

industrialization and resist foreign economic encroachment. Plagued by chronic inflation, labor in Latin America often consents to employer paternalism and fringe benefits in lieu of additional wages.

A high degree of politicalization also characterizes labor movements in Latin America. Be it caused by the political propensities of early immigrant leaders, the attractiveness of subsidies from friendly political parties, or the benefits of legislation over collective bargaining, it generally results in politicians using labor rather than serving it. Professor Alexander concludes that politicalization under dictatorships jeopardizes the material interests of the working class. In my opinion, however, this conclusion should be qualified. Though the real wages of skilled labor declined under Perón and Castro, the combination of greater fringe benefits and wages actually improved the standard of living of most unskilled workers. Nor should we surmise that the development of progressive governments will decrease labor's political proclivities. On the contrary, the growth of state and mixed industries fostered by the democratic left will inevitably make the government an interested party in the process of collective bargaining. Labor will then have a greater stake in electing sympathetic officials.

The major portion of *Organized Labor in Latin America* presents a concise summary of labor movements in the Latin American republics as well as the nonrepublican areas of the Caribbean. The key word in the title is "organized"; the author is primarily interested in describing the activities of anarcho-syndicalist, socialist, communist, Catholic, and syndicalist labor confederations. But since a large segment of labor is not organized—especially in the less developed nations—this book is of limited application. It is nonetheless the principal reference on labor in Latin America.

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GORDON PACKARD, JR.

A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House. By ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. Boston, 1965. Houghton Mifflin Company. Index. Pp. v, 1087. \$9.00.

Arthur M. Schlesinger reveals again his prize-winning ability to express ideas and describe personal characteristics and actions in a way that rivets the attention of the reader. *A Thousand Days* is a remarkably readable and detailed chronicle of the three years of the Kennedy administration. It has the full flavor that comes from intimate observation. It is vividly autobiographical as it reveals the thinking and attitudes of the author. It is also undoubtedly repre-

sentative of the political attitudes of many of the other professors who advised and assisted President Kennedy.

One most important feature of the book is that it reveals the characteristics of Schlesinger's own thinking which made his presence in the White House a symbol of President Kennedy's personal and official interest in intellectuals and idealists who were not only unappreciated but often in the political opposition in many countries of the world. I know that this gave hope to many such people. And President Kennedy obviously valued this symbolism, because he persisted in it, even though it caused him suspicion of more conservative elements in our own country and abroad, whose cooperation with the Kennedy administration was less enthusiastic because Schlesinger was there. The faith that President Kennedy showed in Schlesinger was linked closely with the aspect of the President's mind and personality that made him revered by youth.

Readers of the *HAHR* should have special interest in Schlesinger's account of United States relations with the Hispanic American countries during the 'thousand days.' Undoubtedly I was invited to write this review for the reason that I knew about these relations intimately during a quarter of the thousand days—the eight months from July 1961 to March 1962 when I was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. I can recommend Schlesinger's book as a vividly revealing picture of the way in which President Kennedy and those around him formulated policies, the way they thought and performed. This intimate detail, the personal observations and attitudes, the biographical opinions and descriptions, will all be extremely valuable material to be weighed with the differing views and observations of others in the eventual perspective of history.

In my own opinion less partisan perspective will reveal that most of the ideas of the Kennedy administration in relations with Latin America were less original than Schlesinger would lead one to believe. For example, practically nothing in the long-standing administration of Public Law 480 was changed by calling this program "Food for Peace." But it is probable that this program—providing a wide variety of uses abroad for surplus agricultural commodities and for the local currency proceeds from the sale of those products—was given more propaganda value by the more imaginative name.

Although few concrete measures for economic and social development were new, this should not diminish the significance of the mystique of the slogan, "Alliance for Progress," symbolizing a collective effort toward lofty and concrete goals. Great impetus was given to

the conviction—already slowly gaining currency—that “The men of wealth and power in poor nations . . . must lead the fight for those basic reforms which alone can preserve the fabric of their own societies” (p. 789). But Schlesinger does not give full weight to the high cost of the effort—the temporary effects which alarmed many conscientious Latin American leaders. Capital fled, fearing higher taxes and instability brought on by demands of “less-developed” populations which they knew they could not fulfill. But gradually confidence is building up. The greater respectability and enthusiasm won for the basic ideas of the “Alliance” are now showing their effects. History should demonstrate that the “Alliance” did accelerate progress, and the part played in this by multilateral organization of help in planning economic and social investment and development should not be underestimated.

Conversely, Schlesinger touched only lightly on one measure sponsored decisively by the Kennedy administration which I urged persistently in the belief that it was essential. This was an agreement on world coffee production and marketing which has been vital to the economies and the very stability of several of the fourteen coffee-producing nations in Latin America. Without this the ideals of the “Alliance” might still be in the doldrums. This commodity agreement may well prove to be one of the great landmarks in world economic development, an example for other such agreements; Michael Blumenthal, representing the United States as the largest consuming country, deserves kudos for helping to bring this pact into being.

Schlesinger shows the impatience of the idealist in some of his comments about bureaucrats and Department of State personnel. His incisive and sometimes stinging personal opinions should be welcomed and conscientiously examined. I can substantiate that he was at his fairest when he described the second meeting at Punta del Este in January 1962 and stated that all the qualities of Secretary Rusk, “his intelligence, command of detail, inexhaustible patience and effortless inscrutability—precisely fitted the requirements of the occasion” (p. 781). I believe that future perspective will reveal that this meeting was an achievement, that it stopped a fall in United States ideological and military prestige in Latin America which was far more serious than Schlesinger suggests.

While welcoming the author’s own views of President Kennedy’s comments about people and problems—comments which might have arisen from the exasperation of the moment—I could wish that he had given “equal time” to other more meditative reflections by the Presi-

dent. On December 17, 1962 President Kennedy commented on two years in the presidency with representatives of the three large broadcasting chains in an interview which was sent to United States embassies as a motion picture. William Lawrence of ABC asked the President how his experience during the two years had matched his expectations at the beginning. President Kennedy replied: "Well, I think in the first place the problems are more difficult than I had imagined they were. Secondly, there is a limitation on the ability of the United States to solve these problems." He repeated these thoughts for emphasis and elaborated on the theme with examples and then added, "If you take the wrong course, and on occasion I have, the President bears the burden of the responsibility quite rightly. The advisors may move on to new advice."

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Latin American Mission. An Adventure in Hemisphere Diplomacy.

By DELESSEPS S. MORRISON. Edited and with an introduction by GEROLD FRANK. New York, 1965. Simon and Schuster. Index. Pp. 288. \$5.95.

Delesseps Morrison's posthumous account of his tenure as United States Ambassador to the OAS does not pretend to be scholarly. However, the impressions of this political activist are indeed a primary source. Ambassador Morrison explains the intricacies of the Alliance for Progress as well as his role in attaining economic and diplomatic sanctions against Castro's Cuba. The lack of a cohesive Latin American policy during the Kennedy years is apparent and also the state of confusion existing in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. The ambassador is critical of Kennedy's White House staff of untrained romantics whose ideas about Latin America frequently took precedence over those of experienced Department of State advisors.

He expresses grave concern for the future of United States policy in Latin America vis a vis the ineffective OAS, which is controlled by the United States but operates under a facade of juridical equality. Examples of United States coercion of hemispheric neighbors are related, and of particular interest is the role which Washington played in the expulsion of the Trujillos from the Dominican Republic.

Morrison recommends a flexible Latin American policy, strongly supporting the *Alianza*, encouraging European nations and Japan to assist, and accepting differences of opinion within the hemisphere. In his opinion also the Department of State should upgrade its personnel and help to strengthen the Secretariat of the OAS. He warns