberger as Secretary for the Environment, and the detonation of the illegal landing strip made by *garimpeiros* in the Yanomami Indian Land, which received extensive press cover age and international support. At the same time, the Collor government also promoted some effective measures, such as the demarcation of the Yanomami Lands in one contiguous area, revoking the previous decree that had dispersed the lands. As the author noticed, "The immediate objective of these actions was to flatter the industrialized countries and to show that Brazil was in position to export environmental public goods to the rest of the world, exchanging the conservation of the tropical forests for financial, technological and institutional support from its international partners" (Barreto 2001: 449).

6.2.3   The National Forests in the Pilot Program

Initially, the National Forests were contemplated in the Pilot Program as part of the sub-project called "conservation units of direct use," which included the Extractive Reserves and National Forests. The general objective was to develop and test models for

conservation and sustainable use of natural resources in conservation units of direct use, with the emphasis on the participation of civil society (World Bank 1993). This sub-project envisioned strengthening the implementation in National Forests of sustainable forest resource management projects that could be replicated in other parts of the Amazon region. The Pilot Program had highlighted that although there were twenty-four National Forests in the Amazon region (12.6 million hectares, which corresponded to approximately 2.6 percent of the region), not one had been fully implemented. Thus, the Tapajós, Tefé, and Caxiuanã National Forests were the three national forests chosen to implement the sub-project called "conservation units of direct use." For each one of these national forests an "Integration and Participatory Management Plan" (MISP) was to be implemented that would provide support for the reserves' management and administration.

The intent of these activities was to promote an intensive participation of local communities, as well as other interest groups involved in reserve issues. This was understood as a requirement for sub-project success. The World Bank mission in 1993 established that the success of the "sub-project will depend predominantly on the adequate participation of the social groups involved directly or indirectly in it. Special attention must be given to integration of the FLONAS [National Forests] resident populations, timber enterprises, regional and local public administrations, and non-governmental organizations in the elaboration of the project as well as in its implementation" (World Bank, 1993: 2). Even so, in its initial phase, the Flona Project faced many conceptual, institutional, and financial problems. One important aspect was,

precisely, related to the lack of involvement of the local population and the definition of a participatory management model.

As Fatheuer (1997) discussed, there were general complaints from several non-governmental organizations that the project did not, in reality, promote mechanisms for greater participation. In 1994, the World Bank and donors refused IBAMA's version of the sub-project for national forests, and it was redesigned the next year with the collaboration of IMAFLORA.[6] After several modifications, its final version was included as "Flona Tapajós sub-project" in the so-called the "Project to Support the Forest Management in the Amazônia" (PROMANEJO), which was subdivided in four components: 1) Strategic Analysis and Recommendation for Public Policies; 2) Promising Initiatives for Forest Management; 3) Pilot Program for Monitoring and Control; and 4) Flona Tapajós.

Taking a participatory approach, these components were to promote initial activities, called pre-investment activities, to support the implementation of pilot experiences that could contribute to the development of sustainable uses of forest resources in the Amazon region. For the objective of this present analysis, I focus only on component 4 (Flona Tapajós).

6.2.4 Flona Tapajós Component of PROMANEJO

Component 4 (Flona Tapajós) of Promanejo defined the pre-investment activities to be developed specifically in Flona Tapajós, precluding, thus, the Tefé and Caxiuanã National Forests in this phase of the project. IMAFLORA was contracted to draft a participatory Management Plan for Flona Tapajós. A first workshop was held in October

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[6] IMAFLORA (*Instituto de Manejo e Certificação Florestal, Forest Management and Certification Institute*).

1995, on a boat that navigated around Flona Tapajós. In this workshop, in which fifty-four representatives of several national and local-level governmental and non-governmental organizations participated, the conflicts regarding community land tenure became the central point of discussion, and were understood as the main obstacle to Promanejo activities in Flona Tapajos. The workshop's participants determined that defining community land tenure was a pre-condition for the drafting of Flona Tapajós' management plan, and they decided that Promanejo pre-investment activities would concentrate on the elaboration of the Flona Tapajós Management Plan and on the definition of the communities' areas.

The workshop's participants also decided to support the community election process that had started in 1993 to determine whether the community area to be defined would be excluded or not from Flona Tapajós' limits. In February 1996, the Flona Tapajós Work Group carried out a vote, which revealed that seventy three percent of the communities' residents opted to have the area excluded from Flona Tapajós. This vote took place at the same time IMAFLORA was conducting a second workshop in Santarém to define the methodology to be applied in mapping the community area's uses. I was contracted by IMAFLORA as an anthropologist to be responsible for the social issues related to community mapping. Although representatives of different interest groups participated in this workshop, the historical tensions between IBAMA and local communities still played a strong role in the discussion, and were increased when the vote's results were revealed.

IBAMA did not support the community's claim to have their lands excluded from the area of Flona Tapajós. This had been the government's position since 1989, when

several National Forests were created, superimposed on native territories and opened up to mining. The permanence inside the boundaries of the national forests of "traditional peoples who provided evidence of inhabiting the area before the publication of the reserve creation decree" had been authorized in October 27 of 1994, when President Itamar Franco passed into legislation the first National Forest regulation (Decree n° 1.298, Art. 8). None of the community people knew about this regulation, when I carried out the socio-economic survey in 1996.

The community mapping was carried out between March 20 and April 18, 1996, to identify the historical and social organizations of the communities and their natural resource management systems. In addition, a study of the forest structure was carried out in the community areas. Based on all of this information, which was analyzed and systematized in the next three months in Piracicaba (in the state of São Paulo), IMAFLORA drafted a proposal of the area's size for the eighteen communities. The calculation of the area took into account the size and dynamic of the eight production systems identified in the mapping process, as well as population growth, which resulted in a proposed area of 67,625.91 hectares. This proposal was around 6,000 hectares bigger than the two previous proposals, one of which had been defined by local communities carried out the demarcation in 1983, and the other defined on the socio-economic survey carried out by IBAMA in 1993.

The results from this community mapping and the proposal of the area to be designated for the communities were sent to all governmental and non-governmental representatives involved in the project and discussed in a final workshop that took place in Santarém on July 22-25, 1996. In this workshop, IMAFLORA also presented the

proposal for Flona Tapajós' Management Plan. Although there were some disagreements

about Flona Tapajó's Management Plan, the community area proposed was generally

agreed upon by all participants, including IBAMA.

Despite IBAMA's initial, apparent approval of the community area proposed, the

government agency later rejected the proposal, disregarding all the work that had been

carried out with the community people as part of the Promanejo pre-investment activities

of Flona Tapajós. Instead, IBAMA decided to propose its own area concession to the

communities. And, despite the fact that community people had voted to have their lands

placed out of the reserve's borders, IBAMA followed the official government position,

defined in 1994, when the National Forest decree authorizing the permanence of

"traditional people" was passed into legislation. Before analyzing this process of

government acceptance of the "traditional people" in Flona Tapajós area, I want to

discuss briefly the participatory approach that was taken in the component 4 of

Promanejo.

6.2.5 Participation and Decision Making: Demands from Overseas

The activities of the Flona Tapajós component promoted the intensive participation

of the local communities, as well as other interests related to reserve issues, which

followed the participatory approach emphasized in the preliminary versions of the Pilot

Program. As Fatheuer observed, "considering the initial history of Flona Tapajós, such

an approach means a radical change" (Fatheuer 1998: 63). However, IBAMA's rejection

of the community area that had been drafted by IMAFLORA, with the active

participation of the communities and based on the community mapping exercises and

ecological studies, sent a clear signal to communities that they had no decision-making

power. IBAMA's proposed concession area meant that the community area would fall

under the government's control.

While trying to understand IBAMA's reasons and procedures regarding its ultimate

stand, I had difficulty getting information from officials. Selma Barra Melgaço, who

became Chief of Flona Tapajós in late 1996, was the only official who talked more

directly about the issue but, even so, she did so with some reluctance. When I asked her

why the 1995-96 consultation process had not been considered by IBAMA, and why they

had not initially been open about their position, she answered:

Melgaço: I think that the negotiation [with the community people] started to
happen later on. First, IBAMA never wanted to separate Flona [Tapajós]. You should
recall that, at that moment, IBAMA did not speak; it did not manifest its opinion. I think
it was IBAMA's strategy. That is my opinion, because, at that moment, Virgilio[7] was the
person who gave and took the commands, and what he said nobody disagreed with.
Moreover, IBAMA did not order that study (to be carried out), but the Ministry of the
Environment ordered it. IBAMA had already developed a socio-economic study in 1993
of the community area… That is why I think the negotiation started only after that [after
IMAFLORA's activities]. At that moment, Virgilio was the interlocutor, someone who
could not even speak in the name of IBAMA, because he was not part of IBAMA
employees.

Edviges: Please, explain to me why IBAMA did not take part in these activities,
and only the Ministry of the Environment. How did that happen?

Melgaço: It was because Virgilio was a friend of the people from the World Bank.
The World Bank contracted him and, then, it was a done deal. IBAMA was always left
out of the story. Thus, IBAMA took a position of not showing its position. It was more
or less deliberate. I recall the only meeting I took part in…it was a strange thing.
IBAMA stayed apart, (from) the other [people] discussing over there. It was a very
strange thing. That is why I took a position when I came here: I did not want
IMAFLORA working here, because IMAFLORA was placed as if were the owner of
Flona Tapajós. IBAMA should take back (control of) these issues.

Discussing how IBAMA was formed, from administrative agencies with different

origins, trajectories and prerogatives in relation to the environment and national territorial

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[7] Virgilio Vianna was the Executive-Director of IMAFLORA.

configuration, Barretto (2001a: 446) remarked that the governmental agency has "an

institutional culture marked by internal rivalries and divergent interpretations on the

meanings of environmental policies." The author also attributed to IBAMA the tendency

to have a certain exclusivity in state environmental administration, and to be suspicious

and resistant to initiatives based on cooperation with non-governmental organizations.

Melgaço's comments reflect this internally heterogeneous governmental structure and the

resistance against non-governmental organizations, in this case IMAFLORA, conducting

activities for which IBAMA understood itself to be responsible.

In the case of Flona Tapajós, the role of IBAMA in the Pilot Program was a

sensitive issue since, as indicated earlier, the World Bank had rejected the proposal

presented by IBAMA in favor of a proposal that was more participatory and that was to

be implemented by IMAFLORA, in partnership with IBAMA. However, the latter

proposal, while it highlighted the need for a broad consultation process to capture local

demands, ignored the institutional power relationships and the complicated decision-

making processes. In doing so, it created the illusion that the community land tenure

conflict would be solved based on the results of the Promanejo-component 4 activities.

At no time did IBAMA explicitly express, or was it ever questioned, that in the case of

disagreement with the final results, the governmental agency would disregard them as it

did. Although the activities of the Promanejo-component 4 were carried out specifically

to solve the land tenure conflict, they had not established clear rules to guarantee that the

results would be accepted by all interest groups, including IBAMA.

In his article about community-based forestry approaches that have been recently

adopted in forest policies, Gauld (2000: 231) pointed out that the apparent transition from

top-down models towards community-based approaches were not "as substantive or innovative as they may initially appear." The author highlighted, through an analysis of case studies, that there often exists a gap between discourse and practice, in part because the adoption of community-based forest policies was less a product of local demand and understanding of forest management than of compliance with directives and policies of donor agencies, in order to be able to take "advantage of international funding" (Gauld 2000: 236). A similar situation happened in Flona Tapajós, with regards to component 4 activities. The participatory approach adopted responded more directly to the broader directives and policies of the Pilot Program than to a new IBAMA conceptualization of community participation in forest management policies.

In the absence of clear rules and agreements, IBAMA was able to conceal its position in relation to the definition of the community area. Without an opportunity to reveal its position, and having to take part in the process on account of broader international governmental policies (PPG-7), IBAMA was forced to simulate participation. This led, ultimately, to frustration on both sides, and reinforced previous tensions and suspicions between the governmental agency and the local communities. These tensions were reflected in the second phase of Promanejo activities, and in the government's attempts to convince the community people to accept a new identity as "traditional people," which would give them access to the community concession area.

6.3 The Making of the Traditional People

As previously mentioned, when the Decree that regularized the National Forests was passed into legislation in 1994, authorizing the permanence of "traditional peoples" in Flonas, the community people in Flona Tapajós had no idea of these changes. "Traditional people" was not a social identification claimed previously by the community

people in Flona Tapajós, but rather was created by the government during the process of redefining and legalizing the category of the National Forest. The term "traditional people" started to be formally applied beginning in the 1990s, holding official status with the creation in 1992 of the National Center for Sustainable Development of Traditional Peoples (CNPT), an agency of IBAMA established to deal with the creation and implementation of the Extractive Reserves. The policy makers involved in the creation of the CNPT justified the use of the term "traditional people" as a "government response to the demands expressed by the population who *traditionally and culturally subsist from extractivism and renewable natural resources*" (Siqueira and Bellia 1992: 7, emphasis added). However, it was not until the late 1990s that the communities of Flona Tapajós found out about their status, in the eyes of the government, as "traditional people."

The official acknowledgment of "traditional peoples" was incorporated in the National System of Conservation Units (*Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação*-SNUC), passed into law in 2000. Besides re-conceptualizing and creating new sets of reserves, SNUC incorporated the category of "traditional people" as a way to make it legal for existing communities to remain in the reserves that previously had been called "Direct Use" and renamed "Sustainable Use" reserves (SNUC 2000). These included National Forests, Extractive Reserves, and Sustainable Development Reserves,[8] a new category of reserve. For the Extractive Reserves and the Sustainable Development Reserves, the presence of "traditional people" was a condition for the creation of the reserves, while for National Forests their permanence was "admitted" if they previously

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[8] The category of "Sustainable Use" also includes the reserves denominated as Environmental Protection Area, the Area of Relevant Ecological Interest, Wildlife Reserve, and Private Reserve of the Natural Patrimony, but they do not involve "traditional people."

inhabited the reserve's area. In both cases, the "traditional" occupation patterns and the modes of resource appropriation became subordinated to the government-defined management plan established for the reserves.

6.3.1 "Traditional People" in the International Field of Conservation

Several authors have discussed the notion of "traditional people" as it is officially applied in Brazil (Lima 2002, 1996; Esterci 2002; Barretto 2001b; Cunha and Almeida 2001; Diegues 1998; Vianna 1996). They have located its emergence in the encounter between the social rights and environmental movements that started to take place in the Amazon region in the mid-1980s. In his *sociogenesis* of the notion of "traditional people," Barretto (2001a) pointed out its adoption in Brazil resonated with the debate on the presence of human groups in protected areas that first began in the international field of conservation the 1960s.

The international debate about the presence of people in national parks and the social conflicts caused by the reserves' implementation, took on a broader expression in the 1980s, especially among organizations that allied human rights with conservation, such as Cultural Survival and the Environmental Defense Fund. In February 1985, Cultural Survival published an entire issue dedicated to the theme "Parks and People," in which the editor, Jason Clay, criticized the outright expulsion of local communities from protected areas and proposed that these communities be incorporated in conservation areas. He asserted that, "protected areas could ensure the survival of habitats as well as the indigenous inhabitants. Reserves can either preserve traditional lifestyles or slow the rate of change to levels acceptable and controlled by local residents. The indigenous inhabitants can benefit from protection of their rights to traditional areas as well as the sale of goods or income generated from tourism" (Clay 1985: 2).

Most of these organizations that aligned human rights with conservation started to proclaim that the exclusion of local people from the creation and establishment of protected areas not only was resulting in social conflicts, but was also detrimental to the objectives of conservation. This perspective has been discussed by many authors who have studied the theme. Looking at two national parks, one in Thailand and other in Madagascar, Ghimire (1994) examined the negative effects of the reserves on local communities, and demonstrated that removing people from the areas had led to increased land degradation, since the displaced people were compelled to overexploit resources outside the reserve boundaries. She also demonstrated that the lack of involvement of these communities in establishing these reserves had necessitated greater expenditures by the governments to implement more sophisticated policing systems. Brechin et al. (2000: 2) argued that a new conceptualization of nature protection was needed that "must be socially and politically feasible and morally just. If not, interventions will most likely generate increasing levels of resistance and conflict at all geographic scales, thus derailing attempts at protection."

As Barretto (2001b) noted, these arguments constitute part of a series of critiques against the *fences and fines approach* that was being applied to manage fully-protected reserves, especially in tropical regions. To overcome the conflicts caused by this dominant approach, "the planners and the decision-makers started to establish the cooperation and the support from the 'local population' as *sine qua non* condition for the long-term achievement of the reserve's management" (Barretto (2001a: 6, emphasis in the original).

Intensifying this debate, indigenous knowledge began to be valorized, supported,

especially, by ethno-botanical studies that revealed that native resource management

practices often favored not just the maintenance, but also the promotion of biological

diversity (Posey and Balée 1992; Balée 1989; Posey 1985; Alcorn 1981; Carneiro 1978).

As such, these social groups started to be represented as stewards for better understanding

complex tropical environments, and their involvement in the establishment of reserves

began to be seen as a way to contribute to conservation purposes. Notably, Clay (1985:

5) declared that, "the key to understanding sustained activities in fragile environments

begins with local residents. Their knowledge is valuable to the future of the earth's

environment and peoples."

This perspective on the participation of local social groups as a means for achieving

conservation purposes was influential in the construction of the notion of "traditional

people" as a broad category that encapsulated innumerable social groups despite their

heterogeneous, specific forms of territorialities and socio-cultural organizations.

Attributing to these diverse peoples a "traditionality," this notion tended to highlight the

relationship these social groups established with natural resources in the environment

they exploited, which was considered to cause low environmental impacts, thus not

preventing conservation goals. Vianna (1996: 107-108) pointed out that the term

"traditional" used in several international documents and publications was applied

indistinctly "as an adjective for types of management, types of societies, forms of natural

resources utilization, territory, modes of life, specific groups, and cultural types." As this

author and others discussed, the notion of "traditional people" used in the international

field of conservation represented local social groups *as part of the ecosystems to be*

protected, and, as such, they were expected to pledge themselves to conservation achievements. Thus, although recognizing the rights of these social groups to self-determination regarding their socio-cultural and economic organizations, the notion of "traditional people," entangled with the conservation principles revealed, as Barretto (2001a: 15) noted, an ambivalence because it subordinates "their management systems to practical interests in administrating protected areas, making them accept an exogenous agenda."

6.3.2 "Traditional People" in Brazil

Resonating, thus, with the international debate on the presence of human groups in protected areas, the introduction of the notion of "traditional people" in Brazil is attributed to the anthropologist Antonio Carlos Diegues (Barretto 2001b; Vianna 1996). Vianna (1996: 20) recognized him as the "pioneer in the discussion on the relationship between population and protected areas, one of those responsible for the introduction of this discussion in the environmental field in a broader way." She also attributed to him a significant influence on the ideas related to the construction of the category of "traditional people," by having incorporated it in several of the official regulations that ended up permitting the presence of residents in reserves, as well as by having founded many non-governmental organizations occupied with these issues.

In his "The Myth of the Untouchable Nature," Diegues (1998) discussed the problems regarding social conflicts caused by the creation and implementation of protected areas overlapping the territories of a large number of social groups with a long history of occupancy. Criticizing the eradication of these people from reserves, the author attributed such a model of "reserves without people" to a misconception on nature protection that disregards the influences of human actions on the formation of most areas

considered to be in a natural state. The author's arguments sought to show the inaccuracy of this model of reserve for local social realities, which has generated endless social conflicts in rural areas worldwide.

Discussing the theme in Brazil, the author focused on those social groups who "present a large variety of modes of life and differentiated cultures that might be considered *traditional* " (Diegues 1998: 14). Although recognizing that indigenous groups also comprise "traditional peoples," the author did not include them in this category, pointing to the existence of specific legislation for Indian Groups. Under Brazilian law, Indian Groups are ensured territorial rights over any other private or public possession. Therefore, excluding indigenous people, Diegues characterized "traditional people" as "peasants, who are the fruit of intense miscegenation among the white colonizer, the Portuguese, the native indigenous population, and the black slave" (1998: 14). Among them, he included a large spectrum of social groups, such as the "*caiçaras*" from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the "*caipiras*" from the South region, the "*pantaneira* communities" from the Pantanal region, the fishing communities from the seacoast, the riverine people from the Amazon region, among others. Attributing their origins to the colonial period, the author argued that their "relative isolation" allowed these social groups to develop "particular modes of life that involved a great dependency on natural cycles, profound knowledge about biological cycles and of natural resources, patrimonial technologies, symbols, myths, and, even, a specific language" (Diegues 1998: 14-15).

Besides the influence of the international conservation debate, Vianna (1996) and Barretto (2001a) identified two other influences on the construction of the notion of "traditional people" in Brazil. One was the Brazilian anthropo-geographical studies on

regional cultural types, which were defined based on the concept of "rustic" societies or cultures. Discussing these assumptions, Barretto (2001a: 17) looked at the biological and cultural premises of this conceptual model, remarking on the strong emphasis placed on regional sub-cultures' inheritance of indigenous practices and knowledge. This connected regional cultures to indigenous people and, thus, "to ensure them a room under the conceptual umbrella of *traditional people*, who were considered as encompassing the positive characteristics for nature conservation" (Barretto 2001b: 17, emphasis in the original).

The other factor influencing the notion of "traditional people" in Brazil was the social grassroots movements that first emerged in the Amazon region in the mid-1980s and that incorporated environmental issues into their political activism. Cunha and Almeida (2001: 184) remarked that this association made possible a "surprising change in the ideological route: Amazonian traditional peoples, considered thus far as hindrances to 'development', were promoted to the frontline of modernity." The most notable example was the rubber tapper movement in the state of Acre, which proposed to reconcile social rights and conservation through the creation of Extractive Reserves. For the authors, a tacit accord between the social rights and environmental agendas was created. According to them, Amazonian social groups, "overall, are disposed to negotiation: in exchange for territorial control, they pledge themselves to promote environmental protection" (2001: 184)

Recognizing that the category of "traditional people" is a western construction, "a fruit of the colonial encounter," Cunha and Almeida (2001: 184) stated that initially the category grouped together rubber tappers (*seringueiros*) and Brazil-nut collectors

(*castanheiros*) from Amazon region. However, during the 1990s, the category was expanded to embrace several other social groups throughout the country, who shared a history of low environmental impact and a current interest in retaking the control over the territory they exploit. As such, Cunha and Almeida defined "traditional people" as an "extensional" category, since it has the tendency to progressively change and incorporate many other social groups: "It denotes a category still little inhabited, but it already comprises some members and has candidates to come in" (2001: 184-185).

Therefore, under the category of "traditional people" several social groups in the Amazonian region, deprived of a specific ethnic identity, and who had been officially categorized as "*posseiros*" (squatters) (Lima 2002), were afforded a legitimacy that gave them, for the first time, official rights over the territory they occupied. Esterci (2002) remarked that this reflected a process of redefining and reclassifying social segments in the region that included ecological criteria. This occurred simultaneously with the redefinition of spaces, through the establishment of environmental reserves, and the redefinition of the rules to use and to access natural resources.

While the incorporation of an environmental dimension to social identities has significantly advanced regional grassroots movements in their efforts toward gaining rights to their territories, on the other hand, the official construction of the notion of "traditional people" must be taken with care, especially with regard to its adoption in National Forests. As Barretto (2001a) accurately pointed out, the construction of the notion of "traditional people," based on regional types and strongly attached to environmental criteria, has simplified the diversity of cultural practices and "naturalized" them. In this process, "traditional people" were reduced to instruments to be used by

government agencies to help meet the objectives of reserve management plans. It was expected that "traditional people" never change their modes of life so as not to affect environmental conservation objectives. As such, the category of "traditional people" tends to conspire against the autonomy of these social groups by subjugating their forms of social organization to an externally defined environmental political rationality. This is especially relevant with regard to National Forests, whose 2000 legislation confined people's autonomy, as will be discussed in the next section.

6.4 Flona Tapajós and Traditional People Relationship

When I returned to the field in 2000 for pre-dissertation fieldwork, my main concern was about the progress regarding community land tenure resolution. This soon appeared to be no easy task. In Brasilia, at IBAMA's offices, I had been informed that the community area would not be excluded from Flona Tapajós; instead, it had been designated an area for community use according to the reserve's Management Plan. However, the communities' permanence in the reserve had not yet been legalized because the legal mechanisms by which to accomplish this remained uncertain. Yet IBAMA's officials said that it was being discussed under the judicial concept of land-use concessions, which was similar to that applied for the Extractive Reserves, in which the state retains land ownership (tenure) but provides residents with usufruct rights to the natural resources for a minimum period of thirty years (Allegretti 1990). I was unable to get information on the reasons why the borders of Flona Tapajós could not be changed and the area of the communities placed outside its borders, as had been requested by them. I did not find official documents clearly stating the decisions taken, and found resistance from the officials to talk about it.

Among the community people, I observed that they had difficulty explaining the official situation of their lands. Many of them said that they knew that they could stay in the area, but they did not understand the conditions or the area they could occupy. Aldemar, from the Piquiatuba community, complained: "IBAMA came here and said that now, everything will be Flona. They say that there is no need to demarcate the area and, then, we can use the entire forest of the Flona. So, what does it mean? Does it mean that, if we can exploit all areas within the Flona, IBAMA can also come and exploit our lands?" There was also a noticeable misunderstanding in relation to the term "land-use concession" that was under discussion. Several of them complained about it, saying, like Davi: "It must be us from the communities who give concessions to IBAMA, and not the contrary. We were living here before IBAMA came; thus, it should be us who give the concession to IBAMA to use it."

The community people also were frustrated about the work that had been carried out in 1996, as part of the Promanejo pre-investment activities, which was aimed at trying to solve the community land tenure. As they were expecting their lands to be excluded from Flona Tapajós, the new and incomprehensible IBAMA stand caused feelings of disappointment, as there had not been any advances in terms of resolving the land issues. The people commented: "Edviges, IBAMA said that the study you carried out did not serve for anything." This feeling of frustration was expressed particularly among the people from the Taquara community, who had began to identify themselves as Mundurucu Indians, and were claiming recognition of their lands with FUNAI.

Several changes had also occurred at the IBAMA regional office. Promanejo had established a regional base in Santarém with a team of technicians, whose office was in

the IBAMA building. This regional base was established to put in motion the activities of the second phase of Promanejo *Component 4: Flona Tapajós* of the Pilot Program. This component included activities related to the definition and execution of the Management Plan for the reserve, the improvement of the reserve's infrastructure, the acquisition of motor vehicles, support for community organization and productive projects, and promotion of eco-tourism and environmental education. Therefore, Promanejo became the main support for the administration of the reserve.

Flona Tapajós administrative sector had undergone some changes on account of the implementation of Promanejo. As previously indicated, in 1996, the former chief of Flona Tapajós, Sebastião Santos Silva, was replaced by the sociologist Selma Barra Melgaço, who had worked in Acre and had taken part in the last workshop of the Promanejo pre-investment activities. The replacement of the former director had been under discussion since the development of the Promanejo pre-investment activities, because of his problematic relationship with the community people, which had impeded attempts to negotiate with them. With the new approach taken in Flona Tapajós, which emphasized that the communities should take part in defining and implementing the reserve's program, it was decided that it was necessary to have someone with the ability to establish a dialogue with the communities. Melgaço was put in charge of undertaking this task, whose most sensitive theme was to convince the communities to accept the placement of their lands within the reserve and under its Management Plan.

Melgaço remained as Flona Tapajós's chief only until 1998, when she left to replace the director of the regional IBAMA office, the forester Nicola Sebastião Tancredi, who disagreed with IBAMA's national director with regard to the creation of

the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve, the first of its kind in the region. Two years later, in 2000, she replaced the director of the IBAMA state office in Belém, who had been dismissed because of suspected corruption. Despite her short term as chief of Flona Tapajós, and after that, as IBAMA's regional director, Melgaço's administration was fundamental in the implementation of the new process in Flona Tapajós, which had started to incorporate the communities in the reserve's program. Under her administration, several measures were undertaken to resolve the community land tenure conflict. This included settling the disputes that emerged in relation to the ITTO project, the Use Plan for the communities, and the creation of the Management Group (*Grupo Gestor*) of Flona Tapajós, in which representatives of the several governmental and non-governmental agencies took part.

6.4.1   Disputes over the ITTO Project Area

As was previously discussed, throughout the history of social conflicts in Flona Tapajós, the official government position taken has been to avoid splitting the community area from the reserve. In 1995-96, the Promanejo pre-investment activities in a certain way restrained IBAMA's intents since it took into account the community demand to remove their lands from Flona Tapajós. Once more, IBAMA struggled to avoid breaking up the reserve, and succeeded by rejecting the area that had been proposed based on the studies that had been carried out by IMAFLORA and the consultations with communities. In late November of 1996, the National Forest Division (DIFLONA) sent an assessment team to DEREF (Department of Forest Resources), stressing that this community area proposal would cause "an impossible arrangement to be administered" (DIFLONA/process n° 3560/96).

A reading of official documents revealed that IBAMA did not actually have a final

position with regard to the community area. In November 1997, IBAMA drafted four

proposals for the location of the community areas, based on studies carried out in 1993

and 1996. The first proposal contemplated an area of 60,373 hectares (proposed by the

1993 study) that would provide the communities with collective or individual title, the

latter limited to thirty hectares per family to be regulated through INCRA. This proposal

warned that in the case of individual title, INCRA could also use the area to place

landless families, since the area "greatly exceeds the needs of the families that

traditionally reside there"(IBAMA/DIFLONA 1997). The second proposal envisioned

the exclusion of an area that extended ten kilometers into forest from the river, to be

created as an Extractive Reserve. The third proposal focused on this area of ten

kilometers, but excluded five kilometers for the community use for residences and

agriculture fields, and placed the other five kilometers as a "Legal Reserve." In this case,

the communities would be provided with a "land-use concession" (*Concessão de Uso*).

And, finally, the fourth proposal was similar to the third proposal, except that it proposed

that the ten kilometers would be placed within the reserve boundaries.

In these proposals, except for the Extractive Reserve proposal, one can perceive

IBAMA's persistent avoidance to place the area claimed by the communities outside

Flona Tapajós' boundaries. They kept insisting on the initial 1983 IBDF attempt to

demarcate the community area. IBAMA officials persisted that the area claimed by the

communities *greatly exceeded the needs of the families that traditionally resided there*,

despite the fact that this contradicted the results of both the 1993 and 1996 studies that

had established this as a minimum area. Although IBAMA began to recognize the

families as "traditional," they tried to define what these communities' *needs* were, and as such, disregarded community claims to their lands.

Among the main reasons underlying the government's resistance to concede the entire area claimed by the communities was an attempt to avoid losing the forest area with timber potential, especially regarding the ITTO project, which was designed overlapping with the area claimed by the communities and was stopped due to conflicts. On account of these disputes, by late 1997 the ITTO project had run the risk of being canceled by ODA, the main project sponsor, after almost a decade of waiting to be implemented. ODA's representative Gordon Amstrong, who actively took part in the workshops during the Promanejo pre-investment activities, had made clear his position to avoid conflicts with the communities, making community land resolution a condition for the implementation of the ITTO project.

At the same time, the communities had started to intensely mobilize to protest the ITTO project, demanding the withdrawal of the part of the project that overlapped their lands. Soliciting the support of several local non-governmental organizations, this mobilization intensified as a result of the Public Consultation (*Audiência Pública*), which presented the environmental impact report (EIA/RIMA), on May 16, 1997, in Santarém. These NGOs jointly wrote a document for this Public Consultation, in which they demanded that community land tenure be resolved as a condition for the approval of the project. Community representatives, especially from Piquiatuba and Marituba, the two communities directly affected by the ITTO project, sent several letters to governmental agencies, stating that they were rejecting the ITTO project.

It was at this moment that community people started to self-identify as "traditional people," as seen in the letter sent by people from Piquiatuba to IBAMA and the Environment Ministry: "Our position as *traditional people* is against the implementation of the ITTO project in the area that is superposed over our community lands" (Piquiatuba/Marituba 1997). By identifying themselves as "traditional people," the communities were claiming the long-established rights they understood they had to the territory they occupied.

Community mobilization against the implementation of the ITTO project caught the attention of environmental non-governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. These organizations not only endorsed the community claims, but also complained about several of the technical components of the project, which, according to them, did not follow Forest Certification norms and criteria. In their view, the project did not guarantee the sustainable exploitation of timber, as it was supposed to, and there was a lack of transparency in the project. The impact of this mobilization was felt in a meeting that took place in March 1998, in Brasilia, at IBAMA's headquarters. Twenty-one people participated, including IBAMA's president, Eduardo Martins, ITTO's General Coordinator, Cleuber Delano José Delano, Flona Tapajós Chief, Selma Melgaço, and representatives from non-governmental organizations such as GTA (Amazônia Working Group), Friends of the Earth, IMAFLORA, WWF (World Wildlife Fund), Greenpeace, IMAZON, FASE, Union of Rural Workers, and the Piquiatuba community. At this meeting, the group presented a document with some technical modifications, and reiterated that the project's area of implementation had to be agreed upon by the communities.

The power of this mobilization had led, a year before, IBAMA officials to negotiate directly with the community and to establish an accord with them regarding the ITTO project. During these negotiations, IBAMA representatives had tried to defend the importance of the ITTO project, which they saw as representing the first Brazilian attempt to exploit a pilot area through the sustainable production of timber. The communities, on the other hand, understanding that the implementation of the project would reduce their lands in favor of timber exploitation for export, defended their customary rights.

These divergent positions and the difficulty the communities and the governmental agency had in reaching an accord, drove IBAMA's president, Eduardo Martins, to go to the Piquiatuba community to negotiate directly with the people in August 1997. Considered an enthusiast of the "traditional people" cause, Martins had created the CNPT in the last week of his first mandate as IBAMA president. In his meeting with community people, Martins demonstrated a sensitivity to community demands, and made a commitment to reduce the area of the ITTO project that overlapped with the community land. Martins also assured them that IBAMA would provide the communities with a land-use concession contract once the communities presented a Utilization Plan of the area. In the end, instead of the initial five thousand hectares designated to the IITO project, the area was reduced to 3,221 hectares. Timber exploitation started in late 1999, and was to be concluded in 2004. The *Empresa Agropecuária Treviso Ltda/ Comercial Madeiras Exportação S&A* (CEMEX), known as CEMEX/Treviso, won the bidding to exploit the timber.

However, this did not put an end to the story. Although the area of the ITTO project had been reduced, this happened only in the Piquiatuba community area, and not in the Marituba community area. Instead, another part of the project area that had been removed, had not been in an area claimed by the communities. When I talked with Cleuber D.J. Lisboa, an IBAMA employee and General Coordinator of the ITTO project, about the criteria used to define the exclusion of areas from the project, he said that they had considered the area proposed by IMAFLORA. He said that they had considered this proposal because ODA was pressuring for the community land tenure conflict to be resolved, and this proposal was the only one IBAMA had at that moment.

For IBAMA, especially for its forestry sector, the implementation of the ITTO project was essential because it would represent the first timber exploitation in the Amazon region that combined the private sector, forest science, and governmental forest policies, thereby, consolidating the objectives of the National Forests. It was especially pertinent for Flona Tapajós, which, by then, had not yet developed any timber exploitation project after over two decades of existence. The ITTO project was expected to provide a model of forest exploitation for the Amazon region. The demands of the community for land and their capacity to mobilize, however, represented an obstacle. These difficulties also marked the attempts to concede the land-use concession to the community.

6.4.2   The Land-use Concession

At the same time that IBAMA was negotiating the ITTO project, the agency also initiated a process to provide the community with a land-use concession, as had been decided at the time of IBAMA president's visit to the Piquiatuba community. The legal mechanisms, however, had not yet been defined under National Forest legislation; they

were being discussed in the new SNUC that was being elaborated. To solve this problem, IBAMA decided to apply the regulations governing the Extractive Reserves, which required that residents present to the agency a Utilization Plan[9] in order to be given usufruct rights for a period of thirty years.

Flona Tapajós administrators started to work with communities on the elaboration of the Utilization Plan. After several meetings, the Utilization Plan was voted on at a meeting that took place on December 05, 1997, in the community of Pedreira, with the participation of representatives of twenty-one communities, IBAMA, and non-governmental organizations. According to the meeting report, most communities approved the Utilization Plan, except for the Tauari, Maguari and Pini communities that declared they had doubts about the terms of the land-use concession. The communities' approval of the Utilization Plan was necessary for the Public Audience meeting that would be held a week later, on December 11, to present to the community the terms of the land-use concession.

After the Public Audience meeting, the community people seemed to become more apprehensive about the terms of the land-use concession. The idea that in thirty years the contract would finish and could potentially not be renewed frightened them, especially because most of them were firmly demanding permanent title to the land. When I went to the field three years later, in 2000, and found the issue still unresolved, community complaints revealed fears that the acceptance of these terms would put at risk the future of their children, as Paulo said: "We already fought for almost thirty years to guarantee our lands. Now, if we accept this concession for thirty years, what, then, will happen

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[9] Presently, the Utilization Plan was renamed as Management Plan.

with our children? Will they have to start to fight all over again?" Moreover, as the
Utilization Plan only indicates the areas of use and the rules to follow, but does not
demarcate the precise boundaries of the area, the community also feared the uncertainty
that this presented for them. José, one of the leaders of the Piquiatuba community, said:
"I am not against the land-use concession, but I want to know where our area starts and
where it ends." The idea that the area would be determined based on the Utilization Plan
was too vague for them, who had already defined the area when they had demarcated the
boundaries they were demanding.

These communities' uncertainties led to the organization of another meeting in
1997, on December 19, in the Tauari community, with the presence of the *Procurador
Geral da República* (Attorney General*)*, Felício Pontes. At this meeting, the
representatives of the community expressed their doubts, many of them still calling for
the exclusion of the community area from Flona Tapajós, and they finally resolved to
postpone the decision about the land-use concession until March of the following year.
In the meantime, additional discussions with the communities about the land size and
entitlement would be held before a final decision was taken.

The communities' indecision started to worry Flona Tapajós directors, who were
taking part in discussions held by Flona Tapajós*' Grupo Gestor* (Management Group),
which had been created in July 1997, the first of its kind in Brazil. The *Grupo Gestor*
was created with the intent to develop a participatory administration of Flona Tapajós. It
was comprised of representatives of the community, local governmental agencies and
sectors of the civil society, and later became the Consultative Group for National Forests
under the new SNUC. The diversity of representatives in the Gestor Group, expressing

different interests, such as those of the timber industry, community people, and scientific institutions, in a certain way made it difficult for discussions to be conducted. This was apparent in the report of the first Gestor Group meeting, in which the representative of the timber industry insisted on discussing the opening of Flona Tapajós to timber exploitation, and the representative of community people insisted on the need to define community land tenure. Melgaço, the chief of Flona Tapajós at the time, insisted that the Gestor Group discuss the reserve policy plan and not just "isolated actions."

Yet, as Melgaço expressed, the communities' unwillingness to make a quick decision regarding the land-use concession became a source of frustration for the Gestor Group. In an interview, while she was the director of the regional IBAMA office in Santarém, she said: "The meetings of the Gestor Group were irritating. Every time, they [community people] wanted something different. Once, they wanted an Extractive Reserve, another time they wanted something else. Nobody in the Group could stand to discuss it any more. Nobody was taking the community seriously anymore." While the Gestor Group was getting annoyed with the communities' indecision, on the other hand, the communities began to realize that their doubts were not unfounded at all, and that the land-use concession was actually very complicated to implement. For example, IBAMA employees ended up finding out that the agency did not actually have the authority to provide the land-use concession because most of Flona Tapajós did not belong to IBAMA, but to INCRA.

For IBAMA to get jurisdiction over Flona Tapajos, a series of bureaucratic steps would have to be undertaken.[10] This was a cold shower for IBAMA's directors, and it

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[10] IBAMA had already outlined the decree to be assigned by the President of Brazil, which would provide the communities in Flona Tapajós with the land-use concession. This procedure required that the lands of

reinforced the communities' suspicions. To ease the situation, IBAMA decided to

provide what was called a *Termo de Ajustamento de Conduta* (Adjustment of Conduct

Term), which was signed in May 1998 by representatives of IBAMA and the Federal

Public Ministry, and gave the communities the right to remain and exploit the resources

in Flona Tapajós until the land-use concession was provided. Talking about these

bureaucratic difficulties, Angelo Francisco de Lima, Flona Tapajós' chief in 2001, said

that he had selected land regularization as a priority for his administration. By late 2003,

INCRA had transferred the lands in the Flona to the Service for the Union Patrimony

(SPU), the first step in the process before the lands could be officially transferred to

IBAMA.

These intricate bureaucratic procedures, and the lack of an articulate policy to deal

with the community people, postponed IBAMA attempts to come to terms with the

community about land tenure, and prevented the official incorporation of the

communities in the reserve's program. The unresolved community land tenure issue

became the main obstacle for the implementation of the second phase of Promanejo, as

will be seen in the next section. It also was responsible for creating a rupture in the

relationship between IBAMA and the indigenous communities, which I will discuss in

the next chapter.

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the area were officially under IBAMA responsibility. However, in the early 1970s, these lands had been
transferred, in the social interest of agrarian reform, to INCRA. Besides INCRA, there were also several
private titles in the area. To provide the land-use concession, IBAMA needed to dispossess owners of their
private land titles, and obtain from INCRA the remaining lands. Yet, INCRA could not transfer the lands
directly to IBAMA, but had to first transfer them to the Service for the Union Patrimony (SPU) that, then,
could transfer them to IBAMA.

6.4.3 Promanejo: Working with Community People

With the financial support of around $5 million to be expended over a period of

five years, the second phase of Promanejo-component 4 in Flona Tapajós was planned to

be initiated after the pre-investment activities. For Promanejo-Component 4, two main

lines of action were established: to support the management of the reserve with emphasis

on the participation of civil society; and, to generate and support pilot experiences that

were *alternatives to traditional land uses*, with emphasis on community forest

management. The main objective was to provide the conditions for the effective

implementation of the reserve's goals, and for the establishment of a relationship with the

community people, who IBAMA had started to recognize as "traditional people" and,

thus, supported their incorporation in the reserve's program. Therefore, in an attempt to

help overcome the reserve's deficiencies, the Promanejo-component 4 second phase

initiated several activities related to surveillance, tourism, infrastructure, and community

projects[11]. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will only focus on the community

projects.

Although the precondition for the implementation of the second phase of

Promanejo-Component 4 was the resolution of the conflicts regarding community land

tenure, by late 1997, the situation remained unresolved. Without a clear definition about

the designation of the community area, the people started to mobilize again to pressure

the governmental agency for a final solution. As Promanejo reports emphasized,

community discontentment constituted the main problem for the implementation of the

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[11] The 2001 Promanejo activities' report attributed the reserve's ineffectiveness also to the absence of qualified human resources, shortage of financial resources, limited operational capacity, and inappropriate reserve management.

activities. This unresolved situation also brought up a controversial issue, which revolved around Promanejo financial resources for the communities. As some communities continued to claim the exclusion of their lands from the reserve, there was an understanding that these communities would not have access to these financial resources because they were designated for communities *in* Flona Tapajós, not *outside*. At a Promanejo meeting in Santarém, in 2000, Antonio C. Hummel, the executive director of Promanejo in Manaus at the time, and, later (2003-2005), DIFLONA's director, stated: "The rules are clear; the resources are for the communities in Flona Tapajós, in the reserve's area, and not for those outside Flona. Those who do not want to remain will not have rights to them."

Hummel's position, which came to prevail, created new forms of discontentment and suspicion among community people, and aggravated their internal divisions. Two weeks after this meeting, Adilson, the leader from the Pini community, complained that: "These projects are a kind of pill that IBAMA wants to give us to forget the land issue. They said that only the communities that accept to remain in Flona could have the resources. Those who want the exclusion would not have the right to them. What does it mean? It means people are forced to accept IBAMA's proposal." Similar understandings led many communities to refuse Promanejo's projects.

Moreover, although the Promanejo resources were designated for the communities, there were not clear definitions about what projects would be implemented, by whom, or how. This created unattainable expectations among the community people, as well as disputes among the non-governmental organizations working with the communities to administer the Promanejo funds (Fauther 1997). Intensifying the dispute, PSA, the

largest NGO in Santarém at the time, had already presented a proposal for administering
the Promanejo resources in 1996, followed by other non-governmental organizations that
also started to request participation in the resource allocation, such as the Rural Workers'
Union and GDA (Amazônia Defense Group). To resolve the disputes, the Promanejo
coordination decided that the resources would go directly to the communities, through
their grassroots associations, and that non-governmental organizations could participate
in the capacity of providing technical assistance (Gonçalves, Hummel, and Francisco
n.d.).

This Promanejo attempt to transfer the responsibility for project initiatives to the
communities, however, encountered problems. In 1997, during the first phase of
Promanejo, IMAFLORA organized two workshops to capacitate the community people
in the elaboration of proposals. Despite these workshops, by 2000, no community had
presented a proposal. Before visiting Santarém in 2000, I first went to the World Bank in
Brasilia to obtain information about the projects, and there, Ricardo Tarifa, responsible
for Promanejo affairs, said to me: "I do not understand; the money is there available for
the communities, but so far, no proposal has been presented. It seems that they do not
want the projects." Tarifa was not wrong at all.

Carrying out my research in the field, I heard several versions from community
people about conflicting perspectives on what the community projects should be, which
had ended up discouraging communities from sending a project application. Among the
Taquara community people, I found the bitterest complaints. The representatives who
had participated in the IMAFLORA workshops had left in the middle of the workshop
activities, and the community had decided that they would not request any projects from

Promanejo. Daniel, one of the community leaders, explained: "We were taking part in the IMAFLORA workshop. Then, they started to ask us to make a map of the community people. I got so angry! You know, after a year making all those maps for the socio-economic survey in 1996, they asked us to do everything again. I am not a child to play with maps all the time. Moreover, everything that we wanted for the project, they said was not possible. If I cannot have a project that I want, I do not want any other."

This was the moment when the Taquara community ended their relationship with IBAMA. A year later, this was one of the communities that started to identify themselves as "indigenous people," as will be discussed in the next chapter. I also heard a complaint from one of the leaders of the Tauari community, who said: "I cried on that day. You know, we had defined a nice proposal during the IMAFLORA workshop to install a mobile sawmill. Yet, when we presented the project they said that it was not possible, that it would destroy the forest and so many things that I cried with anger. Then, I said that I did not want any other thing."

In the Pedreira community, where a poultry project was initiated in 2002, I also heard similar comments. When I asked the community leader why they had decided to raise hens, he said: "Actually, we wanted a project for wildlife management. We wanted to manage turtles in the lake behind the community area, on the way to Acaratinga. But, then, the technicians came here and said that it was too difficult and it was better not to do that. We tried to have a project to manage wild game and they said again it was not possible. The only possible thing that remained was the hens, so, we said ok, bring the hens."

After several drafts, Promanejo finally defined the kinds of project proposals

communities were allowed to submit for funding. It was established that community

project proposals could follow one or more of the following five priority "thematic

areas:" 1) Low-impact forest management, for the production and commercialization of

non-timber resources; 2) Agro-forestry systems, for the introduction and cultivation of

forest species; 3) Community health, for preventative health actions; 4) Community

organization, for strengthening the community association; and 5) Forest extension

training, for the technicians working with projects. Promanejo also established that the

proposals needed to reconcile sustainable management of the resources with revenue

generation.

There was little motivation for the community people to take advantage of

Promanejo resources. In the four years of Promanejo-component 4 implementation, from

1998 to 2002, only a few families from six communities engaged in the Promanejo

projects. I suggest that the lack of motivation was a reflection of communities' resistance

to the government's attempts to adjust their production systems to fit the reserve's goals,

which Promanejo was responsible for consolidating. The poultry-raising project, like the

andiroba and copaiba[12] oil production project, both discussed briefly in the next section,

reflect Promanejo attempts to alter communities' production systems in favor of activities

that specifically reduce the pressure on forest resources and the communities' need for

larger areas. I discuss both projects because they greatly differ from existing community

livelihood strategies: one represents the introduction of an economic activity completely

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[12] Andiroba (*Carapa guianensis* Aubl.) and copaiba (*Copaifera* spp).

alien to community livelihood strategies; the other is based on an activity already developed by community people but not for intensive commercialization purposes.

6.4.4   Managing Poultry in the Forest

The poultry-raising project was officially called "Community Project for Aviculture and Cultivation of Agro-forestry Systems," but more commonly known among the community people as the "hens project." The project was implemented in four communities –Maguary, Pedreira, Piquiatuba, and Nazaré– at a cost of $12,293 for each community, which was requested through the AITA and ASMIPRUT, both community associations. The technical assistance was provided by *Projeto Saúde e Alegria* (PSA),[13] at a cost of $95,193. Although PSA had proposed to assist all the twenty-two communities, only these four communities had accepted to take part, and, even so, only a segment of each of these communities had been interested. The objective of the project was the implementation of an integrated system of aviculture and agro-forestry systems (SAFs) to improve food quality and diversify family revenue. The plan was to plant thirty-six hectares of SAFs, as well as construct a building for poultry raising designated for consumption and commercialization.

Under discussion since 1998, the project took a long time to become effective, and there were several controversial versions about its inception. As indicated earlier, for most of the communities, the project had not been requested by the communities themselves. Rather, as in the case of the Pedreira community, the poultry project was the only option given by the Promanejo technicians, who refused their demand for a project to manage turtles or wild game. The Promanejo coordination explained that the poultry

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[13] PSA (*Projeto Saúde e Alegria* -Health and Happiness Project), a NGO from Santarém.

raising project was presented as a way to appease frustrated expectations about the financial resources that would be provided during the Promanejo second phase. According to the coordination, the anticipation of resources generated expectations about several kinds of projects that were not attainable within Promanejo objectives. This was aggravated by the long delay in the liberalization of the resources, due to the complexity of bureaucratic procedures of these multilateral programs. As this situation fueled community discontentment, and the poultry-raising project was the only community project underway, the coordination decided to support it to avoid creating new expectations and frustrations.

PSA's coordinator, Caetano Scannavino, explained that the project originated from the need they perceived for community people to improve the quality of their diet. He said they had observed throughout the years working with these communities that their nutrition and cultivation systems were deficient, and, as such, the objective of the project was to help communities overcome these scarcities. When I asked him why they decided to promote such intensive poultry raising instead of techniques more adapted to community traditions, he just answered that "it was the idea," and suggested that I talk directly with the technicians responsible for project implementation to get more details. However, continuous changes in the PSA technicians' team prevented me from getting more precise information about the project's conceptualization. Participating in a meeting that took place in 2000 in the Piquiatuba community to discuss the project with the PSA technician and Promanejo's consultants, the PSA technician explained to me that when he started to work at PSA the project was already being discussed, and he just had to accept it as it stood and to try to do his best. He admitted that he was not confident

about the project's success, since it applied techniques unfamiliar to the community and

was time consuming. Moreover, he was concerned about the fact that there was no

understanding about the project's potential impacts on the communities' existing

production systems, or about the environmental impacts that intensive poultry raising

could cause. For unknown reasons, he did not remain a long time in the PSA team.

The PSA technician's concerns, however, made sense. Project implementation not

only disregarded such concerns, but also imposed a complex and bureaucratic operation,

conflicting in many ways with the communities existing production systems.

Implementation of the project was initiated in late 2001, with several seminars about

project management, visits to poultry farms to learn the techniques required, production

of nursery plants, and the construction of the chicken coop. For this construction, people

were contracted to work. Promanejo had requested that communities plant field crops to

ensure that the hens would be fed. Each community group was responsible for its own

cultivation plot, or could also provide an equivalent quantity from individual field crops.

This constituted the first problem. Except for the Maguary community, no other

community was able to provide for the hens' provision, and it reflected a mistake in the

conceptualization about collective work in the community production systems.

Although families in the communities jointly prepare the agricultural fields

(*roçados)*, the harvesting is done on an individual family basis. The idea of "collective

field crops," established in the project, disregarded these community forms of work, as

well as the divergences among the family nuclei, and assumed, instead, that they were

harmonious. Moreover, the project was excessively centralized, controlled by the

technicians, as Ferreira Neto (2002) accurately pointed out in his assessment. Most of the

groups were not able to deal with the requirements set by the project, failing to provide food for the hens, which had to be bought.

The arrival of the chicks in the communities in July 2002 was a complex operation, as was the system for raising them, both of which reflected the project's dissonance with the communities' production systems. The chicks were bought in São Paulo, and were transported to Santarém by airplane and, from Santarém to the communities, by boat. The transportation of the chicks demanded extreme care, since any stress tended to kill them. A week before the chicks' arrival, the PSA technician visited each of the communities to explain what needed to be done. I was in the Piquiatuba community when he came for a meeting. The technician started the meeting by explaining how the chicks were going to be transported and said: "First of all, there is an important point to be emphasized: after the chicks arrive, the mother or the father cannot say that they do not have time to care for the chicks, and send the children to do it. The chicks are too sensitive; they get stressed so easily. Additionally, the chicks require food and medicines in the right amount, and the children are not able to do that." Listening as he explaining these instructions, I immediately recalled the children I observed in the morning feeding the chicks, an activity that generally is their responsibility in the household division of tasks. In front of the chicken coop that had been constructed with Promanejo money was a plaque on which was written: "Prohibited entrance of children."

Two hundred and twenty five chicks were bought for each community group; approximately twenty-five chicks died per group during their transportation. Initially, the project planned to buy four hundred and fifty chicks for each community group, but the lack of food for the chickens made the technicians reduce the quantity. Even with fewer

chicks, the poultry raising techniques demanded intensive care twenty-four hours a day.

This directly affected community time use. Children having been prohibited, the

responsibility was left to an adult to care for a group of chicks that were maintained in a

closed area. It required that they pay close attention to any wounds, in order to prevent

attacks by others that might kill the injured chick. Food and medicine had to be given in

the right amounts and at the right time, and temperature and light had to be controlled.

To meet all of these demands, the community groups had to establish rotating turns for

every person during the day and night. In Piquiatuba, the group established two shifts:

one from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm, and the other from 6:00 pm to 6:00am. Once I visited the

poultry raising project in Piquiatuba, and I met Josefa, who was taking her turn at caring

for the chicks. When I asked her about her day, she said: "It was so sad, nobody to talk

to, just looking at the chicks all day long."

The time people had to spend on the poultry project was much greater than they

used for their domestic animals. Raising chickens among the communities is only one

component of their production system. Chickens are raised to supply food in the absence

of other animal protein, and are eaten, mainly, by sick people. Chicken for daily

consumption was not considered "strong food."[14] Usually, the time spent for raising hens

was distributed throughout the day, and carried out by women and children. Raised

openly in the garden, around the house, the chickens were closed up only at night, to

avoid attacks from predators. As chicks, they were generally cared for by the housewife;

when they grew up, the children took over the responsibility for feeding them. Besides

providing a source of food, chickens were also important commercially. Constituting the

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[14] An analysis of the perceptions about "strong food" in opposition to "weak food" among peasant
communities in Lower Tapajós region is found in Lins and Silva (1980).

main source of revenue for housewives, I observed several times chickens being used as currency for exchanging goods.

The poultry raising system that was implemented through the project disregarded these community strategies, in addition to demanding time that was subtracted from other production activities. The communities' production systems had been based on exploitation of a variety of resources throughout the yearly calendar, whose sustainability rested precisely in this multiplicity of strategies. Having to spend a day per week to care for hens —not taking into consideration the time spent on meetings, trainings, and other project activities— altered the communities' organization of time by forcing them to concentrate efforts in one specialized activity. In this case, specialization not only interfered in the communities' organization of production activities, but also had not provided any compensation.

An average of twenty families per community group took part in the project. The distribution of the two hundred hens that had been successfully raised for this large number of families provided each family with only ten hens. To reach this number did not require the expensive project or the time spent. The survey I had carried out among the communities revealed that, with the exception of a few, most families customarily kept a minimum of ten hens. In 2003, when I returned to field, I was told that the project had temporarily stopped, and that the remaining hens had been distributed among the family groups. The thirty-six hectares planned to implement the SAF's had been reduced to 0.25 hectares for each group, with the cultivation of four species.

In his assessment of Promanejo community projects, Ferreira Neto (2002) also highlighted the problem that the poultry project was pushed on the communities for lack

of other options. The author emphasized that the proposal was not built with the

communities' traditional production systems in mind. One of the effects, he remarks,

"was the little dominion of the groups over the proposal and, consequently, the lack of

motivation to execute it. The communities have not appropriated the project for

themselves. It was the project of Promanejo, or project of PSA" (Ferreira Neto 2002: 8).

I also heard people saying that the project was Promanejo's or PSA's, and observed

that people had little understanding about the term "SAFs." Once, in the Piquiatuba

community, Marinalvo, the owner's house where I was being received as guest, called me

to talk to him and asked me: "Edviges, what is SAFs?" Surprised with the question, in

few words, I answered that the SAF's were based on the cultivation of different species in

the same area. He, then, looked outside the house and asked me again: "But, is that not

what we have always done?" I commented that the development of SAFs came precisely

from the native system, especially, from Amazon region, which, like theirs, used to mix

several kinds of species. He, then, took some time to think and wondered: "Why, then,

do the technicians come here to teach us what we have already taught to them?"

Although it was hard to find someone defending the poultry project, its lack of

success cannot be taken as inconsequential. It was not just one more unsuccessful and

frustrating project, but it also disorganized the communities' production systems, a

consequence which was left to the communities to resolve. In her assessment of the

Promanejo-Component 4, Padovan (2002: 26) alerted that, "it is the very community

people who become the main injured party, generating, moreover, a strong distrust and

aloofness from them with regard to issues related directly or indirectly to the global

management of the reserve." In fact, distrust and aloofness had characterized the

relationship between the community people and reserve since the beginning. Similar to the reserve's difficulties in getting implemented, the poultry project's lack of success cannot be attributed simply to technical problems that disregarded the communities' traditional production systems. The proposal was the object of intense discussion, and several experts pointed out the problems for its implementation. Rather, the problem was with the poultry project's main purpose, which was to prioritize the reserve's objective to lessen the pressure on timber resources, without taking into consideration the impacts for the communities' production systems.

6.4.5   The Project for Copaiba and Andiroba Oil Production

The project for production of the oil of andiroba (*Carapa guianensis* Aubl.) and copaiba (*Copaifera* spp) started to be implemented in July 2000, initially with families from the communities of São Domingos and Nararé, and, later, in 2002, with families from the Pedreira community. This project also was requested through AITA and ASMIPRUT, and its value was $9,506 for each community. The main objective of the project was to provide infrastructure to intensify the production of andiroba and copaiba oils. Andiroba oil is extracted from the trees' seeds, and copaiba oil is extracted directly from the trees' trunks; both are applied for medicinal purposes. Oil production, an activity extensively carried out in the region is, however, customarily done on a small scale for domestic uses and, occasionally, for commercialization. The project envisioned increasing and improving oil production to supply the cosmetic industry.

The proposal for the oil project was an initiative of the Promanejo coordination in Santarém. To accelerate the process, Viviane Araujo Gonçalvez, Promanejo's technical coordinator, took the proposal to the community people. Initially, just the communities of São Domingos and Nararé accepted to participate, with thirteen and twelve families,

respectively. The project provided for these families the construction of a building for the production and storage of the oils, training to improve the quality of production, and market studies.

In spite of some minor problems, the oil project initially was evaluated positively by an external assessment team hired by Promanejo (Padovan 2002; Ferreira Neto 2002). The project was considered to be technically sound and to have a good level of participation, in terms of the project being based on a well-known traditional activity and the high level of involvement of the people in the project. The project's results were already showing an increase in oil production and commercialization, although much lower than the goals initially established, which were to reach a minimum of four thousand liters a year. In 2002, São Domingos sold a hundred liters of oil and Nazaré sold three hundred and twenty, which corresponded to an average increase of 290% in relation to 1998 production levels (Ferreira Neto 2002).

Although one can identify some levels of success in the project, the goals of the project conflicted with the communities' production systems. Andiroba oil is extracted from the seeds, which must be collected from trees that are unequally dispersed in the forest. The production of andiroba oil requires an average of one hundred kilos of seeds to produce eighteen liters of oil (Shanley, Cymerys, and Galvão 1998). The quantity required for production in both communities was the first and most critical problem. In the communities' areas, andiroba trees were scarce, which was not the case in the Pedreira community area. Forest surveys had located andiroba trees in more distant areas in Flona Tapajós, along the Highway 163. The collection and transportation of the seeds from these areas required a boat and a car. For awhile, Promanejo and the Flona Tapajós

administration provided both vehicles for transportation. This caused families to depend on outside help to produce oil, in addition to the need to spend more effort and time to collect the seeds, because of the distance to the areas.

Similar to raising chickens, andiroba oil production is part of the domestic production system and is essentially a female activity. While men bring the seeds from the forest, women are responsible for extracting the oil. In addition, community practices dictate that women who are menstruating cannot extract the oil or even be present during the processing of the oil. Domestic andiroba oil production designated for medicinal uses and, eventually, commercialization, was also distributed among the other productive activities along the agriculture calendar. In general, for the communities, individuals cannot claim ownership to andiroba trees and their seeds, unless someone had planted the tree. Andiroba, like land and forest resources, is viewed by the communities as a common resource to be shared by all.

The project's intensification of oil production, however, impacted these traditional andiroba practices and rules. For example, the exploitation of andiroba seeds in Flona Tapajós required the submission of a management plan that must be approved by DIFLONA, in Brasilia. This strongly interfered with the communities' autonomy to define the rules of their production systems, as it transferred decision-making power to IBAMA officials. Community resistance to such interferences was part of these particular communities' long-term struggles, and, certainly, explained the lack of significant community participation in the project, as well as the withdrawal of some families that initially comprised the groups. In 2002, only six families in each community group remained working in the project.

The project did, in fact, intensify oil production, but it also promoted dependencies and altered community rules for resource appropriation toward a bureaucratic and specialized activity. This reflected the priority given to the studies on economic market and forest potentials, and the lack of attention paid to community forest uses, and the impacts on them. The composition of the Promanejo technical team and expert consultants also reveals the priority that was given to economic forest issues, at the expense of community understandings on resources exploitation. Whereas several economists and foresters were hired for the Promanejo-Component 4's activities, no social scientists were called at any moment to assist or to assess the development of the community projects.

6.5 Traditional People and National Forests

Although recognizing a series of difficulties in implementing the projects in the communities in the Flona Tapajós, the coordinators of Promanejo-component 4 have attributed the difficulties to factors that were considered out of the control of the project. The 2001 Promanejo activities report pointed to several difficulties that got in the way of the project's objectives. Among the difficulties identified as "external," the report highlighted the unresolved community land tenure conflict, and "the lack of organizational capacity of community people" (PROMANEJO 2001). When I first read this, it sounded strange. First, how could the undefined community land tenure be considered an external issue if it represented the area in which the community projects would be implemented? While for the Promanejo coordination the lack of resolution regarding the community lands was external to project activities, for the community people, the definition of the area was a necessary pre-condition for the reserve's management plan, which community projects were expected to help consolidate.

The second argument, "the lack of organizational capacity of community people,," also sounded strange to me. After having followed the long history of community resistance against attempts at expulsion, and its contribution to changing the legislation regarding the presence of community people in reserves, it was difficult for me to accept that for these communities lacked "organizational capacity." Moreover, the project proposals had to be elaborated according to rigid parameters and externally defined demands, and under a heavy bureaucratic structure. As indicated, among the thematic areas, except for community health and community association, the thematic areas related to the productive activities were focused on the promotion of commercial forest uses without taking into consideration the community forest management systems or their socio-cultural organizations. By placing blame on the communities' incapacity to organize, the Promanejo's coordination, perhaps, was trying to conceal the reality, which was that the communities were resisting because Promanejo did not respond to their demands and interests.

Although Promanejo had established that the beneficiaries were the "traditional communities residing in Flona Tapajós's perimeters" (PROMANEJO 1997), there was no mention of their production systems. The thematic areas were not defined to support community forest uses, but to promote activities compatible with the reserve's goals to become economically viable through forest exploitation, the main purpose of National Forests. Thus, Promanejo funded projects and activities were not aimed at promoting community forms of forest uses, the main focus of their struggle over the last two decades, but rather at transforming them to meet the purposes of the reserve management plan. In fact, this is clearly written in the Promanejocomponent 4 objectives in

supporting *pilot experiences that provide alternatives to traditional land uses* (PROMANEJO 2001).

One of the sources of the problem lies with the SNUC regulation, which does not recognize, in National Forests, "traditional people's" rights to their territories. Instead, "traditional people" are "admitted" on the condition that they previously lived in the area prior to the creation of the reserve[15]. This establishes an unequal power relationship, which tends to negate the legitimacy of the people's claims to access to their territory and forest resources, and to create a relationship of dependency with governmental agencies. This is also reflected in the National Forests' administrative structure, which has a Consultative Council in which representatives of "traditional people" *can take part of* "when appropriate" (SNUC, Art. 17, § 5°).

Moreover, National Forest legislation, article n° 17, establishes reserves' basic objective as "sustainable multiple uses of forest resources and scientific research, with emphasis on the exploitation of native forests." Thus, "traditional people," who were *admitted* into the reserve, have to follow the reserve's management plan that is elaborated to respond to these objectives. This means that "traditional" community production systems must be adjusted to fit the reserve's management plan, whose objective, in the case of Flona Tapajós, is the promotion of timber exploitation based on the principles of scientific forestry.

Not surprisingly, the Promanejo-component 4 activities and objectives were consistent with National Forests' objective of making timber exploitation in the reserve's

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[15] This is a different perspective from the Extractive Reserves, which are created assuming the existence of "traditional people," and whose objective is to solve social conflicts. For further reading, see Allegretti (2002).

areas economically attainable. Focused on reducing the pressures on timber resources, the Promanejo project dismembered community production systems based on the multiple uses of forest resources, which required larger areas, in favor of specialized economic activities designated to support the market. In other terms, it reflected the processes of simplification and standardization present in modern statecraft, as discussed by Scott (1998), to exert control over spaces and social relations. Yet, as the author cautions, "we never assume that local practice conforms with state theory" (Scott 1998: 49); both environmental and human factors intervene to interfere with the *utopian dream*, in this case, forest modernization. The communities' indifference to the "global reserve management" (Padovan 2002) is part of their efforts to resist government attempts to change their forms of relating to spaces and to resources to meet the objectives of the reserve management plan.

While people showed some resistance to such interferences, the communities of Taquara, Maritiba and Bragança have taken a more radical position. By reclaiming their indigenous identity, they have transformed their struggle, distancing themselves from the "traditional people" category that had been imposed on them by the government. I discuss this in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7
RECOVERING OLD CULTURAL TRADITIONS: THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I discussed two key moments related to the
(re)construction of community territory and social identity that began with the creation of
Flona Tapajós. The first set of events, which took place from 1974 to the early 1990s,
was characterized by the government's attempts to displace people from the Flona and its
unwillingness to recognize community social organization and identities. Rather, in the
eyes of the government, community people were identified as *caboclo*, squatters, or
occasional occupants and, consequently, were denied their territorial rights. The second
set of events, which started began in 1994, was characterized by the government's
acceptance of community peoples' permanence in the reserve, after having been officially
recognized as "traditional people."

In this chapter, I focus on a third moment in this long history of community
territory and social identity (re)construction, which was defined by a process of
reinstatement of indigenous identity, starting in 1998 among the people of the Taquara,
Marituba, and Bragança communities. I will refer to this as the indigenous movement,
which has been characterized by the claim to an ethnic identity and ancient cultural
practices, as well as requests for the recognition of their lands with FUNAI. Different
from the previous two moments of territorial and identity formation, discussed above,
which resulted from direct governmental intervention to advance with Flona Tapajós'
implementation, the indigenous movement emerged from the communities themselves

who started to reconstruct old indigenous traditions and to remodel their forms of political and cultural organizations. The indigenous movement that arose from three communities in Flona Tapajós area not only detached these particular communities from their previous associations with other communities, separating them into their own social groups, but has also redefined the political field, from which new social and spatial relations have emerged.

7.2 Indigenous Territory and Identity: The Process of "Territorialization"

As previously indicated, the movement to reinstate an indigenous identity began in 1998 among the community people from the Taquara community, who started to recognize themselves as belonging to the Mundurucu ethnicity. In 2001, the communities of Marituba and Bragança also started to self-identify as Mundurucu Indians.[1] The emergence of the ethnic identity movement, across these three communities, has caused a schism among the "communities of resistance," dividing them into the indigenous and non-indigenous communities, and, consequently, this has impacted their forms of political association and struggle for land.

This movement to reconstruct an indigenous identity among these three communities, which expanded throughout the Lower Tapajós region, resonates with the movements that occurred in the 1970-80s in the Brazilian Northeast (Oliveira 1999a). As in the case of the Lower Tapajós, indigenous groups in the Northeast who were considered to be either extinct or residues of a process of decimation and miscegenation that had been initiated with colonization, started a process of cultural reconstruction,

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[1] Claiming distinct ethnicities, some communities located in the left bank of Tapajós River, in the area of Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve, have also undertaken a similar movement toward reinstating indigenous identities.

recognizing themselves as belonging to a differentiated ethnic identity. Analyzing this process of ethnic emergence in the Northeast region, Oliveira (1999a) pointed out the notion of "territorialization," which the author developed to explain the processes by which native peoples became the subject of state intervention. According to him, this process associates individuals and groups to specific geographical limits, in the process creating ethnic objects through arbitrary mechanisms that are outside the control of the native peoples and controlled by the state.

Oliveira (1999a) identified the first process of "territorialization," of which the native groups from the Northeast region were a part starting in the middle of the seventeenth century and the first decades of the eighteenth century, during the religious missions. A similar process also occurred in the Amazon region, especially, in the Lower Tapajós region, as previously discussed in Chapter 3. In both regions, the religious missions constituted an important mechanism for colonial policy to expand the frontiers and finances of the Portuguese Crown, which looked to homogenize several different cultures through catechization, a strict discipline of work, and, in the Amazon region, through the creation of a generalizable language (*Língua Geral)*. In the Amazon and the Northeast, the religious missions created the first "mix" (*mistura*) of native groups, which subsequently was reinforced by the assimilation policies of the Directorate of the Indians, which encouraged inter-ethnic marriages and the occupation of the old mission areas (*aldeamentos*) by white colonizers. By the end of the nineteenth century, indigenous peoples were considered to be extinct, being referred to as just remainders or descendents.

Oliveira (1999a) also identified a second and different process of "territorialization" that occurred among the Northeast Indians beginning in the 1920s, with the arrival of the Indian Protection Service (SPI), the first governmental Indian agency, created in 1911. In subsequent decades, based on state wardship (*tutela*) policies, the government implemented several SPI offices (*Posto Indígena*/Indian Post) in the region, and demarcated lands for several Indian groups. For Indian groups, this process resulted in behaviors and beliefs that were characteristic of these protectionist policies, which Oliveira (1998) defined as *indianidade*, being imposed on them. However, in contrast to the Northeast region, the indigenous groups in the Lower Tapajós were not subject to this process of state intervention. The SPI only established one Indian Post and demarcated lands for the Mundurucu Indians in the Upper Tapajós River; there is no record about any similar actions taken in the Lower Tapajós region.

As in the Northeast, by the late nineteenth century, the indigenous groups in the Lower Tapajós were thought to be extinct, and the literature reinforced this perspective, describing them as *caboclos*. This is why the ethnic emergence among communities such as Taquara, Marituba, and Bragança has surprised academics, as well as governmental and non-governmental agencies, and the regional society. From Oliveira's perspective (1999a), this reconstruction movement of indigenous identities carried out by these groups that were not recognized by the State, nor described in the literature, comes to constitute another process of "territorialization."

In this last process of "territorialization," indigenous groups attempted to reestablish a relationship with their origins, reinventing old cultural traditions that allow them to define for themselves an ethnically organized collectivity that differentiates them

from their regional neighbors. This has been happening in Taquara, Marituba and Bragança, where the resumption of rituals, body painting, language, and organizational institutions derived from indigenous traditions of the past represent a part of the attempts to establish a connection to their origins, and to differentiate themselves from other social groups in the area. Oliveira (1999a), however, alerts us that this indigenous movement does not constitute a nostalgic exercise to return to the past that is disconnected from the present: "They know that they are very distant from their origins in terms of political organization, as well as in terms of cultural and cognitive dimension" (1999a: 31). This understanding, however, does not invalidate the references and feelings that are attached to their ethnic origins, but, rather, tends to reinforce them. This can be seen in the explanation provided by, Olavo, from the Taquara community:

Olavo: We are Indians as we always were. But before, we were ashamed of being Indians because we were taught that to be Indian was awful; that Indian was like an animal in the forest. It comes from a long time ago, from missions, and after that the *Cabanagem*, always trying to destroy Indian culture. Yet, today we are free, we understand that the Indian has value, that our culture comes from the past and we do not have to be ashamed of that.

This association between indigenous identity and freedom was frequently expressed in the three communities in Flona Tapajós that began recognizing themselves as Mundurucu Indians. By establishing a connection with their ethnic origins, reinventing old beliefs and rituals, they established cultural parameters that allowed them to feel free in the territory they occupy. This was especially emphasized to IBAMA, which, since the creation of the reserve, has imposed regulations on rights to territory and on existing social relations.

In his analysis on the process of ethnic emergence, Oliveira (1999a) pointed out the importance of territory in social movements for ethnicity construction, remarking on the

connection between feelings of ethnic belonging and the place of origin, "where the individual and his/her magic components are united and identified with the very land, coming to integrate a common destiny" (1999a: 31). Therefore, the importance of territory in this process mediates the relationship between the individual and the ethnic group.

This can be seen in the communities of Taquara, Marituba and Bragança, with regard to their claim to an indigenous identity and their call for the recognition of their lands. As discussed in the previous chapter, the category of "traditional people" and its use in the context of the National Forests, has represented a mechanism of the government to exert control over the communities. Moreover, the territory that is vital to establishing this connection between individuals and the ethnic group, reproducing a feeling of belonging, fell outside the control of the three communities that had established themselves as Mundurucu. Therefore, to get control over their territory it was necessary to reestablish the connection with the past, with their origins, recreating their social organizations under the mantle of old indigenous traditions. It has been through this movement that the Indians of Flona Tapajós have distanced themselves from the category of "traditional people," allowing them to feel "freed" to decide about their destiny.

This, however, raises an important question: why have not other communities in Flona Tapajós taken the same route as the communities of Taquara, Marituba, and Bragança, if they are all part of the same historical process, and some of them share strong kinship ties? My investigation suggested that there are two main reasons for the emergence of the indigenous movement. One was to resist against the government imposed category of "traditional people", and the second was to overcome an internal

political crisis precipitated principally by the death of their main leaders. Moreover, compared to other communities in the Flona, these three communities shared some key characteristics, including similar social and religious organizations, a strong patriarchal leadership, and shamanism, all of which favored the emergence of an indigenous movement in these particular communities.

7.3 Resurgence of Cultural Traditions and the Struggle for Land

7.3.1 Revival from the Ashes: Ethnic Identity Movement in the Taquara Community

The people in Taquara attributed the founding of the community to Pedro and Maria, who arrived in the area in 1889. Their descendants identified Pedro as being the son of a "Mundurucu woman and a Portuguese man," and it is because of this Mundurucu descent that the community people recognized themselves as belonging to this ethnic group, although they also recognized other ethnic origins among their ascendants, including Tupinamba and Camaruara.

Although Pedro and Maria were considered the "founders" of the Taquara community, the couple, however, did not have any children. Instead, they adopted a girl by the name of Anabela, and a boy by the name of Ilácio. In 1908, Anabela married Romeu dos Santos, who was from the Lower Amazon and was identified as a Mundurucu Indian. Anabela and Romeu had four children: Irani, who did not get married nor had any children; Carlos, who married and moved to the community of Prainha, but died soon after; Maria Antonia; and Clara. In 1938, Antonia married Saulo Cruz, with whom she had five children, although two died as babies. Antonia died at a young age, and Saulo got remarried, with Clara, Antonia's younger sister. Saulo and Maria Candida had six children and adopted four more.

This extended family of Pedro and Maria constitutes the core of the social organization of the Taquara community, although other families from diverse places also came to settle in the area. With a strong tradition of shamans (*pajé*), who heal not only the people in the community but also from other places, shamanism was at the base of the Taquara community's belief system, along with Catholicism, and their socio-political organization. Among the shamans, the most famous was Saulo, who died in 1988. His healing practices were one of the reasons behind the settlement of these families in the Taquara community. This was the case of Ricardo's family, which originally was from the left bank of Tapajós River. After being healed by Saulo, Ricardo decided to remain in the place, as he explained: "After being healed by Saulo, he invited me to do some jobs for him, and I, grateful, accepted." Over time, through marriage, strong kinship ties have been established between new families settling in the area and the initial extended family of Pedro and Maria.

Saulo was born in the Upper Arapiuns River, a tributary of the Tapajós River, and he identified himself as a Camaruara Indian. He became known as a shaman not only in the Taquara community, but also throughout the Tapajós Valley. Because of the strong power attributed to him to heal people, Saulo was known as the "land's medical doctor" (*médico da terra*), as he also identified himself. It was very common to hear people throughout the Tapajós region saying: "It was God in heaven and Saulo on earth; what the medical doctor was not able to treat, Saulo healed." Besides receiving people in the Taquara community to treat, Saulo also went to Santarém once a month, where hundreds of people waited in lines to be cured by him.

When he was young, Saulo was initiated in shamanism by Merandolino Cobra Grande, who was referred to as being the most famous shaman the Lower Amazon region had ever seen. It was said that "Merandolino Cobra Grande was married on the earth as well as in the water," a reference to the belief that he became a snake (*Cobra Grande*), and traveled in the waters. It also was said that he did not die, but, instead, that he was "deadened" [*amortecido*] and was believed to reside in an enchanted city located in the Arapiuns River's waters, next to a place called Lago Grande. These beliefs were associated with the shamanistic system of *caboclo* culture, discussed in Chapter 3. The powerful shaman was distinguished by his capacity to become a snake (*Cobra Grande*), called a *sacaca*. Like Merandolino Cobra Grande, the *sacaca* does not die like common people, but, instead, he disappears to live forever in the "enchanted kingdom of the deep waters" (Galvão 1952: 124).

Although Saulo was considered a powerful shaman, it seems that he did not consider himself a *sacaca*, as he talked about it with Florencio Vaz[2] in an interview given in 1995:

FV: Are you saying that Merandolino Cobra Grande was a *sacaca*?

L: "I am not sure about that. Yet, it is said that the *sacaca* goes to the depths of the water [*fundo*]… I will tell you what I saw. Merandolino was dressed in a man's suit, shoes, and hat, and, in the river behind his house, in the Aruanã River[3], he fell in the water. I thought he had died, but that was not what happened. Two days later, he came back with everything perfect, cleaned and dried.

FV: Have you traveled underwater [*fundo*]?

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[2] Florencio Vaz carried out this interview during his masters fieldwork. His thesis was on the communities of Tapajós River (Vaz 1997a). Vaz kindly showed me and authorized me to use the interviews in my dissertation. I am grateful for his cooperation.

[3] The meeting of Aruanã River with Maró River forms the Arapiuns River.

L: No, I have not. Merandolino did not teach me to do that. When he passed away, I was already living in the Tapajós.

FV: Is there any other *sacaca* in our region?

L: I do not think so. I do not know of any other.

According to Saulo's descendants, although Merandolino had initiated Saulo in the practices of shamanism, it was Lucrecio Ribeiro who continued to work with him and made him a shaman. Lucrecio was the brother of Saulo's father-in-law, as Irani explained:

Irani My uncle Saulo got this gift [*dom*] from birth. You know, the *pajé* [shaman] is already born with this gift, but it has to be worked on. If he does not work on this gift, he will go crazy [*zuretado da cabeça*], like Saulo was because he had not finished the work. Then, Saulo's first wife called her uncle, Lucrecio Ribeiro, who was also a shaman, to finish the job Merandolino had not finished. Thus, Saulo was treated, and started to heal people.

Irani's description resounds with the process discussed by Taussig (1987: 447) in his study on "terror and healing," in which the author noticed that "folk healers and shamans embark on their careers as a way of healing themselves. The resolution of their illness is to become a healer, and their pursuit of this calling is a more or less persistent battle with the forces of illness that lie within them as much as in their patients… To cure is to become a curer. In being healed he is become a healer." Therefore, in crossing what Taussig called the "space of death," Saulo came to be recognized as the last powerful healer in the Tapajós Valley. However, in contrast to his master Merandolino Cobra Grande, Saulo did not consider himself a *sacaca*, since he did not travel underwater, but just as the "land's medical doctor," the way he came to be greatly appreciated and recognized for his strong power to cure.

The shamanism performed within the Taquara community came to constitute the main factor articulating their socio-cultural and political organization. Saulo was not just a well-known and respected healer in the region, but also the chief of a large extended family, the basis of the community social organization, the president of the community and its main political leader. It was also through his shamanistic practices that the relationship with other social groups in the region was established. Saulo's importance for the Taquara community, as well as for the regional society, was expressed in the homage paid to him after his death. During several rituals I observed in Taquara, as well as in Marituba and Bragança, Saulo was always invoked as their great shaman. This also occurred at a meeting in the Tapajós-Arapiuns RESEX in May 2003, when the RESEX's president, after saying that he had been cured by Saulo, asked for the people to observe a moment of silence in his memory.

It was precisely just after Saulo's death that community people in Taquara started the social movement to reclaim indigenous cultural traditions, and began recognizing themselves as belonging to the Mundurucu ethnicity. It was to Saulo that the people in Taquara pointed as the reason why they started recognizing themselves as belonging to Mundurucu ethnicity. It was often heard from Saulo's descendants that they started to recognize themselves as an "indigenous community" because Saulo, before passing away, "asked to us not forget our ancestors, our culture." According to them, Saulo's call had been recorded on cassettes by Florencio Vaz, who had carried out interviews with Saulo and had given them copies of the tapes. Antero, Saulo's son and currently the Vice-Cacique of the community, explained that: "After my father's death, we spent a long time listening to the tapes, one tape after the other. We started to ask ourselves: if

our father's desire was that we recognize our culture, if we are really Indians, why, then, do we not acknowledge that we are Indians? Is it because of shame? Then, let us put the shame aside and to be what we really are." After hearing several similar accounts in the community, it was evident that these tapes had been the main motivation behind the decision to reclaim their indigenous identity.

However, while the community took up Saulo's call, one can dig deeper and see that this was also motivated by a need to find social mechanisms to readjust the community socio-cultural organization that undergoes periods of crisis. In his analysis on "social dramas," defined "as units of aharmonic or disharmonic process, arising in conflict situations," Turner (1974: 39) pointed out that a phase of *redressive action* follows a stage of crisis in social organizations. Expanding on van Gennep's seminal theories on "rites of passage," which encompass three distinct stages of separation, transition, and reaggregation, often called *preliminal*, *liminal* and *postliminal*, Turner (1974) examined the transition or "liminal" period of passage and the spontaneous development of specific communities of commonality, which he denominated as *communitas*. Therefore, understanding that stages of crisis are "the turning point or moments of danger and suspense" that affect social organizations, the author remarked that, "in order to limit the spread of crisis, certain *adjustive and redressive mechanisms* (…), informal or formal, institutionalized or ad hoc, are swiftly brought into operation by leading or structurally representative members of the disturbed social system" (Turner 1974: 39, emphasis in the original). For Turner, "it is in the redressive phase that both pragmatic techniques and symbolic action reach their fullest expression" (1974: 41). I

suggest applying this perspective to shed light on the internal reasons for the emergence, within the Taquara community, of an ethnic resurgence movement.

For decades, the Taquara community was held together by Saulo's leadership, whose shamanistic practices provided the basis for community socio-cultural and political relations. Saulo's death caused an irreparable loss, an empty space in the organization of these social relations. This represented a *liminal* period for the community since, in Turner's words, it was "a threshold between more or less stable phases of the social process" (1974: 39). It was, precisely, at this moment, in the *liminal* period following Saulo's death, that the Taquara community began to reinstate old indigenous traditions, in which Saulo's shamanistic practices were expressed the most elaborately. This move to claim an indigenous identity can be understood as comprising an *adjustive* or *redressive* mechanism to overcome the crisis caused by Saulo's absence. The vacuum caused by his death, and the imminent crisis that emerged from a leaderless community, was filled with a focus on claiming and reasserting their ethnic origins.

Although quite different, the Taquara people's reaffirmation of an old indigenous tradition resounds with the "invention of traditions" discussed by Hobsbawm (1983), which were the reenactment of old European traditions of the late nineteenth century, including rituals of the British Crown and Scottish dress (*kilt, tartan,* and *fole* music*)*. Analyzing the "invention of traditions" from a state politics perspective, the author remarked that the reenactment of these traditions reflected the profound and swift changes that were occurring in Europe during that period, and the need for entirely new, or old, traditions presented a means to ensure or express identity and social cohesion. Therefore, currently thought of as millenaries, the "invention" of such "traditions" came

to constitute an important political instrument that was manipulated by the state to strengthen a sense of unity and provide an ideological orientation, based on symbols and traditions reconstructed as part of the past, as part of people's origins.

Without extending the discussion, I want to point out that these processes indicate that the reinvention of old traditions, such as happened in Europe, or has been taking place in the Taquara community, constitutes part of the socio-cultural mechanisms to reestablish an order to social relations. Under the mantle of old traditions, the Taquara community has not only redefined the foundation of its social and political organization, but also delimitated ethnic boundaries that allow them to distinguish themselves from other groups in the region, as a separate organized collectivity. While this indigenous movement represented an attempt to detach themselves from the category of "traditional people," it also represented a *redressive* mechanism used to overcome the crisis caused by the death of their main leader. Like a phoenix, the old indigenous traditions in the Taquara were reborn from Saulo's ashes.

7.3.2 The Marituba and Bragança Communities: Political Leadership and Social Cohesion

The indigenous movement in the Marituba and Bragança communities was greatly influenced by the Taquara community. In January 2001, the communities promoted numerous meetings to announce that both communities had also joined the movement, by also recognizing themselves as belonging to the Mundurucu ethnicity.

In the recent past, the communities of Marituba and Bragança were comprised of extended families belonging to the Marai community, as well as the Nazaré community, situated in the southern limits of the Marai community. There are several and contradictory narratives about the historical origins of Marai, but, in general, they point

towards an old indigenous village. The name Marai is also attributed to an Indian called *Maraio*, who resided in the place, although nobody was able to identify his ethnic affiliation. According to kinship genealogies, a great part of the people from the four communities descended from Miloca, who was referred as an "old Indian lady" (*índia velha*), who only spoke the "indigenous language," or "spoke badly" (*falava feio*). Nobody from the communities was able to say precisely when Miloca passed way; the data indicated that it was between the decades of the 1920s and 1930s. Miloca did not marry, yet had four sons with different men, and adopted a girl. Except for one of Miloca's son, who lives on the left bank of the Tapajós River, the other sons had already passed away. The communities of Marai, Nazaré, Marituba, and Bragança were constituted mainly from Miloca's direct descendants.

The Nazaré community originated from the extended families of Romenio and Josenildo, Miloca's sons, who moved in the 1920s to the place where the Nazaré community is now located. In the 1930s, Branca, one of Romenio' daughters, married Ronaldo, who was from Jaguarary, another community in Flona Tapajós. After marrying, Branca and Ronaldo lived some time in the Jaguarari community and returned to reside in the Marai community, where Ronaldo became the most important leader. Yet, in the 1980s, because of internal community disputes, the Ronaldo/Branca extended family, constituted by their nine children and their respective families, moved to the place where they founded the Bragança community.

Laura, one of Ronaldo's and Branca's daughters, was married to the main leader of the Marituba community, who was Noraldino and Flor's son. Noraldino was also from the Marai community, yet belonged to a separate extended family. After residing in

several places around the Marai community, the Noraldino's extended family fixed their residence in the place that now is called Marai. There, the Noraldino extended family and the Marilda extended family separated from the Marai community and founded the Marituba community in the beginning of the 1990s. Marilda was identified as a Borari Indian from Alter do Chão, who moved with her husband, Renato, to a place where the Marituba community was in the 1940s, encouraged by the second rubber boom.

Although the four communities share close and intricate kinship ties, and, in general, the people admit to being indigenous descendants, only the Marituba and Bragança communities have become involved in the movement to reconstruct their indigenous identity. The other two communities, Marai and Nazaré, have refused to accept the category of "Indian," asserting constantly that "we are Indian, but I do not want to be Indian." Such differing positions taken by the communities reflect previous disputes and conflicts among these extended families. The decision taken by the Marituba and Bragança communities to be identified as "indigenous" has reinforced the social boundaries between them and the Maria and Nazaré communities, by creating a distinction between the "Indians" and "non-Indians." Looking at the communities' main characteristics one comes to understand that their respective social, political, and religious organizations were critical in the positions taken.

As pointed out, the Marituba and Bragança communities were founded by extended families that separated from Marai community due to internal differences. Ronaldo was the main leader of the Marai community, the community president for several years, and he is attributed as having carried out major community improvements, including having created the community itself. As discussed in Chapter 3, the configuration of

"community" emerged in the late 1960s, with the Catholic Church's *Comunidades Eclesiais de Base* program. After Ronaldo left the Marai community to establish the Bragança community, Marai suffered from his absence in terms of political leadership, with a frequent turnover of representatives. In Bragança, Ronaldo put into action his leadership skills, creating a new community based on his direct descendants. Up until his death in 1993, Ronaldo led a unified social group, which, after that, remained unified under Branca's maternal leadership.

Marituba followed a similar process. Noraldino and Flor had eleven children, and the power of this extended family created internal conflicts, which led them to leave Marai. Allied with the extended family of Marilda and Renato, the Noraldino extended family, the largest, was able to establish the Marituba community, over which Noraldino exerted leadership up until his death in 2001. Thus, both the Matituba and Bragança communities were based on relatively homogenous family units, whose political representation rested on strong and continuous paternal leadership that favored internal social cohesion.

The situation was different in the Marai and Nazaré communities. As previously discussed, the Nazaré community was established around the two extended families of Romenio and Josenildo, Miloca's sons. Besides these two major families, other families also settled in the area, creating a more complex social organization, whose political leadership became an object of dispute among the families. The Marai community was reduced in number with the separation of the Marituba and Bragança communities. After Ronaldo left Marai, the community started to suffer because it was unable to replace his strong leadership. The most notable leader that emerged after Ronaldo was Arivaldo,

who, however, was renowned as being rowdy and an alcoholic prior to his conversion to the Pentecostal religion, the *Assembléia de Deus* (Assembly of God), in the middle 1990s. As a Protestant, Arivaldo's leadership tended to be contested by the Catholics, which reduced his power in the Marai community.

Religion was another aspect that differentiated the four communities. While all community people from Marituba and Bragança identified themselves as being Catholic, the people in the Marai and Nazaré communities claimed different religions. The community people in Marai were divided between Catholics and "*Crentes*" (Believers), people who were followers of the *Assembleia de Deus* religion. In the Nazaré community, the people were divided among three religions: Catholic, *Assembleia de Deus*, and *Igreja da Paz* (Peace Church), another Pentecostal Christian religion, founded by American missionaries in Santarém that had spread throughout the Tapajós Valley. These different religions created schisms among the extended families, turning the process of community decision-making more complex. Belonging to the *Assembleia de Deus* or *Igreja da Paz* was one of the reasons why these community people kept a distance from the indigenous movement. Arivaldo, from Marai, told me: "I have indigenous heritage, but, as a *Crente*, I cannot recognize myself as Indian. My religion does not permit that."

Although some people in the Marai and Nararé communities wanted to participate in the indigenous movement, internal divisions prevented them from doing so. In Marai, Lourdes complained that: "We all know that we are Indians; our grand-parents were Indians who lived here for long time, but the community does not want to accept that." While for these communities, internal divergences and the absence of centralized

leadership acted as a barrier to becoming involved in the indigenous movement, the

communities of Taquara, Marituba, and Bragança mobilized to affirm an indigenous

identity. Among these three communities, one can find another similarity. The decision

to participate in the indigenous movement was taken only after their leaders passed away.

In the Taquara and Marituba communities, the decision was taken immediately after

Saulo and Noraldino's death, respectively. In Bragança, although Ronaldo had passed

away in 1993, the extended family remained unified under his memory and reinforced by

the presence of his wife Branca, who kept the children around her, ensuring the family's

cohesion. Branca, however, was too old and frail to carry on. In all three communities, it

was, precisely, at this moment when the communities found themselves without a

paternal leadership that they started the movement to reinstate an indigenous identity and

cultural traditions.[4]

Thus, it was in this *liminal* period that the indigenous movement emerged, which

acted as a significant mechanism to readjust and ensure community cohesion, which had

been threatened by the deaths of their leaders. As Turner (1974: 41) pointed out, in the

redressive phase… pragmatic techniques and symbolic action reached their fullest

expression. With no leadership to hold them together, these three communities found, in

the reenactment of old indigenous traditions, symbolic forces from the past that allowed

them to reproduce their social cohesion.

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[4] These characteristics found in the communities of Marai and Nazaré could be identified also in other communities, such as Piquiatuba and Tauri, located, respectively, in the northern and southern limits of the Marituba/Bragança community. The Piquiatuba community was comprised of two major and three minor family nuclei, which were divided between Catholic and *Igreja da Paz* followers. In Tauri, despite the long-term establishment of the community in the region, several family nuclei had sold rights to land, and newcomers had established in the community. Divided among dispersed family nuclei, and three religions, the community also had suffered from the absence of representative leadership. Like in Marai, some people in Tauri also expressed the desire to engage in the indigenous movement.

7.3.3   Ritual Ties and Affirmation of Ethnic Identity

One of the impressive aspects of the ethnic emergence movement among these three communities was the performance of rituals, some of which were done for large audiences. Soon after starting to recognize themselves as Mundurucu Indians, the Taquara community organized a great ritual called *puracê abá* (in Nhengatu, people's party), which took place on December 19-20, 1998. In this *puracê abá* ritual, two hundred and twenty people participated, including people from other communities, located on both bank of the Tapajós River, representatives of FUNAI, the Rural Workers' Union, CIMI (Missionary Indigenous Council), and the indigenous movement from Santarém, Manaus and Belém. On April 10-11, 1999, another celebration was organized, the *Primeira Missa Indígena* (First Indigenous Mass), with the same number of participants.

The Marituba and Bragança communities carried out similar indigenous rituals, when they began identifying themselves as Mundurucu Indians. Representatives of both communities had participated in the Taquara rituals, which had influenced them in their decision to recognize themselves as part of the Mundurucu ethnicity. On January 13-14, 2001, both communities organized a large celebration similar to the one that had occurred in the Taquara community. According to them, it was to inform others that, from then on, they were to be "recognized as Mundurucu Indians." It was through these particular celebrations, and others later on, that the indigenous cause started to spread among other communities in the region, and several communities started to claim that they belonged to an indigenous ethnicity.

Rapidly spreading, this process was marked by ritual celebrations that started to occur at the end of each year, which were called "Meetings for Indigenous Recognition"

(*Encontros de Reconhecimento Indígena*). On New Year's Day, in 2000, the celebration was held in the Jauarituba community, located on the left bank of the Tapajós River, in which the communities of Pinhel, Muratuba and Paraná-Pixuna also participated. In 2001, the celebration took place in São Francisco, and in the 2002 in the São Pedro community, both located in the region of the Arapiuns River. For all of these rituals, people dressed in indigenous costumes, and carried out activities such as ritual dances and other acts related to indigenous culture, as well as political discussions regarding indigenous issues.

In his analysis of ritual processes, Turner (1974) emphasized the transformative role that rituals play in societies, remarking on the several significances they express in the stages of transition in the life of human beings. Taking van Gennep's discussion of the correlation between status movement and change of spatial position in his analysis on rites of passage, Turner pointed to the diverse meanings and functions in ritual performances, emphasizing that, "basically the process and state of liminality represents at once a negation of many, though not all, of the features of preliminal social structure and an affirmation of another order of things and relations" (1974: 196). Such a perspective seems appropriate to explain the development of these inter-community ritual celebrations. Like baptism, which assimilates individuals into a moral community, these inter-community ritual celebrations emphasized a double negation of the previous categories attributed to them (*caboclo* and *traditional people*), and affirmed their self-defined new identity, that of indigenous people.

The spontaneous character of this affirmation of an indigenous identity, a new status position, needed to be marked ritualistically to recognize new symbols, and to

establish new alliances and reinforce new social bonds. Comprising a set of values, behaviors, and symbols, the rituals endorse social cohesion and feelings of loyalty for the common goal of creating a homogeneous social unity. Therefore, among the communities in Flona Tapajós one can now find two distinct social groups: those who identify themselves as *Mundurucu Indians* and those who see themselves as *Traditional People*.

7.3.4 In Search of *Encantados*

The rituals started to be performed not only for broader audiences, but also, within the communities themselves. They started to be carried out in conjunction with the reconstruction of other cultural practices. These included restructuring their political representation, renaming themselves and their institutions with indigenous names, preparing indigenous drinks and foods, and adopting the language. The language that was being reinstated is Nhengatu (*Língua Geral*), not the Mundurucu language. As seen in Chapter 3, *Língua Geral* was the language spoken by the Indians in the Lower Tapajós region, at least up to the beginning of the twentieth century. Through contacts with CIMI in Manaus, the three communities held two courses in Nhengatu, which were taught by a linguist who was an expert in the language. After that, the communities invited a Baniwa Indian, from the Upper Negro River, in the state of Amazonas, who was fluent in Nhengatu, one of his two native languages. He lived in the communities and implemented a program for teaching Nhengatu on a regular basis. This Baniwa Indian eventually settled in the Taquara community, after having become engaged to the Vice-*Cacique*'s daughter.

Discussing the process of ethnic affirmation in the Northeast, Oliveira (1999a) remarked on the particular ways each group rethinks and reconstructs their respective

historical process. The author asserted that in these situations, in which the "genealogic

chain was lost from memory, and there are no evident bonds with the old villages

(*aldeamentos*)" (Oliveira 1999a: 27), the Indians tend to appeal to "enchanted beings"

(*encantados*) as a way of establishing a relationship with their ancestors, and getting

away from the identity as people of "mixture" which was imposed on them and to which

they were submitted. For Oliveira, it is only through the elaboration of utopias

(religious/moral/political) that the Indians might "overcome the contradiction between

historical objectives and the feeling of loyalty to their origins, transforming ethnic

identity into an effective social practice, culminating in the process of territorialization"

(1999: 32).

Among the Taquara, Marituba, and Bragança communities, such an appeal to

encantados was expressed in several ways. In the Taquara community, for example, I

observed people referring to the *Igarapé Martanchim*, the small river on the northern

borders of the area, as a sacred place where *encantados* were purified, a process by which

they became prepared to be embodied in the shamans, as Irani explained:

Irani: This history comes from a long time ago. *Igarapé Martanchim* means
purification of the *encantados*. The *sacadas* [shamans] said that to be purified, the spirit
of the *encantados* takes a long time; it is like the canonization of a saint. Then, after
being purified, the spirits are prepared to be embodied in the sacaca; thus, he can heal the
people, and expulse the bad spirits through prayer. If the spirit is not purified, it remains
over there, and can be embodied in someone who then goes crazy… *Martanchin* is one
of these places where the spirit of the *encantados* is purified, but the modern people have
disrespected this river. My uncle Saulo always told us to respect this place because it has
an owner.

Although one notices that Irani's perception of this purification process was

influenced by Catholic references —"*it is like the canonization of a saint"*— for the

Taquara community, the symbolic significance of this river was directly associated with

the shamanistic practices performed by Saulo, and, later, by two of his sons. The reference to the place as "sacred," where the spirits of *encantados* were purified, brought together all the symbols and values that kept the community connected to an immediate ancestor (Saulo), and also indicated which cultural references to follow.

The appeal to *encantados* was also reproduced in the rituals to the "water's mother" (*mãe d' água*), or other mother-spirits (*espíritos-mães*) found in the nature. One ritual that was dedicated to the "water's mother," in which I took part in Taquara, was performed to ask for abundance in fishing activities. The Cacique explained that the ritual was being performed because "fish are becoming scarce, and we need to ask her to bring the fish back." The ritual's structure, which was reproduced across a diversity of rituals performed, consisted of dancing rhythmically in a large circle to folksongs that were sung in Portuguese as well as in Nhengatu, and followed by drums. The people were dressed in costumes made of palm fibers, and displayed body painting and other indigenous ornaments. The ceremony was conducted by both the Cacique and the Vice-Cacique, and by Irani, who was considered to be the religious leader for Catholic as well as "indigenous" celebrations. During the rituals, they —the political and religious leaders—blew smoke around the people, using tobacco that was made of several aromatic herbs and roots. Several times, they invoked the protection of the mother-spirits, as well as recalled their ancestors, especially Saulo.

As seen in Chapter 3, despite some variations, ceremonies for the mother-spirits are present in the literature on the Mundurucu Indians from the various regions. These rituals are performed to please the mother-spirits in order to have abundance, especially in hunting or fishing. Up until colonial contact, great ritual ceremonies, such as the war

to obtain the "head-trophy," or inter-village ceremonies at the beginning of the rainy season, were also carried out to please the mother-spirits. Describing these inter-village ceremonies, Horton (1948: 279) remarked that they took place in alternate years and noted that the shaman, "isolated in a special cabana, invoked the spirits of the animals and fish. A leader conducted the ceremony, who should be both a great warrior and a good singer." Murphy and Murphy (1954; 1958) and Murphy (1960), who studied the Mundurucu Indians in the 1950s, remarked that their religious system was based on shamanism and on the belief in the mother-spirits of certain species of animals, fish, and plants. As these authors emphasized, these great ceremonies, attributed to the "glorious times" of the Mundurucu cultural system, stopped existing once the process of colonial contact was initiated.

Although these references to the mother-spirits present similarities with the current rituals performed in the Taquara, Marituba and Bragança communities, one cannot make a direct connection between these communities and the Mundurucu cultural system from the past, or try to present historical evidences to support a supposed "authenticity" of these three communities as Mundurucu Indians. As Murphy and Murphy (1954: 7) pointed out, the shamanism and beliefs found among Mundurucu Indians in the 1950s "seemed common for Amazonia," indicating that they were not specific to the Mundurucu culture, but could have been part of a larger cultural system, that involved other regional social groups. Additionally, there is a large historical lacuna about the Munducuru expansion into the Lower Tapajós region, and the relationship established with other native social groups. Although the literature has emphasized the bellicose and

cultural dominion of Mundurucu in the Tapajós Valley throughout the nineteenth century (Ramos 2000), there is no study that elucidates how this power was exerted.

Although the current rituals to the "water-mother" performed by the three communities in Flona Tapajós paid tribute to the ancient times, they did not reproduce the same meanings as in the past, nor the same structure. In contrast to the performances described by the literature on Mundurucu Indians, the rituals in these three communities included several innovative elements, such as people smoking, the smelling-bath (*banho de cheiro*) made with aromatic herbs, *Língua Geral* folksongs, and Catholic prayers. The presence of these elements reflected the regional history of which the native social groups in the Lower Tapajós have been a part. Turner (1974: 55) remarked on the dynamic character of the development of ritual symbols, which were not understood as *timeless entities*, but as "originating in and sustaining processes involving temporal changes in social relations." Mentioning the emergence of new *existential communitas*, defined as "the direct, immediate, and total confrontation of human identities" (Turner 1974: 169), the author also asserted that "in this way, there is a cross-influence between new and traditional forms of communitas, leading in some cases to the recovery of traditional forms that have long been enfeebled or at a low pulse" (Turner 1974: 172).

Thus, instead of trying to corroborate a supposed "genuine" connection to the old Mundurucu cultural system, the rituals performed by the three communities suggest a continuing and dynamic process of cultural invention, whose meanings and performance have been changing throughout history. As Oliveira (1999b: 117) stated, "the symbolic manifestations of current Indians will be commonly marked by different cultural traditions… The incorporation of exogenous rituals, beliefs, and practices does not

necessarily mean that such a culture is no longer *authentically indigenous* or would belong to *acculturated Indians* (in the pejorative meaning of *ex-Indians* or *false Indians*)" (emphasis in the original).

7.3.6   Rearrangement of Political Representations

As was previously emphasized, for the Taquara community, shamanism constituted the foundation of their social-cultural and political organization, up until Saulo's death, their main leader. In this community, there was a strong relationship between religious and political spheres. While shamanism, in its own right, played a significant role in the community's belief system and political organization, Catholism also was important. Our Lady of Aparecida was the patron saint of the community, whose celebration occurred on the 12 of October, besides celebrations every Sunday that were coordinated by Irani, Saulo's brother-in-law. Based on these two belief systems, shaminism and Catholicism, the Taquara community established the basis of social and political organization.

These aspects of community social and political organizations were maintained after Saulo's death, although with significant alterations. Two of Saulo's sons became healers, and, in some ways, tried to reproduce their father's practices. Several people from other communities had sought them to treat their diseases. Although both had been initiated into shamanism by Saulo, they used to say that they had not inherited from the their father this capacity to heal. Although both were considered to be strong leaders in the community, they were not selected by the community to be their political representatives. This was different from the past, when Saulo represented both the political and religious components of the community.

After claiming Mundurucu origins, the community also changed their political organization, both internally as well as externally. Internally, they replaced the previously categories of "president" and "vice-president" of the community, with the *Cacique*, and the Vice-*Cacique*, who were advised by a group of counselors. While the Vice-*Cacique* was one of the Saulo's sons, the *Cacique* was married to Saulo's granddaughter. The *Cacique* was from Amorim, a community located on the left bank of the Tapajós River, and, although he recognized his origin as a Tupinamba Indian, he identified himself as a Mundurucu Indian, because, he said, "I have lived amongst them from the time I got married eighteen years ago." According to the community people, the cacique was chosen because he was a "warrior," a term he also used to identify himself.

The Marituba and Bragança communities had created similar political organizations, but with some specific particularities. In the Bragança community, which was constituted by only one extended family, the *Cacique* was the youngest son, who was actually Branca and Ronaldo 's nephew, but as they had raised him, he was considered a "son." The *Cacique* identified himself as a Sataré-Mawé Indian, because his mother belonged to this ethnicity. The *Cacique*'s brothers filled the positions of second *Cacique*, first and second *Tuxaua*, and Counselor. In this way, all of Ronaldo's and Branca's sons who lived in the community were involved directly in the process of decision-making. In Marituba, where the community social organization was based on two main extended families, the main political representative was the *Cacique*, and his vice was the *Tuxaua*, who was also his son. The Cacique was Noraldino's son, who, after the death of his father, replaced him, becoming the main community leader who encouraged the community to engage in the indigenous movement. In this community, similar to the

Taquara community, the two main representatives, the *Cacique* and *Tuxaua*, came from

the same extended family and this showed this family's power over the other extended

families.

Although the adoption of the new "indigenous" terminologies to designate their

political representatives was understood to be "properly indigenous," they did not

reproduce ancient genuine native categories. Instead, as has been very well-documented

by the anthropological literature on Amazonian Indians, the categories of *cacique* or

tuxaua were colonial constructions, which were imposed by the official state apparatus

designated to deal with Indians affairs at the time. Frequently, such political

representatives were chosen by state officials to serve not just as mediators between them

and the Indians, but also as translators (Oliveira 1988).

Despite this direct intervention in the political organization of the Indians, it did not

prevent cultural mechanisms from being set in motion, to legitimate the "chosen

cacique." As Oliveira (1999a) points out, the *process of "territorialization"* is not a one-

way route in which the Indians are passively involved; instead, Indians also appropriate

the categories that are imposed on them and use them according to their interests and

beliefs, legitimizing, in the process, their socio-political organizations. This can be seen

in the Taquara, Marituba and Bragança communities, which, despite adopting categories

defined externally –*caciques* and *tuxauas*– appropriated them and molded them according

to their own particular ways of conceiving power relations.

While internally these communities established their political representations based

on *cacique* and *tuxaua*, externally they also interacted with broader political

organizations. Regionally, the Indians created the *Conselho Indígena dos Rios Tapajós*

and Arapiuns (CITA - Indigenous Council of the Tapajós and Arapiuns Rivers) in May 2000, which by 2005 involved over thirty indigenous communities in the region. CITA was created after the Indians had participated in the *Marcha Indígena* (Indigenous March) to Porto Seguro, in the state of Bahia, in the April 2000 in reaction to the celebrations of Brazil's five-hundred year anniversary. In fact, the Indigenous March was organized to complain against the Indians' conditions after five hundred years of Brazil's existence. Eleven Indians from the Tapajós region participated in the Indigenous March, carrying sings that said: "reduced but never defeated." The participation in this march increased people's knowledge at the national level about the indigenous movement and their forms of political organization, and encouraged the creation of local forms of representation such as CITA. At the regional level, CITA articulated with the Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Amazonia Brasileira (COIAB- Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon).

At the local level, the main support basis for the indigenous movement had been provided by the *Grupo Consciência Indígena* (GCI- Indigenous Consciousness Group), created in 1997 by a team of students and professors, some of them from the Federal University of Pará (UFPA), working at the campus in Santarém. The people involved in CGI identified themselves as indigenous, and most of them were from communities located along the Tapajós and Arapiuns Rivers who had lived in Santarém for many years. Led by Florencio Vaz, a member of the religious order of Saint Francisco and a professor at UFPA, the group informally initiated a process of discussion with the objective of recovering the indigenous origins of each person. With the development of the ethnic emergence movement among the several communities in the region, CGI

decided to restructure itself to be able to provide more effective support for the

indigenous movement. In 2005, CGI formally became a non-governmental organization.

It was through these new forms of social organization and articulation with the

indigenous movement in broader spheres that the three communities of Taquara,

Marituba, and Bragança were able to embrace an innovative political strategy that

allowed them to distinguish and separate themselves from other communities in Flona

Tapajós, as well as other regional non-Indian groups. Adopting a political system based

on *cacique* or *tuxaua* representation, these three communities distinguished themselves

from others based on *president* and *vice-president*. At the same time, they stopped

participating in regional community associations, such as the ASPMIPRUT and AITA,

the two main organizations of the communities in Flona Tapajós, which had been created

in the early 1990s. Instead, regionally, the Indian communities became involved with

CITA, and other broader indigenous organizations, establishing a new political field

(Bourdieu 2003) through which they could mobilize to demand rights to their lands.

7.3.7   The Movement To Claim Land

The creation of their own proper political organizations and the reinstatement of

indigenous rituals and other cultural practices have distinguished the Indian communities

from other communities in Flona Tapajós. The distinction made between Indians and

non-Indians was also expressed in communities' claims to the territory they occupied and

in the strategies used to regain control over it. Among non-Indian communities there

were two predominant trends: one, to accept staying in Flona Tapajós area as "traditional

people," and the other, to have their lands placed outside the boundaries of the reserve.

The Indians, on the other hand, started to demand the recognition of their lands according

to legislation established in the Indian Statute, which guaranteed them the exclusive use

of their territory and resources. These three different positions in relation to land claims led to divisions among these communities, after over two decades of struggling together to avoid displacement and to guarantee land occupation. While politically united in the first struggle, they separated when the struggle was no longer about avoiding displacement but about exerting a means of control over their lands.

While the position of the non-Indian communities favored establishing some level of relationship with IBAMA, this was not the case for the Indian communities. As previously discussed, the Indians no longer agreed to take part in any discussion or work headed by IBAMA's representatives. They accepted my own research only after I proved that I did not have any working relationship with IBAMA. Expressing an absolute distrust for the government agency, they frequently emphasized that: "With IBAMA it does not work. It was years after years of meetings and discussion and we never got anywhere. With IBAMA we will never be the owners of our lands, of what is ours." Therefore, they refused IBAMA's attempt at resolving the communities' land tenure situation in Flona Tapajó by redefining them as *traditional people*. Instead, the Indians started to intensely mobilize to have their lands recognized under the Indian Statute.

The Taquara community was the first to initiate this process. In August 1998, two of Saulo's sons went to the city of Itaituba, in the Middle Tapajós River, to inform the FUNAI regional office of their existence as an "indigenous community." At the time, the regional FUNAI administrator was Walter Azevedo Tertulino. After visiting the community, he sent a document to FUNAI in Brasilia, reporting that "there were indications that the Taquara residents are Mundurucu Indians," and made a solicitation for official procedures to begin. He also sent a document to IBAMA, INCRA, and the

Public Ministry to inform them of the "indications of Mundurucu Indians" in the

Taquara community, and that FUNAI was getting involved. As the Indians of Taquara

explained, when they initially sought FUNAI, the community was not aware about the

existence of official Indian rights to territory. This was stated by the *tuxaua* from the

Marituba community, who said that, "when we decided to acknowledge that we were

Indians, I had no idea about the Indian Statute."

Tertulino was an important key figure in the legitimization of the Indian movement

in Flona Tapajós at this initial moment. He visited them frequently and spent several

days with the communities. He also provided the communities with important

information regarding Indians' rights, sent frequent reports to the FUNAI in Brasília, as

well as defended the Flona Tapajós' Indians' rights in his interactions with other

governmental agencies. The Indians used to talk about him with gratitude, frequently

saying that: "When Walter came here, he soon said that he had no doubt that we were

really Indians."

The first official procedure taken to recognize the Indian lands was the creation, in

2001, of a Working Group (WG) in the Department of Identification and (Preliminary)

Demarcation Studies (DEID) of Indian Lands,[5] under the Directory for Land Issues

(DAF). The objective of this WG was to carry out a preliminary survey among the

indigenous communities in the Lower Tapajós region to identify the Indians' demands.

The WG was comprised of anthropologists Rodrigo Pádua Rodrigues Chaves, the WG's

coordinator, and Rita Heloisa de Almeida, and by the FUNAI's regional officer, Walter

Azevedo Tertulino. They began their survey at the beginning of April 2001, visiting the

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[5] Currently, DEID was renamed as General Coordination for Identification and (Preliminary) Demarcation (CGID).

Mundurucu Indians in the Upper and Middle Tapajós River, and after that, visited the

Taquara, Marituba and Bragança communities, and nine communities on the left bank of

the Tapajós River, in the area of the Tapajós-Arapiuns RESEX[6] (Almeida 2001).

The WG final report recommended the creation of another WG to carry out studies

to identify and demarcation of the Indian Lands of the communities of Taquara,

Marituba, and Bragança in Flona Tapajós.[7] The Working Group to carry out these

studies was created on 13 of August 2003 (Port. N° 799/PRES/2003), and I was given the

responsibility to oversee the studies regarding the creation of two Indian Lands, one in

Taquara, and the other in Marituba and Bragança.

In 2005, the reports of the studies were still being assessed by FUNAI. In general,

these processes for the official recognition of Indian Lands tend to take years, and,

usually, endure very difficult disputes. Aside from having the report approved, the Indian

Land proposed needs to be published in the official journal (*Diário Oficial*), judicial

contestations opened, the lands' borders demarcated, and, finally, the decree first signed

by the Justice Minister and then by the President.

In relation to the two Indian Lands proposed in Flona Tapajós, the main party

challenging the proposal was IBAMA, since the recognition of these lands would signify

the loss of two important parts of the forest of Flona Tapajós. For some IBAMA

employees, the recognition of the Indian Lands would render the reserve unfeasible, as

expressed by Paulo Grieger, from the Forest Directory (DIFLONA), in an interview

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[6] The visits to the communities in the RESEX area were not totally achieved because the FUNAI-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Program, which provided the financial support for WG's coordinator, was temporally canceled, preventing the work conclusion.

[7] A year later, DEID included the lands of these three communities on the list of the Indians Lands to be identified in 2003 through the PPTAL (part of the Pilot Program-PPG-7, designating financial support for regulation of Indian Lands in Brazil).

carried out in Brasília: "The demarcation of these Indian Lands will finish Flona

Tapajós." In principle, the Indian Statute guarantees the Indian rights over the territory

"traditionally occupied," which means that Indians are given priority to the land, over any

private or public entitlement.

Worried about the potential size of the area of these Indian Lands, IBAMA made

some efforts to limit it. In the beginning of September 2002, while FUNAI was taking

steps to create the WG to carry out the identification and demarcation studies of the

Indian Lands, Flona Tapajós' director Angelo de Lima Francisco contacted the Public

Ministery in Santarém. Making references to previous accords with representatives of

the Public Ministry, and warning of potential conflicts with communities in the reserve,

Lima asked the Public Ministry to confine the Indian Lands to the areas that were

"currently occupied by the communities of Taquara, Marituba and Bragança, according

to the agreement established with all communities regarding 67,000 hectares of collective

use" (Of. N° 044/02, Protocol n°. 20002.000320). It was the first document from

IBAMA that expressed that there had been an "accord" with regard to the area of 67,000

hectares proposed in 1996.

Alongside IBAMA, some non-Indian families who lived on the lands claimed by

Indians also opposed the creation of the Indian Lands. The legislation regarding

indigenous territory did not allow any non-Indian residents in Indian Lands, which meant

that these families would be removed from the area. Such a potential threat, which for

the community people represented part of the drama they had just overcome, generated

conflicts between the Indian and non-Indian communities. The conflicts between

communities also revolved around communal forest resources, to which the non-Indians

communities feared they would lose access. In the Piquiatuba community, which is adjacent to Marituba Indian community, the people asserted that they were against the demarcation of the Indian Lands because they assumed that they would not be allowed to fish in the lake located in the Marituba area, which had been used by both communities.

FUNAI procedures to legalize the Indian Lands have intensified previous conflicts between Indian and non-Indians communities, as well as precipitated new ones. On the one side, the Indian communities, through their indigenous organizations, have demanded legal recognition of their lands. On the other side, the non-Indian communities have voiced their opposition to this through their community associations and the Rural Workers' Union, whose representatives had attended all the meetings held with the non-Indian communities during the WG's work to identify the Indian Lands. At a regional level, both groups of communities have also had support from some religious institutions. While the Indian communities have had support from some segments of the Catholic Church, especially from the monks of the Saint Francisco Order, the non-Indian communities have had support from other Catholic priests, and, especially, from Protestant sectors. As previously discussed, in most non-Indian communities at least one type of Protestant church, and the pastors tend also to be community leaders, at least in the eyes of their followers.

These different positions taken in relation to Indian Lands have accentuated the divergences between both groups of communities, distancing them socially and politically. This situation has also led to an unexpected approximation between the non-Indian communities and IBAMA, as both, for their own reasons, want to stop the creation of the Indian Lands.

The mobilization of non-Indian communities against the identification and demarcation of Indian Lands in Flona Tapajós has greatly increased the animosities between the two groups of communities, and accentuated the schisms between them. In 2005, the process of demarcating and legalizing the Indian Lands was still underway, but it is unpredictable because it will depend fundamentally on the Indians' capacity to continue to mobilize and apply pressure. The Indian Statute by itself does not automatically guarantee that the Indian Lands will be recognized. Moreover, the process is highly bureaucratic and tends to take years to advance. Finally, FUNAI, like IBAMA, is internally divided regarding the issue of Indian Lands, and frequent political changes within agency often alter the position and actions taken in relation to the processes for land recognition.

7.4 Losing the Sense of Shame of Being Indian

In this chapter, I sought to show the process of mobilization in the communities of Taquara, Marituba and Bragança to reinstate the Mundurucu indigenous identity, which allowed them to differentiate themselves from other communities in Flona Tapajós. I would like to conclude by briefly discussing the different perspectives of the Indian and non-Indian communities in Flona Tapajós with regards to *being Indian*. Emphasizing the dynamic character of inter-ethnic relations, Barth (1970) stressed the importance of identifying different values people attribute to certain categories that prevent the interaction between social groups. For the author, "the greater the differences between these value orientations are, the more constraints on inter-ethnic interaction they entail" (Barth 1970: 18). As could be observed in the Indian and non-Indian communities in Flona Tapajós, differences in values regarding the category *Indian* had significantly constrained their interaction.

Although the indigenous movement had started in 1998, I only took notice of it in 2000 when I returned to the field for a short-term survey for my doctoral research. After that, I heard and observed several controversial reactions to the indigenous movement among the community people as well as among representatives from grassroots organizations. For some representatives of the Rural Workers' Union and non-governmental organizations, the indigenous movement was seen as weakening the struggle for land. They frequently commented: "Taquara is exchanging government for government; it will get away from IBAMA's hands to fall into FUNAI's hands."

While among the Indian communities, for obvious reasons, there was a strong positive value attached to the category "Indian," among non-Indian communities people tended to see the recognition of indigenous identity as senseless, almost bizarre. Talking about the indigenous movement of Taquara, Nelson, from the Pedreira community, commented: "It is true that all of us are descendants of Indians, but this is a retrogression." Tadeu, from the Pini community asserted: "Descendants of Indians we are, but it no longer is in our blood." Rinaldo, more irritated, had doubts: "I want to see them prove genetically that they are Indians." Some people said that they were waiting for an anthropologist from FUNAI to take a blood test in order to know if they still had "Indian blood." When some of them asked me whether I would visit the "Indians," they soon added: "Then, you don't need to take clothes because there everybody goes naked, just with body paint." The sarcastic comments thrown at the Indians were frequent, reflecting the pejorative value that the category "Indian" had for these communities. For them, to be recognized as Indian meant a retrocession and, in some cases, a source of

shame, as Tulio, from the Prainha community, adjacent to the Taquara community, remarked during a meeting with the FUNAI WG: "I am Indian, but I am ashamed of it."

The Indians always revealed that they were aware of the hostilities toward them, saying that many times these hostilities were expressed directly to them, such as when they arrived in some places and the people started shouting: "there go the Indians." Yet, in general, the Indians commented that they did not get annoyed with these hostilities, explaining that it happed because "these, our relatives, are not conscious yet." They replied to the non-Indian critiques using similar arguments: "We are Indians because it is in our blood. If these people took a look at the mirror, they would know that they are Indians, as they always were." For them, the recognition of their status as Indian was a matter of raising a sense of consciousness about themselves, about their history, and to break down, as they frequently stressed, the *shame of being Indian*. Explaining the significance of a ritual performed in the Taquara community, Irani emphasized:

Irani: Ritual is a celebration. The smoke in the ritual meant that everything was made clear. We knew that we were Indians, that our ancestry was indigenous, and that my father, my mother, all of them belonged to the Mundurucu ethnicity. But, we were somewhat ashamed to say who we were. Then, that smoke had so much meaning, clarity, because we were ashamed to say that we were Indians… The meaning of that smoke was also about us, who were dispersed over there, our people lived dispersed, and, when that smoke rose, that made it all clear, it opened our minds and we became aware of who we really are.

These differences in perceptions about the category "Indian" among the communities in Flona Tapajós, which affected their forms of behaviors and associations, divided them into two separate social groups, and constrained their interaction. While "non-Indian" people looked to erase their indigenous past, the Indians looked to revive ancient traditions. Therefore, their opposing behaviors have led them to create different forms of political associations and struggles for land, which in turn, reproduce and

reinforce the differences between them. In other words, these divergent perceptions in relation to the category Indian reflect the *struggles over ethnic or regional identity* defined by Bourdieu (2003: 221) as "a particular case of the different struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to *make and unmake groups*" (emphasis in the original). The struggles over community social identity, which have been closely associated with the struggles over spaces and resources, that have taken place in Flona Tapajós during its thirty-years of existence reflect this dynamic of "mak(ing) and unmak(ing of) groups."

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Focusing on the creation and implementation of the Tapajós National Forest, this dissertation discussed the processes of social and spatial transformation precipitated by state policies that were implemented to exert control over resources and social organizations. Comprising one of the strategies of the geo-political project to expand the Amazon economic frontiers, the establishment of this forest reserve altered forest social spaces not only by imposing new forms of thinking about and accessing forest resources, but also by reshaping community social identity. As such, the creation and implementation of the Tapajós National Forest was revealed to be a dynamic process, in which one can distinguish three key moments of (re)construction of spaces and social organizations.

The first moment coincided with the initial implementation of the reserve, when government efforts focused on removing people in order to liberate the reserve's area for planned timber exploitation. Following the modern state rationale to homogenize spaces and social relations, the establishment of this forest reserve, and the subsequent attempts to displace people, reconfigured forest spaces. It did so by turning the reserve into an administrative unit, which ensured the federal government exclusive access to the resources, and by fragmenting the complex community social relations, replacing them by a wageworker system. The government's assessment of the communities as *caboclo*, *squatter*, or *occasional occupants* – essentially, people without an identity and right to land – justified the transformation of forest spaces into a reserve and the displacement of

its communities from the reserve. These governmental efforts to redesign forest spaces into a category of reserve without permanent residents were in line with the strategies of the *programmed network* (Becker 1992), in which territorial displacement and transformation of spaces comprised the goals of the geo-political project to modernize and accelerate in the Amazon the exploitation of natural resources, and the formation of a mobile labor force. It was in this way that the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós operated as an instrument to simultaneously exert social and territorial control.

The communities' resistance to this project forced the government, in the 1990s, to accept people's permanence in the reserve, which the government did by redefining local people as "traditional people." This represented the second moment of significant redefinition of spaces and social organizations in Flona Tapajós, which took place in the context of unprecedented worldwide attention on the preservation of the Amazon forest. The international environmental debate to save the Amazon forest from the advance of economic frontiers that had been set in motion in the early 1970s, resonated with local grassroots movements that were defending rural communities' rights to their lands, which were being appropriated by the government and given to large-scale economic enterprises. The defense of native territories and the integrity of Amazon forest provided a common ground for both social rights and environmental movements, and mobilized academic institutions, grassroots organizations, multilateral agencies and the press worldwide, to force the Brazilian government to take effective measures to stop the accelerating deforestation in the region, and to protect native territories.

The most notable outcome of the association between the social rights and environmental movements was the creation of Extractive Reserves, which influenced the

government's perspective regarding the permanence of local communities in the National Forests. The creation of environmental reserves, such as the Extractive Reserves, designated to promote conservation through customary uses of the resources, and the government's decision to also permit local communities to remain in other types of reserves, such as National Forests, introduced the category of "traditional people." The diverse social groups already living in the Amazon – lumped together by many, including the government, as *caboclo*, *squatter*, and *occasional occupants*, among other terms - had no legal recognition. Therefore, the new SNUC adopted the category of "traditional people," a terminology employed in the international debate about human presence in protected areas, and applied it to the set of reserves denominated of "sustainable uses." As remarked by Lima (2002: 40), "following an international terminology, it (the government) decided to invent a traditionality with an ecological identity in order to recognize a peasant population whose designation (was) hard to define."

Making a close association between "traditional people" and the natural environment, the new SNUC placed a condition on communities' permanence in the reserves. Communities were obligated to follow reserve management plans, establishing, as Barretto (2001b) pointed out, an instrumental relationship that tends to suppress people's autonomy by subjugating their forms of social organization and livelihood strategies to an exogenously-defined environmental policy rationale. This is especially relevant in relation to the category of National Forests, whose principle objective, as defined in their management plans, is intensive timber exploitation. Although the category of National Forest was based on the concept of "multiples uses," the emphasis, according to SNUC legislation, is on "the exploitation of native forests." Thus, the

permanence of people in National Forests was conditional on them adjusting their forms

of relating to forest resources to meet the criteria defined for the reserve to promote

commercial timber exploitation.

Community resistance to such forms of interferences that came with the category of

"traditional people," defined a third key moment in Flona Tapajós' history of redefining

spaces and social identity. This was the emergence of an indigenous movement to

reinstate the Mundurucu ethnic identity among three communities in the reserve -

Taquara, Marituba and Bragança. The indigenous movement of these communities was

the immediate reaction against the government's imposition of the generic identity of

"traditional people," whose definition was based fundamentally on ecological and not

socio-cultural criteria, and its correlate effects. It was not only to remain on their lands

that these indigenous communities engaged in this struggle, but also to exercise a

particular way of life that the category of "traditional people" denied. By reclaiming

ancient cultural references as a way to distance themselves from this generic and

externally-imposed identity, the Mundurucu Indians from Taquara, Marituba and

Bragança redirected their previous forms of struggle for land, turning to FUNAI for

assistance in having their territories officially recognized as Indian Lands. Therefore, by

identifying themselves as Mundurucu Indians, they precipitated another redefinition of

forest spaces in Flona Tapajós.

Throughout these three moments of (re)construction of social identities and spaces

in Flona Tapajós in its three decades of existence, one can perceive a variety of interests,

practices, discourses, power mechanisms and forms of mobilization. One can also see

that, even in the attempts to displace people, the community people were not neglected,

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or not noticed, by the government agencies but, rather, were the object of significant attention. However, this was not as direct beneficiaries of the reserve project but as objects of intense government manipulation of existing social and territorial organizations to serve the interests of the new forest economy. From a historical point of view, this did not represent a new stand, but can be traced back to the colonial times and the treatment of regional native social groups ever since.

As seen in Chapter 3, historically, Amazonian native social groups were the target of official programs that focused on eradicating their social identities and confiscating their territories in order to take advantage of them as a source of labor power. The creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós did not divert from this endeavor. Rather, it represented, possibly, the most drastic attempt undertaken by the government in the last century to reduce native social groups workers integrated in the national political economy. The fundamental difference in this forest reserve project was that it rested on the enclosure of forest spaces and attempts to displace people from those areas. These would have functioned to break people's historical ties to their land, transform them into wageworkers, and liberate the forest for timber exploitation.

Under the control of technical and scientific sectors focused on accelerating the economic growth of the wood industry, the establishment of Flona Tapajós also entailed the imposition of scientific and bureaucratic understandings of forest resource management that counteracted customary uses coming from long histories of occupation. The resistance movements of the communities in the reserve, changes in the political national and international scenario, and the articulation of the social rights and environmental movements converged to transform this reserve project into a remarkable

field of disputes. In this process, spaces and social identities became critical to the government, which worked intensely to ensure control over resources and social organizations.

In relation to the social groups that live in Flona Tapajós, although the initial proposal to remove the people from the reserve was replaced by a conditional agreement to allow existing communities to remain, it was done by reshaping local people into "traditional people." Thus, the only populations permitted to remain in the reserve were those recognized by governmental agencies as being "traditional people." While most of the community people in Flona Tapajós accepted this new identity, some did not, such as the communities of Taquara, Marituba and Bragança, which mounted a strong resistance. However, the indigenous movement that emerged from these three communities cannot be understood as simply a response to state control to regulate spaces and social relations. It was also an internal response to the imminent crisis caused by the death of their main leaders, in order to maintain community social cohesion.

Despite the intensity of the disputes regarding Flona Tapajós, the repeated government efforts to regulate forest social spaces and resource exploitation had some level of success. The reserve was created, representing one the most important forest reserves in the Amazon region and for the implementation of government programs. Flona Tapajós has also become a site for scientific research, acclaimed as the most studied forest reserve, with over three hundred publications. Besides other research projects underway, Flona Tapajós was also the site for international research initiatives, such as the Large Scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia (LBA Project), designated to understand the climatological, ecological, biogeochemical, and

hydrological functioning of Amazonia and impacts caused by land use change and the influences on the Earth system.

While the government had some success, through the creation and implementation of Flona Tapajós, in disciplining spaces and social relations, it was not as successful in relation to the reserve's primary objective, which was planned timber exploitation. Thirty-years after the reserve was created, the ITTO Project was the only project implemented to exploit timber, in an area of only 3,6000 hectares. The reasons for this poor performance were attributed to administrative inadequacies, primarily insufficient financial and human resources to manage the reserve, and inadequate legislation allowing timber exploitation in reserves by private enterprises. Additionally, the reserve's area where most of the commercially valuable wood species were found was under dispute with the community people, whose mobilization prevented the development of any timber exploitation project until rights to their lands had been guaranteed.

The difficulties the Flona Tapajós administration faced in implementing timber exploitation, certainly were, in part, the result of these multi-faceted challenges. However, as this dissertation on Flona Tapajós reveals, at the heart of the issue is the fact that the reserve was created not so much to promote controlled timber production, but to function as instrument for the government to exert social and territorial control. I suggest that such an understanding of the history of Flona Tapajós, in particular the conflicts between the local community people and government agencies, might help to better comprehend the "poor performance" of other National Forests in the Amazon region.

APPENDIX
PICTURES

Figure A-1 The meeting of the Tapajós River with the Amazon River.

Figure A-2 Port in the Santarém city.

Figure A-3. Fordlândia.

Figure A-4 Rubber plantation in Belterra.

Figure A-5. IBAMA office in Tapajós National Forest.

Figure A-6 Ritual to mother-earth in Bragança community.

Figure A-7 Ritual to mother-water in Taquara community.

Figure A-8 Children playing theater in Piquiatuba community.

Figure A-9 Andiroba oil production

Figure A-10 People going to clean the line demarcation (*Pico das Communidades*/Community Line)

Figure A-11 Cattle-ranch in Tapajós National Forest.

Figure A-12 ITTO Project in the Tapajós National Forest..

Figure A-13 Community signal against ITTO Project.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Edviges Marta Ioris was born in Rio Grande do Sul, South of Brazil. Her undergraduate studies were carried out at the University of the Sinos River Valley (UNISINOS), São Leopoldo-RS, with a major in social sciences and minor in history. Soon after concluding the undergraduate studies in 1985, she started to work with native peoples in the Amazon region, where she has been carrying out most of her research. Initially, she worked with indigenous groups in the states of Rondônia and Acre, as a volunteer for a non-governmental organization. In 1988, she was engaged in the research project called "Traditional Land Use in the Amazon Estuary," at the Emílio Goeldi Museum, in Belém, state of Pará, to carry out a study on social organization and resource management among a riverine community in the Amazon Estuary. In 1992, she started her master's degree in social anthropology at the National Museum of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, in Rio de Janeiro, and her thesis was on the Ashaninca Indians living in the state of Acre. Upon the completion of her master's degree, Edviges Ioris was employed as a Professor of Sociology at the *Fundação Integrada Municipal de Ensino Superior* (FIMES), in state of Goiás, and also worked as Coordinator of a Medicinal Plants Project for the Afro-Brazilian community of Cedro. She stopped both jobs to start the Ph.D. program in cultural anthropology at the University of Florida in 1999, when she retook the research in the Amazon region, carrying out a study on social conflicts in protected areas.