

A History of U.S. Drone Strikes on Pakistan and Its Implications

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Abstract

Although the history of U.S. drone strikes on Pakistan is not so long, which was began since 2004 and is still continue but it have complicated narrative. Strikes by drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are the key tools used by the U.S. in “War on Terror” to combat with Al Qaida and Taliban particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Though the history and narrative of drone strikes in Pakistan has been examined by various scholars and historians but numerous questions are still obscure. In particular, what is the U.S. drone policy towards drone strikes under the umbrella of counterterrorism? Which was the U.S. drone strikes legality towards Pakistan? What were the drone strikes implications on Pakistan from 2004 to present date? Answering these questions, not only will the history of drone and beginning of strikes be examined in this study but also intends to analyze the narrative of drone strikes in Pakistan. The study has been distributed into three parts. In first part of study, we will focus on drone technology and historical overview of drone strikes. Second part will be discussed on U.S. policies towards drone strikes and it’s implicit for international law, especially in the realm of law of global human rights; Legitimacy of United States drone attacks in Pakistan and Pak-U.S. internal narrative on drone strikes. About the drone strikes effects (from 2004 to present) on Pakistan (i.e. drone strikes and terrorists, revenge by militants, its economical, psychological, social and political effects on Pakistan) will be discussed in third part of study.

Keywords: Drone strikes, Terrorists, U.S. Drone Policies, Human Rights, Implications on Pakistan

Don't hit someone else's door with a
finger because your door might be
hit with a fist.

Dari Proverb

1. Introduction

The militants attacks that destroyed the United States World Trade Center and scratched the Pentagon triggered the most dramatic and rapid change in the history of U.S. Foreign Policies. On September 10, 2001, there was a slightest hint that the U.S. was about to embark on an all-out operations and campaign against terrorism. Thus the President of U.S. has declared that they should fight the “war on terrorism” and use any kind of sources and actions against terrorism. The U.S. quickly traced the attacks of Taliban and network of Al Qaeda which was led by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and U.S. has decided to military operations and drone strikes against them.

Over a decade, the using of UAV technology generally referred to as attacks by drone or UAV are the major strategies carried out by the U.S. for killings of militants both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The discerned achievement of the drone strikes have lead to an extensive growing in using of drone’s strikes as a tactical weapon of the United States military and it’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) around the global (Miller, 2011). In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the targets are basically Al Qaeda and the leaders of Taliban in Northeast region of Pakistan. Though from 2004 to present date various Al Qaida and Taliban’s central members have been targeted by drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also the using of drone in Pakistan is rejected by the population of Pakistan due to “collateral” citizen’s victims and other various damages and these damages frequently connected with drone strikes.

2. Drone Technology - Historical Overview

2.1 Drone Technology

Drone is Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV), remotely controlled and in real time controlled by human operators (Melzer, 2013). Which are mostly called “PRAS” (Piloted Remotely Aircraft Systems): They are robot aircrafts

flown and controlled by ground based pilots, although in-country or from the U.S.A or another third world country, and current advancement in technology of war fighting, separating the fighter of war from the costs of his actions by hundred miles (Webb et al, 2010). Apparently, there are several kinds of drones in global which are different in shape, cost, size, capability and weight (Melzer, 2013). As per North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) classification and categorization table of UAV: some drones weight start only from 2 kg to until 600 kg and these drones can fly from 200 feet to 65,000 feet (NATO, 2010).

2.2 Usage of Drones

First time in history, the UAV was used in second decade of twenty century, when the creator and entrepreneur of automatic pilot airplane and tool of gyroscope depressed a Ceremony battleship by an autopilot airplane (Dempsey, 2010). In Vietnam War drone were also used for the purpose of survey (Newcome, 2004). Drones have led of gathering of valuable and significant intelligence without any human life risk (Nagl et al, 2008). Intelligence gathered by UAV can be evaluate in instantaneous situation by the number of players, as well as armed leaders, leading to a latent development in accountability and transparency of the process of decision making, mostly if the Drones (UAV) have attack ability and the use of that ability is being contemplated (Beard, 2009). The drones have two generations, first generation is known exclusively and entirely for surveillance. Second generation is used for attacks capability.

U.S.A and Israel have most advancement in drone technology while other countries are trying to rapid and swift developments in the same field (Wan, 2011). The first two stages of drone have prime role in current drone environment (Mayer, 2009). Drone was also used by U.S.A in 1950s as practice of targeted. In 1960s, drones were used over China and Vietnam for spy purpose and also in Kosovo and Bosnia for surveillance purpose in 1990s (Webb, 2010). Israel used the drone for reconnaissance and surveillance in 1982 and in 1996 to guided pilot fighter bombers for targeting (Cole, 2010). Though technology have been earlier developed and drone are most used as weapon more than surveillance and they are much linked with 9/11 attacks on America. First time drone missile was fired by U.S. in Afghanistan (Cole, 2010). United States particularly Bush government originate great value in drone and attacks on terrorists especially on Al Qaida in various countries including Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan (Rona, 2003).

3. Drone Policy, Legitimacy and Internal Narrative on Drone Strikes in Pakistan

3.1 U.S. Drone Strikes Policies, International Law, Human Rights

Drones strikes have turned into a key policy tool in U.S.A's counterterrorism policy. In at minimal five states – Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq and U.S. drones' surveillance in the skies and occasionally strikes are used to attacks on terrorists. Furthermore, drone strike became the major issue to debate within policy maker community not only in U.S but also in Pakistan (American Security Project, 2014).

Micah Zenko gave the comments in Council Special Report on drone strike and the U.S. work worldwide to establish rules and norms governing the using of drone strikes. He also discussed the issues in United States on Drone Strike. He stated:-

“There are four critical issues confronting U.S. drone strike policies: coordination with broader U.S. foreign policy objectives, signature strikes and civilian casualties, transparency and oversight, and legality (Zenko, 2013).”

Furthermore, Micah Zenko pointed out that, while refinement in United States drone attacks policies are complicated and can need sophisticated consideration for balance and established clarity by the U.S. to defend sensitive and careful intelligence methods and sources, it would provide United States nationwide interests by:- (Zenko, 2013).

1. *Allowing policymakers and diplomats to paint a more accurate portrayal of drones to counter the myths and misperceptions that currently remain unaddressed due to secrecy concerns;*
2. *Placing the use of drones as a counterterrorism tactic on a more legitimate and defensible footing with domestic and international audiences;*
3. *Increasing the likelihood that the U.S. will sustain the international tolerance and cooperation required to carry out future drone strikes, such as intelligence support and host-state basing rights;*
4. *Exerting a normative influence on the policies and actions of other states; and*
5. *Providing current and future U.S. administrations with the requisite political leverage to shape and promote responsible use of drones by other states and nonstate actors.*

In 2013, U.S. President officially acknowledged that U.S. had been taking “lethal targeting action against terrorists, its associated forces and especially to Al Qaida by using drone strikes and these activities are legal and effective (Obama, 2013).

Although U.S., in these countries (i.e. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen) and other theater countries would be exercises their “self-defense immanent right” against Al Qaida and other non-state actors as shown in United Nation (UN) Charter article 51 (Orr, 2011). U.S. President Obama stated that under international and domestic law, we are at war with Taliban, Al Qaida and their associated allies, the war waged corresponding and proportionally, in final option, and in self-defense.

Harold Hongu Koh the legal adviser of U.S. Department restated this position in language of unmistakable at annual meeting of international law held in Washington on 2010, Koh affirmed that, “as the issue of international rule, the U.S. is fighting the armed war with Taliban, their associated forces and Al Qaida, to response of 9/11 attacks, and can use the army consistent with their inherent right under international law for self-defense (Koh, 2010). So, from the U.S.A perspective, international human rights law applies to their conflict with terrorists and Al Qaeda allies. Thus the means that international humanitarian law should be legally for assessing the American’s lawfulness drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan. Besides, if the U.S.A not in frames of an armed war towards Al Qaida and terrorists in FATA (Northwest Pakistan) so that the application of said law example to the particulars should be regulating the conclusions into lawful. It is more difficult to justify and defend of U.S. drone strikes on Pakistan under international humanitarian law, as the said law needed those territories to exercise the forces as previous resort, “to defend against specific, solid and forthcoming threats of seriously physically injury or death (Tomuschat et al, 2010).

In more ruling, according to Cole that drones are used in three different groups: First, when attacks of ground troops or they become under attacks so that armed drone strikes can be used on other militants, military aircrafts or terrorists; Secondly, drones mostly are used for surveillance in sky of any country to observe the people’s routine life; And thirdly, drones are used in designed missions or plans to kill the terrorists or militants (Cole, 2010).

First, the utilizing of these drone have little difference with other weapons, comprise with traditional manned airplane, under the umbrella of international law: the use of drone will not be lawful on international human right law parameters. Second use of surveillance, drone need did not even be armed and only play for surveillance purpose. Principally, this may not have any human rights law implication, but does concerned to sovereignty, domination and private matters among others. So as in third one, it seems most important cause of drone’s technology and where the focal point of legality and legitimacy has been shed upon. To direct killing of anyone is illegal or legal (commonly illegal) irrespectively of the means used; but armed drones actually makes it easier to killing and murder of humans in remote areas has created and established a powerful connection between targeted killing and drones that concerned with both humanitarian law and international human rights (Alston, 2010).

It also has a great depth that Pakistani Minister Khar’s criticism of U.S. strikes in FATA region in 2011 was phrased in the armed conflict language: She stated that “such drone strikes in Pakistan comprise the troubles and also create issues towards humanitarian law and human rights. Unlawful and reckless conduct of drone strikes cannot be justified anywhere by U.S. or any other authority in the world (Ministry, 2011).

Also number of scholars and researchers have raised a lot of arguments for the illegality and unlawful of U.S. drone attacks on Pakistan. First, terrorism is a law enforcement matter but not military matter (Mary, 2010). Secondly, drone strikes are also violation of territorial sovereignty and supremacy of Pakistan, a state that is not involved with U.S. in armed conflict (Shah, 2010). Furthermore, the drone strikes on Pakistan don’t meet the requirements of UN charter on self-defense (United Nation, 51), as international Court of Justice interpreted and usually international law (Shah, 2010).

As per history point of view, the Security Council (S.C) has passed various resolutions and rules to holding terrorist activities as threats to security and international peace (Gray, 2008). It has criticized acts of terrorism and called upon countries to refrain and desist from providing to support or any kind of assistance to terrorist groups, suppress and prevent terrorist activities, affairs and also their financing, and energetically coordinate with each other to suppress acts of their terrorism emergence within their areas and borders (Security Council Resolution, 53). However, S.C., no resolution has affirmed or declared the right to use armed against another country under the umbrella of counterterrorism (Gray, 2008).

3.2 *Legitimacy of United States Drone Attacks in Pakistan*

The emergence of U.S.A's war on terrorism in Afghanistan gets an end of Taliban's Government in the Afghan territory but not the insurgencies. As a resultant, Afghanistan has become the state of anarchism with the influence of American-instituted Afghanistan regime limited within Kabul city. NATO and U.S. allies' forces failed to control in any part of Afghanistan. Consequently, the country was flooded with millions of radical troops from Middle East, Central Asia and other various parts of world whom perceive the region as religious and spiritual battle zone and also relish the opportunities to fight against the west (Crews, 2009). Due to border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S.A asserts that various such troops usually flees towards Pakistan's frontier region where the terrorists feel safe haven and also be helped by tribal communities (Crews, 2009). Furthermore, U.S. and NATO claimed that various local fighters and troops from Pakistani tribal areas engaged with NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan (Crews, 2009). The actuality of these argues is challengeable to few, but irrespective and whatever of that determination, one object is for convinced: the war against terrorism has spilled and overturned into Pakistan (Hasan, 2009). Beside, the Taliban and terrorists consistent with ethnic group of Pashtun establish at Pakistan and Afghanistan boundaries. Whereas the Afghan terrorists were quite gigantic group so as presently Pakistani various terrorist organizations exist which is communally known as terrorist groups. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is most important which is known largest terrorist group in Pakistan and also safe haven for Taliban in the Pakistan region (FATA Area). TTP is also mostly vigorous in terrorism activities in Pakistan territory. Not only TTP is so theater for Pakistan but a further main group is Haqqani faction who create disturbance in FATA (Pakistan Area) and this group also participated in different terrorism activities in Afghan region (Jaeger, 2012). All of these circumstances, one should analyze the consequence and legality of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan.

3.3 *Pak-U.S. Internal Narrative on Drone Strikes in Pakistan*

The history and narrative of drone strikes by U.S. in Pakistan is very complicated. A number of researchers and historians showed that although civilians opposed the U.S drone programme in Pakistan due to causalities and heavy damaging of their property but in secretly government and Pak Army support this.

In 2004 when drone strikes began to targeted militants in FATA region (Pakistan); at that time Pakistan army granted permission to U.S. for using of Shami and Shahbaz air basis in Pakistan. These were supposedly also used by the U.S. to conduct drone strikes and collect intelligence (Woods, 2011). Initially Pakistan appeared to help the U.S. in drone attacks covertly. From 2004 to till 2007, government of Pakistan claimed responsibility of these strikes that had been conducted by U.S., thus asked the CIA to deny any permission and involvement (Williams, 2009). According to Shah:-

"The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousuf Raza Gilani, has on numerous occasions officially condemned such attacks, and has termed them a violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan and a dangerous course of action that fuels militarism. He has urged the U.S. administration to immediately bring a halt to halt such operations (Shah, 2010)."

It is ambiguity that the Government of Pakistan consent needed an unambiguous, if not formal and written, agreement. It did not look the case in Pakistan, where "while various reports claimed that Pakistan had secretly backed to these operations and permitted to use their air fields. While the Prime Minister of Pakistan denied such agreement between Pak and U.S. (Shah, 2010). According to Down newspaper, in 2009 meeting with Codel Leahy, Asif Ali Zardari (President of Pakistan) said that drone program be given to government of Pakistan to control by Pakistan Military so that we cannot be criticized by their media (Patterson, 2009).

There are abundant evidences by the Pakistani officials' tacit permission and cooperation with U.S. authorities since 2004. In 2008 and 2010, Prime Minister of Pakistan Gilani disclosed that Musharraf's regime had authorized drone strikes to U.S. (Express, 2010). Also Musharraf himself acknowledged in 2013 during media interview that his administration has privately agreed on the drone strikes of United States (Robertson, 2013).

During 2004-2007 Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Pervez Kayani also coordinated with U.S. on drone strikes even after Musharraf's regime (Hameed, 2013). According to Zaidi Hasan that Pakistan's military and civil authorities had supported to U.S. on drone operations. So that in 2008, during presidential elections, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Pervez requested to United States officials for provision of drone coverage in FATA area of Pakistan (Zaidi, 2011). In 2009 confidential cable by American embassy affirmed that Kayani "well knows that drone attacks have been explicit (making some civilians deaths) and killing basically at foreign fighters in FATA, Waziristan (Zaidi, 2011).

All the previous study and analyses showed that Pak Army position towards U.S. strikes reflects the haziness of

their connections towards Taliban. An informed observer said that “The reality is that Pakistan Army wants both, the safe havens for terrorists and also U.S. drone attacks on them (Sethi, 2012).

4. Drones Strike’s Implications on Terrorists and Particularly on Pakistan

Drone strikes have started in FATA Pakistan from 2004 to present date but there is not excellent public information and data avail about how many drone attacks have been taken place, what number of peoples have been wounded and killed by them and what political and social outcome have resulted accurately. Various public studies and researches contradict to each other or current data and conclusions or results that are difficult to reconcile. Because drone strikes data is so inconclusive, the need for dialog with public and judgments are greater than ever. In this part of study we will discuss on drone strike’s effects on Pakistan with different perspectives.

4.1 Drone Strikes and Terrorists

In history mirror, it has been seen that drone strikes have key effects in increasing of terrorist attacks, suicide bombing and also other terrorist activities in Pakistan. Even though drone strikes have achieved gigantic goals against terrorism.

Drone attacks are associated among 24% reduce in terrorists attacks; 22% decrease in the use of Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs); 16% reduce lethality of these attack and probably 32% reduction of suicide bombing (Johnston, 2013). These results at least suggested that drone strikes have reduced terrorist attacks in a current civil war. Beside, various studies showed the increasing in terrorist’s attacks in Pakistan.

First of all it was a big achievement in first strike in Pakistan, for instance, and the killing of Nek Muhammad on June 2004, the key leader of an insurgency in FATA Pakistan. Officials had accused that Wazir Muhammad was harbored figure of Taliban and Al Qaeda (Khan, 2004). Although during drone strikes in FATA Pakistan, a number of high ranking terrorists and including Al Qaida leaders, Mustafa Abu Yazid the chief finance officer of Al Qaida, Sheikh Fateh al Masri, Qari Muhammad Zafar most wanted by U.S. for his suspected involvement in attacks on U.S. consulate in Karachi Pakistan, Mustafa al Jaziri who was also a seiner member of Al Qaida, other terrorists wanted by U.S. for their suspected involvement in bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania during 1998, Baitullah Mehsud leader of TTP have been killed (Bill, 2013). Whatever the program of drone strike is short and success is also so medium, its effectiveness in militant networking degrading in the lengthy is doubtful at best. Terrorist commanding vacuums are not left long unfilled. Abu Laith al-Libi, for example, was killed on 2008 in drone strike who was the third of command of Al Qaida; In 2011 killed a second in command of Al Qaida, Ariyah Abd al-Rahman; Within year in June 4, 2012, Abu Yahya al-Libi, a new Al Qaida’s second in command, was killed by the U.S.; At about three year later Mustafa Abu al-Yazid was killed by drone strike who was also a Al Qaida successor.

For terrorists and their leaders, the appearance of drones over the battleground has also interrupted their current activities. “Life in a cave,” written one enthusiast of airpower, “is no high life casino (Peck, 1928). These strikes may also create a wedge between terrorist and the public by brightly underscoring the counterterrorist’s power to hurt and the lack of insurgent symmetrical reaction. Officials of Obama administration stated that U.S. eliminated at least top 20 leaders of Al Qaida from 2009 to 2012 in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Reuters, 2012). Only in Pakistan, as per New American Foundation, fifty eight of Al-Qaida affiliated and terrorist leaders were killed in Pakistan by U.S. drone strikes during 2004 to 2013 (New America Foundation, 2014). Drone strikes also killed various high level Afghan and Pakistani terrorists and leaders of Al Qaida. In 2009, leader of TTP Baitullah Mehsud was killed; on January 2013, Pakistani Taliban’s suicide wing head Wali Mohammed Toofan was killed; Haqqani network’s third in command Badruddin Haqqani was killed in August 2012 and Ilyas Kashmiri of Harkatul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) was killed in June 2011; Maulvi Nazir Wazir another TTP commander ‘for example’ was killed in drone attack in FATA Pakistan on January 2, 2013 (New America Foundation, 2014). Drone strikes have thus rather disrupted and disturbed the capability of Waziristan-based regional and international terrorists for planning and attacking on American and their allies’ forces in Afghanistan and Afghani terrorists beyond the boundaries and also these strikes affected on terrorists in Pakistan region. Ex-Britain official stated that U.S. drone strikes in FATA area of Pakistan and Yemen showed the considerable effects on militant’s attacks towards European countries and United Kingdom (Ravi, 2013).

Drone strikes have key effects on insurgents, for instance, documents received from Osama bin Laden’s compound Pakistan where Osama Bin Laden advised to members of Al Qaida to move to Kunar the province of Afghanistan for protection from drone strikes (Combating Terrorism Center, 2014). And also several of Al Qaida and Afghan militants have been arrested and captured in Baluchistan (province of Pakistan) since 2009, when the

drone strikes in FATA Pakistan escalated.

Although these are the biggest achievements against the counterterrorism due to drone strikes but as the retaliation, Pakistan has suffered the different problems as suicide bombing and other kind of terrorism by terrorists.

4.2 *Retaliation by Militants*

When we see to back in history of drone attacks and terrorist's attacks in Pakistan, we have found that drone and terrorists attacks have closely impact on each others. David's report that here is a considerable effect of drone attacks on Al Qaeda and Taliban violations in Pakistani region. They have founded in their research that continually drone attacks increased the terrorist's attacks in Pakistan and have a strong impact on Al Qaida and Taliban attacks in Pakistan (Jaeger, 2012).

Even the key terrorist member have been killed by the U.S. drone attacks, but the use of drones are disliked in Pakistani territory because of civilian deaths and others damages, furthermore, conceivable retaliation against civil population by the terrorists. For instance, in the suicide attacking on Police academy at Lahore Pakistan during 2009, in which eighteen peoples were killed, the chief leader of TTP Baitullah Mehsud declared that "suicide attack on police academy at Lahore was in revenge of U.S. strikes in Pakistan (BBC, 2009).

Before 2004, there is no any kind of suicide attacks in Pakistan but after the binging of drone strikes this counterterrorism (suicide attacks) have also increased; On February 2, 2013, for instance, terrorists attack on military check post in Khyber Pakhtoons Khaw, province of Pakistan, neighboring to FATA which resulted the killing of 24 people. Declared credit, the Taliban of Pakistan stated that attack was meant as retaliation and reaction in Pakistani cooperation with NATO and U.S. on drone program (Tribune, 2013).

According to study of Living Under Drone, although the drone attack's frequency increased by U.S. as a retaliation the militants attacks by the Al-Qaeda and Taliban have also been increased (Living Under Drones, 2014). The real benefit is going to radical groups, as well as in the forms of recruiting of new militants. A researcher comprehensively investigation on governance and security into Southern Areas of Pakistan and he stated that whereas anti-strikes oratory should draw various exchanges, "the death of Qari Hussain or other key leaders is much more loss than the recruitment of various foot recruits (Hameed, 2013)."

In the same way, in bomb case on Jun, 2010, Faisal Shahzad (Pakistani American) stated to judge in court that he placed a bomb at Times Square as retaliation of U.S. activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and also their international usage of drone attacks. On asking of judge about killing of innocent civilians, he replied: 'Well, the drone strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan killed the lot of innocents and they also did not care anybody (Shifrel et al, 2010). So the attack in United States by Faisal Shahzad in U.S. and other terrorist's attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan and also in U.S can be retaliation on the usage of drone attacks in Pakistan, Afghan territory and somewhere else was not accepted. Therefore, it should be expected that drone strikes have associated with increased militant's attacks.

5. **Drone Strikes and Its Economical, Psychological, Social and Political Effects on Pakistan**

Drones can hover and fly for days and hours over an area to collect information that operators used to recognize their objectives, strikes and get the instant impact of an attack; According to various researches and interviews, while a drone hover in the sky, uncertainly, that it should attack understandably provokes fear among peoples of FATA (Living Under Drones, 2014). Most of peoples of Northern areas of Pakistan considered those local reporters, giving information and also fitting some chips for drone's guidance towards potential terrorist targets; destabilize the security of their peoples. Terrorists punished the suspected informants into coerced confessions, and mostly release videos and photos to warn their peoples on cooperation with the NATO and United States (Express, 2013). It is although a big psychological effect on the peoples of that region.

The number of studies showed that drone attacks approach hinders the culture of FATA and activities of war, for instance, by leading to the striking of Jirgas in FATA area. It is asserted that leader of tribal area currently distressed to holding the Jirgas (Living Under Drones, 2014). For example, in March 17, 2011 the strike on a tribal Jirgas in Datta Khel in North Waziristan, only 4 were terrorists but 40 peoples were killed (Shah, 2012). Beside, in political point of view, drone strikes have key effects to destabilizing the politics of Pakistan. Government and civilians everyone is worried about drone strikes. According to a study, former President Asif Ali Zardari said to General David Petraeus in a meeting that 'continuing drone strikes on Pakistan, which results in loss of casualties and financial damages are difficult to make clear by the democratic administration. Also this kind of activities is generating a credibility gap (Williams, 2010).

Government of Pakistan is in critical situation due to the growing of big hostility towards U.S. drone attacks. The U.S. drone policy is becoming the dangerous day-to-day for Pakistan; According to a Pew study, only seventeen per cent civilians support the drone attacks against terrorists, even the strikes conducted with the government support (Pew, 2012). This is rising anti-American emotions peaked in October 2012, during the Imran Khan's protesting march against United States, in which millions of protesters attempt to go inside the FATA areas where mostly U.S. drones were attacks (Masood, 2012). After a reviewing of U.S. and Pakistan relationship, the Pakistan's National Assembly insists the United States to stop their strikes and every kind of war in the region (Walsh, 2012).

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