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A New Isogeny Representation and Applications to Cryptography

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Abstract. This paper focuses on isogeny representations, defined as ways to evaluate isogenies and verify membership to the language of isogenous supersingular curves (the set of triples D, E_1, E_2 with a cyclic isogeny of degree D between E_1 and E_2). The tasks of evaluating and verifying isogenies are fundamental for isogeny-based cryptography.

Our main contribution is the design of the suborder representation, a new isogeny representation targetted at the case of (big) prime degree. The core of our new method is the revelation of endomorphisms of smooth norm inside a well-chosen suborder of the codomain's endomorphism ring. This new representation appears to be opening interesting prospects for isogeny-based cryptography under the hardness of a new computational problem: the SubOrder to Ideal Problem (SOIP). As an application, we introduce pSIDH, a new NIKE based on the suborder representation. Studying new assumption appears to be particularly crucial in the light of the recent attacks against isogeny-based cryptography.

In order to manipulate efficiently the suborder representation, we develop several heuristic algorithmic tools to solve norm equations inside a new family of quaternion orders. These new algorithms may be of independent interest.

1 Introduction

Isogeny-based cryptography has been receiving an increasing amount of interest over the last few years due to its presumed resistance to quantum computers. As the variety of primitives achievable from isogenies is expanding, new problems are arising. The problem of proving the knowledge of an isogeny between two elliptic curves is one that appears more and more central in isogeny-based cryptography. It has applications in validation of SIDH public keys [JDF11, GPST16, FP22, UXT⁺22], digital signatures [YAJ⁺17, DFG19, BKV19, JS14], VDFs [DFMPS19, CSRHT22], delay encryption [BDF21] and oblivious PRF [BKW20].

Intuitively, proving a statement requires an efficient way to represent and manipulate the objects involved in that statement. In the case of isogenies, the standard representation is obtained from the Vélu formulas [Vél71] that give a way to compute and evaluate an isogeny from its kernel. The best generic

algorithm to compute these formulas requires $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{D'})$ operations over the field of definition of the isogeny's kernel where D' is the biggest factor of the degree (see [BdFLS20]). Thus, the computation is only efficient when the degree is smooth and the kernel points are defined over a small field extension. In full generality, this only happens when the degree is powersmooth but there are ways to make it work for smooth degrees as well. All the schemes we mentioned above are subject to these computational limitations and use smooth degrees. However, the recent trend of works studying the Deuring correspondence and its applications to isogeny-based cryptography has provided us the means to represent and manipulate efficiently isogenies of arbitrary degrees.

This story begins with the KLPT algorithm from Kohel, Lauter, Petit and Tignol [KLPT14] to solve the quaternion analog of the isogeny path problem. In [EHL⁺18], Eisentrager et al. heuristically showed that quaternion ideals can be used as an *efficient representation* of isogenies, with the "efficiency" stemming from KLPT and other heuristic polynomial-time algorithms. Wesolowski presented provable variants of these algorithms in his recent article [Wes22].

The original motivation behind the study of the Deuring correspondence in [KLPT14, EHL⁺18] is cryptanalysis. The tools developed toward that end have only recently started to be used constructively. The main building blocks of the signature scheme from Galbraith, Petit and Silva [GPS17] and the later generalization of SQISign by De Feo, Kohel, Leroux, Petit and Wesolowski [DFKL⁺20] are variants of the KLPT algorithm from Kohel et al. The key generation of the encryption scheme Seta [DFFdSG⁺21] is also based on the same techniques. The first complete implementation of all these algorithmic blocks was another contribution of the authors of SQISign. Additionally, this protocol is the first example of a scheme that is explicitly making use of isogenies of big prime degree that are manipulated as ideals. In [DFKL⁺20], the authors argue that using a secret key of prime degree provides better efficiency for the same level of security. The motivation of our paper is to provide a new way of representing isogenies of prime degree that can open up some interesting cryptographic applications. This appears particularly interesting in light of the recent attacks [CD22, MM22, Rob22] that break SIDH and Seta. These attacks are targeting smooth degree secret isogenies and we will see how these attacks fail to break the assumption based on the new representation we introduce.

A first small contribution of this work is to introduce a new terminology of *isogeny representation*, hoping that it can help formalizing some results about isogenies by providing a common framework on the different methods of isogeny computations.

Our main contribution is a new generic isogeny representation that we call a *suborder representation*. This representation is constituted of the endomorphism ring of the domain and several endomorphisms of the isogeny's codomain. We present heuristic polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify the suborder representation when the degree D is prime. The case of composite D is more complicated and does not seem to be more interesting for cryptography, so it is treated in Appendix. The *suborder representation* is not equivalent to the *ideal*

representation under the hardness of a new computational problem: the Suborder to Ideal Problem (SOIP), or its equivalent reformulation: the Suborder to Endomorphism Ring Problem (SOERP). The assumed hardness of the SOERP implies that the knowledge of a suborder of rank 4 is not always enough to derive the full endomorphism ring of a supersingular curve. We include in Section 4.5, a discussion about the hardness of those new problems where we also prove that the SOIP is equivalent to some instances of the Torsion to Ideal Problem (TIP), a new problem that can be seen as a generalization of the CSSI, the key recovery problem of SIDH [JDF11]. Because we consider an instance of this problem where the degree of the secret isogeny is prime, the recent attacks on SIDH does not seem to apply directly.

Our new isogeny representation requires to solve norm equations inside a new family of quaternion orders and ideals and we develop the necessary heuristic tools for that task. This contribution may be of independent interest as solving norm equations inside different types of order have proven to be useful in various situations such as [DFKL⁺20, DFFdSG⁺21].

Finally, we illustrate the cryptographic interest of our new isogeny representation by building pSIDH, a NIKE based on a generalization of SIDH to the prime degree setting. The key recovery problem is the SOIP and the key exchange is secure under the hardness of a decisional variant of the SOIP. The efficiency of pSIDH is not likely to be competitive and it needs to be considered as a first step toward more involved applications.

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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is dedicated to the background materials. In Section 3, we give the definition for $\mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$, the language of isogenous curves, and show that it is in NP using the *ideal representation* of isogenies. In Section 4, we introduce our new *suborder representation*. We provide some algorithms to compute and verify these representations, and analyze how they differ from *ideal representations*. The algorithmic gaps left in Section 4 are filled in Section 5 where we introduce new algorithms to solve norm equations inside a new family of quaternion orders. Finally, in Section 6, we introduce a new isogeny-based NIKE scheme based on the suborder representation.

2 Background material

The set of prime numbers is denoted \mathbb{P} . For a prime $\ell \in \mathbb{P}$, we define $\ell^\bullet = \{\ell^k \mid k \in \mathbb{N}\}$.

We call *negligible* a function $f : \mathbb{Z}_{>0} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{>0}$ if it is asymptotically dominated by $O(x^{-n})$ for all $n > 0$. In the analysis of a probabilistic algorithm, we say that

an event happens with *overwhelming probability* if its probability of failure is a negligible function of the length of the input.

2.1 Notations and simplifications.

Throughout this work, $p > 3$ is a prime number and $B_{p,\infty}$ is the unique quaternion algebra ramified at p and ∞ . For ease of exposition, we use a simplified terminology and conventions that we will keep during the entire paper. We introduce them below.

When talking about elliptic curves and isogenies, we always consider isomorphism classes of curves and isogenies respectively. This means that when needed (in an algorithm for instance) we represent curves by their j -invariant that we write $j(E)$ for a curve E (implicitly deriving a full equation of a canonical representative of the isomorphism class if needed). For an isogeny φ , we implicitly adapt whatever isogeny representation we use to this convention, so we pre and post-compose with the relevant isomorphisms to have an isogeny defined on the canonical representatives of the domain and codomain. For an isogeny of domain E and kernel G , we note the codomain class as E/G .

Any four dimensional lattice Λ of $B_{p,\infty}$ is given by 16 coefficients in \mathbb{Q} corresponding to the decomposition over a basis of $B_{p,\infty}$ of a basis of Λ . This is what we call the *representation* of an order or an ideal and is what is used when a computation is required. For an order $\mathcal{O} \in B_{p,\infty}$, an \mathcal{O} -ideal of $B_{p,\infty}$ will always be a left integral \mathcal{O} -ideal of norm coprime with p unless said otherwise. An isogeny will always be a cyclic separable isogeny.

2.2 Supersingular elliptic curves and isogenies.

Isogenies. An *isogeny* $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ is a non-constant morphism sending the identity of E_1 to that of E_2 . The degree of an isogeny is its degree as a rational map (see [HS09] for more details). When the degree $\deg(\varphi) = d$ is coprime to p , the isogeny is necessarily *separable* and $d = \#\ker \varphi$. An isogeny is said to be cyclic when its kernel is a cyclic group. The Vélú formulas [Vél71] can be used to compute any cyclic isogeny from its kernel. For any $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$, there exists a unique dual isogeny $\hat{\varphi} : E_2 \rightarrow E_1$, satisfying $\varphi \circ \hat{\varphi} = [\deg(\varphi)]$.

Endomorphism ring. An isogeny from a curve E to itself is an *endomorphism*. The set $\text{End}(E)$ of all endomorphisms of E forms a ring under addition and composition. For elliptic curves defined over a finite field \mathbb{F}_q , $\text{End}(E)$ is isomorphic either to an order of a quadratic imaginary field or a maximal order in a quaternion algebra. In the first case, the curve is said to be *ordinary* and otherwise *supersingular*. We focus on the supersingular case in this article. Every supersingular elliptic curve defined over a field of characteristic p admits an isomorphic model over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} . It implies that there only a finite number of isomorphism class of supersingular elliptic curves. The Frobenius over \mathbb{F}_p is the only inseparable isogeny between supersingular curves and it has degree p . We write $\pi : E \rightarrow E^p$. For any supersingular curve E , the property $\text{End}(E) \cong \text{End}(E^p)$ is satisfied but we have $E \cong E^p$ if and only if E has an isomorphic model over \mathbb{F}_p .

2.3 Quaternion algebras.

For $a, b \in \mathbb{Q}^*$ we denote by $H(a, b) = \mathbb{Q} + i\mathbb{Q} + j\mathbb{Q} + k\mathbb{Q}$ the quaternion algebra over \mathbb{Q} with basis $1, i, j, k$ such that $i^2 = a, j^2 = b$ and $k = ij = -ji$. Every quaternion algebra has a canonical involution that sends an element $\alpha = a_1 + a_2i + a_3j + a_4k$ to its conjugate $\bar{\alpha} = a_1 - a_2i - a_3j - a_4k$. We define the *reduced trace* and the *reduced norm* by $tr(\alpha) = \alpha + \bar{\alpha}$ and $n(\alpha) = \alpha\bar{\alpha}$.

Orders and ideals. A *fractional ideal* I of a quaternion algebra \mathcal{B} is a \mathbb{Z} -lattice of rank four contained in \mathcal{B} . We denote by $n(I)$ the *norm* of I , defined as the \mathbb{Z} -module generated by the reduced norms of the elements of I .

An order \mathcal{O} is a subring of \mathcal{B} that is also a fractional ideal. Elements of an order \mathcal{O} have reduced norm and trace in \mathbb{Z} . An order is called *maximal* when it is not contained in any other larger order. A suborder \mathcal{D} of \mathcal{O} is an order of rank 4 contained in \mathcal{O} .

The left order of a fractional ideal is defined as $\mathcal{O}_L(I) = \{\alpha \in \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty} \mid \alpha I \subset I\}$ and similarly for the right order $\mathcal{O}_R(I)$. A fractional ideal is *integral* if it is contained in its left order, or equivalently in its right order. An integral ideal is *primitive* if it is not the scalar multiple of another integral ideal. We refer to integral primitive ideals hereafter as *ideals*.

The product IJ of ideals I and J satisfying $\mathcal{O}_R(I) = \mathcal{O}_L(J)$ is the ideal generated by the products of pairs in $I \times J$. It follows that IJ is also an (integral) ideal and $\mathcal{O}_L(IJ) = \mathcal{O}_L(I)$ and $\mathcal{O}_R(IJ) = \mathcal{O}_R(J)$. The ideal norm is multiplicative with respect to ideal products. An ideal I is invertible if there exists another ideal I^{-1} verifying $II^{-1} = \mathcal{O}_L(I) = \mathcal{O}_R(I^{-1})$ and $I^{-1}I = \mathcal{O}_R(I) = \mathcal{O}_L(I^{-1})$. The conjugate of an ideal \bar{I} is the set of conjugates of elements of I , which is an ideal satisfying $\bar{I}\bar{I} = n(I)\mathcal{O}_L(I)$ and $\bar{I}I = n(I)\mathcal{O}_R(I)$.

We define an equivalence on orders by conjugacy and on left \mathcal{O} -ideals by right scalar multiplication. Two orders \mathcal{O}_1 and \mathcal{O}_2 are equivalent if there is an element $\beta \in \mathcal{B}^*$ such that $\beta\mathcal{O}_1 = \mathcal{O}_2\beta$. Two left \mathcal{O} -ideals I and J are equivalent if there exists $\beta \in \mathcal{B}^*$, such that $I = J\beta$. If the latter holds, then it follows that $\mathcal{O}_R(I)$ and $\mathcal{O}_R(J)$ are equivalent since $\beta\mathcal{O}_R(I) = \mathcal{O}_R(J)\beta$. For a given \mathcal{O} , this defines equivalence classes of left \mathcal{O} -ideals, and we denote the set of such classes by $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$.

Quaternion order can be classified in different categories. As the name indicates, the Gorenstein Closure is a Gorenstein order (i.e orders whose Brandt invariant is 1). A *Bass* order, is an order for which all suborders are gorenstein. Equivalent definitions and further properties of Gorenstein and Bass orders can be found in [Voi18]. Eichler orders are Bass order that can be written as the intersection of two maximal orders. A study of Eichler orders and their interpretation under the Deuring correspondence can be found in [DFKL⁺20, Section 4].

2.4 The Deuring correspondence

The Deuring correspondence is an equivalence of categories between isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves and the left ideals over maximal order \mathcal{O} of $\mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$,

inducing a bijection between conjugacy classes of supersingular j -invariants and maximal orders (up to equivalence) [Koh96]. This bijection is explicitly constructed as $E \rightarrow \text{End}(E)$. Hence, given a supersingular curve E_0 with endomorphism ring \mathcal{O}_0 , the pair (E_1, φ) , where E_1 is another supersingular elliptic curve and $\varphi : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$ is an isogeny, is sent to a left integral \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal (obtained by considering kernel ideals [Wat69]) with $\mathcal{O}_R(I) \cong \text{End}(E_1)$.

Definition 1. Let $I \subset \text{End}(E_0)$ be an integral ideal, we define $E_0[I] = \{P \in E_0(\overline{\mathbb{F}}_{p^2}) : \alpha(P) = 0 \text{ for all } \alpha \in I\}$ and the isogeny corresponding to I is $\varphi_I : E_0 \rightarrow E_0/E_0[I]$. Conversely, given an isogeny φ with domain E_0 , the corresponding ideal is $I_\varphi = \{\alpha \in \mathcal{O}_0 : \alpha(P) = 0 \text{ for all } P \in \ker(\varphi)\}$.

Quaternion orders admit what we call a *Gorenstein decomposition*. Any quaternion order \mathcal{O} can be expressed as $\mathbb{Z} + f\mathcal{O}'$, where f is the *Brandt Invariant* and \mathcal{O}' is the *Gorenstein closure*. We will try to understand the *Brandt Invariant* through the Deuring correspondence in Section 4.1

Supersingular j -invariants over \mathbb{F}_{p^2}	Maximal orders in $B_{p,\infty}$
$j(E)$ (up to Galois conjugacy)	$\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$ (up to isomorphism)
(E_1, φ) with $\varphi : E \rightarrow E_1$	I_φ integral left \mathcal{O} -ideal and right \mathcal{O}_1 -ideal
$\theta \in \text{End}(E_0)$	Principal ideal $\mathcal{O}\theta$
$\deg(\varphi)$	$n(I_\varphi)$
$\hat{\varphi}$	$\overline{I_\varphi}$
Supersingular j -invariants over \mathbb{F}_{p^2}	Ideal class set of a maximal order \mathcal{O}

Table 1. The Deuring correspondence, a summary from [DFKL⁺20].

3 The language of isogenous curves and the ideal representation

Let us fix a prime p . We will study $\mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$, the language of isogenous supersingular curves in characteristic p .

We write \mathcal{S}_p as the set of isomorphism classes of supersingular elliptic curves in characteristic p , and Isog_D the set of cyclic D -isogenies between curves of \mathcal{S}_p .

Definition 2. The language of isogenous supersingular curves is

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}} = \{(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{S}_p^2 \mid \exists \varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2 \in \text{Isog}_D\}.$$

An isogeny representation is a string s_φ associated to an isogeny $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ of degree D . This string can be used as input to two algorithms: one that can verify that the element D, E_1, E_2 is in $\mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$ and one that can compute $\varphi(P)$ for some point $P \in E_1$.

We call the former a *verification algorithm* and the latter an *evaluation algorithm*. We can regroup isogeny representations in *families of representations*

by looking at the associated verification and evaluation algorithms. Thus, to a family XX of representations we associate two algorithms XXVerification and XXEvaluation .

Standard isogeny representations. The *default isogeny representation* of $\varphi \in \text{Isog}_D$ is made of the rational maps $f_1, f_2 \in \mathbb{F}_{p^m}(x, y)$ such that the image under φ of any point (x, y) of the domain is $(f_1(x, y), f_2(x, y))$ and \mathbb{F}_{p^m} is the field of definition of $\ker \varphi$. The degree of the polynomials used in f_1, f_2 are in $O(\text{poly}(D))$. Since any isogeny of degree $D_1 D_2$ is the composition of a D_1 -isogeny and a D_2 -isogeny, decomposing φ in smaller isogenies allows us to get a default representation of size $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$ when D has smoothness bound in $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$. When not said otherwise, this default representation is used for the computation of isogenies of smooth degree. It is also standard in the literature to use a generator of $\ker \varphi$ as a representation, we call that the *kernel representation*. This representation can be used to compute the default isogeny representation with the Vélú Formulae [Vél71]. The computational cost is also $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$ when D has smoothness bound in $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$.

3.1 Polynomial-time algorithms of the Deuring correspondence

We give below a list of algorithms taken from the literature. Throughout this paper, we are going to use the provable version of these algorithms, most of which were introduced by Wesolowski in [Wes22]. For a concrete instantiation of any of them, one will rather want to use the efficient heuristic version (see [DFKL⁺20] for instance). The KLPT algorithms depend on some special extremal order \mathcal{O}_0 that we consider as a fixed parameter. We use the default representation of isogenies.

- `ConnectingIdeal`: takes two maximal orders $\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2 \subset B_{p, \infty}$ and outputs an ideal I with $\mathcal{O}_L(I) = \mathcal{O}_1$ and $\mathcal{O}_R(I) = \mathcal{O}_2$.
- `KLPT $_{\ell^e}$` : takes a left \mathcal{O} -ideal I and outputs $J \sim I$ of norm ℓ^e .
- `KLPT $_{\text{PS}}$` : takes a left \mathcal{O} -ideal I and outputs $J \sim I$ of powersmooth norm.
- `IdealToIsogeny $_T$` : takes a left \mathcal{O} -ideal I of norm T and computes φ_I .
- `IsogenyToIdeal $_T$` : takes an isogeny $\varphi : E \rightarrow E'$ of degree T , a maximal order $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$ and computes I_φ .

We reformulate below in Proposition 1 to Proposition 5, some of the results proven in [Wes22].

Proposition 1. *ConnectingIdeal terminates in $O(\text{poly}(\log(p) + C))$ where C is the size of the representation of $\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2$.*

Proposition 2. *Assuming GRH, KLPT $_{\ell^e}$ terminates in expected $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD) + C))$ where D is the norm of the input and outputs an ideal of norm e where $e = O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$ and the representation of \mathcal{O} has C bits.*

Proposition 3. *Assuming GRH, KLPT_{PS} terminates in expected $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD) + C))$ where D is the norm of the input and outputs an ideal of norm in $O(\text{poly}(p))$ with smoothness bound in $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$ and the representation of \mathcal{O} has C bits.*

Proposition 4. *For any number $T = O(\text{poly}(p))$ with smoothness bound in $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$, IsogenyToldeal_T terminates in expected $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$ and the output has size $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$.*

Proposition 5. *For any number $T = O(\text{poly}(p))$ with smoothness bound in $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$, IdealTolsogeny_T terminates in expected $O(\text{poly}(\log(p) + C))$ and the output has size $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$ and the representation of \mathcal{O} has C bits.*

3.2 Ideal witnesses: membership proofs to $\mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$ from the Deuring correspondence

We define the *ideal representation* for the isogeny φ as a representation of the associated kernel ideal I_φ . Note that this implies the knowledge of the endomorphism rings of both E_1 and E_2 . With Lemma 1 below, we prove that the ideal representation can be compact.

Lemma 1. *Any ideal I of norm D is isomorphic to an ideal J with a representation of size $O(\log(pD))$.*

Proof. It was shown in [EHL⁺18] that any maximal order is isomorphic to an order with a representation of size $O(\log(p))$. Let us write \mathcal{O} for the maximal order with the small representation isomorphic to $\mathcal{O}_L(I)$. We can write J for the image of I under the isomorphism between $\mathcal{O}_L(I)$ and \mathcal{O} . Since $D\mathcal{O} \subset J$ (this is true for any cyclic \mathcal{O} -ideal of norm D), we see that we can choose a basis of J inside the basis of \mathcal{O} with coefficients of size $O(\log(D))$. Thus, there exists a representation of J of size $O(\log(p) + \log(D))$.

For simplicity, we assume in the rest of this work, that ideals and orders are given with a compact representation as in Lemma 1.

We now present `IdealVerification` as Algorithm 1. It is a verification algorithm that takes a triple $x = (D, E_1, E_2)$ and an ideal I and decides if $x \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$. The idea is to compute the curves whose endomorphism ring are isomorphic to the left and right order of I . If the curves obtained in this way are isomorphic to E_1, E_2 , the verification passes. To do that, we will use the following procedure on ideals connecting a special order \mathcal{O}_0 with $\mathcal{O}_L(I)$ and $\mathcal{O}_R(I)$: use `KLPT` to get an equivalent ideal of smooth norm and compute the codomain of the corresponding isogeny with `IdealTolsogeny`. Since these isogenies have smooth norm, they can be efficiently computed.

Lemma 2. *Let D be any integer in \mathbb{N} coprime with p . If $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ has degree D , then $\text{IdealVerification}((D, E_1, E_2), I_\varphi) = 1$.*

Conversely, for $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{S}_p^2$, if there exists an ideal I such that $\text{IdealVerification}((D, E_1, E_2), I) = 1$ then $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$.

Algorithm 1 IdealVerification(x, I)

Input: $x \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{S}_p^2$ and I an ideal of $B_{p,\infty}$.

Output: A bit indicating if $x \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$.

- 1: Parse x as D, E_1, E_2 and take ℓ a small prime.
 - 2: Compute $n(I)$ and $\mathcal{O}_L(I), \mathcal{O}_R(I)$.
 - 3: **if** $n(I) \neq D$ or $I \not\subset \mathcal{O}_L(I)$ **then**
 - 4: Return 0.
 - 5: **end if**
 - 6: Take a curve E_0 defined over \mathbb{F}_p with $\text{End}(E_0) \cong \mathcal{O}_0$ and compute $I_1 = \text{ConnectingIdeal}(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O}_L(I)), I_2 = I_1 \cdot I$.
 - 7: **for** $i \in [1, 2]$ **do**
 - 8: Compute $J_i = \text{KLPT}_{\ell^\bullet}(I_i)$ and $\varphi_i : E_0 \rightarrow E'_i = \text{IdealTolsogeny}_{\ell^\bullet}(E_0, J_i)$.
 - 9: **end for**
 - 10: **if** $(j(E'_1), j(E'_2)) \notin \{(j(E_1), j(E_2)), (j(E_1)^p, j(E_2)^p)\}$ **then**
 - 11: Return 0.
 - 12: **end if**
 - 13: **return** 1.
-

Proof. Let us take $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ of degree D . By definition of I_φ , we have $n(I_\varphi) = D$ and $I_\varphi \subset \mathcal{O}_L(I_\varphi)$ so the first check passes. Then, the codomain of the two φ_{I_i} have endomorphism ring isomorphic to $\mathcal{O}_R(I_i)$ so they might be either both E_i or both E_i^p (since $I_2 = I_1 I_\varphi$, it cannot be E_1, E_2^p or E_1^p, E_2). In both cases, the final output is 1.

If there exists an ideal I such that $\text{IdealVerification}((D, E_1, E_2), I) = 1$, then $n(I) = D$ and I is integral (this is from the first verification). Since $I = \overline{I_1} \cdot I_2 / n(I_1) \sim \overline{J_1} \cdot J_2$ is an integral ideal of degree D , there exists an isogeny of degree D between E'_1, E'_2 . Since the final output is 1, the two curves E'_1, E'_2 are equal to either E_1, E_2 or E_1^p, E_2^p . Since $\varphi : E_1^p \rightarrow E_2^p$ of degree D imply the existence of $\varphi^p : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ of degree D , in both cases we have that $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$.

Proposition 6. *Under GRH, IdealVerification terminates in expected $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD) + C))$ where C is the bit size of the representation of I .*

Proposition 6 follows directly from Propositions 1, 2 and 5.

Isogeny Evaluation from ideals. It is also possible to evaluate an isogeny from its ideal representation. Below, we present an algorithm `IdealEvaluation` solving that task. The main idea is to apply `KLPT` and `IdealTolsogeny` to find an equivalent isogeny of powersmooth degree and making use of it to perform the computation. Note that an algorithm very similar to `IdealEvaluation` can be found in [FKMT22].

For simplicity, we assume that I is an \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal where $\mathcal{O}_0 \cong \text{End}(E_0)$ and E_0 is a curve for which evaluating endomorphisms can be done easily (the curve of j -invariant 1728 is an example of such a curve). A generic algorithm of complexity $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$ exists but it is more complicated and we do not really need it here.

Algorithm 2 IdealEvaluation(I, P)

Input: I an \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal of $B_{p,\infty}$ and $P \in E_0(\overline{\mathbb{F}_p})$ of order coprime with $D = n(I)$.

Output: $\varphi_I(P)$.

- 1: Take a small prime number ℓ .
 - 2: Compute $J = \text{KLPT}_{\ell^\bullet}(I)$ and set $K = I \cdot \bar{J}$. We write $\alpha \in \text{End}(E)$ for the endomorphism φ_K .
 - 3: Compute $\alpha(P)$.
 - 4: Compute $\varphi_J = \text{IdealTolsogeny}_{\ell^\bullet}(J)$ and compute $Q = \varphi_J(\alpha(P))$.
 - 5: Compute $\mu = n(J)^{-1} \pmod{n(I)}$.
 - 6: **return** $[\mu]Q$.
-

Proposition 7. *Under GRH, IdealEvaluation is correct and terminates in probabilistic $O(\text{poly}(\log(p) + \log(D)))$ operations over the field of definition of P .*

Proof. We have $\varphi_K = \hat{\varphi}_J \circ \varphi_I$ and so $\mu\varphi_J(\alpha(P)) = \varphi_I(P)$. The division by μ makes sense mod $n(I)$ since the order of P is coprime with $n(I)$. The correctness of IdealEvaluation follows from the correctness of the sub-algorithms KLPT, IdealTolsogeny (see Propositions 2 and 5). Step 3 can be executed because of our assumption on E_0 . If we assume that $\ell = O(1)$, termination is a consequence of Propositions 1, 2 and 5 and that the computation of $\varphi_J(P)$ can be done in $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$ operations over the field of definition of P since $\deg \varphi = O(\text{poly}(p))$ and have smoothness bound in $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$.

3.3 Other advantages and limitations of the ideal representation

The alternate path problem. Two curves E_1, E_2 are connected by an infinite number of isogenies. The problem of finding an ideal representation for (N, E_1, E_2) from an ideal representation for (D, E_1, E_2) with $N \neq D$, was first introduced and solved in [KLPT14] with a polynomial-time heuristic solution KLPT for $N \in \ell^\bullet$. Our verification IdealVerification and the IdealEvaluation algorithm that we mention the end of Section 3.2 are both using that powerful mechanism.

Limitations of the ideal representation for cryptographic applications. The existence of those efficient algorithms is not necessarily a good thing in the context of cryptography. Indeed, the bottom line is that I reveals pretty much everything there is to know about the two curves E_1, E_2 . Thus, there is not much hope to use ideal representation as anything else than secret keys. The goal of our new suborder representation in Section 4 is to address this shortcoming of the ideal representation. The gap between ideal and suborder representations open interesting cryptographical prospects as the NIKE introduced in Section 6.

4 A new isogeny representation

In this section, we propose a new way to prove the existence of a D -isogeny between two curves when D is a prime number. We call it the *suborder representation/witness*. Composite degrees require more care and we will argue

at the end of Section 4.5 that they do not appear more interesting. We will briefly explain how to extend the suborder representation to composite degrees in Appendix. From now on, unless stated otherwise, D can be assumed to be prime. The suborder representation has also another small limitation: the proof only shows that either E_1, E_2 or E_1, E_2^p are D -isogenous and works only when $\text{End}(E_1) \not\cong \text{End}(E_2)$. Thus, we consider the alternate language $\mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$ defined as follows:

$$\mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}} = \{(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathbb{P} \times \mathcal{S}_p^2 \mid E_1 \not\cong E_2, E_2^p \text{ and } (D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}} \text{ or } (D, E_1, E_2^p) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}\}$$

In Section 4.1, we introduce the mathematical results underlying our new method. The method to extract the new representation from the ideal representation is the goal of Section 4.2. Then, in Section 4.3, we explain how to perform a heuristic polynomial-time verification of this new witness. We start with a brief summary of the important ideas in the next paragraph.

A brief overview. Our starting point is Proposition 8 which implies that the suborder $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ is embedded inside $\text{End}(E_2)$, if and only if either $\text{End}(E_2) \cong \text{End}(E_1)$ or $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$. Thus, our new representation will be constituted of a maximal order $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E_1)$ and an embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ inside $\text{End}(E_2)$ and this is what we concretely call a *suborder representation*. We highlight that \mathcal{O} is simply given as an order inside $B_{p,\infty}$, whereas the embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ is made of isogenies of smooth degree from E_2 to E_2 . The suborder representation can be verified by computing the traces of the endomorphisms revealed in this manner.

4.1 Brandt Invariant and relation with isogenies

The goal of this section is to prove Proposition 8 that links the *Brandt invariant* of some orders with isogenies through the Deuring correspondence.

Proposition 8. *Let $D \neq p$ be a prime number and E_1, E_2 be two supersingular curves over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} , $\mathcal{O}_1 \subset B_{p,\infty}$ is a maximal order isomorphic to $\text{End}(E_1)$. The order $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_1$ is embedded inside $\text{End}(E_2)$ if and only if either $j(E_2) \in \{j(E_1), j(E_1)^p\}$ or $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$.*

We will prove the backward direction of Proposition 8 with a simple argument using orders and ideals, but it is worth noting that the concrete embedding can be obtained with the map $\alpha_0 \mapsto [d] + \varphi \circ \alpha_0 \circ \hat{\varphi}$ between $\text{End}(E_1)$ and $\text{End}(E_2)$ when there exists $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ of degree D . This is not the first appearance of this map that was introduced by Waterhouse [Wat69, Section 3.1]. It is also at the heart of the attacks [Pet17, QKL⁺21] on the SIDH key exchange and underlies the decryption process of the Seta encryption scheme [DFFdSG⁺21]. In the proof of Proposition 8. The forward direction is more subtle and we use the preliminary Lemma 3.

Lemma 3. *Let D be prime number different from p and $\mathfrak{D} \subset B_{p,\infty}$ be a quaternion order such that $\mathfrak{D} = \mathbb{Z} + D\mathfrak{D}_0$ for another order $\mathfrak{D}_0 \subset B_{p,\infty}$. When \mathfrak{D} is embedded in a maximal order \mathcal{O} , either \mathcal{O} contains \mathfrak{D}_0 or there exists a left- \mathcal{O} integral primitive ideal I of norm D whose right order \mathcal{O}_0 contains \mathfrak{D}_0 .*

Proof. Let us assume that \mathfrak{D}_0 is not contained in \mathcal{O} . We set $I = \{x \in \mathcal{O}, x\mathfrak{D}_0 \subset \mathcal{O}\}$. First, it is easy to verify that I is an integral left \mathcal{O} -ideal since it is contained in \mathcal{O} . Then, we are going to see that it has norm D . It suffices to show that $D\mathcal{O} \subsetneq I \subsetneq \mathcal{O}$. To see that $I \neq \mathcal{O}$, it suffices to note that $1 \notin I$ since $\mathfrak{D}_0 \not\subset \mathcal{O}$. Then, with $D\mathfrak{D}_0 \subset \mathcal{O}$ we have $Dx\mathfrak{D}_0 = xD\mathfrak{D}_0 \subset \mathcal{O}$ for every $x \in \mathcal{O}$, which proves that $D\mathcal{O} \subset I$. Finally, to prove that $D\mathcal{O} \neq I$, we take $x_0 \in \mathfrak{D}_0$ and not contained in \mathcal{O} . It is clear that $Dx_0 \in I$, but $Dx_0 \notin D\mathcal{O}$. Finally, from the definition of I it is quite clear that \mathfrak{D}_0 is contained in $\mathcal{O}_R(I)$. This concludes the proof.

Proof. (Proposition 8) For the forward direction, let us take a maximal order $\mathcal{O}_2 \cong \text{End}(E_2)$ such that $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_1 \subset \mathcal{O}_2$ (which is possible since $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_1$ is embedded inside $\text{End}(E_2)$). Then, we apply Lemma 3 to $\mathfrak{D}_0 = \mathcal{O}_1$, and $\mathcal{O} = \mathcal{O}_2$, we obtain that either \mathcal{O}_2 contains \mathcal{O}_1 (in which case $\mathcal{O}_2 = \mathcal{O}_1$ since \mathcal{O}_1 is maximal) and so we have $\text{End}(E_1) \cong \text{End}(E_2) \Rightarrow j(E_2) \in \{j(E_1), j(E_1)^p\}$, or there must be an \mathcal{O}_2 -integral ideal of norm D whose right order contains \mathcal{O}_1 . Once again, since \mathcal{O}_1 is maximal, we have in fact equality and so we have an ideal of norm D whose right order is \mathcal{O}_2 and left order is \mathcal{O}_1 . By the Deuring correspondence, this means that $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$.

For the backward direction, let us consider the ideal I corresponding to the D -isogeny $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ (w.l.o.g, we can assume that $D, E_1, E_2 \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$). This ideal has norm D . Since $\mathcal{O}_L(I)$ is maximal, the local order $\mathcal{O}_L(I) \otimes \mathbb{Z}_D$ is a principal ideal domain (see [Voi18, Chapter 23]) and so the ideal I is locally principal. This proves that we can write $I = \mathcal{O}_L(I)\alpha + \mathcal{O}_L(I)D$ for some element $\alpha \in \mathcal{O}_L(I)$ and so $D\mathcal{O}_L(I) \subset I \subset \mathcal{O}_R(I)$. Thus, we obtain that $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_L(I) \subset \mathcal{O}_R(I)$, and the proof is concluded by $\mathcal{O}_L(I) \cong \text{End}(E_1)$ and $\mathcal{O}_R(I) \cong \text{End}(E_2)$.

4.2 Deriving the suborder representation from the ideal representation

Proposition 8 suggests that the embedding $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1) \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$ can be used to prove the existence of an isogeny of degree D between E_1 and E_2 . The goal of this section is to introduce an algorithm `IdealToSuborder` that takes a maximal order $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E_1)$ and an \mathcal{O} -ideal I of norm D and outputs a suborder representation for φ made of \mathcal{O} and the embedding $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O} \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$. By a representation of the embedding, we actually mean the embeddings of a *generating family* for $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ (see Definition 3 below). We give the full definition for a suborder representation as Definition 4.

Definition 3. *A generating family $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$ for an order \mathcal{O} is a set of elements in \mathcal{O} such that any element $\rho \in \mathcal{O}$ can be written as a linear combination of 1 and $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \theta_j$ for all $\mathcal{I} \subset \{1, \dots, n\}$. In that case, we write $\mathcal{O} = \text{Order}(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n)$.*

Definition 4. Let $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ be an isogeny of degree D . A suborder representation π_φ for φ is made of an order $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E_1)$ and of the default representations s_1, \dots, s_n of n endomorphisms of E_2 corresponding to a generating family of $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$.

Our algorithm `IdealToSuborder` (Algorithm 3) is built upon a `SmoothGen \mathcal{N}` sub-algorithm that we will present in Section 5.3. This algorithm computes a generating family $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n \in B_{p,\infty}$ for the order $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ on input D, \mathcal{O} where each θ_i has norm in \mathcal{N} . For Proposition 9 and Proposition 11, we are going to assume several things about this `SmoothGen` algorithm. We summarize them in Assumption 1.

Assumption 1 Let $\mathcal{N} \subset \mathbb{N}$ be either ℓ^\bullet for some prime $\ell = O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$, or the set of divisors of T for some integer $T > p^{7/2}D^6$ of size $O(\text{poly}(pD))$ and smoothness bound $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$. On input \mathcal{O}, D , the algorithm `SmoothGen \mathcal{N}` is deterministic, correct and terminates in $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD) + C))$ where \mathcal{O} is represented by C bits. It outputs $n = O(1)$ quaternion elements whose norms are contained in \mathcal{N} for all $1 \leq i \leq n$.

Remark 1. We hide several heuristics and a conjecture under Assumption 1. We discuss these heuristics in Section 5.3.

`IdealToSuborder` can be divided in two main parts: `SmoothGen` to obtain quaternion elements $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$ and an `IdealTolsogeny` step to convert the ideals $\mathcal{O}_R(I)\theta_i$ to isogenies $\varphi_i : E_2 \rightarrow E_2$. For all the algorithms of this section, we are going to assume that a small constant prime ℓ has been fixed and we write ℓ^\bullet for the set $\{\ell^e, e \in \mathbb{N}\}$.

Algorithm 3 `IdealToSuborder`(I)

Input: I an integral ideal of maximal orders inside $B_{p,\infty}$ of norm D .

Output: Endomorphisms $\varphi_i : E_2 \rightarrow E_2$ such that $\iota : \text{End}(E_2) \xrightarrow{\sim} \mathcal{O}_R(I)$ sends $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n$ to a generating family $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$ for $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_L(I)$.

- 1: Compute $D = n(I)$ and $\mathcal{O} = \mathcal{O}_L(I), \mathcal{O}' = \mathcal{O}_R(I)$.
 - 2: Compute $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n = \text{SmoothGen}_{\ell^\bullet}(\mathcal{O}, D)$.
 - 3: **for** $i \in [1, n]$ **do**
 - 4: Compute $\varphi_i : E_2 \rightarrow E_2 = \text{IdealTolsogeny}_{\ell^\bullet}(\mathcal{O}'\theta_i)$.
 - 5: Compute the default representation s_i of φ_i .
 - 6: **end for**
 - 7: Choose \mathcal{O}_c , a maximal order isomorphic to \mathcal{O} of small representation.
 - 8: **return** $\pi = \mathcal{O}_c, (s_i)_{1 \leq i \leq n}$.
-

Proposition 9. Under Assumption 1 and GRH, `IdealToSuborder` is correct and terminates in $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD) + C))$ where C is the bitsize of I and the output has size $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$.

Proof. Correctness follows from the correctness of `IdealTolsogeny` and `SmoothGen`. The left and right orders of I have representation of size smaller than C , and so termination follows from GRH, Assumption 1 and Proposition 5 (with $n = O(1)$). The degree and smoothness bound of all the $\deg \varphi_i$ is given by Assumption 1 and this implies that the default isogeny representation has size $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$ as we explained in the beginning of Section 3. An \mathcal{O}_c with representation of size $O(\log(p))$ can be found and this concludes the proof.

4.3 Verification of the suborder representation

This section focuses on the verification of the representation computed with `IdealToSuborder`. From Proposition 8, we know that it suffices to convince the verifier that $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ is embedded inside $\text{End}(E_2)$ and $\text{End}(E_1) \not\cong \text{End}(E_2)$. The second part is easy to verify, it suffices to compute the j -invariants and verify that neither $j(E_1) = j(E_2)$ nor $j(E_1) = j(E_2)^p$. The first part of the verification is achieved with the endomorphisms $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n$. With Lemma 4, we show that it suffices to check some traces and norms of endomorphisms computed from the $(\varphi_i)_{1 \leq i \leq n}$.

Lemma 4. *Two orders $\mathcal{O}_1 = \text{Order}(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n)$ and $\mathcal{O}_2 = \text{Order}(\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n)$ of rank 4 in a quaternion algebra are isomorphic if $n(\theta_i) = n(\omega_i)$ for all $i \in [1, n]$ and $\text{tr}(\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \theta_j) = \text{tr}(\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \omega_j)$ for all $\mathcal{I} \subset [1, n]$.*

Proof. In our setting, two quaternion orders are isomorphic if their norm form are the same. Thus, we are going to give a bijection $\alpha : \mathcal{O}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{O}_2$ and verify that it preserves norm and traces. We label $\theta'_0, \theta'_1, \dots, \theta'_m$ (resp. $\omega'_0, \omega'_1, \dots, \omega'_m$) with $m = 2^n - 1$ the set of multi-products obtained from $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$ (resp. $\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n$), the multi-product θ_0 (resp. ω_0) corresponding to the empty set is simply 1. By the definition of a generating family, any element $\alpha \in \mathcal{O}_1$ (resp. \mathcal{O}_2) can be written as a linear combination of $\theta'_0, \dots, \theta'_m$ (resp. $\omega'_0, \dots, \omega'_m$). We are going to prove that the map $\alpha : \sum_{i=0}^m x_i \theta'_i \mapsto \sum_{i=0}^m x_i \omega'_i$ is an isomorphism of quaternion orders. It is easy to verify that this map is bijective. It remains to check that it preserves the trace and the norm when $n(\theta'_i) = n(\omega'_i)$ and $\text{tr}(\theta'_i) = \text{tr}(\omega'_i)$ for all $i \in [0, m]$.

The trace being linear, it is clear that $\text{tr}(\alpha(\theta)) = \text{tr}(\theta)$ for all $\theta \in \mathcal{O}_1$. For any $\theta = \sum_{i=0}^m x_i \theta'_i$, we have $n(\theta) = \sum_{0 \leq i < j \leq m} x_i x_j \text{tr}(\theta'_i \theta'_j) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=0}^m x_i^2 \text{tr}(\theta'_i \hat{\theta}'_i)$. Thus, we need to prove that we have equality of traces for all $\theta'_i \hat{\theta}'_j$ and $\omega'_i \hat{\omega}'_j$. Since $\text{tr}(ab) = \text{tr}(ba) = \text{tr}(\hat{a}\hat{b})$ and $\text{tr}(a)\text{tr}(b) = \text{tr}(ab) + \text{tr}(\hat{a}\hat{b})$ for all $a, b \in B_{p, \infty}$, it suffices to verify the equality $\text{tr}(\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \theta_j) = \text{tr}(\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \omega_j)$ to get the desired result. This also proves that we have equality of norms between θ and $\alpha(\theta)$.

As Lemma 4 indicates, we need to compute some traces for the verification. This will be done by an algorithm `CheckTraceM` (whose description we postpone until Section 5.4) that will verify the validity of the traces modulo the parameter M (see Proposition 20).

Lemma 5 below gives a bound above which equality will hold over \mathbb{Z} if it holds mod M . In the Appendix B, we also explore the option of choosing a value of

M below the bound of Lemma 5, producing a tradeoff between efficiency and soundness.

Lemma 5. *Given any $\theta \in \text{End}(E_1)$, if $\text{tr}(\theta) = t \pmod{M}$ for $M > 4\sqrt{n(\theta)}$ and $|t| \leq M/2$, then $\text{tr}(\theta) = t$.*

Proof. Over $B_{p,\infty}$, the norm form is $n : (x, y, z, w) \mapsto x^2 + qy^2 + pz^2 + qpw^2$ where $q > 0, p > 0$. Since $\text{tr} : (x, y, z, w) \mapsto 2x$, we can easily verify that $\text{tr}(\theta)^2 < 4n(\theta)$. This gives a bound of $2\sqrt{n(\theta)}$ on the absolute value of $\text{tr}(\theta)$. The result follows.

Algorithm 4 SuborderVerification $_M(x, \pi)$

Input: $M \in \mathbb{N}$, $x \in \mathbb{P} \times \mathcal{S}_p^2$ and π a suborder representation.

Output: A bit indicating if $x \in \mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$.

- 1: Parse x as D, E_1, E_2 and $\pi = \mathcal{O}, (s_i)_{1 \leq i \leq n}$.
 - 2: **if** disc $\mathcal{O} \neq p$ **then**
 - 3: Return 0.
 - 4: **end if**
 - 5: Compute $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n = \text{SmoothGen}_{\ell^\bullet}(\mathcal{O}, D)$.
 - 6: Compute $J = \text{ConnectingIdeal}(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O})$ and $L = \text{KLPT}_{\ell^\bullet}(J)$.
 - 7: Compute $\psi : E_0 \rightarrow E'_1 = \text{IdealTolsogeny}_{\ell^\bullet}(L)$.
 - 8: **if** $j(E_1) \neq j(E'_1)$ **or** $j(E_1) \neq j(E'_1)^p$ **then**
 - 9: Return 0.
 - 10: **end if**
 - 11: **for** $i \in [1, n]$ **do**
 - 12: Parse s_i as the default representation of an isogeny of degree $n(\theta_i) \in \ell^\bullet$ and compute it as $\varphi_i : E_2 \rightarrow F_i$.
 - 13: **if** $j(F_i) \neq j(E_2)$ **then**
 - 14: Return 0.
 - 15: **end if**
 - 16: **end for**
 - 17: **return** CheckTrace $_M(\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_n, E_2)$.
-

Proposition 10. *If $M > \max_{1 \leq j \leq n} 2\sqrt{n(\theta_j)^n}$, then for $x \in \mathbb{P} \times \mathcal{S}_p^2$, there exists a suborder representation π such that $\text{VerifSuborderProof}_M(x, \pi) = 1$ if and only if $x \in \mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$.*

Proof. Assume that there exists a representation π passing the verification for a given $x = (D, E_1, E_2)$. The check in Step 2 proves that \mathcal{O} is a maximal order of $B_{p,\infty}$. The second verification in Step 8 proves that $\text{End}(E_1) \cong \mathcal{O}$. Finally, the verification in Step 13 proves that the φ_i are endomorphisms of E_2 . Then, if $\text{CheckTrace}_M(\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_n, E_2) = 1$, the correctness of SmoothGen, CheckTrace, Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ is embedded inside $\text{End}(E_2)$ and Proposition 8 proves that $x \in \mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$.

Now let us take $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$. By definition there exists an ideal I of norm D and $\mathcal{O}_L(I) \cong \text{End}(E_1)$, $\mathcal{O}_R(I) \cong \text{End}(E_2)$. We are going to show that if $\pi = \text{IdealToSuborder}(I)$, then we have $\text{SuborderVerification}_M(x, \pi) = 1$. First, since $\mathcal{O}_L(I)$ is a maximal order, the verification of Step 2 passes successfully. This is also the case for the verification of Step 8 since $\mathcal{O}_L(I) \cong \text{End}(E_1)$. Then, by the correctness of `IdealToSuborder` showed in Proposition 9, we have that s_i can be parsed as isogenies $\varphi_i : E_2 \rightarrow E_2$ that corresponds to the $\mathcal{O}_R(I)\theta_i$ through the Deuring correspondence (since `SmoothGen` is deterministic). Thus, it is clear that `CheckTrace` will output 1 and this concludes the proof.

With Assumption 1 and Proposition 10, we see that we can take $M = \#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})$ for the smallest $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that M is bigger than the bound in Proposition 10. We refer to Proposition 20 for correctness and complexity of the `CheckTrace` algorithm.

Proposition 11. *Let m, M be as defined above. Under GRH and Assumption 1, $\text{SuborderVerification}_M$ terminates in probabilistic $O(\text{poly}(\log(p) + \log(D)))$.*

Proof. Since $m = O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$ by Proposition 10 and Assumption 1, the result follows from Assumption 1, Propositions 1, 2, 5 and 20

4.4 Evaluating with the suborder representation

In this section, we show that we can evaluate an isogeny from the suborder representation. By Proposition 8, any suborder representation π defines a unique isogeny that we write φ_π . The algorithm `SuborderEvaluation` that we introduce below shows how to use π to evaluate φ_π . This algorithm is going to be one of the major building blocks behind the NIKE scheme of Section 6. For this application of our algorithm, we only need to compute the image of cyclic subgroups of the form $E_1[J]$ for some ideal J . Thus, `SuborderEvaluation` take a suborder representation for φ and an ideal J as input and outputs $\varphi(E_1[J])$.

The `SuborderEvaluation` algorithm is built on a subprotocol `IdealSuborderNormEquation` that we will introduce in Section 5.2. This algorithm is only heuristic and we summarize in Assumption 2, what we expect of this algorithm.

Assumption 2 *Let $\mathcal{N} \subset \mathbb{N}$ be either ℓ^\bullet for some prime $\ell = O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$, or the set of divisors of T for some integer $T > B$ of size $O(\text{poly}(pD))$ and smoothness bound $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$ and where $B = p^2 D^6 n(I)^3 n(J)^2$. The algorithm `IdealSuborderNormEquation` $_{\mathcal{N}}$ takes in input an integer D , two ideals I, J and outputs an element $\beta \in (\mathbb{Z} + DI) \cap J$ with $n(\beta)/n(J) \in \mathcal{N}$, it terminates in expected $O(\text{poly}(\log(pDn(I)n(J))))$ with overwhelming probability.*

The principle of `SuborderEvaluation` is different from the one of `IdealEvaluation` we sketched in Section 3.2. Indeed, as we will argue in Section 4.5, solving the alternate path problem (which is the key step in `IdealEvaluation`) appears hard from the suborder representation. Instead, we propose to use the fact that the embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ inside $\text{End}(E_2)$ is obtained by push-forwards through φ_π .

More precisely, this means that $\ker \iota(\beta) = \varphi_\pi(\ker \beta)$ for any $\beta \in \mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ where $\iota : \mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1) \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$. Thus, to find $\varphi_\pi(E_1[J])$, we want to find an endomorphism $\beta \in \mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ such that $\ker \beta \cap E_1[n(J)] = E_1[J]$. By definition of $E_1[J]$, and Assumption 2, such a β is exactly found by `IdealSuborderNormEquation`. After that, it suffices to compute $\ker \iota(\beta) \cap E_2[n(J)]$ and we are done. The integer m is taken as in Proposition 11.

Algorithm 5 `SuborderEvaluation`(E_1, E_2, π, D, J)

Input: two curves E_1, E_2 , a prime D , π a suborder representation for $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$ and an ideal J of norm coprime with D and ℓ .

Output: \perp or $\varphi_\pi(E_1[J])$.

- 1: Parse π as $\mathcal{O}, s_1, \dots, s_n$.
 - 2: **if** $\mathcal{O}_L(J) \not\cong \mathcal{O}$ **then**
 - 3: Return \perp .
 - 4: **end if**
 - 5: **if** `SuborderVerification` _{$\#E_1(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})$} ((D, E_1, E_2), π) = 0. **then**
 - 6: Return \perp .
 - 7: **end if**
 - 8: **for** $i \in [1, n]$ **do**
 - 9: Parse s_i as the default representation of an isogeny of degree $n(\theta_i) \in \ell^\bullet$ and compute it as $\varphi_i : E_2 \rightarrow E_2$.
 - 10: **end for**
 - 11: Compute $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n = \text{SmoothGen}_{\ell^\bullet}(\mathcal{O}, D)$.
 - 12: Compute $L = \text{ConnectingIdeal}(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O})$ and $I = \text{RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal}(\mathbb{L})$ with $I = L\alpha$.
 - 13: Compute $\beta = \text{IdealSuborderNormEquation}_{\ell^\bullet}(D, I, \alpha^{-1}J\alpha)$.
 - 14: Express $\alpha\beta\alpha^{-1} = \sum_{\mathcal{I} \subset \{1, \dots, n\}} c_{i, \mathcal{I}} (\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \theta_j)$.
 - 15: Compute P, Q , a basis of $E_2[n(J)]$.
 - 16: Compute $R, S = \sum_{\mathcal{I} \subset \{1, \dots, n\}} c_{i, \mathcal{I}} (\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \varphi_j)(P, Q)$.
 - 17: **if** $S = 0$ **then**
 - 18: **return** $\langle Q \rangle$.
 - 19: **end if**
 - 20: Compute $a = \text{DLP}(R, S)$.
 - 21: **return** $\langle P - [a]Q \rangle$.
-

Proposition 12. *Under GRH and Assumptions 1 and 2, `SuborderEvaluation` is correct when the output is not \perp and terminates in probabilistic $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)) + C_{\text{DLP}}(n(J)))$ operations over the $n(J)$ torsion where $C_{\text{DLP}}(n(J))$ is the complexity of the discrete logarithms in groups of order $n(J)$.*

Proof. First, we will prove correctness. The verification at the beginning proves that if the output is not \perp , π is a valid suborder representation. When $L = \text{ConnectingIdeal}(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O})$ and $I = \text{RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal}(\mathbb{L})$ with $I = L\alpha$, then if $\beta \in (\mathbb{Z} + DI) \cap \alpha^{-1}J\alpha$, then $\alpha\beta\alpha^{-1} \in (\mathbb{Z} + DL) \cap J \subset (\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}) \cap J$. This explains that we can decompose $\alpha\beta\alpha^{-1}$ on the generating family $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$.

Since π gives a correct embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ inside $\text{End}(E_1)$ and so $\sigma = \sum_{\mathcal{I} \subset \{1, \dots, n\}} c_{i, \mathcal{I}} \prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \varphi_j$ is an endomorphism of E_2 whose degree is a multiple of $n(J)$. To conclude the proof of correctness, it suffices to show that $\ker \sigma \cap E_2[n(J)] = \varphi_\pi(E_1[J])$. If $\alpha\beta\alpha^{-1} = [d] + [D]\gamma$ for some $\gamma \in \text{End}(E_1)$, we have that $\sigma = [d] + \varphi_\pi \circ \gamma \circ \hat{\varphi}_\pi$. Now let us take $P_0 \in E_1[J]$. Since $\alpha\beta\alpha^{-1} \in J$, we have $([d] + [D]\gamma)P_0 = 0$ and $\sigma(\varphi_\pi(P_0)) = [d]\varphi_\pi(P_0) + \varphi_\pi(\gamma \circ \hat{\varphi}_\pi \circ \varphi_\pi(P_0)) = \varphi_\pi(([d] + [D]\gamma)P_0) = 0$. This proves that $\varphi_\pi(E[j]) \subset \ker \sigma \cap E_2[n(J)]$. And we obtain equality since the two subgroups have the same order. Thus, we have showed that our protocol is correct. In ℓ^\bullet , we can always select an element $\ell^e = O(\text{poly}(\log(pDn(I)n(J))))$ of norm bigger than the bound B from Assumption 2 so the complexity follows from Assumptions 1 and 2, Propositions 1 and 11 and the fact that $n(I) = O(\text{poly}(p))$ by Proposition 15.

4.5 Deducing the ideal representation from the suborder representation

We saw with Proposition 9 that our new suborder representation can be computed from the ideal representation in polynomial time. The goal of this section is to study the reverse problem of extracting an ideal representation from a suborder representation. We are going to try to argue that this problem is hard in general and describe some cases where it is easy. We also introduce several other problems and prove that they are equivalent.

Problem 1. (SubOrder to Ideal Problem, SOIP) Let $x = (D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{p-isog}}$, and π be a suborder representation such that $\text{SuborderVerification}(x, \pi) = 1$. Compute I , an ideal such that $\text{IdealVerification}(x, I) = 1$ or $\text{IdealVerification}((D, E_1, E_2^p), I) = 1$.

We will show in Proposition 13 the equivalence of Problem 1 with the problem of computing the endomorphism ring of the codomain from the suborder representation (Problem 2).

Problem 2. (SubOrder to Endomorphism Ring Problem (SOERP)). Let $x = (D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{p-isog}}$, and π be a suborder representation such that $\text{SuborderVerification}(x, \pi) = 1$. Compute $\mathcal{O}_2 \subset B_{p, \infty}$ with $\mathcal{O}_2 \cong \text{End}(E_2)$.

Proposition 13. *Under Assumption 1 and GRH, The SOIP and SOERP are equivalent.*

Proof. Since $\mathcal{O}_R(I) \cong \text{End}(E_2)$ when $\text{IdealVerification}((D, E_1, E_2), I) = 1$, it is clear that breaking the SOIP imply to break the SOERP in polynomial-time. The reverse direction is more complicated.

Assume that π, \mathcal{O}_2 is given with $\text{SuborderVerification}((D, E_1, E_2), \pi) = 1$ and $\mathcal{O}_2 \cong \text{End}(E_2)$. We describe an algorithm finding an ideal representation I for $x \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$ (up to swapping E_1 and E_1^p we can assume that it is true). Parse $\pi = \mathcal{O}_1, \varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n$. The isogenies $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n$ can be translated into ideals using an `IsogenyToIdeal` algorithm. In that way, we obtain $\mathcal{O}_2\alpha_1, \dots, \mathcal{O}_2\alpha_n$ principal

ideals. Compute $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n = \text{SmoothGen}(\mathcal{O}_2, D)$. Select $\beta \in \mathcal{O}_1$ such that D is inert in $\mathbb{Z}[\beta]$ and $\gcd(n(\beta), D) = 1$. Express $D\beta$ as a linear combination of $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \theta_j$ for $\mathcal{I} \subset \langle 1, \dots, n \rangle$ and compute α as the same linear combination of the $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \alpha_j$. Compute $J = \mathcal{O}_2\alpha + \mathcal{O}_0D$. Find γ such that $\mathcal{O}_1 = \gamma\mathcal{O}_R(J)\gamma^{-1}$ and output $I = \gamma\bar{J}\gamma^{-1}$.

The important property is that if I_0 is the \mathcal{O}_1 -ideal that we look for, then $\bar{I}_0 = \mathcal{O}_R(I_0)D\beta + \mathcal{O}_R(I_0)D$ when $\beta \in \mathcal{O}_1$ is such that D is inert in $\mathbb{Z}[\beta]$ and $\gcd(n(\beta), D) = 1$. This is a consequence of [DFFdSG⁺21, Lemma 3.4]. The rest of the algorithm described above is just to compute the value of $D\beta$ through the isomorphism between $\mathcal{O}_R(I)$ and \mathcal{O}_2 to get the \mathcal{O}_2 -ideal J . Finally we send J back through the inverse isomorphism to compute $I = I_0$.

With the knowledge of \mathcal{O}_2 , the `IsogenyToIdeal` algorithm can be applied and its complexity is polynomial in our parameters due to Proposition 4. The same is true for `SmoothGen` due to Assumption 1 and all the other operations are performed over the quaternions and have polynomial complexity.

One of the two reductions is trivial since the right order of a solution to the SOIP is exactly a solution to the SOERP. The other reduction is more complex, the idea is that with the knowledge of the endomorphism ring of E_2 , the endomorphisms of the suborder representation can be translated into principal ideals over the quaternions and with that, it is possible to compute a generator of the desired ideal.

Interestingly, we can show that the SOIP is also equivalent to another problem, the Torsion to Ideal Problem (TIP) that can be seen as a generalization of the CSSI problem introduced by De Feo and Jao for SIDH [JDF11].

Problem 3. (T-Torsion to Ideal (T-TI)) Let T be an integer. Let $x = (D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$ where D is coprime with T and let $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ be an element of Isog_D . Let P, Q be a basis of $E_1[T]$. Given $\text{End}(E_1)$ and $\varphi(P), \varphi(Q) \in E_2[T]$, Compute I , an ideal such that $\text{IdealVerification}(x, I) = 1$.

Proposition 14. *For every D, p , there exists a value of T , such that the SOIP is equivalent to the T-TIP.*

Proof. In this proof, we take a powersmooth value T big enough so that `SmoothGen` _{$\mathcal{M}(T)$} will terminate with overwhelming probability ($\mathcal{M}(T)$ is the set of divisors of T). This assumption will be useful to prove that if we can solve the SOIP, we can solve the TIP for T . For the other direction, we need not assume anything on the size T , only that it is powersmooth. The fact that T is powersmooth implies that points of $E_1[T]$ and $E_2[T]$ have a polynomial representation, that discrete logarithm can be computed in $E_1[T]$ and that isogenies of degree N can be computed in polynomial time.

Let us assume that we know how to solve the TIP for such a powersmooth value T . Let x, π be an instance of the SOIP and let us write φ for the isogeny corresponding to the representation π . If we can compute the image of φ on $E_1[T]$, then we can apply our solver of the TIP to solve the SOIP. Using the suborder representation, we can apply `SuborderEvaluation` to compute the image

of three cyclic subgroups of order T through φ (the ideals corresponding to the subgroups can be computed in polynomial time because we know $\text{End}(E_1)$ and we can solve DLP efficiently over the T -torsion). Once we have the image of three subgroups, it is easy to see that we can compute the image of any points with some DLP and pairing computations. Thus, we get a valid entry to the TIP and we use our solver to find a solution.

For the order direction, let us assume that we have a solver for the SOIP. Let us take an instance of the TIP. By our assumption on the size of T , we can run $\text{SmoothGen}_{\mathcal{M}(T)}$ to get a generating family $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$ of $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ with norms dividing T . Since we know $\text{End}(E_1)$ we can compute the embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ inside $\text{End}(E_1)$. Since the embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ inside $\text{End}(E_2)$ induced by φ is obtained by push-forward through φ of the embedding $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1) \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_1)$, it suffices to use the image of the basis P, Q given in input of the TIP to find the kernel of the endomorphism $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n \in \text{End}(E_2)$ giving the generating family of the embedding $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1) \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$. Once, we have these kernels, we can derive the corresponding isogeny and this yields a valid suborder representation for φ . Now that we have this suborder representation, we can simply apply our solver of the SOIP to find a correct solution.

A sub-exponential quantum attack against the SOIP. To the best of our knowledge, the attack we describe below is the most efficient against the generic SOIP. We use a result from [KMPW21] that a one-way function $f : \mathcal{E} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$ can be inverted at $f(e)$ by solving an instance of the hidden shift problem when there exists a group action $\star : G \times \mathcal{E} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}$ for which there is a malleability oracle: i.e., an efficient way to evaluate the function $g \mapsto f(g \star e)$ on any $g \in G$. The hidden shift problem can be solved in quantum sub-exponential time. In our context, we consider the group action of $(\text{End}(E_1)/D\text{End}(E_1))^*$ on the set of cyclic subgroups of order D . This set is in correspondence with cyclic ideals of norm D inside $\text{End}(E_1)$ and so we can invert the function $I \mapsto E/E[I]$ in sub-exponential time if we have a malleability oracle. In [KMPW21], it was shown that this malleability oracle could be obtained as soon as the image of a big enough torsion-group through the secret isogeny was given. This can be done with our algorithm $\text{SuborderEvaluation}$. As a consequence, we can evaluate φ_I on any subgroup of powersmooth order and this is more than enough to obtain a malleability oracle with the ideas of [KMPW21]. Thus, we can apply the reduction from [KMPW21] and get a sub-exponential quantum method to solve Problem 1.

Remark 2. The existence of a sub-exponential attack is inevitable as soon as one non-trivial endomorphism $\sigma : E_2 \rightarrow E_2$ is revealed. The attack stems from the existence of a group action of $\text{Cl}(\mathbb{Z}[\sigma])$ on the set of $\mathbb{Z}[\sigma]$ -orientations (i.e. pairs E, ι where $\iota : \mathbb{Z}[\sigma] \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_1)$, see [CK19, DFFdSG⁺21] for more on orientations). With the knowledge of σ , one can apply the idea (first introduced by Biase, Jao and Sankar [BJS14] in the special case where $\mathbb{Z}[\sigma] = \mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}]$) that the algorithm from Childs et al. [CJS14] can be adapted to find a path of powersmooth degree between two $\mathbb{Z}[\sigma]$ -oriented curves. When this algorithm

is applied between E_2 and E_1 , a curve of known endomorphism ring, the path obtained in output allows the attacker to compute the endomorphism ring of E_2 . This algorithm has sub-exponential complexity in $\log h(\mathbb{Z}[\sigma])$ as it reduces to an instance of the hidden shift problem. The attack we just outlined is similar to the ones exposed in [Wes22,ACL+22].

In the remaining of this section, we will describe other attacks, analyze the cases in which they prove to be efficient and explain why they fail to solve the generic SOIP.

Torsion point attacks. With the terminology torsion point attack, we designate any attack that aims at recovering an isogeny representation of a secret isogeny $\varphi : E \rightarrow F$ from the knowledge of $\varphi(P), \varphi(Q)$ where P, Q is a basis of $E[T]$ for some integer T . This definition covers attacks against the T -TIP and the CSSI problem of SIDH, including the recent attacks by Castryck and Decru [CD22], Maino and Martindale [MM22] and Robert [Rob22]. These new attacks against SIDH can be seen as a generalization to higher dimension of the original torsion point attack due to Petit [Pet17]. Here is how we can explain their common generic principle: use the torsion points $\varphi(P), \varphi(Q)$ to compute θ , a T -endomorphism/isogeny of abelian varieties in dimension g (for some constant g) whose expression depends on φ . When T is big enough with respect to $\deg \varphi$, the computation of θ can be made solely from $\varphi(P), \varphi(Q)$. Then, θ can be evaluated on the $\deg \varphi$ -torsion to recover $\ker \varphi$. The real advantage of the new attacks against the initial idea of Petit is that they reduce the constraint to $T > \deg \varphi$ which mean they can be applied to SIDH. With our algorithm `SuborderEvaluation`, it is possible to get the image of any subgroup under the isogeny φ of degree D from a suborder representation π_φ . Thus, it is always possible to apply a torsion point attack to the setting of the SOIP. However, the complexity of this attack will not always be polynomial. The main obstacle seems to be the field of definition of the D -torsion. In general, for a random integer D , we can expect the D -torsion to be defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^k} where $k = O(D)$. This is true in particular when D is prime. When the field of definition of the torsion point is too big, there does not seem to be any way to express the kernel of φ in a compact manner and thus the attack does not have a polynomial complexity.

On the other hand, when the degree k of the field extension is polynomial in D , there is a quantum polynomial attack against the SOIP. Indeed, in this case, the torsion point attacks allow us to compute the kernel of φ in polynomial time and this kernel admits a representation of polynomial size. Then, the only remaining task to solve the SOIP is to compute the ideal I corresponding to φ . Since the endomorphism ring of the domain E_1 is known, this can be done in quantum polynomial time using the algorithm from Galbraith, Petit and Silva [GPS17, Algorithm 3]. It is only quantum polynomial time because the algorithm requires to solve some DLPs over the D -torsion, every other aspect of the algorithm can be executed in classical polynomial time.

To conclude, we need that the D -torsion is not defined over a small field extension to ensure hardness of the SOIP. Fortunately, this should happen with

overwhelming probability when D is chosen at random, and it can be verified by computing the order of $p \bmod D$ (the degree k is equal to this order up to a factor 2).

Other attacks. We start by analyzing the complexity of the brute-force algorithm. In full generality, for a given D , the brute force will take $O(\min(p, D))$. The idea is that since $\text{End}(E_1)$ is part of the suborder representation, it suffices to enumerate through all $\text{End}(E_1)$ ideals of norm D until `IdealVerification` passes. There are $O(D)$ such ideals, but since there are only $O(p)$ curves, we need to test at most $O(p)$ of them. Thus, the generic complexity of the brute force is $O(\min(D, p))$. Note that when D is prime, there does not seem to be an adaptation of the meet-in-the-middle attack which provides a quadratic speed-up over a brute-force search, and is considered to be the most efficient method to find an isogeny of smooth degree between two random supersingular curves.

Another way to solve the problem in a generic manner is by computing $\text{End}(E_2)$ (see Proposition 13). Without using the proof π as a hint, the complexity is believed to be $\tilde{O}(p^{1/2})$ for classical computers and $\tilde{O}(p^{1/4})$ for quantum computers (see [EHL+20]).

Even after seeing the above analysis, the hardness of the SOERP may still come as a surprise to a reader familiar with isogeny-based cryptography. In particular, the fact that we reveal several endomorphisms of E_2 might seem like a very troublesome thing to do. This concern is legitimate: the algorithm from [EHL+20] to compute the endomorphism ring of any supersingular curve is based on the principle that knowing two distinct non-trivial endomorphisms is enough to recover the full endomorphism ring in polynomial-time. The idea behind this algorithm is that Bass orders are contained in a small number of maximal orders. Thus, when the two non-trivial endomorphisms generate a Bass order, it suffices to enumerate all the maximal orders containing that same Bass order to find the solution. The authors from [EHL+20] prove their result under the conjecture that two random cycles will form a Bass order with good probability. However, the endomorphisms that we reveal in the suborder representation are not random cycles. By design, the suborder they generate is not Bass and we know that it is contained in an exponential number of maximal orders (this number is equal to the number of D -isogenies by Lemma 3). As such, when using the endomorphisms of the suborder representation, the algorithm described in [EHL+20] is essentially the brute force attack where each ideal of norm D is tested.

Readers might also be concerned with the quaternion alternate path problem. A way to break the SOERP would be to use the embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1)$ inside $\text{End}(E_2)$ to compute a path from E_2 to a curve E_0 of known endomorphism ring. Following the (now standard) blueprint that underlies most of the algorithm in this work, such an attack would be divided in two steps: first a computation over the quaternions (analog to KLPT) and then a conversion through the Deuring correspondence to obtain an isogeny connecting E_2 to E_0 (analog to `IdealTolsogeny`). This supposed attack would have to work over orders of non-trivial Brandt invariant rather than maximal orders to exploit the suborder representation. It appears that the first part of this method can be made to

work over non-Gorenstein orders. In fact, the `IdealSuborderNormEquation` that we describe in Algorithm 7 is exactly the analog of KLPT for orders of the form $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$. However, the fact that the Brandt invariant is non-trivial appears like a serious obstacle to the second part of the proposed attack. Indeed, as the number of curves admitting an embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ inside their endomorphism ring is big, it becomes hard to tell which pair of curves are connected by any ideal of the form $(\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}) \cap J$ (which was not the case for maximal orders because we have almost a 1-to-1 correspondence between curves and maximal orders). Thus, it seems implausible to be able to find a path between E_2 and a given curve E_0 in that manner. Another way of seeing this is that since $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ is a generic suborder shared by a lot of curves, we cannot compute anything that will be specific to a given curve from the knowledge of $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ only.

On prime case vs. composite. Isogenies of degree D_1D_2 can be decomposed as two isogenies of respective degree D_1 and D_2 . Given the local-global principle on the objects of $B_{p,\infty}$, if the ideal that we look for can be decomposed as $I_1 \cdot I_2$ where $n(I_i) = D_i$, there does not seem to be any reason why finding I_2 from the suborder representation for D_1D_2, E_1, E_2 should be different from solving Problem 1 when the degree is simply D_2 . Once I_2 has been found, it is easy to see that recovering I_1 reduces to an instance of Problem 1 of degree D_1 . This informal reasoning justifies that taking D composite should only make Problem 1 easier to solve.

5 Sub-algorithms over the quaternion algebra

In this section, we fill the blanks left in the Section 4. We provide precise descriptions of the algorithms `IdealSuborderNormEquation`, `SmoothGen`, and `CheckTraceM` in Sections 5.2 to 5.4 respectively. We recall that the first algorithm is used to evaluate isogenies from the suborder representation in `SuborderEvaluation` (Algorithm 5 of Section 4.4) and the last two are building blocks for `SuborderVerification` (Algorithm 4 of Section 4.3) for the verification of our new suborder representation. Note that `IdealSuborderNormEquation` and `SmoothGen` are only heuristic as for the algorithms from [KLPT14,DFKL+20]. We expand on this matter in Remark 3.

We use the basis $1, i, j, k$ for $B_{p,\infty}$ where $i^2 = -q, j^2 = -p$ and $k = ij = -ji$ for some small integer $q > 0$ (see [KLPT14] for values of q for all p , when $p = 3 \pmod{4}$ we can take $q = 1$). Following the classical approach in the literature ([KLPT14,DFKL+20]), we take $\mathcal{O}_0 \subset B_{p,\infty}$ as a special extremal order as defined in [KLPT14], i.e., a maximal order containing a suborder with orthogonal basis $\langle 1, \omega, j, \omega j \rangle$ where $\mathbb{Z}[\omega] \subset \mathbb{Q}[i]$ is a quadratic order of small discriminant.

5.1 Algorithms from previous works

In the next sections, we rely upon several algorithms existing in the literature. The full version of [DFKL+20] is a good reference for all these algorithms. We briefly recall their purpose.

- `RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal(l)`, given a left \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal I , finds an equivalent left \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal of prime norm.
- `IdealModConstraint(I, γ)`, given an ideal I of norm N , and $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0$ of norm n coprime with N , finds $(C_0 : D_0) \in \mathbb{P}^1(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$ such that $\mu_0 = j(C_0 + \omega D_0)$ satisfies $\gamma\mu_0 \in I$.
- `EichlerModConstraint(I, γ)`, given an ideal I of norm N , and $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0$ of norm n coprime with N , finds $(C_0 : D_0) \in \mathbb{P}^1(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$ such that $\mu_0 = j(C_0 + \omega D_0)$ satisfies $\gamma\mu_0 \in \mathbb{Z} + I$.
- `StrongApproximation \mathcal{N} (N, C0, D0)`, given a prime N and $C_0, D_0 \in \mathbb{Z}$, finds $\mu = \lambda\mu_0 + N\mu' \in \mathcal{O}_0$ of norm in \mathcal{N} , with $\mu_0 = j(C_0 + \omega D_0)$ and $\mu' \in \mathcal{O}_0$.

The following result on the size of the output of `RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal` will prove useful.

Proposition 15. *Let I be an integral ideal of maximal orders. The output $J = \text{RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal}(l)$ has norm $n(J) = O(\text{poly}(p))$.*

Remark 3. The algorithms that we have introduced above are all expected to terminate in polynomial-time under various plausible heuristic assumptions introduced in [KLPT14,DFKL⁺20]. By plausible, we mean that these assumptions were verified experimentally. These assumptions mostly concern the probability that some integers represented by specific quadratic forms are prime and satisfy some quadratic redosity condition (as in Remark 4 for instance, see also [Wes22] for more details). Our new algorithms are based on the sub-algorithms from [KLPT14] and this is why our results will be subject to the same assumptions. However, these assumptions are only used to justify the termination and expected running time of the sub-algorithms, and so they do not appear directly in our proofs, and this is also why we do not state them clearly.

Remark 4. The `StrongApproximation \mathcal{N} (N, \cdot)` algorithm was originally introduced for a prime number N in [KLPT14]. The probability of success depends on some quadratic redosity condition mod N . We can easily extend `StrongApproximation` to the case of composite N (and this is the version that we use in the algorithms below) if we allow the success probability to decrease. In general, under the heuristic assumption that the integers we consider mod N behave like random integers of the same size, we can see that the success probability should be $1/2^k$ where k is the number of distinct prime divisors of N . Below, we are going to use the algorithm with N having at most three large prime divisors.

5.2 Solving Norm Equations inside non-Gorenstein orders

In this section, we extend the range of 4-dimensional lattices $A \subset B_{p,\infty}$ inside which we know how to solve norm equations. Each of our norm equation algorithm is parameterized by a set $\mathcal{N} \subset \mathbb{N}$ that defines the possible norm of the outputs. This set \mathcal{N} can be either ℓ^\bullet for some prime ℓ or $\mathcal{M}(T)$, the divisors of T for some $T \in \mathbb{N}$.

The first algorithms targeting that task were introduced in [KLPT14] where A was either a special extremal maximal order like \mathcal{O}_0 or an ideal of left (and right) maximal order. In [DFKL⁺20], new methods were introduced to work inside Eichler orders and their ideals, thus covering lattices of the form $\mathbb{Z} + I$ and $(\mathbb{Z} + I) \cap J$ where I, J are cyclic integral ideals with $\gcd(n(I), n(J)) = 1$. We continue this trend of work by exploring the case of non-Gorenstein orders with Gorenstein closure equal to Eichler orders and their ideals. Concretely, this means lattices of the form $\mathbb{Z} + DI$ and $(\mathbb{Z} + DI) \cap J$ where I, J are cyclic integral ideals and $\gcd(n(I), n(J), D) = 1$.

Our motivation is the resolution of norm equations inside $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ for any maximal order $\mathcal{O} \subset B_{p,\infty}$. In the particular case where \mathcal{O} is a maximal extremal order as \mathcal{O}_0 , an algorithm to find elements of given norm inside $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ was introduced in [Pet17]. Unfortunately, the generic case requires a different treatment. We apply the idea from De Feo et al. in [DFKL⁺20] that consists in restricting the resolution to the suborder $(\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}) \cap \mathcal{O}_0$. Since $\mathcal{O} \cap \mathcal{O}_0 = \mathbb{Z} + I$ where $I = \text{ConnectingIdeal}(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O})$, our main tool is an algorithm `EichlerSuborderNormEquation` to solve norm equations inside $\mathbb{Z} + DI = (\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}) \cap (\mathbb{Z} + I)$. This algorithm is going to be the main building block of `SmoothGen` (whose description we give in Section 5.3). In the end of this section, we show with `IdealSuborderNormEquation` how to extend `EichlerSuborderNormEquation` to solve norm equations inside $(\mathbb{Z} + DI) \cap J$ where $\gcd(n(J), n(I)) = 1$.

To clarify the explanations, we try to extract a pattern in the formulations of the algorithms from [KLPT14,DFKL⁺20] and ours. We will explain how the ideas from [KLPT14,DFKL⁺20] fit into a common framework before introducing our approach. We hope that it might provide some insights on these algorithms and help the reader understand how they work and how they were designed.

Each algorithm is parameterized by two integers N_1, N_2 . We look for elements of norm contained in some set $\mathcal{N} \subset \mathbb{N}$. In practice \mathcal{N} is going to be either ℓ^\bullet or the divisors of some powersmooth integer T . The algorithms can be decomposed as follows:

1. Find γ satisfying a set of conditions and having a norm dividing $N_1 n'$ where $n' \in \mathcal{N}$.
2. Find $C, D \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gamma j(C + D\omega) \in A$.
3. Compute $\mu = \text{StrongApproximation}_{\mathcal{N}}(N_2, C, D)$.
4. Output $\gamma\mu$.

The goal of these "conditions" on γ in the first step is to ensure that the second step will always have a solution. As we are going to see, the only real difference between the several algorithms are the values of N_1, N_2 and these conditions on γ . The second step is always solved using linear algebra mod N_2 . When N_2 is composite, we will decompose it in sub-operations modulo the different factors before using a CRT to put everything together.

In the rest of this section, we may assume for simplicity that ideals have prime norm. When not, the algorithm `EquivalentRandomPrimeIdeal` can be used to reduce the computation to the prime case. The first algorithm fitting the framework above was introduced in [KLPT14] and targetted the case where A

is an \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal of norm N . The condition on γ is summarized by Lemma 6 that is a reformulation of some of the results from [KLPT14]. We have $N_1 = N$ and $N_2 = N$.

Lemma 6. [KLPT14] *Let I be an \mathcal{O}_0 ideal of norm N and $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0$. When $\gcd(n(\gamma), N^2) = N$, there exists $C, D \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gamma j(C + D\omega) \in I$ with overwhelming probability.*

The goal of the authors of [DFKL+20] was to obtain a generalization of the algorithm of [KLPT14] when Λ is an \mathcal{O} -ideal K for any maximal order \mathcal{O} (and not just the special case \mathcal{O}_0). To do that, they proposed to solve the norm equation inside $K \cap \mathcal{O}_0$ which can be written as $(\mathbb{Z} + I) \cap J$ for two \mathcal{O}_0 -ideals I, J . To achieve that goal they started by implicitly introducing a method to solve the norm equation inside $\mathbb{Z} + I$ before combining that with the ideas from [KLPT14] to get the full method.

For the case $\Lambda = \mathbb{Z} + I$ where I has norm N , the condition on γ can be summarized with Lemma 7. In that case, $N_1 = 1$ and $N_2 = N$.

Lemma 7. [DFKL+20] *Let I be an \mathcal{O}_0 ideal. When $\gcd(\gamma, N) = 1$, there exists $C, D \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gamma j(C + D\omega) \in \mathbb{Z} + I$ with overwhelming probability.*

When $\Lambda = (\mathbb{Z} + I) \cap J$ with $n(I) = N$ and $n(J) = N'$, the solution presented in [DFKL+20, Section 5] is simply obtained by combining Lemmas 6 and 7 with $N_1 = N'$, $N_2 = NN'$.

Norm equations inside $\mathbb{Z} + DI$. Next, we explain our method for the case $\Lambda = \mathbb{Z} + DI$. This time, we need γ to satisfy more conditions than a simple constraint on its norm. We will introduce the necessary condition in Proposition 16. The constraint proves to be slightly inconvenient, and will impact the size of the final solution, but we managed to find a way to keep some control on the norm of γ while ensuring that the linear algebra step always has a solution.

Proposition 16. *Let I be an integral left \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal of norm N and let D be a prime number distinct from N . If $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0$ can be written as $j(C_2 + \omega D_2) + D\mu_2$ with $\mu_2 \in \mathcal{O}_0$ and γ has norm coprime with N , then there exists $C_1, D_1 \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gamma j(C_1 + \omega D_1) \in \mathbb{Z} + DI$.*

Proof. If γ has norm coprime with N , we know from [DFKL+20] that there exists C_0, D_0 such that $\gamma j(C_0 + \omega D_0) \in \mathbb{Z} + I$ (this is Lemma 7). Then, if we set $C'_2 = -D'_2 C_2 (D_2)^{-1} \pmod{D}$ for any D'_2 , it is easy to verify that $\gamma j(C'_2 + \omega D'_2) \in \mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_0$. Hence, if C_1, D_1 satisfies $C_1 = C_0 \pmod{N}, D_1 = D_0 \pmod{N}, C_1 = C'_2, D_1 = D'_2 \pmod{D}$ and $\gcd(N, D) = 1$, we have that $\gamma j(C_1 + \omega D_1) \in \mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_0 \cap (\mathbb{Z} + I) = \mathbb{Z} + DI$. By the CRT, we know we can find such C_1, D_1 .

With Proposition 16, we see that we must take $N_1 = 1$ and $N_2 = ND$ and that we must also apply a strong approximation \pmod{D} to compute exactly γ . When we apply these ideas to the framework described above, we obtain EichlerSuborderNormEquation.

Algorithm 6 EichlerSuborderNormEquation $_{\mathcal{N}}(D, I)$

Input: I a left \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal of norm N coprime with D .

Output: $\beta \in \mathbb{Z} + DI$ of norm dividing F .

- 1: Select a random class $(C_2 : D_2) \in \mathbb{P}^1(\mathbb{Z}/D\mathbb{Z})$.
 - 2: Compute $\mu_2 = \text{StrongApproximation}_{\mathcal{N}}(D, C_2, D_2)$. If the computation fails, go back to Step 1.
 - 3: Compute $(C_0 : D_0) = \text{EichlerModConstraint}(\mu_2, I)$.
 - 4: Sample a random D'_2 in $\mathbb{Z}/D\mathbb{Z}$, compute $C'_2 = -D'_2 C_2 (D_2)^{-1} \pmod{D}$.
 - 5: Compute $C_1 = \text{CRT}_{N,D}(C_0, C'_2)$, $D_1 = \text{CRT}_{N,D}(D_0, D'_2)$.
 - 6: Compute $\mu_1 = \text{StrongApproximation}_{\mathcal{N}}(ND, C_1, D_1)$. If it fails, go back to step 1.
 - 7: **return** $\beta = \mu_2 \mu_1$.
-

We remind the reader that the heuristics in Proposition 17 are the same as the ones from [KLPT14] (see Remark 3). This goes for Propositions 18 and 19 as well.

Proposition 17. (*Heuristic*) *When N, D are distinct primes, Algorithm 6 terminates in expected $O(\text{poly}(\log(DN)))$ and outputs an element of $\mathbb{Z} + DI$ of norm in \mathcal{N} when \mathcal{N} contains an element bigger than $p^{7/2} D^6$. The expected norm is in $O(\text{poly}(p, D, N))$.*

Proof. As mentioned in Remark 4, because D is prime, under plausible heuristics, the algorithm $\text{StrongApproximation}_{\mathcal{N}}(D, \cdot)$ finds a solution of norm in \mathcal{N} with probability at least $1/2$ in polynomial time when \mathcal{N} contain a big enough element (we will look at the required size at the end of the proof). As a result of Proposition 16, $\text{EichlerModConstraint}$ always succeeds in finding a solution $(C_0 : D_0)$. Then, the second $\text{StrongApproximation}$ has a $1/4$ success probability when N, D are prime. Assuming that a new choice of $(C_2 : D_2)$ randomizes $(C_1 : D_1)$ sufficiently we can show that a solution can be found with overwhelming probability after a constant number of repetitions. This proves the algorithm's termination.

For correctness, we can verify easily that $j(C_2 + D_2 \omega) j(C'_2 + \omega D'_2) \in \mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_0$. Since $\beta - j(C_2 + D_2 \omega) j(C'_2 + \omega D'_2) \in D\mathcal{O}_0$ this proves that $\beta \in \mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_0$. By the correctness of $\text{EichlerModConstraint}$ and the fact that $N\mathcal{O}_0$ is contained in I we can also show that $\beta \in \mathbb{Z} + I$. Hence, $\beta \in (\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}_0) \cap (\mathbb{Z} + I) = \mathbb{Z} + DI$.

The estimates provided in [DFKL+20] allow us to predict that we can find a solution β of norm in \mathcal{N} if \mathcal{N} contains elements of size $\approx 2 \log_{\ell}(p) + 6 \log_{\ell}(D) + 3 \log_{\ell}(N)$. This comes from the fact that a strong approximation mod N' can find solutions of norm approximately equal to pN'^3 . Other estimates provided in [DFKL+20] prove that we will have $N \approx \sqrt{p}$ and this yields the final bound $p^{7/2} D^6$.

Norm equations inside $(\mathbb{Z} + DI) \cap J$. We set $N = n(I)$ and $N' = n(J)$. For this final case, it suffices to combine Lemmas 6 and 7 and Proposition 16 and take $N_1 = N'$, $N_2 = NN'D$. This yields Algorithm 7.

Proposition 18. *(Heuristic) Assumption 2 holds.*

Proof. Due to Lemmas 6 and 7 and Proposition 16, we know that we can find $(C_0 : D_0), (C_3 : D_3)$ and $(C'_2 : D'_2)$ with overwhelming probability and that the result will be correct. The computation takes $O(\text{poly}(\log(DNN')))$ since it consists of linear algebra mod D, N, N' . The executions of **StrongApproximations** terminates in probabilistic polynomial time and output a value with constant probability. So the global computations terminates in probabilistic $O(\text{poly}(\log(DNN')))$. It is correct because **StrongApproximation** is correct. The computation succeeds as soon as the target set \mathcal{N} contains elements that have size bigger than $2 \log_\ell(p) + 6 \log_\ell(D) + 3 \log_\ell(N) + 2 \log_\ell(N')$ and this is the value we can take for the bound B (the first execution of **StrongApproximation** gives an element of size $\sim pD^3/N'$ and the second $p(DNN')^3$).

Algorithm 7 $\text{IdealSuborderNormEquation}_{\mathcal{N}}(D, I, J)$

Input: An integer D , and I, J two left \mathcal{O}_0 -ideals of norm N, N' with $\gcd(N, N', D) = 1$.

Output: $\beta \in (\mathbb{Z} + DI) \cap J$ of norm $N'N''$ where $N'' \in \mathcal{N}$.

- 1: Select a random class $(C_2 : D_2) \in \mathbb{P}^1(\mathbb{Z}/D\mathbb{Z})$.
 - 2: Compute $\mu_2 = \text{StrongApproximation}_{\mathcal{N}}(D, C_2, D_2)$. If the computation fails or if $\gcd(n(\mu_2), N') = 1$, go back to Step 1.
 - 3: Compute $(C_0 : D_0) = \text{EichlerModConstraint}(\mu_2, I)$.
 - 4: Compute $(C_3 : D_3) = \text{IdealModConstraint}(\mu_2, J)$.
 - 5: Sample a random D'_2 in $\mathbb{Z}/D\mathbb{Z}$, compute $C'_2 = -D'_2 C_2 (D_2)^{-1} \pmod{D}$.
 - 6: Compute $C_1 = \text{CRT}_{N, D, N'}(C_0, C'_2, C_3)$, $D_1 = \text{CRT}_{N, D, N'}(D_0, D'_2, D_3)$.
 - 7: Compute $\mu_1 = \text{StrongApproximation}_{\mathcal{N}}(NDN', C_1, D_1)$. If it fails, go back to step 1.
 - 8: **return** $\beta = \mu_2 \mu_1$.
-

5.3 Computing a smooth generating family

In this section, we describe the **SmoothGen** algorithm that takes in input a maximal order \mathcal{O} and a prime D , outputs a generating family of $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ of elements whose norms are in \mathcal{N} . The idea behind this algorithm is quite straightforward: apply **EichlerSuborderNormEquation** on I , for various ideals I connecting \mathcal{O}_0 and orders isomorphic to \mathcal{O} . This gives a way to sample elements in $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$, and we iterate this method until we obtain a generating family from this set. Experimental results show that after taking a few elements in that manner (for instance, no more than ten for parameters of cryptographic sizes, i.e, of a few hundred bits), we can extract a generating family of size three. We formulate this more precisely as Conjecture 1.

Conjecture 1. Let \mathcal{O}_1 be a maximal order in $B_{p, \infty}$. Let I_1, I_2, I_3 be random \mathcal{O}_0 -ideals of prime norms with $\alpha_i \mathcal{O}_R(I_i) \alpha_i^{-1} = \mathcal{O}$ for some $\alpha_i \in B_{p, \infty}^*$. If $\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3$

are random outputs of $\text{EichlerSuborderNormEquation}(D, l_i)$ for $i = 1, 2, 3$, then $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O} = \text{Order}(\alpha_1\theta_1\alpha_1^{-1}, \alpha_2\theta_2\alpha_2^{-1}, \alpha_3\theta_3\alpha_3^{-1})$ with probability $1/c$ where $c = O(\text{poly}(\log(pD)))$.

Proposition 19. (*Heuristic*) Assuming Conjecture 1, Assumption 1 holds.

Proof. Proposition 1 proves the desired running time for ConnectingIdeal . The same holds for $\text{RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal}$ and the outputs of this algorithm have norms in $O(\text{poly}(p))$ by Proposition 15. By Conjecture 1, $n = 3$ and we need only to repeat a polynomial number of times the algorithm $\text{EichlerSuborderNormEquation}$ which terminates in polynomial time by Proposition 17 and the outputs have norm in $O(\text{poly}(pD))$. By the termination condition, the output is a generating family of $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$.

Algorithm 8 $\text{SmoothGen}_{\mathcal{N}}(\mathcal{O}, D)$

Input: A maximal order \mathcal{O} and a prime D .

Output: A generating family $\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3$ for $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ where each θ_j has norm in \mathcal{N} .

- 1: Set $L = \emptyset$ and $I_0 = \text{ConnectingIdeal}(\mathcal{O}_0, \mathcal{O})$.
 - 2: **while** There does not exist $\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3 \in L$ s.t $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O} = \text{Order}(\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)$ **do**
 - 3: $I = \text{RandomEquivalentPrimeIdeal}(I_0)$ and $I = I_0\alpha$.
 - 4: Compute $\theta = \text{EichlerSuborderNormEquation}_{\mathcal{N}}(D, J)$.
 - 5: $L = L \cup \{\alpha\theta\alpha^{-1}\}$.
 - 6: **end while**
 - 7: **return** $\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3$.
-

5.4 Checking traces

In this section, we present an algorithm CheckTrace_M to perform the verification of the suborder representation.

Computing the trace of an endomorphism is a well-studied problem, as it is the primary tool of the point counting algorithms such as SEA [Sch95]. For our application the task is even simpler as we merely have to verify the correctness of the alleged trace value and not compute it. With the formula $\text{tr}(\theta) = \theta + \hat{\theta}$, it suffices to evaluate θ and $\hat{\theta}$ on a basis of the M -torsion, and then verify the relation. In particular, we do not need M to be smooth since we just want to check equality.

Proposition 20. When $M = \#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})$, $n = O(1)$ and $\deg \varphi_i = O(\text{poly}(p))$ and have smoothness bound in $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$, CheckTrace_M terminates in $O(\text{poly}(m \log(p)))$

Proof. By choice of M , P, Q are defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^m} and so operations over the M -torsions have $O(\text{poly}(m \log(p)))$ complexity. By the assumption on the degree of the φ_i , computing all the $\varphi_{\mathcal{I}}(P, Q)$ can be done in $O(\text{poly}(\log(p)))$ since $n = O(1)$ and this concludes the proof.

Algorithm 9 $\text{CheckTrace}_M(E, \varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_n)$

Input: $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$, n endomorphisms of E and n elements of $B_{p, \infty}$ $\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n$.

Output: A bit b equal to 1 if and only if $\text{tr}(\theta_i) = \text{tr}(\omega_i) \pmod M$ for all $i \in [1, n]$.

- 1: Compute P, Q a basis of $E[M]$ over the appropriate field extension. Set $b = 1$.
 - 2: **for** All $\mathcal{I} \subset [1, n]$ **do**
 - 3: Set $\theta_{\mathcal{I}} = \prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \theta_j$ and $\varphi_{\mathcal{I}} = \prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \varphi_j$.
 - 4: Verify $\varphi_{\mathcal{I}}(R) + \hat{\varphi}_{\mathcal{I}}(R) = [\text{tr}(\theta_{\mathcal{I}})]R$ for $R \in \{P, Q\}$. If not, set $b = 0$.
 - 5: **end for**
 - 6: **return** b .
-

6 A new NIKE based on a generalization of SIDH for big prime degrees.

We present here pSIDH (prime-SIDH) a new NIKE scheme. It is based on a SIDH-style isogeny diagram (see Fig. 2) but with prime degrees. For secret keys we propose to use ideal representations and then take suborder representations as public keys. The key exchange will be made possible with **SuborderEvaluation** (Algorithm 5 of Section 4.4). The full description can be found in In terms of security, the pSIDH key recovery problem is exactly the SOIP and our NIKE is secure under the hardness of a decisional variant of the SOIP (Problem 1) in a similar manner to SIDH with the CSSI and SSDDH problems introduced in [JDF11].

As pSIDH is a NIKE and the best attack is quantum-subexponential (see Section 4.5), pSIDH has an application profile similar to CSIDH (there is even a group action involved). The SOIP in itself is closer to the key recovery problem of CSIDH than it is to the one of SIDH (in the sense that they can be both seen as isogeny problems with partial endomorphism ring information which is not really the case for SIDH). However, despite some similarities, the protocols relies on different assumptions. Moreover, the underlying structure in pSIDH is not the same as in CSIDH so it might open new possibilities.

We discuss a concrete instantiation and the efficiency of pSIDH in Section 6.2, where we also compare with the efficiency of CSIDH. Finally, we mention other cryptographic applications in Section 6.3.

6.1 The description of pSIDH

The idea of SIDH is the following: the two participants Alice and Bob generate isogenies φ_A, φ_B of degree $\gcd(N_A, N_B) = 1$. Their public keys are the curves E_A, E_B , together with additional pieces of information to make possible the computation of the two push-forward isogenies $[\varphi_A]_*\varphi_B$ and $[\varphi_B]_*\varphi_A$ depicted in Fig. 2. It is possible to show that the codomains of these push-forward isogenies are isomorphic (thus providing a way to derive the common key from $j(E)$). We have $\ker[\varphi_A]_*\varphi_B = \varphi_A(\ker \varphi_B)$ and this is why Alice's SIDH-public key is the curve E_A together with $\varphi_A(P_B), \varphi_A(Q_B)$ where $\langle P_B, Q_B \rangle = E_0[N_B]$ (and the reverse for Bob's). For efficiency, the degrees N_A, N_B need to be smooth.

In the case of SIDH (or the B-SIDH variant [Cos20]), the degrees are smooth which makes isogeny computations efficient from the kernels if the N_A, N_B torsion is defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} .




Fig. 1. SIDH-isogeny diagram.

To do the same thing for two prime degrees D_A, D_B , we need a new method to compute the codomain of the push-forward isogenies. We propose to use the ideal representations as secret keys and the suborder representations as public keys. The computation of the common key $j(E)$ can be done as follows. Given an ideal I of norm D_A and the suborder $\mathbb{Z} + D_B\mathcal{O}_0$, it is possible to find an element $\theta \in (\mathbb{Z} + D_B\mathcal{O}_0) \cap I$ of norm $D_A S$ where S is a powersmooth integer with the algorithm `IdealSuborderNormEquation` (Algorithm 7 in Section 5.2). The embedding $\iota_B : \mathbb{Z} + D_B\mathcal{O}_0 \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_B)$, is obtained by pushing forward the embedding of $\mathbb{Z} + D_B\mathcal{O}_0$ inside $\text{End}(E_0)$ through φ_B and so we have $\iota_B(\theta) = \psi_A \circ [\varphi_B]_* \varphi_A$ where ψ_A has degree S . Thus, using π_B , the suborder representation of φ_B , we can use `SuborderEvaluation` to compute $\ker \hat{\psi}_A$ and $\hat{\psi}_A$. The codomain of $\hat{\psi}_A$ is isomorphic to E and so the common secret $j(E)$ can be derived from that.

These ideas are summarized in Fig. 2 and the full description of the key exchange mechanism is given as Algorithm 11. The key generation algorithm is also described in Algorithm 10. To be able to run this algorithm in polynomial-time, we need to be able to compute efficiently isogenies of degree ψ_A and to be able to manipulate the full $\deg \psi_A$ torsion. This is why we take the degree of ψ_A as a divisor of a powersmooth integer T . To be able to apply `SuborderEvaluation`, we also need that T is coprime with the degree of the endomorphisms of the suborder representation (so we take T coprime with ℓ). We write $\mathcal{M}(T)$ for the set of divisors of T . The integer m is taken to be as in Proposition 11.

The public parameters of pSIDH should include a prime p and a starting curve E_0 together with a description of $\text{End}(E_0)$. For simplicity, we may assume that $\text{End}(E_0) \cong \mathcal{O}_0$, where \mathcal{O}_0 is the special extremal order introduced in the beginning of Section 5.

Proposition 21. *Under GRH, Assumption 1, Assumption 2, KeyExchange terminates in expected $\text{poly}(\log(pD'D))$.*

Proof. Since $B = O(\text{poly}(\log(pDD')))$, we can choose a value of T with a smoothness bound equal in $O(\text{poly}(\log(pDD')))$. Thus, all operations over the T -torsion




Fig. 2. SIDH/pSIDH-isogeny diagram.

Algorithm 10 $\text{KeyGeneration}(D)$

Input: A prime number $D \neq p$.

Output: The pSIDH public key $\text{pk} = (E, \pi)$ and the pSIDH secret key $\text{sk} = I$ where π is a suborder representation and I an ideal representation for $(D, E_0, E) \in \mathcal{L}_{p\text{-isog}}$.

- 1: Sample I as a random \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal of norm D .
 - 2: Compute $\pi = \text{IdealToSuborder}(I)$ and set E as the domain of the endomorphisms in π .
 - 3: **return** $\text{pk}, \text{sk} = (E, \pi), I$.
-

and the final computation of ψ can be done in $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD'D)))$. The remaining computations terminate in expected $O(\text{poly}(\log(pD'D)))$ due to Assumptions 1 and 2 and Propositions 1, 11, 12 and 15.

Proposition 22. *Let $D_A, D_B \neq p$ be two distinct prime numbers. If $E_A, \pi_A, I_A = \text{KeyGen}(D_A)$ and $E_B, \pi_B, I_B = \text{KeyGen}(D_B)$, then*

$$\text{KeyExchange}(I_A, D_B, E_B, \pi_B) = \text{KeyExchange}(I_B, D_A, E_A, \pi_A).$$

Proof. Let us write φ_A, φ_B the isogenies corresponding to the two ideals I_A, I_B . Let us write θ_A the quaternion element defined in Step 8 of $\text{KeyExchange}(I_A, D_B, E_B, \pi_B)$. Then, the quaternion element $\alpha_A^{-1}\theta_A\alpha_A \in (\mathbb{Z} + D_B\mathcal{O}_0) \cap I_A$ corresponds to an endomorphism $\psi_{A,0} \circ \varphi_A \in \text{End}(E_0)$ for some isogeny $\psi_{A,0} : E_A \rightarrow E_0$. Since it is contained in $(\mathbb{Z} + D_B\mathcal{O}_0) \cap I_A$, we can embed it inside the endomorphism ring of E_B by Proposition 8 and we obtain in that manner the endomorphism $\psi_A \circ [\varphi_B]_* \varphi_A$ where $\hat{\psi}_A = [\varphi_B]_* \psi_{A,0}$. In particular, the codomain of $\hat{\psi}_A$ is isomorphic to the codomain of $[\varphi_B]_* \varphi_A$. We can make the same reasoning by swapping A and B and by definition of push-forward isogenies and Proposition 12, the two j -invariants obtained at the end of the two executions of KeyExchange are equal.

Remark 5. The purpose of Algorithm 11 is to present a simple version of the protocol for the key exchange. However, as it is written, our solution is not very

Algorithm 11 $\text{KeyExchange}(I, D', E', \pi)$

Input: I an ideal of degree D and a prime $D' \neq D, p$. A curve E' and a suborder representation π .

Output: A j -invariant or \perp .

- 1: Parse $\pi = (\mathcal{O}_0, \varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n)$.
 - 2: Compute $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n = \text{SmoothGen}_{\ell^\bullet}(\mathcal{O}_0, D')$.
 - 3: **if** $\text{!SuborderVerification}_{\#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})}((D', E_0, E'), \pi)$ **then**
 - 4: Return \perp .
 - 5: **end if**
 - 6: Take a powersmooth integer T coprime with ℓ with $B < T < 2B$ where B is the bound in Assumption 2 and T has the smallest possible smoothness bound.
 - 7: Set $J = \mathcal{O}_0 1$.
 - 8: Compute $\theta = \text{IdealSuborderNormEquation}_{\mathcal{M}(T)}(D', J, I)$.
 - 9: Factorize $T = \prod_{i=1}^r \ell_i^{e_i}$.
 - 10: Set $G = \langle 0_{E'} \rangle$.
 - 11: **for** $i \in [1, r]$ **do**
 - 12: Compute $J_i = \mathcal{O}_0 \overline{\alpha^{-1} \theta \alpha} + \mathcal{O}_0 \ell_i^{e_i}$.
 - 13: $G = G + \text{SuborderEvaluation}(E_0, E', \pi, D', J_i)$.
 - 14: **end for**
 - 15: Compute $\psi : E' \rightarrow E'/G$.
 - 16: **return** $j(E'/G)$.
-

optimized. For instance, a lot of redundant computations are made through the call to `SuborderEvaluation`. In an optimized implementation of this key exchange, one would want to skip all the first steps which are already executed in `KeyExchange` to focus on the important steps.

Security of pSIDH By design, we have the algorithm `SuborderVerification` to validate public keys and so we obtain a NIKE. For key validation, the public parameters for pSIDH also include a value $M = \#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})$ as in Proposition 10. By design, the pSIDH key recovery problem is simply the SOIP (Problem 1). To prove security of our key exchange, we need a decisional variant which we call the pSSDDH (prime supersingular DDH) problem (see Problem 4).

Problem 4. (pSSDDH) Let $D_A, D_B \neq p$ be two distinct prime numbers and $E_A, \pi_A, I_A = \text{KeyGen}(D_A)$ and $E_B, \pi_B, I_B = \text{KeyGen}(D_B)$. The problem is to distinguish between the two distributions:

1. $(E_A, \pi_A), (E_B, \pi_B), E_{AB}$ where $\text{End}(E_{AB}) \cong \mathcal{O}_R(I_A \cap I_B)$.
2. $(E_A, \pi_A), (E_B, \pi_B), E_C$ where E_C is a random curve $N_A N_B$ -isogenous to E_0 .

With the pSSDDH problem, we can state the security of the key agreement protocol we just outlined. The proof mimicks the one made in [JDF11]. Using arguments similar to the proof of Proposition 14, we could prove that the decisional variant of the TIP is equivalent to our pSSDDH. Interestingly, this decisional variant would be formulated almost identically to the SSDDH problem underlying the security of SIDH [JDF11] (but with different parameters).

Proposition 23. *Under the p SSDDH assumption, the key-agreement protocol made of Algorithms 10 and 11 is session-key secure in the authenticated-links adversarial model of Canetti and Krawczyk [CK01].*

6.2 About efficiency and concrete instantiations

Efficiency. We have proven (at least heuristically) that all our new algorithms can be executed in polynomial time. However, this does not prove anything on the concrete efficiency. We did not make a full implementation but we can obtain a good idea of the efficiency by comparison with the SQISign signature [DFKL⁺20]. This comparison is relevant for two reasons: we can take the same size of prime p (and measure relative efficiency by counting the number of operations over \mathbb{F}_{p^2}) and the bottlenecks should be the same. We elaborate on that below.

Our analysis in Section 4.5 indicates that the only security constraint on the prime p is that it needs to be big enough to prevent the exponential attacks against the endomorphism ring problem (which is the SQISign key recovery problem). Once p has been fixed, the hardness of our new SOIP depends on the value of D . The main attack against the SOIP that we introduce in Section 4.5 has quantum sub-exponential complexity in D . It is unclear what should be the size of D but we can expect it to be bigger than p . This gap between p and D will also induce a gap between the performances of SQISign and the performances of pSIDH. Based on empirical observations, we can predict that the bottleneck in our algorithms is going to be the same as the bottleneck in SQISign’s signature: executions of the `IdealTolsogeny` sub-algorithm. The method introduced in [DFKL⁺20] and the improvement in [DFLW22] for `IdealTolsogeny` both requires to perform a number of arithmetic operations over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} that is linear in the length of the isogeny to be translated. For SQISign the degree 2^e where e is linear in the security parameter. For pSIDH, the size estimates from Section 5.2 show that we may expect element of degree whose logarithm is in $6 \log(D)$ (and some linear dependency on $\log(p)$).

On a concrete instantiation. We believe that finding a parameter D to reach a NIST-1 level of security for pSIDH is a problem on its own. However, we can easily find parameters that reaches the same security level as CSIDH-512. For that, we can take p of at least 256-bits (one of the SQISign primes should be good) and we can take E_0 to be any starting curve of known endomorphism ring. For instance, if $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, we can take the curve of j -invariant 1728 with endomorphism ring isomorphic to $\langle 1, i, \frac{1+k}{2}, \frac{i+j}{2} \rangle$ where $1, i, j, k$ is the canonical basis of the quaternion algebra ramified at p and ∞ .

We need D of at least 256-bits as well (so that the set of subgroups of order D has the same size as the class number in CSIDH-512). We remind the reader that, for the hardness of the SOIP, the D -torsion of supersingular curves in characteristic p needs to be defined over an extension of big degree (roughly equal to 2^{256} to have the best possible security). This condition can be checked by computing the order of $p \pmod{D}$. If $(D-1)/2$ is prime, then the computation

of the order will have polynomial time (because $D - 1$ is easy to factor) and the order of $p \bmod D$ is going to be bigger than $(D - 1)/2$ with overwhelming probability. Such a prime D can be found after trying roughly $\log D$ primes. Apart from that, there is no constraint on the choice of D .

Even though we did not make an implementation, it is clear, looking at the latest performances of SQISign [DFLW22], that an implementation of pSIDH with the parameters we propose, is going to be a lot slower than CSIDH-512.

However, we want to stress that the asymptotic behaviour is rather on the side of pSIDH. Indeed, as we said, the complexity of pSIDH is linear in $\log(D)$ whereas the complexity of CSIDH is worst than linear in $\log(p)$ (and the quantum attack is sub-exponential in $\log(p)$ for CSIDH).

6.3 Potential for other cryptographic applications

We have introduced a new NIKE scheme, pSIDH, as a way to illustrate the possibilities offered by our new isogeny representation under the hardness of the SOIP. We discuss below other potential applications. We propose directions to explore for future work rather than concrete protocols.

Adaptation of protocols based on SIDH. A lot of isogeny-based primitives are based on the mechanism underlying the SIDH key exchange. We can mention n -party key exchange [AJJS19], signatures [YAJ⁺17] built upon the SIDH identification scheme from [JDF11], oblivious transfers [BOBN19,dSGOPS20] and oblivious PRF [BKW20]. It is natural to ask if we can adapt them to the setting of pSIDH.

A multi-party key exchange can easily be designed in the SIDH setting. It suffices to take coprime degrees D_1, D_2, \dots, D_n and the commutative diamond in Fig. 2 can be extended to an n -dimensional commutative diagram that leads naturally to a multi-party key exchange. The main problem with this protocol in the setting of SIDH is security as it is under serious threat of the most recent advances on torsion point attacks from [QKL⁺21] (the construction is broken as soon as $n \geq 6$). It seem plausible to adapt this multi-party key exchange to the setting of pSIDH using the successive suborders $\mathbb{Z} + D_i D_j \mathcal{O}, \mathbb{Z} + D_i D_j D_k \mathcal{O}, \dots$. In terms of security, this n -party pSIDH could be addressing some of the shortcomings of the SIDH version. Indeed, as explained in Section 4.5, the composite version of the SOIP (Problem 1) appears to be reducing to the prime case which tends to suggest that the multi-party key exchange could be as secure as the two-party version. Remains to see how exactly the successive suborders can be computed from the suborder representations. We leave that to future work.

The flexibility offered by pSIDH could also be useful in a simpler setting. Let us assume that there are three parties Alice, Bob and Charlie who want to agree on three keys (one for each pair of parties). In the setting of SIDH, they will need at least 4 public keys. Indeed, if Alice has a key of degree D_A and Bob a key of degree D_B , then Charlie will need a key of degree D_B (resp. D_A) to interact with Alice (resp. Bob). In pSIDH, each party can select a different degree and so they need only 3 public keys.

Contrary to the multi-party key exchange, the adaptation of SIDH signatures to the setting of pSIDH seems like a complicated task. It would require a zero-knowledge ideal-representation proof of knowledge which seem hard to build. However, if it is possible to build one, the suborder representation appear like a good starting point so there could be more to that story.

The OT protocols that we mentioned should not be complicated to adapt to pSIDH given that they mostly require a DDH commutative diagram. However, it is not clear that using pSIDH would be more interesting than SIDH for that primitive.

The oblivious PRF from [BKW20] appears like a more interesting application. First, verifiability is a big issue for this primitive and the construction proposed in [BKW20] includes some zero-knowledge isogeny proof-of-knowledges which are quite expensive and not very compact in the setting of SIDH. Given that verifying computations is inherently a lot easier with pSIDH, it might prove a good match. Second, [BKM⁺21] have presented some attacks against the SIDH-based OPRF from [BKW20]. These attacks might be avoided with a pSIDH variant. Of course, as for the n-party key exchange, new algorithmic tools are needed before we can hope to obtain the analog of the OPRF in the setting of pSIDH and it requires some more work.

Group action. The sub-exponential quantum attack that we presented in Section 4.5 is based on the existence of a group action on the set of ideals of norm D .

It is not exactly clear that this new group action could be more interesting than the one based on CSIDH [CLM⁺18], but it is probably worth studying further. For instance, we could hope that the structure of the underlying group could be easier to compute so we can reproduce the CSI-FiSh [BKV19] signature scheme in our framework without having to perform a subexponential precomputation.

Zero-knowledge proof of suborder representation knowledge. We mentioned several time already the interest of zero-knowledge proofs of isogeny-knowledge. We know there exist somewhat practical instantiations in the setting of SIDH and CSIDH. We explained and argued that it seems complicated to do the same with ideal representations. The next natural question is whether we can hope to do it for the new suborder representations. Proving the knowledge of several endomorphisms of given norm might be feasible but making the additional verification that they generate a specific quaternion order might prove a lot more arduous. As of yet, there does not seem to be an easy way to do that.

Trapdoor mechanism from endomorphisms revelation. One of the main novelty behind our suborder representation construction is the revelation of suborders of rank 4 contained inside endomorphism rings of supersingular curves. Until our work, revealing more than one non-trivial endomorphisms has always been considered as a dangerous thing, but we conjecture with the hardness of the SOIP that it is not problematic when done carefully. It might be possible to

exploit this mechanism for further applications. For instance, we can look at the trapdoor one-way function (TOWF) of the Seta scheme from [DFFdSG⁺21]. In this primitive, the trapdoor is some endomorphism of the public key curve. In the instantiation proposed in [DFFdSG⁺21], the endomorphism ring of the public key curve is typically computed during key generation, but we could imagine a situation where one participant P_1 generates a curve E (and compute its endomorphism ring along the way) before revealing a well-chosen endomorphism of E to another participant P_2 . Then, P_2 could use this endomorphism to perform some protocols (for instance the Seta-TOWF) without knowing anything else on the curve E .

It seems tempting to try to build IBE from this setting. For instance, the master public key could be a curve E with the master secret key as $\text{End}(E)$, identities would be isogenies from E to curves E_{id} and the corresponding secret key would be an endomorphism of E_{id} that could be used as a Seta secret key. Unfortunately, it seems hard to choose these secret keys in a way that would prevent an adversary who has access to several of them to recover enough information to generate secret keys for himself. Even though IBE appears to be out of reach from this idea, lesser primitive could still be achievable.

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Supplementary Material

A suborder representations for composite degree isogenies

In this section, we explain how to extend the results from Section 4 to the case of composite degree. The main obstacle is that when D is not prime, Lemma 3 does not hold anymore. In fact, the problem is already there when D is prime but it is manageable. Indeed, the formulation of Proposition 8 that we would have liked is that E_1, E_2 are D -isogenies if and only if $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E)$ is embedded inside $\text{End}(E_2)$. Instead, we have to take into account the case where $\text{End}(E)$ and $\text{End}(E_2)$ are isomorphic as $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O} \subset \mathcal{O}$ for any quaternion order \mathcal{O} . This is not really problematic as checking that $\text{End}(E) \cong \text{End}(E_2)$ is very easy. However, the problem becomes a lot more serious when D is composite. Let us take $\varphi_2 \circ \varphi_1 : E_0 \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ of degree D_1D_2 . Then, $\mathbb{Z} + D_1D_2\text{End}(E_0)$ is in the three endomorphism rings $\text{End}(E_0), \text{End}(E_1)$ and $\text{End}(E_2)$. Thus, if we prove that E_0, E_2 are D_1D_2 isogenous we need a way to rule out the case where E_2 is only D_1 or D_2 isogenous to E_0 .

This is where the definition of **primitive** embeddings comes into play. We say that the embedding $\iota : \mathfrak{D} \hookrightarrow \mathcal{O}$ is primitive if there does not exist any order $\mathcal{O}' \subsetneq \mathcal{O}$ such that $\iota(\mathfrak{D}) = \mathbb{Z} + N\mathcal{O}'$. With this definition of primitive embeddings we can state the generalization of Proposition 8.

Proposition 24. *Let $D \neq p$ be a prime number and E_1, E_2 be two supersingular curves, $\mathcal{O} \subset B_{p,\infty}$ is a maximal order isomorphic to $\text{End}(E)$. The order $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$ is **primitively** embedded inside $\text{End}(E_2)$ if and only if $(D, E_1, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$ or $(D, E_1^p, E_2) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{isog}}$.*

Proof. For the forward direction, we need the equivalent of Lemma 3 for primitive embeddings. Thus, we are going to show that when, $\mathfrak{D} = \mathbb{Z} + D\mathfrak{D}_0$ is primitively embedded inside \mathcal{O} , then there exists a left integral primitive \mathcal{O} -ideal of norm D whose right order contains \mathfrak{D}_0 . We can prove this by applying recursively Lemma 3 on $\mathfrak{D} = \mathbb{Z} + \ell((D/\ell)\mathfrak{D}_0)$ for any prime ℓ dividing D . At each given iteration, we will obtain an ideal of norm ℓ (and the fact that \mathfrak{D} is primitively embedded rules out the case where $\mathfrak{D}_0 \subset \mathcal{O}$). In the end, multiplying all these ideals together, we obtain an ideal of norm D between \mathcal{O} and a maximal ideal containing \mathfrak{D}_0 . The final ideal is primitive as otherwise we could divide by some constant $d'|D$ and obtain that $\mathbb{Z} + (D/d')\mathfrak{D}_0$ is embedded inside \mathcal{O} .

For the backward direction, using the same construction as in the proof of Proposition 8, we obtain that $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E)$ is embedded inside $\text{End}(E_2)$. Remains to see that this embedding is primitive. Let us assume that the embedding is not primitive. Then there exists $\iota : \mathcal{O}' \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$ such that the elements of $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E)$ are contained inside $\mathbb{Z} + N\iota(\mathcal{O}')$. First, it is clear that N must be dividing D . If we write $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ for the isogeny of degree D . This isogeny can be decomposed as $\psi_N \circ \psi$ where ψ_N has degree N . By our assumption any endomorphism $\gamma = d + \varphi\alpha\hat{\varphi}$ must equal to $d + N\alpha_N$ where $\alpha_N \in \text{End}(E_2)$. Thus, the action of γ on the N -torsion must be equal to the scalar multiplication by d . It is easy to see that it cannot be the case for all $\alpha \in \text{End}(E)$. So there is a contradiction and this proves that the embedding is primitive.

Verification in the composite case. Now, we explain briefly how to extend the `SuborderVerification` to perform the verification when the degree D is composite. The current verification mechanism simply check that there is an embedding $\iota : \mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E) \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$. With Proposition 24, we see that we also need to check that this embedding is primitive. To do that, it suffices to check that $\iota(\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E)) \neq \mathbb{Z} + N\mathfrak{D}$ for some order $\mathfrak{D} \subset \text{End}(E_2)$ and $N|D$. Since $\mathfrak{D} \cong \mathbb{Z} + (D/N)\text{End}(E)$, it suffices to find one endomorphism $\beta = d + \varphi \circ \alpha \circ \hat{\varphi}$ and prove that $d' + (\beta - d)/N$ is not an endomorphism of E_2 to prove that $\iota(\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E)) \neq \mathbb{Z} + N\mathfrak{D}$ for any N of \mathfrak{D} . If the norm of $d' + (\beta - d)/N$ is powersmooth and coprime with N , $G_N = \ker(d' + (\beta - d)/N)$ and E_2/G_N can be computed efficiently. Thus, the additional verification mechanism work as follows: for every prime N dividing D , use `SmoothGen` to compute a generating family $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$ of norm coprime with N of $\mathbb{Z} + (D/N)\text{End}(E)$, express each θ_i as $d' + (\beta_i - d)/N$ where $\beta_i \in \mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E)$ and compute $G_{N,i} = \ker d' + (\iota(\beta_i) - d)/N$. If there exists one N such that $j(E_2/G_{i,N}) = j(E_2)$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$, the verification fails.

B Faster verification with computational soundness.

Proposition 10 is conditioned on the size of the value $M = \#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})$. As explained in Section 5.4, `CheckTraceM` works by evaluating the endomorphisms in input over the M -torsion. Given the big bound on M (see Lemma 5), the field of definition of the M -torsion might be quite big in practice. To speed-up the computation it might be possible to take a value of M below the bound of Proposition 10. In that case, we would obtain a proof system with computational soundness. The underlying hard problem would be the following.

Problem 5. Let M be some integer. Given a maximal order $\mathcal{O} \subset B_{p,\infty}$ and an integer D . The problem is to find E and $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_n \in \text{End}(E)$ such that $\text{CheckTrace}_M(E, \varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_n) = 1$ with $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n = \text{SmoothGen}_{\ell^\bullet}(\mathcal{O}, D)$ but the order generated by $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n$ is not isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z} + D\mathcal{O}$.

Analysis of Problem 5. First, we would like to highlight that the hardness of Problem 5 is a type of assumption quite unusual in isogeny-based cryptography. Contrary to Problem 1 (which is new but remains related to rather classical problem given the equivalence with Problem 2), the hardness of Problem 5 is related to the hardness of solving some set of quadratic equations.

Problem 5 is difficult to analyze. Indeed, in Lemma 5 we give an upper bound on the value of M for which there are no solutions to the problem. However, it is not clear what is the optimal such value. It may be that for some values asymptotically smaller than the proven bound, there is already no possible solutions. However, since we were unable to prove that, the conservative approach is to assume that there may be some solutions. In that case, finding a solution amounts to finding a curve E and endomorphisms of $\text{End}(E)$ satisfying a bunch of norm equations in \mathbb{Z} and trace equations mod M . These equations can be seen

as quadratic equations that can be solved mod M , but since we also need equality of the norms over \mathbb{Z} , it is not clear whether there are solutions and if they are easy to find. The usual tools used to solve equations over quaternion orders (for instance in [KLPT14,DFKL⁺20]) are not sufficient to address our problem.

Let us look at the simple example where $n = 2$. Then, the order is $\mathfrak{O} = \text{Order}(\theta_1, \theta_2) = \langle 1, \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_1\theta_2 \rangle$. The goal is to find θ_1, θ_2 with a precise constraint on their norm, and a constraint mod M for the three traces $\text{tr}(\theta_1)$, $\text{tr}(\theta_2)$, $\text{tr}(\theta_1\theta_2)$. While it is easy to find θ_1 and θ_2 with the correct norm and trace, it seems difficult to ensure the additional constraint on $\text{tr}(\theta_1\theta_2)$. Let us look at that constraint when $\theta_1 = a + ib + jc + kd$ and $\theta_2 = e + if + jg + kh$, then $\text{tr}(\theta_1\theta_2) = ae - (qbf + p(cg + qdh))$. Thus, the problem is: given $n_1, n_2, t_1, t_2, t_3, M$ find a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h such that $a^2 + qb^2 + pc^2 + qpd^2 = n_1$, $e^2 + qf^2 + pg^2 + pqh^2 = n_2$ and $2a = t_1 \pmod{M}$, $2e = t_2 \pmod{M}$ and $ae - (qbf + p(cg + qdh)) = t_3 \pmod{M}$. This appears to be hard when M is too big for the equation mod M to be satisfied at random. In practice, as explained in Section 5.3, we take $n = 3$ and \mathfrak{O} has an even more complicated structure which only increases the number of equations to be verified, as highlighted in Lemma 4.

Remark 6. Additionally, we highlight that progress toward solving the kind of equations above, would probably allow us to devise an algorithm SmoothGen finding solutions of smaller norm, which would make Problem 5 more difficult.