

A UNIVERSAL APPROACH TO SELF-REFERENTIAL PARADOXES,
INCOMPLETENESS AND FIXED POINTS

NOSON S. YANOFSKY

*The point of these observations
is not the reduction of the
familiar to the unfamiliar[. . .]
but the extension of the familiar
to cover many more cases.*

Saunders MacLane

*Categories for the Working Mathematician [14]
Page 226.*

Abstract. Following F. William Lawvere, we show that many self-referential paradoxes, incompleteness theorems and fixed point theorems fall out of the same simple scheme. We demonstrate these similarities by showing how this simple scheme encompasses the semantic paradoxes, and how they arise as diagonal arguments and fixed point theorems in logic, computability theory, complexity theory and formal language theory.

§1. Introduction. In 1969, F. William Lawvere wrote a paper [11] in which he showed how to describe many of the classical paradoxes and incompleteness theorems in a categorical fashion. He used the language of category theory (and of cartesian closed categories in particular) to describe the setting. In that paper he showed that in a cartesian closed category satisfying certain conditions, paradoxical phenomena can occur. Lawvere then went on to demonstrate this scheme by showing the following examples

1. Cantor's theorem that $\mathbb{N} \not\cong \wp(\mathbb{N})$
2. Russell's paradox
3. The non-definability of satisfiability
4. Tarski's non-definability of truth and
5. Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.

Further work along these lines were done in several papers e.g., [8], [17], [19], [20]. Unfortunately, Lawvere's paper has been overlooked by many people both inside and outside of the category theory community. Lawvere

Received April 15, 2003; accepted June 28, 2003.

© 2003, Association for Symbolic Logic
1079-8986/03/0903-0004/\$3.50

and Schanuel revisited these ideas in Session 29 of their book [13]. Recently, Lawvere and Robert Rosebrugh came out with a book *Sets for Mathematics* [12] which also has a few pages on this scheme.

It is our goal to make these amazing results available to a larger audience. Towards this aim we restate Lawvere’s theorems without using the language of category theory. Instead, we use sets and functions. The main theorems and their proofs are done at tutorial speed. We generalize one of the theorems and then we go on to show different instances of this result. In order to demonstrate the ubiquity of the theorems, we have tried to bring examples from many diverse areas of logic and theoretical computer science.

Classically, Cantor proved that there is no onto (surjection) function

$$\mathbb{N} \longrightarrow 2^{\mathbb{N}} \cong \wp(\mathbb{N})$$

where $2^{\mathbb{N}}$ is the set of functions from \mathbb{N} to $\mathbf{2} = \{0, 1\}$. $2^{\mathbb{N}}$ is the set of characteristic functions on the set \mathbb{N} and is equivalent to the powerset of \mathbb{N} . We can generalize Cantor’s theorem to show that for any set T there is no onto function

$$T \longrightarrow 2^T \cong \wp(T).$$

The same theorem is also true for other sets besides $\mathbf{2}$, e.g., $\mathbf{3} = \{0, 1, 2\}$ or $\mathbf{23} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 21, 22\}$. The theorem is not true for the set $\mathbf{1} = \{0\}$. In general we can replace $\mathbf{2}$ with an arbitrary “non-degenerate” set Y . From this generalization, the basic statement of Cantor’s theorem roughly says that if Y is “non-degenerate” then there is no onto function

$$T \longrightarrow Y^T$$

where Y^T is the set of functions from T to Y . Y can be thought of as the set of possible “truth-values” or “properties” of elements of T . By “non-degenerate” we mean that the objects of Y can be interchanged or that there exists a function α from Y to Y without any fixed points ($y \in Y$ where $\alpha(y) = y$.)

Rather than looking at functions $\hat{f}: T \longrightarrow Y^T$, we shall look at equivalent functions of the form $f: T \times T \longrightarrow Y$. Every \hat{f} can be converted to a function f where $f(t, t') = \hat{f}(t')(t) \in Y$. Saying that \hat{f} is not onto is the same thing as saying that there exists a $g(-) \in Y^T$ such that for all $t' \in T$ the function $\hat{f}(t') = f(-, t'): T \longrightarrow Y$ is not the same as the function $g(-): T \longrightarrow Y$. In other words there exists a $t \in T$ such that

$$g(t) \neq f(t, t').$$

We shall call a function $g: T \longrightarrow Y$ “representable by t_0 ” if $g(-) = f(-, t_0)$. So if \hat{f} is not onto, then there exists a $g(-) \in Y^T$ that is not representable by any $t \in T$.

On a philosophical level, this generalized Cantor’s theorem says that as long as the truth-values or properties of T are non-trivial, there is no way

that a set T of things can “talk about” or “describe” their own truthfulness or their own properties. In other words, there must be a limitation in the way that T deals with its own properties. The Liar paradox is the three thousand year-old primary example that shows that natural languages should not talk about their own truthfulness. Russell’s paradox shows that naive set theory is inherently flawed because sets can talk about their own properties (membership.) Gödel’s incompleteness results shows that arithmetic cannot completely talk about its own provability. Turing’s Halting problem shows that computers cannot completely deal with the property of whether a computer will halt or go into an infinite loop. All these different examples are really saying the same thing: there will be trouble when things deal with their own properties. It is with this in mind that we try to make a single formalism that describes all these diverse—yet similar—ideas.

The best part of this unified scheme is that it shows that there really are no paradoxes. There are limitations. Paradoxes are ways of showing that if you permit one to violate a limitation, then you will get an inconsistent system. The Liar paradox shows that if you permit natural language to talk about its own truthfulness (as it—of course—does) then we will have inconsistencies in natural languages. Russell’s paradox shows that if we permit one to talk about any set without limitations, we will get an inconsistency in set theory. This is exactly what is said by Tarski’s theorem about truth in formal systems. Our scheme exhibits the inherent limitations of all these systems. The constructed g , in some sense is the limitation that your system (f) cannot deal with. If the system does deal with the g , there will be an inconsistency (fixed point).

The contrapositive of Cantor’s theorem says that if there is a onto $T \rightarrow Y^T$ then Y must be “degenerate” i.e., every map from Y to Y must have a fixed point. In other words, if T can talk about or describe its own properties then Y must be faulty in some sense. This “degenerate”-ness is a way of producing fixed point theorems.

For pedagogical reasons, we have elected not to use the powerful language of category theory. This might be an error. Without using category theory we might be skipping over an important step or even worse: wave our hands at a potential error. It is our hope that this paper will make you go out and look at Lawvere’s original paper and his subsequent books. Only the language of category theory can give an exact formulation of the theory and truly encompass all the diverse areas that are discussed in this paper. Although we have chosen not to employ category theory here, its spirit is nevertheless pervasive throughout.

This paper is intended to be extremely easy to read. We have tried to make use of the same proof pattern over and over again. Whenever possible we use the same notation. The examples are mostly disjoint. If the reader is unfamiliar with or cannot follow one of them, he or she can move on

to the next one without losing anything. Section 2 states Lawvere's main theorem and some of our generalizations. Section 3 has many worked out examples. We start the section with the classical paradoxes and then move on to some of the semantic paradoxes. From there we go on to other examples from theoretical computer science. Section 4 states the contrapositive of the main theorem and some of its generalizations. The example of this contrapositive is in Section 5. We finish off the paper by looking at some future directions for this work to continue. We also list some other examples of limitations and fixed point theorems that might be expressible in our scheme.

We close this introduction with a translation of Cantor's original proof of his diagonalization theorem. His language is remarkably reminiscent of our language. This translation was taken from Shaughan Lavine's book [10].

The proof seems remarkable not only because of its simplicity, but especially also because the principle that is employed in it can be extended to the general theorem, that the powers of well-defined sets have no maximum or, what is the same, that for any given set L another M can be placed beside it that is of greater power than L .

For example Let L be a linear continuum, perhaps the domain of all real numerical quantities that are ≥ 0 and ≤ 1 .

Let M be understood as the domain of all single-valued functions $f(x)$ that take on only the two values 0 or 1, while x runs through all real values that are ≥ 0 and ≤ 1 . [$M = 2^L \dots$]

But M does not have the same power as L either. For otherwise M can be put into one-to-one correspondence to the variable z [of L], and thus M could be thought of in the form of a single valued function

$$\phi(x, z)$$

of the two variables x and z , in such a way that through every specification of z one would obtain an element $f(x) = \phi(x, z)$ of M and also conversely each element $f(x)$ of M could be generated from $\phi(x, z)$ through a single definite specification of z . This however leads to a contradiction. For if we understand by $g(x)$ that single valued function of x which takes only values 0 or 1 and which every value of x is different from $\phi(x, x)$, then on the one hand $g(x)$ is an element of M , and on the other it cannot be generated from $\phi(x, z)$ by any specification $z = z_0$, because $\phi(z_0, z_0)$ is different from $g(z_0)$.

Acknowledgments. The author is grateful to Rohit Parikh for suggesting that this paper be written and for his warm encouragement. The author also had many helpful conversations with Eva Cogan, Scott Dexter, Mel Fitting, Alex Heller, Roman Kossak, Mirco Mannucci, and Paula Whitlock.

§2. Cantor's theorems and its generalizations. It is pedagogically sound to skip this section for a moment and read the beginning of the next section where you can remind yourself of the proof of the more familiar version of Cantor's theorem (about $\mathbb{N} \not\cong \wp(\mathbb{N})$) and Russell's set theory paradox. Our theorem here might seem slightly abstract at first.

THEOREM 1 (Cantor's Theorem). *If Y is a set and there exists a function $\alpha: Y \rightarrow Y$ without a fixed point (for all $y \in Y$, $\alpha(y) \neq y$), then for all sets T and for all functions $f: T \times T \rightarrow Y$ there exists a function $g: T \rightarrow Y$ that is not representable by f i.e., such that for all $t \in T$*

$$g(-) \neq f(-, t).$$

PROOF. Let Y be a set and assume $\alpha: Y \rightarrow Y$ is a function without fixed points. There is a function $\Delta: T \rightarrow T \times T$ that sends every $t \in T$ to $(t, t) \in T \times T$. Then construct $g: T \rightarrow Y$ as the following composition of three functions.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} T \times T & \xrightarrow{f} & Y \\ \Delta \uparrow & & \downarrow \alpha \\ T & \xrightarrow{g} & Y \end{array}$$

In other words,

$$g(t) = \alpha(f(t, t)).$$

We claim that for all $t \in T$, $g(-) \neq f(-, t)$ as functions of one variable. If $g(-) = f(-, t_0)$ then by evaluation at t_0 we have

$$f(t_0, t_0) = g(t_0) = \alpha(f(t_0, t_0))$$

where the first equality is the fact that g is representable and the second equality is the definition of g . But this means that α does have a fixed point. \square

REMARK 1. *Obviously, every set Y with two or more elements has a function to itself that does not have a fixed point. It is here that we get in trouble for talking about sets and functions as opposed to objects in a category and morphisms between those objects. Perhaps Y and T are sets with extra (algebraic) structure and functions between them are intended to preserve that extra structure. For example Y might be a partial order and α must preserve the order structure. There are few partial order maps from the partial order Y to the partial order Y . In contrast, there are many functions from the set Y to the set Y . Similar statements can be made about any structure that one puts on Y (e.g., topological space, group, complete lattice etc.) There are fewer endomaps of Y if you insist that the endomaps preserve the extra structure.*

The above theorem has more content if you take notice of the fact that we might not be dealing with functions between sets.


REMARK 2. The Δ map is called the “diagonal” and many of the proofs are called “diagonalization arguments.” f is some type of evaluation function and $f(t, t)$ is an evaluation of itself, hence “self-reference” or “self-referential arguments.”

REMARK 3. We follow Lawvere and Schanuel [13] in calling this theorem “Cantor’s Theorem” and its contrapositive the “Diagonal Theorem” which is stated in Section 4.

We generalize the above theorem so that instead of $\Delta = \langle Id, Id \rangle$ we use $\langle Id, \beta \rangle$ for an arbitrary onto (right invertible) function $\beta : T \rightarrow S$. Whereas $\Delta = \langle Id, Id \rangle : T \rightarrow T \times T$ takes every t to (t, t) , $\langle Id, \beta \rangle : T \rightarrow T \times S$ takes every t to $(t, \beta(t))$.

The way to think about this theorem is to say that if there is an onto $\beta : T \rightarrow S$ then in a sense $|S| \leq |T|$ and Cantor’s theorem says $|T| \leq |Y^T|$ and so we conclude that $|S| \leq |Y^T|$.

THEOREM 2. Let Y be a set, $\alpha : Y \rightarrow Y$ a function without a fixed point, T and S sets and $\beta : T \rightarrow S$ a function that is onto (i.e., has a right inverse $\bar{\beta} : S \rightarrow T$.) then for all functions $f : T \times S \rightarrow Y$ the function $g_\beta : T \rightarrow Y$ constructed as follows



is not representable by f .

PROOF. Let Y, α, T and β be given. Let $\bar{\beta} : S \rightarrow T$ be the right inverse of β . By definition

$$g_\beta(t) = \alpha(f(t, \beta(t))).$$

We claim that for all $s \in S$ $g_\beta(-) \neq f(-, s)$. If $g_\beta(-) = f(-, s_0)$ then evaluation at $\bar{\beta}(s_0)$ gives

$$\begin{aligned}
 f(\bar{\beta}(s_0), s_0) &= g_\beta(\bar{\beta}(s_0)) \quad \text{by representability of } g_\beta \\
 &= \alpha(f(\bar{\beta}(s_0), \beta(\bar{\beta}(s_0)))) \quad \text{by definition of } g_\beta \\
 &= \alpha(f(\bar{\beta}(s_0), s_0)) \quad \text{by definition of right inverse.}
 \end{aligned}$$

Which means that α does have a fixed point. □

We can think of this theorem in another way. Set $S = T$ and let's consider a β different than Id_T . The usual way to visualize Cantor's Theorem is

f	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_4	t_5	\dots
t_1	$[y_3]$	y_7	y_{21}	y_2	y_4	\dots
t_2	y_1	$[y_{17}]$	y_2	y_7	y_{41}	\dots
t_3	y_0	y_3	$[y_7]$	y_2	y_{24}	\dots
t_4	y_9	y_7	y_{64}	$[y_2]$	y_4	\dots
t_5	y_4	y_{73}	y_{31}	y_2	$[y_4]$	\dots
\vdots	\vdots		\vdots		\vdots	\ddots

Everything that is in square brackets gets changed. For example y_3 gets changed to $\alpha(y_3)$. However a little thought shows that we do not need to go along the diagonal. The diagonal is just the simplest way. What is needed is that every row of the table gets at least one element changed. So we might have a picture that looks like this:

f	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_4	t_5	\dots
t_1	y_3	y_7	y_{21}	$[y_2]$	y_4	\dots
t_2	$[y_1]$	y_{17}	$[y_2]$	y_7	y_{41}	\dots
t_3	y_0	y_3	y_7	y_2	$[y_{24}]$	\dots
t_4	y_9	$[y_7]$	y_{64}	$[y_2]$	y_4	\dots
t_5	y_4	y_{73}	y_{31}	$[y_2]$	y_4	\dots
\vdots	\vdots		\vdots		\vdots	\ddots

The fact that every row has something changed is in essence the fact that β is onto. As long as β is onto, Cantor's theorem still holds.

With this in mind we may pose—but do not answer—the following questions. Should these theorems really be called “diagonalization theorems”? Does self-reference really play a role here? Since we can generate the same paradoxes without self-reference, does this destroy Russell's vicious-circle principle?

§3. Instances of Cantor's theorems. We shall begin with the familiar version of Cantor's theorem about the power set of the natural numbers. From there we move on to Russell's set theory paradox and other paradoxes and limitations. We shall do the first two instances slowly and use the same notation and ideas as the theorems in the last section. The other instances we shall do more quickly.

Instance: Cantor's $\mathbb{N} \not\subseteq \wp(\mathbb{N})$ theorem. The theorem says that there cannot be an onto function from \mathbb{N} to $\wp(\mathbb{N})$. Let S_0, S_1, S_2, \dots be a proposed enumeration of all subsets of \mathbb{N} . Let $\mathbf{2} = \{0, 1\}$ be a set and consider the “negation” function $\alpha: \mathbf{2} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ where $\alpha(0) = 1$ and $\alpha(1) = 0$. Let


$f : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ be defined as

$$f(n, m) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } n \in S_m \\ 0 & \text{if } n \notin S_m. \end{cases}$$

For each m , $f(-, m)$ is the characteristic function of S_m :

$$f(-, m) = \chi_{S_m}.$$

Construct g as follows:



g is the characteristic function of the set

$$G = \{n \in \mathbb{N} \mid n \notin S_n\}.$$

For all m , $\chi_G = g(-) \neq f(-, m) = \chi_{S_m}$. Because if there was an m_0 such that $g(-) = f(-, m_0)$ then by evaluation at m_0 we have


$$f(m_0, m_0) = g(m_0) = \alpha(f(m_0, m_0))$$

where the first equality is from the fact that g is representable by m_0 and the second equality is by the definition of g . This means that the negation operator has a fixed point which is clearly false. In other words $G \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is not in the proposed enumeration of all subsets of \mathbb{N} . \square

Instance: Russell’s paradox. This paradox says that the set of all sets that are not members of themselves is both a member of itself and not a member of itself. Let *Sets* be some universe of sets (we are being deliberately ambiguous here.) Again consider the “negation” function $\alpha : \mathbf{2} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ where $\alpha(0) = 1$ and $\alpha(1) = 0$. Let $f : \text{Sets} \times \text{Sets} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ be defined as follows on sets s and t .

$$f(s, t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s \in t \\ 0 & \text{if } s \notin t. \end{cases}$$

We construct g as follows



g is the characteristic function of those sets that are not a member of themselves. For all sets t , $g(-) \neq f(-, t)$. Because if there was a set t_0 such that $g(-) = f(-, t_0)$ then from evaluation at t_0 we get

$$f(t_0, t_0) = g(t_0) = \alpha(f(t_0, t_0))$$

where the first equality is because g is representable and the second equality is from the definition of g . This is plainly false. To summarize, in order to make sure that there are no paradoxes we must say that g is the characteristic function of a “collection” of *Sets* but this “collection” does not form a set.


We mention in passing that the Barber paradox and other simple self-referential paradoxes can be done exactly like this. The Barber paradox has a simple solution, namely that the village described by the phrase “there is a village where everyone who does not shave themselves is shaved by the barber” does not really exist. We are in a sense saying the same thing about Russell’s paradox. Namely, the collection of sets that do not contain themselves does not form an existent set. \square

Instance: Grelling’s paradox. We now move on to some of the semantic paradoxes. There are some adjectives that describe themselves and there are some that do not. “English” is an English word. “French” is not a French word. “Polysyllabic” is polysyllabic but “monosyllabic” is not monosyllabic. Call all words that do not describe themselves “heterological.” Now ask yourself if “heterological” is heterological. It is if and only if it is not.

Consider the set *Adj* of all (English) adjectives. We have the following function $f : Adj \times Adj \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ defined for all adjectives a_1 and a_2 ,

$$f(a_1, a_2) = \begin{cases} 1: & \text{if } a_2 \text{ describes } a_1 \\ 0: & \text{if } a_2 \text{ does not describe } a_1. \end{cases}$$

And so we have the following construction of g



g is the characteristic function of a subset (= property) of adjectives that cannot be described by any adjectives. This is exactly what is meant by $g(-) \neq f(-, a)$ for all adjectives a . “Heterological” is not the only adjective that is in this subset. Some authors (e.g., Kleene) have also used the word “impredicable”. Our formulation includes all such paradoxical adjectives. □

Instance: Liar paradox. The oldest example of a self-referential paradox is the (Cretans) liar paradox. Epimenides of Crete said “All Cretans are liars.” There are many such examples: “This sentence is false.”, “I am lying.” The Liar paradox is very similar to Grelling’s paradox. Whereas with Grelling’s paradox we dealt with adjectives, here we deal with complete English sentences. Quine’s paradox is the primary example:

‘yields falsehood when appended to its own quotation’
yields falsehood when appended to its own quotation.

The philosophical literature is full of such examples. Since the formalism is similar to Grelling’s paradox, we leave it to the reader. □

Instance: The strong Liar paradox. A common “solution” to the Liar’s paradox is to say that there are certain sentences that are neither true nor false but are meaningless. “I am lying” would be such a sentence. This is a type of three-valued logic. This is, however, not a “solution.” Consider the sentence

‘yields falsehood or meaningfulness
when appended to its own quotation’
yields falsehood or meaningfulness
when appended to its own quotation.


If this sentence is true, then it is false or meaningless. If it is false, then it is true and not meaningless. If it is meaningless, then it is true and not meaningless.

This paradox can also be formulated with our scheme. Consider the set of English sentences $Sent$ and the set $\mathbf{3} = \{T(rue), M(eaningless), F(alse)\}$. We have the following function $f : Sent \times Sent \rightarrow \mathbf{3}$ defined for all sentences

s_1 and s_2 ,

$$f(s_1, s_2) = \begin{cases} T: & \text{if } a_2 \text{ describes } a_1 \\ M: & \text{if it is meaningless for } a_2 \text{ to describe } a_1 \\ F: & \text{if } a_2 \text{ does not describe } a_1. \end{cases}$$

Now consider the function $\alpha: \mathbf{3} \rightarrow \mathbf{3}$ defined as $\alpha(T) = F$ and $\alpha(M) = \alpha(F) = T$. Construct g as follows




g is the characteristic function of sentences that are neither false nor meaningless when describing themselves. By characteristic function we mean those sentences that g takes to T as opposed to M or F . \square

Instance: Richard’s paradox. There are many sentences in the English language that describe real numbers between 0 and 1. Let us lexicographically order all English sentences. Using this order, we can select all those English sentences that describe real numbers between 0 and 1. For example “ x is the ratio between the circumference and the diameter of a circle divided by ten.” describes the number 0.314159 There are many similar English sentences. Call such a sentence a “Richard Sentence.” So we have the concept of the “ m -th Richard Sentence.”

Consider the set $\mathbf{10} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 9\}$ and the function $\alpha: \mathbf{10} \rightarrow \mathbf{10}$ defined as $\alpha(i) = 9 - i$. This function does not have a fixed point. Now consider the function $f: \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{10}$ defined as

$$f(n, m) = \text{The } n\text{-th decimal number of the } m\text{-th Richard Sentence.}$$

For example, if the sentence in the above paragraph is the 15th Richard sentence then $f(4, 15) = 1$ because of the 1 in 0.314159 Now consider $g: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{10}$ constructed as



This g describes a real number between 0 and 1 and yet for all $m \in \mathbb{N}$

$$g(-) \neq f(-, m)$$

i.e., this number is different than all Richard Sentences. Yet here is a Richard Sentence that describes this number:

x is the real number between 0 and 1 whose n -th digit is nine minus the n -th digit of the number described by the n -th Richard sentence.

Why does this paradox remain? Our scheme is supposed to give a limitation of “Richard-sentenceness” and yet, for some reason, the paradox remains. Jay Kangel (in an e-mail correspondence) has suggested that the problem is that “Richard-sentenceness” is not a well defined or a computable concept. Consider the following sentence: “Let x be a red cow if the Goldbach Conjecture is true and let x be $3/4$ if the Goldbach Conjecture is false.” Does this sentence describe a real number? Is this sentence a Richard sentence? Even if we know that a sentence is a Richard sentence, we might not be able to determine what number the sentence describes. It is not clear what number is described by the following Richard sentence: “Let x be $1/4$ if the Riemann Hypothesis is true and let x be $3/4$ if it is false.” Since the set of Richard sentences is not well defined and the function f is also not well defined, it is not surprising that the paradox remains. \square

Instance: Turing’s Halting problem. The following formulation was inspired by Heller’s fascinating work on recursion categories [6] and Manin’s intriguing paper on classical and quantum computations [15].

For this instance we leave the comfortable world of sets and functions. We must talk about computable universes. A computable universe is a category \mathbf{U} with the following two properties

1. \mathbb{N} and $\mathbf{2}$ are objects in \mathbf{U}
2. For every object C in \mathbf{U} there is some type of enumeration of the elements of C . An enumeration is a total isomorphism $e_C: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow C$. One should think of C as a set of computable things, e.g., trees, graphs, numbers, stacks, strings etc.
3. For every (not necessarily total) function $f: C \rightarrow C'$ there is a corresponding number $\ulcorner f \urcorner \in \mathbb{N}$. Think of this as the Gödel number of the program that computes the computation.
4. For every (not necessarily total) function $f: C \rightarrow C'$ there is a corresponding recursively enumerable (r.e.) set $W_{\ulcorner f \urcorner} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$. For every $c \in C$, f has a value at c if and only if $e_C^{-1}(c) \in W_{\ulcorner f \urcorner}$. Again one should think of a partial function from one computable domain to another.


Halt in a computable universe should be a total function $Halt: \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ in \mathbf{U} such that for all $f: C \rightarrow C'$

$$Halt(-, \ulcorner f \urcorner) = \chi_{W_{\langle f \rangle}}.$$

This says that *Halt* should be able to tell for what values in C the computation halts. Formally

$$Halt(n, m) = \begin{cases} 1: & \text{if } n \in W_m \\ 0: & \text{if } n \notin W_m. \end{cases}$$

Consider $\alpha: \mathbf{2} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ defined as follows: $\alpha(0) = 1$ and $\alpha(1) \uparrow$, i.e., the computation is undefined. Construct g as follows:



We conclude by showing that *Halt* is not total because it is not defined at $\ulcorner g \urcorner$. If *Halt* was defined at $\ulcorner g \urcorner$ then we would have the following contradiction:


$$\begin{aligned}
 Halt(\ulcorner g \urcorner, \ulcorner g \urcorner) &= 1 \text{ iff } \ulcorner g \urcorner \in W_{\langle g \rangle} && \text{by definition of } Halt \\
 &\text{iff } g(\ulcorner g \urcorner) = 1 && \text{by the halting of } g \\
 &\text{iff } Halt(\ulcorner g \urcorner, \ulcorner g \urcorner) = 0 && \text{by the definition of } g.
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence no total *Halt* can exist. □

Instance: A non-r.e. language. There is a language that is not recognized by any Turing machine. Let M_0, M_1, M_2, \dots be an enumeration of all Turing machines on the input language $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$. Let w_0, w_1, w_2, \dots be an enumeration of all the words in Σ^* . If w_i is a word in Σ we let (w_i) denote the numerical value of the binary word. Consider the following function $f: \Sigma^* \times \Sigma^* \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ defined as follows:

$$f(w_i, w_j) = \begin{cases} 1: & \text{if } w_i \text{ is accepted by } M_{(w_j)} \\ 0: & \text{if } w_i \text{ is not accepted by } M_{(w_j)}. \end{cases}$$

Then the constructed g



is the characteristic function of a language that is not accepted by any Turing machine. Of course, the fact that there are non-r.e. languages also follows from a simple counting argument. Namely the number of Turing machines is countable and the number of languages ($\wp(\Sigma^*)$) is uncountable. \square

Instance: An oracle B such that $P^B \neq NP^B$. One of the major open questions in computer science is whether or not P , the set of all problems that can be solved by deterministic Turing machines (TMs) in polynomial time, is equal to the set NP , of all problems that can be solved by non-deterministic TMs in polynomial time. Alas, this question will not be answered in this paper. However there is a related question that can be answered. Consider the same question for oracle TMs. An oracle TM is a TM with an associated set S , such that the TM can determine if a word is actually an element of S . For a given set S there are analogous sets P^S and NP^S . Baker, Gil and Solovay [1] have proven that there exists a set A such that $P^A = NP^A$ and there exists a set B such that $P^B \neq NP^B$. Here we shall prove the second result. Since every deterministic machine is by definition also nondeterministic, we have for every B , $P^B \subseteq NP^B$. What remains is to show that there is a set B and a language L_B such that $L_B \in NP^B$ but $L_B \notin P^B$ i.e., $NP^B \not\subseteq P^B$. Our proof was adopted from [7].

Let $M_0^?, M_1^?, M_2^?, \dots$ be some enumeration of all the oracle deterministic polynomial Turing machines in the alphabet $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$. There is a corresponding sequence of polynomials $p_0(x), p_1(x), p_2(x), \dots$ expressing the worst execution time for each machine.


For any function $f: \Sigma^* \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ and for each $i \in \mathbb{N}$, $f(-, i): \Sigma^* \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ is a characteristic function on the set Σ^* . We will often confuse a set and its characteristic function. Let $\overline{f}(-, i)$ denote the characteristic function of the complement of $f(-, i)$, i.e., $\overline{f}(-, i)$ is the set that $f(-, i)$ takes to 0. Let $\overline{F}(-, i)$ denote the cumulative characteristic function

$$\overline{F}(-, i) = \bigcup_{j \leq i} \overline{f}(-, j).$$

We shall define $f(-, -)$ inductively. $(\forall w \in \Sigma^*)f(w, 0) = 1$. For $w \in \Sigma^*$ and $i \in \mathbb{N}$, $f(w, i) = 0$ if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied

1. $(\forall w' < w) f(w', i) = 1$ where the $<$ is a lexicographical order on the words of Σ^* . This insures that there is only one word accepted to B for each i .
2. $M_i^{F(-,i)}$ rejects $0^{|w|}$ within $i^{\log i}$ steps.
3. $(\forall j < i) M_j^{F(-,j)}$ on input $0^{|w|}$ does not query w within $j^{\log j}$ steps.

Once this f is defined, we construct g as follows



where $\beta(w) = |w|$, $\alpha(0) = 1$ and $\alpha(1) = 0$. $g(w) = 1$ if and only if $f(w, |w|) = 0$ if and only if the above three requirements are satisfied.

g is the characteristic function of the set $B \subseteq \Sigma^*$. Now construct the language

$$L_B = \{0^i \mid B \text{ contains a word of length } i\}.$$

This language can easily be recognized by a linear time nondeterministic TM. On input 0^i , the NTM simply has to guess a string w of length i and see if it is in B . Hence $L_B \in NP^B$. In contrast, because of condition 2 above, L_B cannot be recognized by any DTM in polynomial time, i.e., $(\forall m) g(-) \neq f(-, m)$. \square

Instance: Time travel paradoxes. If time travel (whatever that might mean) was possible, a time traveller might go back in time and shoot his bachelor grandfather thus insuring that the time traveller was never born. If he was never born, then he could not have shot his grandfather. There is no reason to be so homicidal in order to get such paradoxical results. The time traveller might just insure that his parents never meet or he might simply go back in time and make sure that he does not get into the time machine.

These self-referential paradoxes can be put into our scheme. The following key point is of central importance. The time traveller should not shoot his own grandfather (besides for moral reasons, of course) not because he will not be born, rather because if he shoots his own grandfather he will not be able to go back in time to shoot his own grandfather. This is the self-reference. The time traveller is not self-referential, rather the event is self-referential.


With this in mind, we define the set *Events* of all possible events in 4-dimensional space-time. *Events* has a lot of structure. In fact, the entire enterprise of physics is to discover this extra structure. We, however, are considering it only as a set. We have the following function

$f : Events \times Events \longrightarrow \mathbf{2}$ defined for all events e_1 and e_2 ,

$$f(e_1, e_2) = \begin{cases} 1: & \text{if } e_2 \text{ is compatible with } e_1 \\ 0: & \text{if } e_2 \text{ is incompatible with } e_1. \end{cases}$$

For example f (the sun shining at a particular time in a particular place, the sun not shining at a particular time in a particular place) = 0. f (Jack playing ball in New York now, Jill skating in California now) = 1. In fact, any two events where the first event is outside of the light-cone of the second event is compatible. f (Jack killing his bachelor grandfather, Jack being born) = 0.

We now have the following construction of g



g is the characteristic function of those events that would be incompatible with themselves. These events cannot exist with any other event in our universe.

In 1949, Kurt Gödel wrote a paper on relativity theory. In this paper Gödel constructed a mathematical model in which time travel would be possible. On page 168 of [21], Rudy Rucker describes an interview with Gödel in which Rucker asks about the time traveller paradoxes. Gödel answers that the universe simply will not let you kill your grandfather. Just like P and $\neg P$ cannot both be true, so too the universe will not let you do something that will cause a contradiction. Gödel’s words are worth quoting:

“ . . . time-travel is possible, but no person will ever manage to kill his past self.” Gödel laughed his laugh then, and concluded, “The *a priori* is greatly neglected. Logic is very powerful.” □

§4. Diagonal Theorem and generalizations. The contrapositive of Cantor’s Theorem is of equal importance.

THEOREM 3 (Diagonal Theorem). *If Y is a set and there exists a set T and a function $f : T \times T \longrightarrow Y$ such that all functions $g : T \longrightarrow Y$ are representable by f (there exists a $t \in T$ such that $g(-) = f(-, t)$), then all functions $\alpha : Y \longrightarrow Y$ have a fixed point.*

PROOF. The proof is constructive. Let Y, T, f and α be given. Then we construct g as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 T \times T & \xrightarrow{f} & Y \\
 \uparrow \Delta & & \downarrow \alpha \\
 T & \xrightarrow{g} & Y
 \end{array}$$

g is defined as

$$g(m) = \alpha(f(m, m)).$$

Since we have assumed that g is representable by some $t \in T$, we have that

$$g(m) = f(m, t).$$

And so we have a fixed point of α at $y_0 = g(t)$. Explicitly we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 \alpha(g(t)) &= \alpha(f(t, t)) \quad \text{by representation of } g \\
 &= g(t) \quad \text{by definition of } g. \quad \square
 \end{aligned}$$

REMARK 4. Obviously, any set Y with two or more elements has functions $Y \rightarrow Y$ that do not have fixed points. It is here that we get in trouble by ignoring the category theory that is necessary. In the examples that we will do, the objects we will be dealing with have more structure than just sets and the functions between the objects are required to preserve that structure. We are only talking about these restricted classes of functions. See Remark 1 for more explanations.

REMARK 5. It is important to note that the theorem uses a stronger hypothesis than the proof actually uses. The theorem asks that **all** $g: T \rightarrow Y$ be representable, but the proof only uses the fact that any g constructed in such a manner is representable. In the future, we shall use this fact and only require that constructed g be representable.

§5. Instances of diagonal theorems. We use Mendelson’s [16] notation and language. In particular $\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner$ is the Gödel number of $\mathcal{B}(x)$. We shall assume that we are working in a theory where there is a recursive $D: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ that is defined as follows: For all $\mathcal{B}(x)$ where \mathcal{B} is a logical statement with x its only free variable then

$$D(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner) = \ulcorner \mathcal{B}(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner) \urcorner.$$

THEOREM 4 (Diagonalization lemma). For any well-formed formula (wf) $\mathcal{E}(x)$ with x as its only free variable, there exists a closed formula \mathcal{C} such that

$$\vdash \mathcal{C} \iff \mathcal{E}(\ulcorner \mathcal{C} \urcorner).$$

PROOF. Let $Lind^i$ be the set of Lindenbaum classes (algebra) of well-formed formulas with i free variables. Two wfs are equivalent iff they are provably logically equivalent. Let $f: Lind^1 \times Lind^1 \rightarrow Lind^0$ be defined for two wfs with a free variable $\mathcal{B}(x)$ and $\mathcal{H}(y)$ as follows:

$$f(\mathcal{B}(x), \mathcal{H}(y)) = \mathcal{H}(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner).$$

Let the operator on $Lind^0$ $\Phi_{\mathcal{E}}: Lind^0 \rightarrow Lind^0$ be defined as $\mathcal{P} \mapsto \Phi_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{P}) = \mathcal{E}(\ulcorner \mathcal{P} \urcorner)$. Using these functions, we combine them to create g as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} Lind^1 \times Lind^1 & \xrightarrow{f} & Lind^0 \\ \uparrow \Delta & & \downarrow \Phi_{\mathcal{E}} \\ Lind^1 & \xrightarrow{g} & Lind^0. \end{array}$$

By definition

$$g(\mathcal{B}(x)) = \Phi_{\mathcal{E}}(f(\mathcal{B}(x), \mathcal{B}(x))) = \mathcal{E}(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner) \urcorner).$$

We claim that g is representable by $\mathcal{G}(x) = \mathcal{E}(D(x))$. This is true because

$$\begin{aligned} g(\mathcal{B}(x)) &= \mathcal{E}(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner) \urcorner) = \mathcal{E}(D(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner)) \\ &= \mathcal{G}(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner) = f(\mathcal{B}(x), \mathcal{G}(y)). \end{aligned}$$

So there is a fixed point of $\Phi_{\mathcal{E}}$ at $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{G}(\ulcorner \mathcal{G}(x) \urcorner)$. Explicitly we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}(\ulcorner \mathcal{G}(\ulcorner \mathcal{G}(x) \urcorner) \urcorner) &= \Phi_{\mathcal{E}}(\ulcorner \mathcal{G}(\ulcorner \mathcal{G}(x) \urcorner) \urcorner) \quad \text{by definition of } \Phi_{\mathcal{E}} \\ &= \Phi_{\mathcal{E}}(f(\mathcal{G}(x), \mathcal{G}(x))) \quad \text{by definition of } f \\ &= g(\mathcal{G}(x)) \quad \text{by definition of } g \\ &= f(\mathcal{G}(x), \mathcal{G}(x)) \quad \text{by representability of } g \\ &= \mathcal{G}(\ulcorner \mathcal{G}(x) \urcorner) \quad \text{by definition of } f. \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Application: Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Let $Prov(y, x)$ stand for “ y is the Gödel number of a proof of a statement whose Gödel number is x .” Then let

$$\mathcal{E}(x) \equiv (\forall y) \neg Prov(y, x).$$

A fixed point for this $\mathcal{E}(x)$ in a consistent and ω -consistent theory is a sentence that is equivalent to its own statement of unprovability. \square

Application: Gödel-Rosser’s incompleteness theorem. Let $Neg: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be defined for Gödel numbers as follows

$$Neg(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner) = \ulcorner \neg \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner$$

Let

$$\mathcal{E}(x) \equiv (\forall y)(\text{Prov}(y, x) \rightarrow (\exists w)(w < y) \wedge \text{Prov}(w, \text{Neg}(x))).$$

A fixed point for this $\mathcal{E}(x)$ in a consistent theory is a sentence that is equivalent to its own statement of unprovability. \square

Application: Tarski's theorem. Let us assume that there exists a well-formed formula $\mathcal{T}(x)$ that expresses the fact that x is the Gödel number of a (true) theorem in the theory. Set

$$\mathcal{E}(x) \equiv \neg\mathcal{T}(x).$$

A fixed point of $\mathcal{E}(x)$ shows that $\mathcal{T}(x)$ does not do what it is supposed to do. We conclude that a theory in which the diagonalization lemma holds cannot express its own theoremhood. \square

Application: Parikh sentences. There are true sentences that have very long proofs, but there are relatively short proofs of the fact that the sentences are provable. This amazing result about lengths of proofs can be found on page 496 of R. Parikh's famous paper *Existence and Feasibility in Arithmetic* [18]. Consider a consistent theory that contains Peano Arithmetic. We shall deal with the following predicates:

- $\text{Prflen}(m, x) \equiv m$ is the length (in symbols) of a proof of a statement whose Gödel number is x . This is decidable because there are only a finite number of proofs of length m .
- $P(x) \equiv \exists y \text{Prov}(y, x)$ i.e., there exists a proof of a statement whose Gödel number is x .
- $\mathcal{E}_n(x) \equiv \neg(\exists m < n \text{Prflen}(m, x))$.

Applying the diagonalization lemma to $\mathcal{E}_n(x)$ gives us a fixed point \mathcal{C}_n such that

$$\vdash \mathcal{C}_n \longleftrightarrow \mathcal{E}_n(\ulcorner \mathcal{C}_n \urcorner) \equiv \neg(\exists m < n \text{Prflen}(m, \ulcorner \mathcal{C}_n \urcorner)).$$

In other words \mathcal{C}_n says

“I do not have a proof of myself shorter than n .”

If \mathcal{C}_n is false, then there is a proof shorter than n of \mathcal{C}_n and the system is not consistent.

Consider the following *short* proof of $P(\mathcal{C}_n)$

1. If \mathcal{C}_n does not have any proof, then \mathcal{C}_n is true.
2. If \mathcal{C}_n is true, we can check all proofs of length less than n and prove \mathcal{C}_n .
3. From 1 and 2 we have that if \mathcal{C}_n does not have a proof, then we can prove \mathcal{C}_n . i.e., $\neg P(\mathcal{C}_n) \longrightarrow P(\mathcal{C}_n)$.
4. $\therefore P(\mathcal{C}_n)$.

This proof can be formulated in Peano Arithmetic in a fairly short proof. In contrast n can be chosen to be fairly large. So we have a statement \mathcal{C}_n which has a very long proof, but a short proof of the fact that it has a proof. \square

Application: Löb’s paradox. We prove that every logical sentence is true. The standard notation for the Gödel number of a wff \mathcal{C} is $\ulcorner \mathcal{C} \urcorner$. In contrast, if n is an integer then we shall write $\lfloor n \rfloor$ for the wff that corresponds to that number. Obviously $\lfloor \ulcorner \mathcal{C} \urcorner \rfloor = \mathcal{C}$

Let \mathcal{A} be any sentence. We shall prove that it is always true. Use the diagonalization lemma on

$$\mathcal{E}(x) \equiv \lfloor x \rfloor \Rightarrow \mathcal{A}.$$

A fixed point for this $\mathcal{E}(x)$ is a \mathcal{C} such that

$$\vdash \mathcal{C} \longleftrightarrow \mathcal{E}(\ulcorner \mathcal{C} \urcorner) \equiv (\lfloor \ulcorner \mathcal{C} \urcorner \rfloor \Rightarrow \mathcal{A}) = (\mathcal{C} \Rightarrow \mathcal{A}).$$

So \mathcal{C} is equivalent to $\mathcal{C} \Rightarrow \mathcal{A}$. Assume, for a second that \mathcal{C} is true. Then $\mathcal{C} \Rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ is also true. By modus ponens \mathcal{A} is also true. So by assuming \mathcal{C} we have proven \mathcal{A} . This is exactly what $\mathcal{C} \Rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ says and hence it is true as is its equivalent \mathcal{C} and so \mathcal{A} is true.

This looks like a real paradox. It seems to me that the paradox arises because we did not put a restriction on the wffs $\mathcal{E}(x)$ for which we are permitted to use the diagonalization lemma. The Löb’s paradox is related to Curry’s paradox which shows that we must restrict the comprehension scheme in axiomatic set theory. In a similar way, here we must restrict the diagonalization lemma. Restricting the diagonalization lemma might seem strange because its constructive proof seems applicable to all $\mathcal{E}(x)$. But restrict we must as we restrict the seemingly obvious comprehension scheme in set theory.


The reviewer has suggested that the real reason why this paradox remains is that the $\lfloor x \rfloor$ operation is not defined within the system and hence we are not permitted to use it in $\mathcal{E}(x)$. □

Let us move from logic to computability theory. We shall use the language and notation of [4].

THEOREM 5 (The Recursion Theorem). *Let $h: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be a total computable function. There exists an $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that*

$$\phi_{h(n_0)} = \phi_{n_0}.$$

PROOF. Let \mathcal{F} be the set of unary computable functions. Consider $f: \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$ be defined as $f(m, n) \cong \phi_{\phi_n(m)}$. If $\phi_n(m)$ is undefined, then $f(m, n)$ is also undefined. Letting the operator $\Phi_h: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$ be defined as $\Phi_h(\phi_n) = \phi_{h(n)}$. We have the following square:



g is defined as $g(m) = \phi_{h(\phi_m(m))}$. By the S-M-N theorem there is a total computable function $s(m)$ such the $\phi_{h(\phi_m(m))} = \phi_{s(m)}$. Since s is total and computable, there exists a number t such that $s(m) = \phi_t(m)$ and so g is representable because $g(m) = \phi_{h(\phi_m(m))} = \phi_{s(m)} = \phi_{\phi_t(m)} = f(m, t)$. So there is a fixed point of Φ_h at $n_0 = \phi_{\phi_t(t)}$. Explicitly we have

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_{h(\phi_t(t))} &= \Phi_h(\phi_{\phi_t(t)}) && \text{by definition of } \Phi_h \\ &= \Phi_h(f(t, t)) && \text{by definition of } f \\ &= g(t) && \text{by definition of } g \\ &= f(t, t) && \text{by representability of } g \\ &= \phi_{\phi_t(t)} && \text{by definition of } f. \end{aligned} \quad \square$$

Application: Rice’s theorem. Every nontrivial property of computable functions is not decidable: Let \mathcal{A} be a nonempty proper subset of \mathcal{F} , the set of all unary computable functions. Let $A = \{x \mid \phi_x \in \mathcal{A}\}$. Then A is not recursive. We prove this by assuming (wrongly) that A is recursive. Let $a \in A$ and $b \notin A$. Define the function h as follows.

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} a: & \text{if } x \notin A \\ b: & \text{if } x \in A. \end{cases}$$

By definition $x \in A$ iff $h(x) \notin A$. From our assumption, we have that h is computable (and total). Hence by the recursion theorem, there is an n_0 such that $\phi_{h(n_0)} = \phi_{n_0}$. Now we have the following contradiction:

$$\begin{aligned} n_0 \in A &\iff h(n_0) \notin A && \text{by definition of } h \\ &\iff \phi_{h(n_0)} \notin \mathcal{A} && \text{by the definition of } A \\ &\iff \phi_{n_0} \notin \mathcal{A} && \text{by the recursion theorem} \\ &\iff n_0 \notin A && \text{by definition of } A. \end{aligned} \quad \square$$

Application: Von Neumann’s self-reproducing machines. A self-reproducing machine is a computable function that always outputs its own description. It might seem impossible to construct such a self-reproducing machine since in order to construct such a machine, we would need to know its description and hence know the machine in advance. However, by a simple application of the recursion theorem, we get such a machine.

By a description of a machine, we could mean the number of the computable function i.e., a self-reproducing machine is a function $\phi_n(x) = n$ for all input x .

Let $f : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be the computable projection function $f(y, x) = y$. By the S-M-N theorem there exists a total computable function s such that $\phi_{s(y)}(x) = f(y, x) = y$. From the recursion theorem, there exists an n such that $\phi_n(x) = \phi_{s(n)}(x) = f(n, x) = n$. □

§6. Future directions. There are many possible ways that we can go on with this work. We shall list a few.

The general Cantor's theorem can be generalized further so that even more phenomena can be encompassed by this one theorem. For example what if we have two sets Y and Y' and there is an onto function from Y to Y' . What does this say about the relationship between $f: T \times T \rightarrow Y$ and $f': T \times T \rightarrow Y'$? We should get the concept of a paradox "reduction" from one paradox to another.

Rather than simply talking about sets and functions, perhaps we should be talking about partial orders and order preserving maps. With this generalization, we might be able to not only get fixed point theorems but also *least* fixed point theorems. There are many simple least fixed point theorems such as ones for continuous maps of cpo's and Scott domains; Kripke's definition of truth [5] and the Knaster-Tarski theorem.

Some more thought must go into Richards and Löb's paradoxes. Although we have stated their limitations, the paradoxes remain. Perhaps we are not formulating them correctly or perhaps there is something intrinsically problematic about these paradoxes.

There are many fixed point theorems throughout logic and mathematics that are not of the type described in Sections 3 and 4. Can we in some sense characterize those fixed point theorems that are self-referential?

It seems that the key component of the diagonalization lemma is the existence of a recursive $D: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ that is defined for all $\mathcal{B}(x)$ as

$$D(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner) = \ulcorner \mathcal{B}(\ulcorner \mathcal{B}(x) \urcorner) \urcorner.$$

Similarly, in order to have the recursion theorem we needed the S-M-N theorem. These two properties of systems are the key to the fact that the systems can talk about themselves. Are these two properties related to each other? More importantly, can we find other key properties in systems that make self-reference possible?

In the introduction of this paper we talked of the lack of an onto function $T \rightarrow Y^T$ and we said that Y may be thought of as truth-values or properties of objects in T . Can we find a better word for Y ? In Section 5 where we talked about an onto function $Lind^1 \rightarrow Lind^{0Lind^1}$ where $Lind^i$ is the Lindenbaum classes of formula with i variables. In what sense is $Lind^0$ the truth-values or properties of $Lind^1$? We then went on to talk about an onto function $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}^{\mathbb{N}}$ where \mathcal{F} is the set of unary computable functions. We used this onto function to prove The Recursion Theorem. In what sense is \mathcal{F} the truth-values or the properties of \mathbb{N} ?

As for more instances of our theorems, the field is wide open. There are many paradoxical phenomena and fixed point theorems that we have not talked about. Some of them might be amenable to our scheme and some might not be.

- There are many of the semantic paradoxes that we did not discuss. The Berry paradox asks one to consider the sentence “Let x be the first number that cannot be described by any sentence with less than 200 characters.” We just described such a number.
- The Crocodile’s Dilemma is an ancient paradox that is a deviously cute self-referential paradox. A crocodile steals a child and the mother of the child begs for the return of her beloved baby. The crocodile responds “I will return the child if and only if you correctly guess whether or not I will return your child.” The mother cleverly responds that he will keep the child. What is an honest crocodile to do?!?
- There is a belief that all paradoxes would melt away if there were no self-referential statements. Yablo’s Non-self-referential Liar’s Paradox was formulated to counteract that thesis. There is a sequence of statements such that none of them ever refer to themselves and yet they are all both true and false. Consider the sequence

(S_i): For all $k > i$, S_k is false.

Suppose S_n is true for some n . Then S_{n+1} is false as are all subsequent statements. Since all subsequent statements are false, S_{n+1} is true which is a contradiction. So in contrast, S_n is false for all n . That means that S_1 is true and S_2 is true etc etc. Again we have a contradiction.

- Brandenburger’s Epistemic Paradox [3] considers the situation where
Ann believes that Bob believes that Ann believes that Bob has a false belief about Ann.
 Now ask yourself the following question: Does Ann believe that Bob has a false belief about Ann? With much thought, you can see that this is a paradoxical situation.
- Curry’s paradox is a paradox about logic and set theory that is very similar to Löb’s paradox.
- The Ackermann function is not a primitive recursive function. One hears the phrase that Ackermann’s function “diagonalizes-out” of primitive recursive functions.
- There is a famous Paris-Harrington result which says that certain generalized Ramsey theorems cannot be proven in Peano Arithmetic. Kanamori and McAloon [9] make the connection to the Ackermann function. Just as the Ackermann function “diagonalized-out” of primitive recursiveness, so too, generalized Ramsey theory is “diagonalized-out” of Peano Arithmetic. Both of these are really stating limitations of the systems.

There are many instances of fixed point theorems that might be put into the form of our scheme.

- Borodin’s Gap Theorem is a type of fixed point theorem in complexity theory that might be right for our scheme.

- We again mention the Knaster-Tarski theorem about monotonic functions between preorders. There is also a much used theorem about fixed points of continuous functions between cpo's.
- As the ultimate in self-reference, we would like to mention Kripke's theory of truth that he used to banish self-referential paradoxes. It is, in essence, a type of fixed point theorem. It would really be nice to formulate that way of dealing with paradoxes in our language.
- Brouwer's fixed point theorem, or the far simpler intermediate value theorem.
- Nash's equilibria theorem and its many generalizations from game theory.

There are several theorems from "real" mathematics that are proved via diagonalization proofs. We might be able to put them into our language.

- Baire's category theory about metric spaces.
- Montel's theorem from complex function theory.
- Ascoli theorem from topology.
- Helly's theorem about limits of distributions.

The following ideas are a little more "spacey."

- Gödel's second incompleteness theorem about the unprovability within arithmetic of the consistency of arithmetic. This theorem is usually proved as a consequence of the first incompleteness theorem. However Kreisel has a direct model theoretic proofs that uses a diagonal method (see, e.g., page 860 of Smoryński's article in [2].) This proof seems amenable to our scheme.
- Many of Chaitin's algorithmic information theory arguments seem to fit our scheme.
- We worked out Gödel's first incompleteness theorem which showed that (using the language of the introduction) arithmetic cannot completely talk about its own provability. What about Gödel's completeness theorem? Certain weak systems can completely talk about their own provability. Can this be stated as some type of fixed point theorem?

REFERENCES

- [1] THEODORE BAKER, JOHN GILL, and ROBERT SOLOVAY, *Relativizations of the $\mathcal{P} = ?\mathcal{NP}$ question*, *SIAM Journal on Computing*, vol. 4 (1975), no. 4, pp. 431–442.
- [2] Jon Barwise (editor), *Handbook of mathematical logic*, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1977, With the cooperation of H. J. Keisler, K. Kunen, Y. N. Moschovakis and A. S. Troelstra, *Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics*, vol. 90.
- [3] ADAM BRANDENBURGER, *The power of paradox*, available at <http://www.people.hbs.edu/abrandenburger/paradox-03-12-021.pdf>.
- [4] NIGEL CUTLAND, *Computability*, An introduction to recursive function theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.

- [5] MELVIN FITTING, *Notes on the mathematical aspects of Kripke's theory of truth*, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. 27 (1986), no. 1, pp. 75–88.
- [6] ALEX HELLER, *An existence theorem for recursion categories*, *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 55 (1990), no. 3, pp. 1252–1268.
- [7] JOHN E. HOPCROFT and JEFFREY D. ULLMAN, *Introduction to automata theory, languages, and computation*, Addison-Wesley Series in Computer Science, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Reading, Mass., 1979.
- [8] HAGEN HUWIG and AXEL POIGNÉ, *A note on inconsistencies caused by fixpoints in a Cartesian closed category*, *Theoretical Computer Science*, vol. 73 (1990), no. 1, pp. 101–112.
- [9] AKIHIRO KANAMORI and KENNETH MCALOON, *On Gödel incompleteness and finite combinatorics*, *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic*, vol. 33 (1987), no. 1, pp. 23–41.
- [10] SHAUGHAN LAVINE, *Understanding the infinite*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994.
- [11] F. WILLIAM LAWVERE, *Diagonal arguments and cartesian closed categories*, *Category theory, homology theory and their applications, II (Battelle Institute Conference, Seattle, Wash., 1968)*, Springer, Berlin, 1969, pp. 134–145.
- [12] F. WILLIAM LAWVERE and ROBERT ROSEBRUGH, *Sets for mathematics*, Cambridge University Press.
- [13] F. WILLIAM LAWVERE and STEPHEN H. SCHANUEL, *Conceptual mathematics*, A first introduction to categories. With the assistance of Emilio Faro, Fatima Fenaroli and Danilo Lawvere. Buffalo Workshop Press, Buffalo, NY, 1991.
- [14] SAUNDERS MAC LANE, *Categories for the working mathematician*, second ed., Graduate Texts in Mathematics, vol. 5, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1998.
- [15] YURI I. MANIN, *Classical computing, quantum computing, and Shor's factoring algorithm*, *Astérisque*, (2000), no. 266, Exp. No. 862, 5, pp. 375–404, Séminaire Bourbaki, Vol. 1998/99.
- [16] ELLIOTT MENDELSON, *Introduction to mathematical logic*, fourth ed., Chapman & Hall, London, 1997.
- [17] PHILIP S. MULRY, *Categorical fixed point semantics*, *Theoretical Computer Science*, vol. 70 (1990), no. 1, pp. 85–97, Fourth Workshop on Mathematical Foundations of Programming Semantics (Boulder, CO, 1988).
- [18] ROHIT PARIKH, *Existence and feasibility in arithmetic*, *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 36 (1971), pp. 494–508.
- [19] DUŠKO PAVLOVIĆ, *On the structure of paradoxes*, *Archive for Mathematical Logic*, vol. 31 (1992), no. 6, pp. 397–406.
- [20] ANDREW M. PITTS and PAUL TAYLOR, *A note on Russell's paradox in locally Cartesian closed categories*, *Studia Logica*, vol. 48 (1989), no. 3, pp. 377–387.
- [21] RUDY RUCKER, *Infinity and the mind: The science and philosophy of the infinite*, Birkhäuser, Boston, Mass., 1982.

DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCE
 BROOKLYN COLLEGE, CUNY
 BROOKLYN, N.Y. 11210

and

DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
 THE GRADUATE CENTER, CUNY
 365 FIFTH AVENUE
 NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

E-mail: noson@sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu