

## **A MULTIPLE VALUES MODEL OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE**

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## ABSTRACT

While students of political tolerance often view tolerance decisions as a trade-off between opposing values (civil liberties versus other values), there have been few explicit attempts to formulate and test such a multiple-values model. With rare exception, researchers typically examine linkages between tolerance judgments and a single value constellation (civil liberties or general norms of democracy) without examining directly the way people rank competing values. In this paper, we use data from a national telephone survey to test a model of how various value trade-off measures (e.g., value conflict) influence citizens' *initial* tolerance decisions, as well as their willingness to stick to that judgment in the face of counter-arguments (i.e., the *pliability* of the initial baseline judgment). We find that while value conflict is often associated with greater political forbearance of disliked groups (e.g., the Klan, flag burners), greater conflict also makes individuals more susceptible to counter-arguments. We also find that when people are presented with roughly equal counter-arguments, the tolerant are much more willing to abandon their initial judgment than the intolerant. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings for the study of political tolerance and political values.

One of the most enduring findings documented by a generation of research on political tolerance is the striking inconsistency between nearly universal public support for abstract, general norms of democracy, and considerably less support for applying these norms to offensive groups. Thus, while upwards of ninety percent of the adult U.S. public agrees with statements like, "I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be," only about thirty to forty percent support allowing members of an offensive group (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan or the Communist Party) to speak in public or teach in schools (Gibson 1992; Sullivan, et al 1982).

This "slippage" between support for democracy in the abstract and intolerance revealed in specific applications was viewed by early studies (e.g., Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964) with some alarm because it suggested a weak and superficial public commitment to democratic values and thus a potential threat to a healthy democracy. Such dire conclusions, however, have been tempered over the years, for they fail to recognize that free expression is only one value which, for some individuals, is seen as conflicting with other important values (Hanson 1993, Marcus et al 1995, Sniderman et al 1996). Thus, citizens may strongly support civil liberties in the abstract but may, simultaneously, feel even more strongly about other values (e.g., national security, equality, law and order) with which free expression may compete. As Gibson and Bingham (1982, 1985) argue, the exercise of civil liberties (by offensive groups) invariably generates conflict among values. While democracy may require free speech, it also requires support for other, competing values, such as social order and majority rule (see also Marcus, et al 1995, 116). Even the most committed civil libertarian, for example, would prohibit falsely yelling "fire!" in a crowded theater. On the other hand, civil libertarians, as represented by the American Civil Liberties

Union, often oppose the banning of “hate speech” and flag burning, and view citizen support for such bans as a potential threat to first amendment freedoms.

Irrespective of the normative dimensions of this debate, however, it is clear that values matter. In particular, the way citizens rank *competing* values should play a major role in conditioning political tolerance judgments. Accordingly, our primary purpose in this paper is to explore a multiple-values model of political tolerance. One of the ironies of political tolerance research is that while analysts have often viewed tolerance decisions as a trade-off between opposing values (civil liberties versus other values), there have been few explicit attempts to formulate and test such a multiple values model. To the contrary, researchers typically examine the linkages between tolerance judgments and a single value constellation: civil liberties or general norms of democracy. To be sure, a handful of studies (e.g., Gibson 1988, Golebiowska 1995) examining political tolerance toward specific groups (e.g., homosexuals) has investigated the impact of other values (e.g., religious values) in addition to civil liberties, but such studies are an exception in the literature. Moreover, as we shall argue below, analysts have not assessed the way citizens rank these competing values. Thus, while many researchers have paid lip service to the view that tolerance decisions result from a competition of values, the failure to provide an explicit test of such a perspective has, in our view, led to a truncated understanding of tolerance judgments.

Our purpose is to explore the way values affect not only citizens’ initial *baseline* tolerance decisions, but also their willingness to stick to that judgment in the face of persuasive appeals to the contrary (i.e., the pliability of the initial baseline judgment). For in the push and shove of political debate over civil liberties issues in the real world, we want to know not just what an individual’s initial position is but also, after being exposed to counter-arguments, how *pliable* the individual’s judgments are (Sniderman, et al 1996). Political tolerance issues are certainly contentious, as demonstrated by the

heated debate over proposals to ban “hate speech” on college campuses (e.g., Gates, et al 1994; Matsuda, et al 1993). Once citizens are exposed to conflicting arguments from various elites (i.e., elected officials, interest groups and the media), their initial judgments may be overturned—intolerant majorities may become the minority view, and vice versa.

And there is every reason to believe that citizens *can* be talked out of their initial response to questions of political tolerance. For the ordinary citizen, civil liberties issues are likely to be complex and remote from everyday experience. More generally, the pliability of tolerance attitudes is consistent with recent theories of the survey response, which suggest that people seldom hold firm or immutable attitudes (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Torangeau and Razinski 1988). Rather, public opinion in a number of domains appears responsive to elite cues (Zaller 1992) and media framing (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997).

One particularly healthy development in political tolerance research is the increased attention to questions of how people respond to persuasive appeals of various kinds (Gibson 1998; Marcus, et al 1995; Sniderman, et al 1996). By mimicking the two-sided nature of civil liberties controversies in the real world, such interventions can shed light on two important questions beyond the scope of earlier studies. First, counter-argument experiments can provide additional evidence for a multiple values perspective. It is one thing to show that citizens’ values are associated with baseline tolerance decisions in the static case; it is quite another to show that these same values predict how people respond to a series of counter-arguments in a more dynamic setting. Second, by confronting people with counter-arguments, we can determine whether the tolerant or the intolerant are more susceptible to change. Thus, the fact that most people initially express political intolerance in a survey may be less worrisome if the intolerant are susceptible to counter-arguments (e.g., free speech appeals)—if, for example, they can be persuaded to give the issue a “sober second thought” (Stouffer 1955). On the other hand, if it is the tolerant who are

less committed to their initial positions, there is more cause for concern (e.g., Gibson 1998; Marcus, et al 1995; Sullivan et al 1993; c.f., Sniderman et al 1996).

We begin by developing a multiple values model of tolerance, which leads to a series of hypotheses about how values are likely to shape baseline political tolerance judgments as well as the pliability of those judgments. We then test these expectations using data from a national survey. After discussing the survey results, we conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings for the study of political tolerance and political values.

### **A MULTIPLE VALUES MODEL**

A large literature demonstrates that values such as individualism, equality, and patriotism are central elements in mass belief systems, shaping and structuring political attitudes in a variety of policy domains (e.g., Feldman 1988, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, McClosky and Zaller 1985). However, as Sniderman (1993, 227) has argued, once we recognize that multiple values underlie political judgments, it is not enough to explore the vertical linkages between “specific opinions and deeper values -- taken one at a time. It is necessary to take into account the relations of values to one another....[For] belief systems differ not only in the priority attached to...values (Rokeach 1973), but also in the degree to which these values are...in conflict or tension (Tetlock 1986)” (emphasis added). Understanding such relations between multiple values would seem to be crucial for the study of political tolerance, for the decision to extend civil liberties to an offensive group is inherently conflictual. Not only are individuals asked, by definition, to tolerate a group they do not like, but, as noted previously, the exercise of civil liberties by offensive groups invariably generates conflict between the values of civil liberties, on the one hand, and cherished values (e.g., equality, order) the group (e.g., the KKK, Nazis) is perceived to threaten, on the other hand.

Both concepts identified in the literature on multiple values—value priorities and value conflict—are likely to affect political tolerance decisions. By *value priority*, we mean the importance that an individual attaches to a given value, relative to other values against which it competes. A person would be said to attach a higher priority to racial equality than free speech, for example, to the degree that s/he ranks equality much higher than other values and free speech much lower. An individual experiences *value conflict*, on the other hand, when s/he simultaneously ranks competing values highly (e.g., Tetlock 1986).<sup>1</sup> We note that value priority and value conflict are conceptually distinct and should affect political tolerance judgments in different ways as well.

To illustrate, consider three citizens with different value rankings of free speech and racial equality who are asked whether they think the Klan should be allowed to give what is likely to be a racist speech in their community. Citizens A and B have roughly the opposite *value priorities*: A attaches a high priority to free speech and a relatively low one to racial equality while B ranks racial equality high and free speech low. Other things equal, citizen A is much more likely to favor allowing the Klan to speak than citizen B. For these two citizens, whose value priorities are heavily skewed in one direction or another, the decision to tolerate the Klan may seem a simple matter. Not so, however, for citizens who find themselves in a state of value conflict. Thus, because citizen C feels that both free speech *and* racial equality are extremely important values, she is likely to react differently to a debate on the Klan's right to give a racist speech than individuals who clearly prefer one value to the other (citizens A and B). Having a strong affinity for both values, for example, should make C susceptible to both sides of the argument in the ensuing debate.

## Hypotheses

*Baseline Tolerance Judgments.* Exactly how might value priorities and value conflict affect baseline tolerance judgments as well as the pliability of these judgments? With respect to baseline judgments, one's *value priorities* should have a clear impact on tolerance decisions. To the extent that people assign a higher priority to free speech over values that a particular target group is presumed to threaten, forbearance is more likely. Likewise, attaching a higher priority to values the group is assumed to threaten should push people in the direction of favoring restrictions on the civil liberties of the group in question. Thus, as in other domains, tolerance judgments should be influenced by the priorities people attach to competing values (e.g., Rokeach 1973, Inglehart 1990).

The likely impact of *value conflict* on baseline judgments is less clear cut. Several studies find that value conflict or ambivalence often leads to greater uncertainty, unpredictability, instability and moderation in one's attitudes (e.g., Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Glathar 1996). Thus, there may simply be more "error" in predicting the tolerance judgments of conflicted individuals. On the other hand, research by Tetlock (e.g., 1984, 1986) suggests that conflict may also lead to greater tolerance by encouraging more complex styles of political reasoning and deliberation. Tetlock finds that when important values are in conflict in a given content domain, people are more likely to engage in more thoughtful and complex styles of political reasoning.<sup>2</sup> This more reflective style of reasoning is similar to the deliberative "sober second thought" that has long been associated with political forbearance (Stouffer 1955, McClosky and Brill 1983). Indeed, Marcus et al (1995, 80) found that when subjects are asked to attend more to their thoughts (instead of their feelings), they tend to select a more tolerant response (but see Kuklinski et al 1991). This, they argue, is "consistent with the notion that a 'sober second



thought’ leads people to reconsider their automatic response, which is a natural intolerance toward groups and ideas they find objectionable.” In short, we expect value conflict to lead to greater political tolerance.

The impact of values is not expected to be invariant, however. Specifically, there is every reason to believe that value priorities and value conflict will be more influential in shaping tolerance judgments among the politically sophisticated. As Zaller (1992, 25) argues, the impact of people’s values always depends on whether citizens possess the knowledge necessary to translate their values into specific political judgments. While politically sophisticated citizens are likely to see the relevance of their general values to concrete civil liberties issues (i.e., should the Klan be allowed to speak?), those with less knowledge may fail to make the necessary connections. In particular, because political sophisticates are likely to experience a sharper degree of value conflict on tolerance issues, they are more likely to respond with greater deliberation and political tolerance.

*Pliability.* Both value constructs should also affect the pliability of tolerance attitudes, or the degree to which people are susceptible to counter-arguments. Value *conflict* should contribute to pliability for a variety of reasons. In the first place, more conflicted individuals are often less confident of their judgments (e.g., Tetlock 1986). In addition, conflicted individuals have predilections that allow them to appreciate both sides of the tolerance issue, and with some prodding they should be more persuadable than individuals who are not conflicted (e.g., McGraw 1994 and Glathar 1994).

The impact of value *priorities* on susceptibility to a counter-argument should be more complex, depending critically on whether one’s value priorities are *consistent* with one’s initial tolerance position. Consider the citizen who assigns a higher priority to free speech than to a competing value and yet, for whatever reason, initially opposes the Klan’s right to speak. Because their value priorities are *inconsistent* with their initial judgment, they are likely to be more *susceptible* to a counter-argument

designed to move them toward tolerance. On the other hand, imagine the citizen whose value priorities are perfectly *consistent* with their initial tolerance judgment (e.g., tolerant with a higher priority for free speech). In this case, their priorities would make them more *resistant* to persuasive appeals (Rokeach 1973). Therefore, we expect to find a significant interaction between the direction of prior tolerance judgments (tolerant versus intolerant) and value priorities.

## **METHODS, DATA, AND MEASURES**

### Strategy

It is essential to ask respondents about specific target groups in order to sharpen the conflict between civil liberties and the particular values that different groups are presumed to threaten. To this end, we have selected three different target groups that an earlier student survey ( $N = 193$ )<sup>3</sup> indicated were associated with threats to different value constellations: (1) the Ku Klux Klan which, through its long-standing advocacy of white supremacy, explicitly challenges the value of racial equality; (2) “homosexual or gay activists,” who, for many, represent a challenge to traditional religious values<sup>4</sup>; and (3) “people who burn the American flag,” who are perceived by many as an affront to patriotic values.

Rather than asking all respondents questions about each of the three target groups, our approach is to randomly assign respondents to one of three treatment groups, each asked about a different target group. Thus, one-third of our sample is asked a battery of tolerance items about the KKK, and so forth. In this fashion, we are able to keep the focus on particular groups and the relevant values the tolerance questions are likely to activate.<sup>5</sup>

In asking respondents about specific target groups, our design diverges from the least-liked protocol introduced by Sullivan, et al. (1979) wherein respondents are asked a battery of tolerance questions pertaining to a group which they have identified as the one they “like the least.” Despite its many advantages, the least-liked approach is not easily amenable to testing a multiple values framework, for it is

a safe bet that many people who select a particular group (e.g., flag burners) as the one they like the least also attach a high priority to the value the group is assumed to threaten (e.g., patriotism). With such a homogenous group of subjects, the variance of any value preference measure is likely to be severely restricted. To keep the focus on political *tolerance*, however, we restrict the analyses below to respondents who rate the group in question on the negative end of a standard feeling thermometer scale (i.e., 0 to 49 on a 100-point scale).<sup>6</sup> Thus, consistent with the definition of political tolerance, our respondents are being asked to tolerate a target they dislike to varying degrees.

### Data

Data for this analysis were taken from the 1994 Multi-Investigator Study, a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) national survey administered by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of California, Berkeley. The 1,464 respondents selected for the random digit telephone sample were interviewed by the SRC between June 10 and September 30, 1994.

### Measures

*Political Tolerance.* As noted, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions -- an assignment which dictated the target group ("members of the Ku Klux Klan," "homosexual or gay activists," and "people who burn the American flag") about which the individual would be asked. After rating the target group using a conventional (0 to 100 degree) feeling thermometer, respondents were asked three *baseline* tolerance questions about whether their group should be permitted to: 1) "make a speech in your city"; 2) "hold a rally in your area"; and 3) "have a ... program on a community access cable television station in your area." The three items were then summed to form a Political Tolerance Index that ranges from 3 to 12 (individual items utilized 1 to 4 Likert formats), with higher values representing maximum levels of tolerance (average Cronbach's alpha across the three groups = .90).<sup>7</sup>

To measure the *pliability* of political tolerance judgments, after answering two of the tolerance questions (permitting cable access and allowing a rally) respondents were read a counter-argument tailored to their initial baseline response and then asked whether they would still feel the same about the issue (...“would you still be in favor of (opposed to) allowing [the group to hold a rally/have cable access], or would you be less in favor (opposed), or would you be opposed to (in favor of)”). Pliability is assessed as the degree to which the individual moves away from his or her initial position in response to the counter-argument and is measured on a three-point scale ranging from no change (coded as 0), to less in favor (opposed) (coded 1), to switching from tolerance to intolerance or vice-versa (2). The baseline tolerance items and associated counter-arguments are presented in the Appendix.

*Value Measures.* Most tolerance studies measure commitment to civil liberties (and related constructs, such as democratic or legal norms) with a standard intensity measure consisting of a battery of Likert items. One problem with such measures, for our purposes, is that it is possible to indicate agreement with the value without it being a high priority for the individual (Alwin and Krosnick 1985). By contrast, our measures rely on a ranking procedure that can be easily administered over the telephone. To rank four values (free speech, racial equality, patriotism and religious values), respondents were presented with all possible pairs of values (e.g., free speech and racial equality) and asked to rate which of the two in the pair is more important (see the Appendix for the wording of the values and the questions).<sup>8</sup> This procedure thus allows us to give each value an initial value ranking that ranges from 3 (it is *always* ranked more highly than the other three values) to 0 (it is *never* ranked more highly than the others) for each respondent.

The rankings are then used to compute measures of value priorities and value conflict. *Value Priorities* is assessed by subtracting an individual’s value ranking for free speech from his or her ranking

of the other relevant, competing value. Thus, if the individual is asked about the KKK, the competing values are free speech versus racial equality, and the value priority measure ranges from +3, the highest possible priority given to free speech (3 - 0), to -3, the highest priority given to racial equality (0 - 3). For individuals who are asked about the Klan, those who score a 3 on this scale always ranked free speech more highly than other values, while racial equality was never ranked more highly than the other values. By the same token, individuals who score a -3 on the same scale always ranked racial equality, but never ranked free speech more highly than the other values. Those who score at the midpoint of the scale (at 0), rated the two values similarly. In this fashion, we are able to discern not *whether* a given value is supported by each respondent but, more importantly for our purposes, how strongly it is supported *relative to another competing value*.

Our measure of *Value Conflict* is based on a formula designed by Thompson, Zanna and Griffin (1995) that has received extensive validity testing from Glathar (1995):<sup>9</sup>

$$\text{Value Conflict} = (V_1 + V_2)/2 - |V_1 - V_2|/2,$$

where  $V_1$  is the initial ranking for the first value (free speech in this case) and  $V_2$  is the ranking of the second value (the other relevant, competing value). The computational formula depicts value conflict as being equal to the average importance of the component values corrected by the dissimilarity in their magnitude. In other words, the formula reflects the intuitive idea that value conflict is greater when both values are important and are similarly ranked. As an example, an individual who ranks both values highly (e.g., 3 for free speech and 2 for equality) would achieve the maximum value conflict score (5/2-1, or +1.5). By contrast, individuals with low levels of value conflict who rank one value very high (3) and the other value very low (0) would achieve the lowest score on the value conflict scale (-1.5). One

advantage of the above operationalization is that the correlation between our measures of value priorities and value conflict is only .03, which indicates that the two measures are basically orthogonal.

*Control Variables.* Also included in the model predicting political tolerance are a number of control variables identified in the literature as important antecedents of tolerance: self-esteem,<sup>10</sup> ideology,<sup>11</sup> political knowledge,<sup>12</sup> education, age, and gender. In addition, thermometer ratings of the group were included as a crude proxy for perceptions of threat from the group.<sup>13</sup>

## ANALYSIS

### Predicting Baseline Political Tolerance Judgments

To what extent do value priorities and value conflict shape baseline political tolerance attitudes?

To answer this question, we regress the political tolerance index on the two value variables (value priorities and value conflict) and the control variables described above. Because the impact of the value measures may vary for different target groups (e.g., Rohrschneider 1995), we include in the equation two group dummy variables (gay activists and flag burners, with the KKK serving as the contrast group) and four multiplicative terms formed by multiplying the two group dummies by the two value measures. In addition, because the impact of our value variables (priorities and conflict) is likely to be greater among political sophisticates, we included two additional interaction terms, formed by multiplying the value variables by political knowledge. Before estimation, the substantive variables in the analysis were coded so that expected relationships yielded positive coefficients. In addition, the variables involved in the interactions were “centered” (the mean value was subtracted) to aid in the interpretation of the “main effects” variables.<sup>14</sup>

--TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE--

The regression results for the baseline political tolerance index are presented in Table 1. As indicated by the first row of (OLS regression) coefficients in the table, the impact of value priorities is substantial and in the anticipated direction. As expected, attaching a higher priority to free speech over other relevant values leads respondents to greater political tolerance toward a disliked group. The second row of coefficients reveals a more novel finding: baseline political tolerance judgments are also affected by value conflict, with stronger conflict associated with greater political tolerance. We return to this finding in the discussion of the interaction between values and political knowledge below. For now, we note value conflict appears to lead to more deliberative reasoning styles that foster political tolerance.

Notably, none of the interactions formed between the value variables and the group dummies is statistically significant, indicating that there are no significant differences in the impact of either value priorities or value conflict across the three target groups. Thus, regardless of the specific target and the different value trade-offs that come into play, the relative importance of competing values has a similar effect on political tolerance judgments.<sup>15</sup>

The impact of multiple values is not invariant, however. Consistent with our expectations, the impact of both value variables on political tolerance increases significantly at higher levels of political knowledge. The computed effects of the value variables at different levels of political knowledge are displayed at the bottom of Table 1. At low levels of political knowledge (one standard deviation below the mean), values have only a slight impact in shaping tolerance ( $b$  for Value Priorities = .268, .084 for Value Conflict). But for the politically knowledgeable (at one standard deviation above the mean) – i.e., individuals who are more likely to see connections between their values and political tolerance issues – the impact of the value measures is substantial ( $b$  = .59 and .50, respectively).

Finally, we note that – in keeping with prior studies – higher levels of political tolerance are significantly associated with greater political knowledge, less negative affect toward the group, more formal education, being younger, and being male. To place our findings in perspective, then, values are certainly important in shaping baseline tolerance judgments, but two caveats are in order. First, values are much less important among the politically unsophisticated. And second, values constitute only one of several bases for deciding whether to tolerate a disliked group. Thus, even after taking into account citizens' value priorities and conflict, there still remains a good deal of slippage between general value orientations and specific tolerance judgments. Whether these values can be activated to get people to *revise* their initial judgments remains to be seen.

#### Predicting Pliability

It is one thing to demonstrate that competing values shape baseline tolerance judgments; it is quite another to uncover evidence that such values affect one's susceptibility to counter-arguments designed to persuade citizens to give up their initial positions. Recall that pliability is assessed as the degree to which respondents move away from their initial judgment after being read a counter-argument challenging their initial position. While similar in design, the two counter-argument experiments were created for slightly different purposes.

*The Cable TV Experiment.* The primary objective of the Cable Access experiment is to see whether it is possible to talk people out of their initial judgment on tolerance by posing a threat to values on the other side of the issue. Susceptibility to such value threats would lend additional support to our claim that values matter (this time in a more dynamic setting). Initially *tolerant* individuals were asked if they would still be tolerant if many people were offended by a cable program that promoted: "the idea that blacks are inferior to whites" (and thus threatened the value of racial equality, in the case of the



KKK), “burning the American flag” (threatening patriotism, in the case of flag burners) or “a homosexual lifestyle” (threatening traditional religious values, in the case of gay activists). Initially *intolerant* individuals, on the other hand, were presented with an argument where free speech principles were threatened if the cable station “also denied other groups the right to speak on television” (thus posing a threat to free speech). Thus, by posing a threat to the value which their initial tolerance judgment has forsaken, our objective is to determine whether citizens’ value rankings (i.e., value priorities and value conflict) affect their susceptibility to such value-based appeals.

*The Rally Experiment.* One potential drawback of counter-argument experiments is that because the persuasive appeals are different (being tailored to the direction of one’s initial response), it is difficult to determine whether people on one side of the issue change because their positions are more pliable or because they were simply subjected to stronger counter-arguments. The second persuasion experiment, asked in connection with the Hold Rally question, is designed to determine whether tolerant or intolerant responses are more pliable by presenting people with roughly equivalent counter-arguments. Thus, tolerant respondents were asked whether they would still favor allowing the group “to hold a rally if police protection for this rally would cost the taxpayers *more than one hundred thousand dollars?*” Intolerant respondents were asked whether they would still be opposed to the rally if it would cost taxpayers *more than one hundred thousand dollars* defending the city against a lawsuit brought against the city by the group in question for denying its right to hold a rally. Although we have no guarantee that respondents *perceive* the counterarguments as identical (e.g., individuals may consider spending money for police protection as either more or less burdensome than spending it for legal defense), the monetary costs (\$100,000) imposed in the counter-arguments, at the very least, provide us with the best possible opportunity for objective parity across sides of the argument.

*Estimation.* The degree to which people change their baseline judgments in response to counter-arguments (i.e., pliability) is assumed to be a function of many of the same predictors of baseline judgments encountered in Table 1, including value priorities, value conflict, and various control variables. The equations estimated in Table 2, however, differ from those in Table 1 in several important respects. First, to assess whether tolerant individuals are more easily swayed than intolerant individuals, we include a measure of the initial direction of the baseline tolerance judgment (scored 0 if intolerant, 1 if tolerant). Second, because the impact of the value variables is likely to be conditional on the direction of the initial tolerance judgment (which also determined the wording of the counter-argument), we included two interactive terms formed by multiplying prior tolerance by the two value measures.<sup>16</sup> And third, because the dependent variables in this case (Cable Access and Hold Rally) are three-point scales, ordered logit procedures were used to estimate the two equations.<sup>17</sup>

--TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE--

*Results.* Table 2 displays the maximum likelihood (logit) coefficients and standard errors for each of the predictors in the two pliability equations. As the first four rows of coefficients in the table indicate, change in tolerance judgments is often, though not always, significantly affected by the value variables and their interaction with baseline tolerance judgments. Given the coding of the variables, the first two rows of coefficients in the table indicate the impact of the value variables on pliability among the initially intolerant. Thus, placing a higher priority on free speech versus competing values (first row of coefficients) makes people more likely to move toward a tolerant response when presented with a counter-argument. The impact of value conflict (second row) is also in the anticipated direction, with greater conflict leading to greater susceptibility to persuasive appeals.<sup>18</sup> The differences across equations are also important here, for value conflict has a slightly smaller impact in the Rally equation than in the Cable equation;

consequently, the former coefficient is significant at a lower probability level than the latter (.10 versus .05 for a two-tailed test). As might be expected, the value-based appeals of the Cable experiment were more effective in mobilizing the effects of value conflict than the Rally experiment. Finally, three of the four interactions between the value variables and prior tolerance are significant (rows 3 and 4).

While the results in Table 2 are useful for assessing the statistical significance of the various effects, especially the interactive variables, the coefficients for the value variables only give the impact for the initially intolerant. To gain a better appreciation of the conditional effects of the value variables, we present in Figure 1 several graphs of the predicted probability of changing in response to the counter-arguments among both the initially tolerant and intolerant across the range of the value variables.<sup>19</sup>

--FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE--

At the top of Figure 1 (A) is displayed a graph of the probability of change for the Cable Access question across the value priorities scale among two groups of respondents – those who gave either tolerant or intolerant baseline responses (i.e., those who were either in favor of, or opposed to, allowing the disliked group access to a cable television station). The intersecting plots for these two groups reveal how the effect of value priorities on change runs in opposite directions, depending on one's initial baseline response. For individuals who gave a tolerant response, moving toward the free speech end of the value priorities continuum increases *resistance* to persuasion. For those who initially gave an intolerant response, however, an increased priority for free speech is associated with greater *susceptibility* to change in response to the persuasive appeal.<sup>20</sup> In essence, then, in keeping with our expectations, susceptibility to change is greatest for individuals whose value priorities are inconsistent with their baseline tolerance judgments: those who are initially *tolerant* who place a high priority on values threatened by the group, as well as *intolerant* individuals who place a high priority on free speech. Clearly, one's value

priorities affect one's susceptibility to value-based appeals in theoretically interpretable ways, though the impact of such priorities is evident only after taking into account one's baseline tolerance judgments.

A slightly different pattern is displayed in the following graph for value conflict (Figure 1.B). Here, the greatest impact of value conflict is among the initially intolerant; the more attenuated (and inverse) effect for the initially tolerant is not significant. For the initially intolerant, greater value conflict is associated with greater susceptibility to persuasive appeals. Specifically, when asked whether they would still deny the group cable access if the cable station denied other (potentially offensive) groups the right to speak on television, the intolerant become less so if they are conflicted. Presumably, because conflicted individuals tend to see the costs and benefits associated with both sides of the tolerance issue, they are more willing to move to the opposite side of the issue in response to a counter-argument. But why is it only the intolerant who are so moved? One possible explanation is that initial judgments of political tolerance are already characterized to some degree by the sober second thought of deliberation that value conflict encourages. Having already considered the costs of "offensive speech" from the group in question, the conflicted are not as likely to be swayed by an additional reminder of the costs of such speech in the counter-argument presented to them ("What if many people were offended by the program because it promoted [the idea that blacks are inferior to whites, burning the flag, a homosexual lifestyle]?").

Thus, to summarize the results thus far, both value measures clearly condition the pliability of individuals' tolerance judgments, particularly when respondents are presented with a counter-argument that appeals to opposing values. One question that the Cable Access experiment is unable to answer convincingly, however, is whether the initially tolerant or intolerant are more persuadable? We turn now to the Rally Experiment, which tests the commitment of respondents to stick to their initial position in the

tolerance debate by presenting them with scenarios that impose equivalent monetary costs on their initial position.

As Figures 1.C and 1.D make plain, the initially tolerant are much more likely to move away from their position than the intolerant, who seem almost intransigent by comparison. Apparently, many tolerant citizens find the “costs” of forbearance borne by the city – \$100,000 in this case – too high. To be sure, the initially intolerant are more likely to move toward tolerance if they tilt toward the free speech end of the value priorities scale (Figure 1.C) or they are conflicted (Figure 1.D). But while moving from the polar extremes of the two value scales makes intolerant individuals about 10 percent more likely to move toward tolerance, the initially tolerant are approximately twice as likely to move toward intolerance.

This conclusion, of course, is based on the assumption of equivalency between counter-arguments. We therefore acknowledge the possibility that the anti-rally argument was somehow more powerful, thereby accounting for the asymmetry of pliability between the two groups. Nonetheless, to the degree that our counterarguments *are* equivalent, it appears decidedly easier to talk the tolerant out of their position than the intolerant. These results are consistent with those of Marcus, et al (1995) who found that more tolerant individuals are less likely to act on their attitudes (e.g., voting against a judge who had issued an order forbidding an offensive group to hold a rally) than the intolerant (see also, Sullivan et al 1993). Our results help to explain why the tolerant appear less committed to their initial position: while the intolerant are often susceptible to value-based arguments that appeal to free speech principles (Cable and Rally experiments), the initial judgments of the tolerant appear to be much more tentative than the intolerant (Rally Experiment).

Thus, the “good news” part of our change analysis for civil libertarians is that the initially intolerant can be persuaded toward greater tolerance with appeals directed to free speech principles. Importantly,

the reason why the intolerant can be moved to tolerance is that many intolerant individuals do, in fact, value free speech principles, even if free speech is not always the most important value for them. In addition, many other individuals attach a high importance to both sets of competing values and these conflicted individuals are also capable of being moved to tolerance. The “bad news,” however, is that the tolerant appear less committed to their initial position. Not only can they be moved toward intolerance with an appeal to the values the target group may threaten (Cable Experiment), but, more consequentially, they are much less willing to pay what must be considered a nominal monetary cost to guarantee the freedom of groups they dislike (Rally Experiment). Their sober second thought is not without equivocation. It is as if the initially tolerant, having given the issue a second thought, are, regrettably, more willing to rethink the issue again.

## **DISCUSSION**

Research on political tolerance has made enormous strides in the last few decades in advancing our knowledge of how citizens arrive at tolerance judgments (e.g., see Marcus et al. 1995; and Sniderman 1993 for reviews). Spurred by numerous innovations in measurement, design and applications, we now have a much more detailed portrait of how individuals weigh various considerations in deciding whether to extend basic civil liberties to groups they do not like. One of the ironies of this research, however, is that while analysts have often viewed tolerance decisions as a trade-off between opposing values (civil liberties versus other values), there have been few explicit attempts to formulate and test such a multiple values model. Our study sought to do just that. Instead of the usual intensity measure of support for a single value constellation (civil liberties or democratic norms), we developed value measures based on rankings of multiple values that can be administered in a mass telephone survey. The two orthogonal measures – value priorities and value conflict – were found to play an important role in

shaping both initial (baseline) tolerance judgments and the pliability of those judgments in various counter-argument experiments.

With respect to baseline tolerance judgments, our most remarkable finding is that value conflict (i.e., the extent to which individuals rank both competing values as important), in addition to value priorities (i.e., the relative rankings of free speech versus competing values), engenders greater political tolerance. Our results here are most consistent with accumulating evidence from a series of experimental studies by Marcus et al (1995) documenting the benefits of more thoughtful reasoning. Marcus and his colleagues found that when people are instructed to attend to their thoughts, they tend to select a more tolerant response. Consistent with the adage, “no pain, no gain,” the discomfort associated with intense value conflict apparently spurs more thoughtful and complex political reasoning (Tetlock, 1986), nudging citizens toward the “sober second thought” that overrides their first inclination toward intolerance.

Importantly, however, our results also suggest that tolerance issues do not automatically activate competing value assessments among the mass public. Values matter most for the politically sophisticated who see a connection between their general value orientations and specific tolerance issues. The influence of the value measures was small to nonexistent among those low in political knowledge. The fact that value conflict has almost no impact among the less knowledgeable is not surprising: if the connections between values and tolerance issues remains murky in one’s mind, or if values are not activated in the context of political tolerance issues, value conflict (as well as value priorities) is unlikely to matter. This also suggests that one possible reason why Tetlock has been so successful in documenting a relationship between value conflict and more complex reasoning is that he typically studies either elite policy-makers (e.g., 1984), on the one hand, or students who are asked to write essays about their thinking on particular

policy issues (1986). Our results suggest that the deliberative effects of value conflict experienced by Tetlock's subjects are likely to be confined to the politically knowledgeable in a mass survey context.

Our most important findings deal with people's responses to counter-arguments designed to persuade them to revise their initial tolerance judgment. We found that both value priorities and value conflict tend to work in theoretically explicable ways in shaping citizens' susceptibility to counter-arguments. As expected, for example, value *conflict* was associated with greater susceptibility to value-based persuasive appeals, presumably because conflicted individuals are cross-pressured and can see some merit to both sides of the tolerance issue. On the other hand, the impact of citizens' value *priorities* on susceptibility to change was found to hinge critically on the consistency between their value rankings and their initial tolerance judgments. When the two are consistent (e.g., when those who prefer free speech initially select a tolerant response), value priorities work as an anchor for tolerance judgments, making people more resistant to counter-arguments. When the two are inconsistent (e.g., among the intolerant who assign a higher priority to free speech), however, people are more susceptible to value-laden appeals. Politically, then, one unforeseen consequence of the "slippage" between people's value priorities and their initial tolerance judgments is that the intolerant remain ripe for political persuasion. Thus, because a nontrivial portion of the intolerant value free speech, they can be moved to tolerance with an appeal to free speech principles. By the same token, however, a nontrivial portion of the initially tolerant can also be moved to restrict the rights of disliked groups with appeals to values (e.g., racial equality, patriotism) that compete with free speech.

On the more general question of whether the tolerant or the intolerant are more persuadable, our findings varied across experiments. The results of the Cable Access Experiment indicated that the intolerant were just as likely to revise their initial judgment in response to the counter-argument as the



tolerant (i.e., the main effect for initial tolerance was not significant in Table 1). Such findings are consistent with Sniderman et al's (1996) study of tolerance issues revolving around the Canadian Charter of Rights, where respondents initially opposed to banning hate speech were no more likely to change in response to a counter-argument than respondents who initially favored banning hate speech. Thus, the net political effect of exposing citizens to persuasive appeals is nil, since neither group appears more pliable or persuadable.

But this must be considered a tentative assessment because the two counter-arguments used were not equivalent. A very different conclusion emerges from our Rally Experiment, where the tolerant and intolerant were asked to pay equivalent monetary costs in the counter-arguments. In this study, however, we have found the tolerant to be much more susceptible to persuasion than the intolerant, who seemed almost intransigent by comparison. It is worth noting that the findings of the Rally Experiment are consistent with studies by Marcus et al (1995) and Sullivan et al (1993), who found that the tolerant are much less likely than the intolerant to indicate they would *act* on their judgments (e.g., sign a petition, join a peaceful demonstration) when given the opportunity. Taken together, these results suggest that the tolerant are less committed to their initial judgment. A relatively modest increase in the costs of tolerance – either in the form of participation costs or monetary costs – is sufficient to deter forbearance. Given the fact that tolerance is a distinctly minority position among the mass public to begin with, this lack of commitment is certainly cause for concern.

Our findings on value conflict help us to understand this lack of commitment among the initially tolerant. While value conflict promotes greater tolerance in people's baseline responses—presumably by prompting a “sober second thought”—value conflict also makes the tolerant more ambivalent and thus more susceptible to what must be considered fairly weak appeals to intolerance. In this way, value

conflict leads to a shaky foundation of support for political tolerance among the public. For having given the issue a second thought, the tolerant are more than willing to rethink the issue again.

We conclude with three important caveats. First, our findings on the greater persuasibility of the tolerant than the intolerant are based on our belief that the strength of the counter-arguments used in the Rally Experiment is roughly equal. As indicated earlier, however, we need to exercise caution in assuming perfect equivalency of the counter-arguments, inasmuch as those on one side of the issue may subjectively *perceive* their costs as greater than those on the other side. Replications are essential before we can accept the validity of such an approach to study pliability. The fact that our results are consistent with other studies using different methods, however, gives us more confidence in our findings.

Second, because the 1994 Multi-Investigator Survey did not include a conventional intensity measure of values, we cannot determine with the available data whether our value priorities measure performs any better than conventional measures. Further effort must be devoted to examining the properties of the two types of measures and their relationship to political tolerance judgments. At the very least, however, our value trade-off measures performed largely as predicted; they proved to be important predictors of initial and changing tolerance judgments in theoretically explicable ways.

Finally, we need to keep in mind the underlying message of this paper: values matter, but their impact on tolerance is circumscribed in a number of important ways. As noted earlier, values were rather anemic predictors of baseline tolerance judgments among the politically unsophisticated. And values were much less important in predicting responses to the counter-arguments if the appeals did not implicate values in some obvious way. The implication is clear: under many conditions competing values (at least as we have measured them here) are simply not activated when ordinary citizens respond to tolerance issues.

On the other hand, when values do matter, considering the trade-offs between multiple values manifestly enhances our understanding of political tolerance among the mass public.

## **APPENDIX**

### **Political Tolerance Survey Items**

#### **Political Tolerance Items**

##### **1) Speech in Your City Question**

- a) Baseline Item Only: Suppose (members of the Ku Klux Klan, people who burn the American flag, homosexual or gay activists) wanted to give a speech in your city? Would you be strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed?

##### **2) Cable Access Question**

- a) Baseline Item: Suppose (members of the Ku Klux Klan, people who burn the American flag, homosexual or gay activists) wanted to have a weekly cable television program on a community access cable television station in your area? Would you be strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed?

##### **b) Counter-argument:**

- i) If in favor: What if many people were offended by the program because it promoted (the idea that blacks are inferior to whites, burning the flag, a homosexual lifestyle)? Would you still be as much in favor of allowing (group) to have a weekly cable television program, would you be less in favor, or would you be opposed to allowing (group) to have the television program?
- ii) If opposed: What if the cable television station also denied other groups the right to speak on television because these groups offend many people? Would you still be as opposed to allowing (group) to have a weekly cable television program, would you be less opposed, or would you be in favor of allowing (group) to have the television program?

##### **3) Hold Rally Question**

- a) Baseline Item: Suppose (group) wanted to hold a rally in your area? Would you be strongly in favor of their right to hold the rally, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed?

##### **b) Counter-argument:**

- i) If in favor: What if police protection for this rally would cost the taxpayers more than one hundred thousand dollars? Would you still be in favor of allowing (group) to hold a rally in

that city, would you be less in favor, or would you be opposed to allowing (group) to hold a rally?

ii) If opposed: What if the taxpayers would have to spend more than one hundred thousand dollars defending the city in court because (group) sued the city for denying its right to hold a rally. Would you still be as opposed to allowing (group) to hold a rally, would you be less opposed, or would you be in favor of allowing (group) to hold the rally?

### **Value Ranking Items**

There are certain issues that everyone agrees are important. For these next questions I will read you two statements at a time and then I'd like you to tell me which one is more important to you personally.

First, if you had to choose, do you think it is more important to...

The four values that appeared in the six value pairs were represented by: 1) "protect[ing] free speech for all people, no matter what their views are"; 2) "promot[ing] racial harmony and equality between blacks and whites"; 3) "maintain[ing] pride and respect for our country"; and 4) "promot[ing] traditional religious values in politics and society."

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**Table 1. Predicting Political Tolerance from Value Priorities and Value Conflict**

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Political Tolerance Index</u>		
	<u>Unst.</u>	<u>(se)</u>	<u>Stand.</u>
<b>Values</b>			
Value Priorities	.43**	(.04)	.26
Values Conflict	.29**	(.07)	.11
<b>Group*Value Interactions</b>			
Gay Activists	-.06	(.21)	-.01
Flag Burners	-.66**	(.18)	-.11
Val Conflict * Gays	-.17	(.18)	-.03
Val Conflict * Flag	-.29	(.18)	-.05
Val Priorities * Gays	-.05	(.11)	-.02
Val Priorities * Flag	-.05	(.11)	-.01
<b>Control Variables</b>			
Political Knowledge	.55**	(.07)	.26
Val Priorities * Knowledge	.12**	(.03)	.10
Val Conflict * Knowledge	.15**	(.05)	.07
Group Affect	.06**	(.01)	.22
Ideology	.01	(.05)	.01
Self-Esteem	.01	(.07)	.01
Education	.37**	(.08)	.15
Age	-.03**	(.01)	-.15
Gender	.52**	(.16)	.09
Intercept	4.98**	(.62)	
R <sup>2</sup>	.378		
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	.367		
N	909		

*Note:* Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (Unst.), with standard errors (se) in parentheses, alongside standardized coefficients. Variables are coded so that higher values indicate: greater political tolerance, higher priority for free speech vs competing value (racial equality for KKK, religious values for gay activists, and patriotism for flag burners), greater value conflict, greater political knowledge, higher thermometer ratings of the target group, more conservative, greater self-esteem, more formal education, older and female. Group dummies indicate assignment of gay activists or flag burners as target group, with the KKK as the omitted group.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ .

<u>Computed Interactive Effects</u>		<u>Value Priorities</u>	<u>Value Conflict</u>
Political Knowledge	- 1 s.d.	.27	.08
	Mean	.43	.29
	+ 1 s.d.	.59	.50

**Table 2. Predicting Pliability of Political Tolerance from Value Priorities and Value Conflict**


<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Change in Political Tolerance</b>			
	<b>Cable Access</b>		<b>Hold Rally</b>	
	MLE	(se)	MLE	(se)
<b>Values</b>				
Value Priorities	.12*	(.05)	.12*	(.05)
Values Conflict	.19*	(.08)	.15	(.09)
<b>Values * Prior Tolerance</b>				
Value Priority * Toler	-.36**	(.10)	-.19*	(.09)
Value Conflict * Toler	-.29*	(.14)	-.08	(.14)
Prior Tolerance	.20	(.17)	1.81**	(.18)
<b>Control Variables</b>				
Group Affect	.02**	(.01)	.02*	(.01)
Ideology	.07	(.04)	.01	(.01)
Political Knowledge	.04	(.06)	-.14**	(.06)
Self-Esteem	-.11	(.06)	-.16*	(.06)
Education	-.10	(.07)	.06	(.07)
Age	.01	(.01)	-.01	(.01)
Gender	-.04	(.15)	-.23	(.15)
Intercept1	.23	(.55)	-.19	(.56)
Intercept2	-2.1**	(.56)	-.24**	(.06)
-2 X Log Likelihood	1453.55		1487.52	
Chi Square	40** (12 <i>df</i> )		170** (12 <i>df</i> )	
Percent Correctly Predicted	62.8%		72.6%	
N	904		904	

*Note:* Entries are unstandardized maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) from categorical logit regression, with standard errors (se) in parentheses. Variables are coded so that higher values indicate: greater political tolerance, higher priority for free speech vs competing value (racial equality for KKK, religious values for gay activists, and patriotism for flag burners), greater value conflict, greater political knowledge, higher thermometer ratings of the target group, more conservative, greater self-esteem, more formal education, older and female.


\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ .

**Figure 1.**  
**Predicted Probability of Change among Intolerant and Tolerant across Value Scales**

**Figure 1.A Value Priorities, Cable Access Question**





**Figure 1.B. Value Conflict, Cable Access Question**



Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the estimated logit equations in Table 2 (see note 19). Higher values on the Value Priorities and Value Conflict scales indicate greater priority for free speech (vs competing value) and greater value conflict, respectively.

**Figure 1. Cont'd**  
**Predicted Probability of Change among Intolerant and Tolerant across Value Scales**



Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the estimated logit equations in Table 2 (see note 19). Higher values on the Value Priorities and Value Conflict scales indicate greater priority for free speech (vs competing value) and greater value conflict, respectively.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Value conflict has been defined and measured in various ways in recent studies (e.g., Brehm and Alvarez 1995). Our definition is consistent with the value pluralism model of Tetlock (1986) and others (e.g., Glathar 1996, McGraw and Glathar 1994), which emphasizes the degree to which one assigns a high priority to competing values.

<sup>2</sup> Tetlock calls this an “integratively complex” style of reasoning where individuals take into consideration more (values) and see more connections between the values. In the domain of economic policy, for example, economic moderates who value both individual economic freedom and social equality tend to eschew simple one-sided solutions to trade-off problems and see both the costs and benefits of economic policy choices. See Jackson and Marcus (1975) for a similar operationalization of what they term “cognitive complexity.”

<sup>3</sup> In an omnibus survey of undergraduates in several American Government classes, those who agreed that (the Ku Klux Klan, a person who burned the American flag, or homosexuals) should be banned from running for office, were asked to “take a few minutes to explain your answer...indicating what exactly are the negative or harmful consequences associated with allowing the group to run for public office?” The value constellations associated with each target group are those that were mentioned most frequently in the student protocols. Tolerant respondents mentioned free speech considerations, while intolerant respondents mentioned threats to racial harmony and equality, religious values, and patriotism, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Gibson’s (1988) study of political tolerance of homosexuals, where he finds that traditional religious and moral values engender intolerance of homosexuals.

<sup>5</sup> A particular worry is that, in the process of asking respondents about their willingness to tolerate several groups seriatim, individuals will begin to respond in a generic, rather than in a group-specific, fashion.

<sup>6</sup> Notably, the average thermometer rating for the three groups is 6.7, with 63 percent of the sample rating the group at 0 on a 100-point scale and 80 percent rating the group at 10 or less.

<sup>7</sup> We report analyses of the Political Tolerance Index rather than of the specific tolerance items for ease of presentation. All analyses were performed on individual items as well, but we did not find

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any remarkable inter-item difference worthy of mention. Levels of political intolerance across these items ranged from about 60% to 70%, similar to various other national studies.

<sup>8</sup> Value ranking procedures are quite common in the social sciences, where a number of analysts have followed Rokeach's (1973) lead in arguing that values are often thought to be inherently comparative and competitive, and thus the "choice" nature of the task fits nicely with this conceptualization (e.g., Inglehart 1990, Tetlock 1986). On the other hand, some may question whether our "forced-choice" value ranking measure imposes an artificial contrast between values if, for example, respondents are not given the option of indicating that both (or all) values are equally desirable. However, the high response rate for the value trade-off items (97%) suggests that asking people to choose between the value pairs was neither unreasonable nor confusing. It is also interesting to note that while the questions did not preclude respondents from volunteering that both values in the pair were equally important, less than 2% of the respondents did so.

<sup>9</sup> Specifically, Glathar (1996) found this operationalization of value conflict to outperform a multiplicative measure developed by Katz and Hass (1988) (and employed by Alvarez and Brehm [1995]), where value conflict is computed as the product of two intensity measures of competing values, each assessed with several Likert items. The former (trade-off) measure was a better predictor of non-responses, ambiguous responses, and attitude confidence than the latter measure.

<sup>10</sup> Sullivan, et al (1982) included a measure of psychological insecurity in their model of political tolerance which consisted of self-esteem, faith-in-people, and dogmatism. Our CPI Self-Esteem scale (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .53$ ) consists of three dummy variable items taken from the California Personality Inventory (CPI) where respondents were asked to indicate whether the following statements were "true" or "false" about them personally: 1) "I am certainly lacking in self-confidence", 2) "I doubt whether I would make a good leader" and 3) "It is hard for me to start a conversation with strangers."

<sup>11</sup> Ideology is measured on the standard 7-point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.

<sup>12</sup> Political knowledge is measured using five items, with perfect scores awarded to respondents who correctly know: 1) the party controlling the House of Representatives prior to the 1992 election; 2) the proportion of the House and Senate needed to override a presidential veto; 3) which of the

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parties is more liberal; 4) which branch of government determines the constitutionality of a law; and 5) the political office held by Al Gore.

<sup>13</sup> While direct measures of perceived threat were not available in the survey, thermometer ratings should be acceptable proxies. Though affective measures are not identical to perceived threat, the latter certainly overlap a good deal with the former. Sullivan, et al (1982), for example, found that “good-bad” ratings of the group were an important component of an affective dimension of perceived threat which had more impact on political tolerance than a more cognitive dimension of threat (see also Marcus, et al 1995). The real question, of course, is whether our proxy is so crude that estimates of other determinants of tolerance in the model are hopelessly biased. The fact that threat has been found to be an exogenous determinant of political tolerance (Sullivan et al 1982) should reduce problems of bias, however.

<sup>14</sup> Centering the main effects variables serves two functions (see Jaccard, Turrissi, and Wan 1990). First, it reduces problems of multicollinearity in estimating interactions. Second, the coefficients of the “main effects” are more easily interpreted as the usual average effect of the variable that would be obtained without the multiplicative terms in the model. This is because the main effects coefficients (of the centered variables) give the effect of the variable at the mean value of the variable(s) with which it interacts.

<sup>15</sup> While the significant coefficient for the Flag Burners dummy variable indicates that political tolerance is lower for flag burners (5.6 on the 12-point scale) than the KKK (6.1), the important point for our purposes is that the impact of the value scales does not vary significantly across the target groups.

<sup>16</sup> The value priorities variable is especially likely to interact with prior tolerance. Someone who prefers free speech to racial equality, for example, but for other reasons is initially intolerant toward the KKK is doubtless more susceptible to persuasion than the individual whose value priorities are more consistent with her baseline tolerance judgment. In addition, we would expect the interactions to be greater for the Cable Access question, which uses value-based persuasive appeals.

<sup>17</sup> To reduce the complexity of the estimated equation, we omitted the group dummies and associated multiplicative terms after finding in preliminary analysis that the effects of value priorities and

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value conflict did not vary across target groups. Similar logic led us to drop the political knowledge \* values interactions, which were not significant in any preliminary equations.

<sup>18</sup> It should be noted that approximately 65 items (or about 30 minutes of interviewing time) separated the value questions from the political tolerance questions in the interview. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the observed relationships between the value constructs and political tolerance in Tables 1 and 2 was somehow “artificially” induced either by the format or the content of the value items.

<sup>19</sup> The “main effects” of the variables involved in the interaction indicate only the conditional effects of a variable at a single value (0) of the variable with which it interacts. Thus, given the coding of the baseline tolerance dummy, the main effects of the value variables indicate their impact among initially intolerant respondents only. The graphs in Figure 1 were constructed to display the conditional effects of the value measures, depending on one’s initial baseline tolerance judgment. Specifically, the graphs in Figure 1 show the probability of moving from no change (point 0) to some change (point 1) in baseline tolerance judgments after being presented with a counter-argument. To compute the predicted probabilities, we varied the level of the two value variables and initial tolerance, while holding the other predictors in Table 2 at their mean value.

<sup>20</sup> The reason why the average or main effect of initial tolerance is insignificant in Table 2 is clear in the graph: these opposing effects of value priorities among the two groups cancel each other out in the full sample.