

A Review On Data Anonymization Technique For Data Publishing

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, for many kinds of structured data, including tabular, graph and item set data, data anonymization techniques have been subject of research. In this paper, we present brief yet systematic review of several anonymization techniques such as generalization and bucketization, have been designed for privacy preserving microdata publishing. Recent work has shown that generalization loses considerable amount of information, especially for high-dimensional data. On the other hand, bucketization does not prevent membership disclosure. Whereas slicing preserves better data utility than generalization and also prevents membership disclosure. This paper focus on effective method that can be used for providing better data utility and can handle high-dimensional data.

Keywords-

Data anonymization, Privacy preservation, Data publishing, Data security

I. INTRODUCTION

Data Mining which is sometimes also called as Knowledge Discovery Data (KDD) is the process of analyzing data from different perspectives and summarizing it into useful information. Today, data mining is used by many companies with a strong consumer focus such as retail, financial, communication, and marketing organizations. Extraction of hidden predictive information from large databases, is a powerful new technology with great potential to help companies focus on the most important information in their data warehouses. Various algorithms and techniques like Classification, Clustering, Regression, Artificial Intelligence, Neural Networks, Association Rules, Decision Trees, Genetic Algorithm, Nearest Neighbor method etc., are used for knowledge discovery from databases.

In recent years, data mining has been used widely in the areas of science and engineering, such as bioinformatics, genetics, medicine, education and electrical power engineering. It has been said that knowledge is power, and this is exactly what data mining is about. It is the acquisition of relevant knowledge that can allow to make strategic

decisions. which will further allow for the successful business or organization.

Data Anonymization

Data anonymization technique for privacy-preserving data publishing has received a lot of attention in recent years. Detailed data (also called as microdata) contains information about a person, a household or an organization. Most popular anonymization techniques are *Generalization and Bucketization*. [1] There are number of attributes in each record which can be categorized as 1) *Identifiers* such as *Name or Social Security Number* are the attributes that can be uniquely identify the individuals. 2) some attributes may be Sensitive Attributes (SAs) such as *disease* and *salary* and 3) some may be Quasi-Identifiers (QI) such as *zipcode, age, and sex* whose values, when taken together, can potentially identify an individual.

Data from which the patient cannot be identified by the recipient of the information. The name, address, and full post code must be removed together with any other information which, in conjunction with other data held by or disclosed to the recipient, could identify the patient. Unique numbers may be included only if recipients of the data do not have access to the 'key' to trace the identity of the patient. Technology that converts clear text data into a nonhuman readable and irreversible form, including but not limited to preimage resistant hashes (e.g., one-way hashes) and encryption techniques in which the decryption key has been discarded. Data is considered anonymized even when conjoined with pointer or pedigree values that direct the user to the originating system, record, and value (e.g., supporting selective revelation) and when anonymized records can be associated, matched, and/or conjoined with other anonymized records. Data anonymization enables the transfer of information across a boundary, such as between two departments within an agency or between two agencies, while reducing the risk of unintended disclosure, and in certain environments in a manner that enables evaluation and analytics post-anonymization.

[1] The two techniques differ in the next step. Generalization transforms the QI-values in each bucket into "less specific but semantically consistent" values so that tuples in the same bucket cannot be distinguished by their

QI values. In bucketization, one separates the SAs from the QIs by randomly permuting the SA values in each bucket.

The anonymized data consist of a set of buckets with permuted sensitive attribute values.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes about Background of two main privacy preserving paradigms Section III describes various techniques of data anonymization for privacy preserving data publishing. Section IV outline about comparison of slicing technique with generalization and bucketization. Section V concludes this paper.

II. BACKGROUND

Two main Privacy preserving paradigms have been established: *k*-anonymity [7], which prevents identification of individual records in the data, and *l*-diversity [1], which prevents the association of an individual record with a sensitive attribute value.

k-anonymity

The database is said to be *K*-anonymous where attributes are suppressed or generalized until each row is identical with at least $k-1$ other rows. *K*-Anonymity thus prevents definite database linkages. *K*-Anonymity guarantees that the data released is accurate. *K*-anonymity proposal focuses on two techniques in particular: generalization and suppression. [2] To protect respondents' identity when releasing microdata, data holders often remove or encrypt explicit identifiers, such as names and social security numbers. De-identifying data, however, provide no guarantee of anonymity. Released information often contains other data, such as birth date, sex, and ZIP code, that can be linked to publicly available information to re-identify respondents and to infer information that was not intended for release. One of the emerging concept in microdata protection is *k-anonymity*, which has been recently proposed as a property that captures the protection of a microdata table with respect to possible re-identification of the respondents to which the data refer. *k-anonymity* demands that every tuple in the microdata table released be indistinguishably related to no fewer than *k* respondents. One of the interesting aspect of *k-anonymity* is its association with protection techniques that preserve the truthfulness of the data. The first approach toward privacy protection in data mining was to perturb the input (the data) before it is mined. The drawback of the perturbation approach is that it lacks a formal framework for proving how much privacy is guaranteed. At the same time, a second branch of privacy preserving data mining was developed, using cryptographic techniques. Thus, it falls short of providing a complete answer to the problem of privacy preserving data mining. One definition of privacy which has come a long way in the public arena and is accepted today by both legislators and corporations is that of *k-anonymity* [3]. The guarantee given by *k-anonymity* is that no

information can be linked to groups of less than *k* individuals. Generalization for *k-anonymity* losses

considerable amount of information, especially for high-dimensional data.

[4] Limitations of *k-anonymity* are: (1) it does not hide whether a given individual is in the database, (2) it reveals individuals' sensitive attributes, (3) it does not protect against attacks based on background knowledge, (4) mere knowledge of the *k-anonymization* algorithm can violate privacy, (5) it cannot be applied to high-dimensional data without complete loss of utility, and (6) special methods are required if a dataset is anonymized and published more than once.

l-diversity

The next concept is "*l*-diversity". Say you have a group of *k* different records that all share a particular quasi-identifier. That's good, in that an attacker cannot identify the individual based on the quasi-identifier. But what if the value they're interested in, (e.g. the individual's medical diagnosis) is the same for every value in the group. The distribution of target values within a group is referred to as "*l*-diversity". [8] Currently, there exist two broad categories of *l*-diversity techniques: *generalization* and *permutation*-based. An existing generalization method would partition the data into disjoint groups of transactions, such that each group contains sufficient records with *l*-distinct, well represented sensitive items.

III. VARIOUS ANONYMIZATION TECHNIQUES

Two widely studied data anonymization technique are *generalization* and *bucketization*. The main difference between the two anonymization techniques lies in that bucketization does not generalize the QI attributes.

A. GENERALIZATION

Generalization is one of the commonly anonymized approach, which replaces quasi-identifier values with values that are less-specific but semantically consistent. Then, all quasi-identifier values in a group would be generalized to the entire group extent in the QID space. [12] If at least two transactions in a group have distinct values in a certain column (i.e. one contains an item and the other does not), then all information about that item in the current group is lost. The QID used in this process includes all possible items in the log. Due to the high-dimensionality of the quasi-identifier, with the number of possible items in the order of thousands, it is likely that any generalization method would incur extremely high information loss, rendering the data useless [8]. In order for generalization to be effective, records in the same bucket must be close to

each other so that generalizing the records would not lose too much information. However, in high-dimensional data, most data points have similar distances with each other. To perform data analysis or data mining tasks on the generalized table, the data analyst has to make the uniform distribution assumption that every value in a generalized interval/set is equally possible, as no other distribution assumption can be justified. This significantly reduces the data utility of the generalized data. And also because each attribute is generalized separately, correlations between different attributes are lost. In order to study attribute correlations on the generalized table, the data analyst has to assume that every possible combination of attribute values is equally possible. This is an inherent problem of generalization that prevents effective analysis of attribute correlations.

B. BUCKETIZATION

The first, which we term *bucketization*, is to partition the tuples in T into *buckets*, and then to separate the sensitive attribute from the non-sensitive ones by randomly permuting the sensitive attribute values within each bucket. The sanitized data then consists of the buckets with permuted sensitive values. In this paper,[13,] we use bucketization as the method of constructing the published data from the original table T , although all our results hold for full-domain generalization as well. We now specify our notion of bucketization more formally. Partition the tuples into buckets (i.e., horizontally partition the table T according to some scheme), and within each bucket, we apply an independent random permutation to the column containing S -values. The resulting set of buckets, denoted by B , is then published. For example, if the underlying table T , then the publisher might publish bucketization B . Of course, for added privacy, the publisher can completely mask the identifying attribute (Name) and may partially mask some of the other non-sensitive attributes (Age, Sex, Zip). For a bucket $b \in B$, we use the following notation.

P_b	set of people $p \in P$ with tuples $t_p \in b$
n_b	number of tuples in b
$n_b(s)$	frequency of sensitive value $s \in S$ in b
S_b^0, S_b^1, \dots	sensitive values in decreasing order of frequency in b

While bucketization [1,13] has better data utility than generalization, it has several limitations. First, bucketization does not prevent membership disclosure. Because bucketization publishes the QI values in their original forms, an adversary can find out whether an individual has a record in the published data or not. As shown in, 87 percent of the individuals in the United States can be uniquely identified using only three attributes (Birthdate, Sex, and Zipcode). A microdata (e.g., census data) usually contains many other attributes besides those three attributes. This means that the membership information of most individuals can be inferred from the bucketized table.

Second, bucketization requires a clear separation between QI s and SA s. However, in many data sets, it is unclear which attributes are QI s and which are SA s. Third, by separating the sensitive attribute from the QI attributes, bucketization breaks the attribute correlations between the QI s and the SA s.

Bucketization first partitions tuples in the table into buckets and then separates the quasi identifiers with the sensitive attribute by randomly permuting the sensitive attribute values in each bucket. The anonymized data consist of a set of buckets with permuted sensitive attribute values. In particular, bucketization has been used for anonymizing high-dimensional data. However, their approach assumes a clear separation between QI s and SA s. In addition, because the exact values of all QI s are released, membership information is disclosed.

C. SLICING

To improve the current state of the art in this paper, we introduce a novel data anonymization technique called slicing. [1] Slicing partitions the data set both vertically and horizontally. Vertical partitioning is done by grouping attributes into columns based on the correlations among the attributes. Each column contains a subset of attributes that are highly correlated. Horizontal partitioning is done by grouping tuples into buckets. Finally, within each bucket, values in each column are randomly permuted (or sorted) to break the linking between different columns. The basic idea of slicing is to break the association cross columns, but to preserve the association within each column. This reduces the dimensionality of the data and preserves better utility than generalization and bucketization.

Slicing preserves utility because it groups highly correlated attributes together, and preserves the correlations between such attributes. Slicing protects privacy because it breaks the associations between uncorrelated attributes, which are infrequent and thus identifying. Note that when the data set contains QI s and one SA , bucketization has to break their correlation; slicing, on the other hand, can group some QI attributes with the SA , preserving attribute correlations with the sensitive attribute.

The key intuition that slicing provides privacy protection is that the slicing process ensures that for any tuple, there are generally multiple matching buckets. Slicing first partitions attributes into columns. Each column contains a subset of attributes. Slicing also partition tuples into buckets. Each bucket contains a subset of tuples. This horizontally partitions the table. Within each bucket, values in each column are randomly permuted to break the linking between different columns.

IV. DISCUSSION

Our discussion includes comparative study of slicing technique which is better than generalization and bucketization for the high dimension data sets.

Comparison with Generalization

We would like to emphasize that our intention is not to eliminate generalization; there is no doubt that

generalization is an important technique, partly proved by the fact that it has received much attention in the literature. Instead, our goal is to present an alternative option for privacy preservation, which has its own advantages, since it can retain a larger amount of data characteristics. [14, 19]Indeed, anatomy is not an all-around winner. Intuitively, by releasing the QI-values directly, anatomy may allow a higher breach probability than generalization. Nevertheless, such probability is always bounded by $1/l$, as long as the background knowledge of an adversary is not stronger than the level allowed by the l -diversity model. There are several types of recodings for generalization. The recoding that preserves the most information is local recoding. In local recoding, one first groups tuples into buckets and then for each bucket, one replaces all values of one attribute with a generalized value. Such a recoding is local because the same attribute value may be generalized differently when they appear in different buckets. We now show that slicing preserves more information than such a local recoding approach, assuming that the same tuple partition is used. We achieve this by showing that slicing is better than the following enhancement of the local recoding approach. Rather than using a generalized value to replace more specific attribute values, one uses the multiset of exact values in each bucket. [1]The main problems with generalization are: 1) it fails on high-dimensional data due to the curse of dimensionality and 2) it causes too much information loss due to the uniform-distribution assumption.

Comparison with Bucketization

[1,13,18]The advantages of slicing over bucketization can be understood as follows: First, by partitioning attributes into more than two columns, slicing can be used to prevent membership disclosure. Our empirical evaluation on a real data set shows that bucketization does not prevent membership disclosure.

Second, unlike bucketization, which requires a clear separation of QI attributes and the sensitive attribute, slicing can be used without such a separation. For data set such as the census data, one often cannot clearly separate QIs from SAs because there is no single external public database that one can use to determine which attributes the adversary already knows. Slicing can be useful for such data. Finally, by allowing a column to contain both some QI attributes and the sensitive attribute, attribute correlations between the sensitive attribute and the QI attributes are preserved.

V. CONCLUSION

An important research problem is for handling high-dimensional data. As per the above comparison there are two popular data anonymization technique Generalization and Bucketization. These techniques are designed for privacy preserving microdata publishing. But recent work has shown that for high dimensional data generalization loses considerable amount of information. Bucketization, on

the other hand, does not prevent membership disclosure and does not apply for data that do not have a clear separation between quasi-identifying attributes and sensitive attributes. On the other hand, slicing can be used for anonymizing transaction databases. Slicing preserves better data utility than generalization and can be used for membership disclosure protection. Another important advantage of slicing is that it can handle high-dimensional data.

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