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ABSTRACT

This guide identifies the key steps that any work/education partnership program should take to achieve success and patterns of critical issues that such collaborations must address if they are to survive. It is rooted in the experiences of "The Partnership Projects," a network of 21 work/education partnership programs in cities around the country. The guide investigates the effects of local politics and organizational turf on a partnership, communication between individuals from different professional worlds, and how turnover of staff can affect a partnership. An indepth look is taken at the realities of mobilizing community leaders and of sustaining those leaders' active involvement over time. The following key issues in nurturing a partnership project are explored: brokering, forming two groups of the right players, building commitment through ownership, planning a partnership, and preserving the partnership. A summary discusses sever lessons learned from the projects. A bibliography of 55 items concludes the document. (YLB)

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
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A GUIDE TO WORKING PARTNERSHIPS



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I. INTRODUCTION



In 1987, four New York City banks sponsored a partnership program with the city's public school system. The program offered training in banking skills followed by jobs in the city's banking community as bank tellers, word processors, and file clerks. It was designed "to keep students in school and to encourage the schools to be more responsive to preparing students for the job market."

Three hundred young people applied for the program. They were conscientious, well-behaved high school graduates whose interviewing performance, dress, and attitude were superior to those of most applicants. Yet only one third could pass the eighth-grade arithmetic test required to enter "teller school." The banks could fill only 40 percent of the jobs and many angry, frustrated people blamed school leaders for the failure. The controversy sparked by the failure of the program contributed to the resignation of the Chancellor of the New York Public Schools.

A few months later, a nationally prominent corporate leader announced an ambitious new project to put employment offices in New York high schools, staffed by business people. With expectations of first-year financing of \$1 million in state funds and \$5 million from corporations, and with a

promise of an additional \$20-\$50 million annually from the mayor, the project explicitly intended to pressure schools to improve the quality of their graduates and provide businesses with competent workers. The corporate leader spearheading the effort was frank: "I am trying to use this to force the system to make changes."

While reflecting the business community's continued commitment to the schools, these untested, business-operated employment offices will be expensive; it is also unclear whether they will bring school improvement.

New York's story dramatizes the problems that well-intentioned school-business partnerships encounter in efforts to shepherd disadvantaged youth from school to quality entry-level jobs. At one level, the story highlights the critical educational deficiencies suffered by disadvantaged high school graduates. As one state banking association official put it, "The cold reality reared itself."

At another level, these efforts in New York illustrate the need to go beyond simple mandates or incentives in encouraging institutional change. These projects assumed that the incentive of jobs for graduates would automatically motivate the schools to improve. Yet, although all five high schools in the

bank-skills program had been encouraged to provide extra mathematics classes to the students interested in the banks' program, only one of the schools did so.

In the end, the irony of the New York banking-skills program is that, had business and educational leaders investigated parallel efforts nearby, they would have discovered *already in the school system* at Westinghouse High, an award-winning work-education partnership project, launched with Edna McConnell Clark Foundation funding, that had been operating successfully for more than six years. Similar projects have been operating in New York's Gompers and Prospect Heights High Schools, one of which is even designed around banking careers.

During the past decade, thousands of local partnerships and "adopt-a-school" programs have sprung up across the country. What is new is the focus of school-business partnerships on educational reform and on strengthening the links between education and the work-place for economically disadvantaged students. Designed to meet several aims—to expand political support for public schools, to attract resources to education, to prevent dropouts, and to develop entry level jobs for high school graduates, among other purposes—partnerships have begun to involve business people, from CEC's to employee volunteers, in the activities and concerns of public education.

As business leaders have moved from "adopting" individual schools to adopting fresh attitudes toward public education, interest in more ambitious partnerships aimed at bringing about substantive change—"moving the system"—has grown.



Work/Education Partnerships

A relatively new form of collaboration, known as "work/education partnerships," is designed to bring an array of public and private resources to bear on the issues of basic skills and the transition from school to work for disadvantaged youth. Although much has been written about planning and developing traditional school-business partnerships such as Adopt-A-School programs, few publications address the issues raised by the more complex work/education collaborations. Practical information is needed about how to form and sustain alliances among *groups* of employers rather than individual firms, *school systems* rather than single schools, and *combinations* of governmental and private funding rather than a single source.

This Guidebook is Designed to Fill Those Gaps

The *Guide to Working Partnerships* focuses heavily on implementation issues and is rooted in the experiences of "The Partnership Projects," a network of 21 work/education partnership programs fostered by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation in cities around the country. It takes a pragmatic look at how the projects were initiated, operated, and institutionalized, and from their experiences, gleans recommendations for developing such partnerships. The Guide highlights the essential steps that must be taken to be successful and the issues that partnerships must address if their impact is to grow over time.

The 21 Partnership Projects

Conceived as complex, community-wide efforts involving local employers, educational institutions, and government agencies, the 21 Partnership Projects focused on improving the employment prospects of disadvantaged, marginally-achieving high school students—"low income kids in the middle." They addressed such pressing issues as poor basic skills, rising dropout rates, and high rates of unemployment. They sought changes in relationships between the educational system and the business community, and in the quality of public education.

The projects' model was derived from an innovative partnership in Oakland, California, known as Success on the Move. What distinguished Oakland's project was that its partner organizations shared equally in the responsibility of developing a high school curriculum that related basic skills to the work-place. Participating students coupled their studies with summer and after-school jobs provided by local businesses—the real-life "laboratory" students needed to discover how their academic subjects related to the world of work.

With financial backing from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, two organizations (Youthwork, Inc. and Martin & Rosi, Inc.) were designated intermediaries to promote the development of additional work/education partnerships that would:

- involve employers, school systems, and government agencies;
- seek long-range changes in relationships between the education and business communities, even if at first the project was small and experimental;
- increase primary labor market employment opportunities, enhance self-esteem, and improve school attendance among disadvantaged, marginally-achieving high school students;
- improve public secondary school education by relating instruction in basic academic skills to requirements of entry-level work;
- broaden teachers' understanding of the labor market through first-hand exposure to work-places.

While fulfilling local needs, the projects were to incorporate a number of common features:

- Their financial support would stem primarily from local government employment-and-training agencies affiliated with the U.S. Department of Labor—using monies from Title VII (the Private Sector Initiative Program) of the Comprehensive Employment & Training Act (CETA) or its successor the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA).
- A local business entity (Private Industry Council, Alliance of Business, Chamber of Commerce) would develop and administer the partnership in collaboration with schools, enlist other private sector employers, and pay administrative costs;
- Private businesses would hire the students, pay their wages, and provide input to new curricula.

Over seven years, work/education partnerships were fostered in 21 cities:

Richmond, VA;	Miami, FL;	New York, NY;
Birmingham, AL;	San Antonio, TX.	Houston, TX;
Blanding, UT;	Greensboro, NC;	Greenville, SC;
Kansas City, KS;	Providence, RI;	Louisville, KY;
Kansas City, MO;	Richmond, CA;	St. Louis, MO;
Charleston, SC;	Benton Harbor, MI;	Buffalo, NY,
Pittsburgh, PA;	Portland, OR;	Dayton, OH.

Of the almost 5,000 youths the projects have served, nearly 1,500 have obtained good jobs upon graduation, and another 2,500 have entered postsecondary education, vocational training, or the armed forces. The projects have attracted nearly \$10 million in direct funding, plus innumerable in-kind contributions. The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation invested over \$1 million, and other private foundations about \$300,000 more. Approximately \$2.4 million has been provided by CETA or JTPA. Private sector wages to youth has totaled \$3.2 million, and public schools have contributed at least \$520,000.

A few projects have successfully operated for eight years; some have spawned replications; several have won national acclaim. The partnerships in Buffalo (NY) and Portland (OR) are being replicated in cities throughout their own states. White House awards were made to three of the projects: The Partners for Advancement in Electronics (PAE) program in Brooklyn, New York; The Youth Employment Partnership in Buffalo, New York; and Teen Opportunities to Promote Success (TOPS) in Birmingham, Alabama. In 1986/87, the National Alliance of Business named the Richmond, Virginia project the best youth program in the country. On the other hand, most have shown mixed results, and a few failed at the outset. Several never overcame persistent obstacles to create a fully-functioning partnership; and a handful are attempting a comeback.

Success and Failure— The Lessons Endure

The lessons from The Partnership Projects speak directly to the growing interest in public-private collaboration. Lessons span every stage of project development and reinforce the view that partnerships are complex, often fragile initiatives. As this Guide makes clear, vision, careful planning, and commitment are needed for success. The process of nurturing a partnership project involves several key issues, which are explored in this guide: brokering, feasibility, identifying the right players, promoting ownership, meticulous planning, and maintaining the partnership.

In cities around the country, work/education partnerships have demonstrated their capacity to bring new players, ideas, and resources to education, and to focus a community's energies on the problems faced by economically disadvantaged youth.



II. BROKERING—THE FIRST STEP

broker ('bro-kər) one who brings parties together and assists in negotiating contracts between them [Old French *brochier* to broach, tap a wine cask]

Effective links between classrooms and work-places require the active, enthusiastic participation of the public, private, and non-profit/independent sectors. Work/education partnerships bring together public high schools, businesses, government employment and training agencies, local foundations, and civic organizations. With so many institutions, tension is inevitable.

Why a Broker Is Needed

Since cross-sector collaboration is unfamiliar to most participants, the specialized institutions involved must learn to adjust to ways of working that may be generally foreign to their own organizational cultures and structures. They must accommodate each other's ways of operating, learn how each other communicates, and together grope toward the definition of objectives that all partners can accept.

School administrators, teachers, business executives, line supervisors, and agency workers tend to start in very different places. First, assumptions underlying the language each speaks will need clarification and brokering. Schools tend to talk process; business tends to talk product; agencies tend to talk regulations. Then, because of differing institutional priorities, objectives, and habits, partners may arrive at decisions in different ways. And even seemingly trivial matters, such as the clothes people wear or how they spend their lunch hours, may loom large in a collaborative effort.

As expected, the Partnership Projects learned the difficulty of convening leaders whose institutions had not previously worked together. *Every successful partnership was launched, spurred or negotiated by a "broker."* Someone had to act as an intermediary or "broker" until a permanent governance or management structure was in place. Usually this intermediary was a person or small group of people whose vision, influence, and tenacity made something happen.

The best brokers were "bilingual"; that is, they could move comfortably in several contexts, acting as trusted translators and diplomats. They would forego personal credit in favor of instilling a sense of ownership of the project among potential partnership leaders. In the early stages, such brokers used their official status or personal influence to reach leaders in the community. Armed with a vision of what

was possible and working usually behind the scenes, brokers proceeded to build a group of key resources.

Brokering strategies varied among the Partnership Projects, but the most successful involved early development of two planning groups: high-level leaders with resources and the power to commit them to set policy, and staff-level workers to implement those policies. The amount and type of work each group had to do depended upon the size of the project. Both groups were always needed.

Joint Brokers

Sometimes an initial brokering group of business leaders (rather than a single individual) took responsibility for the whole business community. Such groups conveyed the strong message that collaboration was not the unique idea of a lone visionary leader, and they provided a pool of leaders for continuity.

In Oregon, for instance, a small group of trusted, high-level and staff-level people, organized to participate in a national effort called the Urban Network Project. Working together as the "broker" for Portland, they enlisted the support of their bosses—the Mayor, the Superintendent, and key business leaders and community people—to tie together schools, businesses, and training. They were able to point to the partnership effort as an example of what could be done by sectors working together in one school.

In Birmingham's TOPS (Teen Opportunities Promote Success) program, a team of three corporate leaders, working as if they were a single project director, began and sustained a small, but effective, project by continually applying their significant personal energies to the collaborative effort. As elsewhere, a larger group of participants and advisors from all sectors provided oversight, resources, and partial output. Here, the individuals who began in the brokering role continued to do so. This "troika" brokering system also prevented undue strain on a single business leader.

Over time, the brokering role usually shifted from the original individual to one of the two groups—either the leaders' group or the staff group. This shift was possible, however, only after the original broker assisted in defining group membership within the constraints set by the political situation, answering questions such as:

- Whose help will be needed?
- How will the project interest and benefit them?
- Who would feel threatened by the project? How can their fear be transformed into support?

- Which employers have a history of community involvement?
- Which employers would hire young workers?
- Which schools would benefit from a partnership?
- Which government agencies will play a role in regulating or funding this partnership?
- What roles (policy makers, implementors, catalysts) should individual top-level leaders assume in the partnership?

In cases where a strong business leader spontaneously started the initiative in educational reform, having a broker translate that leader's vision into strong relationships among prospective partners was still essential.




Requirements of Brokers

The Partnerships' experience demonstrates that brokers must be local. A dynamic outside organization may be the stimulus to partnership (providing money, inspiration, or ideas), but it cannot be the sustaining broker because of its limited ongoing availability. Someone has to be available all the time to cajole, convince, and spur on the partnership by drawing in powerful people and getting them to work together to create the organization that will make the partnership succeed.

Partnerships also demonstrated enormous variability among the quality and qualifications of brokers. Their strengths and weaknesses were clearest where local circumstances called for extraordinary demands for performance under pressure. Considering the brokering duties, the projects' experience shows that a broker should possess as many of following strengths as possible:

- commitment to the partnership concept;
- a vision of how the systems could improve;
- credibility among potential partners in business, education, and government, with ability to move in all three sectors and fluency in the different "languages";
- contacts throughout the community, including local political actors, civic organizations, and neighborhood groups;
- experience with related efforts, or solid knowledge of how they work;
- management and organizational skills;
- stamina to maintain effort over time as referee, cheerleader, and coach;
- understanding of the JTPA system, school system, and governmental operations.

Whether the broker is an individual or a group depends upon local circumstances, but the most effective pattern appears to be something like this:



Feasibility Assessment First

A broker's crucial first step is to check out whether conditions exist for potential success.

Partnership participants sometimes compared the partnership process to marriage. It included the stages of courtship (initiated and fostered by the marriage broker), temporary tensions and squabbles, making up, increased loyalty and commitment, and involvement of friends and extended family members. No one should get married and raise a family based merely on societal expectation, sense of obligation, mutual first attraction, a feeling that it seems like a good idea at the moment, or everyone else is doing it.

As in a marriage, the consequences and responsibilities of work/education partnerships should be considered seriously before the knot is tied because so many personal commitments and expectations, including those of disadvantaged students and their families, are at stake. The cost of failing, as well as the benefits of success, for youth, schools,

and employers must all be considered before beginning a partnership program.

Some Partnership Projects suffered costs of failed expectations that could have been avoided. Their decisions to create the projects were premature. The power of the idea led their leaders to assume erroneously that a work/education partnership would succeed, even though a careful look at their local labor market or political situation would have indicated otherwise. Overly-optimistic leaders were reassured by what seemed to be trouble-free examples in Oakland's "Success on the Move" and Richmond, Virginia's "New Horizons." Some were inspired by the enthusiasm, vision, commitment and know-how of Youthwork and of Martin & Rosi, the talented intermediary organizations that the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation charged with replicating partnerships nationwide. Bright signs of a growing national, school-business partnership movement beckoned to some leaders, who responded too eagerly to news that Foundation support might be available.





A Way that Worked

In Oregon, three individuals at high levels in their respective organizations worked together to bring other key individuals into Portland's partnership group. They worked in tandem with the city's Regional Youth Employment Council (now called the Business-Youth Exchange), an arm of the city's Chamber of Commerce that coordinates private sector activities around youth employment. With the Council's strong backing, these three individuals brokered a partnership among four worlds: business people, students, school teachers and administrators, and government officials.

The Grant High School project was developed slowly and cautiously. Great care was taken at every stage, especially in developing a work-related curriculum to replace, rather than supplement, regular English and math classes, while meeting state and local education requirements.

The project was well organized and coordinated by a director who worked at the school in the morning and at the Business-Youth Exchange in the afternoons, maintaining a strong flow of communication between educators and business people. Outstanding job placements for students are reinforced by training that integrates remediation in basic skills with motivational and pre-employment activities. Executives at two major banks and an insurance company have high praise for the project. The vice principal at Grant High School successfully promoted the program among faculty.


In the 1986-87 school year, the project expanded to a second high school. The final evaluation report to the Clark Foundation states: "Such deliberate care in introducing and expanding every aspect of the program has been typical of the Business Youth Exchange's work in Portland. To the outsider, the caution might seem excessive, but fine acceptance of the project in the schools and elsewhere in the community is largely attributable to the fact that the Exchange sees to it that everything conceivable about Portland's Partnership Project is buttoned down in advance."

A Way that Didn't

When Richmond, California's partnership project was being designed, the city's PIC had little experience with business or educational leaders, and therefore little credibility among them. Program planning lagged as the PIC staff learned how to work with the other groups. No one individual was willing to do the hard work of initiating, and the group chosen as broker could not find a primary lead business on which to build a partnership base. It took several years to build the base of support needed in Richmond to mount a successful work/education partnership.

A difficult and important responsibility of the broker, then, is to ascertain whether several conditions are present; and if not, have the courage to defer or even to scrap the project. Prior to seeking funding, a broker needs to answer the following feasibility questions:

- What unmet needs could the proposed partnership address?
- Is there a dedicated lead company or obvious business leader with proven capability to initiate successful social action projects?
- Is private seed money available to offset constraints dictated by JTPA and other public funders?
- Does a sufficiently healthy local labor market exist to generate jobs for students?
- Are cordial relations among school, business, and/or government agency partners possible? Is there a foundation for good (or at least neutral) relationships?
- Will school leaders acknowledge that business may be able to assist them in improving their preparation of disadvantaged students for the work world?
- Are PIC/JTPA Service Delivery Area staff willing to allow the partnership to do some things differently from typical, adult-oriented employment/training or "manpower" programs?



IDENTIFY LOCAL NEEDS

Where brokers identified local needs before assembling potential partners, planning could proceed rapidly because the group understood what needs its partnership activities could address successfully. Conditions in several Partnership Projects that failed indicated that they should never have been attempted. Their prospective "partners" were not ready or not in a position to collaborate.

Three that Suffered

In Kansas City, Missouri, the needs of unemployed adults in a depressed local economy made trying to provide jobs to students politically unacceptable because of fears of displacing adult workers. Despite this clear impediment, planning proceeded, yielding a Partnership Project that failed to generate jobs for its students.

Pittsburgh school officials strongly and repeatedly denied any need for a work/educational partnership that would create or modify their existing academic curriculum. A true partnership was stymied.

Meanwhile in Dayton, project start-up was delayed because the director of vocational education thought that there was no need for it. His covert and overt fight to kill the program was what succeeded under those conditions.

DEFINE BUSINESS LEADERSHIP

In many Partnership Projects that failed early, business leadership was not clearly defined. Sometimes potential leaders had never proven themselves capable of initiating and overseeing a social action project, much less one requiring collaboration with a variety of public sector people. In all of the successful projects, however, business leadership was distinctly evident.

In the *beginning* stages of projects, leadership depended largely upon *individuals* committed to public-private collaboration. Over the long term, however, stability required shifting that enthusiastic support from individuals to their institutions. Private Industry Councils, which, by statute, are composed mainly of business representatives, sometimes led the Partnerships. In other cases, the Chamber of Commerce or a local Alliance of Business played that role. When involved early, these organizations often provided needed stability as individual business leaders changed.

LOCATE PRIVATE "POCKET MONEY"

A small cache of private funds offered Partnership Projects flexibility that smoothed the way for efficient programs and effective communication among partners. Private funds filled budgetary holes, leveraged other dollars, and permitted project leaders to do things that government funding would not cover.

Three that Benefited

Buffalo's program leaders found that private funds "made all the difference," especially in the beginning stages of the joint effort. Private dollars supported luncheons "as business does," plaques, awards, public relations, and other activities which cemented many relationships but were not permitted under JTPA guidelines.

In Richmond, Virginia, Clark Foundation funds supported a catered breakfast and awards ceremony to "thank the bosses" for their help in making the summer program a success.

Louisville's partnership program could not quite fit the salary for its project coordinator into the right budget slots under JTPA. Private funding filled the gap.

Who's on Speaking Terms?

In Missouri, a three-year battle between the Kansas City government and business leaders for control of the PIC and of JTPA funds meant that key leaders were on speaking terms. Ralph Leach of Martin and Rossi wrote: "The warning about the debilitating effects of political instability is certainly best illustrated in Kansas City." There, while suffering from local and national criticism and top-level turmoil (five superintendents in fewer than five years), school officials decided to establish a "partnership" that excluded many important groups. Meanwhile, business people, who were not involved in the planning, remained cool toward the project. Companies refused to provide jobs for the students who completed the schools' excellent pre-employment curriculum.

In Texas, Houston's fledgling partnership was caught between two warring Private Industry Councils during the transition from CETA to JTPA. The mayor appointed a new PIC to administer JTPA—a Council with a new agenda. When the original (CETA) PIC would not compromise, the potential partnership died.

CHECK THE LABOR MARKET'S HEALTH

The local labor market must be healthy enough to enable employers to hire disadvantaged young workers in part-time, after-school jobs and in full-time, post-graduation and summer positions. How healthy is enough? One guidepost is what firms say. If, after some convincing, they say they can provide jobs, they usually can. As important, is assessing the relative health of different sectors of the the labor market as at least one project demonstrated.

Look Again

Buffalo's project responded creatively to its labor market analysis. At first glance, the city's labor scene looked gloomy as large businesses were laying off workers and would not be able to hire students. A deeper look, however, revealed that among small businesses, the labor market was reasonably healthy. By focussing on such businesses, the partnership was able to generate a lot of good jobs for youth.

Where superintendents, principals, and teachers were unwilling to collaborate, work/education partnerships initiated by business leaders hadn't a chance. If, however, the community atmosphere is judged reasonable or better, the broker still needs to assess whether potential partners will be capable of reaching compromise.

For schools, agreement around the good intentions of a partnership required that school people recognize a need for outside help in preparing youth for the work-force. In the third sector of partnerships (government employment and training agencies), compromise often proved hardest to reach. Here in the PIC and the JTPA Service Delivery Area offices that administer JTPA special regulations, standard procedures and expectations were usually oriented to traditional "manpower" programs. Trying to match the requirements of these training agencies (covering funding, certification of eligibility, placement, and program monitoring) with the design of a partnership that operated principally between schools and businesses was a major ongoing task.

FIND POTENTIAL FOR CORDIALITY AND COMPROMISE

Can enemies be partners? The Projects learned that it is folly to attempt a partnership project in the midst of an ongoing MAJOR political battle between schools and business and/or government leaders, staffs, or agencies. Political instability and significant, active conflict between potential partners proved practically impossible to overcome.



III. FORMING TWO GROUPS OF THE RIGHT PLAYERS

A partnership needs a core group of high-level leaders from all sectors who strongly endorse the mission of the joint venture and agree to share risks and benefits equally. These individuals must be willing to commit jobs, people with creative ideas, training, political influence, and ample funds to accomplish the partnership's mission. In practice, negotiating agreement to work on an equal basis can be very difficult.



Leadership And Risk-Taking Are Required

In St. Louis, the business community was willing to assume risks. The school people, eager to reap the benefits of the project, were not willing to share the burden of risks equally. They agreed to participate only on the condition that Civic Progress, the business group, first "prove itself." Without enthusiastic school support from the start, the project never gelled into a strong partnership.

In Virginia, in contrast, Richmond's superintendent of schools immediately matched the commitment of business resources by appointing several full-time staff (including an assistant superintendent) to devote their efforts entirely to the partnership. He sold the concept throughout the school system, involving personnel at all levels in the program planning and development. The structure for lasting institutional change was established.

Mapping Out Self-Interest

The core leaders are responsible for determining from which organizations, and from which people within those organizations, the partnership should draw the resources it needs. They must then determine what aspects of the project will interest the people and organizations they have recruited. Equally important, the leaders must identify who is likely to feel threatened by the project, and must deduce how that fear can be overcome.

Securing and Sustaining Commitment

The Projects which experienced the greatest problems failed to secure strong support from all key players during their earliest days. Conversely, partnerships that have enjoyed consistent success strove to garner and sustain commitment from the outset of planning.

Then even successful projects found it necessary to continue selling the partnership concept in order to hold the interest and maintain the active involvement of their influential leaders. These were busy people who regularly had to choose among many competing priorities and who are experts in delegating responsibilities in order to turn their attention elsewhere.

The best projects recognized that each leader would need to feel that his or her organization would benefit directly from the project. They started out marketing their projects in the most positive and encouraging light possible. And they continually reinforced the key points and benefits of the collaborative effort so that no one lost sight of the partnerships' fundamental purposes and essential elements. And they kept it up. Among all of the Partnership Projects, continuous marketing to new players was an important way to offset the turnover of key players.

Valuing Middle-Management and Line Staff

Recognizing that no program can operate successfully if it relies solely upon upper echelon players, the best of the Projects sought out energetic, committed players for every level of their respective organizations, right from the start.

SCHOOL-BASED PLAYERS

Besides school superintendents and other key central office administrators, successful projects involved principals, guidance personnel, teachers, and curriculum specialists in the early stages of planning. The early involvement of principals proved especially important.

The Local Lesson

In retrospect, Martin & Rosi emphasize the lessons of early, positive contact with local school administrators. "Experience has shown that not nearly enough attention was paid to school principals in our initial efforts to generate interest and commitment on the part of school systems in the project sites. Those projects that seemed promising because of system-wide participation, supported by school superintendents, have had many more difficulties than the more modest efforts begun in one high school with the interest and support of that school's principal. Later efforts to involve principals have greatly strengthened the projects.

"Superintendents and other administrators must not be overlooked, because they can hinder the development of projects through rigid application of existing procedures and can help through imaginative interpretation of regulations and by encouraging principals and teachers. It is clear that principals are key to successful operation of partnership projects."

A Case in Point

Charleston's superintendent of schools was fully involved in planning, and support from the Chamber of Commerce was assured. Unfortunately, the principals, who were relatively autonomous, and the distributive education teachers were not recruited soon enough—at least not soon enough to suit them. The teachers were especially wary of "turf," and when the preliminary partnership plan was presented to them, they strongly resisted.

After three months, only seven of the 45 participants had jobs, and six months later, 15 were still unemployed. The distributive education teachers then became openly critical. In response, the Chamber promised to go "all out" to obtain jobs for students who participated in the summer classes, which provided excellent supplemental instruction. But neither PIC nor Chamber members personally committed jobs, and fewer than a quarter of the students were employed. By the fall, school officials retreated from the partnership, claiming that the project was straining the schools' relationship with the Chamber of Commerce.

CORPORATE PLAYERS

The Partnership Projects learned quickly that their programs had to be designed to fit into partner corporations' existing systems and operations. Besides company CEOs, they needed to involve vice presidents, managers, personnel directors and line supervisors in the design and early development of the project. Because they ultimately affect the employability of students, personnel interviewers and line supervisors needed to take part in the development of the work-related curriculum—personnel people to define the attitudes and skills they would demand from job applicants, and line supervisors to define what students would need to keep and advance in jobs.

Projects that neglected line supervisors learned that top-level agreements were not necessarily honored by those who worked directly with students. Supervisors who were not involved in project planning or not oriented to the program *before* students began jobs, felt little incentive to go the extra mile to make a student's job a positive learning experience.

Some supervisors felt that their department's productivity would decline if youngsters were put to work there. Some resented the extra time and effort required to oversee students. Some simply disliked disadvantaged youth.

In contrast, when supervisors were involved in planning and were well-prepared for their roles, they experienced results that reinforced their initial enthusiasm for the program.

Supervisors as Program Boosters

At New York City's Partners for Advancement of Electronics (PAE) program at Westinghouse High School, well-oriented, heavily-involved line supervisors found that partnership students actually improved productivity and alleviated many of the typical headaches of supervision. These youths often arrived early. Sometimes when regular employees were absent or became ill on the job, the youth took over their responsibilities.

Several approaches to enhancing supervisor involvement have been tested. Comprehensive orientation, top-level corporate recognition, regular reinforcement through a committee of participating supervisors, supervisory feedback and discussion groups, special awards and compensation, and "buddy systems" that pair experienced and inexperienced workers were all especially fruitful.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PLAYERS

Reliance upon JTPA funds dictated that government employment and training staff would play a major role in defining operations in many of the projects. In addition to high-level PIC and SDA staff, it became necessary to involve upper-level SDA managers, lower-level administrators, recruiters, planners, intake workers, and other staff who could affect the success of any aspect of the project. Their expertise proved invaluable, as when SDA planners showed curriculum designers how to incorporate PIC-generated competencies into the curriculum.

On the other hand, some Projects encountered serious problems when local administrators of federal employment/training funds who had not been involved in planning the partnership later insisted upon procedures and measurement criteria that conflicted with Project goals. For instance, rigid interpretation of JTPA regulations could starve the core of a partnership project's long term plan when JTPA administrators cut off funding for students as soon as they were placed in jobs, interpreting job-placement as "termination" from the JTPA system. The follow-up services central to the plan would be lost as soon as they became appropriate!

In the high schools, modifications in the basic skills curriculum had to combine competencies required by the local PIC with educational objectives required by the school board and state regulations. When representatives of these three government decision-making bodies were not involved in the partnerships at their earliest stages, the project sometimes designed a curriculum unacceptable to someone.

To Be or Not To Be... What?


The Richmond Project staff wisely recognized that its curriculum design had to conform to California's state-mandated competencies for graduation. In developing an excellent curriculum that fulfilled those requirements, the team had to find ways of making traditional subjects "work oriented." (Should Lady MacBeth's cry, "Out damned spot!" be a dry cleaning motto? Should the play be taught to warn over-ambitious youth against undermining their supervisors?)

Talent—It Goes Without Saying

Partnership Projects that did fail lacked coordination by a high-quality staff led by a dynamic director. Analysis of effective staffs found the following conditions needed among the director and his or her staff:

- high levels of energy, organization, willingness to take risks, and attention to details;
- ability to communicate and generate confidence in working relationships among participants from business, education, and government;
- professionalism, adequate pay, and business orientation;
- easy and frequent access to key business and school people;
- commitment to the project over a period of years.





IV. BUILDING COMMITMENT THROUGH OWNERSHIP

The Partnership Projects found that success required commitments that combined leadership with resources, and resources with follow-up. Planning time for key teachers and school administrators, and the continuing loan of talented and determined professional program managers from the business sector were tangible manifestations of commitment. Successful partnerships confirmed that sustaining such commitment was absolutely essential for success. All partners had to realize that preparing disadvantaged youth for career-long employability takes extraordinary effort, patience, and TIME.

Everyone Must Feel Ownership

In effective partnerships, partners felt that they "owned" the project, and this sense of ownership sustained them through the long hard process. The senior leaders in these projects helped others join in a collective sense of ownership. When projects hired a director, they quickly recognized the importance of major partners' conveying ownership to him or her by sharing significant power, influence, and access to powerful decision-makers.

Similarly, strong partnerships gave ownership to line staff. The nuts-and-bolts work of collaboration depended heavily upon the skills and motivation of people selected by the leaders from the respective sectors. Success hinged on when and how these people were recruited, involved, and managed. Their sense of sharing ownership can be developed from several sources:

- early involvement in planning;
- communication of high expectations;
- shared decision-making power;
- fulfillment of organizational needs.

Enthusiasm is No Substitute for Early Involvement

In South Carolina, the enthusiasm of Charleston's superintendent of schools led him to commit the schools to cooperation with the business community before consulting principals or teachers. The enthusiasm of the Chamber of Commerce led them to contract (without notifying the superintendent) with a local college to design the pre-employment curriculum and assist in developing the program plan. When the completed plan had been handed to the schools as a *fait accompli*, no amount of effort could overcome the resistance of the superintendent, principals, and teachers.

INVOLVEMENT MUST BE CULTIVATED

Line staff must be sold on the partnership concept, and asked—not told—to take part. Ownership was best instilled by assigning tasks according to preferences, and by giving line staff opportunities to help create their job descriptions and to define issues they felt were important.

References to "growing" a partnership appear repeatedly in the stories of effective programs, and cultivating line staff participation offers a good example. Other approaches bred resentment and distrust. Projects that thought to prepare the ground, plant the best seeds, and then water and fertilize their growth, produced successful gardens where line staff carried out the design of the project, communicated results back to the leaders, and committed their organizations to implementation.



Commitment Works against the Odds

The Partners for Advancement of Electronics (PAE) Project at New York's Westinghouse High School illustrates how long-term leadership from the governing group can protect a partnership from divisive political situations and threatening forces.

After PAE was well-established, Westinghouse's principal retired. A new principal was appointed just as a new Chancellor was being chosen to run the New York Public Schools. During that transition, a reorganization of the education system transferred control over PAE from the city's PIC to the education department's cooperative education division.

The new principal strongly supported the project, and in his first year, nominated PAE for a national award. In October, 1984, PAE was selected as the only vocational-technical high school in the country to receive a White House award, among business-education programs described as "exemplary" by the U.S. Department of Education.

Yet, amidst the national accolades, locally PAE was being ignored—stranded in limbo in the cooperative education division, whose supervising administrator

reportedly resented PAE's receiving a national award. In the words of the new principal, "Nobody in the co-op ed office would look out for any PIC youth programs. PAE became an orphan assigned to a functionary who churned out boilerplate coop-ed proposals to the feds. PAE had no one to promote it among private business or to develop jobs for the kids. That division viewed everything through one lens, co-op ed; and they saw PAE encroaching on precious job slots. So they tried to starve the orphans."

Things deteriorated to the point where, when Digital Equipment Corporation offered to donate thousands of dollars worth of computer equipment to PAE, the system's central board officials refused to approve the donation.

Then PAE's governing group, the Council of Industry Executives and Educators, used their considerable influence to insure that PAE could not be further handicapped through neglect and deliberate unresponsiveness. Largely as a result of the Council's efforts, the Board of Education hired a professional staff-person to assist and lobby for the program on a regular basis. PAE's downward slide was stopped.

HIGH EXPECTATIONS MOTIVATE PARTNERS

Just as a teacher's high expectations motivate students' achievement, the leaders of successful projects made clear that all partners would be expected to become visibly committed to the joint effort. Partners were expected to enlist other partners, appoint capable staff from their own organizations, and demonstrate their personal involvement.

SHARED DECISION-MAKING GIVES POWER

Simple things matter. The policy-making bodies of successful projects represented all participating partners and assumed responsibility for ongoing leadership. Each member participated in electing officers, developing project objectives, defining the governing group's role, hiring staff, and agreeing upon methods of communication and decisions-making. Although these steps sound obvious, the unsuccessful projects usually neglected one or more of them. In short, a well developed governance structure served as a vehicle for continued, committed leadership, and survival.

Organizational Needs Must Be Met

The fulfillment of organizational needs proved to be the key reason institutions joined in The Partnership Projects. When leaders from each sector saw clearly that tangible benefits could be realized through energetic participation, they made collaboration a priority. On the other hand, when benefits to their organizations were vague, or not regularly reinforced, ownership was viewed as valueless and they were reluctant to participate wholeheartedly.

Projects also learned that, besides understanding how the project met their own organizational needs, partners needed to see how it met the needs of the other partners, needs that sometimes were not immediately evident, or were misleading at first. To avoid miscommunication, someone had to spell out clearly the central reasons for each partner's involvement. Without such mutual understanding, it was difficult for partners to reach constructive compromises on issues over which there was disagreement. In short, the program needs to be sold through self-interest; partners need to see benefits to their own self-interest and the self-interest of their partners. Incentives had to be shaped for each prospective partner. Features that appealed to a business sometimes had to be presented to a school or government agency in different forms.

Something for Everyone

In many instances, outdated equipment, faculty out of touch with new developments, or with negative attitudes toward vocational education made it difficult for partnerships tied to vocational-technical high schools to develop support. In New York City, PAE demonstrated how a vocational program could be marketed successfully based on mutual self-interest.

New York's partners were sold on the idea that it was important not only to Westinghouse Vocational-Technical High School, but also to managers of local electronics-related companies, that the school's curriculum, texts, equipment, and teaching methods be upgraded. Both sectors in PAE would clearly benefit from ensuring that the students were trained with up-to-date equipment and techniques to fit present and future needs in that industry. An advisory Industry Council of 12 companies continues to market the program to industry.

Working relations among line supervisors and teachers were also important. Company owners, managers, supervisors, and technicians met regularly with school staff. The partners successfully addressed three mutual concerns over an 18-month period. They related the high school's curriculum to current employment needs, made specific improvements in the school's equipment and facilities, and developed methods to foster positive attitudes and work habits among the students.

SCHOOLS MUST SEE DIRECT BENEFITS

In well-conceived partnerships, schools felt a number of tangible benefits. Most importantly, they gained jobs for their students. In turn, students' morale improved as the combination of paid employment and workplace-related schoolwork helped them to recognize the importance and benefits of education. Teachers then found that students who participated in effective partnership projects demonstrated marked improvements in their classroom behavior. Teachers attributed these changes to the social support for achievement and good behavior provided by work-site supervisors and co-workers. For principals, overcoming resistance to change was helped by the support of local business leaders.

BENEFITS TO EMPLOYERS MUST CLEAR

Business leaders around the country candidly state that their involvement in school-business partnerships result from enlightened self-interest.

Programs to improve students' basic skills and to relate classroom studies to work-place requirements can meet business partners' needs by improving the quality of their available work-force leading to tangible productivity gains. Work-oriented partnerships reduced the costs of training and supervising otherwise poorly-prepared employees. And, finally, participating companies gained enhanced image in the local community.

Mutual Self-Interest

In Buffalo, businesses wanted a more qualified, entry-level work-force. Schools were interested in helping their students become employed but had no history of placing general high school program youth in jobs; the city's academic/comprehensive high schools were not vocationally oriented. A center was set up to provide vocational-technical training as a transition to work-places.

Since the schools had never had success in obtaining part-time after-school jobs, and the business community sought reliable younger workers, complementary needs were evident. Rather than promote the program as a social enterprise, the PIC marketed students as job-ready, motivated employees. The mutual self-interests of the school system and local business community were understood by each party, and jobs were forthcoming. The partnership is now a model for additional replications around New York State.





PREPARATION FOR THE PRIMARY LABOR MARKET IS KEY

In study after study, when asked what they seek in their workers, employers have expressed the same distressing view: that a high school diploma, especially one from an urban comprehensive high school, was generally a meaningless indicator of the skills needed on the job. Yet ironically, these same employers regularly relied upon that diploma as a screening device in their hiring practices.

Work/education partnerships provide an opportunity to define mutually-agreed-upon standards of employability — standards that are achievable within a schools' secondary curricula and that are acceptable to a business community. Applied to the requirements for graduation, such standards can make a diploma mean something. Promising "primary labor market" jobs to youth is not enough if a diploma does not assure that the graduate has the competencies required for employment. Specific competencies for employability must be developed through close cooperation among school and

employer representatives. For instance, in a partnership that purports to prepare students for jobs in local banks, managers must make sure that what the students learn in class will pass muster at the teller's window.

Although employability requirements may vary from one locale to another, identifying the general areas of competence that a high school student needs is not particularly difficult. National surveys of employers reveal a high degree of consensus about qualifying criteria for an entry level job. In *High Schools and the Changing Workplace: The Employers' View*, a high level panel stressed "the ability to learn and to adapt to changes in the workplace [as] the essential hallmark of the successful employee." In its 1985 report of a two-year survey of personnel officers of both large and small firms, the Committee for Economic Development (CED) concluded that "specific occupational skills are less crucial for entry-level employment than are a generally high level of literacy, responsible attitudes toward work, the ability to communicate well, and the ability to continue to

learn." Employers told CED that they were "looking for young people who demonstrate a set of attitudes, abilities, and behaviors associated with a sense of responsibility, self-discipline, pride, teamwork, and enthusiasm." Furthermore, CED reported, "employers do not think that the schools are doing a good job of developing these much-needed abilities."

Effects of National Manpower Policy

Although the Partnership Projects originated with financial and technical assistance from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, they received the bulk of their funding first from CETA, and then from local JTPA, PIC, and Service Delivery Area (SDA) offices. The sites that involved PIC/SDA staff from the inception of their planning processes, and that used JTPA as a tool to accomplish their goals, were generally successful.

When PIC/SDA staff were involved heavily in a partnership's collaborative planning process, important compromises were possible. Early PIC/JTPA agency participation facilitated the solution of turf issues, and eliminated many of the barriers arising from government regulations and rules. During the planning process, the PIC/SDA agendas could be clarified.

- How should students be judged "income eligible?"
- How many job placements had to be achieved, and by when?
- What would constitute a "positive termination?"
- How should schools and summer programs collaborate?
- What access would employers get in the schools?
- Would school grades be shown to business groups?

Unless the agencies shared a sense of ownership, compromise proved impossible. Agency involvement in planning from the start helps assure that policies developed can benefit from available public funds. When JTPA funds supported the bulk of a partnership project, partners had to work especially hard to find ways to operate the program as flexibly as possible. Sometimes the partners had to redefine the purposes and expectations governing the administration of "manpower" funds.

In all cases, SDA staff had to be willing to be creative—to know their JTPA regulations well, to grasp what could and could not be done, and sometimes to seek out non-traditional, more flexible ways of doing things that would allow the partnership to do its job well.

On the Barrier Reef

In a city that did not involve SDA staff early in the planning process, the partnership had persistent problems in cutting through the red tape resulting from overly stringent local interpretation of JTPA regulations. Of the hundreds of students who signed up for the program, and appeared to qualify for it, only a quarter were willing to undergo the "bureaucratic nightmare" involved in fulfilling all of the SDA's certification procedures.

This project's staff expressed a concern, shared in many projects, that PIC/SDA officials remained locked into the traditional "manpower program mentality" held over from CETA days, and were unwilling to find ways of accommodating special conditions for improving the employability of youth in school. (Some PIC/SDA officials in this city still referred to JTPA as CETA.)

ADDRESSING REGULATION FRUSTRATION

In many of the projects, teachers and principals had difficulty understanding why, because of government-dictated income requirements, they had to reject a deserving student whose family "just missed" meeting income level requirements. As one principal lamented, "We educators have a mandate to serve all the kids in our school who are disadvantaged. Those manpower types are too concerned with targeting, audits, and so on."

Some projects managed to enroll students in this situation by covering services to "marginally disadvantaged" students with private funds. This strategy worked well for a limited number of students. On a larger scale, however, the projects that had to rely upon Department of Labor funds for the bulk of their support found that they had to work within this often uncomfortable limitation. In such cases, school and business partners needed to understand the regulations, pressures, and constraints affecting PIC and JTPA Service Delivery Area offices. Otherwise, as the record shows, the partnership will deteriorate.

At the state and local levels, manpower staff were forced to balance the priorities of job placements against the need to build competencies for long-term employability. They struggled to balance performance standards required by JTPA against enormous needs for basic remediation among the least employable youth. Again, the most effective partnerships were those in which school and business people understood these constraints and challenges from the inception of the partnership effort.

Mutual Understanding and Collaborative Planning

In Buffalo, PIC and SDA staff provided leadership that led to a durable, highly-respected program that has become a model for New York State. Buffalo's project was funded almost entirely by JTPA. Because of the area's high unemployment of older, dislocated workers, a priority for PIC staff was to enlist prominent business leaders who would sell to their own communities the notion of providing part-time employment to disadvantaged high school students.

JTPA staff were careful not to imply any stigma about low income when they interviewed youth. The eligibility certification process was presented as minor paperwork involved in making a new opportunity possible. Efforts were made to help youth feel comfortable during the procedure; they were treated as individuals in an important project rather than as cases to be processed.

PIC staff felt strong long term commitment to the project. One of their major objectives was to counteract the effects of disincentives toward work in the welfare system. Parents of eligible youth frequently resisted the program at first because they worried that their AFDC stipend might be reduced. After reassurances, in numerous cases, these youths became the only members of their extended families who obtained steady employment in the primary labor market.

Rural Success

JTPA funds have also been effectively used in one of the most rural work/education partnerships imaginable.

In Utah, many Native Americans who make up nearly half of the population in San Juan County depend primarily upon public assistance. Jobs are especially scarce

for Navajo and Ute youth who often lack of work experience, have limited proficiency in English, face discrimination, and are unfamiliar with workplace expectations. Geography compounds these problems. Native American youth often live on reservations located many hours from schools and jobs.

Employers in Blaine (population 4,500) joined county school officials to design a partnership project known as Naalnish Nizhoni (Navajo for "Project Goodwork"). The original partners consisted of a PIC, a regional high school, employers in the Chamber of Commerce, and the local state Employment Service.

JTPA and Title XX funds, supplemented by funds from foundations, enabled "Project Goodwork" to hire a director in the summer of 1985. The project began as a summer program because long distances between schools and homes made an after-school jobs program impractical. Funds were used to develop a new curriculum and instructional component. A week's pre-employment instruction was developed to precede the combination of basic job-related subjects and work experience (mostly subsidized).

Businesses in the few San Juan County towns initially opposed hiring Indians, even if someone else paid them. As the program progressed, however, the school district's vocational director noted progress. Dozens of Navajo and Ute students were employed in a variety of positions—mechanics, nursing assistants, cashiers, legal secretaries, construction workers, salespeople, florists, and an archeologist's assistant. The Assistant School Superintendent became sold on the program, and the school system now awards academic credit for the pre-employment component.

The major problem that projects had with JTPA funding was JTPA administrators' need to show quick turn-around placements. While JTPA strove for short-term results, the work/education partnership concept is based upon a relatively long-term effort—at least one to two years. To satisfy JTPA administrators' needs to provide numbers that demonstrate signs of success, effective partnership programs enrolled some high school seniors whose participation would be relatively short-term and oriented toward rapid job placement. Placement of these youths enabled the partnerships to meet JTPA placement performance standards. The rest of the participants were juniors and sophomores whose par-

ticipation was longer in duration. Successful projects also used private funds to provide the balance of needed follow-up services after formal JTPA termination took place. Staff became expert in assisting youth over the long haul, and often used a "paper termination" to satisfy JTPA requirements.

Over all, experience has shown that negotiations with the JTPA system must take place in the early stages of project planning and development. Each side must be willing to be flexible in seeking to achieve a common purpose. Each partner must be willing to be flexible about its traditional agenda—the traditional academic agenda and the conventional manpower agenda.

VI. PLANNING A WORK/EDUCATION PARTNERSHIP

Work/education partnerships require meticulous planning. Even among those Partnership Projects that had enough foresight to involve all key partners early, virtually all major problems and successes converged around the fundamental principles of sound planning. Most "problems" were, in fact, symptoms of poor planning. Successes resulted from effective planning—a clear mission, measurable objectives, solid implementation, structured communication, and regular evaluation.

Overcoming Attitudinal Barriers

For effective planning to be possible, partners' attitudes toward each other and each other's institutions had to be positive. Many of the Partnership Projects found it necessary to begin by overcoming traditional prejudices among the worlds of education, business, and government. Because a significant number of the individuals involved in the partnerships had rarely worked together (or worse, had previously collaborated unsuccessfully), stereotypes and negative images of each others' institutions abounded.

Educators commonly entered partnership efforts expecting the profit motive to influence businesses to push the schools toward teaching short-term skills at the expense of long-term educational values. School people in some projects feared that their schools would become entirely "vocationalized." Many teachers believed that business people had no sincere interest in helping or hiring disadvantaged students.

The business community entertained equally strong biases about educators. A common belief was that the schools taught students little that was useful, and that teachers were incapable of preparing students for work. Some business people suspected that a competent person would not teach but would work in the private-sector, where they could earn more attractive salaries. Given the widespread public criticism leveled at schools, some business leaders were wary of involvement with an institution regarded as failing. Others, sensitive to the intensely political nature of public schooling, were concerned about confrontation with schoolboards or having to deal with government "red tape." Still others assumed that school officials would not welcome business involvement in their affairs. . . . except perhaps as financial contributions.



Finally, public school educators and business people alike held a number of negative attitudes toward CETA/JTPA and PIC representatives and the organizations themselves, and vice versa. A typical view was that CETA/JTPA officials were inefficient government bureaucrats and that government red tape and regulations would suffocate partnership activities. From their side, CETA, JTPA, and PIC officials often considered the schools to blame for the failure of many unemployed young people, such as school dropouts. They sometimes felt that the schools contained insensitive and incompetent teaching, irrelevant and outmoded curricula, regimentation, and unreasonable requirements. Many of them resented feeling that the government's employment and training system was being asked to "bail out" the schools—to overcome the enormous deficits in employability among these disadvantaged "kids whom the schools had failed."

Therefore, for planning to proceed smoothly, efforts to eliminate attitudinal barriers among institutions need to be undertaken *early*. Successful projects began by breaking down the isolation among participants from business, government, and the schools.

Two Avenues to Understanding

In Oakland CA, "Success on the Move" achieved enthusiastic "buy in" among upper-echelon school and business players during its early stages, only to encounter some resistance among lower-level players. But Oakland's partnership model helped to defuse that resistance. Its work groups, governed by consensus decision-making processes and composed of players from all organizational levels, provided excellent forums for overcoming resistance. By participating in arguing and negotiating program policy and process, and by designing the curriculum, individuals from each institution got to know and appreciate the skills of their counterparts from other institutions.

In Brooklyn, NY, business and education players approached each other warily at first. For them, however, practical tasks requiring regular face-to-face contact between teachers and industry representatives allayed initial fears on both sides. Result. At a meeting held to assess the experiences of company managers and line supervisors at the end of the program's first year, business representatives competed to top each others' stories of outstanding student performance and of their new-found respect for the quality of teaching in the school. Dozens of companies in the electronics industry in Brooklyn refer proudly to the Westinghouse High School's partnership students as their "farm team."

Taking Time... and More Time

Partners must expect a long haul before their partnership regularly achieves, with minimal headaches, the successes envisioned by its creators. Underestimating the time needed to plan for projects, and to continue planning throughout implementation, caused problems for many Partnership Projects.

Too often, in a rush to produce a visible product, program planners failed to realize that, by devoting minimal time to up-front planning, they were committing themselves to spend inordinate amounts of time later coping with problems that could have been avoided.

Planners learned the hard way to play "devil's advocate" early in the planning process. Anticipating possible problems in advance helps in designing a partnership to avoid them. Solving problems later is much more complex when they must be tackled within the constraints, structures, systems, and bureaucracy of an operating program.

Details, Clarity, and Specification

The complexities of collaboration among diverse groups required that partners jointly agree upon their project's mission, short- and long-term goals, and implementation strategies. The most effective plans developed short- and long-range goals, translated them into measurable objectives, which, in turn, were converted into concrete tasks that specified who would be responsible for what, when each task should be completed, and what level of quality had to be achieved for a task to be considered satisfactorily completed.

The best plans included clear chains of authority. Such frameworks provided for mutual accountability in terms of specific responsibilities, expectations, tasks, delivery dates, and so on.

The projects demonstrated that lack of clarity wastes valuable time. When policy and operational details were inadequately spelled out during the planning process, staff members found themselves struggling later to keep their heads above water. Instead of working within a clear mission and management structure, staff found themselves regularly "putting out fires."

Making a Long-Range Mission Part of the Plan

When early strategic planning was not guided by a long-range viewpoint, partnerships ran into a variety of problems. After their initial year, some sites found themselves disagreeing about whether or how their partnership should expand. Several sites started out small, and never grew despite their success on a small scale. Others continually changed priorities with no coherent direction, and eventually lost the interest of several key partners.

As new issues emerged, projects that had not spelled out a long-term mission faced the need for an awkward re-evaluation of their earlier definitions of success and goals. Too often, they entered new periods of struggle and disillusionment that could have been avoided had early planning been more thorough.

The development of a long-range strategy was particularly important in institutionalizing a partnership in a community. In their early planning the most effective programs not only identified long-term goals, but also developed strategies for securing additional partners, for developing new components, and for securing new sources of stable funding. Such long-range plans provided the drive and vision their partnerships needed to maintain the commitment of key actors and to move forward after the initial program was in place.



Making Commitments in Writing...and Public

Among the best of the Partnership Projects, all key leaders and managers substantiated the commitments of their organizations to accomplish the partnership's goals by signing a public document. Among the best of the Partnership Projects, all key leaders and managers substantiated their organization's commitments to the partnership's goals by signing a public document to that effect. Many partnership leaders claim that this publicized agreement is one of the most critical conditions for a successful partnership.

Going Public with Commitment

In Portland, OR, 14 top leaders signed the "Leaders' Roundtable Master Agreement," in which they vowed active participation in implementing the city's partnership plan. The agreement defined the goals of reducing school dropouts, increasing students' employability skills, and providing students (especially low income and minority youth) with increased access to jobs.

They also agreed to work for the inclusion of effective education, job training, and support services in the city's youth employment programs. Furthermore, the signers pledged to undertake joint planning, share resources, set jurisdictional and turf issues aside, and commit staff as necessary.

This formal document was heavily publicized and was accompanied by other documents that set out, in detail, how the project would evolve over time.

Assuring Job Placement

Any work/education partnership plan must provide for summer, after-school, and post-graduation jobs. Concrete pledges for these jobs should be secured *in writing* (preferably as part of the partnership plan) before students are recruited.

All the Projects promised jobs, and jobs and were perceived by students as a reward for participation. Many of the projects, however, were unable to deliver those jobs, and so lost all credibility among parents, teachers, administrators, and students.

Once programs were in operation, the staffs of most of the partnership programs that did suffer from shortages of jobs were already operating under the impression that jobs would be supplied. They interpreted initial expressions of interest and support from businesses as commitment to provide jobs. They discovered to their dismay that, without

written promises of jobs, even the most enthusiastic interest did not necessarily translate into paychecks.

Another problem in obtaining job placements arose from planners and program managers being overly optimistic about job availability. Setting their job development goals too high and recruiting students based upon the number of *projected* rather than *committed* job slots, led to debilitating frustrations all around. Similarly, in making their commitments, corporate leaders need to consult their own personnel departments to avoid letting their enthusiasm for the program lure them into similar overestimation of their capacity to deliver on job commitments.

On the other hand, many communities did provide jobs for the majority of their participants. Not surprisingly, these projects had meticulously planned their partnerships from inception, had asked executives to consult with their lower-level staff, had involved those staff in the planning process, and then had solicited written job commitments



Sorry, Not Hiring

When the Benton Harbor project did not produce jobs, youth felt "burned" and teachers betrayed. The lesson from Michigan was that when local businesses fail to deliver promised jobs, the program can be mortally wounded.

When Charleston's partners failed to honor their commitments, it was practically impossible to control the damage. Teachers felt especially cynical about claims that a partnership could result in good jobs for disadvantaged youth or that the business community and the schools could cooperate successfully.

When the St. Louis business community tried to deliver on its original commitment to provide primary labor market jobs, leaders found they had seriously overestimated the capacity of their organizations to assimilate youth into the work force. When initial "guesstimates" of potential part-time job slots had been made, the top-level executives in large production companies did not grasp what their own personnel managers and line supervisors understood at the operations level—namely, that youth were incapable of doing most of the jobs that were available.

Have We Got a Job for You!

In Richmond, however, no student is enrolled in the New Horizons program unless a confirmed job awaits him or her. Virtually every student who completes the curriculum satisfactorily is hired.

When partnerships put everything in writing from the start, jobs were generally forthcoming. Where written commitments were not obtained, partner responsibilities became damagingly ambiguous. Partners sometimes "didn't remember how many jobs they might have offered," nor when those jobs were supposed to be provided. Not only numbers of job slots but also dates of delivery and follow-up procedures must be spelled out during the planning period.

The negative consequences of failure to deal clearly with the terms of the commitments and expectations proved debilitating, resulting in resentment, distrust, and misunderstandings as well as duplication of effort, lack of follow-through, open conflict, and resignations.

VI. PRESERVING THE PARTNERSHIP

On-going planning, continuity of leadership, systems for handling glitches in partnership cooperation, and effective use of evaluation enable partnerships to survive and flourish.

Planning that Never Ceases

During the early stages of effective Partnership Projects, implementation and operational tasks reflected the strategies dictated in their partnership plans. As the projects evolved, built momentum, and matured, however, the priorities of several of their partner organizations shifted. Original visions had to be adjusted in light of new conditions. Planning, originally considered by some to be an up-front process only, turned out to require on-going attention.

The best of The Partnership Projects managed to revise their plans by balancing their early needs for clarity with their later needs for flexibility. When up-front planning had been thorough, the structures they needed to handle these changes—decision-making, communication, and problem-solving systems—helped them make revisions smoothly.

Continuity of Leadership

The greatest source of frustration to Frances Rosi of the intermediary organization Martin & Rosi, Inc., as she helped The Partnership Projects around the

country, was the turnover of key people. Circumstances such as retirement, transfers, corporate takeovers, and other overriding priorities eliminated certain leaders, and those who took their places did not necessarily have the same degree of commitment and dedication to the effort. Whenever a key player changed, it meant that complex, frequently delicate relationships had to be cultivated anew. It took time and effort to rebuild interpersonal and interinstitutional trust. The difficulty of the task was increased when the new leader often had to be sold on the partnership itself—where it had already been made a priority of the previous administration.

Another kind of turnover occurred where leaders, having confidently sown the seeds of excellent public-private partnership, turned to other tasks or delegated the enterprise to a successor without ensuring that it would remain priority long term.

In all cases, partnerships drifted when leadership was interrupted. The overriding point is that when the leadership changes, the entire social structure must expend enormous energy to adjust to the next leader.

The most effective planning strategy to counteract the difficulties created by leadership turnover is to develop buffer relationships with groups that form policy for the partnership such as was developed in Portland.

Continuity Counts

In Oregon, the lengthy tenure of Portland's superintendent of schools and his membership on the Leaders' Roundtable assured continuous cooperation from schools—which were traditionally most resistant to institutional change—in developing a city-wide youth employment network.

In Pittsburgh, however, during the partnership's early operation period, top level managers in the city's PIC changed several times. Without coherent, continuous understanding and endorsement of the project's concept, it became confused and misinterpreted. PIC staff thinking that their only goal was to develop primary labor market jobs for disadvantaged high school youth made placement of youth in jobs their only priority. For several years, no work was done to develop a work-oriented curriculum or to better relate students' school work to the needs of the labor market.

In Louisville, the partnership's project director resigned shortly after the highly-supportive PIC had submitted his own resignation. There was a simultaneous change

in the PIC chairman. In the interim, the PIC assigned project operation to the schools. The schools were left to hire a staff director to rebuild from scratch.


In Birmingham, in contrast, the business leaders who comprised the Alliance that sponsored the TOPS partnership have not changed. The chair of the Alliance rotates and completes a full cycle during a 4- or 5-year period. TOPS' executive director and staff have also been stable, with the result that Birmingham has sustained an excellent partnership project.

In Portland, Oregon, the city's stable Leaders' Roundtable had a significant stake in continuity of collaborative support. When the incumbent mayor unexpectedly lost an election, broad-based commitment among all of the top leaders in the city to maintain the process of inter-institutional change enabled them to avoid any set-back during the transition of administrations. They lobbied the mayor-elect from all sides, with the result that he was smoothly integrated into the process as a key leader.

The Portland Partnership's PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS

A = Planning Team member *not* involved directly in the problem.

B = Team member whose organization *is* involved directly in the problem.



Defined Strategies for Communication

All components of a partnership—among and within partner organizations—are interdependent. Hence, all of the players need to be kept aware of pertinent developments throughout the life of the program. Successful projects established distinct formal lines of communication. They defined who should participate in decision-making and who should be notified about each decision. Regular meetings, telephone calls, newsletters, multiple copies of letters

and memos strengthened the flow of information that gave vitality to ongoing collaboration.

A process of problem-catching communication needs to be put in place that will help project partners handle problems before they reach the point of destructive sideline griping or deadlocks. To prevent problems resulting in the embarrassment of one or more institutions, the most meticulously planned partnerships developed formal problem-solving procedures to insure that the appropriate individuals were notified of major and minor problems and addressed them in a timely manner.

Evaluation that Is Put to Use

Although this report focuses primarily upon the interorganizational aspects of partnerships, the ultimate measure of a work/education program's success relates only partly to institutional change. One must also be sure to ask: *How are kids benefitting from the project?* Regardless of how well it brings institutions together, no partnership is succeeding in *all* ways unless it is meeting its student-oriented goals and objectives.

Evaluation and management information systems should relate directly back to the goals and objectives set out for students in the partnership plan. Is the partnership having an observable, measurable impact on the students it intends to serve? Are students getting jobs? Are they learning pre-employment and task-oriented skills? Are their reading, writing, math, and problem-solving skills improving? Are graduates able to obtain and sustain primary labor market employment? Where are they three years after graduation?

One shortcoming of The Partnership Projects was the lack of specific requirement of evaluation of participant outcomes other than records required for CETA and JTPA. Because the projects were created as educational rather than employment initiatives, record-keeping and follow-up of student placements was not rigorous. To this day, it is difficult to determine whether a number of The Partnership Projects were "successful" as measured by student gains.

Of course, if a work/education partnership seeks institutional change, its evaluation mechanism should not be limited to its impact on students only. How partnering affects the organizations involved should also be measured. To what extent is the partnership's work-oriented curriculum being adopted by the school system? Did the schools give business adequate input into the curriculum in the first place? Is the curriculum being revised as new needs become evident? Are businesses that previously hesitated to hire youth now accepting them and viewing them as productive workers? Are institutions that formerly didn't work together now collaborating regularly in new ways?

MAKING EVALUATION FEEL GOOD

Evaluation is threatening if it is viewed as a necessary evil that will probably produce information damaging to the partnership effort. And it is a waste of time if it is viewed only as an exercise endured to meet grantors' requirements. Neither view need be true. Threatening though evaluation may sometimes appear before it is undertaken, it can be handled in a constructive, valuable way.

Results of evaluation that are less than positive provide information helpful in improving the program and its management before real "negatives" ever appear. To avoid the discomfort of a summary evaluation that says, "The program isn't working," the evaluation process should start at the *start* of a program. The data it produces should be reviewed regularly, and evaluators (who can be insiders or the planning staff) should strive to translate data into constructive recommendations. Decision-makers should implement steps that lead to rapid remediation of program defects.

In a similar manner, positive evaluation data serves as a vehicle for strengthening program benefits. Because it shows that the partners' efforts are paying off, it can be useful in soliciting continuing funds and other resources, keeping partners involved, enlisting additional involvement, and overcoming resistance to participation among individuals who have been "sitting on the fence" waiting to see whether the partnership was a good idea.

To be useful, the evaluation system needs to combine on-going analysis of student and institutional benefits, regular program operations, long-term follow-up, and resulting program revision, and it should be kept simple. It must be easy to understand, free of business and education jargon, and presented in a form that permits clear, corrective decisions.



VII. SUMMARY

Our nation's future economic, social, and cultural well-being is tied to how our communities address the needs of disadvantaged youth. Work/education partnerships between public high schools and businesses focus on increasing the employability of economically-disadvantaged kids who have not dropped out of school. This strategy reflects growing concern about the vitality of the future workforce if it is dominated by economically-disadvantaged and poorly prepared young workers.

The 21 Partnership Projects demonstrate an important approach to services for improving the economic success of academically-average, often-overlooked, young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. The lessons from the projects show that creating and maintaining optimal conditions for collaboration, planning, and implementation of effective programs require determined leadership, combined resources, skilled management, and long-term commitment. Work/education partnerships are not a sudden elixir to the problems of persistent poverty, school failure, or a rapidly changing economy. They are promising, yet difficult to run.

LESSON ONE:

Collaboration must be brokered and managed. Cross-institutional alliances do not occur naturally, and are conducted in territories that are unfamiliar to most participants. Among projects that have been successful, some person or small group with vision, influence, tenacity, and enthusiasm played the role of "broker" bringing these sometimes reluctant players together and helping them plan their joint effort.

Effective brokers determined whether local conditions made a partnership feasible. Could a partnership meet at least some needs of all of its potential key partners? Could a local company or corporate group take the lead, drawing in the active, committed involvement of other businesses? Could adequate funding be found? Could the local labor market generate jobs for disadvantaged youth? Could key institutions relate cordially enough for collaboration? Could partners and funders compromise if the potential benefits to be accrued from their risk-taking hinged upon the actions of the other partners?

LESSON TWO:

Once a work/education partnership appeared feasible, the better brokers identified and brought together a core group of key business, education, and government leaders; persuaded them that active involvement in the partnership would generate tangible benefits for their own organizations; and elicited their firm, long-term support. These individuals had to endorse the mission of the joint venture and agree to share risks and benefits mutually.

LESSON THREE:

As part of this process, good brokers worked to instill a sense of "ownership" for the partnership in each player, and set the stage for transferring the brokering and leadership roles to two groups of players from all key institutions—a high-level group of committed leaders (with resources and the power to commit them) to set policy and a staff-level group to translate policy into the concrete implementation tasks. Marketing the program's benefits to address the self-interest of the individuals being recruited for the partnership was the key to obtaining effective participation.

LESSON FOUR:

Enlisting the involvement of all key players during the project's earliest days became particularly important and meant marketing the program's benefits based on the self-interest of the individuals and organizations being recruited. Partnerships would need a committed, highly-qualified staff that had credibility among school, business, and government people.

LESSON FIVE:

Solid partnerships jointly developed formal plans that included short- and long-range goals, measurable objectives, concrete tasks, and specifications defining who was responsible for what, and by when. The best plans included clear chains of authority, were signed by all of the top leaders, and were publicized.

LESSON SIX:

Evaluation, management, and communication systems were key part to successful partnerships. Only through a well-conceived evaluation could projects determine to what extent they were meeting their goals, whether young people were benefiting from the program, and whether institutions were changing tradition always of dealing with each other.

LESSON SEVEN:

Partnerships had to prepare for change. Plans required revision in light of evaluation data, new conditions, or shifting priorities of the partner organizations. Turnover of key players meant continued marketing of the project to insure that new partners joined the project with a level of commitment equal to that of their predecessors. It was sometimes even necessary to embark upon new initiatives so that the excitement inherent in a new project could be reinstilled.

* * *

Such lessons demonstrate that exploring the reasons for failure, as well as trumpeting the ingredients of success, in publicly- and privately-funded partnerships can help the nationwide partnership movement. It is a movement that will mature through shared understanding of what it takes to plant and nurture work-education partnerships. Study of these 21 projects simply underlines that the potential of work/education partnerships in educational reform is the most important lesson of all.

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