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Administrative colonialism: district administration and colonial 'middle management' in Kelantan 1909-1919 and the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea 1947-1957

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**ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIALISM:
District Administration and Colonial 'Middle Management'
in Kelantan 1909-1919 and the
Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea 1947-1957**

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

from

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

Charles Michael Hawksley
B.A. (Hons) UNSW

History and Politics Program

December 2001

DECLARATION

I, Charles Michael Hawksley, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in the History and Politics Program, Faculty of Arts, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. This document has not been submitted for qualification at any other academic institution.

Charles M. Hawksley

21 December 2001

As one studies the records, the men who founded this corner of the empire, and who wrote these letters, notes and memoranda gradually come to life; and more than that, the thing itself, their handiwork, takes form and substance: one sees the fashioning of Leviathan.

J S Furnivall

from *The Fashioning of Leviathan:
the Beginnings of British Rule in Burma* (1939)

ABSTRACT

This study explores the structure of colonial power at the level of the district in Kelantan under British administration between 1909-1919, and in the eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea under Australian administration between 1947-1957. It examines the stated aims and actions of district administrators in two examples of what is termed administrative colonialism, a type of colonial power dependent on regulation and governmentality rather than on physical force, and not based on economic exploitation. In doing so it argues that traditional explanations of imperialism and colonialism are inadequate in explaining the structures of power that underpin these two administrations and advances a typology of colonialism based on four ideal types: extractive, commercial, expansionist and administrative.

This study argues that the two cases examined represent administrative colonialism, and uses the annual reports and other records of the regimes to get inside the administrative and bureaucratic mentality. Colonial 'middle managers' closed down avenues of resistance through regulation at the same time as they accumulated knowledge and made judgements on which aspects of pre-colonial life would be incompatible with modernity. They eliminated behaviour or actions that would disrupt centralised rule through the creation of structures of colonial power.

Each case is examined during the first decade of colonial rule concentrating on the imperial framework, the imposition of the rule of law, the extension of colonial services, the use of land and the use of labour. The results in Kelantan and the eastern highlands suggest that traditional explanations of imperialism and colonialism need to be reconsidered with greater attention paid to district level analysis, regional variation and the structure of colonial government.

The use of law and regulation, rather than physical violence, to make people obey marks a development in techniques used to control others. Changes introduced by administrative colonialism, such as the imposition of peace and the partial prohibition of traditional customs, have enabled the people of these and other regions to participate in the economic market of global capitalism. The linking of social life to the administrative structure and institutions of the colonial state was an integral part of this process and this study examines the day-to-day functioning of power in two colonial districts in the first ten years of their administrations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is my own work but a large number of people have assisted me in various ways during its fashioning. It has been a long process and while there are many who will be pleased that it is now over, my pleasure exceeds theirs.

Where many doctoral candidates generally have one supervisor, I have been fortunate enough to experience four: Professor Edward P Wolfers; Associate Professor Adrian Vickers; Professor Peter King; and Associate Professor Andrew Wells. I have benefited from their support, encouragement, criticisms and insights and my thanks are due to each of these scholars.

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In Malaysia my thanks are due to the staff of the Arkib Negara Malaysia, in particular Haji Abdul Halim, and to Zarinah and Sabariah, who processed my many requests for files over six weeks in Kuala Lumpur. Yasuko and Dean Caletti kindly let me stay with them and gave me access to a car, which made my research much easier.

I could not have finished this work without the constant support of my friends and family. My mother, Kay, and my father Bob, allowed me to move in and out of home as required, provided top-up funds for field trips at no interest and sometimes with no repayments. Without their help this thesis would never have been written. My friends Dr Milan Voykovic, Kazuhiro Monden and Tim Handley-Garben kept me sane throughout.

Lastly, special thanks to Jenni Roberts who has put up with this thesis, and its author, for over five years. Her patience and understanding have allowed me to reach the end of the tunnel. Our baby son Declan has also contributed in ways that he won't understand until much later, but this one's for you too Dex!

While this thesis has been commented on by many people, the final responsibility for what is submitted and for any mistakes in arguments are mine and mine alone.

Charles M Hawksley
Wollongong
December 2001

List of Acronyms

ADO	Assistant District Officer
ALP	Australian Labor Party
ANGAU	Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit
ANMEF	Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force
ARCHD	Annual Report Central Highlands District
AREHD	Annual Report Eastern Highlands District
ASF	Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries
ASOPA	Australian School of Pacific Administration
BA	British Adviser
BAK	British Adviser Kelantan
BKel	Files of the British Adviser to Kelantan
CHD	Central Highlands District
CPO	Cadet Patrol Officer
DC	District Commissioner
DDCL	Duff Development Company Limited
DDSNA	Department of District Services and Native Affairs
DNA	Department of Native Affairs
DO	District Officer
DOPP	District Officer Pasir Puteh
DOUK	District Officer Ulu Kelantan
EHD	Eastern Highlands District
FMS	Federated Malay States
HFSA	Highlands Farmers and Settlers Association
HLS	Highlands Labour Scheme
ICS	Indian Civil Service
KAR	Kelantan Administration Report
MBRAS	Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
MTNG	Mandated Territory of New Guinea
NAR	Native Administration Regulations
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NEA	Native Employment Agreement
NLGC	Native Local Government Councils
OIC	Officer in Charge
PAS	Parti Islam Sa-Melayu (Pan Malayan Islamic Party)
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PO	Patrol Officer
PP	Patrol Post
RCI	Royal Colonial Institute
SD	Sub-District
SDA	Seventh Day Adventist
SHD	Southern Highlands District
SMC	Bureau of State, Marine and Customs
TEC	Territory Executive Council
UMNO	United Malay Nationalist Organisation
UMS	Unfederated Malay States
UN	United Nations
WHD	Western Highlands District

A NOTE ON CURRENCY

Kelantan

Prior to 1904 Kelantan used currency of its own, British silver dollars and a variety of other coinage. From 1904 the Straits Settlement dollar was in common usage throughout the Malay peninsula.

Any pounds (£) mentioned refer to British pounds sterling.

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea used Australian imperial currency throughout the period under review. Pounds, shillings and pence were expressed 1/4/10 or 1.4.10.

12 pence (d) to the shilling (s)

20 shillings to the pound (£)

Oddities of the imperial system included 1 Guinea being equal to 1/1/- or 21 shillings.

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Chapter 1: Colonialism and Governance in the Twentieth Century

In the nineteenth century the management of dependent territories assumed a professional and technical character. Empires that had existed for decades, and in some cases centuries, began to train professional administrators to assist in the governance of their colonies. This marked a shift away from employing the generalist to a new class of professional bureaucrat schooled in anthropology, history, tropical hygiene and techniques of colonial administration. Many of these new professional colonial officers worked at the intermediate level within a colony or dependent territory and acted as part of the bureaucracy of an administrative district. They collected information about those they sought to control, compiled and analysed it and aimed to make the business of government more efficient. As a result of this shift in emphasis toward gathering detailed information for the study of the colonised, the methods employed to achieve social compliance with the various aims of European powers also underwent significant transformation. Information was used by the colonial state in increasingly sophisticated ways as it moved from a position of ruling by coercive violence to the maintenance of political rule by tenuous consent within a framework of regulation that restricted avenues of opposition.

This thesis is an examination of two areas — Kelantan in the Malay peninsula and the eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea — that were subjected to this new form of colonial rule in the twentieth century. This rule is defined as administrative colonialism, and the term implies a predisposition for administrative mechanisms to impose order and a bureaucratic mentality toward the concept of ruling others. This thesis utilises the

unit of the colonial district, the intermediate level of colonial governance, as a means of exposing the interface between macro-political colonial policy and the effects of that policy on colonised peoples at the village level. As such, colonial district analysis offers a fertile field for studying the purposes and rationale for colonial governance in the century that oversaw the demise of empires both new and old.

This introductory chapter argues that there are different varieties of colonialism and constructs a typology using four ideal types. These types represent stages in the development of political and economic control by European states over non-European peoples. The ideal types chart the changing methods used to enforce social control from crude to sophisticated, with the final ideal type, administrative colonialism, employing the most sophisticated means available to regulate and order its geographic territory. These modern techniques of regulation and rule required the imposition of peace, accompanied by administrative apparatus that sought to order practically every facet of the lives of the colonised. Such changes were not always effective and were frequently resisted, nonetheless administrative colonialism indicates a shift from the use of brute force to achieve particular aims, to the use of legislative and administrative power to close off avenues of resistance.¹ Administrative colonialism aimed to establish the hegemonic position of the colonial state through a combination of structural and regulatory coercion and the tacit consent of the governed. In the periods under consideration, Kelantan and the Eastern Highlands District of Papua New Guinea represent examples of the implementation of colonial rule that relied mainly on the enactment and enforcement of legal proscriptions of acceptable behaviour. Neither

¹ J. S. Furnivall, 'The Fashioning of Leviathan: The Beginnings of British Rule in Burma', *JMBRAS* [1939], Australian National University, Canberra, 1991, outlines this type of approach to government with tacit consent as early as 1825.

regime was entirely benign, yet both aimed to avoid using force directly against the populations they aimed to control, a tendency copied from the operation of the police arm of the state in the 'modern' and industrialised liberal democratic states of Britain and Australia.

The use of direct coercive force was usually limited to occasions in which the administrations felt that aberrant behaviour required modification. Police action operated to push specific groups within society back into the behavioural framework created by colonial administrators. Social protest against colonial administrations was thus stigmatised by colonial administrators as constituting a threat to the stability of the operations of the colonial district as a whole. Furthermore, recourse to violence as a form of protest attacked the prestige of the rulers. Colonial administrators preferred a system where colonial peoples became self-regulating and operated within the logic of the new order of legal enactment. This thesis shows that in neither case was the colonial administration entirely successful in its aim of pacifying without violence, yet violence was mainly used when those being ruled departed from the compelling behavioural logic of the new system introduced by colonial middle managers. The new administrations justified their presence and control, on the basis that such laws were designed to assist with the moral, social and economic development of the colonised.

The two colonial districts examined in this thesis were established by regimes both less violent and more effective in achieving their aims than previous colonial administrations. By establishing a structured coercion based on regulation of society, the colonial states were able to integrate both regions into the world economy. Later, as parts of independent states, the practices inherited from colonial rule served as the

organising principles of governance in the era of decolonisation and independence. The former colonial possessions operated within an international economy that was capitalist in nature and, in most cases, they retained their colonial borders. Their common lack of economic development in comparison to the industrialised nations of the world has categorised them collectively as ‘the Third World’ or the slightly less pejorative ‘Less Developed Countries’. They remain however enmeshed in the productive cycles of global capitalism. Colonialism developed in sophistication over time, especially in its construction of morally justifications for its own presence and in its increasingly professional attitude to the rule of others. As such colonialism, and specifically the administrative colonialism of the twentieth century, played a large part in fashioning the world and making dependent territories operate in a very particular way. At the same time it has become identified as a descriptive term for such a wide range of social, cultural and economic interactions between colonisers and the colonised that its core meaning of political domination has become blurred. This thesis attempts to rescue colonialism from this semantic confusion and aims to provide a framework for understanding the different types of colonialism based on the structures of power that underpin it.

1.1 Etymology and meaning of colonialism

All studies of colonialism come up against a basic problem of terminology: what is it that is being described? From this follows the problem of what exactly does the word ‘colonialism’ mean? Like its cognate term imperialism, colonialism has a number of meanings, and several nuances of meaning. In *Keywords*, Raymond Williams notes that

the English word ‘colony’ comes from the Latin noun *colonus* (farmer) which itself derives from the Latin verb *colere* (to cultivate).² This meaning suggests the birth or growth of a new society within a wider cultural world. The colonies of ancient Greece or Rome were settled through a process whereby a group of people left the heartland of the cultural community for new areas. Once established, these communities attempted to maintain the language, social mores and culture of the original polity. In a sense they attempted to ‘grow’ a like culture through ‘colonising’ the new region. This is the sense of meaning that emerged to describe the social, political and early economic relationships of the settler societies of the Antipodes, North America and South Africa.

Such a view of colonialism as the process of creating a settled community culturally affiliated with its homeland may be distinguished from the mid-late nineteenth century meaning of colonialism used to describe the extension of European political rule over newly acquired territories in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. With the expansion of empire, the term ‘colonialism’ came to be applied to the practise of maintaining colonies, or of the mannerisms of those people, or customs, emanating from the colonies — ‘a colonialism’.³ The Oxford English Dictionary also notes that colonialism is frequently used “in the derogatory sense of an alleged policy of exploitation of backward or weak peoples by a large power.”⁴ This pejorative connotation that colonialism acquired is due to the inherent racism of the entire colonial project – the belief that people needed to be shown how to govern themselves – and to the alleged economic exploitation of colonised peoples and their resources.

² R. Williams, *Keywords*, Fontana, London, 1983, p. 87.

³ *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Colonialism in this sense of economic exploitation has been applied retrospectively to the relationship between Iberian powers and their American possessions from the fifteenth century. Equally during decolonisation, particularly after World War II, ‘colonialism’ was used to describe administrations that had international sanction under the principles of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

David Fieldhouse has observed that colonialism can only be understood in relation to its cognate terms of imperialism, colonisation and neo-colonialism. Each of these terms forms part of an historical cycle that begins with imperialism, then transforms into either colonisation or colonialism.⁵ Later, with decolonisation, the dynamic of political domination is expressed through neo-colonialism, a political independence that is stymied by a lack of real political control due to the retention of economic links between the former colonial power and the newly independent state.⁶ At the heart of each of these terms is political domination.

Taking Fieldhouse’s broad definition of imperialism as “the tendency of one society or state to control another, for whatever means or for whatever purpose”,⁷ the act of political control may lead to colonisation, the peopling of territories with folk of the same culture group to create a like society, or to colonialism, a process where political rule is exercised without an attempt at settlement. This explanation is useful to distinguish some parts of the world from others, in particular the areas of the world that came to be called the self-governing colonies from those dependent territories where small minorities usually of Europeans, ruled large non-European populations.

⁵ D. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870-1945, An Introduction*, Macmillan, London, 1981, p.1.

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 8-11.

⁷ *Ibid.* p.1.

Colonies, protected states, mandates and trusteeships thus all form part of a wider colonial whole, or are at least caught up in the descriptive analysis of colonial power relations. Colonialism has been and is used to describe a vast range of interactions between peoples over the past 500 years. Yet it has not remained an exclusively European term. The actions of the Japanese in Taiwan, from 1895, and in Korea from 1905 have allowed colonialism a wider interpretation so it can be used to describe general political principles of power relations between dominant and subordinated powers. Colonialism has lost its European monopoly, but it can be understood as a dynamic concerned with power – the power of one society to enforce its will over another. Any investigation of colonial power thus requires an examination of the tools and methods of domination.

The suggested typology detailed here attempts to make some sense of the enormous diversity of colonial rule. It suggests that there are four differing ‘modes of domination’ that over time increase in sophistication and encourage humane treatment of the colonised. This evolution in the varieties of colonial rule has been accompanied by increasingly sophisticated techniques of control. At one end of the spectrum of colonial rule is the consistent use of physical force and violence by private citizens under loose state control acting to attain maximum profit; at the other there is the creation of regimes of control that operate through the more intangible, yet paradoxically more effective, structural coercion of what Michel Foucault has termed ‘governmentality’.⁸

⁸ See H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983, especially Chapter 6 ‘From the Repressive Hypothesis to Bio-Power’, pp. 126-142, and M. Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’, in C. Gordon ed. *Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1980, pp. 109-133.

In an effort to give greater definition to colonialism, and to get away from this amorphous quality that reduces complex problems of social interaction, transformation and domination to singular notions of profit or racism, this thesis constructs four ideal types to delineate different structures of colonial power. These varieties of colonialism are distinguished by four basic characteristics:

1. the treatment of people under the rule of the colonisers;
2. the level of physical coercion present;
3. the sophistication of systems of colonial government;
4. the stated intentions of the colonial power.

These ideal types are then examined in terms of their aims, means and effects. Colonialism may be usefully seen as the imposition of order by one society over another. By classifying colonialism into degrees of sophistication in the techniques used to rule others and its level of humanism, the economic, political, cultural, and other operations of colonial rule can become clear. When analysed in terms of the structures of power that enabled political control to be exercised over people and territories, the key operations of colonial rule are illuminated. Such an investigation of colonial power by necessity involves an examination of the colonial state, its administrative mechanisms and administrative practice it employed within specific territories. The four ideal types outlined below provide a point of comparison for understanding the main trends and explanations within colonial historiography that are addressed in the next chapter. They further provide a means to compare 'reality' against theoretical abstractions.

1.2 *The ideal types*

Max Weber used the notion of the ideal type in comparative analysis to discuss ‘pure’ cases. As Gerth and Wright Mills note “The term ‘ideal’ has nothing to do with evaluations of any sort.”⁹ The ideal types proposed are not meant to describe any particular situation at any time or in any territory, nor is it argued that any colonial situation ever exactly fitted one of the four ideal types presented. The categories proposed are rather approximations of tendencies that represent extremes on a colonial continuum of power and domination ranging from brute physical coercion and plunder to sophisticated regulatory mechanisms, governmentality and claimed justifications of action on behalf of colonial administrators.

The ideal types provide a method of conceptualising colonialism and its socially transformative functions, both positive and negative. The linkage between colonialism and modernity is through administration, as it is by establishing modern bureaucratic government that colonial empires reshaped the world in their own image, or at least as variations on a theme. The ideal types show that colonialism in its various forms can be viewed as a totality when the emphasis is shifted from the economic effects, which were not uniform, toward the political subjection of people to authority. As such they provide a method of understanding the different stages in the development of what this thesis refers to as ‘modes of domination’ in world history over the past 500 years. They offer a point of departure for future investigations into colonialism, both recent and contemporary, as the point of analysis concerns political power and its diffusion through

⁹ H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1969, p 59.

administration, a matter with which international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund are chiefly concerned.

While there is some notion of evolution involved in the ideal types as presented, they could indeed be contemporaneous. Taking King Leopold's Congo as an example of the colonialism of plunder and British administration in Kelantan as an example of administrative colonialism it is possible to show that different ideal types existed roughly at the same point in history. That is to say one ideal type did not necessarily move onto another as various powers treated their colonial dependencies differently. Even within an empire, not all parts would be treated in a similar fashion. In New Guinea, for example there were differences in the administrative management of areas. There were restricted areas in the eastern highlands district until the 1960s, sometime after the first Gorokan has purchased a motor vehicle with profits from the coffee industry.¹⁰

1.2.1 Ideal type 1 - Plunder

The first of the ideal types can be described as the colonialism of plunder. It occupies territory through force of arms, has scant regard for colonised peoples and frequently enslaves them, works them to death or kills them when taking land. Emissaries of states, or companies or religious orders, administer these territories in the name of an absent political figure. Rules and regulations governing the treatment of the colonised favour the colonists and, for the colonial power, any such riches acquired are displayed through

¹⁰ See B. Finney, *Big Men and Business: Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the New Guinea Highlands*, University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1973, p. 71, and I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship Papua New Guinea 1945-1975*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1980, Maps at pp. 268-269.

conspicuous consumption in the construction of palaces and other buildings. The colony exists for the benefit of the imperial state, its resources are plundered and the proceeds enrich the colonisers.

The sole aim of the colonialism of plunder in acquiring territory is to exploit the riches it possesses. The colonialism of plunder is a primitive form of wealth accumulation. The means by which it does so is violent and is often achieved by private individuals who exploit political tensions in the areas they are present. Its concentration on physical force to suppress a population in order to extract wealth incurs continuing expense. The effects of this type of colonial control are that power is held without consent, wealth is extracted and people poorly treated. This form of colonialism is the least sophisticated of the modes of domination. The activities of the Spanish and Portuguese in the Americas from the late fifteenth centuries to the late eighteenth centuries approximate this ideal type, as does the late nineteenth century example of King Leopold's Congo.

1.2.2 Ideal type 2 -Commerce

The colonialism of commerce occurs when a European state licenses a chartered company to act on its behalf. A commercial colony is created by the company through negotiation with an indigenous self-governing polity. The colonialism of commerce consists of a trading base, a fort or a 'factory', often with a small defensive perimeter. As this is an essentially commercial venture, there is no formal attempt to impose political or governmental control over large areas and no use of large armies to gain substantial territory. Colonial rule is restricted to the entrepot, the company workers themselves and their retainers. The purpose of commercial colonialism is to acquire

goods for the European market and as such the rationale of commercial colonialism is to survive as a company/state. Political relations that exist between the commercial colony and indigenous polities are shaped by trade concerns. The neighbouring indigenous polities tolerate Europeans as they have particular commercial, political and military uses. Commercial colonists gather commodities to both create and meet demand in European markets. Commercial colonialism moves goods from place to place and creates wealth by doing so.

The aims of the colonialism of commerce are to run a successful business and to create profit for directors, shareholders, and for the officers of the company, the workers and governors who run the day-to-day business. The means by which it achieves this is to enter into commercial relationships with other trading entities in order to obtain goods for sale in a market place. The objective is of course to buy commodities for less than the selling price so that the company profits. The effects of this type of colonial rule are that comparatively few people are affected by the activities of the colonial rulers, as they are basically just another group of traders in a competitive trading system. The activities of the Dutch in the Indian Ocean from the mid sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century approximate this ideal type.

1.2.3 *Ideal type 3 -Expansion*

Expansionist colonialism is primarily concerned with territorial acquisition and the introduction of capitalism, the period commonly referred to as the age of “High Imperialism”. The competitive edge of capitalism in Europe is blunted by the emergence of monopolies and cartels. Influential business and political groups lobby for political expansion so as to provide further opportunities for investment. The need for new markets and new opportunities for capitalist enterprises, such as railways and plantations, leads to political control over new territories and peoples. Political regimes are established through military means, often annexing a region to protect the European investments already in existence. The economy of the colony plays its part in a wider imperial economy. The government of a colony is created in an *ad hoc* manner, and officials make rules concerning land alienation and acceptable behaviour for Europeans in the treatment of indigenes. High levels of violence and physical coercion accompany the occupation of territory. People are forced from their lands or are killed when resisting. Labour is acquired by force for plantation agriculture and mining while the maximisation of profit is uppermost in the minds of the colonisers. The colony forms part of the empire and is used both for its raw materials and as a market to sell commodities. Within the imperial framework each colony contributes what it can best provide.

The aims of expansionist colonialism are to acquire territory and to create new markets. This type of colonialism is a progression from the business-orientated colonialism of commerce to a far more effective integration of new regions into an imperial economy. The means by which it acquires this new territory are both commercial and military and

the nexus between the two remains unbroken with the considerations of one affecting the actions of the other. The effects of expansionist colonialism are the establishment of vast empires claiming to govern much of the world's territory and the integration of peoples within these empires to an international capitalist economy. The activities of the British, French and Germans in Africa in the nineteenth centuries approximate this ideal type.

1.2.4 Ideal type 4 -Administration

Administrative colonialism moves away from the use of physical force in favour of increasingly sophisticated techniques of social management. In place of direct physical coercion comes the structured coercion of governmentality. There is careful consideration given to creating the structures of rule for the colonial state. Through the creation of state departments and legal codes, everyday life in colonies is regulated so that pre-modern forms of economic production are transformed to support a capitalist mode of production. The purpose of the colonial presence is to create a way of life that resembles more closely the civilisation of the coloniser. The interests of capital are subordinated to the interests of the state and the colonial state acts in what it considers to be the best interests of the indigenous population. The administrative colonial state spends more than it earns and the main motive is not so much the creation of profit for the administration but the linking of the region to the international economy. The administrative colonial state creates a sense of legitimacy of governmental purpose that knits people together into organisational units. With decolonisation these structures of the colonial state become essential for the maintenance of the national government. The key features of administrative colonialism are the provision of government services, the

way in which it uses administration to induce changes in the economic and political structures of pre-colonial society, and its positioning of the colonial state as a central actor in matters of production, distribution and exchange of commodities. When attacked at an ideological level, administrative colonialism defends itself with its position that what is being done is in the best interests of the people concerned.

As George Balandier noted in 1951, colonial power could be exercised through non-military means by using a combination of administrative machinery and ideological dominance. The colonial state in the eastern highlands adopted a number of tactics that Balandier felt were possible ways of achieving non-violent social control. It offered itself a model for emulation whilst effectively blocking or at least severely limiting access to authority; it maintained contact a minimum, it used its ideology of progress to justify its position, and it preserved political tactics designed to preserve an imbalance in favour of the colonial power.¹¹ Indeed Balandier states that force alone is insufficient to maintain control with a large indigenous population and that misunderstanding became a tool of domination. The confusion of the new, all that had been introduced by administrative colonialism, the laws, the regulations and the new standards of behaviour, assisted in the ongoing project of political subjection as they sought to have people self-regulate.¹² For those who could not follow the new rules, the police acted as agents for transferring the package of new ideas to the uninitiated, they further demonstrated that the state had the capacity to use violence if required. Once behaviour

¹¹ G. Balandier, 'The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach', in I. Wallerstein, *Social Change: The Colonial Situation*, J. Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, pp. 34-61, at p 47.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.48.

that threatened the legitimacy of the colonial state had been largely eliminated the police began to perform a simpler function of disciplining minorities.¹³

Administrative colonialism demands nothing less than the transformation of society to reflect the priorities of the colonisers. The means by which it seeks to achieve this are not physically coercive and rely on regulation. The techniques it uses makes this form of colonialism the most sophisticated of the four ideal types presented here. By imposing its logic on colonial society it has the effect of creating conditions that are safe for capital and integrating the governed into the process of government by creating consent to give support to the colonial regime. It is the means and methods by which this consent is achieved that are the main subject of this thesis.

1.3 Motivations

The techniques of social control that enabled domination to occur are central to understanding the events that fall under the rubric of colonialism. The motivations of the rulers are often harder to assess. From the nineteenth century colonial administrators the world over justified their actions through reference to the progress of mankind. In the 20th century those practicing administrative colonialism spent much time and effort on the study of subject peoples so as to understand the nature of their societies. Frequently they made generalisations about pre-modern societies that enabled techniques of rule to be developed that were easy to implement. Whereas the colonialism of plunder had developed direct rule and allowed the imposition of

¹³ See H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, op. cit.*, pp. 138-139. For more on the use of police power under administrative colonialism see discussions of police in Malaya and Kelantan, Chapter 4, and in Papua New Guinea Chapter 7.

European desires over the entire society, by the late nineteenth century the scientific rationality of Europe had examined its own political structures and found that such rule was not necessary, even for colonised peoples. The notion of indirect rule evolved to accommodate this new thinking that was developed first in Africa using traditional forms of political leadership. By installing themselves above existing governing groups, Europeans were able to exert control. This enabled administrative colonialism to pass itself off as advice, or to explain its presence as merely assisting local rulers to create wealth and development.

The administrative colonial state has a defined territorial boundary and fashions its regime according to political expediency. At the heart of administrative colonialism is a notion of progress that involves breaking traditions and replacing them with the hallmark of modernity — good government. It is both less physically coercive and more effective than the other ideal types in achieving its aims. The implementation of bureaucratic and legislative regimes of social control place limits on the opportunities of colonised people to rebel. When necessary physical force is used but the state prefers to operate through regulation so as to restructure society and direct its development. The coercive nature of administrative colonialism lies in its closing of outlets for dissent: the basic choices available to people are those prescribed by the state and its institutions. Colonial middle managers aimed to introduce benign forms of capitalism; the structural changes wrought become permanent, not because of the logic of colonialism, but because of the logic of global capitalism.

Governments, particularly European governments with bureaucracies, keep records. Thanks to the often meticulous record keeping of colonial bureaucrats from the late

nineteenth and early twentieth century, contemporary scholars may review the systems they were creating and working within, along with the possible reasons for the implementation of a particular policy. Scholars may further speculate on the motivations for their actions and while all good scholarship is critical, one must resist the temptation to read too much into the words of the administrators.

1.4 *The records of administrative colonialism*

Colonial records are a mixed bag. At their most banal they attempt to convey information from one part of the governing structure to another. This information may concern rainfall, the quantity of gold won, the amount of crops purchased from the local population, or another quantifiable matter. Yet in the collection of information stronger forces are at work. Foucault argues that power supports the collection of knowledge and knowledge reinforces power;¹⁴ colonial records are therefore both a record of the past and a record of the mentality of the past. They contain claims to truth, claims to observable facts and claims to observable trends. Equally they contain the impressions of senior officers in the colonial administration on particular matters and are thus personal records of how individuals worked within a system and how they regarded their position.

Edward Said's *Orientalism* follows on from Foucault's theories and deals mainly with Western conceptions of what we know today as the Middle East. Said offers some salient observations on the construction of knowledge, what he refers to as the

¹⁴ See M. Foucault, 'Truth and Power' in C. Gordon ed. *Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-133.

embodiment of a “systematic discipline of accumulation.”¹⁵ The social construction of the identity of colonised peoples occurs through a long history of writing about ‘the Other’, leading to the formation of a type of learned behaviour for colonial rulers. They perceive the colonised as childish and weak, and they announce what they feel to be the needs of the colonised. As Said notes, and this could be applied as much to Malays as to Papua New Guineans,

... everything one can know or learn about “Semites” and “Orientals” receives immediate corroboration, not merely in the archives, but directly on the ground.

Out of such a coercive framework, by which modern “coloured” man is chained irrevocably to the general truths formulated about his prototypical linguistic, anthropological, and doctrinal forebears by a white European scholar, the work of the twentieth century Oriental experts in England and France derived.¹⁶

The records examined in this thesis are chiefly reports of colonial officials engaged in the day to day administration of dependent territories. These colonial middle managers brought to their task a conception of their position as representatives of advanced culture, as well as notions of how to understand the societies they were dealing with. Their observations reveal the strength of the opinions they held concerning the people they administered as well as their impressions of their own role in the process of cultural transformation. These observations may no doubt strike the reader, who observes the world by contemporary standards of humanism, liberalism and democracy, as racist. There is nothing in the ideal types presented, or in this thesis, that go against the deserved reputation of colonialism as a racist enterprise and, in one sense, the entire

¹⁵ E. Said, *Orientalism*, Penguin, London, 1991, p. 123.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

history of colonial rule is a chronicle of racism. Administrative colonialism has strong elements of paternalism and an innate sense of superiority in its ordering of civilisations. Attitudes such as racism were part of the structural requirement of social division necessary for the maintenance of colonial power so as to divide society into classes of rulers and ruled. Equality for Europeans and the colonised was strongly resisted right up until independence.¹⁷

While the records of colonial administrations and the memoirs of colonial middle managers and their underlings contain much that would today be branded as racist, judging these records as racist is in a way beside the point. Such an approach glosses over the far more complex and interesting task of analysing how the colonial state created itself in new regions, how the colonial state regarded the success of its own development and how it maintained control. Therefore in examining the records of the district administrators, the colonial ‘middle managers’ of this thesis, attention is given to the structures of rule that were created. The statements made by colonial administrators should not to be taken as ‘truth claims’, rather they are representative of how colonial administrators perceived their own positions as rulers within the overall logic of colonial administration: such claims concerning the activities of ruling regimes reveal the mindset and operations of administrative colonialism.

¹⁷ See Bernard Schaffer, ‘The Concept of Preparation: Some questions about the transfer of systems of government’, *World Politics*, XVIII, October 1965, No. 1, pp. 42-67.

1.5 *Techniques of control*

This thesis demonstrates that administrative colonialism equated (and conflated) economic development with peace, the rule of law, the commodification of land and the transition to a system of wage labour. Furthermore administrative colonialism believed that the elimination of native religion and superstition was a good and proper thing. Administrative colonialism was confident in the superiority of its own civilisation and aimed to create a type of modernity in the dependent territory. This was not always a replica of the home civilisation and where tradition or custom did not inhibit the operations of peace, commerce or economic development (as defined by the administrators themselves) – for example with the practice of Islam in Kelantan or the *moka* exchange ceremonies in the highlands of Papua New Guinea – such practices were permitted to continue. Other practices, such as slavery in Kelantan, and cannibalism and payback killing in the eastern highlands, were prevented as far as was possible. Administrative colonialism therefore involves a degree of accommodation on behalf of both rulers and ruled as total social transformation was not considered necessary, nor could it have been achieved swiftly. Over time however the administrations of dependent territories came to resemble those of the home states of colonial powers.

While the colossal arrogance of reorganising a society to reflect one's own priorities can not be ignored, it is worth noting that the idea of leaving what colonial administrators considered 'pre-modern' peoples in their 'pre-modern' state — an idea attractive to those who today cherish the 'authenticity' of primitive culture amidst a fast changing world — was not seriously entertained by any colonial power. On the contrary, colonial

powers used the rhetoric of the civilising mission as a justification for their political control. Progress demanded that ‘backward’ peoples be brought into the ‘modern’ world, the League of Nations endorsed this idea, the United Nations later regulated it, and colonial powers embraced it in various ways and with varying levels of commitment and interest.

Ironically, the movement to end colonialism and to grant independence to colonial peoples led to vast improvements in the management of colonial territories. European states developed training schools for colonial officers, and such functionaries were taught techniques of government, law and tropical medicine, read comparative surveys of colonial affairs, and were instructed in that great servant of imperial power, anthropology. Paradoxically, and at the level of rhetoric at least, it was this ‘high colonialism’ of the mid-late twentieth century that most approaches the ideal type of administrative colonial rule — structures of government that claimed not to be driven by profit, but by the higher purpose of improving the lives of others. But again, as Bernard Schaffer has observed, most of the justifications for colonial rule were *post-hoc* rationalisations designed more to avoid handing over power than to actually grant independence.¹⁸ However, at the level of ideas, and as a philosophy that few colonial states approached in good faith, the notion that colonial rule could be used to improve the lives of people to release them from superstition, backwardness and harm was strong amongst colonial administrators, some of whom, such as Australia’s Minister for Territories Paul Hasluck, created expositions and variations on this theme.¹⁹

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-52.

¹⁹ See for example the discussion of ‘Partnership’ in Chapter 9. This official Ministerial line evolved to justify the Australian presence in Papua New Guinea.

Self-justification for colonial rule commenced in the mid-nineteenth century and the literature of self-exculpation became increasingly detailed as states grew more experienced in the business of their own administration. Comparative studies of colonial regimes informed the minds of colonial administrators. In the twentieth century the administrators themselves were required to attend specialist colleges and training schools to learn the art of governing subject peoples. The canon of colonial rule included Lord Lugard's *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*²⁰ and Lord Hailey's *An African Survey*,²¹ both exhaustive audits of British colonial practice. They offer the view that the purpose of colonial rule is both noble and beneficial for Africans. They treat the subject of the most effective way to rule with great care and point to the strategies of social management known as indirect rule as an inexpensive method of retaining control in the colonial territories.

Lord Lugard's arguments for extending Lord Milner's system of indirect rule to Nigeria centred around three main propositions. The first was an acknowledgment of the ethnic diversity of Africa and the fact that the separate tribes were at 'different stages of evolution', thus making it impossible to produce men of education who could then rule through a narrowly conceived self government, as was then being tried in India.²²

The second proposition gets to the heart of why, for Lugard at least, the British were in Africa: to teach people how to govern themselves. He wrote that in principle every community should be allowed to govern itself with the object of complete independence but noted

²⁰ Lord Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 5th edition, Cass, London, 1965.

²¹ Lord Hailey, *An African Survey* (Revised 1956), Oxford University Press, London, 1957.

²² Lord Lugard, *The Dual Madate in British Tropical Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-196.

Those who hold this view generally, I think, also consider that attempts to train primitive tribes in any form of self-government are futile, and the administration must be wholly conducted by British officials. This in the past has been the principle adopted in many dependencies. It recognised no alternative between a status of independence, like the Sultans of Malaya, or the native princes of India, and the direct rule of the district commissioner.²³

In Africa however, Lugard felt that British advice in matters of government and construction of legal frameworks contributed to the maintenance of order and prevented the imposition of oppressive taxes on trade or people. While the authority of a chief to levy such taxes was recognised, the influence of British administrators mitigated the potential harm to the vast majority of the population. The third justification for British rule evolved due to a combination of the lack of education in the indigenous population and the need to check possible despotism. Overall political control was felt to be for the greater good of the majority of the people. For Lugard, the international community, constituted as the League of Nations and embodied in the Mandate system, in fact demanded this.²⁴

As Fieldhouse notes, Lugard “provided solutions to acutely felt problems” and the principles of indirect rule came to dominate British administration in Africa after 1920, even in East Africa where dependencies such as Kenya had been subject to more direct administration through small professional bodies of administrators.²⁵ Native councils were developed to provide a second level of decision-making within the structures of

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 196-197.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

²⁵ D. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd edition, Macmillan, London, 1986, p. 300.

colonial power, an innovation that led to the installation of indigenous leaders as buffers against British rule.²⁶

Justification for indirect rule in Africa develops from the perceived necessity of imposing ‘good government’ to rescue Africans from the abuses of their own rulers: in theory British administration therefore aimed to civilise people as well as to bring economic development. The conflation of ‘good government’ with the imposition of the rule of law and social and moral progress is apparent. The combination of these impulses created the colonial state apparatus that respected law, property and capital. Importantly, indirect rule could also be organised to pay for its own administration through the commodification of land and its use as the basis of taxation.

As a system, indirect rule applied to areas outside of townships where the authority of the traditional rulers was felt to be strongest. Towns were considered separately from villages, which functioned as the basic unit of government administration. By imposing a level of advice above the existing political system, administrative colonialism saved money through the use of existing authority. In doing so it created a buffer of indigenous elite rule closely allied to the colonial power. Administrative colonialism and the traditional rulers were mutually advantageous.

²⁶ This buffer system was developed to its logical conclusion in the late nineteenth century by the Dutch in Java. See H. Sutherland, *The Making of A Bureaucratic Elite*, Asian Studies Association of Australia, Southeast Asia Publications Series, Heinman Educational Books (Asia) Ltd, Singapore, 1979. This was not however developed as fully in Malaya. See for example J. de Vere Allen, ‘Malayan Civil Service, 1874-194: Colonial Bureaucracy/Malayan Elite’, in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol 12, 1970, pp. 149-178, except in Kedah and Johore where Malay participation in government was accepted without question.

As Hailey observed, the system of indirect rule in Africa emerges from the dual concerns for the elimination of the slave trade and the freedom of commerce but soon came to use indigenous political systems for the provision of government services.²⁷ Indirect rule was therefore both centralised and yet decentralised: the use of lower level political units permitted the colonial state to reach the everyday people in villages while the nominal authority of the indigenous rulers provided a fiction of unitary governance. The legitimacy of indigenous rule, through custom and political lineages, eliminated the necessity for large numbers of troops to be stationed in a territory to enforce colonial control. Rather, because the ruling elites of the colonised and the colonisers cooperated, coercive force ceased to be as important. The shift toward the framework of regulations, laws and ordinances that is governmentality could be established once effective opposition to colonial rule was eliminated from within the dependent territory by the indigenous elites who became the allies of the colonial rulers.

The first edition of *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* was published in 1922 and Lugard's work became part of the apparatus of colonial power and was required reading for budding administrators. It, and Hailey's mammoth work of 1956, gave the post-war colonial administrator the historical data upon which his own administrative experiences could be assessed. As a point of reference, the work of older colonial administrators was a powerful force in ensuring conformity of purpose. Learning to think and work like the masters of colonial government was also an important factor in ensuring a continuity of practice. Reports adopted a particular format: specific issues needed to be addressed, statistical tables had to be presented and data had to be gathered. The administrators themselves thus functioned according to a created logic

²⁷ Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-202.

and rationale imposed upon them by a system of governance adapted from the experiences of others who had once been in similar positions. The logic of the system encouraged efficiency both in language and in administration. The cost factor meant administrators were constantly looking for ways to do things better or cheaper; the drive for efficiency in administrative colonialism meant that an innovation in administration could be adopted throughout a colony, even throughout an empire.

1.6 *The moral defence of colonial rule*

It was thought possible to utilise such efficiencies to adapt systems of government developed in India to Malaysia, to adapt ways of ruling Africans to Papua New Guinea. Techniques of social management thus became interchangeable: tribes were tribes, whether in Africa or the Pacific, and tribes had chiefs. And where no chiefs were apparent they were created for ease of adapting a system of rule developed in one location for implementation in another.²⁸ After all, colonised people were all thought to be essentially child-like so similar pedagogical structures and techniques of rule could and should be used for conformity of colonial purpose.

Even the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci felt that the moral dimension of colonial rule justified intervention in the name of good governance. For colonial administrators in the twentieth century the issue was not so much the right to bring pre-modern peoples into modernity, but what constituted acceptable behaviour when doing so. The Italian philosopher Antonio Labriola put it thus: “How would you go about the moral

²⁸ See J. A. Barnes, ‘Indigenous Politics and Colonial Administration with Special Reference to Australia’, in I. Wallerstein ed., *Social Change: The Colonial Situation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-231 at pp. 227-228.

education of a Papuan?” and this question was taken up by Antonio Gramsci. Where Labriola had felt that slavery would be the first option with the possibility of beginning pedagogy after two or three generations, Gramsci wrote that:

It seems to me that historically the problem ought to be posed differently: whether, that is, a nation or a social group which has reached a higher degree of civilisation should not (and therefore should) ‘accelerate’ the process of education of the more backward peoples and social groups thereby appropriately universalising and translating its new experiences.²⁹

Gramsci argued that British use of colonial (primitive) peoples as police still came with instruction in the use of modern weapons, even if it was less technologically sophisticated. He went on to critique Labriola as backward for his assumption that pedagogy could not begin at once:

For it may quite well be that it is ‘necessary to reduce the Papuan to slavery’ in order to educate them, but it is none the less necessary for someone to say that it is only incidentally necessary since there exist certain given conditions, that - in other words - this is a ‘historical’ and not an absolute necessity; it is necessary, rather, that there should be a struggle over the issue, and this struggle is exactly the condition by means of which the grandsons or great-grandsons of the Papuan will be freed from slavery and educated by modern pedagogy. That there are people who assert most vigorously that the slavery of the Papuans is but a necessity of the moment and who rebel against this necessity is also a philosophical-historical fact: 1) since it will contribute to reducing the period of slavery to the time necessary; 2) since it will cause the Papuans themselves to reflect on themselves and educate themselves, in so far as they will have the support of

²⁹ A. Gramsci, *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1998, p. 159.

people of a superior civilisation; 3) since only this resistance shows that one really is in a higher epoch of civilisation and thought etc.³⁰

Gramsci here is announcing what amounts to a necessary evil of colonial rule for the ultimate benefit of the ruled. He is saying that there must be some level of unequal dealing between pre-modern and modern peoples, but that this disparity should be kept to a minimum, and both parties should be encouraged to work toward the ultimate goal of liberation for the pre-modern society which would come through the development of education and consciousness of social position. Only a truly civilised society could carry out such a task, 'the moral education' of the pre-modern society in such a way; for Gramsci to control without attempting to liberate was not acceptable and not a characteristic of a truly civilised society. A degree of force is therefore acceptable if the desired end is morally acceptable.

That a backward people or social group may need a coercive external discipline so as to be educated in the ways of civilisation does not mean they should be reduced to slavery, *unless one considers all state coercion to be slavery.*³¹

While Gramsci argues for coercion as a necessary factor in bringing the light of civilisation, neither Kelantan nor the eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea were examples of this type of coercive external discipline. Rather both regions are indicative of the more sophisticated techniques of rule developed during the twentieth century, the justification of which was expressed in terms of the need to bring people into the modern world. The lack of physical coercion in the sense of slavery or forced labour is characteristic of a more mature and morally justifiable approach to colonial

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.* (Emphasis added).

administration that aimed to link the administrative district with the world market. These regions thus provide good tests of the ideal type of administrative colonialism.

Both districts were characterised by a high degree of paternalism and tended to view the people being organised as little more than ‘wards of the state’ who were being assisted by a more advanced power. The hubris of power within colonial middle management did not consider that the changes being thrust upon people might have been unwelcome. By the same token it needs to be recognised that this administrative colonialism is not a neutral instrument to impose modernity: rather it is a culturally loaded, and ideologically driven, bureaucratic apparatus that seeks to create a particular type of state, civil society and economy that both respects property and capital investment and reduces options for resistance through the creation of a mode of domination based on legal regulation.

The administrations of Kelantan and the eastern highlands operated along bureaucratic and rationalist lines that allowed for the opening of these regions to the international economy. Both introduced modern social, labour and economic relationships that were capitalist by virtue of their involvement in the world market. Colonial administration enabled their participation in complex commodity chains, which included the production of cash crops and the use of human labour. In the eastern highlands, the export of a single introduced product, rather than a diversified approach to economic development, was seen as the fastest way to abolish residual pre-modern social and labour relations. In Kelantan the romantic desire to protect the Malay from the ravages of economic development that had occurred in the western Malay peninsula meant that any economic development was restricted fairly much to the underpopulated interior

where the colonial state encouraged mining and plantation farming. The best way to extract an economic gain remained to encourage political and social stability through investment, the ultimate aim of which was to reduce the financial liability of the colonial state to the imperial power. The benefits of economic development — peace, the rule of law, certainty in land use, and the opportunity to create wealth under a stable and relatively safe political and economic environment — reinforced the colonial state's central position in people's lives. This was further intensified through perhaps the most visible part of colonial district administrations, the provision of health and education services. While the ultimate aim for both administrations reviewed in this study was to run a self-supporting administration, in neither case was this aim realised after a decade, and both regions cost more than either Britain or Australia gained from them.

The forms of administrative colonial rule were slightly different in both cases but still represent an adaptation of a similar tendency. In Kelantan the colonial state masked itself and its dominance behind an indigenous authority so as to not invite the responsibilities of direct rule.³² In Kelantan indirect rule operated through the villages and parishes that permitted society to be compartmentalised, studied and reconfigured under a bureaucracy. This had the dual benefit of proving historical continuity under the Sultan for those being ruled, and of coaxing the political elite to support the main social changes being directed by the British. Those who wished to preserve their positions were forced to adopt new allegiances but were in any case gradually marginalised from the exercise of any real power. Years later they were incorporated as part of the formation of an indigenous governing elite that could maintain the operations of the colonial state.

³² The initial idea had been to bring Kelantan into the FMS but this was later discarded. Official incorporation into that body was not required as administrative colonialism performed the same tasks.

The eastern highlands was a different story altogether. Indirect rule through a central figure was not possible as there was no single political grouping, let alone a single ruler, through which power could be wielded. Instead the administration needed to bring on side several dozen autochthonous political groupings, each of which had to be convinced to support the new regime of the colonial administration. The appointment of village officials (*luluais* and *tultuls*), as well as the use of Papua New Guineans as police, went some way toward creating links between the colonial state and the wider society. Such appointments created a group of people who worked with the colonial state rather, often partly for their own purposes, than against it. Yet the main weapon the administration held against a possible return to the dark days of pre-contract tribal warfare was economic advancement. The question of how to create a commercial peasantry from people the colonial administrators regarded as ‘stone age tribesmen’ occupied the minds of colonial ‘middle managers’ and other administration staff.

The eastern highlands was organised under the principle of Trusteeship that had as its ultimate end political independence, even if this was not imagined during the lifetimes of early administrators. Those introducing the administration and laying the foundations of the colonial state, and even the Australian Minister for Territories, felt that the road to independence would be long and that Trusteeship in Papua New Guinea involved building the capacity of the people to engage with the modern world on equal terms. This in turn required centralised state planning for social services and the development of commodity production as a viable factor in the local economy. In the eastern highlands the commodities developed were peanuts, fruits, vegetables and ultimately coffee which was seen as the potential saviour of the region. Coffee growing was

widely promoted as a path to economic development in partnership with the colonial power. In the spirit of responsible government the Australian administration did not impose taxation on the people of the highlands until political representation was established in the late 1950s.

The motto of ‘no taxation without representation’ held for New Guinea where the administration was aiming to foster democratic systems, but in Kelantan the British administration aimed to perpetuate the authority of the ruling dynasty as long as possible and thus had no interest in creating democratic institutions that would have been detrimental to their control.

Both of these districts are examples of a form of administrative colonialism that aimed to educate, inoculate and liberate the people under their administrations. They were not axiomatically exploitative and while they certainly aimed to make an eventual profit, this was not the entire *raison d’etre* of the colonial presence. And while it is tempting to view both administrations as benign, paternal and fundamentally different from previous forms of colonialism, the effects of the administrative systems they introduced were more effective and enmeshed people within colonial states within a shorter time frame. The imposition of colonial rule through governmentality achieved the objective of ordering and organising people through regulations rather than force. In implementing this new regulatory framework of control, colonial middle managers were mimicking the practices within their own states where the mode of domination had shifted from coercive discipline using troops, to the use of police forces to supplement a wider structural coercion of governmentality.

Administrative colonialism did have an agenda of reorganising societies toward integration in the emerging international economy. This was achieved along with the imposition of a type of European modernity. Yet in the two case studies the colonial middle managers did not attempt to make the world exactly like England or Australia and were content to create the main systems and organising principles which allowed capitalism to flourish. In both situations the governing authorities were prepared to accept that not everything about the society had to change, it was merely necessary to create a policy environment into which European capital, businesses and enterprises could flow. Consequently in Kelantan the power of Islam was sidelined but it was not extinguished; in New Guinea the moka pig feast was frowned upon as an example of gluttony, but it was not banned.

1.7 Colonial governance and modernity

This thesis argues that the societies under colonial rule gradually adapted themselves to the new conditions in their first decade of administration. The ruling regimes had a number of objectives. They were concerned with exploring and charting the geographical territory under their responsibility; they conducted censuses; they organised people to accept politically centralised rule; they implemented peace and outlawed breaches of it; they removed any threats to their political rule; and they adapted traditional social systems to the logic of market capitalism, incorporating the colonial district into the overall framework of the colonial state. Coercive force was used on occasion to remove or repel threats to rule and to demonstrate the power of the colonial state, but most of the pressure in administrative colonialism came from the new

rules, ordinances, legislative provisions and other instruments of controlling social behaviour that were created by the colonial middle managers.

The two case studies, one commencing just after the turn of the century and one just after the end of World War II, show that these increasingly sophisticated techniques of social control were being adapted into the logic of colonial governance. They entered a new international environment in which the entire colonial project was increasingly being brought into question. In an era where independence was conflated with becoming a modern nation, the interpretations of modernity itself, and how to arrive at that point, became the subject of practical revolution and academic debate.

Just as with colonialism, there are a number of debates about what modernity means and whether there is just one condition of modernity or several ‘modernities’.³³ This debate leads onto another, equally complex, about authenticity in culture, the reification of the traditional and the modern. Cultural authenticity is however as much of an academic construction as modernity, but while arguments about the authenticity of culture (‘the traditional’) convey the idea that pre-modern culture was somehow static, modernity allows for the definition and reconfiguration of ‘traditional’ culture — often for the cultural purposes of those who are being modernised, those having ‘development’ thrust upon them. In addition, exposure to modern techniques of government and new ways of understanding and conceptualising the world allow for the adoption and incorporation of new forms of political organisation, technology and commodities into what many anthropologists would like to believe was the ‘traditional’ and ‘authentic’ existence of a tribe or group. The creation of modernity through the imposition of

³³ See for Example A. Vickers, ‘Modernity and being *Moderen*, An Introduction’, in *Being Modern in Bali*, A. Vickers ed., Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph 43, pp. 1-37.

administrative colonialism is thus a cooperative enterprise that has a vital contribution from the colonised as they participate in the future shape of their own societies.

However, this thesis is not a view of ‘colonialism from below’ and my primary interest lies neither in the cooperation of some colonial peoples with these new regimes, nor with the forms or methods of resistance adopted by colonial people, but the effects of administrative colonialism on those ‘below’ are not irrelevant to this study. With respect to colonial resistance there is already a body of literature on this topic for Malaysia³⁴ and for Papua New Guinea³⁵ generally. With respect to the specific examples examined here there is some literature of resistance for Kelantan³⁶ and for the highlands region of New Guinea.³⁷ There are however few works that aim to get inside the administrative mentality to reveal the processes and structures behind the ordering and management of the administrative colonial district,³⁸ and certainly a comparison of these two districts over time and empires has not been attempted before. This particular comparison illuminates the sociology of colonial power at the district level using the concept of governmentality to show how structures and processes of administrative colonial rule,

³⁴ For Malaysia see for example D. Nonini, *Peasant Resistance, British Colonial Rule and the Resistance of the Malay Peasantry, 1900-1957*, Monograph Series 38, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, New Haven Connecticut, 1992, A. Milner, *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion of the Public Sphere*, CUP, Cambridge 1994, and J. C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985.

³⁵ P. Lawrence, *Road Belong Cargo: a study of the cargo movements in the southern Madang district New Guinea*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1964.

³⁶ For Kelantan see W. R. Roff, ed, *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, and C. S. Kessler, *Islam and Politics in a Malay State, Kelantan 1838-1969*, Cornell University Press, London, 1978.

³⁷ For the PNG highlands B. Connolly and R. Anderson, *First Contact: New Guinea's Highlanders Encounter the Outside World*, Viking, New York, 1987. The book is based on the remarkable film made by Connolly and Anderson *First Contact*, Ronin Films, 1982, and two sequels dealing with the coffee industry in the highlands, *Joe Leahy's Neighbours*, Ronin Films 1988, and *Black Harvest*, Film Australia 1992.

³⁸ One such work is R. Heussler, *Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY, 1963.

as well as the justifications for it, became increasingly sophisticated as the twentieth century developed.

The history of colonialism as it is presented here is thus far more complex than is generally assumed. There are a number of competing and often contradictory colonial systems and positions that need to be accommodated. There are various shades of grey between the black and white of colonial history: the notion that all colonialism was exploitative, profitable and cruel has been scrutinised and found wanting.³⁹ The idea that states benefited financially from the imposition of colonial rule simplifies the complex web of business transactions and reduces the colonial experience to a balance sheet. At a more abstract level the administrative colonial state created the conditions for the entry of capital into new regions and permitted them to operate. Any such profits may have been repatriated and so assisted the imperial state in an indirect manner. They may also have been invested in other colonial territories, rather than in the specific colony. Profit is therefore not the primary concern of the administrative colonial state: the creation of a policy environment that permits the conduct of commerce and allows for taxation is far more germane to the underlying drive toward financial self-sufficiency. Administrative colonialism combines the creation of this policy environment with ideas of progress, of moral development and with general principles of humanism. Such ideas may now be seen as cultural imperialism

³⁹ For a summary of some of the conflicting evidence see A. Porter, *European Imperialism 1860-1914*, Macmillan, London, 1994, pp. 38-49. Another study by M. Havinden, and D. Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies 1850-1960*, Routledge, London, 1993, indicates that profitability, where it occurred, was certainly not uniform. See especially 140-159 on the economics of Trusteeship. Havinden and Meredith use 'tropical' to mean those areas under colonial administration that were under the direct control of the Colonial Office. This includes colonies in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific but excludes parts of the empire such as India, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Sudan. 'Tropical' is therefore not entirely accurate or helpful but it serves to distinguish the non-self-governing territories from the self governing colonies and from those that are partly run by companies or have their own independent administrations. Their study focuses on the economies of these territories which were mainly exporters of agricultural commodities.

underpinned by racism, but at the time these administrations operated these ideas were the norm.

The question of racism in colonialism lies outside the scope of this thesis.⁴⁰ In one sense the entire colonial project was racist as it was predicated on the feeling of superiority of one's society and its use of cultural products over those of another society. As mastery of technology emerged as the criteria for social and educational development — in a schema constructed by those possessing the superior technology — the absence of advanced technology in any society placed the 'primitive' group at the bottom of a social order. None of the evidence presented in this thesis contradicts the widely held impression that colonialism was in part or whole a racist enterprise, and neither does it aim to do so. When the claims of the administrators are considered this is done to illuminate what they thought or reported to their superiors at the time. These musings have not been deconstructed to reveal the 'hidden' racism inherent in every colonial official as the writings speak for themselves.

Unlike the voices of the colonised, the voices of the administrators speak loud and clear. What they tell us in the two case studies presented is that two colonial administrations created regimes of law and governance for what they felt were in the best interests of the colonised. They further show that such regimes utilised a sophisticated mode of domination, copied from the societies of the colonisers, that relied on law and societal regulation to control the population. This does not mean that colonialism should be

⁴⁰ For analysis of racism in colonial rule see F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Macgibbon and Kee, Bungay, 1965, and *A Dying Colonialism*, Grove, New York, 1967; E. W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, Vintage, London, 1994 and *Orientalism*, *op. cit.*; A. Memmi, *Dominated Man*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1968 and *The Coloniser and the Colonised*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1967; and O. Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, [1947] 1990.

rehabilitated, or that the actions of colonial rulers should be exempted from historical judgement. Colonialism was not necessarily a positive, beneficial, socially transformative force in all parts of the world that came under European rule.

The findings do however mean that somewhere in the contested post-modern historiographical landscape of the twenty-first century there is room for the now unpopular notion of 'progress' when dealing with the past. Furthermore we should be able to evaluate the actions and regimes of colonial administrators according to their own standards and using their own measures of success. In these two case studies the weight of historical evidence would suggest that during the first decade of colonial rule the creation of structures of power that regulated society in essentially rationalist ways paved the way for a transition from pre-modernity to modernity with a minimum of force and with a great deal of state directed assistance. The unintended consequences of colonial middle management took much longer to work themselves out. Their legacy remains today with regions, and states, that are classified as developing, both of which are integrated within the world economy and play particular roles within it. They fulfil a peripheral role of agricultural production, and in hindsight they were never going to be able to do otherwise as industrial development was never seriously considered. Nonetheless they are integrated within the basic logic of capitalist production and function accordingly.

1.8 Comparative district analysis

This thesis concentrates on the similarities between two systems of governance, but there are a number of important differences between the case studies. Just prior to the implementation of administrative colonialism Kelantan was (in theory at least) under the rule of a single Raja. The communities of the eastern highlands were autochthonous. Linguistically the vast majority of the people of Kelantan spoke a common Malay language, and had done for centuries. The highlands communities did not share a common tongue until the introduction of *Tok Pisin* by the Australian administration in the 1930s. Land in Kelantan was in theory held by the Raja. In eastern highlands communities land ownership was patrilineal. Kelantan had means of settling disputes between individuals through non-violent means such as courts. Raiding and tribal fighting formed an important part of dispute settlement for eastern highlands peoples.

In terms of their knowledge of the world, Kelantan for centuries had been exposed to a variety of economic and cultural influences. Kelantan was regarded throughout the peninsula as a centre of Islamic learning. The eastern highlands peoples were isolated by geography, practised animism and ancestor worship. Kelantan was aware of the existence of large states through its relationship with Siam and later Britain. The world of the pre-contact eastern highlanders seldom went further than their own tribe's boundaries. Kelantan traded the commodities it produced to other Malay states and to Siam and had both more established markets and wider ranging trading base than the limited barter trading of the peoples of the highlands. Kelantan used minted coinage of several types where eastern highlanders measured value with shells traded up from the coast.

Finally, the attempts to integrate Kelantan and the eastern highlands into the colonial world were separated by two world wars and several decades. In that time the entire colonial project had become the subject of intense criticism and scrutiny under the laws of a new international agency, the United Nations. No organisation, other than the British parliament indirectly, told the British how to run Kelantan. Australian rule in Papua New Guinea was monitored and criticised: any action taken was scrutinised and was required to be explained.

The result was a differing style in the establishment and creation of organisational bureaucracies for controlling the peoples of Kelantan and the eastern highlands. From the beginning of administrative colonialism in Kelantan a strategy was adopted that aimed to create a legal framework backed by a small functional bureaucracy and a police force that worked to support indirect rule through the apprehension of those who departed from the logic of the new system. In contrast, the eastern highlands peoples witnessed the rapid transformation of Australian administration from a virtual police state to a negotiated truce. First contact sometimes resulted in death for highlanders, but once the safety of patrol officers and highlanders alike was assured, and this had been largely achieved by the early 1950s, the police state became an embryonic bureaucracy with health and agricultural services. The function of police then changed from one of enforcing peace to one of monitoring breaches of the peace.

Despite these differences this thesis centres on the similarities between the models and is comparative, but the type of comparisons is a little unusual. It is first of all a comparison of two regions that were subjected to administrative colonial rule during the

twentieth century. Second, it is a comparison of the district level of colonial operations, the intermediate level of administration where colonial policy became colonial practice - the engine room of day-to-day colonialism. Third it compares British and Australian colonial administrations and lastly it compares these two regions in different periods of historical development, Kelantan in 1909-1919 with the Eastern Highlands in 1947-1957. All of these comparisons require some explanation and contain some caveats.

While neither Kelantan nor Papua New Guinea were formal colonies, both represent intermediate levels of colonial administration which took their orders from colonial centres. As the intermediate level of colonial rule, both were then colonial 'districts' in an organisational sense. Kelantan was one part of British Malaya in as much as Selangor or Kedah and can be understood as other parts of this constructed polity. In the Australian Trust Territory of New Guinea, the eastern highlands was one of nine recognised districts, each with a geographic limit and organisation structure.⁴¹ Both cases can be considered colonial districts as they had independent administrations, they answered to the imperial capital and reported to Singapore and Port Moresby respectively while within themselves there were geographic subdivisions. Both are thus examples of what this thesis argues is colonial 'middle management'. By using two 'districts' within areas that were not formally colonies, this thesis shows that the legal classification of dependent territories into colonies, protected states, mandates, trust territories and condominiums, was irrelevant as all underwent structural changes under the logic of administrative colonialism. The main difference between the classifications concerned the rights of colonial subjects to immigrate upon decolonisation but they were by that stage all involved in a system of global capitalist wage relations.

⁴¹ See map of Degree of Administration Control in New Guinea between Chapters 7 and 8.

To compare the British and Australian empires as examples of European colonial power one must accept that Australia was both a European and an imperial power. While the case for Britain is clear, Australia's empire is sometimes seen as a subset of the British empire. Given the way in which Australians regarded themselves as British in all of the censuses of the period under consideration, and the fact that they basically followed the British techniques of administrative colonialism, there is a strong case for claiming the Australia of the mid-twentieth century as a European nation. Australia had been a self-governing Commonwealth since 1901 and Australia's empire, although small, was managed quite separately from Britain's. The two powers differed in their management of colonial territories. Australia's empire was not extensive but it was administered independently and enthusiastically. This selection was mainly determined by the limits of what was possible to achieve in a study conducted from Australia that concerns patterns of rule in the Asia Pacific in the twentieth century — a factor of funding — without a working knowledge of Japanese, Dutch or French.

The non-horological comparison is used to view the first decade of alien rule. This is done in order to identify what similarities and differences existed in the methods of rule and the systems, structures and techniques developed to control people. A comparison of the two regions at the same time was not possible as the eastern highlands were not 'discovered' until the early 1930s and the whole highlands region was not gazetted as a separate district until 1947.⁴² Even so, the examination of different decades shows the

⁴²Even then the size of the area proved too great and it was broken up into the Eastern, Western and Southern Highlands Districts in 1951. Prior to the partition of the central highlands the majority of administration activity was confined to the eastern and western highlands and to provide continuity with the post-1951 period this study has focused on those parts of the Central Highlands District that became the Eastern Highlands District.

development of the need to justify all colonial action to international authorities. After World War II the actions of colonial administrators were subject to international standards of decent humane treatment and reviewed in a way that those of the British in Malaya were not. The geo-political map of the world was evolving, and the treatment of people in dependent territories was meant to evolve with it. Independence was envisaged as the end point of colonial control in post-war Papua New Guinea, but this had never been the rationale for Kelantan. What difference, if any, had this had on the operations of the colonial district? The examples of administrative colonial regimes from a secure empire free from external scrutiny and a minor empire subjected to scrutiny periodically give an insight into the operations of this sophisticated, and publicly acceptable, face of colonialism in the twentieth century.

1.9 Thesis structure

Before the case studies are introduced and the comparison of administrative colonialism over district, empire and time is undertaken, a review of conventional theories of colonialism is attempted in the following chapter in order to situate both administrative colonialism and the approach adopted to its study in this thesis, into the vast historiography of colonialism and imperialism. As the following chapter shows there are basically four schools of thought with differing explanations as to the operative concept and driving force behind the restructuring of the world in Europe's image. These are broadly ascribed to economic, accidental, political and cultural explanations, and while all of these make contributions to the debates on colonialism, none of them takes the perspective of power relations that are advanced in this work and all focus mainly on the late imperial surge from 1870 as characterising the entire history of

colonialism. The novelty of this thesis is its concentration on relatively late examples that investigate how a colonial state is structured in an era where liberal values encourage the humane treatment of the colonised.

The third chapter presents the first case study of Kelantan and provides historical background on the social and administrative framework of the 'traditional' state in Kelantan. It then traces the history of Siamese and British efforts to exert power and control over Kelantan up to 1902, including Siamese historical claims to Kelantan and British interest in the Northern Malay states. It details the preliminary interest of the Duff Development Company, an enterprise that was to have a major impact on Kelantan's political and economic development. Lastly it makes some observations on the internal restructuring of Siam and its dependencies as a response to British and French power in Southeast Asia showing that the notion of administrative colonialism could be exercised by non-European powers as well as European ones and that it was the systems, rather than the nationality of the rulers, that were critical to the drive toward modernity in Siam and its dependencies.

The fourth chapter deals with the period of intensive Siamese Administration in Kelantan between 1903-1909 showing that the governmentality developed was not dependent on European rule. It documents the reformation of the law courts and the creation of a small but efficient state administration, as well as the moves to break down entrenched privilege and traditional links between people and the aristocracy and to replace them with links between people and the colonial state. Of particular note is the strained relationship and arguments between the Duff Company, the largest commercial interest in the state, and the State government of Kelantan, with the latter attempting to

assert its authority and bring the former under more direct control. The main focus of this chapter is on the changes introduced to Kelantan's administration by the Siamese Adviser before the British assumed responsibility for the state. His methods of administration are an example of rational approaches to problems and of finding scientific solutions through study and learning. The Siamese Adviser, Mr Graham, was himself British, so it is no accident that even while working for the King of Siam the administrative methods he introduced were reflective of the hegemonic status of ideas of good government. This process was used by Siam internally and its application in Kelantan was both a way to shore up relations with what it considered to be its tributary state, and an attempt to stave off accusations of mismanagement that could invite European interference in Siamese domestic and foreign policy. These efforts were ultimately unsuccessful and Kelantan was ceded to Britain, along with the other Siamese Malay states in 1909.

The fifth and sixth chapters deal with Kelantan in its first decade under British rule and are treated chronologically. Chapter five covers the first five years from 1909-1913 and examines the administrations of the three main British Advisors, Messrs Mason, Bishop and Langham-Carter. It details the large-scale reorganisation of labour requirements that led to the importation of Indian labour for service on plantations. It analyses the colonial administration in terms of imperial connections, the administration of the state bureaucracy, the imposition of systems of rule, including the police, courts and justice, and the commencement of serious attempts to provide services in education and health.

Chapter six covers the second five year period of 1914-1919 during which time the administrative colonial state in Kelantan, under Messrs Langham-Carter, Farrer and

Thompson, made extensive moves to curtail any semblance of independence that the indigenous leadership in Kelantan may have felt it had retained. The British administration in this period shifted the basis of state revenue from tax on selected produce to tax on land and in doing so provided the administrative colonial bureaucracy with a predictable annual income. Of particular note in this chapter is the entrenchment and expansion of the colonial administration, the creation of an export economy and the response of the colonial state to a local revolt that briefly threatened its primacy. The treatment of the *Toh Janguut* revolt also shows the limits to the capacity of the early administrative colonial state to operate with restraint within the framework of its own logic of governmentality.

Together chapters five and six outline the structure of the British colonial state in Kelantan, the extent of its geographic operations and the significance of the changes in land policy that were introduced. They argue that British administrative colonialism in Kelantan created and developed techniques of social control which aimed to position the colonial state in the lives of people, but which in return advanced state services in health and education. By the end of the first decade of British administrative colonialism, resistance had been effectively eliminated and the colonial state had acquired legitimacy and operated with the consent of the governed. While there was an attempt to make the administration of the colonial state more self reliant, the financial burden for the preservation of British rule in Kelantan lay mostly with British colonial interests in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur and was only partly subsidised by the Kelantanese.

Chapters seven to ten deal with Australia and its relationship with Papua New Guinea. Chapter seven examines the historical development of the Australian presence in Papua

and New Guinea during the twentieth century in the context of the emerging international trend towards decolonisation. It outlines some of the key features of indigenous political and social relations in the eastern highlands, the discovery of the area by Europeans and early Australian attempts to impose the *Pax Australiana*. It then goes on to assess Australian colonial policy in Papua New Guinea, specifically the notion of partnership developed as a rationale for the Australian presence.

Chapter eight deals with administrative colonialism in the eastern highlands region of New Guinea in the periods 1947-51 and chapters nine and ten with the period 1952-57. These chapters explore the tensions between the policy desires of the metropolitan power and the methods of implementing policy adopted by district officials. They concentrate in particular on the establishment of peace, the provision of services, the growth of state surveillance, the development of an economy orientated toward cash crops and exports, and the use of labour.

These chapters argue that by the end of the first ten years of consistent and concerted administration the people of the eastern highlands were by no means modern. They were however a long way from the conditions of endemic warfare that had prevailed in the 1930s, enjoyed on the whole better health, and had expanded economic and social opportunities. Their needs were recognised by a government that was paternal, that regulated the interests of private capital and that made rules governing the employment of labour. The Australian administration promoted new crops to generate economic activity and wealth, and even purchased commodities for domestic and international consumption in an effort to stimulate the supply side of an emerging market economy. Again, while the Australian administration was keen to make the administration

function efficiently, there were few direct economic benefits to the Australian colonial state and the presence of colonial administration was supported totally by the Australian taxpayer until the introduction of taxation and local government which occurred after the period examined.

The final chapter compares the modernising administrations of Kelantan and the eastern highlands, identifying a number of similarities in patterns of rule and the structures of power that were established. It argues that the desire of the imperial state to try to minimise the expense of governing dependent territories worked in tandem with the introduction of modern rational methods of administration that aimed to produce what was termed 'good government'. This was the end product of an evolution that continues to this day in the form of United Nations intervention in collapsing states and in the restructuring of the national economies according to the Washington consensus of the International Monetary Fund.

Administrative colonialism operated in a climate of governmentality and was informed by the constant accumulation of information. While administrative colonialism aimed not to be physically coercive, limits were placed on opportunities for resistance by imposing systems of law and bureaucratic management; land and labour increasingly became commodities that could be traded and used in the new economic system. While neither society was fully modern after just ten years of administrative colonialism the path toward full modernisation was clearly marked. The resonances of colonial society, and the legacy of the colonial 'middle managers' of Kelantan and the eastern highlands, continue in the developing world today.

Chapter 2: Some approaches to colonialism

In the vast historiography of colonialism and imperialism there are basically four schools of thought with differing explanations as to the operative concept and driving force behind the restructuring of the world in Europe's image. This chapter briefly outlines the main arguments of these four schools in a summary that is by its nature selective and is not meant to be comprehensive. It aims rather to demonstrate that each has a focus of inquiry that delineates what are core explanations of why colonialism happened. They do not however throw much light on how colonialism was conducted as an exercise in social control. Each therefore makes its contribution to the debates on colonial rule and all provide insights into the relationship of the governed to the governing. For the purpose of this thesis however, these sometimes-conflicting explanations can be used eclectically through the four ideal types that allow for economic, sociological, geo-political and cultural motivations to exist alongside a focus on the legal frameworks of structured coercion present in administrative colonialism to provide a mechanism for studying administrative colonial power.

2.1 Capitalism drives colonialism

The relationship of productive relations to colonialism is the major operative concept of Marxist theorists, as well as some influential liberal writers. As an economic system, capitalism relies upon the sale of commodities for more than the cost of production. While this is not in itself revolutionary the key difference between capitalism and previous economic activities was the reinvestment of the surplus (as profit, rent and

interest) in industrial enterprises. Where Marx identified capitalism as coming about contemporaneously with the industrial revolution, Wallerstein, following Braudel, dates its origins as early as the mid fifteenth century.¹ Following this argument, Wallerstein charts the development of the Modern World System (a capitalist system of production) that leads to regions in Europe (usually contiguous with emerging states) seeking wealth overseas.² While there is a dispute about the precise point where capitalism begins, the key feature of both neo-Marxist and earlier Marxist works is the claim that without expanded production, capitalism cannot survive: capitalism requires new wealth, commodities, talent and markets. To be confined is to stagnate which will lead to economic downturn, probable war and the death of the political beliefs and systems that have grown up to provide the institutional support for capitalism — liberalism, parliamentary government and a modicum of rules governing the ‘free’ market to perpetuate the creation of wealth.

Marxists argue the structural dialectic of capitalism — the requirement to produce commodities at a lower price than that at which they are to be sold — necessitates the exploitation of labour. The main effects of this process are the enslavement of humans to capital and the opening of new areas of the world either for selling mass produced

¹ I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, Vols I-III, Academic Press, New York, 1974-1989.

² The core of the Modern World System can shift between states and can be split between regions, just as in the late twentieth century where the USA, Europe and to an extent East Asia (Japan) shared the core of the capitalist economic system after a period of American hegemony after WWII. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Portugal tried but failed to acquire leadership over an emerging capitalist world economy, and so too Spain under Charles V was foiled in its attempts to assert its power in Europe through military means. The Netherlands adopted a merchant capitalist strategy and provides the first core and economic superpower of the Modern World System during the seventeenth century. Great Britain emerges from the industrial revolution and Napoleonic Wars as the hegemonic world power during the nineteenth century.

industrial manufactures or for sourcing cheap raw materials used in the construction of industrial products.

On the liberal side, John Hobson felt that capitalism in itself was acceptable but its expansion was leading to Imperialism, a situation in which the systems governing capitalism, the freedoms that had arisen in England to support the capitalist way of life, were not promoted in areas to which capital flow and investment was occurring.³ He also argued that it was not in fact necessary to expand capitalism to alleviate the social concerns created by a lack of investment in Great Britain. Hobson argued that rather than seek new markets workers should be paid more so they could purchase more goods.⁴ Hobson claimed that a small group of wealthy capitalists had manipulated public opinion to convince the majority of people that imperialism was a beneficial concept: by using the press the capitalist class were able to win over the masses through jingoistic appeals to nationalism and Hobson thus tied in socio-political and economic ideas in his theory of imperialism.

Hobson's work influenced Lenin's *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, which has some key points about the relationship of capitalism to territorial acquisition.⁵ For Lenin it was not so much that capitalism in and of itself produced a need to extend to new markets but more the way in which competitive capitalism had been altered by cartels and trusts to bring about a stage of monopoly capitalism. These

³ J. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, 3rd edition, Unwin Hyman, London, [1902], 1988.

⁴ W. J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980, p 16. Such a solution to under-consumption regarded a national economy as a single system and something that could be manipulated by state regulation.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1975. It also contained frequent diversions attacking Karl Kautsky for his "petty bourgeois" tendencies.

monopolies were increasingly controlled by banks, hence 'finance capital'. The monopoly element of capitalism was denying competition in Europe and this in turn caused price fixing and anti-competitive behaviour amongst financiers. One solution was to divide the world's resources so as to give monopoly capitalism a new lease of life, a situation that Lenin felt had led to the Great War, a war fought between capitalist powers for control of markets.

As a Marxist and a historical determinist, Lenin believed that the internal contradictions of the capitalist system would inevitably bring about its decline. He argued that the transformation of the capitalist system from competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism coincided and caused the increased interest in territorial acquisition.⁶ Finance capital found profit extraction easier in countries where formal European political control had been established, but Lenin nonetheless argued that countries not under the control of European powers, such as Persia, China, Turkey and Argentina were also subject to the exploitative nature of finance capital.⁷ Capitalism was thus able to expand by means of economic penetration backed up by political support, capital export, forcible annexation, and imperialist war. One corollary of this was colonialism.

Rosa Luxembourgh attempted to supplement Marx's theory of modern capitalist development and to provide a general theory of imperialism.⁸ She was the first to

⁶ This expansionism chiefly occurred during the 1860s to 1900 in the case of Britain and France, and during the 1880s and 1890s in the case of Germany, *ibid.*, p. 91. Lenin's table on colonial possessions shows the extent of European territorial extension for the dates 1860, 1880 and 1899 in hundred thousand square miles: Britain 2.5, 7.7, and 9.3; France 0.2, 0.7, and 3.7; and Germany 0, 0, and 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94 and pp. 101-102.

⁸ W. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism, op. cit.*, p. 40.

concentrate on the role of the colonies rather than the metropolis (the European centre) in imperialism and came to the conclusion that capitalism could only survive if it kept expanding. She argued for the eventual demise of the capitalist system once the free territories (those with non-capitalist social organisation) had been incorporated and had reached the final limit of their development. Luxemburg proposed that this period of colonial expansion would be characterised by violent conflict between the capitalists of the industrialised world for the control of resources. Luxemburg linked the exploitation of colonial peoples with the exploitation of the domestic labour force in Europe and drew attention to the part played by militarism in the stockpiling of armaments (often financed by indirect taxation) as a subsidiary means of capital accumulation. She argued that capital employed militarism to secure control of areas and to divert purchasing power from the non-capitalist strata.⁹ Luxemburg saw imperialism as a new phase of capitalism which was in essence self-destructive but which provided the necessary platform of capitalist domination of the world through colonies, from which socialist revolution could follow. The role she attributed to the dependent territories in the process of raising global consciousness of the inequality inherent in the colonial economic order was important for later Marxist historians.

The common thread running through these early liberal, Marxist neo-Marxist writings and the later works of the dependency school is that capitalism is inherently expansionist and that its main effect was to direct wealth from non-European colonies and territories toward Europe. Andre Gunder Frank argued that not only had such a

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-45.

situation occurred in history but that it continued to occur.¹⁰ This linkage of colonial history with contemporary economic conditions led to a theory of the underdevelopment of the Third World. Central to their perspective was the rebuttal of modernisation theory and the ‘stages of growth’ model¹¹ advocated by Walt Rostow and others of the Chicago School of Economics. Modernisation theory viewed development as an achievable goal for all and argued that the lack of development in the Third World was caused by outdated labour practices and an inability to adapt to modern capitalist forms of production: ‘tradition’ was seen as an impediment to a ‘take-off’ into modernisation. This argument was advanced widely during the post-war decades, and its central thesis of the capitalist mode of production leading to economic development was attacked by dependency theorists as neglecting the historical links of economic extraction between the developed and the developing world, the very links that dependency theory argued kept the later in a state of underdevelopment.

The juxtaposition of Western economic development with the lack of economic development elsewhere concentrated on economic transfer, the shift of wealth from territories and colonies to Europe. It was, however, an essentially static model of state relations that was unable to accommodate the economic growth and rise to prosperity of former colonies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea or Taiwan. The metropolis-satellite model locked areas of the world in perpetuity into the metropolis or the satellites. In the face of the inability of other Third World states to achieve ‘self-

¹⁰ See for example Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969.

¹¹ For a review of Rostow’s theory see Tamás Szentes, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1971, pp. 86-99.

sustaining growth', socialist revolution was not surprisingly seen as the only solution, particularly for Latin America.¹²

Dependency theory linked European states, imperial activity, colonialism and the failure of political independence to bring about meaningful change. In the 1970s dependency and underdevelopment were joined by neo-colonialism as ways of understanding the economic and political situations of newly independent states, the last of these describing the continuance of economic and political domination in formerly colonial, but now self-governing and independent, territories. Capitalism therefore continues to play its exploitative role in developing societies as it constantly searches for new markets, commodities and opportunities for investment, but now without direct political control.

2.2 *Colonial expansion as accidental*

The claim that capitalism drove imperial expansion and colonialism has been disputed by writers who argue there was no coherent logic over time to account for expansion, empire, colonialism, or the actions of colonisers. Two writers who expound this view are Joseph Schumpeter and David Fieldhouse who have argued that colonialism is more a mixture of politics and human nature.

¹² This failure to account for potential shifts in the relative economic positions of states automatically placed countries still controlling colonies in the metropolis, even though, as in the case of Portugal up to the 1970s, they were economically underdeveloped backwaters themselves in relation to the rest of Europe and the developed world.

Joseph Schumpeter's essay *The Sociology of Imperialisms* (1919) was a rebuttal of Marxist theories. His theory derived in part from Max Weber's work (discussed below) on the sociology of organisations and the structures of European states, but also incorporated elements of the Marxists Rudolph Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg while it aimed to present a counter argument to them.¹³ His historical scope stretched from the third millennium BCE to the early twentieth century and viewed imperialism not as a product of capitalism but rather a form of atavism in the capitalist age — a survival from pre-industrial epochs and political structures of a primitive desire to dominate others. He defined imperialism as “the objectless disposition of the part of the state to unlimited forcible expansion”,¹⁴ that is, the left over but somewhat refined warlike passions of the ruling classes. As such imperialism is associated with social rewards, state building and nationalism.

For Schumpeter imperial actions were due mainly to political and social causes and were based on a somewhat primitive desire for conquest. It was thus an irrational action inclined toward war and conquest that was due to the survival of political structures from the era of absolutism. Capitalism was a direct contrast to imperialism in that it represented the possibility of a new social age of pacificity and reward for labour. Capitalism was “by nature anti-imperialist” and Schumpeter felt the territorial expansion that was occurring came from forces outside of capitalism and was supported by factors outside of modern life.¹⁵

¹³ W. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism, op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁴ J. Schumpeter, cited in *ibid.* p. 22.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 23. Schumpeter argued that imperialism was not therefore what Lenin termed the “highest stage of capitalism” and not the logical corollary of capitalism, however under monopoly capitalism imperialist ideas might find fertile ground.

David Fieldhouse also takes issue with the notion that capitalism drove colonialism and has identified religious motives, national prestige and geo-political strategy as factors that contributed to the inchoate collection of territories that was called empire. Sociological explanations argue that capitalist pressures are but one motive for expansion, and while they do not disregard it completely, and see it as occasionally important and often critical, it is by no means the only motive. There is rather a variety of possible motives and explanations for imperial expansion: colonialism was a slow and uncoordinated development of administrative systems established to deal with new territories.

Fieldhouse generally regards imperialism as “the tendency of one society or state to control another, by whatever means and for whatever purpose”.¹⁶ He argues that the distinctive feature of colonisation, as distinct from colonialism, was that it was a permanent movement of people very much in the ancient Greek concept of a separate settlement with cultural continuity. Colonisation was special as “...immigrants attempted to establish societies as close as possible to that which was left behind: they were not primarily concerned with the indigenous peoples they found overseas”.¹⁷

Fieldhouse claims there were four main reasons why colonies or protectorates were claimed in the period before 1914: for their value as strategic bases; to deny the territory to another power; as pawns in European power politics; and for national

¹⁶ D. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870-1945: An Introduction*, Macmillan, London, p. 1.

pride.¹⁸ He argues complete territorial control was not necessary for these aims to be realised if this was all that Europeans desired. Limited trade was possible in many areas and the protection of the metropolitan power was not strictly necessary. But if the economic desire to trade further than just the coast played some part in annexation, then the needs for the domestic security of capital investments, such as railroads or mines, required a more effective control over land and domestic politics. As a result the administrative systems expanded from coastal areas to include whole regions.¹⁹

But the question remains as to why the majority of the areas that constituted the modern colonial empires were never extensively developed. Why did Europeans push ahead with establishing political control in such regions? Fieldhouse contends that firstly European governments were unwilling to bear the cost of a colony for any more than an initial period. The indigenes had to be taxed in order to pay for the administration: if they resisted then more effective control was required. Secondly the need to safeguard frontiers provided the administration with an excuse to assert full control within the colony. Thirdly the individuals involved in the administration — the ‘men on the spot’ — sought promotion through the establishment of well-run colonies. Lastly there was the moral obligation of the civilising mission that sought to bring native peoples out of their pagan practices and primitive existence and show them the spiritual and material benefits of modern Christian society.²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. The white self-governing dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were therefore colonised in a fundamentally different way to other territories that came under imperial control, in that they were settled deliberately.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23. Kipling’s poem describing the process of this moral imperative ‘The White Man’s Burden’, speaks of self-sacrifice and honour for the children of darkness, but is laced with irony and a sense of colonial decline.

Fieldhouse believes that colonialism was an irrational drive for world domination based on haphazard development and the idea of occupy first, administer later, that evolved directly from imperialism. A tendency toward controlling others led to a system that came to encompass the world and Fieldhouse asserts that the New Imperialism from 1870 was primarily a reflection of growing tensions in Europe and state rivalry that emerged with a unified Germany threatening the balance of power. As the systems of governance evolved, the costs of administration became greater and provide one reason for the withdrawal from empire.

Empire and national pride were complementary. Psychologically Empire came to represent something vitally important for the peoples of Europe and giving it up was consequently unthinkable, whether or not a colony was making a profit. The colony was perhaps not so important for the economy of the given European state, but absolutely vital for its understanding of its place in the world. Germany's drive for colonies in the 1880s is an example of this 'atavistic' colonialism.

Far from being able to be explained by economic or financial interests, the 'accidental' school argues that imperialism is distinctly illogical and grew from European preoccupations with European problems. Schumpeter argues for pre-modern desire for conquest, Fieldhouse for a mixture of serendipity and geo-politics. Both regard colonialism as an irrational and above all a sociological and psychological phenomenon with roots in prestige and national security. While the 'accidental' explanations do not neglect economics they argue that to view colonialism as either totally inconsistent with economic development (i.e. dependency theory) or to view it as the best approach

to stimulating economic growth (i.e. modernisation theory), is to see colonialism as both historically consistent and coherent in its implementation of control. As Fieldhouse notes, “Colonialism was not sufficiently consistent over time to justify any such sweeping assertions, nor were its objectives sufficiently coherent to achieve any particular result”.²¹

2.3 *Colonialism as state rivalry for territorial control*

Writers who view colonialism as a competition for territorial control between European states have a weight of historical evidence to support their claims. European power rivalries have dominated interstate and international relations over the past five hundred years. All such theories however rely on a notion of state interest based on realist conceptions of power politics. This builds on the work of Thomas Hobbes, whose *Leviathan* viewed the forerunners to civil society as a brutish arena of competition among men. The emergence of the Commonwealth (the state) allowed for the subordination of the self-interested parts of human nature to the power of the state, a change reflected in the creation of systems of law and the maintenance of societal order. The projection of power beyond state boundaries is pursued for reasons of collective (national) interest and each state claims a sovereign right to act as it does, just as it feels itself to be the only legitimate representative of its people and its interests.²²

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

²² T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Collins, London 1962. See also Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th edition, Knopf, New York, 1985.

In the realist conception of international relations states require defined geographic areas and within their boundaries make laws for the maintenance of order: their primary objective is to provide security for their citizens.²³ Thus states are ordered societies governed by the rule of law, outside of which exist other states or anarchy — — areas of the world that do not have established states that exist in chaos.²⁴ While an explanation for political expansion and colonialism based on the political dynamics of European states does not effectively distinguish between the activities of private entrepreneurial capital and the political activities of states, the notion that colonialism is a function of competition between states has much to offer and is borne out by history.

With the treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, Portugal had a Papal Bull to take all lands from a point 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, while Spain was entitled to claim lands past that point. European expansionist efforts during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were mainly restricted to Portugal and Spain. The Iberian empires in America

²³ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971. *The Prince* is a classic of renaissance politics, and is widely regarded as being a handbook for realist politics which argues for swift decisive action to ensure the survival of the state, Machiavelli's primary concern at the time of writing. Machiavelli argued for a view of morality of politically motivated acts, including murder, which depended upon their effectiveness in maintaining state power. Machiavelli felt an act could not be judged as good or evil merely by the intrinsic nature of the act; it should rather be judged by the result of the act, and whether or not it fulfilled the intention of the actor. If the act was murder and murder eliminated a threat to the security of the state (i.e. its political frontiers or the well-being of its citizens or its ruler) then the act was necessary, and justifiable, if not always desirable. The notion of justifiable rational self-interest, raised by Machiavelli in the context of the use to which the power of the state is put, involves the projection of common interests, the security of the state and the place of ethical behaviour and action in the relations of states with other nations. Although discussion in foreign policy circles today may be more sophisticated, the substantive issues have changed little since the days of Machiavelli.

²⁴ International relations underwent similar processes during the 20th century with first the League of Nations and then the United Nations. A modern variant of administrative colonialism is 'internationally administrative colonialism' orchestrated by the United Nations where instead of armies, peacekeeping forces are put in place; instead of colonial governments there are orchestrated multi-party/multi-ethnic power sharing arrangements; instead of colonial bureaucracies there are foreign experts who draft

were created through state rivalry and the spheres of competition extended to the Indian and Pacific oceans. The challenge for dominance in Europe both of trade and territory was a political and military battle: Charles V attempted to assert Spanish hegemony over the Holy Roman Empire but became bogged down in military campaigns and went bankrupt.

The assertion of national interest overseas was then joined by the Dutch who challenged the Portuguese in Brazil and the Indian Ocean, and English rivalry with Spanish interests in the Caribbean and with Portuguese and Dutch interests in the Indian Ocean. The main rivalry of the eighteenth century was between the English and the French and war on three continents (Europe, America, Asia) came about as part of the war of the Austrian succession. Later competition between these dominant European powers spread to the Pacific and was not resolved in England's favour until the end of the Napoleonic wars. A French resurgence in the mid-nineteenth century led to their expansion into Indochina and in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the rising power of Germany, and its challenge to France and Britain, led to the partition of Africa, which also included Portugal, Spain, and Belgium. In the late nineteenth century in the Pacific the imperial power of England was met head on by the expansionist 'anti-imperialism' of the United States of America whose commitment to fostering independent states led to US domination in the Philippines and Samoa.

constitutions, create judicial and other institutions and 'create' a fledgling state that operates along lines familiar to liberal capitalist democracy and which welcomes investment.

By 1914, European states controlled much of the earth's land territory and most of Africa, Asia and the Pacific islands were part of European empires.²⁵ The rivalry component of Fieldhouse's argument owes a large debt to Max Weber's writings on prestige as a factor in imperial expansion and his analysis of the basis of state power. Weber's conception of modern administration and bureaucracy is important in understanding the rationale of colonial activity at the turn of the century.²⁶

Weber's explanation of power is complex but draws essentially on the ability of a state to use force against another state or people. He notes that for reasons of power dynamics, great powers are not always orientated toward expansion and cites the example of the little Englanders' reliance on the economic primacy of British manufacturing to assure their place in the world, even if it meant giving up its colonies.²⁷ The nexus between trade and expansion, according to Weber, relies on the struggle for primacy of different interest groups within states. In the early twentieth century Weber observed that Germany was dominated by what he called 'imperialist capitalism': the state was being run by tax-farmers, state creditors, suppliers to the state, overseas traders privileged by the state and colonial capitalists. As Weber noted "The profit opportunities of all these groups rest upon the direct exploitation of executive powers, that is, of political power directed towards expansion".²⁸

²⁵ D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd edition, Macmillan, London, 1986, p. 373, claims 84.6 percent of the world's territories were either colonies or ex-colonies in the 1930s. For the purpose of this thesis a European power is a state that is culturally Western, and would include the USA, Australia and New Zealand.

²⁶ See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford University Press, New York, [1946] reprinted 1969, pp. 196-240.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.161.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p 167.

Weber conceptualised expansion into its pacifist tendency (that which desires free trade) and the imperialist tendency (that which desires monopoly conditions which provide the greatest profit) but felt that imperialist capitalism had won the day.

The universal revival of imperialist capitalism, which has always been the normal form in which capitalist interests have influenced politics, and the revival of political drives for expansion are thus not accidental. For the predictable future, the prognosis will have to be made in their favour.²⁹

While there is commonality about the role of European political concerns in causing colonialism, Weber differs from Fieldhouse by insisting that expansion was not accidental. For Weber imperialism and colonialism were complex extrapolations of European state politics, both internal and external, which involved economic issues but were not totally dominated by them: economics was but one part of the colonial/imperial question. Other factors included culture, the political community, the creation of emotive arguments advanced through the media to encourage nationalism and national prestige. Both Weber and Hobson identified the political role of jingoism in creating legitimacy for imperialism. Weber however ascribed an historical role to it, arguing that legitimacy for state action is sanctioned by the support of the masses for imperial expansion, a function in part of a perceived community responsibility to provide wealth and prospects for succeeding generations.³⁰ By coopting the masses, or at least demonstrating the possible benefits of expansion, states are able to legitimise their actions at home and create a willing workforce for colonial administration through

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-2.

professional training and management. A bureaucracy results which is governed by rules and laws, operates in a defined area and has a division of responsibility, keeps records and files, and develops career structures within a salaried civil service.³¹ It is exactly this type of colonial state activity that is characteristic of administrative colonialism in the twentieth century. Thus for Weber, colonialism is essential for the creation of European modernity.

The extension of national sovereignty over colonies also extended the influence of the ruling class of a state. The expansionist state was likely to grant monopoly concessions to those industrialists who could be relied upon to support imperialism. The armaments industries in particular were a key supporter of imperial governments. For Weber this was not due to something innate or intrinsic in capitalism but to a deviant form of 'predatory capitalism'. He also noted the interest that the intelligentsia had in seeing their national culture increased, and a broadened ambit for culture tied in neatly with the nationalist drive for empire and imperial expansion. Weber's writings thus provide a multi-tiered look at the way in which power operated in states and empires, but he still argued that at the root of colonialism was a struggle between states of Europe for power, territory and resources.

2.4 *Colonialism as cultural capital*

Lastly, colonialism has been viewed as an accumulation of cultural capital. This is something of a catch-all category for a diverse body of theory covering literature,

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 196-204.

representation, post-colonial writing and analyses of power. Such writers concentrate on the role of culture in the imperial process, which to some extent expands Weber's notion of bourgeois leadership of the state's imperial drive. Cultural explanations frequently concern themselves with power through representation, the mental image of the ruled and the ruler that is described, drawn and institutionalised through government, education and popular writing. Such literature is useful firstly as it provides an insight into the mental image of the colonised from the perspective of the coloniser, and secondly as the literature itself forms part of the discourse of European power that reinforces the images of 'the Other' and thus provides justification for colonial occupation through the civilising mission.

Images of non-Europeans as primitive, lazy, childish and immature has its roots in Hegel's master/slave dialectic which are developed into psychological explanation for why people act in particular ways in colonial situations. Why for example is it permissible to beat a native rubber tapper or a servant when such violence against a fellow European would be unthinkable? The behaviour of colonial Europeans is a by-product of the institutionalisation and regimentation of their own societies.

As Foucault³² and Said³³ have shown, such structures are not in fact neutral, but are imbued with meaning and assist in the perpetuation of images of 'the Other' through the construction of discourses of knowledge. The symbiosis between culture and imperial power is complex and has redefined the analysis of imperialism and

³² M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, [C. Gordon ed.] Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1980, pp. 109-133.

³³ E. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*, Penguin, London, 1991, pp. 111-197. Said argues that European perceptions of superiority over foreign peoples were mainly due to the self-reinforcing discourses of power propagated through forms of cultural exchange: novels, travel writing,

colonialism. It can be broadly broken down into three groups: colonial criticism, post-colonial examination of literature and racism and studies of the effects of culture on institutions and discourses of power.

During the colonial period some Europeans involved in imperialism had cause to take stock of their surroundings and describe the system in which they were embroiled. With a number of years first-hand experience as a sub-divisional police officer in Burma, George Orwell was conscious of the schizophrenia of the system of imperialism, and he grew to hate what he was doing. In *Shooting an Elephant*, Orwell recalls he was secretly “all for the Burmese and all against their oppressors, the British.”³⁴ On the other hand he also felt at times that “the greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into a Buddhist priest’s guts.”³⁵ The experience of shooting the elephant which had gone ‘must’ (berserk) allowed Orwell to gain an insight into what was, to him at least, the true nature of imperialism.

He felt that the whole process made the rulers behave in the way in which colonised peoples expected them to behave: Orwell shot the elephant, but he did it primarily to avoid ridicule. The Burmese, who had gathered *en masse* for the spectacle, expected him to kill the elephant as soon as he sent for his gun: to do otherwise would have dented the prestige and power of the whole imperial system. The process of ruling thus

and historiography all played their part in constructing the image of ‘the Other’. See also E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, Vintage, London, 1994.

³⁴ G. Orwell, ‘Shooting an Elephant’, in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. I: An Age Like this 1920-1940*, (CELJ) Penguin, London, 1970, pp. 265-272.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

dehumanised the colonisers and turned them into beings that acted in order to maintain an imaginary status.

In another piece of Orwell's writing, *Burmese Days*, the descriptions of the European inhabitants of a colonial outpost are particularly revealing and show the deep contempt in which Orwell held the system of British colonial rule, and its agents.³⁶ The picture that Orwell painted of European society is incisive and critical, and came from inside the empire. So too, E. M. Forster's *A Passage to India* reveals some of the prejudices of the rulers, with one female character stating proudly that if she fell pregnant to an Indian she would have an abortion on the steps of the town hall.³⁷

The racism described by Orwell and Forster was taken up by a number of writers in the post-colonial period. Edward Said's work deals primarily with representation of the 'Other' in the construction of cultural institutions and draws on the writings of Michel

³⁶ That imaginary status, the mystique of the European, is further explored in Orwell's earlier novel *Burmese Days*, Penguin, Utrecht [1934], 1969. Orwell's British empire characters, who are more like caricatures, inhabit the town of Kyauktada in upper Burma which of course has its own club – a phenomenon in India which Orwell describes as the spiritual citadel and the real seat of British power. The Kyauktada club has "the proud boast of never having admitted an Oriental to membership". The cultural milieu of the club is unquestionably English: English flowers, *Punch*, gin, billiards and a library – although the consumption of alcohol day and night, even before breakfast, is the principle occupation. *Burmese Days* closely reflects his own experiences and the central character of Florey is something of a self-portrait. Florey's self-hatred is related to his inability to feel part of the system in which he participates. Having lived most of his life in Burma, his recollections of England are more imagined than real, and although his drinking and relations with Burmese women are quite normal by the standards of his fellow expatriates, he could not justify his own behaviour and falls into self-loathing. In an effort to redeem himself he attempts to reform and to win the affection and hand, if not the heart, of a newly arrived marriageable English woman. Florey's failings are the tragedy of the colonial misfit; a man with an interest and regard for Burmese people who is distinctly uncomfortable in European society. When his liaison with a Burmese woman is revealed to all during a church service, the resulting social embarrassment and stigma is too much for his intended who regards his known cohabitation with a native woman as completely beyond the pale. Florey's despair at losing social respectability and the possibility of a sort of companionship with a European woman cause him to suicide, a fact that is disguised by other Europeans to avoid the inference that he had 'cracked up'.

³⁷ E. M. Forster, *A Passage to India*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1961.

Foucault. Both *Orientalism*³⁸ and *Culture and Imperialism*³⁹ discuss discourses of knowledge and power that are created and enhanced through cultural creations such as the novel, poetry or art. By defining and depicting ‘otherness’, Europeans were able to construct an image of the Orient and of the cultural practices of Asia that established its essential difference. The exotic and erotic were blended with cruelty and despotism to show the innate superiority of rationalist European forms of organisation and governance, especially during the nineteenth century.

Colonialism was therefore both an actual happening and a long development of an idea — it was an appropriation of the ‘authentic’ voice of non-Europeans so that they were unable to speak for themselves. Colonial rule meant non-Europeans had to be described by European artists, writers and officials. The power of description inculcates and generates a received practice of ‘managing natives’ that permeates every facet of the relations between coloniser and colonised.

As a cultural phenomenon, colonialism is therefore ongoing as is demonstrated by media stereotypes of minority groups, shown in impoverished circumstances without adequate explanation of the historical background of oppression. Said’s work also builds on the tradition of Fanon⁴⁰ and Mannoni⁴¹ and the central place of racism in their analyses of colonial power. None of these however explain the structure of power as they focus on the ‘other’ rather than on the institutions erected to create control.

³⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, *op. cit.*

³⁹ E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, Vintage, London, 1994.

⁴⁰ F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Macgibbon and Kee, Bungay, 1965.

⁴¹ O. Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, [1947] 1990.

English literature has been re-examined for its contribution to the construction of discourses of racism and imperial power: once innocent boys-own stories such as R. M. Ballantyne's *The Coral Island*⁴² are found to contain depictions of headhunting South Sea cannibals; Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*⁴³ has been widely seen as an exploration into the dark soul of European imperial man in the frenzy of expansionist capitalist colonialism. While such departures into literature are interesting, the ideological apparatus of colonialism identified by Foucault, following Gramsci,⁴⁴ remains mostly untouched.

To an extent more recent critiques of the discipline of anthropology, of culture and of the racial construction of empire provide a departure point for this thesis.

Nicholas Thomas⁴⁵ and Ann Laura Stoler⁴⁶ are two writers who examine the sorts of issues investigated here, but their works have focussed on the macrocosmic level of colonialism and its processes, and have not addressed the smaller and more defined structured colonial power examined in this thesis — the ensemble of institutions and rules designed to produce a particular type or form of 'modernity', rather than European modernity *per se*.

⁴² R. M. Ballantyne, *The Coral Island*, Penguin Classics, London [1870] 1994.

⁴³ J. Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973.

⁴⁴ See for example the discussion of hegemonic apparatuses and ideological state apparatuses in C. Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980, pp. 63-69.

⁴⁵ N. Thomas, Thomas, N, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology Travel and Government*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1994.

⁴⁶ A. L. Stoler, 'Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Gender, Race and Morality in Colonial Asia', in M. di Leonardo (ed) *Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era*, University of California, Berkeley, 1991, pp. 51-101, and 'Rethinking Colonial Categories:

Some aspects of this diverse body of literature are integral to this thesis. Where Weber conceives of organisation and bureaucracy as being neutral, Foucault's writings on the construction of regimes and discourses of knowledge show that power can be coercive in ways that do not involve force but do however involve regulation and codification, the outlawing of types of behaviour for the good of the whole society. Such ideological structures permeate social relations in insidious ways and may in fact be more coercive than direct violence as the collective subject (the people) is often unaware of the purpose of change.

For Foucault medicine, government and surveying all create bodies of knowledge that are accessible to the specialist, and the state as a whole controls both the content of education and the way in which new knowledge is incorporated or omitted from governing power structures. The resultant educational product is one that reflects the priorities of the administration, since officials within the bureaucracy act, following Weber, as their vocation dictates. Careers are founded on the interpretation of information which is a key part of successful colonial domination and control.

Cultural explanations for colonialism are both in the past and present but, as Thomas notes, the main point to remember is that

This interest in the cultural construction of particular colonizing projects is thus not a denial of their violations of human rights or their racism; it is rather an effort to account

European Communities and Boundaries of Rule', in N. B. Dirks, ed, *Colonialism and Culture*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1992, pp. 319-352.

for their possibility, and for the imaginative and practical specificity of the intrusions that colonized populations had to resist or accommodate.⁴⁷

Thomas in particular is concerned with explaining the “variable, complex and ambivalent nature” of colonial ideologies, a task in which this thesis is also engaged.⁴⁸ Yet for those writers who seek to explore the cultural construction of colonialism it is not colonial administration *per se* that is their object, rather the way in which depiction and representation are incorporated into a governing consciousness that perpetuates discrimination. This thesis moves beyond the realm of consciousness into an examination of process and structure at the day-to-day level of colonialism to reveal exactly what structures of power were being created and why.

Economics, atavism, politics and culture do not on their own provide a clear picture of the history of the world over the past half millennium but grouped together and analysed in terms of the structures of power that enabled control over people and territories, the key operations of colonial rule become clear. Such an investigation of colonial power by necessity involves an examination of the colonial state, its administrative regimes and its administration within its territories, and a grading of its degrees of sophistication and humane treatment when administering others.

At the end of the twentieth century the basic unit of large-scale political organisation was the nation state. These had been created out of the colonial empires and were

⁴⁷ N. Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture*, *op. cit.*, p.17.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* His concentration on the positive images of colonialism is likewise not meant to rehabilitate the actions or behaviour of colonialists or imperialists. But where Thomas seeks to understand how far and

fashioned in the image of European states.⁴⁹ They operated within a single capitalist dynamic and were recognised as sovereign within their own territories. They had governments, administrations, bureaucracies and functional divisions of expertise and some even had welfare services. All states played by the same rules of international diplomacy and operated within one system.⁵⁰ The question is not so much one of “How did colonialism create this situation?” for its effects were uneven both in distribution and effect, but rather “How did similar structures of power and administration come to be so widespread?”

The four ideal types provide a method of conceptualising colonialism and its socially transformative functions, both positive and negative. The linkage between colonialism and modernity is through administration as by establishing modern bureaucratic government colonial empires reshaped the world in their own image, or at least as variations on a theme. The ideal types show that colonialism can be viewed as a totality, and as a continuum of improving techniques of social control. Furthermore they permit a view of colonialism based on political power and control. As such they are an alternative, and perhaps preferable, way of understanding what has occurred in world history over the past 500 years and offer a point of departure for future investigations into colonialism, both recent and contemporary.

why imperial efforts were, and continue to be, supported by various class and interest groups, this thesis focuses on the structures of power through which colonial administrations aimed to transform societies.

⁴⁹ Which were themselves relatively recent creations having arisen from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

⁵⁰ Even so called ‘rogue states’ have embassies and diplomatic relations with other countries, and conduct some trade.

The next chapter provides historical background on the social and administrative framework of the 'traditional' Kelantan state, and traces the history of Siamese and British efforts to exert power and control over Kelantan up to 1902. It covers the Siamese historical claims to Kelantan and British interest in the Northern Malay states including those of the Duff Development Company Limited (DDCL), an enterprise that was to have a major impact on Kelantan's political and economic development. Lastly it makes some observations on the internal restructuring of Siam and its dependencies as a response to British and French power in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 3: Siam, Britain, Kelantan and spheres of influence in the Malay peninsula to 1902

This chapter provides a historical background to administrative colonialism in Kelantan which began in earnest under the Siamese in 1903. Such an undertaking of necessity refers to the nineteenth century power struggles in Southeast Asia between Britain and France, and in respect of influence over the Malay peninsula, between Britain and Siam. This chapter also addresses 'traditional' social, spatial and administrative relations of the 'Malay state', and of Kelantan in particular, so as to juxtapose it with the changes that are examined in the following three chapters.

3.1 *Geography*

The Malaysian state of Kelantan is located at the northeast edge of the Malay peninsula and forms part of Malaysia's northern border with Thailand. The countryside itself may be roughly classified into three sections: a coastal flat of interconnected rivers up to 10 kilometres inland; a flood plain which stretches to the west another 40 or so kilometres; and a series of hills and mountains which become higher and more rugged the further west one goes.¹ The whole state is mainly drained by one vast river system (see maps), the main tributaries of which run into the Kelantan river and then on into the South China Sea. The area is affected by monsoonal rains, is generally humid and verdant. It

¹ S. Talib, *A History of Kelantan 1890-1940*, MBRAS Monograph No. 21, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, pp.1-2.

is the most ethnically Malay of the Malaysian states with only relatively small minority (Chinese, Thai and Indian) populations in comparison with the rest of the peninsula.²

3.2 *Early history*

Much of Kelantan's history is sketchy. Links with China date perhaps back to the sixth century³ but due to the relative absence of reliable historical records in any language it is difficult to make any claims with certainty about the region before around 1800. Kelantan is thought to have been an independent trading kingdom from around the seventh century. By the thirteenth century it perhaps formed part of the Malay kingdom of Palembang (in Sumatra), and by the fourteenth century Majapahit (also Sumatra). For most of the fifteenth century it was apparently independent but later became a tributary state of Melaka.

Kelantan's reputation as a centre of Islamic learning is better known. Islam is thought to have been present in Kelantan in the late twelfth century. The Arab traveller and trader Ibn Battuta, who left Morocco in 1325, reported meeting a Muslim Queen in a place known as Kuala Krai — a flourishing trading town at the headwaters of the Kelantan river. There is also evidence of the Chinese Muslim eunuch Admiral Cheng Ho establishing diplomatic relations with an Emperor Umar in the early fifteenth century.⁴

² W. R. Roff ed. *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, notes that in the early 1970s Kelantan was 93 percent Malay, p. v.

³ B. W. and L. Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, Macmillan, London, 1982, pp. 21-22. The kingdom of Ch'ih-t'u (the Red Earth Land) has been mentioned in sixth century Chinese sources and is thought to have been located in Kelantan. The Chinese records show that this kingdom was peaceful, prosperous and well administered with each district having a supervising controller.

3.3 *Thai state power and influence*

Modern Thailand can trace its history back to the city of Sukhothai, based in the upper Menam River, which was founded in the thirteenth century and was the centre of the first Siamese Kingdom. Like the other main territorial, as distinct from maritime, powers of the day, such as Angkor and Burma, Sukhothai was the geographic centre of the areas that it controlled and the influence of such powers diminished the farther one travelled from the centre.

The Siamese state structure relied on a notion of radiating responsibility. The capital delegated tasks to its *muang* (provinces), many of which were considered as possible future rivals to the governing central state, and were given military or administrative tasks that could enrich them as ways of shoring up support for the central power. Peripheral polities were more or less independent so long as they accepted the theoretical overlordship of the central power and paid tribute.⁵

Sukhothai's administration created provinces (*muang*), ruled by approved leaders. In the south of the Sukhothai kingdom, Nakhon (Ligor) acted as its emissary. Siamese attempts to influence the Northern Malay states began in the thirteenth century⁶ and Kelantan was considered part of the Siamese sphere of influence. Some form of tribute was no doubt paid to Siam, and from perhaps the seventeenth century this tribute took

⁴ A. A. Haji Hassan, *The Administration of Islamic Law in Kelantan*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, pp. 1-2.

⁵ K. Suwannathat-Pian, *Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1988, pp. 25-30.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

the form of the *bunga mas dan perak*⁷ (gold and silver flowers/trees), payable every three years.

In the mid-fourteenth century a new power arose along the Menam river, Ayudhya, a rival to Sukhothai. By the fifteenth century Ayudhya had incorporated Sukhothai and assumed its role in projecting Siamese influence into the Malay peninsula. Ayudhya's attempts to expand its sphere of influence further south were resisted by the Malay sultanate of Melaka.⁸ In the south of Siam, Nakhon continued to act as Ayudhya's main client state for asserting its influence.

The rise of the Chakri Dynasty and the new capital of Bangkok inspired a more militant state that resumed war against Burma, Siam's main land rival in the region. By the eighteenth century the new centre of Siamese power in Bangkok made it clear to the Northern Malay states of Patani, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu that they were free to rule themselves without much interference, provided that they acknowledged the overlordship of Siam. As such they were to play the role of traditional tributary relations where they were independent up to a point but accepted that Siam was a mighty power.

For the last decades of the eighteenth century the tributes to Siam became increasingly onerous and in Patani, a Malay state with a long history of Thai interference in its

⁷ Although *bunga mas dan perak* literally means 'gold and silver flowers', B. W Andaya and L. Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia, op. cit.*, p. 65, describe it as '...two small trees, fashioned from gold and silver, and standing about a metre high.' The actual *bunga mas* formed but one part of the overall tribute which could also include, cloth, jewellery, weapons and slaves. Evidence from the 19th century suggest that the tribute was worth around one thousand Spanish Dollars.

⁸ Melaka was taken by the Portuguese in 1511, the Dutch in 1641 and finally swapped to the English in 1824.

internal politics, this caused two rebellions against Siamese authority, in 1791 and 1795. The result was that the ruler of Patani was deposed and his kingdom divided into seven principalities under a Siamese governor.⁹ The first clear ruler of Kelantan emerged in the very late eighteenth century and founded a dynasty that continues to this day. Again the date of foundation is not certain,¹⁰ but Long Yunus relied heavily upon the assistance of the Siamese in maintaining his rule and accepted the nature of the tributary relationship that existed between Siam and Kelantan.

3.4 *The Malay State of Kelantan*

The label of state to the polities of the Malay peninsula prior to the twentieth century is a little misleading. The European conception of a state as an entity having a fixed geographic boundary does not apply to Malaya before the intrusion of colonial administrations. According to Anthony Milner, the pre-colonial Malay state was more a social space than a political entity in the European sense. Heading each Malay state was a ruler, titled as either *Raja* or the more prestigious *Sultan*. The position was usually hereditary but tradition could be passed over and others appointed as ruler if for example a Sultan was childless. Other officers of the state were the *Raja Muda* (heir apparent), the *Perdana Menteri* (Chief Minister), the *Temenggung* (Minister for Defence, Justice and Palace affairs) and the *Bendahara* (Principal official). The fortunes of a Malay state generally corresponded to the ability of its Sultan and the death of a

⁹ B. W Andaya and L. Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia, op. cit.*, claim that this occurred in 1795 and Skinner, *The Civil War in Kelantan in 1839*, Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (MBRAS) Monograph II, Singapore, 1965, mentions two sources: W. F. Vella in *Siam under Rama III* (1957) implies that Patani was broken up in 1795 while S. Ibrahim's *Sejarah Kerajaa Melayu Patani* (no date), claims it did not happen until 1808.

Sultan could quite often spark disputes over succession between rival heirs. *Adat* (Malay custom) provided legitimacy for a Raja's rule, but local area chiefs provided the real power outside of the capital.

If *daulat* (spiritual forces surrounding Malay kingship) provided the right for a Raja to rule, Islam provided the stability for society to function, and much of the basic local level administration. Politics and religion were enmeshed within a cultural framework that bestowed order. The distinction between politics and religion was not always apparent with a variety of taxes being collected.

Skinner described the Malay state of the 1800s as basically a port town on a river with limited control of its own hinterland. He gave the following background to his history of the Kelantan civil war of the 1830s.

It is true that the boundaries along the coastal plain are now reasonably well defined, but inland – as the communist revolt of 1948 showed – neither state nor national boundaries have counted for very much. For most of Malaya's history, the Malay 'state' was, typically, centred around a small port-town, a settlement located so as to control the area's most important waterway, from which, area, town and state all took their name. The settlement need not be particularly large, a circle of some 5-10 miles' radius would provide sufficient rice fields, fishing harbours and coconut trees to cover basic foods. Outside of this area, 'upstream', there would be little direct supervision by the ruler, except for an occasional foray in strength, for his control of the main waterway enabled him to levy such tolls as he thought fit upon any produce from the interior worth exporting (e.g. tin and gold). Such

¹⁰ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op.cit.*, p. 13 note 51. Talib notes that A. Rentse's *History of Kelantan I*, JMBRAS, Vol XII, part 2, 1934, has Long Yunus on the throne around 1775 and dying in 1794. Talib gives Yunus' death as 1798.

imports as there were would usually provide the ruling oligarchy with a further source of revenue in the form of port dues and customs duties (as well as the traditional presents and doceurs), and if times were really hard there was always the chance of a little piracy.¹¹

Kelantan in the 1800s was just such a state. For part of the seventeenth century it had been divided between warring chiefs, some of whom were allied to Patani and some to Trengganu. This situation lasted until the late eighteenth century.¹² On claiming the throne Long Yunus established a government that consisted of himself and his State Council, a body constituted to offer assistance in managing the affairs of state to the ruler. With debts to the Siamese for their support being paid in tribute, the Kelantanese chiefs who had supported Long Yunus in gaining power also sought more immediate rewards. Membership of the State Council, the highest administrative organ of state, reflected recognition of past support and this body could attempt to influence decisions due to their more frequent access to the Sultan.

Kelantan during the nineteenth century was ruled by a Raja who relied upon the support of chiefs who lent military assistance if required. It was divided into a number of *daerah* (administrative districts), each of which was controlled by a chief (*Tunkus* or *Datuks*). Kelantan's Rajas had little idea of the extent of their supposed territory and even if they had, the ability of a Raja to actually control, direct or influence events outside of the capital was limited. The Kelantanese state was more like a maritime or port-state, such as old Melaka, than a territorial state. Government was mainly by decree with the Islamic clergy playing an important role in the maintenance of behavioural standards. The rule of law occurred mainly through social sanction. With

¹¹ C. Skinner, *The Civil War in Kelantan, op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

paths rather than roads, rivers and waterways facilitated social contact. Commerce, transport and communication occurred through Kelantan's maritime contact with regional powers in the South China Sea and meant both trade and ideas were able to reach the Kelantanese people.

By 1800 Long Muhammad (Muhammad I) was on the throne and was conscious of Kelantan's position between the rising power of the British (the English East India Company — EIC) to the south and the Siamese to the North. Seeking an opportunity to establish his independence from the Siamese he wrote to the Governor of Penang in 1822 seeking to have the British declare a protectorate over Kelantan in exchange for himself keeping half of the state revenue, an offer that was not accepted.¹³ Article XII of the Burney treaty of 1826 between the EIC and Siam provided for unrestricted access to Trengganu and Kelantan for the purposes of British trade and ensured that the English “shall not go and molest, attack or disturb those States upon any pretence whatever.”¹⁴

A rebellion by Kedah against Siam in 1831 escalated to the Patani principalities and brought in Kelantan and Trengganu on the Malay side. The rebellion was crushed and in Kelantan, Sultan Muhammad was made to pay 30,000 silver dollars to retain the throne and to surrender his nephew, the Raja of Patani, the leader of the rebellion.¹⁵

¹² S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, pp. 12-15.

¹³ K. Suwannathat-Pian, *Thai-Malay Relations, op. cit.*, p. 162.

¹⁴ Burney treaty, cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 222-223.

¹⁵ C. Skinner, *The Civil War in Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 7.

The influence of the Siamese was most apparent when rivals for the Kelantanese throne emerged in the civil war following the death of Muhammad I in 1837¹⁶. A Thai chronicle,¹⁷ talks of how both sides appealed to the King of Siam to recognise them as the legitimate rulers of Kelantan and of how the Thai King appointed people to positions of state. Skinner's account of this period translates twenty-five letters from participants in the Kelantan civil war of 1837-1839, some of which are to the King of Siam seeking recognition of claims and support.¹⁸ Muhammad II was backed by the Siamese who claim in their own chronicle to have removed a political rival to Patani and installed him as its ruler, an assertion supported by Talib amongst others.¹⁹ Clearly there existed a considerable desire for influence on the part of Siam over the Malay States. In the Siamese view however, states such as Kelantan were not major powers but tributaries.

The civil war of 1837-1840 was ended by Nakhon intervening on the side of Sultan Muhammad II (ruled 1837-1886). By acknowledging Siamese overlordship Muhammad II was free to rule his kingdom much as he pleased. An able ruler, he established various offices such as police, public works and land revenue. The Sultan also made and unmade chiefs. Some of these people were of noble birth, and most of the chiefs and nobles chose to live in the capital of Kota Bharu rather than in their administrative districts. The long reign of Muhammad II was reportedly peaceful and much was done to expand the administration and to raise more money for the administration's activities. The tribute to Siam remained.

¹⁶ There is again conjecture as to whether the date of death was 1835 or 1837.

¹⁷ D. K. Wyatt, 'Nineteenth Century Kelantan: A Thai View', in W. R. Roff, ed. *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-21.

3.5 *Siamese administrative changes in Kelantan*

In nineteenth century Kelantan the basic unit of social organisation was the village. Each village was grouped into an administrative division known as a *mukim* (a parish), and a mukim could contain several villages. Each mukim had a *surau* (prayer hall) from where the Imam would speak to the people. With the power of the Raja mainly restricted to the town, and relying on alliances to support his interests thereafter, the power projection of the Kelantan state waxed and waned. Most of Kelantan's daily administration was thus left to religious authorities and in the countryside the Imam was basically unchallenged until the growing power and increased influence of Siam in Kelantan's internal affairs during the nineteenth century.

The more assertive Siamese position led to some administrative changes, the most notable of which was the introduction of the position of the *Toh Kweng* (literally 'circle headman') as the officer in charge of a number of villages grouped not by mukim but by daerah. The records are unclear exactly when this position was introduced but it is likely to have been sometime between 1860 and 1880.²⁰ The Toh Kweng and the Imam became rivals for influence in the same area, and the Siamese insisted on the Toh Kweng collecting taxes. The Toh Kweng was in theory the agent of the government in

¹⁸ C. Skinner, *The Civil War in Kelantan, op. cit.* Some of these letters are to the rulers of Patani and Saiburi petitioning for assistance to ensure a victory.

¹⁹ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 14.

²⁰ W. A. Graham, *Kelantan Administration Report (KAR) 1903/4*, p. 16.

charge of administration in the rural areas.²¹ The Toh Kweng provided a foil to the influence of the Imam and in some areas one was more regarded than the other.

The central means of raising revenue, and of bestowing or denying favouritism, was the Sultan's control over land. The status of land itself was in theory clear: all the land in Kelantan belonged to the Sultan²² and freehold land did not exist. There were no land records until 1881 when Sultan Ahmad, who had been handed the throne through his father Muhammad II's abdication in 1877, established a system of recognition for land rented or inherited in previous years. Even with a system that recognised a form of tenancy, land could be taken away at any time from any person.²³ By 1886 the indigenous government had issued title deeds to all alienated land in eleven mukim.²⁴ Moneys raised from land purchase (rents) or from the Sultan's traditional rights over the collection or sale of forest products, such as elephant tusks or rattan, as well as moneys gained from the practice of issuing licences for opium farms, or from forestry or mining, went into the state treasury.

In the nineteenth century the judicial system was initially based solely on Islamic law, although customary law was tolerated if it did not conflict.²⁵ There were two Imams to each mukim; the senior Imam could collect religious taxes and poll tax (\$1 per free man every three years and 50c per bond slave) as well as officiating at marriages and divorces. The junior Imam assisted with prayers, legal cases, and family disputes over inheritance. When the Toh Kweng was introduced the secular duties of the senior Imam

²¹ The position was unpaid and, after the first creative burst, had little administrative work to perform.

²² S. Talib, *History of Kelantan*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

²³ W. A. Graham, *KAR 1903/4*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

passed to the new position. In theory this delivered the revenue earned from crops, which was collected on padi, coconut and durian only,²⁶ as well as other nominal taxes to the state. With few records of what was planted and only three taxable crops of produce, there was a high possibility of collecting but not remitting state taxes. Tax avoidance was a privilege of the aristocracy and local Datuks would often keep most of what was collected. To complicate matters the Imam retained power over land registration while the Toh Kweng was authorised to collect the revenue. With civil and religious administrations existing side-by-side, a tendency toward administrative expansion is evidenced by the growth in mukim: in 1837 there had been 50; by 1900 there were 250.²⁷

The death of Sultan Ahmad in 1889 gave rise to another period of dynastic uncertainty in Kelantan and again the Siamese played a large part in sorting out the succession. Not all of Kelantan's nobles and ruling elites were supportive of the new ruler Muhammad III who succeeded his father Ahmad with Siamese blessing. Muhammad III was one of twenty two children, sixteen of which were male, by Ahmad's nine wives. Five of Muhammad III's brothers who had not been given offices of state, which they felt were their due, wrote to British officials in Singapore and Pahang claiming Muhammad III's style of rule was dictatorial.²⁸ These same brothers were prepared to give concessions to the British in mining and planting in exchange for British help to overthrow Muhammad III and put up their own candidate. The British again refused to intervene in

²⁴ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, pp. 29-30. The use of 'daerah' was not apparently common until the British introduced it in 1916.

²⁵ A. Hassan, *The Administration of Islamic Law, op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁶ W. A. Graham, *KAR 1903/4, op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁷ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p.15.

Kelantan's internal politics, but there was clearly a potential source of support for Britain among Kelantan's princes and there emerged a 'pro-British' lobby in Kelantan that sought to decrease Siamese influence.

This dynastic squabble coincided with an attempt by Siam to upgrade its political relationship with Kelantan, exemplified through the giving of tribute, to a more closely monitored and better-administered state. Under strong pressure from Britain and France who sought trading concessions with a view to annexing Siam, the young King Chulalongkorn reformed Siam's administration so as to stave off foreign incursions.

Part of this process was a clarification of its relationship with what it considered to be its Malay vassals, states such as Kelantan and Kedah. Northern Malaya became an area where the Siamese attempted to resist moves by the British to shift Kelantan and Trengganu from Siam's sphere of influence and into its own. This consolidation process is apparent from an 1890 visit by Chulalongkorn to Kelantan following the sudden death of Muhammad III in that year. During Chulalongkorn's visit he confirmed the succession to the throne of Sultan Mansor, brother of Muhammad III, and installed Sultan Muhammad III's own son, Tuan Long Senik, as Kelantan's Raja Muda.²⁹ Such an arrangement bypassed the direct line of succession, which was in any case more theoretical than actual, and was a compromise, but one that was apparently accepted by most within Kelantan. The fact that Raja Mansor was a Siamese approved ruler did not stop the machinations of the pro-British lobby within Kelantan.

²⁸ K. Suwanatthat-Pian, *Thai-Malay Relations, op. cit.*, p. 169. Talib (p. 39, footnote 8) cites Graham in stating that the brothers were unwilling to accept the same treatment from the brother as they had had from their father. They claimed to have been denied their natural birthright.

Siamese support was not always in the form of approving or giving an imprimatur of rule to a Kelantanese Raja. A gunboat was sent from Bangkok to remind recalcitrants of Siam's support for Mansor and was accompanied by the appointment of a Siamese official to the Kelantan court in 1890. This was followed up in 1892 by a Siamese attempt to eliminate feudalism and reform Kelantan's provincial administration so as to build a more unified state. Siam also sent a military force to Kelantan and Trengganu in 1894 to assist in the capture of the Pahang Rebels, a group of Malays who opposed by force the declaration in 1888 of a British protectorate in Pahang, which had borders with both Trengganu and Kelantan, and who used the more northerly states as refuges.³⁰ Siam's action in this case aimed to prove to Britain that it could administer its claimed tributaries according to the rule of law, thus shoring up its own fortunes in this regard.

In this last decade of the nineteenth century Siam was attempting to upgrade the *prathesaraj* (tributaries), by which it regarded Kelantan, to full integration into the Thai state (*thesaphiban*). Concerted Siamese attempts to integrate its *prathesaraj* came between 1895 and 1899 and during this period Kelantan, along with Trengganu, was removed from the supervision of Nakhon and placed under the supervision of the permanent commissioner of Phuket.³¹ The immediate effect for Kelantan was one of greater Siamese involvement in its internal affairs. Talib refers to this period, the reign

²⁹ Literally 'Young King' but closer in meaning to prince regent, although on occasions a Raja Muda could be passed over on the death of the Raja. See S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 43, and K. Suwanatthapian, *Thai-Malay Relations, op. cit.*, pp. 169-170.

³⁰ K. Suwanatthapian, *Thai-Malay Relations, op. cit.*, pp. 139-140. Siam was anxious to appear to be assisting British wishes and after hoping in vain that Malay chiefs in Kelantan and Trengganu would arrest the Pahang rebels independently, finally acted itself. The Siamese managed to obtain cooperation from the rulers of Trengganu and Kelantan to capture the rebels who were not then handed over to the British but exiled to Changmai in Siam, well away from the action.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 139-141.

of Sultan Mansor, as a general consolidation on the part of Siam and there were improvements in administration, the creation of post offices and improvements to roads. Siam was confident that its attempt to integrate Kelantan into the central workings of the Siamese kingdom was working, and that Britain would therefore keep out. The confidence was well placed: Britain and Siam had signed a secret convention in 1897 which clearly recognised Siam's claim to Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu.³² Despite repeated attempts by the Government of the Straits Settlement in Singapore to influence the decision of the Colonial Office in London to favour British intervention in Kelantan, as had been done in Perak & Selangor (1874), Negeri Sembilan (1885) and Pahang (1888), London adhered to its treaty obligations with Siam and did not interfere.

The relationship between the Siamese rulers and their Kelantanese tributary during the nineteenth century was on the whole good with Kelantan's rulers visiting Bangkok frequently. For its part Siam consulted Kelantan's rulers on issues directly affecting Kelantan, such as commercial dealings with foreigners and the importation of armaments. However the lack of support outside the capital Kota Bharu for the attempts to capture the Pahang Rebels indicate the fragility of the Kelantan state and the limits of the Raja's actual authority. Outside of the capital the edict of the Sultan was only accepted if popular, and resentment of an increased role in state administration by the Siamese, fuelled by the pro-British lobby and their supporters, meant that when Sultan Ahmad died in 1899, the path to succession was again uncertain. The brothers of Muhammad III who had been the force behind the pro-British/anti-Siamese lobby reached a compromise with their young nephew, the Long Senik and agreed to support him as Raja of Kelantan in exchange for political office and economic concessions.

³² *Ibid.*

Their access to Raja Senik through positions on the State Council meant that the pro-Siamese stance adopted by Muhammad II, Ahmad, Muhammad III and Mansor for the best part of sixty years was now seriously threatened. Further disturbances in Patani in 1901 were observed keenly from Kelantan and these events influenced the willingness of the pro-British lobby in Kelantan to resist further incorporation. To better achieve its stated goal Siam, sent troops and officials to Kota Bharu, although this was possibly at the request of the new ruler Raja Long Senik (later known as Muhammad IV) whose grip on power was uncertain, despite the alliance with his uncles.

Siam's move to become a more cohesive state with greater compliance in its periphery was also a defensive measure. In part the rules of state-to-state relations in Southeast Asia, which had been expressed in the tributary system, had changed. Siam had faced challenges to her own independence from Britain to her south, and from France to her east, operating from Indochina. Siam's response was one of self-strengthening, creating a more efficient state using technical experts from Europe and America. The fact that some of these were German and in key positions such as railways, only increased Singapore's determination to have Kelantan brought under British influence, if not rule.

3.6 *The British forward movement*

In all parts of the British Empire, administrative tasks were broken down into units of spatial organisation. At a macrocosmic level the empire consisted of a wide range of governments and administrations and within each administration, further divisions were made for functional purposes. In nineteenth century Malaya the British colonial state was divided into political units. If the need for better administration arose, as it frequently did, further divisions were made. British contact with people in its territories was therefore through several layers of administration and local intermediaries.

British influence in the Malay peninsula took a territorial base with the ceding of Penang to East India Company trader Francis Light in 1784. Other bases followed at Singapore, Melaka and the Dindings but these areas were administered from Calcutta as part of British India until 1867. With the shift to Singapore as the capital of British interests in Malaya a civil service was developed that was modelled closely on the Indian Civil Service (ICS). From modest beginnings these administrators provided the backbone of British power in Malaya from 1867 until 1957. They attended to the needs of Penang, Province Wellesley, Melaka and Singapore, combined as the Straits Settlements, and provided Residents and Advisers to the Malay states. They ran the Federated Malay States (FMS), created in 1895, under a centralised administration in Kuala Lumpur thereby assisting in the administration of Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang.

The Governorship of Singapore was a key political and strategic position, vital for effective British influence. In addition to his functions as Governor of the Straits

Settlements, he was High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States, and High Commissioner for those Malay States who were not members of the Federation, which became known, by exclusion more than anything else, as the Unfederated Malay States (Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and later Johor).³³

The Governors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century adopted a rather belligerent attitude toward Siamese interests. Their desire to creep north and annex the Northern Malay states created the 'forward movement'. In this respect they were reigned in by their own Foreign Office, which was unwilling to take on new territories, particularly ones that were within the sphere of influence of friendly powers such as Siam, with whom Britain had signed a secret treaty guaranteeing its rights in Kelantan. But such official denials could not stop private capital from trading with Kelantan, nor could it stop the pro-British faction in Kelantan from desiring a closer relationship. One company that was especially influential on Kelantan's subsequent development secured an agreement with Raja Senik shortly after he had come to the throne.

³³ The FMS had all entered into treaties of protection with Great Britain but were administered separately as the FMS to distinguish them from British Crown Colonies, referred to collectively as the Straits Settlements. By 1888 both North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak on the island of Borneo had been brought under British protection; in the first instance the North Borneo Company developed company rule, in the second an individual and family (the Brookes) ruled supreme. The term UMS denotes even more unity than it would appear; political decisions in the UMS were taken by the British Advisers, sometimes acting on the suggestion of the British Governor and High Commissioner in Singapore and there was no consistent attempt to gather the titular Heads of State (the Rajas/Sultans) together. They were as their name suggests unfederated and enjoyed the luxury of not having to deal with the Secretary of the FMS directly.

3.7 *The Duff Company*

Mr Robert William Duff, a former officer in the Straits Civil Service had held the position of Superintendent of Prisons in the neighbouring state of Pahang, and had on occasion been required to enter Kelantan through its southern mountains in pursuit of rebels. At the time he was most impressed with the signs of mineral wealth in the area. In 1900 he retired from the colonial service, returning to London to form a syndicate with the intention of gaining mining concessions in Kelantan. He enlisted some prominent business figures and received support from investors who had resources of over £6,000,000 collectively.³⁴

After some manoeuvring, Duff managed to get Raja Senik to agree to a concession of two districts, one covering much of land to the south west of Kota Bharu bordering Siam and Perak, and a larger area to the south in the Ulu Kelantan between two tributaries that formed near Kuala Lebir up to the Pahang border. The concession was for the purpose of developing any industries that he might wish for the mutual benefit of himself and the Kelantan state. The concession was for 40 years and Duff was required to pay to Raja Senik \$20,000 up front, 4 percent of the share float, and 5 percent of any gold, gems, or timber profits. Exported produce would attract a 4 percent tax. If he began to work a lease he could let it remain idle for up to two years at which time it reverted to the Raja. The concession was not excluded from police jurisdiction and elephant tusks were excluded from the deal.³⁵

³⁴ L. R. Robert, 'The Duff Syndicate in Kelantan 1900-1902', *JMBRAS*, vol XLV, No. 1, 1973, pp. 81-85.

The Duff Concession became widely known as the *Imperium in Imperio* and represented a formidable difficulty for later colonial administrators in Kelantan who sought to limit the generous terms of this agreement so as to provide “good government”. With rights over much of well-watered Ulu Kelantan, the Duff Concession became the centre of the plantation economy, and the Duff Development Company Limited, as it later became, was the major player in efforts to promote an economically productive Kelantan. In attempting to make the most of its concessionary rights the Duff Company came into conflict with the administrative colonial state that was attempting to assert its primacy and the rule of law.

3.8 *The 1902 treaty and a Briton at Raja Senik’s Balai*

Lobbying for British annexation of the Northern Malay States had begun in the 1890s and the actions of the pro-British faction within Kelantan had given Siam much cause for concern. A Treaty in 1902 between Great Britain and Siam addressed, to some extent, the unresolved question of the status of the Northern Malay states.³⁶ An exchange of diplomatic notes between the appointed representatives for negotiation, Lord Lansdowne and Phya Sri Sahadheb, indicates that a draft treaty was drawn up and agreed upon by Britain and Siam, setting out in detail the extent of the Siamese presence in Kelantan and Trengganu. In these diplomatic notes Lansdowne wrote that “to promote the stability and security of the Kingdom of Siam and its Dependencies”,

³⁵ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, pp. 195-197.

³⁶ The uncertainty over the status of the Siamese-claimed Northern Malay States of Kelantan and Trengganu arose from the Treaty of Kedah which guaranteed British rights of trade in Kelantan and Trengganu but referred to those states as “Siamese lands”.

the British Government would use its influence to seek the cooperation of the Malay Rajas. But there was a catch:

The Undersigned thinks it right, however, to observe that, in order to ensure the successful working of the Agreement, and having in view the immediate propinquity of the Malay States under British protection to the two States in question, it will be essential that the officials appointed to be the Advisers and Assistant Advisers of the Rajas, as mentioned in Article 2 of the Agreement shall be of British nationality, and that the concurrence of his Britannic Majesty's Government shall be confidentially obtained for their selection, removal and renewal of their appointments.³⁷

Phya Sri Sahadheb agreed to the appointment of Britons to act as Siamese agents, and to the process of consultation in their selection, removal and renewal as suggested by Lansdowne, but with a caveat: "These officials will be selected from among persons of British nationality who have seen service under the Siamese Government, or who are favourably known to the British Government by service or otherwise..."³⁸

The character and allegiances of the Adviser thus became a key point for the fortunes of Britain and Siam as they attempted to extend their influence in Kelantan.³⁹ Lansdowne reflected the desires of the forward movement that if they could get the right man into the job, British interests would be best served. The issue then was how capably would the Adviser fulfil his required duties, and in whose interests would he act?

³⁷ K. Suwannathat-Pian, 1988. *Thai-Malay Relations, op. cit.*, Appendix A: Exchange Notes Annexed to the Treaty of 1902 between Great Britain and Siam, pp. 216-218. Letter of Lansdowne to Siamese Plenipotentiary, October 6, 1902, p. 217.

³⁸ Cited in *Ibid*: Phya Sri Sahadheb to Lansdowne, October 6, 1902.

³⁹ As a leading member of the British 'forward movement' Sir Frank Swettenham's intention was no doubt to use the Siamese Adviser to Kelantan to further advance the interests of Britain in the area. The

The appointment of a Siamese Adviser of British nationality was a recognition by Siam of the geo-political realities of the day, and of the potential power of the British. When the matter of the nationality of Advisers had been agreed, the terms of the treaties were then presented to the Rajas of Kelantan and Trengganu as an agreement between each state and the King of Siam.⁴⁰

The text of the 1902 treaty between Siam and Kelantan has a number of articles that effectively reduced the power of the ruling clique, despite its assertion that “Nothing in this Agreement is intended to curtail any of the power or authority now held by the Rajah of Kelantan...”. The Raja Kelantan was not to have power over foreign relations (Article I), and had to accept the appointments by the Siamese King of officers to fill the positions of Adviser and Assistant Adviser. These men were to be provided with residences, were to be paid by the Raja Kelantan, and the Raja was required to follow their advice “in all matters other than those touching the Mahommedan religion and Malay custom.” (Article 2). The Raja Kelantan had severe restrictions placed on his power to grant and transfer concessions and to employ officers for the state without the consent in writing of the Siamese government (Art. III). When the state revenue reached \$100,000, one tenth was to be remitted to Siam (Art. IV).

For his part the Siamese King undertook not to interfere in the administration of Kelantan so long as no occurrence there contravened Siam’s own treaties with other

arrangement would function well for Britain if the British appointment felt loyalty to Britons and British interests.

⁴⁰ See K. Suwannathat-Pian, *Thai-Malay Relations, op. cit.*, Appendix B, The Final Draft Agreement 1902 between Siam and the Malay States of Kelantan and Trengganu, pp. 218-220.

governments and “so long as peace and order are maintained within the State, and it is governed for the benefits of its inhabitants with moderation, justice and humanity” (Art. V). Raja Kelantan was to co-operate with the Siamese Governments in the event of proposed extensions of railway and telegraph lines into Kelantan, not to grant concession to any individual or company who proposed to do so, and if any postage stamps were to be used they were to carry the effigy of the Siamese King (Art VI).

For its part Britain officially accepted that Kelantan was a dependency of Siam. The British had secured their right to conduct trade and would have hoped that the Adviser to the government of Kelantan, being himself a Briton, would act in the best interests of Empire to further British commercial and political designs. As part of the attempt to integrate Kelantan more closely the triennial *bunga mas dan perak* was abolished. This signified an upgrading of Siam-Kelantan relations and a shift from the tributary (periphery to state) mode of formal relations, to those of a province and a state. The Siamese Commissioner left Kelantan and was replaced by a Siamese Advisor of British nationality who the Foreign Office hoped would keep British interests uppermost in his considerations.

The acceptance by the British Foreign Office of Siamese primacy in Kelantan delayed the progress of the British forward movement by several years. The tension between the macro-imperial policy and the Foreign Office and the micro-interests of Singapore indicate that Britain’s ultimate recognition of Siam’s rights in Kelantan were part of an overall strategy of maintaining Siam as a buffer against the French in Indochina.

The main losers in these dealings were the Kelantan ruling clique, many of whom had wanted the British to declare a protectorate over the State in the hope that the rights and privileges they had extorted from Raja Senik would be preserved in exchange for their qualified support of his ascension to the throne. While the Raja Senik remained the head of state, the Siamese Adviser was to enjoy substantial power in most matters and as will be shown in the following chapter, the person appointed to advise the government of Kelantan on its administration acted without fear or favour.

Rather than being 'pro-Siamese' or 'pro-British' the Adviser, Mr Walter Armstrong Graham, represented the new bureaucratic face of colonial middle management, and instigated a studied rational approach to administration that was predicated on the desire to do a good job to the best of one's abilities. As such he was a colonial bureaucrat and acted both to advance the welfare of Kelantan's population and, to the perennial consternation of British officials in Singapore, to keep Kelantan Siamese as long as possible.

The treaty between Siam and Britain in 1902 was a compromise accepted by all. It recognised the changing power realities of the Malay peninsula and saved face for the Thai King. The solution of appointing a British agent to act for the King of Siam in the Kelantan capital, Kota Bharu, was put forward by Singapore Governor Sir Frank Swettenham. Swettenham's intention was no doubt to use the position of the British Advisor to Kelantan in order to further advance the interests of Britain in the area but in this he was overruled by his own government. Britain may also have felt that Europe was too difficult a continent upon which to play out its rivalry with France and hence

transferred some of that rivalry to Southeast Asia.⁴¹ This did not however lessen the interest of Singapore in obtaining Kelantan, and the precise nature of the Siamese presence in Kelantan, both before and during Graham's tenure, was disputed by Siamese and British officials in an exchange in 1906 concerning the Siamese Malay states, records of which have been preserved in the files of the Foreign Office.⁴²

In his 1906 statement, Phya Sri Sahadheb, a former Siamese Commissioner appointed to London as Special Envoy to negotiate with the British Government on questions of administration in the Siamese Malay States, made a number of claims. He made clear the Siamese government's consternation at the appointment of former Governor Sir Frank Swettenham, whom the Siamese did not regard as an unbiased observer, to head a British inquiry on the future of the Northern Malay States. His reason for this was the report that when Chulalongkorn (Rama V) visited Swettenham at a location not disclosed, "he considered this private and friendly visit paid to him by His Majesty the King a fitting opportunity to propose the cession to Great Britain of this part of Siamese territory."⁴³ Chief among Phya Sri Sahadheb's points on relations between Siam, Kelantan and Trengganu were that:

Siamese troops from Bangkok are continually quartered in Kelantan and Trengganu and the Rajas have no soldiers of their own. There is a garrison of Siamese soldiers amounting to some 300 men that has been stationed permanently in Kelantan for the past four years..

⁴¹ See for example B. Lewis, 'The Western Questions in Asia and North Africa, 1900-45', in D. Thomson ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII The Era of Violence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 219-220.

⁴² Reproduced in the Appendices of S. Talib, *History of Kelantan 1890-1940, op. cit.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

A Siamese military officer has the police force in both these States under his control and discipline.⁴⁴

And the claim that: “For several years past Siamese Commissioners and various Siamese officials have resided in the Provinces of Kelantan and Trengganu, and the Rajas have acknowledged their authority over the internal affairs of the provinces of (sic) many kinds of ways.”⁴⁵

In addition the Siamese claimed to have funded the building of the postal and telegraph services, appointed and paid the salaries of government officials. Other claims were that Kelantan used Siamese stamps and the revenues went to Bangkok; roads and government buildings were constructed under the supervision of the Commissioner under direction from Bangkok. Further to this, the Commissioner claimed that the Raja Kelantan was personally chosen by the King of Siam and that he required leave to depart from his lands; that the Rajas sent reports to Bangkok and were in the habit of asking advice from Siamese officials; that the King of Siam was the final court of appeal; that particular criminal cases had been judged by specially appointed Siamese Commissioners; that certain prisoners had served time in Bangkok or Singora for crimes committed in Kelantan; that the “old barbourous [sic] customs and inhuman judicial practices which prevailed formerly in the Malay States” had been abolished by legislation; that village administration as practised in Siam had been introduced into Kelantan and Trengganu; and even that Siamese law applied in these regions, particularly the Mining Law of 1901 that had been drafted by the Superintendent of

⁴⁴ Cited in *Ibid*: Memorandum by Phya Sri Sahadheb (to Lord Lansdowne)/Memorandum on the Realtions between Siam and the Siamese Malay States of Kelantan and Trengganu, 6 September 1906. pp. 165-169 (Appendix B) at pp. 165-166.

Mining in Siam, Mr Herbert Warington Smyth, who Sahadheb claimed was now working for Lord Milner in South Africa in a similar position. He backed his claims with a letter from the British *chargé d'affaires* at Bangkok, Mr W. J. Archer that acknowledged that a transfer or sub-lease to the Duff Concession should be ratified by the Siamese government.⁴⁶

Swettenham's history as a key figure in the forward movement leaves no doubt that Sahadheb was correct in his assessment of Swettenham's intentions. The issue of Swettenham's bias appears to be beyond dispute, but many of the other issues canvassed were disputed in the response to these claims that another Malay hand, Sir Hugh Clifford, wrote in a memorandum to the Foreign Office dated 25 September 1906⁴⁷ in which he disputed the effective control of Siam in Kelantan and went as far as to infer that many of the Siamese claims were, if not flexible with the truth, out and out exaggerations or lies.

Clifford's counter claims dealt with three basic points: (1) the claimed administrative control of Siam in Kelantan did not even extend to the environs of the capital; (2) that the Siamese commissioner could not have effected anything very much seeing as he had no effective power outside of Kota Bharu; and (3) that even this influence was resented by Kelantanese and any modifications to the existing regime were obtained through coercion. Clifford wrote that whatever influence Siam had in Kelantan was obtained by threat of force and that the achievements of the regime were overstated. In his opening paragraph he noted that: "In considering the Memorandum one or two facts must be

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-169.

borne constantly in mind. The first of these is a passion for ‘paper’ legislation and for ‘make believe’ administration, which is characteristic of Siamese bureaucracy.”⁴⁸

To his knowledge the Rajas were not able to state their case “publicly in writing or in any European language” whereas the Siamese understood such subtleties as the publication of laws and appointments in the government gazette. As such any claims to effective governance were unknown to the Malay Rajahs. On the claim that the Malay Rajahs had no forces of their own, Clifford noted that this was entirely in keeping with traditional Malay custom where regional chiefs provided armed men in times of need. While he agreed there was no standing army, there was a type of pretorian guard which, while poorly disciplined and ineffective, were nonetheless retainers of the Malay Rajahs and not Siamese appointments.

Clifford found it difficult to believe that Phya Sri Sahadheb could have misrepresented so many things about the situation in Kelantan and Trengganu, given that the Siamese had been active in both states since the late nineteenth century. At the same time Clifford’s own Memorandum must be viewed in the light of his own agenda as he argued that the presence of Siamese troops in Kota Bharu was the backbone of whatever administration that existed, and that the Rajah bowed to superior force, rather than consent to any changes. With an estimated literacy rate of 0.2 percent (1 in 500) throughout the state, the provision of postal services was an achievement of dubious merit, even if it did function, which was doubtful. Clifford consistently pointed to anything that was achieved having to be done through the Rajah “who alone is

⁴⁷ Cited in *Ibid.*, Memorandum by H. Clifford, Appendix C, pp. 170-183.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

recognised by his people as the ruler of Kelantan”.⁴⁹ In summary he felt the Siamese claim to control over Kelantan was overstated.

Curiously enough he made no mention of Graham or his administrative reforms and one must imagine that so-well-informed a commentator must have omitted such germane facts for a purpose, *viz.* to demolish any Siamese claims to serious administrative competence. The next chapter evaluates the changes made by Graham’s administration to adjudicate on this matter.

3.9 *Conclusion*

By European standards Kelantan at the turn of the twentieth century had little in the way of a recognisable state structure. British moves to incorporate Kelantan were partially stymied by the desire of the Foreign Office to keep Siam in play as a buffer between France and itself and as a result Britain was not willing to declare a formal protectorate over Kelantan until 1909. By that time Siam’s status as an independent state had been assured through the Entente Cordiale of 1904 and the rivalry between France and Britain, which had come close to war in the ‘Paknam incident’ of 1893, had subsided.⁵⁰

While nineteenth century Siamese relations with Kelantan can hardly be described as colonial, the new Siamese regime of Graham moved to erect a bureaucracy and a

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-176.

⁵⁰ B. Lewis, ‘The Western Questions in Asia and North Africa, 1900-45’, in D. Thomson ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII The Era of Violence*, op. cit., p. 220.

limited infrastructure that could service Kelantan and shape it so as to resemble other parts of the Malay peninsula. By the time of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1902 it is likely that Siam had accepted that it would eventually lose the Northern Malay states to Britain. In the meantime, King Chulalongkorn was able to retain nominal control of Kelantan through the appointment of an Adviser, albeit one of British nationality.

The actions of Graham show that it was the structures of power that were implemented, rather than the nationality of the people directing them, that were the driving force in the shift from a traditional to a modern society. The efforts of Graham to create a workable administrative system in the State of Kelantan are a study in administrative colonialism, and are the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 4: The foundations of the colonial district: Siamese

Administration in Kelantan 1903-1909:

This chapter traces administrative developments in Kelantan introduced under the direction of the Siamese Adviser, Graham, between 1903-1909, a period of significant change within Kelantan. It highlights the commencement of centralised administrative control in these few years before the first decade of official British protection, concentrating on the creation of a working bureaucracy, the extension of civil administration, the rule of law and the provision of services. It examines the extent and character of the administrative expansion in Kelantan's Siamese directed government and argues that colonial administration was constructed on ideas of 'development' and 'civilisation' — both of which could be achieved through the adoption of western administrative traditions. In fashioning the state of Kelantan, Siam's Adviser strayed into areas of Malay society and behaviour that had previously been viewed as outside of Siamese interest. The changes made resembled those taking place to the south in the British parts of Malaya and aimed to create a society governed by law with an efficient and active government.

The result of Graham's reforms had a lasting impact on Kelantan. They highlight the objectives of the Siamese presence, one which differed markedly from the key objectives of later British administration. Where British influence in Kelantan aimed at incorporating Kelantan into a larger colonial structure — 'British Malaya' — the *raison d'être* of Siamese rule was the need to demonstrate administrative competence in its

tributary state. The nature of the Siamese presence draws obvious parallels with British colonialism and while the system of administration as implemented by Siam in Kelantan was rationalist and bureaucratic, Graham held back on implementing key land tax reforms. Administrative colonialism has at its heart the projection of power and influence through systems of rule and structures of government, and it was during this period that the foundations for a colonial state in Kelantan were laid.

4.1 *The Graham Administration*

The analysis of Siam's administration in Kelantan between 1903-1909 as presented in this chapter is based largely on the first two reports penned by Graham. They detail what he found on his arrival and his initial moves to deepen its administration by coopting the aristocracy into a new system based on sinecures. Reliance on only the first two reports was dictated by available resources during fieldwork in Malaysia while further archival and secondary sources have been consulted to supplement the later years of his tenure. These reports are the first and most comprehensive documents relating to Kelantan in the early twentieth century and have been used widely by Malaysian and other scholars in the writing of Kelantan's history.¹

For Graham, British mastery of, and expertise in, the 'art' of governance meant that British models of administration were the logical ones to implement in order to give the best service to his employer. The development of government administration in

¹ See for example, S. Talib, *A History of Kelantan 1890-1940*, MBRAS Monograph No. 21, Kuala Lumpur, 1995; W. R. Roff, ed., *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, Oxford

Kelantan along lines familiar to western notions of bureaucracy and government, and closely related to the actions of the British in the FMS, was no accident. The reports reveal Graham had a deep knowledge in British Law in Burma and of Siamese administration. The proximity of Kelantan to British Malaya made British administrative practices the natural choice and it is likely that Graham had received instructions also from the British Foreign Office.²

His dual role should not however be taken as an indicator that he was working to make Kelantan British. As his reports show, his main concern was with establishing good government, whoever his employer, and while employed by Siam he did his level best to ensure that Siamese, not British, influence was felt in Kelantan.

Graham's first report, which covered his first year in Kelantan, is thirty-two typewritten foolscap pages, and he included several appendices.³ In the introduction Graham commented on his arrival; the reception of the Siamese Adviser system and his impressions of the feelings of the Kelantanese people toward the new arrangements; the

University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1974; and C. Kessler, *Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan 1838-1969*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1978.

² R. Huessler, *British Rule in Malaya: The Malayan Civil Service and its Predecessors, 1867-1942*, Clio Press, Oxford, 1981, p. 236, claims that Graham was a Foreign Office appointee and reported to London. He was however in the employ of the King of Siam and was responsible to Bangkok. Huessler argues that Graham's status as a Siamese official was "purely pro forma". Graham's use of particular words and expressions makes clear that he was writing for an audience literate in English, and well aware of nuances of language. It is more likely that rather than "working" for the Foreign Office, Graham knew that his reports would be read by Foreign Office officials as a matter of course. His protests against the British takeover in 1909 on behalf of Siam would appear to argue against Huessler's claim that Graham was working for Britain. W. R. Roff, in W. R. Roff ed. *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, p.41 fn 62, writes "Graham had considerable administrative experience, first in British Burma and then with the Government of Siam, in whose Land Department in Bangkok he was then serving. Despite his British Nationality, Graham may be regarded as having been 'pro-Siamese' in the situation in which he now found himself." I tend to agree with Roff.

³ W. A. Graham, *Kelantan Administration Report (KAR) 1903/4*, Bangkok 1904. Photocopy of microfilm report obtained by permission of the Arkib Negara Malaysia.

general state of the government and the security forces; the prior performance of the Siamese commissioner; the power and roles of Raja Senik's uncles and the overall prospects for improvement in the State.⁴ In the section concerning Administration, he detailed the arrangements that preceded him, then went on to explore the situation on the ground with regard to the police force, the justice system and the jail; public works, including the postal system and telegraphs; the conditions of life outside of the capital; the progress of railways and roads; and matters of finance, land, agriculture, mining activity and current staff levels.⁵ In the final section Graham recorded what information he had garnered on the geography, climate, population, health, religion, education, sports, traditional industries and trade relations of Kelantan and gave his estimation of prospects for Kelantan's improvement and development.⁶ The appendices covered revenue and expenditure; rainfall; temperature and heads of estimates for the coming year.

Such a comprehensive review indicates a systematic and careful approach toward studying government, and reflects the view that government could be regarded as a quasi science. Financial accountability, scientific observation and an ordered approach to his task all reflect the late Victorian concerns that order and rationality were keys to progress: information is viewed by Graham as central to just and rational solutions and the level of detail present in the reports indicates his preoccupations. He was also quite conscious of the difficult political position into which he had been thrust. When commenting on the treaty concerning the status of Kelantan and his own appointment,

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-29.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-41.

along with that of Mr H. W. Thomson as His Siamese Majesty's Assistant Adviser⁷, he wrote:

The appointment of an Englishman as His Majesty's Representative and Adviser was at first received with scarcely veiled suspicion. Whether the State was to continue a dependency of Siam or to be taken under the protection of England had for a long time been a burning question with the public, a definite answer to which was anxiously desired.

Now at length, an answer was forthcoming but to many it appeared to be no answer at all. It was supposed to have been definitely settled that the State was a Siamese Dependency and yet here were Englishmen arriving to advise and control the government. The agreement which rendered this arrangement possible was signed by H. H. the Raja and was seen by all his council, but it is probable that it was not fully understood by half a dozen persons in the State, and its provisions were certainly quite unknown to the public. Hence conjecture, far from ceasing, continued to flourish exceedingly, and it is only now, when the oft repeated intentions of His Majesty's Government toward the State are slowly becoming visible facts, that the intellect of the community begins dimly to perceive that a genuine answer to the vexed question has in fact been given.⁸

⁷ Talib notes that Thomson was the "former District Officer of Kuantan and was appointed by the Colonial Office for this post on the recommendation of H. [later Sir Hugh] Clifford" (S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 61, fn. 1). Thomson was later acting British Adviser Kelantan during February - October 1919, British Adviser Kelantan Oct 1919-Mach 1920 and again from late Dec 1920-end of August 1922. See *ibid.*, Appendix L, p. 225.

⁸ *KAR 1903-1904*, pp. 1-2.

Clearly few people in Kelantan understood the details surrounding the appointments of Graham and Thomson. Given that Kelantan became a British protectorate in 1909 the question arises as to whether Graham saw his own appointment as an interregnum. From his writings and communication with his superiors in Bangkok it is more likely that he developed and implemented an independent theory of good government which required technocratic and competent administration not tied to the imperial ambitions of any state. Kelantan required proper administration by the controlling power, but for Graham, British control of Kelantan was neither inevitable nor preferable.

He quite clearly saw himself as the King's man — but his allegiance was to his employer Chulalongkorn in Bangkok and not to George V in London. His job as he perceived and wrote of it was to “advise and control the government”, which is notable as it demonstrates the intention of governing by indirect rule. Nonetheless the general level of suspicion in the community of Graham and of his intentions remained high for some time, and this was especially the case among the Kelantan elite who reacted strongly when he made moves to strip them of the privileges they had previously enjoyed. Graham's ultimate ability to sway such forces to support his efforts had the effect of entrenching the position of the Raja and ossified political relations in Kelantan.

4.2 *Building the state*

When Graham and Thomson came to Kelantan aboard His Siamese Majesty's Gunboat *Muratha* on 25 July 1903, they were accompanied by His Highness Mom Chao Charoon, the Deputy Commissioner of Nakhon Sri Tammarat. They disembarked at the

mouth of the Kelantan River and transferred to a launch that took them to Kota Bharu⁹ where they were met by the Raja Muda and other members of the Kelantan elite. From here they were taken to the *Balai* (the Raja Kelantan's palace) where they were introduced to His Highness Raja Senik.¹⁰ The commands of his Siamese Majesty concerning the appointments of Graham and Thomson — mentioned by Graham as the *Kra Yai*— were read to a packed house. There were speeches, more introductions and a banquet.¹¹ The next day the Siamese Commissioner left Kelantan and returned to Singora (Songhkla). In the days that followed many of the Siamese who had previously been stationed in Kelantan also departed.¹² Those few Siamese who remained formed the core of Graham's new administration in Kelantan.¹³

Graham spent his first weeks in Kelantan around Kota Bharu and its environs.¹⁴ He discovered that the previous Siamese Commissioner had managed some reforms but over the past year or so “a distinct retrogression in the affairs of the State appeared to have taken place”. The Police Force had become “uniformed banditti and licensed blackmailers”; the simple telephone system connecting Kota Bharu to the main port at

⁹ Graham does not indicate exactly where they first docked although Tumpat, at the mouth of the Sungai Kelantan and the major port of the region would be the presumed locale. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁰ Graham notes that Mom Chao Charoon had the responsibility of introducing the Englishmen but it is not clear from his description whether the formal introduction to Raja Senik was performed by a Siamese or Kelantanese. *Ibid.*

¹¹ Graham's exact words on the reading of the commands are: “... the Kra Yai containing the commands of His Majesty anent (sic) our appointments..”. *Ibid.* The use of the rare preposition was most uncommon even in the early 20th century and indicates that his reports were not written for readers of English as a second language. It is more likely they were written for himself with a view to them being shown to British officials.

¹² Graham does not specify numbers but does note that the deputy Commissioner left, as did the Assistant Commissioner, the Doctor and the marines. Their presence of the marines appears to have been mainly military in the form of a small party who had formed the Residency Guard. *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *KAR 1903-4*, p. 2.

the mouth of the Sungai Kelantan, Tumpat, was broken; roads were unfinished and the conduct of legal cases “burlesque”.

[T]hese and other things plainly indicated that efforts had at one time been made to introduce the elements of administration into the State. Such indications were, in fact, the sorry reminder of erstwhile labours of former Commissioners in the days before political complication thrust them and their advice on one side and emboldened His Highness and his Council to enter, ignorant and unaided, upon an attempt at independent rule, the result of which was a quite extraordinary exhibition of hopeless incompetence and corruption.¹⁵

From the tone of his writing it is obvious that Graham had no intention of allowing such anarchic arrangements to continue: his notion of good government would not permit it. Particular blame for the administrative mess was laid squarely at the feet of Raja Senik’s seven uncles who he felt consistently abused their positions and privileges beyond belief. According to Graham the ruler himself was “lamentably infirm of purpose”¹⁶ and because of this his uncles had been able to extract all manner of privileges and exemptions including annual stipends, the right to *krah* labour when required, imprisonment without trial of anyone who displeased them and were selling licences and diverting state revenue to themselves. He felt they were a law unto themselves. Graham provides ample evidence of the contempt for which he held the ruling elite, the condition of the state and the way forward for Kelantan.

It is possible that were the uncles of his Highness imbued with any regard for the welfare of the State, their combination, by checking the despotic power of their nephew, might

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

have been productive of more good than harm, but though the consideration of the public welfare is frequently in their mouths, evidence is wanting as to their ever having actually benefited anybody but themselves.

The results of this peculiar form of government may be imagined but cannot be adequately described. The more prominent were the reduction to an absurd minimum of the revenue of one of the largest, as well as the richest, rural communities of the whole peninsula, the immunity from punishment of criminals of the worst description, the liability to persecution of innocent and unoffending persons, and an ever present atmosphere of unrest and intrigue.

Though the condition of the State was thus little short of anarchy, and it required small discernment to perceive that until something could be done to strengthen the position of His Highness and to reduce the power of his uncles, nothing could be hoped for in the way of good government, yet the outlook was not entirely without its bright side.¹⁷

Such optimism centred on the fact that the State of Kelantan was undoubtedly a prosperous agricultural region, but also in what Graham saw as the good instincts of the majority of the people. To this base would be added his administrative reforms. In his mind he compartmentalised the entire state structure, creating departments and state functionary positions at will.

He created a miniature civil service to meet Kelantan's needs. Graham's actions suggest that his ambitions were twofold: first, to erect the trappings of an ordered and recognisable state to ensure Siam observed her treaty obligations for stability and good government in her dependency; and second, to coopt elements within the Kelantan elite

who were hostile to his administration and the direction of the reforms so that they supported him rather than worked against him.

Driving through reforms was thus an issue of political necessity for Siam and for Graham as the treaty made clear that his advice was to be accepted by Raja Senik and his State Council. Specifically, Graham was concerned about Raja Senik's seven uncles who, he hinted, had some power over "many thousands of the inhabitants of the State", through poll tax exemption and rights to *krah*.¹⁸ Cooperation with the existing ruling elite was thus far preferable to outright confrontation, particularly as Siam had no desire to be seen to be heavy handed or to use its troops to enforce order. But if cooperation with the ruling elite was necessary for the purpose of bringing order where Graham saw only anarchy, the other side of the coin required the cooption of the ruling elite and their support for his designs to guarantee good government. Such a *modus vivendi* was political pragmatism, but it also served to entrench the position of the ruling house with Raja Senik at its head, all of which was entirely consistent with Graham's purpose of providing stable government.

All laws in Kelantan required the seal of the Raja and a stable and compliant throne was therefore a necessity for indirect rule. Since his ascension Raja Senik had governed with some pressure from his uncles and a goal for Graham was to establish the monarch as the undisputed Head of the State of Kelantan and free him from influences other than the measured and impartial advice that would, of course, be provided by his Adviser. In order to make this a reality, Graham was forced to give employment to particular

¹⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 3-4.

individuals in the state administration, people he would otherwise have passed over. While his opinion of the Malay elite of Kelantan was rather low he was quite conscious that important people required positions commensurate with their status, even if they were, to his mind at least, totally corrupt and inept administrators. The adage “if you can’t beat them, join them” quickly became “if you can’t beat them, employ them.”

4.3 *Law and order*

Administrative colonialism depended on self-policing as a form of social control. The shift from government by oppression to government by tacit consent meant imperial needs could be reflected in the priorities of the new societies. The underpinning of society through the use of law and order was an echo of the administrative regimes controlling people in Britain and the use of police to apprehend those who breeched new laws was designed to make most of Kelantan’s people obey the logic of the new system.

The mixed Malay and Indian police service combined the British belief in martial races — those peoples born for fighting such as the Punjabis of India, the Masai of Kenya or the Northern Muslims of Nigeria¹⁹ — with the realisation that a totally alien force would never work. Graham builds the police to resemble a professional force and thus they become useful for the administrative colonial state.²⁰

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁹ J. W. Cell, ‘Colonial Rule’ in J. M. Brown and W. R. Louis eds, *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume IV, The Twentieth Century*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 232-254, at p. 243.

²⁰ There does not appear to be an in depth study of the police forces of the Kelantan, or the Malayan police forces more generally, for the period under consideration. The specific detail for the discussion of

The professionalisation of the police removed power from the Kelantan elite. The combination of police and the threat of incarceration in the gaol meant that people began to control their own behaviour so as not to cross the colonial state. They thus became partially self-policing and acted in ways that were designed not to draw attention to themselves.

In acting as he did Graham embodied the approach of the colonial middle manager; the desire to do the best one can in one's area of responsibility. There are however many ways to administer justice and in Malay society the people preferred consensus to conflict. When it expanded its reach, the administrative colonial state also required a degree of loyalty. Conflict was felt necessary to break the relationship that people had to alternate sources of authority. By positioning itself directly into the lives of everyday people through the resolution of disputes and the dispensation of justice, the administrative colonial state under Siamese rule sought to establish the legal system that rendered a larger military presence unnecessary.

4.3.1 *The Police*

When Graham reviewed the “uniformed banditti” that had constituted the police force before his arrival he found that there were around 150 men who were meant to be paid monthly. They rarely, if ever, received any payment in the form of wages from the state so the police were forced to be entrepreneurial in their search for funds to pay

police in this chapter is gleaned from the KAR 1903-4 and 1904-5, and S. Talib, *History of Kelantan*

themselves, the most usual tactic being the levying of spot fines. Half of the police were Malays and half Punjabis — described by Graham as “Mohammedans and Sikhs”. Official pay for Malay constables was \$6 and for Punjabi constables \$13. The highest Police rank was that of sergeant which attracted \$10 for Malays and \$17 for Punjabis. While the Malay police lived at home and attended the Police station only if called, the immigrants Punjabis were not provided with any accommodation, a factor that most likely explains the differing rates of nominal pay.²¹ The Malay police had uniforms but

... more usually considered a single garment, a red cap or khaki coat, sufficient concession to the demands of their calling. One or more generally slept through the day in the court House, but their chief duty seemed to be to accompany their Sergeants on unholy night expeditions, from which they seldom returned without loot of some sort.²²

The Malay element of the police force appears to have been untrained. For Graham such men could not therefore be expected to, and did not, behave like proper policemen.²³ The presence of the Punjabis in Kelantan suggests that some attempt had been made in the past to install a professional police force. While Graham did not expect quality and professionalism in the Malays, having worked in Burma he had higher expectations of the Punjabis, and he was typically frank in his assessment of their capabilities.

1890-1940, *op. cit.*

²¹ KAR 1903-1904, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6. This distinction in pay is not commented upon by Graham.

²² *Ibid.* pp. 5-6.

²³ The British Empire offered military opportunities to many of its conquered and British rule in India was enforced by the Indian Army in which the martial peoples of India — historically the Muslims, Sikhs, Rajputs, Dogras, Marattas and Ghurkhas who viewed soldiering as an honourable calling — were commanded by British officers. See for example James Morris, *Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire*, London, Penguin, [1968] 1979, pp. 410-412.

The Punjabis were the remnant of that fine force of cow-keepers, sweetmeat sellers and broken shopkeepers which was raised in Singapore a year or two ago, and which caused a frenzy of excitement in French Colonial circles when certain newspapers called it a regiment of the British Indian Native Army. That these men were British subjects is true, but there all resemblance ended. A mob of undisciplined outcasts, badly clothed and worse armed, which to liken to soldiery or police were to insult those professions, it is difficult to see what His Highness, or whoever engaged them, can have expected from them in the way of service.²⁴

Whatever their provenance the police were overseen by the eldest Uncle of Raja Senik, Tunkgu Sri Maha Raja, who received \$20 per month for his position but was felt by Graham to be inexperienced, corrupt and “lacking any instinct of fairness or consistency”.²⁵ He delegated most operational decisions to the senior Malay Sergeant who “was a trusted hanger-on of the Tungkku, who brought to the service a high capacity for villainy of every description, for the exercise of which his position gave him full opportunity....”.²⁶ The extent of the police force’s influence may be seen by its geographic scope and command structure. There was a central police station in Kota Bharu, a small satellite station on the edge of Kota Bharu at which seven men “... divided their time between watching His Highness’ garden and conducting the education of fighting cocks...”, and there were four stations in outlying villages, none of which is geographically specified by Graham.

Graham noted that the central police station in Kota Bharu housed the mentally ill, civil debtors and, sometimes, even criminals. Some of these people were incarcerated at the

²⁴ *KAR 1903-4*, p. 6.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

police station for many months. A constable was on duty but often absented himself, whereupon, his wife or grandmother would perform the duty of striking the time on an old ship's bell. Other comments indicate his opinion of the police service: "Here also a bugle was blown at midnight with the intention, apparently, of creating a false impression that the police were awake and on the alert". He reported that the four outlying stations were totally autonomous which demonstrates the absence of any centralised command structure. Like the uncles, the police outside of Kota Bharu were a law unto themselves.²⁷

Having surveyed the scene Graham approached the task of reorganisation with a degree of caution. Rather than dismiss the existing head of police, Tungku Sri Maha Raja, Graham retained him. An amnesty over past criminal behaviour was declared and a Regulation concerning Police work was drafted and passed, followed by explanations of the official duties of the force.²⁸ Graham found this approach of forgiveness and training had no effect on the continuation of corrupt practices. Rough justice was then invoked and the senior Malay Sergeant was sentenced to a five year jail term for harbouring a criminal.

Having made an example of a senior officer there was a marked improvement in the attitude of many police to their work. That Graham could imprison the trusted confidant of Tungku Sri Maha Raja for previously acceptable behaviour indicated a sea change in

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

official attitudes to police duties and discipline. According to Graham some in the existing force found the new conditions difficult:

The majority of the Malay officers, having either run away, terrified at the idea of having to be honest, or been dismissed, have been replaced by others of a different class, writers have been appointed for each Station, proper registries have been introduced and good uniforms and quarters are being provided.²⁹

The mention of Malays “of a different class” coming in and improving the force is a reference to the previous occupiers of the positions, the Kelantan elite. Graham’s poor opinion of the adaptability toward change of the elite is contrasted in his general affirmation of the fundamental character of the rural Malay. Reading Graham’s reports one gets a sense that he had a lot of sympathy for the rural Malay who was in his opinion downtrodden and oppressed by the aristocracy of Kelantan. He continued to hold this belief and in 1909 penned the entry for the neighbouring state of Trengganu in the thirteenth edition of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and was able to compare it with what he had built in Kelantan.

There were no written laws, no courts, and no police. All manner of crime was rampant, the peasantry was mercilessly downtrodden, but the land was full of holy men and the cries of the miserable were drowned in the noise of ostentatious prayer. In fine, Trengganu presented in the beginning of 1909 the type of untrammelled Malay rule which was fortunately disappeared from every State in the Peninsula.³⁰

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

For Graham the ineptitude of Malay rule was due to the incompetence and indolence of the elites: the aristocracy were parasites and exploited the average village farmer, craftsman or fisherman. The lower class Malay however had Graham's approval and so, despite its previous record of ineptitude and corruption, he felt an efficient police force, the basic element of both central control and indirect rule, could be fashioned from what he had available. After imprisoning the Malay Sergeant, he set the Malay force at 130, the Punjabis at 50, created another village station, drafted and enforced the Police Regulations, emptied the police station of the mentally ill and debtors and reduced the amount of time during which a criminal could be held there. New procedures for dealing with cases were also implemented and a system introduced whereby a police writer recorded the complaints and each complaint was followed up by investigation. The creation of procedure was the first step in establishing the rule of law.

To give the force some backbone Graham engaged a retired Sergeant of the Malay States Guides, Jemadah Bur Sing,³¹ to train and command the Punjabis. In a move reminiscent of the physical separation of alien troops from the major populations of those being governed, like the cantonment system prevalent in India,³² Graham

³⁰ Graham, cited in R. Emerson, *Malaya: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule*, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, [1937] Reprinted 1964, p.255.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.7. Graham gives the name of his appointment in his 1904/5 report, *op. cit.*, p. 23. The Malay States guides were the highly selective regiment of "Sikhs and Pathans" created in 1896 when the Federated Malay States became a reality. F. A. Swettenham, *British Malaya: an account of the origin and progress of British influence in Malaya*, London, 1908, p. 276-277.

³² See for example, K. Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and Their Critics 1793-1905*, New York, St Martin's Press 1980, 'The Contagious Diseases and Cantonments Acts in India', pp. 40-67. "Because the authorities feared that contact with Indian life had mysterious demoralising effects, the soldier was discouraged from 'wandering' in the 'native city'." These concerns stemmed from the rising incidence of venereal disease in the British Army in India in the late nineteenth century which caused a number of troops to be hospitalised, thus sapping the vital force of Empire. It was thought that tighter regulation and licensing of prostitutes, combined with the restriction of troops to cantonments away from main towns would alleviate the problem. Opportunities for sexual

acquired land outside the town and built facilities for the police, including barracks with married and single quarters and a hospital,³³ thus physically removing the newly fashioned and moderately professional force from the main town. He thus employed the old maxim of ‘divide and rule’ in the sense that he separated the police from the people they were to administer, presumably to keep the police as his agents, and his agents alone.

Graham acted swiftly and decisively in Kelantan to impose order. He was able to obtain the consent, albeit sometimes grudgingly, of the Raja and the State Council for his decisions. His reports make no comment that this consent was ever being either withheld or difficult to achieve. By 1905 things had improved, but the royal family still on occasion used the new police force to arrest and try any person they wished in the courts.³⁴ This practice was soon eliminated by Graham and expansion continued. By 1908 there were thirteen police stations and a police school, with a total force of 223.³⁵ By this stage the force was at least competent, if not totally professional.

relations were however still furnished to British troops by the military authorities as the alternative to the greater evil of homosexuality. *Ibid.*, p.162.

³³ KAR 1903/4, pp. 6-7.

³⁴ A. Hassan, *The Administration of Islamic Law in Kelantan*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, p.176. This information is gleaned by Hassan from Graham. KAR 1904/5, p.6.

³⁵ *Draft Administrator's Report for Year 1326 AH (1908)* from the Files of British Adviser Kelantan (BAK) # 227/10, Arkib Negara Malaysia. This document was most likely penned by Graham.

4.3.2 *The justice system*

Kelantan was an Islamic State but it did not follow *sharia* (Islamic) law in all matters. From what is known of the nineteenth century, the administration of justice in Kelantan was divided between religious and royal authorities. The Raja was the final court of appeal for non-religious cases and the mufti for religious ones. In the cases that made it to court, *penghulus* (untrained advocates) would stress the merits of their clients to the authorities in an attempt to diminish or dismiss charges.

The previous Siamese Commissioners at Singora and the one stationed in Kelantan had managed to get Raja Senik to build a courthouse and appoint judges. This he had done, but the judge was expected to side with the established order in occasions of “might against right”. With the courts an arena for elite abuse of power, and justice purchased by the highest bidder, judicial interpretation in Kelantan was varied. Graham objected to murderers being freed as sharia law allowed blood money as compensation for the families of victims. This contrasted starkly with Graham’s notions of fairness and equity in the legal system, legal representation (even if inadequate), and an impartial judicature. Graham opined on the value of Malay custom as a method of dealing with judicial issues:

Now “Malay Custom”, as interpreted in Kelantan, provides, among other things, that the crime of murder may be punished by a fine which may amount to anything from \$10 to \$1000; that theft is punishable with mutilation, though this has within recent years been replaced by the imposition of a small fine; that the evidence of women is inadmissible in murder trials, and that an accused person can at any time go free on solemnly swearing his

innocence. Hence it is difficult to see how the promotion of good government and contentment was to be secured as long as “Malay Custom” was in no way interfered with. Fortunately, after the problem had been set before him, His Highness perceived that reorganisation of Justice made for consolidation of his own power and decided, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Imam and the upper class generally, that, in the interests of Law and Order, Malay Custom must be departed from in dealing with crime.³⁶

While the need for administrative restructuring was apparent, Graham was also well aware of the treaty prescription against his interference in matters concerning Islam and Malay custom in Kelantan. Yet he openly challenged both Islam and customary practice and presented the plan for legal and judicial reform as the Raja’s decision, thus upholding the fiction that the Head of State was in charge and that Graham was less powerful than the Raja Kelantan. Graham accepted and understood the limitations of his rule: first he had to rule through the Malay Raja; second the ruler must understand the necessity of any changes and provide them with his seal of approval; thirdly, discretion in action was important as any changes implemented could not provoke open revolt. His legal reforms had the dual effect of creating a workable justice system and strengthening the position of the Raja against the emergence of possible alternative power centres.

Graham drafted a regulation “for the establishment of Courts where found necessary” (Bill No. 3 of 1903), the effect of which was to set up a hierarchical courts system. It retained the religious court which continued to be presided over by Imams and Hajjis,³⁷ but the civil court structure was divided into a Court of Small Cases with one judge, and

³⁶ *KAR 1904/5, op. cit.*, p. 37.

a Central Court with three judges, one of whom was a Siamese former Assistant Commissioner, Luang Tammarat To Ratan who had been “engaged by his Highness as an official of the State.” At the top there was the High Court that also served as a Court of Appeal. This was presided over by the Raja and one other, in this case his uncle Tungku Sri Perkuma Raja. The High Court had both original and appellant jurisdiction but was seldom called up to do much more than hear appeals.³⁸

Graham found his new system worked tolerably well despite the lack of legal training in the exercise of justice, rules of evidence and court procedure, “though naturally the first efforts are no more than infantile staggerings, frequently resulting, in spite of constant watching, in the most lamentable falls.” By 1 July 1904 the judge of Court of Small Cases in Kota Bharu had heard 148 cases and had 21 pending; the Central Court, also in Kota Bharu, heard 105 cases with 35 pending. In the seven months from September 1904 to March 1905 the High Court heard 65 cases, 56 on appeal, the Central Court heard 106 cases dismissing 25; the small court heard 216 including 26 dismissals. In the Ulu Kelantan the Manager of the Duff Company had the powers of a judge of the small court and tried any cases he could, forwarding the returns to Graham and five cases were heard by the court of the Manager.³⁹ In the draft report of 1908 the Adviser reviewed around 200 decisions but did not change any one. A special court for revenue evaders was established and a Mr Johnson brought in to assist the judges in their work. In total for the year 1326 (1908) there were 440 civil cases and 1516 criminal cases of

³⁷ Those who have completed the *Haj* (also spelt *Hadj*) pilgrimage to Mecca, a goal for all Muslims.

³⁸ A. Hasan, *The Administration of Islamic Law in Kelantan*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁹ *KAR 1904/5*, *op. cit.*, pp.37-38.

which 1038 were convicted, 411 acquitted and 67 unsolved. Petty offences constituted more than one third of the total.⁴⁰

Of all the courts, The High Court gave Graham the most trouble:

The High Court is undoubtedly the weakest link in the system. His Highness and his uncle Sri Perkurma, hitherto quite incapable of mastering the barest rudiments of the new procedure, constitute a Court the vagaries of which might well cause the mildest of reformers to despair. His Highness sits in his Palace: complainant, accused, witnesses, pleaders and the general public, freely intermingling, squat about him at a respectful distance: any chance comer may be invited to assist the Judges in probing the depths of the matter in hand, and, with infinite betel chewing and sipping of sweet coffee, whole weeks are comfortably whittled away in argument which leads to nothing.⁴¹

Graham let the pace and style of High Court deliberations continue but “in the hearing of appeals from the lower Courts, the natural instinct for the Judges to go wrong is checked by the proviso in the Regulations to the effect that reference to the Adviser must be made before the passing of Judgement.” Through this regulation Graham was able to enforce the cooperation of the Raja in exercising a proper process of judicial review. He was a grey eminence and the power behind the throne: in legal affairs he observed all and offered advice that was meant to be taken.

⁴⁰ BAK # 227/10, *Draft Report 1908*, Section on Justice.

⁴¹ KAR 1903/4, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

In his 1903 report Graham wrote that in order to deal with the backlog of cases awaiting trial or decisions from the old system “His Highness is about to constitute a special Court.” This was later found not to be necessary as the legal system expanded and discharged the backlog of cases. Yet this comment makes clear that it was Graham who controlled the Raja. By 1908 the secular legal system was well in place and the Mufti, Haji Wan Sabah, and the Judge of the Islamic court, Said Mohammed, who had been in constant opposition, were removed from their positions by the Raja Muda.⁴² Neither the Islamic religion nor Malay custom was immune from Graham’s reformist zeal.

Like the police the judges had paid their own way. Graham was determined to set up an impartial court system and paid his judges well, nearly double the nominal rates. With the state paying salaries and the fines actually being collected, the difference between Court receipts and the cost of running the Court system was found to be just \$40 which led to the comment “from which it may be inferred that in the past the judges made a very good thing out of their appointments and left the subordinate officers to eke out a living as best they could by dishonest means.”⁴³

By 1905 Graham’s legal system had small courts in Kota Bharu, Pasir Puteh and Batu Menkebang, as well as the Manager of the Duff Development Company. The state was taking justice to the main population and trade centres while it kept up the work in the capital with the central court. Cementing the Raja as the Highest Court of Appeal combined the position of chief justice with the mystical *daulat* of kingship and further decreased the possibility of a challenge to the Raja’s position. Graham’s quite open

⁴² BAK # 227/10, *Draft Report 1908*, Section on Justice.

challenge to the legally and culturally sacrosanct status of “Malay Customs” indicates both that he was operating from a position of great power and influence and that he regarded the task of state building as necessitating the elimination of past abuses, even if they were regarded as quasi religious or typically Malay.

4.3.3 *The Jail*

There was a jail in Kota Bharu that had been built by the previous Siamese Commissioner. Inspecting the 170 by 84 ft compound and the 48 by 24 ft jail at its centre, Graham found that although the building itself was quite reasonable in the main, the management of the facility by none other than His Highness the Raja was not entirely satisfactory. It was fairly clean but resembled more a camp for travellers as relatives were allowed to stay inside the compound, and prisoners had their friends stay over. Opium and tobacco could be brought into the jail. Sentences could be curtailed through the payment of a fee of discharge appropriate to the prisoner and the crime, leg irons could be removed in exchange for a smaller fee. Graham noted the prisoners paid the salaries of the warders and what was left went into the pockets of the Raja or his cronies. Most of the prisoners were those who had had the temerity to somehow annoy “those in high places”, members of the aristocracy who then had them imprisoned.⁴⁴

⁴³ *KAR 1903/4, op. cit.*, p.10. The currency is the British Dollar.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.11.

Graham removed the Raja from the undignified position of superintendent of prisons and replaced him with a relative. He cleared the inside of the prison compound of the temporary structures that had been erected and acquired more land nearby on which he built a guard house and stationed Indian Police. Jail wardens were appointed, salaries set and paid, provisions granted and latrines constructed; friends and relatives were “no longer allowed to roam at will inside”. For those whose stay of incarceration was at the discretion of a powerful member of the aristocracy a review of sentences was conducted. Warrants were introduced and prisoners released on time. Prisoners on the road gang assisted in the upkeep of clean streets but were essentially a captive labour force that could be used for the public good. They were also put to work within the jail making bamboo baskets and handicrafts, a form of rehabilitation or at least an economic use for the captive labour and a form of compensation to society for the transgression of the prisoner. With a capacity of about 60 prisoners the jail was however already full. A new jail was suggested to His Highness, and as with the police it was to be housed outside of the main town.

4.4 *Public works and communications infrastructure*

When Graham arrived there was a total of fifteen miles of roads in and around Kota Bharu but most were effectively useless as they lacked bridges or were in a state of disrepair. A few Public Buildings existed although one of which, the Balai, he considered to be the Raja’s own Palace and drew up a separate budget for it. Of the others there was a Court House, a poorly built police station and a dilapidated Residency which had been the home of the Siamese Commissioner. Two government services, Post Office and Telegraphs, operated from the homes of employees.

In the past road repair had been contracted out by another Uncle, Tungku Besar Tuan Soh. Despite the earth being most suitable for road construction the flood plain of the Kelantan river delta meant that for a road to survive the rains it needed to be raised. This was not however the case and both the roads and the streets turned to bogs when the rains came. There was apparently none of the sense of a road being a neutral space or free area in which all people and traffic could pass unmolested. Instead Graham complained of the dumping of household rubbish on the road, and encroachment onto its precinct by stalls and commerce.

Graham retained Uncle Tunku Besar as Head of the Office of Public Works but real progress required specialists who brought scientific study and professional expertise to complex problems. Luckily, “His Highness was so fortunate as to secure the services of a competent Engineer, a Mr Richards, who has been of the greatest assistance in guiding the efforts of Tungku Besar and whose zeal in the execution of his duties is impossible to overrate.”⁴⁵

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.13.

Clearly Graham was developing a technocracy and increasing the technical capacity of the state. Mr Richard's appointment allowed the roads to be raised above the ground in an effort to avoid flood waters and thus maintain contact and communication at all times. The roads program was methodically arranged and by 1910 there were six miles of properly constructed town street and seventeen miles of country road, with the British administration surveying more. Other measures included the establishment of rubbish dumps; and the construction of bridges and pavements. The progress was charted on a map (borrowed from Mr Pavitt of the Duff Development Company) showing all the tributaries of the Kelantan river. Graham felt that opening the inland to roads would increase the value of the land and be "of great advantage to those regions". He even had in mind articulating his roads system with one that may in the future emerge from the Duff Concession.⁴⁶

The Post Office had been established by a former Siamese Commissioner and brought in just over \$100 a month for the state although it cost \$80 to run, a modest profit indeed. The Siamese government contracted weekly steamers, run by the East Asiatic company, to travel between Bangkok and Singapore and these stopped briefly at Tumpat to transfer mail to the Post Office boat.⁴⁷ Away from the coast there was no demand for the service and the one office at the main harbour was probably ample for the needs of the State. Most Kelantanese were in any case illiterate. The existence of the postal service owed more to Siamese design than Kelantanese aspiration.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-16.

Telegraphs lost money at around \$150 a month, but such a loss-making enterprise as this was tolerable as it was important for Siamese communication with Graham. The telegraph had been introduced before Graham arrived and the single telegraph line went north to Siam's muang Sai in Patani. The fact that the telegraph line started, or stopped, on the west bank of the Kelantan river, away from the main town of Kota Bharu, indicates that the Siamese were the ones doing the contacting, having extended southwards as part of the Peninsula Trunk Line.⁴⁸

Singora, the capital of the Siamese muang Nakhon that had previously administered Kelantan, still desired communication with Graham.⁴⁹ In November 1903 Graham failed in an attempt to get the telegraph line across the Kelantan River and into Kota Bharu. "A further effort will be made this year to get the line over, as much time in dispatching messages is lost in sending them across to the office by boat." By 1905 he had still not managed to connect the telegraph to Kota Bharu but apparently had direct and ready access to the line to Singora.⁵⁰

Letting the people of Kelantan know about the government and its plans required publication of his actions. Graham found a printing press "Originally a toy of His Highness, the machinery has been improved and provided with type and is now used for

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Mail boats stopped at Tumpat.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* Telegraphs were subsidised by a Siamese government department. Siam would even supply *gratis* anything that Graham needed to build up the telegraph line in Kelantan that he could not obtain locally.

⁴⁹ Phuket was replaced as Kelantan's administrators in the late 1890s.

⁵⁰ Problems were encountered when the Sinhalese ("Cingalese") linesman fell ill at the station in Che He, some 12 miles north of Kota Bharu, "and no other person would be found to take his place". Fortunately His Highness the Raja, no doubt inspired by a conversation with his Adviser Graham, had the presence of mind to employ a specialist telegraph operator, this time a Chinese, seconded from the Royal Siam Posts and Telegraphs Department, *KAR 1903/4*, *op. cit.*, p. 14. The telephones that existed were few and were

printing Government Notifications and Forms.” By August 1905, the cost of repair to the printing press had reached diminishing returns and Graham subcontracted the printing of notices to the American Mission Group in Singapore.⁵¹

4.5 *The Administration and the Duff Company*

Much was expected from the Duff Development Company Limited (DDCL) in terms of gold, and the river did contain quantities of alluvial gold. The initial listing of the Duff Syndicate on the stock market in London indicated that the subscribers and shareholders held great hopes for its fortunes in Kelantan where Duff had secured a vast concession with mining, planting and trading rights.⁵² The mining operations of the Duff Company were however never to be as profitable as had been expected, and to increase profits it made use of its rights to sub-let its land, inviting European rubber planters, in the process creating access to international commodity trade.⁵³

The initial agreement allowed Duff to work the concession for forty years. A large company float in 1903 provided the DDCL with its economic platform for investment and development in the upper reaches of Kelantan, specifically the area known as the

in the hands of the key aristocrats, mainly in Kota Bharu. There was a line to the mouth of the river but Graham was planning to convert it to a telegraph line.

⁵¹ *KAR 1904/5, op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁵² For the early history of the Duff Syndicate see L. R. Robert, ‘The Duff Syndicate in Kelantan 1900-1902’, *JMBRAS*, Vol XLV, Part 1, January 1973, pp. 81-111.

⁵³ Rubber eventually grew to become the principal export crop of the plantation economy but before 1910 did not contribute to the economy. The Adviser Mason records that the first export of plantation rubber was 97 pounds in 1910. See *KAR 1910*, p 8.

Ulu (upriver) Kelantan.⁵⁴ The main problem for the Kelantan State was that the Raja had granted Duff sole commercial rights within the concession, which no amount of legal tinkering with subsequent agreements could alter.

The presence of the Duff Company gave the Graham administration several headaches, all of which related to the geographic expanse of the concession. Graham refined the wording of the vague and ill-defined October 1900 agreement, and the August 1903 explanatory document, in a 1905 renegotiation which delimited the area of the Duff Concession. It remained expansive but now consisted of a southern zone in which most mining was taking place, and two primarily agricultural zones on either bank of the Sungai Kelantan. The size of the area created problems for Graham with respect to the direction of intended railway lines, the use of private police forces, the hiring of non-Malay labour, and the overall competence and jurisdiction of the State of Kelantan within the areas of land controlled by the Duff Company, as well as the welfare of the peoples, both Malay and non-Malay, who lived within it. The practice of subletting land created a demand for labourers that was difficult to regulate from Kota Bharu.

During the period of Siamese administration there were some fierce debates between Graham and Duff. In Graham's mind the agreement between Duff and the Raja had been a misguided exercise from the start and had been conducted principally for the sake of avarice on Duff's part. As for the Raja, his actions reflected the lobbying of his relatives and the fervent hope that Duff would bring British protection to Kelantan, thus

⁵⁴ See A. Kaur and S. T. Robert, 'The Extractive Colonial Economy and the Peasantry, Ulu Kelantan 1900-1940', *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)* Vol 15, No. 2, pp. 32-91, at p. 33 & 83 fn 4.

riding Kelantan of the Siamese.⁵⁵ As the largest single enterprise in Kelantan the Duff Company had great influence and Graham had to meet this challenge head on to press home Siamese primacy over the *Imperium in Imperio*.

In an example of the character of dealings between Company and State, Duff applied to His Highness the Raja to build a railway from near Kota Bharu to the Siamese border to avoid the problem of silting close to the mouth of the Sungai Kelantan. Under the terms of the Siam-Kelantan 1902 treaty no company or private individual could gain a concession to build such a railway unless it serviced land already granted, and in any case the Raja Kelantan could not enter into agreement by himself, and was required not to grant permission to any party without the authority of the Siamese government. While this request was turned down, the Adviser was able to approve agricultural leases under 4,000 acres. By the time of the 1909 handover there were twenty-three rubber estates, most of which had sub-leased land from the Duff Company.

Graham was not antipathetic to the interests of capital but sought to subordinate it to the interests of the state. For Graham a railway was one method of increasing trade and revenue for Kelantan. The two lines of the Malay peninsula would eventually meet: the Siamese coming south from Singora, and the British heading north from Singapore. Kelantan was a place where that could happen but British plans of the time showed both projected routes meeting at the headquarters of the Duff DC at Kuala Lebir, roughly at

⁵⁵ In the latter aim of gaining British protection, the Raja Kelantan had been led-on by the then Governor of the Straits Settlement, F. A. Swettenham during a visit to Singapore during 1899, contrary to the wishes of the British Colonial Office who had instructed Swettenham not to give any undertaking of British involvement in the Malay states. The deal with Duff gave the Raja Kelantan visions of great wealth; his original offer involved company shares and a flat 5 percent tax on exports.

the junction of Galas and Lebir rivers and totally within the Duff concession.⁵⁶The prospect of the *Imperium in Imperio* having control over such vital resources as railways was an anathema to Graham, as it was to later British Advisers. The Duff Company and State frequently came into conflict over the issue of railways and Graham was merely the first Adviser to the State of Kelantan to do battle with Duff over issues of sovereignty and supervision.

Graham appears to have been hopeful of the success of Duff Company, if only because it would increase state revenue by boosting exports. The Company carried out much experimental mining in the headwaters of the Galas and Lebir rivers but had disappointing results: in 1909 it found over 8,500 ounces of gold, in 1910 just 3,698. By 1910 it had traded one mining lease on the Nenggiri back to the government.⁵⁷ The Company took to planting rubber trees in greater numbers in an effort to mitigate the disappointing mining results. There was no doubt that the fortunes of Company and State were linked, but to the chagrin of Duff himself, and to some Europeans who observed the actions of Graham when it came to dealing with the company, there was little latitude given and no special favours offered.

The fact that Duff and Graham were both Englishmen counted little to Graham, yet British administrators in Singapore expected this to grease the wheels of economic

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p.16.

⁵⁷ *KAR 1910*, p.14.

development. They were however disappointed as throughout Graham's tenure the state of Kelantan was run with impartiality.⁵⁸

While the administrative system being constructed in Kelantan was clearly recognisable to British interests, and operated in a manner similar to the FMS, Graham made no attempt to make the experience of the Duff Company any more enjoyable than it was required to be. Administering government policy in Kelantan justly and correctly overrode any feeling toward compatriotism that Graham may have had. The result was a relationship that was tense at times but not without admiration and cooperation. The medical officer of the DDCL, Dr John Gimlette, was highly regarded by Graham who relied on him for his data on rainfall and temperature at Kuala Krai and who vaccinated many of the children against small pox in the early days of the administration with reasonable results.⁵⁹ After an attempt at having a private armed force failed, having been quashed by Graham, the Company's police were hired from the Kelantan State Military Police and trained by Graham's administration. Duff found Graham to be "not unreasonable" but noted (perhaps with good reason) that the Raja and all his Council were in awe of him.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ This appears to have been the case in 1906 even when Graham went on furlough and Thomson acted in his stead.

⁵⁹ Dr John Gimlette later left the DDCL and came to work for the State of Kelantan as its Chief Medical Officer. He stayed long in Kelantan and compiled a book, *Malay Poisons and Charm Cures*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur [1915], 1981.

⁶⁰ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, pp. 95-99.

4.6 *The Administration of the interior*

The intention of the Graham administration was to divide the lands of Kelantan that were away from the capital and its immediate surroundings into five administrative districts.⁶¹ The 1904-5 Report notes that in each region a District Officer, “carefully selected from among the most teachable young men of good family in the State” was to be appointed and a Courthouse, a Police Station and quarters were to be built. Each District Officer was to be a magistrate and a revenue officer, the Regulations for both of these duties having already been passed by the State Council.

The boundaries of the planned districts reflected population density and the type of agriculture practised. The Kota Bharu and Pasir Puteh regions were densely settled and populated predominantly by rice growing farmers. They also had large and in some cases prosperous fishing populations along the maritime boundaries. Further inland and back toward the mountains and the headwaters of the Kelantan river system, Batu Menkebang was an area of experimental plantation farming with sparsely settled communities, including a relatively large number of Europeans, Chinese and later Tamil labourers, far from central control.

⁶¹ His intention of creating five was never realised and only three were inaugurated.

For this reason, as well as the possible sensitivities of the investors, Graham and later British Advisors preferred to station European DOs in the Ulu Kelantan. By 1904-5 Graham had established one functional district (Kota Bharu) and was working on another (Batu Menkebang). There was an administration headquarters at Kota Bharu and a District Officer, no less a personage than the Assistant Adviser Thomson, at Batu Menkebang in the Ulu Kelantan. These districts of Graham can however be seen as sub-districts of a single administration, one that was itself being fashioned as a district of Siam.

At the base of administration remained the Toh Kweng although Graham recognised that they were untrained and therefore not effective. He proceeded to instruct them in procedures and bade them assist in investigations by officers of the police. After some training the Toh Kweng assisted in land valuation and received a portion of the land tax as payment. Graham made the Toh Kwengs responsible for the good administration of several villages and in doing so reinforced the influence of the administration against Islam. The division between religious and secular state grew wider as Graham restricted the influence of religious officials and Imam to the religious Courts.

As tribute to Siam was now a flat 10 percent of annual State revenue rather than the triennial offering, money was required each year to meet Kelantan's treaty obligations. Poll Tax and land assessment became Kelantan's financial backbone. Graham examined the nobility's claimed right to demand labour from any person in the rural sector (*krah*). This practice was resented by the *rayaat* (peasantry) and Graham saw it as further evidence of abuse of the privilege of noble birth. He devised an arrangement for the peasants where in exchange for collecting annual poll tax of \$1 per adult male per year,

and with no charge for the young or the old and sick, he abolished the right of nobles to krah any member of the community. The only exception to this was the traditional right of the Raja himself to krah, which was used by Graham to call out select communities living adjacent to where a road was being constructed.⁶² In removing what he saw as a despotic practice Graham was also working to secure the financial viability of the state. This arrangement was apparently popular with the rayaat as it eliminated the possibility of being removed from the fields at arbitrary moments.⁶³

The first two years of Graham's administration are also marked by the shift from the British Dollar to the Straits Dollar as the currency of the land. While for many years there had been indigenous coinage in Kelantan⁶⁴ the emergence of the Straits Settlement Dollar as the principal currency for British Malaya in the early twentieth century allowed for its use in Kelantan. By order of the Raja the Straits Dollar became the official currency in Kelantan on 5 March 1905, the first day of the Islamic year 1323. British Dollars were received by the Kelantan state Treasury for six months and exchanged for the new Straits Dollar at 95 percent of face value. After that time the British dollar was not accepted,⁶⁵ and Graham hoped that Kelantan would have a single currency by the end of 1905. In the meantime minting of indigenous coinage continued

⁶² *KAR 1903/4, op. cit.*, p.17.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Graham notes that the Chinese coin known as the Keping (48 Keping = 1 British dollar) had been used for 'many years' while the Puloh was minted only from 1902. Both were made from tin and the Keping had a hole in the middle. Siamese money was 'never used' and in the late nineteenth century there were Mexican and Spanish dollars, along with Japanese yen and British Dollars. (*Ibid.*, p. 24) The shift to the Straits settlement dollar shows that British economic dominance preceded administrative dominance.

⁶⁵ Graham notes some entrepreneurial activity in money exchange between Kelantan and Terengannu, where the currencies were still equal, and with people who could use the British dollar in other British territories in the East, ie China. *KAR 1904-5, op. cit.*, p. 5.

unabated and Graham was characteristically scathing of the monetary tokens produced and of the organisation of the mint:

The local mint continues to turn out large quantities of tin money which is probably the very worst coin made in any part of the world. The minting of money of this metal has for many years been in the hands of a sort of Company composed of His Highness the Raja and his Uncles, the profits on the work, if any, being divided among them. The former arrangement has not yet been interfered with but is left to the management of the noblemen themselves. Formerly the coin produced had some pretensions to definite shape and weight but during the last year, in the anxiety to make money before the concern is taken over by the Government, the Company has been producing money at half its face value and of the worst possible workmanship. The issue last year of the new "Puloh" coin (nominal value one forty-eighth of a Dollar: actual value less than one hundredth part a Dollar), gave rise to a good deal of counterfeiting, false coin being manufactured in Singapore and shipped to Kelantan in the accommodating schooner of the Export Duty Farmer. It was, however, found quite impossible to make coin so badly as the genuine article, the consequences being that several cases of uttering or possessing false coins were soon detected by the Police when the business, which from the value of the coin was naturally one of small profits, became unpopular. The company has managed to pay a dividend this year but the coin is so entirely disgraceful to the State that the Government has decided to interfere and take over the management of the Mint as soon as possible.⁶⁶

A stable currency could guard against inflation and the introduction of Straits Dollars was of great assistance for Graham, particularly as Siamese currency was never used, the local currency was basically worthless and most of the state's trade was with

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.10.

Singapore. Even on something as fundamental as the currency of the state, the Raja Kelantan was able to be overruled and Graham's administrative powers appear to have been almost absolute. Just as in the Federated Malay States with their British Residents to the south, Kelantan became a model of indirect rule with the Raja as titular head of the state. Effective administrative power was wielded by Graham, assisted by a growing band of technocrats, many of whom were English officers seconded from the Federated Malay States.

Graham recruited these officers himself. Men such as Messrs Keenlyside and Nairn came mainly from Trinity and Oxford, and Heussler argues that the pressure on Raja Senik to cooperate was through personal influence rather than rules.⁶⁷ While this was partly a political decision, the small number of other Europeans (see photographs) in the Kelantan bureaucracy were in subordinate positions to the Malays. Head of Treasury was Tunku Sri Indra Mahkota assisted by the very able Nik Yusuf. Head of Posts and Customs was Tunku Ismail assisted by the efficient Tambi Omar and the reportedly excellent Chai Huat. Land was the province of Tunku Petra Sumorak, who Graham described as being "sick but in any case unwilling", supported by Mr Keenlyside, and by Tunku Khatik Haji Said and Nik Hussain, in whom the government possessed "two unusually painstaking and accurate officers".⁶⁸ The Raja Muda was in charge of administration assisted by his brother Tunku Abdul Rahman. The District Officer in Pasir Puteh was Malay and was visited occasionally by Europeans to ensure that things were functioning. Tunku Sri Maharaja was chief of Police with four Malays assisting

⁶⁷ R. Heussler, *British Rule in Malaya, op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁶⁸ BAK # 227/10, *Draft Report 1908*.

him; Tunku Sri Pekwuna Raja was superintendent of Justice and High Court Judge while Malays filled all judicial positions.

4.7 *The balance sheet*

When the basic administration had been set up revenue was found to come from five main sources: taxes, duties, fines, licences and imposts. There were two types of taxes, poll and produce. Poll tax had been restructured to raise more consistent revenue and produce taxes were levied on padi rice and on productive coconut and durian trees only. Duties covered timber, minerals, tobacco, gambier, sugar and salt and were collected either by the Revenue Office or the Harbour and Customs Department. Fines were collected by the court system. Licences covered the practice of ‘farming’ out the right to import and distribute opium, kerosene, alcoholic spirits; and the rights to operate pawnbroking services, gambling and shops. Imposts operated at all ports and were levied on both exports and imports.⁶⁹

On the other side of the ledger Graham’s first estimate of a budget in February 1904 revealed that expenditure far outstripped income. While revenue was estimated to be \$178,000, and the lowest possible administrative expenditure which allowed decent salaries for officials was just under \$140,000, the cost of the promises extracted from Raja Long Senik in exchange for the political support of his uncles was over \$70,000 per year.⁷⁰ This left a debt of over \$30,000 and if that was not bad enough there was the issue of payment to Siam, and the Privy Purse of His Highness, necessary for running

⁶⁹ *KAR 1903-4, op. cit.*, p. 40

his household. Graham wrote to the Siamese King that 'It has therefore been found necessary to explain to the holders of His Highness' promises that his State is quite unable to fulfil these at present.'⁷¹ Effectively the state, despite its apparent abundance and rumours of rich mineral wealth, was broke.

The estimates of his first year (the Mohammedan year of 1323) found that revenue amounted to \$231,080, but expenditure in the same period was \$246,820: Kelantan was estimated to be \$15,740 in debt in its first year of administrative colonialism and fiscally accountable administration. But despite these pessimistic estimates, Kelantan actually returned a surplus. There were savings in the areas of pensions (\$30,000) which were not accepted by the Raja's relatives who were holding out for more; and in the payment to Siam (\$17,800 — due to prior payment of the part of the triennial tribute). Increases also occurred in the collection of poll tax (up \$15,000), boat licenses (\$3,000) and court fees (\$6,000). Receipts for Farms Revenue were down \$23,000 mainly from revenue being diverted and not reaching the treasury, and in some cases some part payment due to seasonal trade or production. Other items yielded less than expected: padi tax was down by \$5,000, mineral duties by \$3,900 and land office fees by \$2,100.

Graham's plan for 1904-5 included developing better assessment methods for the three taxable crops which were expected to yield an extra \$10,000. The edict of the Raja of 1322 (1903) abolished monopolies in favour of import duties and this was expected to provide another \$5,000. Expenditure for the Privy Purse and Pensions was estimated to increase. The payment to Siam (10 percent of Gross Revenue), as well as the interest on

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

what was owed, would be a further \$23,100. Because of the cost of restructuring the administration of state, particularly the establishment of the privy purse and salaries, His Siamese Majesty's Ministry of Finance advanced a loan to Kelantan of \$60,000 over 12 years at 6 percent interest.⁷² This money was intended chiefly for infrastructure such as roads and it was hoped that the state would become self-sufficient.

Moneys raised from land purchase (i.e. right of settlement and occupation), from the Raja's traditional rights over forest products such as elephant tusks or rattan, as well as moneys gained from the practice of licensing opium farms, or from forestry or mining duties, went in theory to the state treasury which, Graham noted, had in the past been managed in a less than efficient way:

Hitherto the Treasury consisted of two or three clerks at His Highness' Palace, who received the revenue, made a — usually inaccurate — note of it and passed it on into the interior of the Palace, whence it never again emerged unless, at uncertain intervals, grudgingly, to pay long standing accounts for jewellery and similar luxuries. Coin once received in the coffers of His Highness was no longer available for State purposes, salaries, such as they were, being payable only when there happened to be money in the hands of the Treasury clerks and not yet remitted inside. If the government was suddenly called upon to make quite unavoidable payments, recourse was had to the Opium or Export farmers who were invited to advance the sum required, against the revenue payable by them, and running accounts were kept with the farmers for this purpose, which, it is needless to say, were usually to the disadvantage of the State. His Highnesses' bank

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *KAR 1904-5, op. cit.*, p. 5.

consisted of a cache in the hills a few miles distant from the capital, and thither mysterious convoys of elephants were periodically escorted, laden presumably with wealth.⁷³

After appointing a clerk and other treasury officials who drew up balance sheets and counted the physical money, a strong box was eventually established in the Balai. The Raja was counselled that he would not be permitted to use it for his personal wishes, and neither would his relatives.⁷⁴

The promises to the nobility also required attention. Some of the privileges extracted from the Raja Kelantan in exchange for the support of his uncles included payments of up to \$3,000 per year from the civil list. Out of a population of between 250,000-300,000, those with some connection to royal blood, their servants and retainers, numbered around 12,000, all of whom had traditionally been exempted from payment of poll tax to fund the *bunga mas* tribute. Many of the nobility avoided payment of land produce taxes and seemed to Graham to be living off the labour of the *rayaat*. The new regime adopted a civil list of royal pensioners but after having determined decent salaries for officers of the new administration, and attempting to economise⁷⁵ there was no prospect of cutting back to allow for payments to the Raja's extended family. In Graham's opinion the fault lay squarely with the Raja's relatives:

These, not content with the extravagant promises wrung from him as the price of a fealty which has never in fact been rendered, have consistently devoted their efforts to filling their pockets at the further expense of the State. In this, however, they have not been

⁷³ KAR 1903-4, *op. cit.*, p.23.

⁷⁴ KAR 1904-5, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

notably successful, since, though they have acquired monopolies, farms and concessions, covering almost every source of revenue, and have thereby almost ruined the finances of the State, their crass stupidity renders them a prey to the more intelligent but equally dishonest persons to whom they are obliged to entrust their affairs and who batten on the revenue which their patrons have seized but are incapable of securing to themselves.⁷⁶

With a view to expanding rather than making cuts to administrative personnel, Graham moved to eliminate the promises made to relatives which he felt placed an undue burden on the capability of Kelantan to be self-sufficient. Licences and monopolies held by the elite were to be surrendered to the State, either for free or for a nominal quit rent. In exchange powerful nobles such as the Raja Muda and Raja Senik's uncles would receive a fixed monthly stipend from the civil list. In an effort to allay the fears of the old order Graham appointed many of the elites to positions of responsibility for which they received salaries from the government.⁷⁷

The combination of working for a living and being told that moneys promised long ago would not be theirs caused great concern among the aristocracy, and when the plan was first raised they did not agree to the offer. The 1903-4 preliminary budget provided a sum of \$9,600 annually for the civil list, \$12,000 for the Raja Muda, and \$3,600 for each of Raja Senik's seven uncles. His Highness the Raja received \$12,000 for the

⁷⁵ Graham notes "A budget was made for the year beginning 1st Moharrum (17 March) but though the utmost has been done to keep down expenses, the document makes tristful reading." (*Ibid.*, p.19)

⁷⁶ *KAR 1903/4, op. cit.*, p.19.

⁷⁷ For their allowances the Raja Muda received \$1000 per mensem and each of the Seven Uncles \$300 per mensem.

Privy Purse.⁷⁸ In the first year some of this money was not claimed as the political elite resisted any action that would signal their acceptance.

Graham's steady progresses in Kelantan provided a difficult problem for the aristocracy who wished to retain their former privileges, but who were unwilling to be painted as obstacles to change. Loathe to be blamed for the woes of the State, by Graham's second report of 1904/5 the key nobles had relinquished their claimed privileges of birthright in exchange for set salaries and pensions.⁷⁹ They also surprised Graham by diligently pursuing the tasks of government to which they had been assigned.⁸⁰ They remained influential through their familial relationship to the Raja whose own position within the state firmed over time.⁸¹

The combined opposition of the uncles to his pensions plan was a test for Graham, but he proved inflexible and trusted to the winds of change. A much curtailed monarchy still provided a linkage with the past traditions of Kelantan government through the position of the Raja. It reinforced Raja Senik's line as the Kelantan royal house and the position of the Malay monarch as the central figure in the state. Graham arranged the

⁷⁸ *KAR 1903/4, op. cit.*, Appendix A, p. 33.

⁷⁹ *KAR 1904/5, op. cit.*, p.1. Placing the royal family on a budget mirrored the practice of western Europe where an annual sum was paid by the parliament to fund the expenses of the royal house, usually the monarch and those of the immediate family, with some favoured or impoverished uncles included. Such a practice had evolved from the shift from absolutist governments to liberal capitalist states with democratic principles that retained the institution of the monarchy for political reasons. In the case of Britain the Crown was subordinate to parliament but of enormous importance in building public morale; Queen Victoria's reign had been especially splendid and the death of the Great White Queen brought tribute from all parts of the British empire.

⁸⁰ *KAR 1904/5, op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁸¹ After Graham's departure they were initially retained as part of the British administration but were increasingly supplemented by British officials from the Federated Malay States brought in to offer further technical assistance. This is particularly so in 1910 where six Europeans come into the service of Kelantan, many from positions in the FMS. *KAR 1910, op. cit.*, p. 3.

new administration around the Raja, and in doing so eroded the ability of other members of the aristocracy to undermine his rule.

4.8 *The Kelantan 'civil service'*

During his tenure in Kelantan Graham created a mini state, the administrative structure of which was instantly recognisable to any traveller on the Malay peninsula. Like the FMS it had a Malay Monarch, and he had an Adviser who was British. There were Departments and Offices and a variety of officers to fill the allotted tasks. However, unlike the civil services of other Malay protectorate, the Kelantan government service was ethnically diverse with expertise from several areas. From Graham's writings he and Thomson clearly spoke Malay, although Thomson the better of the two. They had been joined by Mr Richards who built roads. Dr Gimlette of the Duff Company brought medical knowledge to the state and assisted Graham in vaccinating against smallpox.

One central court judge was Siamese, another Siamese was an office clerk. The first telegraphist at Che He was Sinhalese, the second Chinese; the police were Punjabi and Malay and the administration had paid positions for customs officers, jailers and postal clerks. Graham involved the aristocracy in indirect rule by employing them and their sons to fill positions, and he employed an Imam as a central court judge. During 1904/5 the small number of European officers in the bureaucracy of Kelantan was augmented with the appointment of Mr H. E. Pennington as Secretary to the Resident and Adviser, on secondment from the FMS.⁸²

⁸² KAR 1904/5, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Using his own experience in Burma and Siam, Graham constructed an administrative colonial state in Kelantan. Using regulatory means backed by the rule of law the affairs of the state began to show a semblance of order. The fact that Kelantan was transferred out of the sphere of interest of Siam and into British Malay was no reflection on Graham's performance in his years administering the state of Kelantan. Later British Advisers retained and expanded Graham's bureaucracy. The opposite was rather the case; Graham's efficacy in Kelantan prompted Siam to introduce an Adviser in Kedah and measures were taken to increase the pace of change there.⁸³

For geo-political reasons Siam eventually accepted the British proposal that her Malay Dependencies of Kelantan and Trengannu pass to Britain and in 1909 Chulalongkorn agreed to this without much discussion. Kelantan was to become a British Protected State and to have a British officer appointed to "advise and on all matters other than those pertaining to the Mohammedan religion and Malay custom". The Englishman at Raja Senik's Balai now worked for Singapore.

⁸³ Kedah had previously operated autonomously under Siamese influence but Siam appointed an Adviser in 1905. See S. Ahmat, *Kedah: Tradition and Change in a Malay State: a Study of the Economic and Political Development 1878-1923*, MBRAS Monograph, No. 12, pp.101-107.

4.9 *Conclusions*

While Graham's assessment of Kelantanese affairs is in some cases opinionated, there do appear to have been large problems in running Kelantan. With few records of what was planted and only three taxable crops, the possibility was high that Toh Kweng would collect but not remit state taxes. While Graham was Adviser this matter occupied much of his time. Major changes and improvements to Kelantan's state administration occurred during his tenure, but he did not make any move to revise the land system, a matter that even the British delayed for some years. The Draft 1908 report notes that:

In view of the uncertainty of the political situation, and the fact that the existing notifications and regulations provided a sufficiently sound system of Land Administration in accordance with the needs of the State, it was not thought expedient to take any further steps towards the passing of a general land law for the State, which might have met with opposition ...⁸⁴

As Siam moved closer to surrendering her Malay dependencies the need for a smooth transition of power became obvious. While Graham had certainly considered the idea of taxation reform he delayed a full overhaul of the land system for political reasons.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ BAK # 227/10, *Draft Report 1908*.

⁸⁵ A later British attempt to rationalise the land system culminated in a full scale riot and will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Six.

The nature of the relationship between Siam and Kelantan during the nineteenth century when the control was nominal, leads to the conclusion that while there was a level of Siamese influence over an interference in Kelantan's affairs, the main purpose was to maintain the basic recognition of Siam as the dominant power. During the early twentieth century Siam made serious efforts to improve the standard of government in Kelantan, principally as a means to tie its former tributary states into a closer and more enduring framework that included political incorporation. This was resisted by both Kelantan and Britain.

Contrary to the expectations of other British nationals, Graham's execution of his responsibilities to the King of Siam won him few friends among British official and commercial interests.⁸⁶ Graham's conception of his responsibilities appears to have been to serve the ultimate goal of effective administration. Where this conflicted with the interests of private capital, the interests of the state of Kelantan had primacy. Despite the fact that the British appear dissatisfied with some aspects of Graham's rule, when Kelantan was transferred to British control in 1909, much of the desired administrative apparatus had already been created and this was not only retained but expanded.

Between 1903-1909 Graham's administration in Kelantan succeeded in establishing a rudimentary government. He introduced accounting methods and began to shape the administration of the state in concert with western notions of responsible governance. Fiscal accountability, measurable indices of administrative expansion and the rule of

⁸⁶ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan 1890-1940, op. cit.*, p.75, fn 64 & 65.

law were important features of this process. This period saw an embryonic state emerge which, due to the political exigencies of the day, required that elements of the old power elites maintained positions of authority. Indirect rule with a cadre of professional administrators had to wait some years before implementation, but the beginnings of administrative colonialism were evidenced in the approach taken to creating structures of power through which the rule of law could be maintained. This was augmented by records and courts. Graham ensured that people could practise commerce without fear. His moves to eliminate aspects of Kelantan society he found oppressive or repugnant show that a more humane society was envisaged. Graham made judgments about what could remain in the new regime and acted to uphold the principles of humanism that were characteristic of the best aspects of his own civilisation. He did not however seek to impose European 'modernity' on Kelantan and left much of what he admired in place as it was not judged to be incompatible.

Kelantan's position within both the Siamese and British spheres of influence make it an interesting study of the role of administrative policy in two empires. Siam's relationship with Kelantan and the other Northern Malay states was never about profit and little importance was placed on deriving monetary gain from these possessions. For Siam the function of Kelantan and other Northern Malay states was altogether political. The nominal control of tributaries by Bangkok allowed powerful regions such as Nakhon and Phuket to derive prestige from the delegated tasks of supervising administration. This diminished the internal threat to the Chakri dynasty and served to keep the country in military balance, as well as guarding against foreign incursion. As a tactic, this worked well for the Siamese Kings during the nineteenth century as the responsibility of administration in one of the Malay border areas carried strategic and military

commitment. It was more important for Siam to keep its mediator states happy and provide them with a reason to be respected than to extract wealth from the periphery.

Kelantan itself may be viewed as one district, one piece of Siamese colonial territory. Siamese control was however political rather than economic. The way in which Graham pursued his task is an example of an emerging administrative colonialism that was based on principles of good government. Such an approach was rationalist and technocratic, widely applicable and not the domain of any one European power. The example of Kelantan shows that an Asian power could also rule with a fair hand and that it is the structures of rule, not the nationality of the controllers, that matters most.

Graham's administration combined contempt for Kelantan's nobility, paternalism and a fundamental belief in the basic goodness of the rayaat. Where the western Malay states had large ethnic Chinese and Indian immigrant populations, Kelantan was rural and agricultural. Graham and later British Advisors intended that it should stay that way. Graham had neither the resources nor the desire to turn Kelantan into Selangor. His writings indicate that he relied on knowledge as the primary weapon against superstition and poverty.

By the gradual extension of the administrative state Graham sought to improve the lives of Kelantan's people and free them from what he regarded as the historical tyranny of the aristocracy. The close resemblance of the Graham administration in Kelantan to the regimes of the FMS was no coincidence but a rational, planned and systematic move toward what the British called 'good government'. As a colonial 'middle manager', Graham believed in the same ideals as later British Advisers and worked to make the

government function properly. As such he was both a man of his time and an exemplar of the bureaucratic and managerial officer required for administrative colonialism.

Chapter 5: Refining the operations of the colonial district:

British Administration in Kelantan, 1909-1913

The changing geo-political situation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Southeast Asia saw an erosion of Siam's political influence over its claimed Malay states. The Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1902, which gave greater surety to Siam's claims in Kelantan and Trenggannu at the expense of British 'forward movement' interests, allowed for increased Siamese administrative control of what it felt were its historical tributaries. In Kelantan this allowed for the introduction of an Adviser of British origin who was appointed from the staff of the King of Siam. Graham's efforts in changing Kelantan from a ramshackle recordless nepotistic fiefdom into a small but efficient administration were important for establishing the central role of the administrative colonial state. With the 1909 declaration of a British Protectorate over Kelantan, Siam accepted the inevitable and lost its claimed Malay dependencies to Britain for reasons of political expediency.¹ The actions of the British Advisers in Kelantan in the first decade of official British administration were a continuation of the policies of good government set in place by Graham and his staff whose reforms were aimed at transforming Kelantan into a modern administration, with book-keeping, accurate records of trade flows, land grants and taxation.

¹ The most egregious loss for Chulalongkorn was apparently Kedah which had long been important for scholastic contacts and had supported Siam with arms in a dispute with France. Of all the Siamese Malay States, Kedah was most clearly part of Siam and so trusted that the Sultan Abdul Hamid (ruled 1879-1943) was the superintendent commissioner of his own state, along with the smaller Siamese tributaries Perlis and Setul. This was in direct contrast with Kelantan and Trenggannu whose commissioners were

British administrative control in Kelantan between 1909-1919 aimed at articulating the management of Kelantan with the dominant British political and economic interests in Malaya. This chapter argues that the colonial bureaucracy that developed under British advice was aimed at deepening the influence of government through the continued professionalisation of the state bureaucracy. This allowed for the accumulation of information about the people and economy of Kelantan. Expansion of colonial public works, health and education systems was accompanied by moves toward land reform that aimed to increase revenue so as to make the Kelantan state more able to meet its liabilities. The state administration of Kelantan became one more 'district' within British Malaya, falling within the sphere of British interest and operating along procedural guidelines familiar to British commercial interests in other parts of Malaya. The central question of how the modern structures of power of administrative colonialism were employed to further British purposes at the district level is explored in this chapter on the expansion of the bureaucracy of Kelantan in the first five years of British Protection.

The European notion that the Malay was not by nature industrious held wide currency throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was due mainly to the presence and industry of large migrant populations of ethnic Chinese in the Malay peninsula. In a paper entitled *The Malay Peninsula: Its Resources and Prospects*, delivered to the Royal Colonial Institute in November 1891, Mr W. E. Maxwell, a British officer with the Straits Settlement Government with 25 years' experience in

first from Phuket and later changed to Nakhon. See B. W. Andaya and K. Y Andaya, *A History of*

Malay affairs, mentioned in respect of the small Malay State of Sungai Ujong, (south east of Selangor and later incorporated into Negeri Sembilan), that “were it possible to give the Chinaman free scope here, this district might contribute largely to the revenue of the State.”² Such attitudes derived from European observations of Malay society and what they saw as the indolence of the traditional aristocracy who they felt lived off the toil of the average Malay peasant, the *rayaat*. Delivering “civilisation” to these people involved introducing modern structures of government that were based on informed and rational decision making processes that involved fiscal accountability, equity before the law and the removal of the historical privileges enjoyed by the Malay aristocracy.

The deepening of administrative colonialism through the extension of the rule of law and the state bureaucracy, which resulted from the assumption of British colonial rule in Kelantan, was accompanied by governmental intrusions into areas of Malay culture and social life, all in the name of “good government”. Many aspects of the administrative system in Kelantan came to resemble more closely the administrative structure of the Federated Malay States. But unlike the situation in those states, British advice in Kelantan sought to impose greater scrutiny over foreign capital, the actions of foreign nationals and the flow and use of indentured labour. Paradoxically, while British administrative control of Kelantan facilitated the entry of British capital and commercial interests, many investors would have hoped for greater freedom of activity and concessions. The relations of the Kelantan state with private capital were coloured

Malaysia, MacMillan, London, 1982, p. 192. Siam did however appoint an Adviser to Kedah in 1905.
² W. E. Maxwell, ‘The Malay Peninsula: Its Resources and Prospects’, in *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute Vol. XXIII* (1891-92), Royal Colonial Institute, London, 1892, pp. 3-50 at pp. 15-16. Such attitudes were prevalent throughout the period under discussion. Maxwell was first Resident of Perak and later Director of Lands in the FMS. He and Swettenham represented two opposing philosophies and clashed frequently.

by the frequent litigation launched by the Duff Company, which stemmed from the agreements concerning its concession signed in the early 1900s. Like Graham, British administrators aimed to curtail the effective power of the *Imperium in Imperio* and to establish the state government as the paramount authority. They scrutinised and regulated the actions of private capital interests, particularly in the plantation economy and the emergent cash crop of rubber, so as to ensure that the interests of capital were subordinated to the interests of the state and the welfare of its people.

This paternalistic attitude toward the Kelantanese and their imagined interests was generally thought of as protecting the traditional Malay of the eastern peninsula who had up to then not been affected by the mass migration experiences of Chinese and Indian labour in the Straits Settlements and the FMS. The sense of duty to protect the Malay from cultural contamination permeates the annual reports of the British Advisers in Kelantan between 1909-1919 and elevates the idealised and imagined stereotypical Malay from the 'lazy native' to a position of 'noble agriculturalist' whose way of life needed to be preserved. At the same time the worst features of Malay traditional life as perceived by the British were the privileges, nepotism and corruption that had characterised the rule of independent Kelantan. British administration aimed squarely at eliminating remaining aristocratic exemptions and exceptions, while still retaining the essential character of the Kelantan peasant and fisherman. In an overwhelmingly Islamic society religion was one area that the British did not attempt to change. Indeed Islam worked to bind society and Advisors did not consider it a force that would stop them from modernising Kelantan.

With the 1909 handover from Siam the British continued the modernisation of the state begun by Graham and moved to tighten the administrative regulations and the influence of the government during their first decade of Protection. Colonial rule in Kelantan was part of the entrenchment of British colonial power in Northern Malaya and the machinery of empire, the colonial bureaucracy established to facilitate social and political control, was always backed by the threat of military force. But despite its obvious access to a well-trained and professional army, the British Advisers in Kelantan preferred to use structure and regulation to achieve their reformist goals. Public compliance with the new regime was achieved through administrative, rather than military means. Such an approach allowed for the gradual integration of Kelantan's civil and criminal codes with those of the FMS and the passing of these laws was achieved through British influence over the Kelantan State Council. This body was subservient to British aims but was nonetheless perceived as operating at arm's length from British rule. By retaining a semblance of independence the official governmental law making authority ensured the implementation of crucial political and legal reforms. British administrative colonialism in Kelantan ruled through Kelantanese structures and Kelantanese figureheads. In doing so it stabilised the position of Kelantan's elite, a crucial factor in the political stability required for indirect rule.

An examination of the administration of Kelantan in this first decade illuminates the sociology of power through the techniques of government adopted by British officials and their administrative staff. It further demonstrates that the legal distinctions between protectorates and colonies were mostly artificial in an administrative colonial state as colonial power operating through the edifice of government could still be exercised on a long term basis. In administrative colonialism government aimed to be non-coercive

and superimposed itself over existing institutions. Legitimacy of rule in Kelantan was achieved through the positioning of the functions of the state as central to people's lives. Better government was achieved through the creation of an administrative technocracy and by expanding the colonial bureaucracy. Legitimacy was gained by expanding the range of state services available to the people of Kelantan. For colonial administrators, each part of the bureaucratic machinery accumulated knowledge that was then collated and examined so as to make better-informed decisions concerning the state and its inhabitants. Governmental power in Kelantan was consciously non-coercive; it was based on the collection of information, on report writing, on numbers and statistics and on an ability to discern trends from the construction of discourses of knowledge about Kelantan and its society. Years of detailed record keeping provide researchers with a wealth of materials, with files on a wide range of topics. The shift toward modernity in government dictated that more sophisticated methods of administration be used to achieve ends that had once required force.

The bureaucracy of Kelantan, the 'middle management' level of colonialism, collected meteorological data; statistics on crime, prisons, health, education, trade; scrutinised the Privy Purse; collated budgetary data to determine the state's changing financial position. The files also recorded the impressions and general commentary of key state officials, including the British Adviser, and the increasingly European staff in the first decade of rule. Knowing as much as possible about the people and social customs of Kelantan permitted colonial administrators to identify pre-modern aspects of society that they considered would retard Kelantan's integration. They then made judgements about what was required to bring Kelantan into the modern world. The key difference from the Graham administration was that the British were the dominant world power;

whatever they chose to do could be pushed through by force if necessary. The fact that they did not use force but relied on administration indicates that the techniques of colonial rule and domination had become more sophisticated.

5.1 *Imperial connections*

Once part of the Indian Civil Service from 1867 Malaya had its own administration. Becoming a Malaya cadet meant that one was part of the Straits Settlements Civil Service, or later part of the FMS service. Recruitment for official postings was initially by local recruitment of men of possible talent, with acceptance of men on the recommendation of members of the British aristocracy and experienced colonial administrators. By the late nineteenth century, patronage had been replaced by examination, and university qualifications came to be essential for potential British officers in Malaya, although some sons of existing British Malayan officials slipped through until the door was firmly shut by the Foreign Office in 1895. This closing off of access to influence was done in conjunction with the creation of the FMS in 1896 and a move toward standardisation of recruitment patterns under the Federated Malay States administration.

Kelantan's affairs were however more broadly a responsibility of the Colonial Office which recommended to Sir John Anderson, Governor of Singapore and High Commissioner for the Malay States, that retaining Graham as Adviser would not be

conducive to improved administration³ given the history of dealings between the Kelantan state and the largest private commercial interest, the Duff Company. As the largest single commercial operation in Kelantan, Duff had experienced frequent disagreements with the administration of Graham over its powers within its concession so in an effort to improve relations with this commercial leviathan, both Graham and the former assistant adviser Thomson, were transferred from the state.⁴

Kelantan was not, as yet, to be included in the FMS, but as Talib notes “the stage was set for a date in future, when occasion presented, for incorporating these [Protected] states into the Federated Malay States”.⁵ However Kelantan did not become part of the FMS and retained a sort of dependent independence. Like the other members of the Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Trenggannu and later Johor) their commonality lay in their non-membership of the FMS and the fact that their state governments had British Advisers rather than Residents.⁶

As part of a sweetener for the effective loss of his kingdom in 1909, the Raja of Kelantan was addressed as Sultan from 1911. Sultan Muhammad IV was then equal in status to other Malay Sultans. The UMS and FMS both formed part of a larger British strategic and commercial investment in Malaya and were all incorporated into a larger

³ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan 1890-1940*, MBRAS Monograph No. 21, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, pp. 105-107. Talib notes that Duff himself approached the Colonial Office seeking the post but was rejected.

⁴ *Ibid.* Due to his long association with Graham, Thomson was transferred to Kedah by orders of Anderson but this did not occur until January of 1910. *KAR 1910*, p 3. Graham’s movements after the handover are unclear.

⁵ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan 1890-1940*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁶ Johor had a General Adviser who was legally responsible to the High Commissioner for the Malay States in Singapore rather than the Sultan. It joined ‘British Malaya’ in 1914. B. W. Andaya and K. Y Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

British colonial state. The separate administrative units functioned as districts, each subdivided into its administrative regions.

Like many of his fellow officers in late nineteenth century Malaya, the first British Adviser to Kelantan, James Scott Mason, was the product of a particular social and political class in England, a class that found its calling in the empire's demand for administrators. An 1896 recruit to the FMS service⁷ Mason was university educated with knowledge of at least two languages (out of Greek, Latin, French and German), as well as mathematics, history and classics. His long service in Malaya had made him fluent in both the spoken and written forms of the Malay language.⁸ By the time he arrived in Kelantan he had accrued well over a decade of experience in Malaya. Mason's earlier posting had been as Acting District Officer of Klang, a port town of Selangor.⁹ He represented the educated professional face of colonial administration.

Mason accepted the handover of power from Graham on 15 July 1909 and his tenure as Adviser lasted eighteen months.¹⁰ His first report on the State of Kelantan was written for the period between 13 January-31 December 1910.¹¹ Unlike Graham, Mason immediately adopted the Christian calendar for administrative purposes. Mason's reports are highly informative and less prone to the colourful descriptions that permeate

⁷ R. Heussler, *British Rule in Malaya: The Malayan Civil Service and its Predecessors, 1867-1942*, Clio Press, Oxford, 1981, p. 203.

⁸ Many of Mason's notes and draft letters are written in Jawi, the Arabic-derived form of writing the Malay language. See files of the British Administrator Kelantan (BAK) 1909-1911. A romanised form of Malay (Bahasa Malaysia) is today used in preference to Jawi in Malaysia.

⁹ R. Heussler, *British Rule in Malaya, op. cit.*, p. 204.

¹⁰ Mason was promoted to the governorship of North Borneo in 1912 but was killed shortly after his arrival in a riding accident. He was 38 years old and served the British Empire in Malaya for 16 years. See *Ibid.*, pp. 205 and 224.

¹¹ *Draft Report KAR 1910*.

Graham's early reports. Mason's first report is businesslike with little speculation or questioning of what to do. It is apparent that the emphasis on measurement, quantification and rationality prompted a thorough investigation into the structure of the state, its commercial prospects and ways to extend its productive capacity.

In Kelantan, incorporation into the colonial state was at first financial. Mason had the relatively prosperous FMS administration assume the cost of the Siamese loans taken out by Graham. This debt, which by then totalled \$150,000, was then owned by the FMS which thus gained an economic interest in Kelantan. The Advisers were then able to make a case that Kelantan should function more efficiently so as to repay debt.

By this time the Duff Company had found that returns from mining were quite poor with only 1909 returning anything like the desired result. In some parts of their concession (the Nenggiri) they abandoned mining altogether. The less than expected situation with respect to mineral profits meant that as early as 1906 the Duff Company recognised it would have to diversify.¹² Duff broadened its commercial activities to include sawmilling and cut timbers, transport of mail and luggage, and a profitable sideline initiating legal action against the Kelantan government for loss of earnings. The massive Duff Concession in Ulu Kelantan¹³ had much land suitable for planting. The world trade in rubber grew exponentially with the development of electrical and

¹² See A. Kaur and S. T. Robert, 'The Extractive Colonial Economy and the Peasantry: Ulu Kelantan 1900-40', in *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)*, vol 15, no. 2, pp. 32-91 at p. 42. Estimates of the size of the concession vary widely with up to 3,000 square miles being the largest.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 33

automotive industry and in the FMS the value of rubber production grew from £399,000 in 1906 to £5,923,000 in 1910.¹⁴

Rubber was therefore the obvious plantation crop for Kelantan. With a maturation time of three years from planting, the rubber industry was well suited to investment by speculative capital and to plantation agriculture. World rubber prices fluctuated and returns on occasion were relatively handsome, but decent profits were to an extent contingent on running an efficient plantation with an effective labour force.

Contract labour was sought for Kelantan as the plantations were at some distance from most large and settled communities of Malays. In addition to distance, rural Malays of Ulu Kelantan placed little importance on earning money thus necessitating the importation of labour.¹⁵ In order to acquire a workforce the colonial government simplified immigration restrictions to allow labourers to work on rubber estates.¹⁶ Mason noted in the 1910 report that the Kelantan estates compared favourably with the best-known estates in the peninsula, and that in 1910 there had been a large importation of Chinese labour for work on the rubber plantations.¹⁷

Also during 1910 Tamil labour was permitted to enter Kelantan for the first time, and a shipment of 118 Tamils came to the *Kluat* and *Kenneth* estates, both of which were

¹⁴ C. A. Fisher, *South East Asia: a political, economic and political geography*, London, Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1964, p. 598.

¹⁵ See A. Kaur and S. T. Robert, 'The Extractive Colonial Economy and the Peasantry: Ulu Kelantan 1900-40', *op. cit.*, pp. 32-91.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 51 ff.

¹⁷ *Draft Report KAR 1910*, p. 8.

managed by the Duff Development Company.¹⁸ The tropical conditions, combined with inadequate plantation sanction, infection and disease resulted in poor health on some estates within the Duff concession. Certain of the rubber plantations were run directly by the Duff Company; concessionaires operated others. In the first years of the rubber economy, Chinese labour was still common with Kaur and Talib noting that in 1916 there were 3,119 Chinese labourers, 1,510 Tamils, 759 Javanese, 849 Banjarese and 50 Thais.¹⁹

While Duff had apparently begun planting rubber in 1901²⁰, two estates on land run by the Duff Company, *Taku* (712 acres planted) and *Kluat* (189 acres planted), had only begun tapping in December 1910. The Company ran another property *Kenneth* (363 acres planted) and leased other parts of its vast concession to European companies. Stakeholders in the business of rubber in Kelantan included the Dominion Rubber Company, the Austral Malay Rubber Company, Central Kelantan Rubber Company, and the New Zealand Malay Rubber Company.²¹

The moral outrage of middle class Europeans at the excesses and cruelty involved in rubber tapping in the Congo led to tighter control and regulation of conditions of plantation labour throughout the British empire. In Malaya the District Officers and Medical Officers inspected 'coolie' lines. In November 1910 Mason, in the company of

¹⁸ *KAR 1910*, p 7-8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51. By 1928 there were less than 1000 Chinese, 4,249 Indians, and a significant number (874) of Malays, along with 225 Banjarese and 90 unspecified "others".

²⁰ C. A. Fisher, *South East Asia, op. cit.*, p. 599.

²¹ *KAR 1910*, pp 7-8. See the location of the major rubber plantations in the maps.

Residency Surgeon Dr Gimlette²² toured all the plantations in Kelantan, finding poor health on only two of the twenty-three estates, affecting 570 men in total.²³

By the end of 1910 Kelantan's rubber estates had a combined total area of 64,290 acres, only 5,402 acres (8.4 percent) of which was actually planted.²⁴ By 1913 around 13,000 acres were under rubber and a further 1,158 acres had been cleared and made ready for planting.²⁵ Only the smallest of the listed estates had actually sold any rubber to anyone; 97 lbs of rubber came from the 30 acres of the *Kota* estate owned by Che Muhammad Sanib.²⁶ European investment in rubber was recent and had not yet paid dividends. Of the twenty-three listed rubber estates in 1910, all but two were run by companies, the exceptions being Che Sanib's *Kota* and *Kuala Hau* where a Mr C. Elster had one hundred acres. There were many smaller Malay rubber producers but commercial plantation production was overwhelmingly restricted to the large estates of the Ulu Kelantan. These were predominantly funded by European capital, often in joint ventures with Singapore Chinese, and within the concession. Rubber was grown in smaller quantities along the coastal plain.²⁷

²² Dr Gimlette had been in Kelantan for some years by this stage, having been the first surgeon of the Duff Development Company. When a permanent position became available in the State of Kelantan service, Dr Gimlette was appointed. Gimlette had a thorough knowledge of the Company's operations and land holdings having seen the initial expectations of profit from mining dampened, and the shift to rubber and land leasing as alternative profit creation strategies. He was a part-time collector of rainfall statistics for Mr Graham and later Advisers.

²³ *KAR 1910*, p. 8. Initially the sources of this labour were diverse, but the increase in area under cultivation meant that larger and larger consignments of labourers were required. Contracts were normally met by Singapore labour brokers.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *KAR 1910*, pp. 7-8.

The pattern of plantation landholding and the names of the companies operating in Kelantan indicate that commercial investment and opportunities had been extended even into this relative economic backwater. Imperial political requirements also meant that Kelantan had to play its part in the British world and the regulation and control of the international opium trade was one area where the consent of the Sultan of Kelantan was required. The British delegate to the convention could not sign on behalf of Malay states under protection so the Secretary of State wrote in March of 1912 to the High Commissioner for the Malay States (the Governor) Sir Arthur Young, with instructions to obtain consent of the FMS, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, Johor to append their signatures.²⁸

The Secretary to the High Commissioner wrote to the Adviser in Kelantan on 13 April 1912; he asked that “you obtain the consent of the Sultan of Kelantan to the signature of the convention on his behalf.” Acting Adviser Bishop replied on 29 April: “at a meeting of the State Council held yesterday morning His Highness the Sultan of Kelantan gave his consent to the International Opium Convention on his behalf.” Bishop had then to supply the statistics on the value of the opium coming into the state.²⁹ The next year the British replaced the tax farming system for opium, on which no duty had previously been levied, and created a government monopoly requiring individuals to purchase licences to smoke, as well as the opium itself. The profit in this first year was \$113,000

²⁸ As the British agent for Sarawak to invite His Highness Rajah Brooke to sign also.

²⁹ *KAR 1908-1913*, and S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 226. Kelantan permitted the importation of opium (chandu) which was distributed under licence, a tax farming arrangement. The chandu operation had been allowed under the Siamese administration and represented a significant portion of State income at that time. In 1905-6 the tax farm for opium brought in 9.35 percent of revenue, in 1906-7, 10.4 percent and in 1907-8, 9.7 percent. The British maintained the system of licenced opium dealing and established a Chandu Department under the Superintendence of the Customs office but seldom gave exact figures for the revenue from this commodity from licences.

where as the tax farming arrangement had been estimated by Mason to raise \$48,000.³⁰ When Kang Siong of house number 153 in Kampong China applied for a licence to smoke opium, which he had done for 10 years without incident, he was reminded that “His Highness the Sultan has forbidden the sale of chandu to Malays and natives of the Madras Presidency..”³¹ Opium was thus a Chinese issue and was used both by Chinese labourers inside the Duff concession (those on rubber estates) from whom \$50,000 was collected in 1913, and by Chinese in the towns who rendered up to the government \$63,000 for this pleasure.³²

Another imperial directive affected the actual practice of report writing. Graham’s reports to the Siamese King were long and comprehensive and Mason’s 1910 report was forty foolscap pages long. The prolixity of the reports emanating from Kelantan in 1327 (1909) caused some consternation in Downing St where Lord Crewe wrote to Sir John Anderson on 27 October 1910 stating that reports with “such length and fullness” were unnecessary.

I request therefore that for the future a short report on the progress of the new states (including Trenggannu) may be sent to me annually to be laid before parliament.

³⁰ *File 580/1914 KAR 1913.*

³¹ *File 338/1913* (Kang Siong re: Licence to smoke opium) Letter from Kang Siong to BA 29/3/1913; letter from J. M. Jansen to Kang Siong 13/4/1913. *KAR 1913*, Chandu.

³² *KAR 1913*, Chandu.

This short report can also be published locally and it seems unnecessary and undesirable that the full Administrative reports of the Advisers should be published at all, but I leave this to your discretion.³³

Anderson wrote to Lewis Harcourt of the Colonial Office on 31 January 1911 acknowledging Crewe's instructions and noted that reports for 1911 on the Malay States under British Protection (other than the Federated Malay States) could all fit into one moderate sized 'Blue Book' which could be prepared locally and sent without covers to the British parliament.³⁴ Instructions to the British Adviser of Kelantan ensued in March and the reports thereafter become noticeably shorter.

Mason's 1910 report contained forty pages, Bishop's 1911 report eleven pages, Langham-Carter's 1913 fourteen pages, Farrar's 1915 report had thirteen pages, his 1916 report had twelve, the 1917 report just ten, and the 1918 report thirteen. With H. W Thomson's return in 1919 the report for that year was twenty pages, most of which are trade statistics. All reports included appendices but these too diminished as the years went on.

³³ File *BAK 259/11* (Administration Reports on the Protected Malay States to be concise). Letter from Crewe to Anderson 27/10/10.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Anderson to Harcourt, 31/1/1911.

The reports were widely circulated and the Kelantan Administration report of 1913 had 1300 copies printed, 1000 of which were for the British parliament. Of the others, 21 reports went to officers within Kelantan, an indication of the growing size of the European bureaucracy, and copies went to the Secretary to the High Commissioner for the Malay States, the Colonial Secretary for the Straits Settlements, the Chief Secretary, the British Residents in Selangor, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, the General Advisers to Johor, the British Advisers to Kedah and Perlis, the British Agent in Trengganu, eight newspaper editors, various FMS officials the Consul General for Germany and the Consul for Japan.³⁵ The distribution of reports within the British administrative machinery for Malaya, the British Foreign and Colonial Offices, the British Parliament and the government of the day indicates that the political, economic and administrative situation of Kelantan was available to those who might take the trouble to investigate. Those who did would have found that in Kelantan the administrators were in a difficult financial situation and that between 1909 and 1913 the state's finances had gone from bad to worse.

5.2 *The administration of the colonial state*

In 1909 Graham's administration had run the state at a debit of just over \$12,000. In 1910 Kelantan's assets and liabilities were \$66,152 to the debit of the state and there was a public debt of \$150,000 due to the British assuming the repayments of Kelantan's

³⁵ Cover note to the *KAR 1913*.

loans from Siam. Combined these figures represented just over half (51.5 percent) of the state revenue.³⁶

The financial position of the state was shortly to become much worse and at the heart of later problems was the agreement reached in 1900 between the Raja of Kelantan and Duff. The 1905 agreement had set out that the sovereign power within the concession was the state but the problem of actually enforcing the state power within the *Imperium in Imperio* remained. The July 1912 agreement between the Government of Kelantan and the Duff Development Company cancelled all previous agreements and the vast concession was converted to 50,000 acres of land,³⁷ and greater restrictions were placed upon the duration of exclusive leases in mining. The matter ended up in court in Britain and the court determined compensation to the Duff Company for loss of earnings and rights to be worth £300,000, to be paid in three instalments, the last of which was due in December of 1914.³⁸ The agreement was costly and the Duff Company continued to enjoy special rights over agriculture, mining and timber, but in other matters became like any other company.³⁹

The court's judgement placed Kelantan's administration in an awkward position, as it could not pay such a vast sum. The FMS administration advanced \$3,000,000 to Kelantan to cover the Duff judgement and other expenses, which further strengthened the requirement for Kelantan's administration to be as efficient as possible. Between

³⁶ *KAR 1910*, p. 1-2.

³⁷ This land had some conditions attached to it concerning the Government's duty to discern a definite railway line connecting Kelantan to Singapore and Thailand which would increase the value of the land selected by the Company, which came to haunt future Advisers to Kelantan

³⁸ *KAR 1915*, p. iv. Appendix A. The total State debt by this stage had reached \$3,416,426. The debt was paid to Duff by the FMS.

1909-1913, the British advisers and their staff tended to spend more than state revenues received, but the largest problem remained debt repayments.⁴⁰

By 1913 Kelantan's liabilities exceeded its assets by \$3,027,423 and Langham-Carter noted that "as the footnote indicates the whole liability cannot yet be set out in figures."⁴¹ Debt plagued Kelantan's administration throughout the first decade of British rule and created a requirement to make the state self-sufficient.

The importance placed upon sound financial management is indicated by the fact that in every report written by the British Advisers it is the very first item addressed. To go some way toward meeting the state's liabilities and costs of administration the British Advisers worked to increase the revenues of Kelantan through a variety of taxation reforms, changes to land registration law, import and export charges and an expansion of criminal detection leading to increased revenues from fines. Part of this money was spent on Kelantan's infrastructure, principally roads and railways, in an effort to enable easier transport of commodities to the port from whence they could be sent around the world.

³⁹ *KAR 1912*, and S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, Appendix I, pp. 208-218.

⁴⁰ *KAR 1913*, Appendix A, p. iv. The balance to the debit of the state is recorded as \$3,027,423 and 57 & 1/2 cents. This debt was comprised of two major loans from the FMS; the large Duff loan and a \$250,000 loan from 1913 which consolidated repayment of the Siamese loans and tribute to Kelantan from 1909 (\$150,000), and \$100,000 from 1912 which is not recorded as being for any specific purpose. The entire \$250,000 was to be paid to the FMS at 4 percent interest per annum.

⁴¹ *BAK 1913*, p. 1, and Appendix A, p. iii.

The dual objective of the British presence was to develop Kelantan economically so as to make it more profitable, which included foreign investment, but also to raise the educational health and general living standards of the people. Backed by the relatively unlimited resources of the wealthy FMS the Advisers were able to use Kelantan's revenues to fund their projects for development, and for the most part the state's revenues were, until 1911, about the same as its expenditures. As can be seen from the Table 5.1, the reforms of the administrative colonial administrations steadily increased state revenues.

Table 5.1 Kelantan revenue and expenditure 1903-1913

Year	Revenue	Expenditure	Balance
1903	178 000	215 456	(37 456)
1904	168 108	153 861	14 247
1905	176 335	205 231	(28 896)
1906	279 783	262 081	17762
1907	317 388	317 612	(224)
1908	335 299	307 154	28165
1909	370 959	377 062	(6 103)
1910	419 327	403 552	15775
1911	487 674	574 850	(87 176)
1912	535 669	665 608	(129 939)
1913	676 020	672 137	3 883

Note the Siamese periods of reporting varied. 1903 is August 1903-August 1904; 1904 is 1 August 1904 to 31 May 1905; 1905 is June 1905-February 1906; 1906 is February 1906-February 1907; 1908 is February 1908 to February 1909; 1909 is interrupted by the transition but is essentially the entire year. From 1910 the reports move to a full calendar year.

The increased state expenditure for 1912 and 1913 came from special projects designed to increase British knowledge of Kelantan. From 1911 the British Advisers commenced the task of mapping the state, a process that required surveying and demarcation of land boundaries. This was part of an aim to reform the system of land titles so as to switch from produce tax to land tax and increase revenue.⁴² In 1912 the survey and demarcation costs were \$64,666, about half of the amount by which the Advisers overspent. In 1913 the costs of surveying were \$71,000 and the Adviser Langham-Carter noted:

Both in 1912 and 1913 attempts were made to complete a Land Enactment under which titles could systematically be issued, and rents and fees be systematically collected. As already remarked the embryo of such an Enactment has taken the form of a notice; and under it, in 1915, serious work should be done to secure the reimbursement of some of the heavy charges the State is incurring for survey.⁴³

The principal of cost recovery is therefore central to understanding the actions taken by British Advisers in Kelantan in the first five years of their administration. If the expenses incurred in land surveys and the consolidated loan were not enough, there was always the omnipresent FMS loan to cover the Duff compensation, and a third loan to the Straits Settlement Government for just under \$150,000 to pay the overdraft from the Mercantile Bank in Kota Bharu. This loan had been steadily climbing since British

⁴² *KAR 1911*, pp. 4-5.

⁴³ *KAR 1913*, p. 2.

protection began.⁴⁴The Duff loan was not due to be repaid until 1918 but in 1914 a further \$439,000 was added as a final payment to the Duff Company.⁴⁵

Both Siamese and British regimes had sought to establish the supremacy of state rule in an area where the Company was out of the reach of the state. Unlike the Siamese, the British had the financial capability to absorb a massive debt. Kelantan was then forced to follow all British designs emanating both from Singapore, the administrative capital of British Malaya, and Kuala Lumpur, the financial nerve centre of the FMS. The crippling debt converted Kelantan from a nominally independent protected Malay state into a district of an emerging 'British Malaya', one that needed to improve its revenue collection.

Ironically where many of the Kelantan elite had hoped that the British would guarantee their independence any semblance of this that had existed under Graham's Siamese administration was extinguished under the British. This debt situation further reinforced the need to pursue a shift in land assessment so as to deliver increased revenues for the largest sector in the Kelantan community, the peasant farmers.⁴⁶ One method of increasing the revenue was to make the administration of the state machinery more efficient through the employment of a technocratic clique from other parts of British Malaya. Experience being seen as transferable, the three advisers in the period under review, Mason (British Adviser from July 1909 to October 1911) Bishop (Acting BA

⁴⁴ *KAR 1911-1913* Appendices A. In 1911 the overdraft had been \$36,659, in 1912 \$94,404 and by 1913 Kelantan's overdraft was consolidated into a general loan from the Straits Settlement of just under \$150,000 at 4.5 percent interest.

⁴⁵ While the relationship between trade and the flag has been discussed by many theorists of colonialism the idea that a company should make profits from litigation seems slightly unusual.

from October 1911 to March 1913) and Langham-Carter (March 1913 to May 1915) all came from the FMS service or the Straits Settlements. Graham's administration staff were seconded to the service of Kelantan and had to resign from whichever service they were in.

The procedural difficulties of serving the government of Kelantan, a protected state, as opposed to the British government in the Straits Settlement of the FMS, were overcome in May 1912 when Sir Arthur Young wrote to His Highness the Sultan of Kelantan.

I have the honour to inform my friend that in order to obviate the difficulty of obtaining European officers for service in any particular state, it is proposed that in the future such officers in all departments in my friend's state shall be recruited by secondment from the service of either the Colony or Federated Malay States.⁴⁷

This arrangement formalised existing practice. In 1911 the personnel of the Kelantan state service had undergone some changes that indicate the closeness of the FMS administrative system to the Kelantan administration. The Adviser Mason left Kelantan for Borneo in October and was replaced by Bishop who was posted to Kelantan from the FMS service.

⁴⁶ The main thrust of this change took the form of a replacement of produce taxes with a fixed rent for lands, a subject that is addressed in full in the next chapter.

⁴⁷ *BAK File 334/1912* (Proposed system for recruiting European officers required in Kelantan)

Mr Mackray, who in 1910 had performed some investigative work on the boundary areas traded between Kelantan and Siam in 1909,⁴⁸ was acting Assistant Adviser until Mr Clayton was appointed Assistant Adviser in October 1911. The collector of land revenue, Mr Hughes, became the magistrate in Kota Bharu, replacing Mr Burton who returned to the FMS. Because of the quantity of work in the lands office in 1911, Mr Clayton had to give up his land functions and take less onerous duties with Customs and Marine while acting Magistrate Mr Bresland was switched to be Superintendent of Lands.

Key administrative positions which under Graham had been headed by Malays were now headed by Europeans: Mr Crawford was the Director of the Works and Surveys, Mr Sturrock was the District Officer in the Ulu Kelantan region of Batu Menkebang and Mr Cullen was the Chief Police Officer. Mr Murphy and later Mr Dowling were the inspectors of police. In Pasir Puteh district the District Officer was a Malay, one of the few to hold a position of administrative, as opposed to titular, authority.

By 1912 the state bureaucracy of Kelantan had a number of European officers (Table 5.2) who had been appointed to serve the government.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Mr Mackray's visit was to these areas in 1910 and he made a report on it. See Map 3, which is contrasted with the 1915 Map of Kelantan compiled by the Survey Department at the back of the thesis.

⁴⁹ Adapted from File *Kelantan 'M' 7/1912 Establishment Lists 1912*.

Table 5.2 European Officers in Kelantan

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Class</i>	<i>Salary (£)</i>	<i>Duty Allowance (£)</i>
J S Mason	British Adviser	Staff	1 000	200
J E Bishop	a/British Adviser	FMS (IV)	1 000	200
T W Clayton	a/Assistant Adviser (Class III)	FMS (V)	650	150
A J Sturrock	District Officer Batu Menkebang	FMS (V)	520	125
C W Bresland	Superintendent of Lands	FMS (V)	500	100
J W W Hughes	Magistrate Kota Bharu	FMS (V)	430	100
Dr. J D Gimlette	Residency Surgeon	Medical Officer Grade I	640	125
Dr H W Furnivall	Medical Officer	Medical Officer Grade II	450	100
R A Crawford	Director of Works and Surveys	Formerly district Surveyor FMS	650	125
G Cullen	Chief Police Officer	Formerly inspector of Police FMS	350	100
J M Favell	Chief surveyor	Formerly 1st Grade Surveyor FMS	450	75
Capt. F W Tomlinson	a/Chief Police Officer	Captain - the Bufs	350	100

The contrast with the Siamese administration could not be more stark. Where Graham was the Adviser and Thomson the Assistant Adviser his European staff had been small⁵⁰ and Graham's administration was characterised by an easy familiarity. Graham and Thomson both had their wives with them and the Grahams had one child.⁵¹

⁵⁰ *KAR 1910* notes that Messrs Nairn and Keenlyside resigned from the service at the expiry of their agreements with the Kelantan government. Keenlyside was later killed in the war, along with Lambert, Pennington and Sayle. *KAR 1915*, p. 13. See photographs for a 1907 view of the Kota Bharu Club.

⁵¹ Photograph 3 of Kota Bharu Club 1907 indicates Mr and Mrs Graham with a child.

Of this period Heussler writes

There was a club in Kota Bharu, with a tennis court. A football ground, and a cricket pitch, and frequent parties at the residency made for a tight-knit, happy society whose members were devoted to their chief and at one with him in the spirit of the job. They shared out the duties - supervision of police, gentle pressure on all the Sultan's officers, urging, refereeing, scolding by turns, as the case demanded.⁵²

Both administrations were bureaucratic and technocratic and used regulations to achieve their ends. But whereas Graham's government led by personal example and maintained some of the facade that Malays still retained power in Kelantan, British Advisers saw no need to persist with such niceties. Inadequate finances restricted Graham, so he carefully selected and handpicked his own staff. His administration was public and friendly, with the senior officers and their wives entertaining at home. In contrast Mason had the full backing of resources of the British empire, a difference that afforded him expertise from a cadre of FMS professional civil servants already well versed in Malay language and culture. These officers had administrative skills from postings around Malaya by which they sought to improve the process of government in Kelantan.

From 1912 officers working for the British in Kelantan no longer had to resign from the FMS service, as had Thomson when he was first posted to Kota Bharu in 1903. Instead

⁵² R. Heussler, *British Rule in Malaya, op. cit.*, p. 202.

they were seconded from the FMS service to the State of Kelantan which formed a branch of a larger British colonial administration in Malaya. Mason and his successor Bishop put Europeans in the key positions of Magistrate, Surveying, Public Works, Lands, and Police, a process that was reinforced by staff transfers to and from the FMS service. This cadre was responsible for general advancement and professionalisation of administration in Kelantan. The administrations of Mason and Bishop widened the gap of familiarity between ruler and ruled that had existed under the Siamese. With their meticulous record keeping, the noting of all matters that affected power and prestige were analysed and interpreted, and barriers to development eliminated. This was seen across Kelantan in land policy, communications infrastructure and in the increasing tendency toward regulation of the legitimate behaviour.

Key features of the British design for Kelantan were the development of the plantation economy and an increased expenditure on capital works. Both of these issues were addressed early with an enactment passed in 1910 permitting Indian immigration, primarily for service as labourers on the rubber plantations.⁵³ The Public works expenditure for 1911 was over \$70,000, more than double the expenditure of the previous year.⁵⁴ Houses were built for staff, a jetty and crane erected at Tumpat for the maritime trade, construction of the Trunk road continued and a trace was fixed for

⁵³ Enactment 7 of 1910.

⁵⁴ *KAR 1911*, p. 2. Public Works took up around 17 percent of the Kelantan budget in 1911 as opposed to 7.4 percent in 1910.

further road stages. FMS surveyors in the Galas Valley surveyed a possible route for the railroad.

In keeping with this progressive attitude the decision was taken to transfer all boundary disputes concerning land up to a value of \$500 away from the courts and to the Lands officer. This move coincided with a gradual push toward the ultimate goal of land registration. In 1910 Mason noted that there were three lands offices, one each in the administrative regions Kota Bharu, Pasir Puteh and Batu Menkebang.⁵⁵ Only the Kota Bharu office actually had separate staff, land matters in the other two cases being part of the functions of the District Officer, each of whom dealt with less than one hundred registrations. On the other hand the Kota Bharu office had five clerks preparing and writing up 13,369 claims for land title across twenty mukim throughout the year from which the office received \$17,519.⁵⁶

The court's insistence that only registered transfers were valid led to a 137 percent rise in applications from the 1909 figure; an increase of 1,708 transactions.⁵⁷ To further cover the costs of administration transfer fees were charged and stamp duty levied. The 2,312 transfers brought \$2,843 to the treasury and stamp duty \$7,756. While \$5,656 of this amount came from the transfer of six rubber estates — the size of European holdings made such transfers a windfall for the government — the average Malay claim

⁵⁵ *KAR 1910*, p. 4.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

for registration was less than half an acre.⁵⁸ After paying to register and receiving legal title to farm the land, disputes concerning ownership could be heard before the courts. As such, the British administrators brought the question of land registration and ownership within the affairs of the state treasury through a simple tactic of refusing to recognise any other form of ownership.⁵⁹

The state made land available to Malays for the purpose of agriculture. In 1910 in Kota Bharu district 5,225 acres were released for farming, a total of 1,176 applications. In Pasir Puteh 2,689 acres were released but in Batu Menkebang, Mason wrote that the wages on the rubber estates tempted Malays from their own land holdings and as a result there were only twenty applications for small plots although there were 801 licences granted for temporary occupation.⁶⁰

British rule in Kelantan favoured progress and reform; both were predicated on the need for state revenue to cover state expenditure. While the benefits of Graham's early efforts were clear to Mason the real hard work of surveying and land registration had made little progress and Graham had deferred any alteration to the system of produce tax collection. The Lands Office realised early on that an estimation based on total area of land held under a registered title would give greater surety of possession and would provide better financial returns than taxes collected on specific produce or selected

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ This was not however particularly successful as the Kelantan Malays customarily disposed of land by oral transfer. Land registration was initially a custom more honoured in the breach than in the observance but eventually caught on through court refusal to accept any but registered claims and British moves to update land registers at the village level in the presence of whole communities. *KAR 1916*, p. 4.

⁶⁰ *KAR 1910*, p. 4-5. This is countered by Kaur and Talib who claim that Malays could make more not working for Europeans and in any case to employ Malays would have led to a decline in productivity and

crops. It could also assist in stemming widespread tax avoidance and non-compliance, particularly among the aristocracy. Graham had lacked the resources and political muscle to tackle the entire system of land registration and tenure. In the handwritten draft report for 1908 he had commented:

In view of the uncertainty of the political situation, and of the fact that the existing notifications and [regulations] provided a sufficiently sound system of land Administration in accordance with the needs of the State, it was not thought expedient to take any further steps towards the passing of a general land law for the State, which might have met with opposition from the S. S. Co. [Straits Settlement Colony].⁶¹

While Graham appeared reluctant to move on land reform because of the workable state of affairs and the possibility of upsetting the future British administration, the British Advisors had the full backing of their government and the financial requirement that Kelantan repay its loans to the FMS. A registration of land and a shift in taxation was thus seen as both desirable and necessary. One way to increase revenue was to encourage foreign investment, and here the conflict between good government and opportunities for business can be clearly seen.

In response to an inquiry from Boustead and Co. (Singapore and Penang) about available land and terms for planting coconuts, Mason wrote that with respect to large

less profit for the European venture. A. Kaur and S. T. Robert, 'The Extractive Colonial Economy and the Peasantry: Ulu Kelantan 1900-40', *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁶¹ *BAK File 227/10* (Draft Administrator's report for year 1326AH (1908)).

areas of 10-20,000 acres, although the premium was free, the survey fee was as in FMS, and the quit rent 50c per acre for the first six years then \$1 an acre per year there after. The cultivation clauses were the same as in the FMS and importantly applications over 5,000 acres were to be approved by His Excellency the High Commissioner in Singapore, not by the Adviser himself or even the Sultan as a rubber stamp.⁶² Mr Dingar from Boustead and Co. was sent to Kelantan to survey land but negotiations appear to have broken down as the land being examined was sought by others who would meet the Kelantan State's conditions whereas Boustead and Co., who claimed they would not come for less than 10-15,000 acres, sought special terms which they claimed the High Commissioner had promised them.⁶³ While Mason was helpful, he was not prepared to compromise Kelantan's interests when local operations and other Europeans would pay the full rent.

In the 1911 report the Adviser Bishop was able to state that coconuts occupied over 21,000 acres in Pasir Puteh district and much of this was with European planters leaving little land left for alienation in that region.⁶⁴ In the Ulu Kelantan European investment

⁶² *File BAK 147/10* (Terms on which 10-20,000 acres of coconut land may be granted). Letter from Mason to Boustead and Co. 29/10/1910.

⁶³ *Ibid.* In a letter to Mason on 8/4/1911, the Under-Secretary for the FMS (Office of the Resident General Kuala Lumpur) had no information on the special terms promised to Boustead and Co. but was able to relate the terms available in Selangor for taking up of 10,000 acres for coconuts:

- (i) no premium;
- (ii) quit rent of 10c/acre increasing by 10c per year to a maximum of \$1 per acre per year;
- (iii) the right to select one 10,000 acre block or five 2,000 acre blocks;
- (iv) one quarter of land taken up to be cultivated within five years
- (v) the cultivation clause was applicable to individual blocks or the whole block at the option of proprietors;
- (vi) Anything except rubber could be grown on the land;
- (vii) "Not less than 100 Javanese or Chinese women to be imported in each of the 10 years for which the reduced rent is payable, the full rent to be paid for any year in which this condition is not fulfilled."

⁶⁴ *File K177/12, BAK 1911.* The coconut plantations ran roughly north-south in a line about 2-5 miles in from the coast from Bachok to Kuala Semarek. Others were established about 25 miles inland on tributaries of the Sungai Kelantan.

concentrated on acquiring land for rubber which jumped from 5,402 acres in 1910 to just over 11,000 acres in 1911. The prognosis was good with three to four year old trees apparently being some 6 months more developed than their counterparts in the FMS. Still, only 55 pikuls (3.437 tons) had been exported which indicates the industry was yet in its infancy.⁶⁵

Following Bishop's departure on leave Mr William Langham-Carter was transferred from the Straits Settlements to Kelantan as BA in March 1913.⁶⁶ He had come to Malaya in 1890 and had spent most of his time in the Straits Settlement where he had been acting first magistrate and District Judge in Singapore prior to his posting to Kelantan.⁶⁷ Like the Grahams before him the Langham-Carters were frequent entertainers at home, and his staff was apparently very fond of him.⁶⁸ As Heussler notes

He moved from the oldest and most firmly established of the British territories to the newest, where the alien hand was light, little understood and much resented. In Kelantan, he continued the work of his predecessors in developing district administration on the standard colonial model, DOs being responsible for all aspects of government activity in their areas.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ *BAK 1911*, Land and Agriculture. (One pikul roughly equal to 62.5 kg). Export quantity therefore equal to 3.437 ton of rubber.

⁶⁶ Langham-Carter was the official replacement for Mason. Bishop had only ever been acting BA and had not been confirmed. Clayton was acting BA until Langham-Carter arrived at the end of March. Bishop died after an operation in Europe. Langham-Carter noted that he was unusually well read and had a remarkably tenacious memory. *KAR 1913*, p 14.

⁶⁷ He had been educated at Bradfield and was a member of the Singapore Sports Club. See *Who's Who in Malaya 1918*, Dorset and Co. Singapore, Methodist Publishing House.

⁶⁸ R. Heussler, *British Rule in Malaya, op. cit.*, pp. 204-205.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p 205.

Langham-Carter continued the trend toward making Kelantan's legislation comply with that of the FMS, and passed seven enactments during 1913 at ten meetings of the State Council. Among these were enactments on Opium and Chandu, extradition, the abolition of debt bondage,⁷⁰ counterfeit coins, banishment, protection of labourers' health and land resumption. Several other regulations to substitute for the cattle slaughter monopoly were passed. This had the aim of eliminating cattle rustling.⁷¹ He was not able to produce a comprehensive Land Enactment as there were a number of points of debate, but achieved acceptance in principle from the State Council that fixed rents would be substituted for produce taxes.

Langham-Carter inherited a state that was in serious debt but in other respects was beginning to function well. The machinery of administration was in place and was in the main controlled by a technocratic class. Most of the officers were apparently capable, although Mr Slack of the Public Works Department was dispensed with in mid-1913 and not replaced, and both the superiors of Mr Morkhill, who was in Kelantan as a surveyor, were alcoholics.⁷² On the whole the administrators were dedicated to the task in hand and were competent. This professionalisation of the machinery of state administration was replicated in the principal apparatus of state control, the police and court system.

⁷⁰ This enactment sought to register all existing debt bondsmen and extinguish all debts and legal recognition of such status by 1918. *KAR 1913*, p. 2. Debt bondsmen did not apparently complain about their condition but as a form of semi slavery the British were keen to see it eliminated.

⁷¹ *BAK 1913*, pp. 1-2.

⁷² *BAK 1913*, p. 2, and R. Heussler, *British Rule in Malaya, op. cit.*, pp. 205-209.

5.3 *Police, courts and justice*

The system of indirect rule as practised in Kelantan depended upon the notional consent of the governed. In exchange for protection from enemies real or imaginary, Kelantan accepted the advice of Advisers who directed the administration of the state and were for all intents and purposes the power behind the throne. Legitimacy and links with a historic past were maintained through the office of Sultan. The day-to-day administration was gradually removed from even the State Council to a bureaucracy that now and again required the permission or endorsement of the State Council to act in a certain way on a particular matter. The curious nexus between the gradual marginalisation of the Sultan from any real power and the need to retain the Sultan as the ruler of the State so as to guarantee legitimacy is best exemplified through an examination of Kelantan's system of justice.

The Kelantan court system was a primary means of enforcing British designs. The historic right of Kelantanese to appeal to the Sultan if a judicial decision had gone against them was regarded by the Advisors as a waste of time and effort.⁷³ The High Court consisted of two judges, one of which was the Sultan. By making the Assistant Adviser the other judge, Mason ensured that correct decision would more likely than not be reached. The Central Court mainly heard criminal matters. Mason created what was essentially a court of petty sessions and intervened in the selection of judges. The

⁷³ Graham quickly demarcated religious and civil jurisdictions in 1903 and left the muftis to deal with sharia law. The civil law system was structured into a Court of Small Cases, a Central Court and a High Court, the highest court of appeal. By 1905 the number of small courts had expanded from one to four. This system survived until the British Advisors acted to revamp the system. The Siamese judge who had served on the High Court was replaced by the Assistant Adviser. Other court officers resigned or were

two small courts heard criminal cases, petty summons and civil matters. District Officers also held court, the performance of which was apparently quite satisfactory. All tiers of this system played their part in removing the dispensation of justice from the Sultan and confining it to the judicature, thus enforcing a separation of powers. The appointment of a European magistrate to the Central Criminal Court for just four months of the year led to a large decrease in the number of criminal appeals which fell from 526 in 1909 to 146 in 1910.⁷⁴ Despite this Mason was still unhappy with the 34 percent of criminal appeals that were upheld in 1910 (47 out of 130 — others presumably pending) which was “still distinctly high”.⁷⁵ Appeals in both criminal and civil cases were discouraged, and the move to a full judicial review by a European judge appears to have discouraged vexatious and frivolous claims.⁷⁶ The percentage of criminal appeals upheld dropped from 34 percent in 1910 to 22 percent in 1911 but stabilised at around 33 percent in 1912 and 1913.⁷⁷ Such relatively high rates for overturning the judgement of lower courts in criminal matters indicates that in many cases wrongful convictions were being recorded.

The Ecclesiastical court was also brought under British control when Mason defined its jurisdiction and procedures in the Ecclesiastical Court Procedure Enactment of 1909. Various other regulations were issued concerning *khalwat* (also written *kluat*) — sexual relations between Muslims and non-Muslims — divorce, registration of marriages and

dismissed which Talib notes “improved the stature of the staff of the courts”. S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁷⁴ KAR 1910, p. 26.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ KAR 1911, p. 6

⁷⁷ KAR 1910, p. 26; KAR 1911, p. 7; KAR 1912 p. 6; KAR 1913, p. 7.

divorce.⁷⁸ Bishop abolished the post of judge of the Friday court (held by Hakim Mankamah Jumaat) in 1911, a move that further diminished the authority of the religious officials and removed the powers of religious courts to hear cases involving non-Muslims.⁷⁹

The changes outlined by the British Advisers ensured that the court system in Kelantan could function with minimum problems and the jurisdiction of the civil court system was wide. On top of the laws and enactments that had been passed under Graham, Mason passed eighteen Enactments through the State Council in twelve meetings in 1910.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Buffaloes | 10. Getah Farm |
| 2. Dogs | 11. Town and village Conservancy |
| 3. Criminal Procedure Code Amendment | 12. Firearms |
| 4. Fish protection | 13. Toddy Farm |
| 5. Courts | 14. Ferries |
| 6. Tamil Immigration fund Amendment | 15. Currency |
| 7. Indian immigration Amendment | 16. Census |
| 8. Pawnbroking Farm | 17. Succession to Small Estate |
| 9. Excise | 18. Indian Immigration |

⁷⁸ A. Hassan, *The Administration of Islamic Law in Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 31-32.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

Just four enactments were passed in 1911 while the number of meetings was not recorded.⁸⁰ In 1912 Bishop passed another four enactments over 12 meetings and Langham-Carter passed seven through ten meetings of the State council during 1913. The apparent diminution in the number of enactments being prepared and passed is slightly misleading, as Langham-Carter notes of 1912.

A large number of notices having the force of, and being in fact “patted” laws were passed to deal with a variety of circumstances. The most interesting gave the owner and occupant of a house standing in a fenced compound the right to shoot, after an unheeded challenge, any one approaching the house by night otherwise than from directly in front of, and by way of, the path, if any, to the front door.⁸¹

Clearly the regulations were as much law as the enactments and could be passed for any matter, great or small. The benefits of so many laws and a codified legal system were twofold. First, the levying of fines for transgressions delivered revenue from fines and court charges into state coffers. In 1910 court fees were \$19,729 which was over \$7,000 more than the previous year. This figure rose to \$39,644 in 1911 and by 1912 had risen again to over \$46,000, falling in the next year to just over \$43,000.⁸² While court fees increased the actual revenue coming to the State declined in 1911 owing to the transfer of lands cases to the Lands Office. Second, the codification of society was imposing a structure of behaviour that closed off avenues of resistance. British administrative colonialism in Kelantan operated through legal and governmental power structures to

⁸⁰ *KAR 1910*, p 2-3; *KAR 1911*, p. 1.

⁸¹ *KAR 1912*, p. 1.

⁸² *KAR 1910-1913*, Appendix A.

direct people to act in a particular way. This mode of domination, this governmentality, is characteristic of administrative colonialism in the twentieth century.

The workload of the central court increased from 573 cases in 1909 to 1380 in 1910, an increase partially explained by an outbreak of hooliganism for which “certain of the younger members of the aristocracy were partly responsible”. The doubling of cases reflects increased ability to apprehend and prosecute breaches of the regulations and laws enacted by the British Advisers. Increased efficiency in detection through greater professionalism of the police arm of the state apprehended dissenting individuals and bade them conform with the new order. Part of this new efficiency is seen with the military, civil and special policing arms of the Kelantan State that had existed under Siamese Administration being amalgamated into one force during the early part of 1910 by Mason. He noted that

F.M.S. books and forms were introduced and by the 1st of May the F.M.S. police system was in working order. Clerks in police stations were abolished, and qualified non-commissioned officers placed in charge of the records. ... A police school was formed to teach Malay to all members of the force. The men take a great interest in the school, more especially the Indians many of whom can now read and write and are qualified to take charge of situations if required. No promotion is guaranteed to illiterates.⁸³

⁸³ *KAR 1910*, p. 28.

The introduction of a professional police unit staffed partly by ethnic Indians was a further move toward modern systems of administration but also reflected a tried and tested British Imperial preference for men from the Indian Army in protecting the interests of the empire. Sikhs were favoured as police and troops by the British. The Indian police existed alongside the Malay constables in a force of 232. A Malay Raja was the Commissioner, and a European the Chief Police Officer. There was one Indian 'Native Officer', eleven Indian NCOs, two Indian buglers and 40 Indian constables. The rest of the force was Malay and included one inspector, 30 NCOs, 132 constables, eight detectives and five clerks.⁸⁴ By the end of 1913 there were 270 police who had during that year been issued with .303 Martini-Enfield carbines. Police stations existed at Kota Bharu, where the main force of Indian troops was housed some way outside of the town, Pasir Mas, Kuala Krai and Pasir Puteh. During 1913 this force received 3,167 reports of crimes, refused 897 more, arrested 1,468 persons and secured 845 convictions while discharging 623 others. The most common crime was theft, which accounted for 1756 of all reports. Of these police refused to take action in 840 cases, made arrests in 516, made 264 convictions and had 252 cases discharged. Assault was the next most common (237 arrests) followed by receiving stolen goods (130), affray (104) and cheating (84). Reports of murder led to four arrests, all of which were discharged. The panoply of offences (up to 47 separate charges) gives an indication of how far the British system of courts and police had intruded into Kelantan society. It also indicates that the small police force, used to push back into line those who would not self-regulate, could administer 286,000 (1913 census). People began to see the police as

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

professionals and they reported crimes to police officers. The police were a far cry from the 'uniformed banditti' described by Graham just ten years earlier.

5.4 *Services: Education and health*

Other changes to Kelantan society were in the services provided by the government to the people, principally in education and health. In 1910 the Kota Bharu school had an average daily attendance of 117 students, one of whom was the Son of Raja Senik, Tungku Ibrahim.⁸⁵ More schools were opened to the west and across the river in Pasir Mas (with 28 enrolments), Kampong Laut (20), and on the coast at Tumpat (31). Not all the students attended but daily averages were around 70 percent. The Mosque school in Kota Bharu, which averaged 42 students, outstripped these, but the education market was fundamentally different. Government schools were for children, particularly boys, while at the mosque the students were adults seeking to increase their religious understanding at one of the most regarded centres of Islamic scholarship in Malaya.⁸⁶ The education services were basic and not widespread considering the population, but a start had been made. Like most actions of the early British administration the main effect was in the towns but the vast majority of Kelantanese lived in the kampongs.

⁸⁵ As the first son he would have been Raja Muda except for a deal in 1899 which put one of Senik's uncles as Raja Muda. He was installed as Raja Muda in 1911 under a deal with the British to secure the throne for Senik's line.

⁸⁶ *KAR 1910*, p. 36.

Health services were also embryonic in 1910 with Dr Gimlette having two dressers to assist him at the hospital, one a son of the Raja of Selangor. As shown by the ethnic Indian guards, options for advancement in colonial administration were not limited to Europeans. During 1910 the hospital admitted 246 patients; 113 of them Malays including six women. A further 4,867 cases were handled on site with cases including venereal disease (264), malaria and cholera (44 deaths from 52 cases in Kota Bharu). While Kota Bharu was generally free from malaria, beri-beri and cholera, Mason notes the on the Duff Development Company's concession 71 cases of cholera occurred with 65 deaths. Mason thought it possible that the cholera infection was imported into the concession by some Tamil coolies from *Ayer Kuning* Estate in Klang (Selangor). In any case the Kelantan health staff dealt with it successfully. Credit was given to the medical department for obtaining the hearty co-operation of the mosque officials in issuing instructions for treatment, and for distribution of disinfectants.⁸⁷

Health conditions of indentured labourers were monitored by the administration, as an inspection of *Kuala Pergau* Rubber Estates in November 1913 indicates.⁸⁸ In October of 1913 the Deputy controller of Labour in Penang (part of the Straits Settlement) wrote to the BA Kelantan with regard to complaints by coolies about unhealthy conditions and ill treatment at the hands of supervisors.

⁸⁷ *BAK File 901/1913* (Condition of Indian coolies on Kula Pergau Rubber Estates).

⁸⁸ In just three years the ownership of this estate appears to have passed from the Kelantan Rubber Company to Paterson, Simons and Co, Singapore, an example of the speculative nature of rubber investment. *Ibid.*

Dr Gimlette, accompanied by the DO Ulu Kelantan, Sturrock, went to investigate with the estate manager, Mr Cameron, but found that the complaints were readily admitted by the Company. In one case, the complaint related to an employee, Mr Mass, being accused of beating a house servant with a *rattan* (cane), of getting drunk and keeping meals from patients. Mr Mass had left shortly before the inspection visit and had been replaced by another dresser, a Chinese, Mr T. I. King. The other raft of complaints concerned beatings by a Mr Muridas, who had been dismissed by Mr Cameron in September. All the coolie lines were inspected and one *mandar* was threatened with dismissal by the DO Sturrock and by Cameron.

The poor quality of drinking water from the Pergau river was found to have been a contributing factor in the poor health on *Kuala Pergau* Rubber Estates. There had been 64 deaths to September 1913. Twenty-three people had died from illness after bowel complaints, but Gimlette and Sturrock found no apparent evidence of systematic abuse. Diseased labourers were isolated and removed. Dr Gimlette found that labourer Lim Shin Kim had leprosy and recommended that he be taken to the government leprosarium on Pulau Jerejah (off the coast of Pahang) for the rest of his life.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

A letter from Langham-Carter to Mr Cameron expressed great satisfaction that European officers of the estate had not been the subject of the complaint and asked that Cameron stress on the mandars and coolies that “beating is absolutely illegal” and would be punished both by the estate and the law. He also asked that Cameron watch for suspicious mandars. The report by Sturrock mentioned that health had always been bad on Kuala Pergau but there had been no complaints against Europeans, even when they were absent.⁹⁰

An outbreak of cholera was a desperate event on plantation lines with their close quarters and high possibility of infection. Coolies were given ten grains of quinine twice weekly on Duff estates but this did not always stop death. Another cholera epidemic struck Kelantan in 1916 and again in 1920.⁹¹ The continued success of western medicine against diseases such as mumps, cholera, malaria, hookworm and flu, VD (especially for Malays) all helped to promote the benefits of government through the provision of health services and to position the state as a provider of services.

5.5 *Conclusions*

When it came to the serious business of shaping Kelantan to be a large contributor to its own state budget, the history of Enactments in the State Council shows that even aspects of Malay culture were being codified and certain activities prohibited. Successive enactments and regulations passed by Mason, Bishop and Langham-Carter legislated on the right to shoot persons approaching your house; labour conditions;

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

fugitive offenders; and firearms amendments. The next challenge was foreshadowed by Langham-Carter who in 1913 noted that in agriculture the current system was time wasting and non-productive as “the land under crop was measured each year and the amount brought during the year on to the fixed annual roll marks one step more in the destruction of this system”.⁹²

In debt to the FMS, the British Advisors in Kelantan had a strong motivation to modernise the state and achieved this by building on the bureaucracy set up under Graham. The expertise of technocrats was an important break from indigenous Malay rule and for the British the shift was designed to eliminate traditional inefficient practices. The commencement of delivery of educational and health services went some way to compensate for the loss of freedom and greater social restrictions placed on Kelantanese by the intrusion of the colonial state. But at the same time the entrenchment of the rule of law allowed greater mobility and encouragement for commerce.

Administrative colonialism in Kelantan permitted an extension of colonial rule which operated through a subtle form of surveillance: law, registration of behaviour, rules and regulations were supplemented and supported by a consistent gathering of knowledge. The product of this endeavour was a more efficient administration that could target areas of need and which constantly sought to improve itself.

⁹¹ *KAR 1916* and *KAR 1920*, Health.

⁹² *KAR 1913*, p. 8.

Through this bureaucratic rational, colonial middle management aimed to have the ruled pay for the cost of their own occupation. While the first five years achieved greater revenues, the task of remodelling the system of land taxation was delayed. The moves to shift the basis of state land taxation from produce to land, so as to recoup money to repay the FMS, occupied the next five years of British efforts in Kelantan and is addressed in the next chapter.

**Chapter 6: Managing the colonial district:
British Administration in Kelantan, 1914-1919**

This chapter covers the period 1914-1919 and is the second part of an examination of the first decade of the fashioning of British colonial administrative machinery in Kelantan. It is the last of the chapters on Kelantan that have examined how modern structures of administrative power were established in an area of Malaya that had until the early twentieth century been fairly much removed from the modernising influences that had washed over other parts of Southeast Asia. As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the bureaucracy and techniques of modern government, with their concomitant stress on the rule of law, departmental accountability and accurate record keeping, were slowly expanded by Messrs Mason, Bishop and Langham-Carter from the embryonic system set up under Graham when he was working for the Siamese King. The drive to achieve administrative conformity with the norms of British rule to the south were underpinned by Kelantan's large debt to the FMS which also required that Kelantan increase its state revenues so as to make a greater contribution to its own administration.

During World War I Langham-Carter and his replacement Farrer acted to ensure that Kelantan complied with the requirements of the British imperial state in matters concerning empire defence. As Kelantan was a Protected state, defence was a British imperial priority, yet the growing accumulation of power in the hands of the British Adviser and his officers also placed vital functions of the Kelantan state in the hands of the administrators. Reforms in trade and taxation, land sale and use, education and

health removed the political elite of Kelantan, including the Sultan, from any position of real power. In less than twenty years Kelantan had moved from what Graham considered to be despotic and anarchic rule to a small but efficient colonial administration governed by the rule of law and British legal principles of justice and fairness. Furthermore this was achieved in the main through regulation and enactments rather than physical coercion and tied in with a desire to see a better deal for the Malay peasant, whom the British considered had been preyed upon by the aristocracy. The 'civilising' mission of administrative colonialism required the elimination of elements of pre-modern society that would impede the transition into the international economy. Debt bondage and other forms of semi-slavery, prerogatives of the Kelantan aristocracy were thus eliminated while the scope and reach of Islam was restricted in its application so that there was a clear division between the colonial administrative state and Kelantanese society.

Between 1914-1919 a system of indirect rule in Kelantan was expanded and entrenched: Sultan Muhammad IV was figurehead, the British Advisers and an increasingly Europeanised administration managed Kelantan's transition into the modern world, and at the village level the government's appointed officials were the Toh Kwengs. A more sophisticated communications system, telegraph and postal facilities, regular shipping services, and the construction of a railway through Kelantan linked it to other nodes of power in British Malaya, and to commercial interests in Siam. In the first decade of British rule the colonial 'district' of Kelantan was brought more firmly into the colonial fold.

For a student of this region one legacy of British colonial administration in Kelantan is a wealth of archival material in both English and Jawi, each year ordered, each file subject specific, now preserved in the Arkib Negara Malaysia by the successors to the Malayan colonial bureaucracy. Using the annual reports of the British Advisers and a number of other specific subject files this chapter concludes the analysis of the structures of power introduced into Kelantan between 1903-1919, a period when it ceased to be even a nominally independent state and became for all intents and purposes a colonial district, ordered by imperial requirements and colonial concerns and administered by colonial “middle managers”.

6.1 *Snapshot*

Kelantan in 1914 was a state in financial crisis. The administration budget was in deficit to the tune of \$61,030 but the more worrying fact was that the state’s liabilities were \$3,416,426 greater than its assets. This was as a result of the deed of cancellation of 1912 that reduced the Duff Company to the same status as any other commercial venture.¹

In 1914 a dispute arose over the failure of the proposed railway route to pass through its remaining lands, Duff again sued the government of Kelantan.²

¹ In 1910 Duff urged Mason to persuade the Governor in Singapore to choose a western route for the peninsula trunk railway as this would pass closer to Duff’s concession. In 1912 the Kelantan government offered to acquire the company’s concessional railway rights for £275,000 but Duff demanded a further £100,000. The dispute was settled in court with £300,000 being paid to Duff and the company having more limited rights within its concession. Kelantan had to borrow money from the FMS Treasury at 4 percent in order to pay the company and had to build a road from Duff’s HQ at Kuala Lebir to the rail line. The deed of cancellation allowed for Duff to select parcels of land in exchange for the abrogation of its general rights. In the settlement there was a clause that committed the government to select a route by a specific date and to build the railway links to Duff’s selected properties. *KAR 1912-1914*.

² Duff had been waiting for the railway since 1904 when its plans for a Tumpat-Kuala Lebir railway had been blocked by Graham. The company had then turned to river transport and diversified into rubber growing to supplement its less than promising dividends from mineral operations. The Duff Company

The British administration, as with that of Graham before it, was hampered by the existence of sizeable European capitalist interests and concentrations of European populations on plantations in the Ulu Kelantan. The pressure placed on the Kelantan budget by complications arising from the Duff concession were far beyond the resources of Kelantan to pay. Raja Senik's 1900 agreement with Duff, concluded so as to bring in the British as an ally against the Siamese, had the effect of causing the total loss of financial independence to Britain. From the time of the 1912 Deed of Cancellation, Kelantan was in debt to the FMS and subjected to its administrative wishes.

Under the pressure of loans incurred to cover the payments to the Duff Company Kelantan's could spend less than it earned, as it did between 1916-1918, but the state would be in debt for the foreseeable future (see Table 6.1).

had also attempted to assert its monopoly rights over transportation in the Ulu Kelantan. As A. Kaur and S. T. Robert *The Extractive Colonial Economy and the Peasantry, Ulu Kelantan 1900-1940*, in *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)* vol 15., No. 2. pp. 32-91, put it "Consequently it ran afoul of the FMS government which sought to thwart its efforts, in the process contributing to the financial ruin of the state." With verbal assurances of the intended rail route, Duff built up his rubber plantations along the expected route but later sued for breach of contract when a different path was chosen. He lost the breach of contract action in 1916 but then sued for non-construction of the road linking his properties to the rail line and was awarded £378,000 plus court costs. The FMS wrote off an earlier loan to Kelantan, returning any repayments, and then loaned \$4,125,000 at no interest for 5 years. The whole sorry history of litigation between Duff Company and Kelantan closed in 1930 with a further £140,000 made payable to the Company.

Table 6.1: Revenue, Expenditure and Debt 1910-1919

<i>Year</i>	<i>Revenue (\$)</i>	<i>Expenditure (\$)</i>	<i>Excess of liabilities over assets (\$)</i>	<i>Explanatory notes</i>
1910	419,327	403,552	81,983	
1911	487,467	574,850	165,692	
1912	535,669	665,608	301,788	
1913	676,020	672,137	2,870,351	DDCL Loan £300,000
1914	762,772	805,965	3,309,226	
1915	692,556	807,714	3,416,426	Pasir Puteh riots
1916	822,860	808,164	3,432,078	Surplus arbitration costs paid
1917	910,291	757,946	3,277,290	
1918	955,402	899,161	3,230,728	
1919	1,141,444	1,065,012	2,688,948	Decrease due to accounting error from 1914 in liabilities list.

Source BAK 1919 p. 1.

The requirement to improve Kelantan's administration had an economic aim. Changes to land registration and the assessment of agricultural produce had been considered necessary by Graham, Mason and Bishop but had been postponed as they were considered too difficult to implement. With a large state debt the British now viewed land tax as essential. While the government of Kelantan expanded its control and influence over the population through new regulations, enactments and notices, backed by an increasingly competent justice and policing system, the main impact of the forced changes and need for greater productivity was felt in the area of land titles. In the minds of the Advisors a naturally rich and densely populated 'district' such as Kelantan should be able to pay for its own administration, and start to meet its debts. But rather than adopting a harsh policy that would alienate most if not all Kelantanese the key to the success of British administrative colonialism was its subtlety. The implementation of

modern techniques of governance was paradoxically enabled by the maintenance of the facade of tradition, embodied in the Sultan.

6.2 *The role of the Sultan*

The entry of Turkey on the side of the allies during the Great War did not present a problem for Britain's protection of Islamic Kelantan. Muhammad IV was very ready to comply with

... early and continuous proofs of his loyalty in the convening early in August of a public meeting to pray for the success of British arms, in telegraphic messages of loyalty to His Majesty the King, in ordering weekly prayers for his success, in instituting and subscribing generally to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales' Relief Fund, and in publishing notices, etc., to the effect that for all Turkey's entry into the war this was no quarrel of Islam's.³

Reading just the printed annual reports, the occupation of his country by a non-Islamic power would not appear to have greatly bothered the Ruler of Kelantan. However a portion of Langham-Carter's draft report for 1914, excised from the printed version, is more revealing as to the precise nature of the Sultan's loyalty to Britain.

That His Highness at least has marched with the times and appreciates modern destructive science, to the disparagement of Malay warfare (with its kubus and its calthrops and all the

³ *KAR 1914*, p 11.

rest of it) is shown by his remark when vouching for the loyalty of his people “Of course they are loyal — how could they fight now”.⁴

The Sultan’s support for the British Advisors was therefore pragmatic and calculated. The regime allowed him certain privileges: he remained ruler, his son would rule after him,⁵ and his immediate family and relatives (out to around third cousins) received funds from the privy purse. He did not always get things his own way and was refused requests by both his British Adviser and the Governor in Singapore with whom he corresponded. In November 1914 Muhammad IV wrote to the High Commissioner for the Malay States (the Governor) in Singapore requesting that he be provided with a private saloon car for use on the Kelantan railway.⁶ The Governor informed him that the Railways Department of the FMS, who operated the rail line through Kelantan, could not set aside a special carriage for him and his family to travel where they wished but they would be able, given sufficient notice, to provide him with a rail carriage for specific journeys.⁷ He was eventually entitled to free passage for all who travelled with him in this, as well as two free first class passes.

⁴ *File BAK 415/1915* (Kelantan Administrators Report 1914). In a note of April 1915 Langham-Carter wrote when submitting the 1914 report that while he had followed most of the instructions on how to write reports, paragraphs 10, 44, 72, 94, 95 and 101 may not be thought appropriate for publication, but if this was the case they should be deleted in Singapore. These paragraphs dealt with matters such as the moral education of the Kelantan Malay, rumours in the Ulu Kelantan of the total destruction of the British China fleet, the run on the bank caused by the war, and the court battle with Duff. While the annual reports are an excellent guide they were obviously censored at times by officials, were in this case, and more judicious authors no doubt self-censored their own writings.

⁵ Protection having seemingly confirmed the European but not Malay custom of primogeniture.

⁶ *BAK 1305/1914* (His Highness the Sultan of Kelantan asks to be provided with a private saloon car for use of the Kelantan railway). Muhammad IV to Anderson 26 November, 1914.

⁷ *Ibid.*, W. G Maxwell (Gov House Singapore) to Muhammad IV 4 December, 1912. The administration did however provide two rail passes to the Sultan’s sons, His Highness the Raja of Kelantan Tungku Ismail (eldest son) and Tunkgu Sri Indra Mahkota (2nd son). Langham-Carter to Straits High Commission (10 February, 1915). When an officious Traffic Inspector at the Port station of Tumpat requested (21 January, 1916) that a cheque for \$48.10 be sent to cover the cost of the Sultan’s trip to Tanah Merah,

Denied the resources of the State Treasury the Sultan was constantly pressed for finances and once attempted to sell his customary rights over ivory tusks and other articles to the state for \$100 per month. This strategy however succeeded only in the High Commissioner setting up a review over all his rights. This review recommended to the British Adviser that the Sultan report all his rights to the State Council within six months, with any rights not reported being forfeited. The Adviser was able to report in February of 1915 that the Sultan did indeed hold rights over ivory and turtle eggs but that other nobles did not have certain rights they had claimed.

While the protection of elephants was not at that stage a pressing need, Langham-Carter felt that it would one day be and he recommended that acquiring his Highness' rights over ivory would allow the state to frame a game law which could recoup the extra appropriation for the Sultan by way of shooting licences and taxes on ivory export. Langham-Carter enquired of His Excellency the Governor if he could be permitted to make arrangements for "doing away with His Highnesses' ivory rights". Such a deal was apparently possible only within the Sultan's lifetime and he noted that "The existence of the 'right' is an anomaly and while it exists no game laws (as regards to elephants) can be introduced to bring this state into line with its F. M. S. neighbours."⁸

Farrer replied (22 January, 1916) that the Sultan travelled for free. This last episode indicates how fast communication had become with the rail line in Kelantan.

⁸ *BAK File 98/1915* (Will His Excellency approve \$100 p. m. extra for His Highness with renunciation of one tusk and other private rights). This file is damaged and incomplete; the result of the request is not known.

If the codification of customary rights, and the abrogation of those not declared, was acceptable practice for British colonial officials, the Sultan was not above the law in land matters either. In 1915 he applied to the Superintendent of Lands to claim State land at the 12th mile of the Truck road. The Lands Office reported that the land had great potential value and a road frontage, was around 15 acres and that the government should not alienate the land to anyone, nor could His Highness argue that he did not already have land in his possession. The Adviser agreed and refused the application.⁹ From a theoretical position where the Sultan owned all land, his Advisors were now denying him even select pieces, all of course in the name of good government.

6.3 *Toh Janggut and the limits of administrative colonialism*

The rights of the Sultan were slowly wound back under the British administration but he was still required as a figurehead. There was no idea that the royal house should be removed and Muhammad IV appears to have been compliant enough. Langham-Carter appears to have been able to bring the Sultan into line when required, but the Adviser's response to a rebellion against government land tax plans, seen as a rebellion against the legitimacy of government, created some animosity between the Sultan and the Adviser. In a demonstration that in a bureaucracy no one person is indispensable Langham-Carter did not return to Kelantan after his departure on furlough. An examination of this rebellion, the Pasir Puteh rising of 1915, illustrates a number of themes that tie in with this study of administration and power in Kelantan during the period of the great war. The Pasir Puteh (or *Toh Janggut*) rising of April-May 1915 has been widely studied and

⁹ *File BAK 149/1915* (Application by HH the Sultan for State land at the 12th mile of the Trunk road at a place call Ketere. Does not recommend.)

commented upon elsewhere¹⁰ and is introduced here to examine questions of power and authority in administrative colonial rule, particularly the boundaries of the non-coercive or regulatory approach to social engineering and the readiness to revert to coercion (force) when threatened.

Of the three administrative divisions of Kelantan in 1915 only Kota Bharu district had its own lands office. In Ulu Kelantan and Pasir Puteh districts the functions of the land officer were assumed by the District Officer. The District Officer of The Ulu Kelantan was a European, Sturrock, who had been posted there precisely as the relatively large European and immigrant labour population required an officer who would be respected and who could deal with European interests.¹¹

The Pasir Puteh district covered the plains area south of Kota Bharu to the border with Trengganu and east of the Kelantan River to the South China Sea. It was populated by settled communities of agriculturalists. Both the revenues from Pasir Puteh District and the population were comparatively small. The 1911 census of the population of Kelantan amounted to 286,751. In 1914 Kelantan's revenue was \$762,772.¹² In 1911 Pasir Puteh's population of 25,523 comprised 8.9 percent of the people in Kelantan, and in 1914 revenue from this district comprised only \$24,000 (4 percent) of total state revenue. It may thus be regarded as a bit of a backwater where government was still a novelty and life was more traditional. Pasir Puteh town was about 27 miles as the crow

¹⁰ See I. N. Mahmood, 'The To' Janggut Rebellion of 1915' in W. R. Roff, ed., *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-86; see also C. B. Kheng, 'Hunting down the rebels in Kelantan, 1915: the Sultan's double game', *JMBRAS*, Vol LXVIII (2) 1995, pp. 9-32.

¹¹ This practice of posting a European to the Ulu Kelantan district was begun under Graham in 1905.

¹² S. Talib, *History of Kelantan*, *op. cit.*, p. 134 fn. 16.

flies from Kota Bharu city but there was no road, and the chief government presence was the District Office and three police stations.

Foreign and locally owned coconut plantations contributed to the copra export industry, padi fields took up much of the best agricultural land and farther toward the Kelantan river rubber, fruits and vegetables were grown. The Pasir Puteh district had been established in 1905 but district administration had advanced slowly with first a police station then a school. In 1912 the Administration had plans for a road but by 1915 this was only half complete and the area was still accessible in poor weather only by boat. With few European interests the Administration had installed a Singapore Malay of five years service as District Officer in the Pasir Puteh region, Inche Abdul (Che) Latif.¹³

The lack of easy communication made the colonial state vulnerable. Traditional loyalty in Pasir Puteh was not so much to the Sultan as to the local chief of Jeram, Engku Besar, who traced his descent back four generations from Jeram's first chief, Long Ga'far, who had been sanctioned to rule by an earlier Raja of Kelantan (possibly Muhammad II). Administrative colonial government in Pasir Puteh had led to a restriction on exemptions from poll tax, the rule of law and the apprehension of criminals, the abolition of the right to *krah* and the posting of a District Officer to supervise collection of produce and poll taxes. These duties bypassed the status role of the Jeram chief who, now deprived of income, sought to redress the imbalance. Ibrahim Nik Mahmood states that the "enforcement of a new land system created

¹³ *File BAK 117/1916* (Annual Report 1915 District Office Pasir Puteh).

misunderstanding among the uneducated and conservative peasantry”.¹⁴ In this climate Engku Besar apparently incited a man now known as Toh Janggut¹⁵ (white beard) and others to defy the government.¹⁶

The new land assessment system was agreed to in principle by the State Council in March 1914 and was introduced in January of 1915.¹⁷ The changes were not implemented in Pasir Puteh but collection of tax was widely known to be moving to become a question of land use rather than actual production. Mahmood claims that Engku Besar enlisted Toh Janggut to lead a boycott of *Hasil* (a tax on padi) payments. The refusal to pay these due to the state led to an investigation by District Officer Latif.¹⁸ On 29 April 1915 the police went to Toh Janggut and several of his associates and requested they come to the Pasir Puteh district office to answer some questions about the boycott. A dispute about who led off from the village then led to a scuffle in which Toh Janggut stabbed a police sergeant in the chest and killed him.¹⁹

¹⁴ The efficiency of the DO Abdul Latif is cited by others as a contributing factor and the British Advisor held an investigation into allegations that the District Officer was collecting the padi assessment and 1914 arrears on padi, durian and coconut assessment faster in 1915 than had previously been the case. *BAK 795/1915*. He concluded that Latif was collecting the moneys early as the harvest was early but that “the allegation seems to have been true literally but in spirit quite false” (note from BA to Assistant Advisor 4/8/15).

¹⁵ The real name of the leader of the Pasir Puteh rising was Haji Mat Hasan. He was a trader who had been instructed by a Mingangkabu teacher and was rumoured to have supernatural qualities. According to tradition he acquired invulnerability after being fed his dried caul by his mother in his teenage years. With his invulnerability went sharp brown eyes (a known feature of the brave); a large bald head with heavy eyebrows (a known sign of intelligence) and Islamic devotion (he was an *haji*). Mat Hasan was allegedly born in Jeram in 1853 and was thus about 62, and still invulnerable, when he was killed. *Ibid.*

¹⁶ I. N. Mahmood, ‘The To’ Janggut Rebellion of 1915’, in W. R. Roff, ed., *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74, note 25 claims that Notice 4/1914 (Land Rules), indicates this was done pending the preparation of a complete Land Enactment.

¹⁸ Mahmood claims Latif dispatched police to the source of the strife, Kampong To’ Akib (about 30mins walk from Pasir Puteh).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp 72-75. The Sultan’s Notice of May 27 (*File 590/1915*) notes the murdered man’s name as Sergant Ruham Pasang.

The remaining police returned to the District Office and reported to Latif. Fearing a raid on the District Office all government officers then left Pasir Puteh by boat (there was no other fast way out) taking with them the district treasury.²⁰ A crowd estimated to be up to 2,000 then descended on Pasir Puteh and finding that the government officials were absent, released prisoners from the jail, burnt down shops, destroyed government property and records and then turned on the houses of two local Europeans, one in Pasir Puteh and one on the coast in Semarak, where there were several European coconut plantations. Mahmood notes “The exact movements of the rebels are not known, but the records report that anarchy reigned in the district for several days before the authorities took counter measures.”²¹

The response to this challenge to authority was dramatic, but not immediate. Unsure as to the extent of the trouble the Adviser Langham-Carter cabled Singapore for support and 250 men of the Shropshire Light Infantry were dispatched up the coast to Kelantan, arriving one week later at Tumpat on the warship *Cadmus*.²² With the prospect of a confrontation between Toh Janggut and the British there was “an almost universal exodus of chiefly harmless folk to Besut.”²³ The exodus of people would appear to indicate that the notion of retribution being visited only on the guilty had yet to catch

²⁰ Latif’s own report says that he left Pasir Puteh at 2:30 pm on April 29, 1915 with an entourage escorting \$10,200 in a boat which later capsized when it arrived at Bachok at 7:30 am the following day. He changed boats, headed for Tumpat at 9 am, arriving there by 2pm then left for Kota Bharu by government launch arriving at 5pm. He saw the Advisor at 7pm and deposited the money to the Treasury at 8pm. *BAK File 287/1915 Monthly Reports District Office Pasir Puteh 1915 (April)*. Latif returned to Pasir Puteh in May, was active in the apprehension of rebels before being replaced by Mr Pepys (*BAK 117/1916 Annual Report 1915 District Office Pasir Puteh*) and transferred to Kota Bharu where he was given a position in the Lands Department.

²¹ Mahmood, *op. cit.*, p 75.

²² Heussler, R, *British Rule in Malaya: The Malayan Civil Service and its Predecessors, 1867-1942*, Clio Press, Oxford, 1981, p. 207.

²³ *File 117/1916 (Annual Report 1915 District Office Pasir Puteh)*.

on, unless the absence of the rule of law made conditions intolerable for residents. As Pepys, who was later appointed DO Pasir Puteh, wrote

The few inoffensive people who remained fled hurriedly on 24th May when Toh Janggot and his braves announced that they intended to attack Pasir Puteh the next morning. They kept their word but lost their leader; but even then after that the fugitives feared to come back dreading apparently both sides - government and rebels alike.²⁴

For the British the murder of a policeman was an assault on the rule of law and it could not remain unpunished. Apart from that, there was the refusal to pay hasil tax which challenged the legitimacy of the state and local district administration. While the rising was a relatively minor occurrence in terms of military history, if there was any doubt about who actually ruled in Kelantan, none remained after the events of 1915.

The Europeans of the Ulu Kelantan reacted with a great willingness to be part of the reprisal. With the British empire embroiled in war such an incident was liable to make the planters nervous as to their future in Kelantan. Ten planters hastily grouped together— Messrs Templer, McPherson, Haughton, Stephens, Green, Belton, Gardner, Bone, Osborne, Dobsun – and collared Javanese and Banjarese labourers from the *Taku* estate armed with long parangs and 4 guns. In total the group had 31 rifles, 7 shotguns, 10 revolvers and sufficient ammunition.

²⁴ *Ibid.*,

They snuck through the mid-morning from Sungai Nal and wound their way behind kampongs until they reached Kamuning. Before being recalled by the British Adviser they covered 50 miles in one night and three short morning walks, and the force is reported to have behaved excellently although “the coolies from Taku estate behaved perfectly but were disappointed at not getting a chance of using their long parangs”. The DO Ulu Kelantan, Sturrock, concluded that the force steadied the country and prevented disturbances.²⁵ Another response by British officers was to evacuate their families to Siamese territory when informed, incorrectly, that the rebels were marching on Kota Bharu.²⁶

Earlier in March of 1915 the Sultan had acted to dispel rumours that Britain was going to lose the war by issuing a notice of superior British military strength. In May he issued proclamations calling on the rebels to surrender within 30 days to the police and delegated Toh Kweng to *krah* labour to assist the British soldiers in the apprehension of the rebels.²⁷ A force of 250 Malays went north from Bukit Jawa to join the Shropshire Light Infantry, who for most of May 1915 waited for an attack that never came as the rebels avoided confrontation with this well armed force. The soldiers occupied what was left of Pasir Puteh but were relieved by the Malay States Guides from 17 May 1915.²⁸ After the initial incident the Pasir Puteh district was virtually deserted and very

²⁵ *File 536/1915* (Report on the action taken by the DOUK in the matter of the outbreak at Pasir Puteh). Their enthusiasm to ‘get amongst it’ may have been in response to possible feelings of guilt for not being in Europe fighting the Hun.

²⁶ C. B. Kheng, ‘Hunting down the rebels in Kelantan, 1915: the Sultan’s double game’, *op. cit.* p 12.

²⁷ *BAK 590/1915* (As regard (a) calling on the people in Pasir Puteh District to surrender their arms and (b) proclaiming all the known participants in the riots and rebellion at Pasir Puteh or arising therefrom (27/5/1915)).

²⁸ R. Heussler *British Rule in Malaya: op. cit.*, p 207, notes that the next Adviser to Kelantan, Farrer, was the commander of the relieving force. C. B. Kheng, ‘Hunting down the rebels in Kelantan, 1915’, *op. cit.*, describes him as a political (intelligence) officer attached to the Army (p. 15.) Farrer was an 1896 Cadet who had thus been in Malaya for around 20 years.

quiet and in order to hasten the capture of the rebels Sultan Muhammad IV offered rewards of up to \$500 for the capture of the ringleaders. Two of the rebel leaders were then captured but Toh Janggut remained at large until 24th of May when he led an attack on the Malay States Guides in the early morning. The attack failed and he was killed, by a single bullet. Toh Janggut's body was hanged upside down in Kota Bharu for several days. Other rebels were pursued and hunted down over the next few weeks.

The consequences of crossing the colonial state can be seen in the public display of the corpse of Toh Janggut. This demonstration of state power represents a reversion to less sophisticated methods of convincing people of the folly of their ways and shows the limits of the regulatory approach to government. Justice and the rule of law could only operate when people accepted their legitimacy and this indicates the fragility of the mechanisms of control in the apparatus of the colonial state in Kelantan. The administration was still fundamentally weak and had not permeated deeply into all parts of its bounded territory. It was required to demonstrate its effectiveness by force, in a very public display of its power.²⁹ The rising did however concern Singapore enough to send the Acting Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlement, W. G. Maxwell, to Kelantan to report on recent events in Kelantan and Trengganu and for the Governor to report to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies in London.³⁰

²⁹ The role of the Sultan in this exhibition of force is a little unclear and there is some dispute over the motivations of the Sultan and the Adviser in handling this issue. Kheng claims that the Sultan was attempting to carve out a position of independence within the British administration by trying to deal with the matter through diplomacy and by sending his own ministers to speak with the Governor in Singapore, while Mahmood regards the Sultan as a compliant cog in the administrative machinery. Kheng's analysis seems to indicate that the Sultan did attempt to delay the arrival of the army, but in the end it was the Malay States Guides, and not the Sultan's men, who quashed the rebellion.

³⁰ *BAK file 533/1915*. A partly coded telegram was sent which indicated that W. G. Maxwell was coming on 17 May and would leave by 21 May. His brother Charlton N Maxwell, was the British Agent in Trengganu. See C. B. Kheng, 'Hunting down the rebels in Kelantan, 1915', *op. cit.*, pp. 10-20. Their father was the WE Maxwell mentioned in Chapter 3 who gave an address to the Royal Colonial Institute.

Another interesting feature of the rebellion is the treatment of rebel leaders. Some were executed for their crimes and others were imprisoned for up to 10 years. Those sentenced to terms over one year were not however kept within Kelantan but were jailed in Singapore following correspondence between Langham-Carter and the Colonial Secretary in Singapore who drew his attention to the fact that under Ordinance X of 1909 the governments of Native States could authorise the colony [the Straits Settlements] to remove and incarcerate a prisoner who would then be subject to the laws and regulations at force in the colony.³¹ Langham-Carter requested this action as

Discipline is much better maintained there than we can maintain it and there is also hard labour which we cannot really provide, while removal from the state could make the punishment much more impressive.³²

Retribution against the rebellion did not stop with the leaders and others were charged with complicity in rebellion, treachery and carrying arms. A total of 141 convictions were recorded with the punishments ranging from the smallest fine of \$50 to life imprisonment.³³ A suggestion from W. G. Maxwell on 21 May 1915 prompted an emergency meeting of the State Council on 22 May which authorised punitive damages be levied against every household in Pasir Puteh. Prices were fixed at \$10 for a large house, \$5 for a medium house and \$3 for a small house. The notice was drafted in English using FMS guidelines with a copy prepared in Jawi; it was proofed and printed

³¹ *BAK 534/1915* (Enquiries whether all such Pasir Puteh rebels as may be sentenced to one year's R. I. or more may be sent to the Singapore Prison).

³² *Ibid.* The cost of keeping the rebels in the Singapore prison was 30 cents a day, half the cost of a prisoner in the colony (Inspector of Prisons to BA Kelantan 19/6/1915)

³³ *BAK 142/1917* (Recommendation for the release of the remaining Pasir Puteh rebels in Singapore).

on 23 May and given the official Chop (Seal) of Muhammad IV.³⁴ Non-payment of fines within 15 days was initially to have resulted in the seizure of goods but the new DO Pepys noted “I demured. I stated that many people would simply take away their goods, and would thus escape scot-free. I stated it to be essential that the houses be burnt, if the fine was not paid.”³⁵ The Sultan agreed to this measure and 100 copies of the notice were sent to the Chief Police Officer to put up in the station and around the Pasir Puteh district. Langham-Carter noted that while there was no legal liability, the money should make good the losses and should not come to general revenue. The administration acted to punish all as “we cannot separate out the guilty where probably all were guilty in greater or lesser degree”.³⁶

British colonial power responded to the challenge of the rebellion and reasserted itself in a variety of ways. The Shropshire Light Infantry were summoned to Kelantan and came fully armed³⁷; the rebels were caught, found guilty by the legal system and killed or expelled to Singapore, the primate city of British imperialism in the far east, and thus removed from the territorial area of the administration;³⁸ and the general populace of Pasir Puteh District was fined *en masse* for its complicity, despite the fact that the dairahs of Jeram and Semarak were the main two regions involved.³⁹ As the number involved in the disturbance was estimated to be between 2,000 and 5,000, a maximum

³⁴ *BAK File 562/1915* (Notice re: Penalty to be inflicted on every household in the Pasir Puteh District for the recent disturbances there 21/5/15).

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Armaments included two maxim guns and field canon.

³⁸ Most were returned to Kelantan in April of 1917 although some lifers remained. The DO Pasir Puteh wrote to the BA in 1917 requesting that the remaining ten also be returned. *BAK File 142/1917*. The file does not record whether this request was granted.

³⁹ *BAK File 562/1915*.

of 20 percent of the 25,523 population (1911 census), this was perhaps unfair.⁴⁰ On this last point the final word should perhaps go to Mr Pepys who noted in his annual district report that

The Punitive Tax which His Highness the Sultan imposed on each house holder in the district in consequence of the rising, so graded as to fall heavily on none, was paid up cheerfully, its fairness being admitted by almost all. It is the kind of retributive justice a Malay appreciates.⁴¹

By the September of 1915 all but 330 people had returned to their villages and by the end of the year only twenty four households continued their absence.⁴² Most therefore accepted both the retribution of the government and the plans for a reform of the land taxation system which has been cited as a cause of the rising.

If we accept that the cause of the Pasir Puteh rising was primarily a refusal to pay tax, it was not a rebellion against the Sultan of Kelantan *per se* but against the system; a rebellion against the proposed reforms of the administration. Resistance was expressed through the murder of a policeman and the burning of government buildings. In Malaysia this event has been seen as a proto-nationalist revolt, but other authors note local political factors as being the main cause for the disturbance. Talib claims “the significance of this short-lived uprising should be underestimated in the history of the state.”⁴³ He is undoubtedly correct in his estimation that the Toh Janggut reflects the

⁴⁰ Estimate of the numbers involved are unreliable and vary considerably, see C. B. Kheng, ‘Hunting down the rebels in Kelantan, 1915’, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ *BAK File 117/1915.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 134.

last gasps of the old order, but the underestimation of this event neglects an analysis of the response by the colonial state when challenged.

Toh Janggut represents the final tilt of local politics, influence and tradition at the modernising forces of British administration that sought to position the state as a more powerful force than local chiefs. The elimination of the power of local chiefs was a further step toward establishing centralised colonial control. The manner of the re-establishment helped to dissuade others from attempting any further resistance. It ensured that the state would be accepted as legitimate and would not be challenged.

The Pasir Puteh rising strained the relationship between Langham-Carter and Sultan Muhammad. The handling of the affair led to distrust on both sides and the Sultan thrice petitioned Singapore to have Langham-Carter replaced. The Sultan's dissatisfaction is evident from his first petition in March 1915, before the rising, when he learned that Langham-Carter was to go on leave. The second was in July 1915, which suggested Farrer, who had commanded the Malay States Guides, be appointed Adviser. A third petition in February 1916 when Langham-Carter was to return to Kelantan expressed his dismay at the prospect of losing Farrer and having Langham-Carter return.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ C. B. Kheng, 'Hunting down the rebels in Kelantan, 1915', *op. cit.*, p. 30. Officially Langham-Carter went on furlough but he did not return to Kelantan after August 1915.

It is difficult to state with any certainty whether it was the Sultan's request or a decision of the High Commissioner that precipitated Langham-Carter's replacement but it is plain that the irreconcilable differences between the two made it expedient for the Governor to appoint a new Adviser. This should not however be taken as implying that the Sultan had somehow triumphed or achieved any measure of real control over his State as it is just as likely that Langham-Carter's superiors disapproved of his panicked resort to Singapore. Throughout his four years Farrer was only ever Acting Adviser in Kelantan but the Sultan was apparently much happier as Farrer apparently had a thorough knowledge of Malay and Malay customs.⁴⁵

But just as his predecessors had done Farrer proceeded with reforms and in many cases hastened their implementation. The arrangement of indirect rule continued much as before: those close to the Sultan gained from their association with him and British support ensured that his rule was not challenged. The ruler of the state had certain privileges; the Sultan had his own telephone and later gained a motorcar. His opinion was less frequently sought as time went by but the line of succession was secure. For the immediate family of Sultan Mohammad IV, the coming of the British meant stability of position and status. For many of the elites the rationalisation of the privy purse deprived them of their livelihoods but resistance was not possible. They cooperated with the regime, despite protests, some even accepting jobs. British

⁴⁵ The Sultan's disapproval of Langham-Carter was perhaps related to his usage of royal Malay form of "we" in his own correspondence with the Sultan which may have been perceived as impertinent and discourteous. Farrer's linguistic and communicative skills were apparently better. *Ibid.*, p. 30, fn. 74.

administrative colonialism ossified the fluid politics of Kelantan and prevented further disruption to the royal house.⁴⁶

6.4 *Changes to land law*

The Pasir Puteh rising rebellion had been a last desperate attempt to maintain local power under the guise of resistance to British plans for land reform. As with the abolition of the right of the nobility to krah and the change to annual poll tax under Graham, the changes to land laws were focused on increasing revenue. Up to 1915 the land registration system required the involvement of *penghulus* (pleaders or advocates) who argued the merits of cases on behalf of their clients. In a note to the Adviser Langham-Carter in April of 1915 the Superintendent of Lands, Norman, wrote that “In my opinion, disputes over land in Kelantan require summary decisions that may not be appealed against.” Norman noted that the system of involving *penghulus* had disputes of as little as \$20 clogging up the Land Court, the High Court, “then your court” and was a grievous waste of government time. Norman proposed that because all courts were in the towns and most of the people were not, the lands officers should decide the cases on the spot. He went so far as to note that “The high issues to be decided in such a case are often ‘Is A.B. a liar, or is C.D., or are both?’” and claimed it was hard to know exactly what was being adjudicated on.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ In a move to sure up the Senik line his son Ibrahim was installed as Raja Muda (one of Senik’s brothers had held this position) and succeeded his father on his death in 1920. Senik’s line rule Kelantan to this day and such stability was a precondition for indirect colonial rule.

⁴⁷ *BAK File 433/1915* (The question of abolishing the right of appeal in Land Cases). Norman to Langham-Carter 11/4/1915.

In support of this request to abolish the right of appeal in land cases Norman cited a circular from the British Resident of Perak in 1906 that said it was “undesirable” for Magistrates to do things that minor officials were already paid to do. He also cited Lord Roberts on abuse of appeals in India and his conclusion that such appeals had an “unsettling effect on the minds of the people and its failure to secure justice.”⁴⁸ Norman claimed that two Kelantanese officers of the land department, Toh Khatib and Haji Muhammad Said, as well as another European officer, supported his position.

The use of systems developed elsewhere for dealing with problems of land was obviously acceptable to Farrer who decided that the work of substituting land rents for produce tax was taking too long. He abolished the previous system on the basis that it was too costly and too slow and used instead the system devised for land registration in Penang and Province Wellesley in the 1890s.

The main difference was that rather than make a start in each demarcated survey area or settlement, the Survey Office after completing partially surveyed kweng,⁴⁹ settled each kweng one at a time. Thus whole kweng could convert from produce tax to fixed rents and the amount of rent to be paid was recorded in the Settlement index.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ The term Kweng was not used until 1916 but, as Farrer noted, it was a mis-nomer in the first place being a Siamese word meaning “head”. The British then changed to the usage of daerah which they spelt ‘dariah’.

When the Index is ready, a rent-roll is made out therefrom and in that Kweng rent thereupon takes the place of all produce taxes. The whole of the records are, of course, indexed by reference to the lot number in the map. The result of the laying down of these rules is that, whereas in July 1915, there were 98 entries in Register relating to lands in various districts, indexed on no workable system, at the end of 1915 Kweng Kota, containing 9,736 lots, was settled, and a rent roll was ready for use in 1916. In no other Kweng has the survey been completed but Kwengs Limbat and Lundang have each been split into two portions, separated by the trunk road, and in each Kweng one portion, the survey of which is now completed, will be settled by the end of 1916, while Kwengs Salor and Beta should be entirely completed by then.⁵⁰

Land registration thus commenced in 1915 in the most populous ‘district’ of Kota Bharu.⁵¹ Farrer believed that in five years all of Kota Bharu district would be under the new land registration system.⁵² On the initial estimation from the kweng of Kota, land rent was liable to bring in about 50 percent more than had produce tax. The padi crop for that year was poor but the first stage of a state-wide land rent substitution scheme still led to an increase in revenue.⁵³

⁵⁰ *KAR 1915*, p 5.

⁵¹ Despite Graham’s early plans for as many as five administrative districts in Kelantan, there were only three until 1927. While they are referred to in the reports as districts within Kelantan these three divisions of Kelantan (Kota Bharu, Pasir Puteh and Ulu Kelantan) were sublevels of administrative rule.

⁵² *KAR 1915*, p. 5.

⁵³ The Kweng of Kota in 1915 showed a rent demand of \$4,403 against a produce tax revenue of \$3,000. *KAR 1915*, p 5.

Farrer argued that the new system was of benefit to the Malay agriculturalist as it provided him with security of tenure and ownership and protected him against false claims.

At the present time no man's property is safe against claims which may involve delving thirty years into the past, and which is buttressed upon and countered by equally vague and unsatisfactory oral evidence. There is no Law of Limitations, no Statute of Frauds, in fact none of the machinery or safeguards which obtain in civilised countries.⁵⁴

Still as the Malay peasant shared "with the peasantry of every other land on earth an affection for the ills he has in preference to others that he knows not of", Farrer was cautious about the rate of change by which the new system would be introduced.

It is obvious that any attempt to change in the twinkling of an eye the system to which he is accustomed into an entirely new system (whatever its theoretical excellence) would arouse sullen and determined opposition. Any change must be brought in gradually and must by its proved advantages win popular approval.⁵⁵

By splitting the whole of Kelantan into manageable and surveyable portions, little by little the basis of agricultural revenue moved from tax paid on produce of specific crops to tax paid on land, irrespective of whether or not it was productive. Land was assessed and graded, then tax levied according to the quality of land. In the long term the system would bring in more money to the state as all private or concession land would be subject to the new stipulations. With land registration the amount of 'theoretical' state land diminished and agricultural people were given certainty of tenure. Abandoned land

could be resumed by the state if required, or where such land was damaging neighbouring crops. The state, and not the Raja or an Imam, became the central actor in the lives of agricultural people through the involvement of the Lands Office.

By 1916 the system was reported to have been well accepted where introduced but with overwhelming illiteracy the oral transfer of property was still common and forced the British to adopt a procedure of periodic visits to each kampong to rectify the land register.⁵⁶ Of Kota Bharu's thirty six daerah,⁵⁷ six were under the rent system by 1917 and a further seven were expected to be added by 1918, although only five were completed.⁵⁸ By 1919 Kota Bharu had sixteen of its 36 daerah under the rent system with a further six to be added in 1920.⁵⁹ In the same year all six daerah of Pasir Puteh⁶⁰ were on the rent roll and in its daerah of Gong Datuok and Semerak the move from produce taxes to fixed rents in 1919 resulted in increases to government revenue from \$4,974 (1918) to \$10,545.⁶¹ By 1918 three of the five daerah in Ulu Kelantan had converted to the new system.⁶²

In 1919 rents from the sixteen Kota Bharu daerah under the fixed rent roll brought in receipts of \$98,926 while total land revenue in that district was \$205,699.⁶³ In 1909 the revenue from all sources for land in Kelantan had been \$104,474,⁶⁴ a figure nearly

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵⁷ By 1922 Kota Bharu district was under the fixed rent system with the exception of three outlying daerah. S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 137, fn. 31.

⁵⁸ *KAR 1917*, p. 2; *KAR 1918*, p. 2.

⁵⁹ *KAR 1919*, p. 6.,

⁶⁰ The daerah of Bukit Abal was subdivided in 1919 and the new daerah of Bukit Sebitir created. *Ibid.*, p. 7. The other daerahs were Semerak, Gong Datuk, Bujkit Jawa and Jeram. There had been four daerahs in 1918.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶² *KAR 1918*, p. 2.

⁶³ *KAR 1919*, p.6.

⁶⁴ *KAR 1910*, p. 3.

equalled by having less than half of the daerah in the largest of Kelantan's administrative districts on fixed land rents. The other two districts combined contributed a further \$60,438 with the old system of padi, produce and poll taxes still operating in the two daerah of Ulu Kelantan south of Kuala Krai.⁶⁵ The major reform of land was more than half way to completion by the end of the first decade of British administration and was a great financial boon to the revenues of the state. The extra income earned was used to fund an expanding administration that aimed to fashion the society of Kelantan to the colonial priorities of Britain.

6.5 *The expansion of Administrative colonialism*

In 1914 Langham-Carter held only seven meetings of State Council and passed seven enactments. These included the Agricultural Pests Enactment which prohibited the importation of all animals and other pests and aimed to protect crops; the Labour Amendment Enactment which protected labourers; the Post Office and Telegraph enactments which legalised existing charges and created state monopolies; the Rubber Dealers Enactment which prohibited illicit rubber dealing; the Indigent Alien Immigration Enactment which aimed to stop vagrancy after termination of labour contracts; and the Railway Enactment which gave the Federated Malay States Railway Department in Kelantan "much the same powers as they enjoy in the Federated Malay States."⁶⁶

⁶⁵ *KAR 1919*, p 8 and Appendix A, p iii.

⁶⁶ *KAR 1914*, p. 5.

Farrer reported that twelve meetings of the State council had been held in 1915 with just three enactments passed. Two of these related to the Amendments to the Railways Enactment of the previous year and one to boats. The Railways amendments were enacted in order to bring Kelantan's legislation into line with FMS law while the Boats Enactment consolidated previous legislation and orders.⁶⁷ The use of Orders of the State Council in place of Enactments reached endemic proportions under Farrer's first year with thirty one Orders passed, only three of these are mentioned by name. The first related to land rent rules which aimed to minimise the compliance costs on the *rayaat* for the State's land reforms; the second rearranged customs duties and the third established a permanent board to advise on matters concerned with Islamic religious practice and Malay customs, the *Majlis Ugama*, established on 24 December 1915.⁶⁸

Enactment No. 4 of 1916 spelt out the powers and responsibilities of the *Majlis Ugama*, amongst which was the supervision of all matters relating to mosques and suraus.⁶⁹ The *Majlis Ugama* had powers as the administrator of property and could issue legal rulings on matters of faith, supervised charitable collections and the collection of the Islamic taxes of *zakat* and *fitrah*.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ *KAR 1915*, p 8.

⁶⁸ See W. R. Roff's article on the *Majlis Ugama* in W. R. Roff ed. *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics*, *op. cit.* See also A. Hassan, *The Administration of Islamic Law in Kelantan*, *op. cit.*, Chapters 3 and 4.

⁶⁹ Farrer commented that this very soon proved unworkable and was amended by Enactment No. 12 of 1916. *KAR 1916*, p. 5.

⁷⁰ A. Hassan, *The Administration of Islamic Law in Kelantan*, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

Hassan notes that this body was characteristic of the religious administration in other Malay states with the exception of Johor and apart from its specific duties it supervised the moral conduct of the people where the participation of Malays in gambling was of great concern to the religious authorities. It was headed by a Muslim elite and religious leaders and on occasion required the permission of the Sultan. Mostly it was left to its own devices and was free from interference by British officers. The establishment of the Majlis Ugama was in accordance with the concept that administration be kept free from matters affecting Malay custom and religion.⁷¹ Minorities such as Chinese, Siamese, Tamils and Europeans, were outside of its jurisdiction. The Majlis Ugama was able to promote Islamic learning and able to control Islamic taxes.

The administrative separation of church and state allowed for dual development of both, and while the Sultan was head of both, and involved in the Majlis Ugama, he was consulted less often on the administrative affairs of civil society. This distinction between Islam and British control established firm boundaries beyond which the colonial state did not seek, and did not wish, to intrude. Having removed religious officials from the operation of colonial 'justice', the Advisers could afford to allow limited autonomy in what they considered 'purely' religious matters. It also indicates that Islam was not necessarily incompatible with British interests in Kelantan, and when made separate from the administration of the colonial state could function as a tool to ensure social compliance and to promote order.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p 75.

Formal meetings of the State Council continued with twenty meetings in 1916 and thirteen Enactments, and a raft of other notices.⁷² The government moved to register all cattle aged over eighteen months by branding, a move that aimed to stop cattle rustling. It also regulated the use of stamps. Enactments and Notices had the same legal effect and Notices appear to have been used when a pressing matter arose which had not had the benefit of a detailed drafting of legislation. The situation in 1917 bears this out with twenty meetings of the State Council, just five enactments passed and 45 Executive Orders (Notices). Included in the notices were matters such as rules on the Rights of Way, no doubt considered necessary as the road system expanded, and passports.⁷³ In 1918 there were twenty-one meetings of the State Council, six Enactments and 31 Executive Orders, including a notice on the important matter of fees for dealing in land and registration.⁷⁴ The return to Kelantan in 1919 as British Adviser of Mr Thomson, who had been Assistant Adviser under Graham during Siamese rule, saw no change in this practice. In that year there were twenty-five meetings of Council, nine Enactments and 43 Executive Orders. The actions of State Council covered amendments to previous Enactments and Notices on the use of motorcars and motor cycles, as well as the prohibition of cattle from Siam owing to concerns about diseased animals.⁷⁵

The State Council thus became a rubber stamp for the wishes of the British Adviser and the number of Notices passed is an indication of the level of social regulation attempted by the colonial state. The intrusion of the administrative machinery into areas of Malay

⁷² *KAR 1916*, p. 5-6.

⁷³ *KAR 1917*, p. 6.

⁷⁴ *KAR 1918*, p. 8.

⁷⁵ *KAR 1919*, p. 5.

culture such as the wearing of arms, the abolition of certain holidays,⁷⁶ use of the Gregorian calendar and the easing out of the Sultan, make the establishment of the Majlis Ugama something of an exception to the rule. It does however relate to the task of controlling Kelantan society, and its operations, although independent, were limited in scope. By its first year of operations there was precious little of Malay customs left for the religious authorities to administer that was not already covered by Enactments and Notices. Much of this mimicked legislation of the FMS and in cases where no regulations existed the General orders of the FMS were followed as far as was suitable.⁷⁷

6.6 *Police and Order*

All of these regulations required a force to apprehend transgressors who were then punished by fines. In 1914 the strength of the Police force stood at 285 but the overall effectiveness of the police was hampered by the prohibitive cost to the administration of connecting the stations by telephone.⁷⁸ Theft was still the major crime accounting for 1,603 of the 2,402 incidents reported to police. Of these only 454 arrests were made and 186 convictions recorded.⁷⁹ Assault was the next frequent crime with 98 cases reported, but the police refused to act in 400 other cases.

⁷⁶ The number of public holidays was decreased from 30 in 1915 to 18 in 1920. *File BAK 870/1919* (Public Holidays for 1920). In most cases this was achieved by reducing the number of days in Malay holiday periods, for example His Highness' birthday was reduced from three days to two and Hari Raya fitrah from four to two. European holidays were also reduced as it was felt "better to cut out European holidays rather than Malay".

⁷⁷ *File 1363/1920* (Application of the Colonial Regulations to the State of Kelantan). The Straits High commission wrote to the BA in October of 1920 stating that in situations not covered by the General Orders the Colonial Regulations should apply. (Communication 23/10/1920)

⁷⁸ *KAR 1914*, p. 7.

Of 131 arrests for assault 91 people were convicted. Other crimes listed can be categorised as assaults against persons, assaults against property, breaches of the peace, hampering the conduct of the administration and the catch-all category “Breach of any other ordinance for which penalty is not provided”. The 972 reports refused by police indicate that people were trying to use the administration to settle differences, but that this tactic was not successful in an era where evidence was required.

The proportion of convictions to arrests increased slowly over time: in 1914 this was 54 percent⁸⁰ which rose to 56 percent in 1915,⁸¹ 58 percent in 1916, up to 59 percent in 1917,⁸² down to 57 percent in 1918 and up to a high of 62 percent by 1919.⁸³ This steady increase in conviction rates indicates greater accuracy in detective work and an overall move toward professionalisation in the apprehension of crime. The police were on their way to being an efficient force but while police crime, common to all ranks, had decreased, police health remained a concern with 33 percent of police admissions to the hospital due to venereal disease.⁸⁴ The budget for policing absorbed roughly one eighth of the state revenue by 1917, the high cost being put down to the absence of effective communication which necessitated a larger number of police than would have otherwise been the case.⁸⁵

The Senior Magistrate of the Central Court was a European, but for the more important criminal cases the European judge would be joined by a Malay Magistrate. In 1918 the

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Appendix H, p xvi.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *KAR 1915*, Appendix H.

⁸² *KAR 1917*, p. 9.

⁸³ *KAR 1919*, p.15.

⁸⁴ *KAR 1914*, p. 8.

⁸⁵ *KAR 1917*, p. 1.

Raja Kelantan, the son of the Sultan, sat with the European Magistrate Mr Robinson on a number of criminal cases and was reported to have been interested in the proceedings. Lower level courts were run by Malay magistrates.⁸⁶ Overall the court system appears to have been efficient and well managed; it overturned poor judgments on appeal, convicted in some cases, pardoned in others and contributed to the finances of the state. The rates of convictions (above) indicate that the courts did not always find the police cases convincing in criminal matters which is perhaps a reflection of the trumpeted British commitment to justice.

There was no standing military force whatsoever in 1914, although there were 69 Indian police who could be pressed into action as and if required. With the outbreak of war “practically all the Europeans enlisted as Special Constables and were joined by a good proportion of non-Malay members of the clerical staff.”⁸⁷ This reservist force was trained three mornings a week in skirmishing and occasionally allowed some target practice when ammunition permitted.⁸⁸ By 1919 the Special Constables had been disbanded and the Sikh contingent converted into something resembling a guard and escort service.⁸⁹ The absence of a standing army during peacetime underscores the commitment to the path of structural, rather than physical, coercion in Kelantan. It highlights the shift in attitudes towards controlling others from the expansionist colonialism of the late nineteenth century to the administrative colonialism of the early twentieth century.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p 7.; *KAR 1918*, p. 11.

⁸⁷ *KAR 1914*, p. 9.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸⁹ *KAR 1919*, p 15.

6.7 *Health and Education*

The provision of benefits from colonial rule to Kelantan's society was one area where the progress of the administration was especially slow. Education and health services were expanded but still affected only a small minority of the total population. British education policy was aimed at eventually creating a civil service to assist in rule and instruction was therefore in English, the language of rule and bureaucracy. By 1919 the government maintained eight schools in Kota Bharu district, five in Pasir Puteh and three in Ulu Kelantan. The *Majlis Ugama* had four schools that provided both secular and religious instruction, the largest of which was in Kota Bharu town with an enrolment of 400. On an average day 247 students attended the government schools in the Kota Bharu district although enrolments were higher.⁹⁰ After ten years the government started a girls' school in Kota Bharu under the supervision of a Mrs Pereira, for the first time providing educational opportunity in English for young Kelantanese women.⁹¹ The report card on education provision in the first decade of British rule would however be a fail, and things did not improve until the late 1920s, by which time the government sent students to be educated outside of Kelantan.⁹²

A more widely felt influence of the colonial state was in health and disease prevention. In 1911 Dr Gimlette had published a memorandum giving advice to Europeans on out-stations indicating which foods to eat and not to eat, treatments for various ailments and methods of disinfection as prevention against epidemic. These had been widely

⁹⁰ For example in 1918 the enrolment of all government schools in Kota Bharu and Pasir Puteh districts was 464 but attendances were 283. *KAR 1918*, p 9.

⁹¹ *KAR 1919*, p 11. S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, makes no mention of the 1919 girls school and gives the date of the first English Girls school as 1938.

circulated to all *Toh Kweng* and he recommended to officials that they exercise caution when dealing with sick Malays. He did not believe that burning dwellings in which sick people had been kept was particularly helpful in building confidence with the Malay population, and he stressed that in order to eliminate the suspicion Malays felt for confinement in hospitals, they should be allowed to be isolated in houses in their villages.⁹³ In Dr Gimlette's absence during the war⁹⁴ the provision of medical services to the Malay population continued under Dr Taylor who completed his contract at the end of June 1916 and was replaced by Dr Geale of the Duff Development Company, assisted by Dr Lim Shin Twin.⁹⁵

While Malays were by far the most numerous ethnic group in Kelantan they comprised just 292 of the 1,050 people admitted to State hospital in 1914. Of the rest, 408 were Chinese or Indian vagrants taken in as the state had no poor houses. Malays comprised around 45 percent of the actually sick population (642) who were placed in the 68 bed facility. The most common complaint was venereal disease (172 cases) followed by malaria (124) dysentery (80) and beri-beri (33) and the parasite *ankylostomiasis* (40). The statistics for Malay outpatients were higher with 8,448 (60 percent) of the 14,073 people treated for minor treatments. Of these, venereal disease was again the most common complaint among Malays with 1,115 cases, but other nationalities accounted for 345 of those seeking treatment. Smaller dispensaries at Tumpat and Kuala Krai also treated ailments with 5,195 and 3,553 people treated respectively. Over 2,000 of these

⁹² S. Talib, *History of Kelantan*, , *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁹³ L. Manderson, *Sickness and the State: Health and Illness in Colonial Malaya 1870-1940*, Cambridge University Press 1996, p. 50.

⁹⁴ Dr. Gimlette was absent from Kelantan for five years and returned in August 1919. He was on active service during the war and retired with the rank of Captain in the Royal Army Medical Corps. *KAR 1919*, p 12.

⁹⁵ *KAR 1916*, p 6.

were Malays with around 200 complaining of venereal disease. There was one recorded death during an operation from 202 performed.⁹⁶

An increase in medical staff levels during 1916 led to an increase in the number of patients who could be treated at the State hospital. The number of hospital admissions grew slightly to 1,102 but the number of outpatients increased to 21,816, with further expansion of the hospital system to Pasir Puteh from 1915 and Kaumining in Ulu Kelantan and Cherang Roko in Pasir Puteh, both of which were combined with the schools in those locations. Venereal disease continued to dominate admissions while the three dispensaries (Tumpat, Kuala Krai and Pasir Puteh) together treated just under 15,000 people. Admissions and outpatients together meant that the medical staff treated 38,000 cases⁹⁷ and vaccinated another 4,850 people against small pox.⁹⁸ Further staff were added in 1917 and 1918 and the number of outpatients was around 25,000 a year at the State hospital with around 17,000 a year being treated at the three other dispensaries. Between 1917 and 1918 the medical services vaccinated over 10,000 children, some of whom were brought by their Malay parents to the hospital, an indication that the health benefits of western medicine at least were being accepted.⁹⁹

When Dr Gimlette returned from the war in 1919 he was pleased with the way in which his work had been continued on the principles of efficient ground work and medical

⁹⁶ *KAR 1914*, p 7.

⁹⁷ It is impossible to determine the recurrence of injuries or the need for follow up treatment.

⁹⁸ *KAR 1916*, p. 7.

⁹⁹ *KAR 1918*, p. 9. A most unusual case treated was of a Tamil railway worker who complained of passing blood after urination and a burning sensation along his urethra. He had a history of cystitis but no history of gonorrhoea so the doctors examined his urine. They found the ova *bilharzia haematobia* (a blood fluke or flatworm) which led to treatment with injections of tartar emetic which apparently proved satisfactory. This was the first such case reported in Kelantan and received a whole paragraph in the 1918 Annual report. A second case was recorded in 1919. *KAR 1919*, p 15.

administration. By then the medical services of Kelantan included a leper camp at Kota Bharu, isolation camps at Tumpat and Kota Bharu treating infectious diseases, a vagrants' ward in Kuala Krai and two travelling dispensaries which took medicine into the villages. Europeans who fell sick could go to the European ward of the Duff Company Hospital at Kuala Lebir or take their chances with the locals. Lunatics were housed in the jail until a separate asylum was constructed in 1920-21.¹⁰⁰

Health services were one of the few areas where the state did not try to recoup the full cost of treatments. It consistently ran at a cost to the state and the revenue from hospital fees and the sale of medicines totalled \$8,445 in 1919 while the health department's expenditure was over \$55,000. It was however a very active department with its eight staff, three doctors and five dressers, servicing a significant proportion of the population of Kelantan in the fields, the towns, the jail, the police service; they were continuously identifying diseases, treating epidemics of pertussis (whooping cough) and measles, vaccinating children against smallpox, injecting "914" and "Galyl" (presumably sulphur solutions) to treat venereal disease, and attending to minor sprains, breaks, cuts and abrasions.

While most government services were restricted to the main population centres, health was one area in which the colonial state made contact with many people in Kelantan. In health services the accumulation and analysis of knowledge was adapted to make a significant and material improvement to the everyday lives of people. The large numbers treated show that the population readily accepted some of the benefits provided by the government.

¹⁰⁰ *KAR 1919*, p 11-12.

Health and the shift to land rents were perhaps the only areas of the colonial state that affected most Kelantanese, the majority of whom continued to be illiterate agriculturalists and fishermen. A very limited number benefited from education. Some no doubt took advantage of the stable commercial environment created by British rule and the possibilities for selling commodities in new markets. Talib's assertion that the society as a whole could not be deemed to be modern¹⁰¹ is correct, but only in the limited sense that it was not, in British eyes at least, 'sophisticated' and the lifestyles of most Kelantanese went on as before. The claim that the British Advisers did not mean it to be modern is however debatable. The paternalistic policy of choosing to withhold education from the majority of people so as to maintain the happiness of the people was developed from a romanticised notion of the life of the Malay *rayaat* and fisherman. Yet at the same time the very land on which agriculture rested had become a commodity; it was rented, and taxed, and over time the people became enmeshed in these processes. Kelantan was brought firmly into the global economy, its people worked for money and paid taxes on land. The notion that society was in no way 'modern' cannot be supported as the commodification of land was a direct result of British rule. In areas such as Ulu Kelantan which had large numbers of immigrants, investment capital and plantation agriculture, capitalism functioned within an economy geared to an export market.

6.8 *The export economy*

¹⁰¹ S. Talib, *History of Kelantan, op. cit.*, p. 127.

Plantation labour introduced large numbers of non-Malays into Kelantan with their employment regulated by the imperial bureaucracies in India and Malaya. In November 1914 Mr Enthoven, the Secretary to the Government of India, wrote to the High Commissioner in Singapore thanking him for looking into some complaints about labour conditions in the FMS.¹⁰² The report of the government comptroller had mentioned that in Kelantan there were contracts between employers and labourers that did not permit the termination of employment with one month's notice by the labourer. Overall Mr Enthoven was pleased as the findings enabled him to "expose the highly exaggerated statements regarding the condition of Indian labourers in the Federated Malay States which are from time to time circulated in this country." Nonetheless the Kelantan government was allowing the infringement of a condition set by the Government of India in its agreement concerning the opening of emigration to Kelantan of 11 March 1910. The nub of the matter was Kelantan had to change the contracts to make them valid. The number of labourers deserting estates was described as "somewhat large".

¹⁰² Enthoven to Young, *BAK 1915 File 193/15* (Straits High Commission requested report on estate in Kelantan where non-legal contracts entered into "without approval of local authorities").

Mr W. G. Maxwell, acting Secretary to the High Commissioner for the Malay States, replied to the Government of India that

... in accordance with your request, instructions are being issued to the British Adviser to the Kelantan Government to take steps to insert in the contracts signed by certain Indian labourers in Kelantan a provision to the effect that they are terminable on one month's notice by the labourer. ... No further contracts of the kind will be allowed in Kelantan.¹⁰³

In Kota Bharu Langham-Carter received the letter from the Straits High Commission in Singapore replying that both parties knew their rights and the contracts for 300 days were clearly terminable. In any case on 10 March 1915 Langham-Carter instructed the District Officer, Ulu Kelantan, for all future contracts to set out termination privileges and to allow *sikheh* (Chinese) labour only until 30 June 1916.¹⁰⁴

This exchange of letters indicates the workings of imperial control in Kelantan and demonstrates the pattern of domination of indirect rule and the interest of the Kelantan administration in regulating capitalist labour conditions on plantations. It appears from Langham-Carter's reply that he did not actually believe the reports (he made marginal notes that he knew Duff and other companies gave their labourers one month's notice) yet he complied and instructed the DO of the plantation region to ensure that the complaint be rectified.

¹⁰³ Maxwell to Enthoven, *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Langham-Carter to Young, *Ibid.*

Even if it was a farphy, the action has been implemented from the stage of policy design (the Government of India) to regional implementation (Malaya) to local policy unit (Kelantan). There was no indication of correspondence with the titular ruler of the State and no pretence that any consultation would ever be made.

An examination of Kelantan's trade shows that plantation agriculture shifted Kelantan's economy from its traditionally agricultural exports to the new economy. When Graham first came to Kelantan the primary exports had been copra and coconuts, bullocks and livestock, hides, betel nut, dried fish, rattan, *getah percha* (sap or latex) and *damar* (resin). The state was an exporter of rice¹⁰⁵ and enjoyed a positive balance of payments. By 1919 the situation had changed remarkably. The value of Kelantan's exports was \$5,467,424 of which rubber accounted for \$3,577,127 (65 percent). This provided the state with over \$88,000 in export duties, over half of the total in this category, and contributed 7.7 percent of total state revenue. The value of Kelantan's exports was almost five times the total state revenue of \$1,141,444.¹⁰⁶

In the main plantation area of Ulu Kelantan, British rule fashioned a set of economic and labour relations that served to create a modern extractive colonial economy. Commercial enterprises had initially been set up within the Duff concession concentrating on mining, but soon gave way to plantation agriculture.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ *KAR 1903*, p. 31 and 1904, Appendix C.

¹⁰⁶ *KAR 1919*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰⁷ The best return from gold royalties to the State was \$10,365 in 1908/9, after which it decreased to a low of \$49 in 1916, \$21 in 1917 and nothing in 1918 or 1919. A. Kaur and S. T. Robert *The Extractive Colonial Economy and the Peasantry, Ulu Kelantan 1900-1940*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

The question of who was the real power in the mountainous interior led to litigation (discussed above) and a struggle for power between colonial administrative state and the interests of capital. Kaur and Talib noted “The two forces, the attempts by the colonial administrators to assert their authority and the growing influence of the Duff Company, were contributing factors to underdevelopment in the area.”¹⁰⁸

Early poor mineral returns prompted the Duff Company to move into rubber growing on the plantation model. In 1909 it had 40,000 acres earmarked for rubber in the Ulu Kelantan, 3,740 of which had been planted. By 1913 around 13,000 acres were planted with rubber and by 1928 this had more than doubled to 24,888 acres.¹⁰⁹ Of the total area growing rubber in 1927, (Table 6.2) only the Ulu Kelantan had more large estates than small or medium size growers.

Table 6.2: Rubber acreage in Kelantan by district 1927

Estate Size	Kota Bharu	Ulu Kelantan	Pasir Puteh	Total acres	As percent of all rubber land
Small	14,465	6,662	14,548	35675	53.9
Medium	430	1,136	290	1856	2.8
Large	3,810	23,538	1,339	28687	43.3
district subtotal in acres	18,705	31,336	16,177	66218	100

Adapted from A. Kaur and S. T. Robert *The Extractive Colonial Economy and the Peasantry, Ulu Kelantan 1900-1940, op. cit.*, p. 49.

The above table shows that more rubber land was farmed by small growers than large growers, and that plantation rubber was not the largest sector of the rubber economy in

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

area. Rubber from Ulu Kelantan however accounted for just under half of all Kelantan's rubber, but over 75 percent of all rubber grown there constituted 82 percent of all rubber coming from large plantations in Kelantan. This sector was dominated by European capital interest with twenty-two of the thirty-four large estates being owned by European business interests in 1923. They occupied the best lands adjoining the main rivers of Lebir, Galas, Kelantan and Pergau.¹¹⁰

Kaur and Talib argue that this European domination of the plantation sector in the Ulu Kelantan acted as a monopoly and effectively shut out other interests, particularly those of Kelantanese, by 1927.¹¹¹ This argument appears to overlook the fact that the other one third of the large estates in the Ulu Kelantan were by deduction either owned by Malays or by Chinese, and over half of all the rubber grown in Kelantan was the product of Malay small farmers. It is overstating the case to suggest that European investment monopolised plantation agriculture in the Ulu Kelantan: it certainly dominated, but two-thirds does not a monopoly make. They also claim that the best land was occupied at nominal rates but provide no evidence. They are however correct in pointing out that the colonial administration simplified immigration and labour regulations to permit large agricultural enterprises to operate on economies of scale.¹¹² In 1916 the majority of rubber plantations labourers were still Chinese (3,110), almost double the number of Tamils (1,510). Other nationals were employed including Banjarese (849), Javanese (759) and Thais (50). By 1928 the preference of the British administration for Indian labour had become obvious with 4,249 Tamils as compared

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p 44.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

with 926 Chinese. By 1928 there were 874 Malays on plantations, along with 225 Javanese and 90 “others”, a figure that contradicts Mason’s earlier assertion of the attractiveness of plantation work to Malays.¹¹³

By 1931 the total population of Kelantan was 362,517 of which 330,774 were ethnic Malays (including Indonesians). There were 17,612 Chinese, 6,745 Indians and 7,306 others (including Europeans, Eurasians and Siamese). Over three quarters of this Indian population and the largest population of Chinese, over 7,000, was in the Ulu Kelantan. The policies of the colonial state directed the demographic development of the Ulu Kelantan and largely kept the minority groups away from the Malays of the coastal plain. Of the 148,647 inhabitants of Kota Bharu district, excluding the town, almost 140,000 were Malays. Of the remainder, Siamese formed the largest part, there were just under 4,000 Chinese, and only 518 Indians.¹¹⁴ From these figures it is clear that the policy of encouraging large rubber estates led to significant ethnic minorities but they were kept away from the heavy concentrations of Malays so as not to corrupt the fabric of Malay life.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p 51.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p 53.

6.9 *Imperial connections and development in Kelantan*

Expertise in the management of government was maintained by frequent exchange of personnel from the FMS thus reinforcing commonality in policy. In 1915 the Malayan civil services moved to formalise the *laissez faire* situation that existed where officers from the FMS and the Straits Settlement were on loan to the Unfederated Malay States. Kelantan had eighteen such officers by 1915, but they were informal appointments. This left Kuala Lumpur with a problem for if one of the Kelantan officers was to go on leave, the FMS government could not replace him as officially there was no posting there.¹¹⁵ By assigning all its officers as Class IV or III appointments, the Kelantan government could ensure a continual supply of new officers when required, and an improvement in techniques and knowledge. Kelantan was also required to contribute to the officers' pension entitlements and superannuation. The letter from the acting Secretary to the High Commissioner to the Malay States closed with the following paragraph:

I am desired to request that, when you explain to the State Council the proposals herein set forth, you will be careful to see that its object is not misunderstood. It will probably not be necessary; but if it is necessary, you can give the fullest assurance that there is no intention of aiming at any thing whereby an underrated state should be drawn towards the federation.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ *BKel File 652/1915* (Arrangement for making provision for the appointment of officers in the UMS from the cadet service of the SS or FMS).

¹¹⁶ *BKel File 652/1915* (Correspondence a/Sec High Commissioner for the Malay States (HCMS) to British Adviser Kelantan 7/6/1915).

Entrenchment of Sultan Muhammad IV at the top of a political elite set the pattern of indirect rule. The Sultan was informed of changes that would be required and the State Council existed as a rubber stamp. The Sultan was tolerated and became a good friend of the empire, visiting Singapore on several occasions and once travelling to London. However when it came to pushing around the officials of his own state, he found that the land office would not even grant his own claim for road frontage land 12 miles from Kota Bharu.¹¹⁷

The outbreak of war between Britain and Germany in 1914 meant that Kelantan's trading relationship with other parts of the world came under scrutiny. The need to withhold goods from the enemy was paramount and rubber was of particular concern due to its uses in manufacturing. In Kelantan rubber had developed as a component of the Kelantan export economy from the first foreign owned plantings in 1905 and by 1914 was a valuable export commodity. Imperial interests required protection by Britain and in Kelantan the Adviser was called upon to act to ensure that rubber went only to the right places. The acting Secretary to the High Commissioner for the Malay States wrote to the British Adviser on 29th December 1914 declaring that;

I have the honour to inform you that the government of Kelantan should be advised not to allow for the present the export of rubber to any port other than the ports of the Straits Settlement or the Federated Malay States.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ *BKel File 149/1915* (Application by HH the Sultan for State land at the 12th mile on the Trucnk Road at a place called Ketere. Not recommended.)

¹¹⁸ *BKel File 23/1915* (Export of rubber to any port other than ports of the colony or the FMS to be prohibited). Letter of 29 December 1914 to British Adviser from a/Sec to HCMS.

This proscription did not in fact affect Kelantan as its only trade in rubber was to Singapore¹¹⁹ but the move by agents of British imperialism to curtail the possibility of Kelantan produce going to the enemy indicates the real position of the Protectorate. When required the British Adviser could be relied upon to secure conformity with British Imperial interests. Langham-Carter, the Adviser from March 1913 to April of 1915, sought a suitable punishment for infringement in communications with his bureau of State, Marine and Customs (SMC) in the first week of January 1915 and this was approved by His Highness the Sultan on 9 January with copies of the prohibition distributed in English, Chinese and Malay. A week later the British Colonial Secretary of State, Lewis Vernon (later Viscount) Harcourt sent a telegram to the Governor of the Straits Settlement to say that export of rubber was now allowed if reported by the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State.¹²⁰

Rather than being an independent state with British advice Kelantan had its foreign policy and trade regulated by British officials in London, Singapore and Kota Bharu. Its administration was structured so that free interchange of staff was possible and Kelantan seconded its European officers from the Federated Malay States where they were developed for rule in Malaya under a cadetship program. They were taught to protect the interests of Malays, even from Europeans.

¹¹⁹ The Straits High Commission wrote to Langham-Carter on 7th January that an inquiry some months ago had found Singapore to be the only export destination for rubber exports. *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ The shipping of rubber to Italy and France required the permission from the committee on Rubber Exports, Westminster Palace Hotel, London. The British Consul at any Italian port was also to be informed. *Ibid.*, note from a/Sec HCMS to BA Kel 5 Feb, 1915.

An exchange of notes between the Kelantan Planters' Association and the Kelantan government in 1915 indicates that the British administrators were careful to stop undue influence of European capital interests in decision making. The Association's Chairman, Mr Paxan, wrote to the British Adviser in Kelantan with a committee member in August 1915 and raised the matter of civilian defence in the Ulu Kelantan, where many of the large plantations were situated.

There had been, they claimed, unrest amongst the Malays twice that year already, and on one occasion during the Toh Janggut rebellion the government had appealed to the Europeans of Ulu Kelantan to assist the police force. Having apparently enjoyed the experience and concerned for the security of their investments and families, they wanted to know that if called upon again to take up arms while Great Britain was at war "are we doing so to safeguard British interests or to ensure those of His Highness the Sultan?" Their plan was to leave enough Europeans to run the estates to ensure security of labour and production. The military types would congregate to protect the women, children and rubber interests. If threatened the white population could retreat safely to the Ulu Kelantan and fight from the estates.¹²¹

In his response the acting BA Farrer noted cryptically

The interest of Great Britain and those of His Highness the Sultan being identical there appears to be no reason for defining particularly whose interests on behalf of which the Europeans would take up arms. Should unfortunately the interests in question become

¹²¹ *BKel File 1278/1915* (Letter 22/9/1915 Kelantan Planters Association to a/BA Kel.)

divergent there can be no doubt that the British Adviser would expect support for the interests which he represents.¹²²

He went on to say that if anyone were to organise private armies it would be the chief Police Officer as the military authority for the state, and the District Officer would command whatever contingent would be raised. While their investment in the rubber trade was welcome the Kelantan government sought to make a clear distinction between itself and the Companies at all times. As mentioned the District Officer in the Ulu Kelantan was European and regular checks were made on the rubber estates to ensure the health and treatment of indentured workers. This was one area where the state policy of paternalism, as exemplified in protecting individuals, was in line with actual colonial practice.

Nor were European interests permitted unfettered free trade. Orders from the Straits High Commission prohibited the export from Kelantan of: (a) all fats and oils, animal or vegetable other than essential oils; (b) all oleaginous nuts seed and product, to all destinations other than UK and British Possessions and Protectorates. With British control over Kelantan's foreign policy, Kelantan's produce could be used only for the greater war effort. A letter from the acting secretary of the High Commissioner of the Malay States and Brunei to the British Adviser Kelantan in May 1916 contained a circular from the Secretary of State in London that explained the matter further. Category (a) was restricted to trade with the UK and its possessions and protectorates

¹²² *Ibid.*, 25/9/1915 Farrar to Kelatan Planters Association.

while category (b) was extended to Russia (except through the Baltic) and France and Italy.¹²³ Again Kelantan's administration had to comply and did so in quick time.

Internal arrangements were also of concern to British administrators in London. Tensions were high during World War I and in 1915 the Pasir Puteh rebellion prompted the Rt Honourable A. Bonar Law MP from the Colonial Office to write to Governor Sir Arthur Young that several of the reports received during 1916 had contained information on the strength of local military forces. Young's attention was drawn to an enclosure: Lord Crewe's circular of 1908, produced in response to a Colonial Defence Committee review of local forces in Colonies and Protectorates. In it Crewe had recommended "not only that such statistics should not be published, but that the returns at present included in the unofficial "colonial office lists" should be omitted in the future."¹²⁴

Imperial concerns were reflected in the administration of Kelantan. Trade was restricted during the war and the interests of British capital were accommodated where possible. This was however balanced by a concern to do the right thing by Kelantan Malays and for the good government of the State as a whole. The free flow of staff between Singapore, the FMS and Kelantan created a single legal and administrative system and these tendencies were reinforced by the accumulated knowledge of the Advisors posted to Kelantan. While the Sultan was necessary for indirect rule to exist, the tenor of the

¹²³ *BKel File 342/1916* (Prohibition of export of (a) ... (b) ... Possessions and Protectorates.)

¹²⁴ In his reply Young admitted the error but stressed it would not happen again. The BA Kelantan was made aware of this, as was the chief Police Officer, as the 1915 report had indeed given such information.

commands and orders sent from London via Singapore indicate that the term Protected State was merely a polite expression for administrative colonial control.

6.10 *Conclusions*

By the time of the handover of Kelantan from Siam to Britain in 1909 much of the structural creation and reorganisation of government agencies and departments had already been accomplished by Graham. Administrative colonialism in Kelantan began in 1903 and continued unabated to the end of British rule in 1957, with a short hiatus during the Pacific War. Despite the fact that two states exercised control and influence in Kelantan, and had rather different goals in doing so, there was a continuity of purpose in reforming the administration of Kelantan.

This examination of the administrations of the various Advisors illustrates how social and economic change was managed through the administrative unit of the district. This was colonialism at the coal face, the “middle management” level of colonialism where colonial ideas become colonial practice and reality. It was in and through the colonial district that plans for development, administration and organisation came to affect the inhabitants of Kelantan. It was through the structures and bureaucracy of administrative colonialism that the power of the colonial state came to be projected far from the capital.

By 1909 Kelantan, and all other Malay states bar Johor, had been incorporated into a wider political structure geared to British imperial and commercial priorities. Kelantan’s Annual Reports were sent to the Governor in Singapore but were published

all the same with the FMS and UMS books. Kelantan was however distinctly different from the western states and its geography and the high proportion of Malays in the population allowed for the continuance of a distinctive culture and ethnic homogeneity that is unrivalled in modern Malaysia: today it is marketed as a piece of ‘authentic’ Malay life. As part of the reification of the traditional, Kelantan was quarantined from some of the more destructive aspects of modernity. It was however a district of ‘British Malaya’ that was beginning to function ‘properly’.

On balance, the first ten years of British administration in Kelantan cost Britain (particularly the government of the FMS) far more than it ever gained from administering her. This was due mainly to the costs incurred when the colonial state sought to assert its supremacy over commercial interests such as the Duff Company, and ended up in court paying damages. Nonetheless, from the early 1900s the administration opened the way for Kelantan’s exposure to international commodity markets and labour systems. Kelantan’s total state revenue in 1919 was over £1 million, yet debt was over £2.6 million.¹²⁵ The Advisers and their staff made choices and determinations about which parts of Kelantan’s society and culture were incompatible with the priorities of the modern world. Those deemed to be so were removed as obstacles to Kelantan’s progress.

Kelantan was peripheral to the main focus of British investment, but this was not due to the status of Kelantan as an Unfederated State so much as to its relatively late date of inclusion, development and the abundance of better opportunities farther south. The fact that Kelantan was a protectorate of Britain, rather than a colony, mattered little.

Kelantan was not part of the FMS but came to be administered in much the same manner. Its state administration utilised officers seconded from the Malayan Civil Services as and when the need arose. Kelantan's Malay elite was gradually removed from positions of control and authority within government offices and departments and replaced by Europeans. Laws were enacted in Kelantan to bring legislation into line with existing regulations, prohibitions and standards of behaviour in the FMS and the Straits Settlement.

The past three chapters have argued that Kelantan functioned under a rubric of administrative colonialism developed first under Siamese administration but continued by the British. It relied mainly on regulation, codification and legal processes to alter the way in which society functioned, although indirect rule remained important for political stability. Both systems utilised an administrative state structure based on a functional division of responsibility, with appropriations, budgets and forward commitments. Most importantly the structures of power introduced, not the nationality of those administering them, facilitated the elimination of what colonial 'middle managers' judged to be 'pre-modern'. The administrative colonial state enabled the fashioning of Kelantan to the priorities of the modern world, as perceived by colonial administrators.

These choices were made by a cadre of men from similar educational and social backgrounds, each of who had an interest in making sure that his job was done to the best of his ability in his area of responsibility. The Advisors to Kelantan brought techniques of government, administration and options for economic development,

¹²⁵ BAK 1919, p. 1.

balanced by limited access to education, health services, improved justice in taxation, improved efficiency in state operations and an end to certain of the privileges of the Malay aristocracy. Colonial control in Kelantan began the long transition to economic, political and social requirements of the modern world. This did not happen immediately, but the groundwork was laid during the six years of Graham's rule and under the first decade of British administration. The fact that administrative control was for the most part achieved through regulatory and non-coercive measures demonstrates that the structures of power employed by colonial 'middle managers' were both more subtle and more effective than previous forms of colonialism. The additional feature of paternalism, the lack of economic profit and the tight regulation of investment companies and international capital all indicate that Kelantan approximates an ideal type of administrative colonialism run by colonial 'middle managers'. The district analysis that has been presented has served to illuminate a number of tendencies that are lost when viewing British Malaya in its entirety.

Chapter 7: Colonial rule in Papua, New Guinea and the New Guinea Highlands to 1947

Some thirty years after Mr Graham began structuring Kelantan, the highlands of New Guinea became known to Europeans. We now move from Southeast Asia to Melanesia to review how another administrative colonial state came to affect and direct the lives of people in subtle but persuasive ways. This chapter places the involvement of Australia in Papua New Guinea¹ in the historical and political context of developing international attitudes towards colonialism during the twentieth century. It provides the contextual framework and background to the structure of Australian administrative colonialism that operated under the categories of Mandate and Trusteeship. This administrative history is sketched in order to demonstrate the place of the Eastern Highlands District (EHD) of New Guinea in the larger context of Australian colonial policy in Papua New Guinea. It also provides background information on the peoples and culture of the eastern highlands necessary for understanding the social, political and economic changes wrought by Australian colonial 'middle managers' discussed in the following three chapters.

¹ Throughout this chapter the various forms of Australian administrative jurisdiction over the territories of Papua and of New Guinea are mostly discussed in the sense of two administrative systems. While the independent state of Papua New Guinea did not officially come into existence until 1975 the administration of the Territory of Papua was combined with the administration of the Trust Territory of New Guinea in 1947 following approval from the United Nations. This move came after a period of Australian military government between 1942-1947. While Australia's international accountability was greater in the Trust Territory of New Guinea than in Territory of Papua (and separate reports were produced for each for submission to the United Nations) in a practical sense the two territories were combined and run as one administration.

7.1 *Historical background*

Lying in the tropical belt, mostly above the ninth parallel, the island of New Guinea and its nearby groups of the Bismark Archipelago, the Admiralty Islands (Manus), New Britain, New Ireland, Bougainville and smaller island chains have experienced human settlement and waves of migrations from lands farther west for around 30,000 years.² At some stage during the past 10,000 years a profound revolution took place and the first arrivals, the hunter-gatherer peoples who survived through skill and fortune, were supplanted by new peoples who relied upon settled agriculture for their sustenance. Intensive food production utilising drainage has been a feature of societies in the valleys of the New Guinea Highlands for the last 6,000-9,000 years,³ and is thought to have evolved independently from other food producing centres.⁴ The geographic isolation of people caused by the sharp ridges and difficult terrain of the highlands created and reinforced the social, linguistic and cultural barriers that developed over time between the different peoples.⁵

² J. Diamond, *Guns Germs and Steel: a short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years*, Vintage, Sydney, 1998, p. 300.

³ *Ibid.*, p.303.

⁴ Diamond argues that there are definitely five and possibly nine areas on four continents where food production arose from agricultural husbandry of indigenous plant species. These regions are the Mesopotamian crescent, China, Mesoamerica, the Andes and Amazonia, the Eastern United States (the area around modern day Ohio and Iowa), and possibly Sahel in West Africa, tropical west Africa, Ethiopia and New Guinea. From these areas all other peoples have learnt techniques that ensure consistent food supplies and have displaced hunter-gatherer lifestyles. The main thrust of *Guns Germs and Steel* concerns the important role of environmental factors and domestication of large animals on the capability of people to develop technological change. Although New Guinea had no pigs when agriculture was developed (c. 7,000 BCE) they arrived later by way of an Austronesian expansion in the past 4,000 years. They were not however large or docile enough to assist with farming, particularly as they ate much of the produce. See Diamond *op. cit.*, Part II. 'The rise and spread of food production'.

⁵ Papua New Guineans are today grouped together as Melanesians (from Latin – 'dark islands') and such a term is useful mainly to distinguish the people of PNG from the lighter skinned Micronesians ('small islands') to the north, and the Polynesian ('many islands') peoples to the west. Despite the wide usage of Melanesian, such a grouping is profoundly misleading. Apart from those classified as 'Melanesian' the peoples of Papua New Guinea are derived from a variety of origins and include elements of Malay, Australian Aboriginal, and even Ainu. See R. Smith, *New Guinea: A Journey Through 10,000 years*,

The island of New Guinea first became known to Europeans in the first half of the sixteenth century through the voyages of Spanish and Portuguese explorers⁶ yet it was not until the nineteenth century that European states began to make claims upon the island and its people. Expanding eastwards from their possessions in the Indonesian archipelago, the Dutch claimed the western half of the main island in 1828 and fixed the limit of their territory in 1885 at the 141st meridian of longitude.⁷ The eastern half of the main island, as well as the larger islands of the Bismark archipelago (Manus, New Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville), remained unclaimed but not unaffected by increased European activity in the Pacific. Missionaries and traders searched for labour, souls and trade goods before the eastern half of the main island and the adjacent archipelagoes became part of European empires.

In the 1880s Germany, along with the United States, was beginning to challenge British commercial and political hegemony. As part of the new imperialism, German activity in

Lansdowne, Melbourne, 1969, p. 4. The over 850 languages of PNG, some of which are from the non-Austronesian family, indicate the profound lack of a uniform origin.

⁶ The first recorded landing by a European on the island of New Guinea is that of the Portuguese Dom Jorge de Menezes on the Vogelkop peninsula in present day Irian Jaya/West Papua in 1526. He named the land *Ilhas dos Papuas* from the Malay word 'Papua' meaning woolly haired. Malay contacts with the region go back much farther, perhaps as early as the 14th century. C. D. Rowley, *The New Guinea Villager*, F W Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965, p.53. Malays and ethnic Chinese traded with the people of Western Papua as far as the Sepik river on the north coast at the time of the German declaration of a Protectorate over New Guinea in 1884. The main items of trade for Malays were slaves, bird feathers and trepang. Rowley argues that it is likely that New Britain was also within the Malay trading world. *Ibid.*, p. 57. The Malay influence lives on through the integration of Malay words in tokpisin. Tasman (1643), Dampier (1700) D'Entrecasteux (1792-93) and D'Urville (1823) all visited the north-eastern portion of the mainland.

⁷ C. D. Rowley, *The New Guinea Villager*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

Africa and the Pacific centred on the consolidation of areas of trading interest and territorial claims, whether profitable or not. Late nineteenth century German colonialism was part of the expansionist colonial trend.

To the south of New Guinea the fledgling Australian colonies were deeply concerned about German activity in the Pacific.⁸ After failing to interest Britain in declaring a protectorate over the region, the Australian colonies backed Queensland in its April 1883 annexation of eastern New Guinea. The resident police magistrate of Thursday Island, Mr Chester, raised the flag, much to the consternation of a missionary worker.

After the ceremony, Mr Chester made a present to the natives, and we explained to them as best we could the nature of the proceedings. We cannot understand them ourselves. Annexation we were in a measure prepared for, although we did not wish it. But that an Australian colony should be allowed to take this step is to us most surprising. Here is the largest island in the world, to which Fiji and even New Zealand are a mere nothing, annexed by a Police Magistrate who comes in a little tub of a cutter! There must be some mistake somewhere. We would much rather not be annexed by anybody, but if there was any probability of a foreign power taking possession of New Guinea, then let us have British rule: but as a crown colony, not as an appendage to Queensland.⁹

A combination of Australian colonial pressure and the possibility of undesirable and irregular settlement by adventurers finally forced the British government to declare a Protectorate over south-eastern New Guinea in November 1884. The Australian colonies with most interest in this venture (Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland)

⁸ H. Nelson. 1972, *Papua New Guinea: Black Unity or Black Chaos?*, Penguin, Ringwood, p.13-19.

each contributed £5,000 per annum to fund the administration.¹⁰ The technical status of the territory was changed from Protectorate to Possession on the arrival of the Administrator, Dr (later Sir) William MacGregor, in 1888. In an address to the Royal Colonial Institute in London on the history and prospects of British New Guinea given in 1895, MacGregor was initially critical of the Premier of Queensland, Sir Thomas McIlwraith,¹¹ and his role in facilitating the trade in New Guinean labour to Queensland, but generally defended the annexation and the system of rule that had developed.

It would be absurd to suppose that, even from the highest motives, these Colonies could go on paying £15,000 a year for all time for maintaining a paternal and philanthropic government in the Possession. The £15,000 represents the amount available for the ordinary expenses of the Administration. Last year the revenue was in round numbers about £6,000, representing nearly two-fifths of the expenditure on establishments and services, exclusive of the cost of maintenance of the steamer. That this burden must be reduced until it disappears may be accepted as a truism.¹²

Such a statement reflects the general principle of the time that colonial governments pay for themselves and not be a burden on the imperial government. MacGregor went on to

⁹ W. G. Lawes, cited in B Jinks, P Biskup and H Nelson eds, *Readings in New Guinea History*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973, p.32-33.

¹⁰ W. MacGregor, 'The history and prospects of British New Guinea', in *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, vol XXVII 1894-95, Royal Colonial Institute, London, 1895, pp. 193-239. The three colonies also met half of the costs of running the government steamer, the main method of communication for outlying European settlements. See p.194.

¹¹ MacGregor examined McIlwraith's statements that Queensland's annexation had not been carried out to enable a new labour source for plantations in that colony, but for the protection of New Guineans. He questioned McIlwraith's claim that New Guineans were not fit for plantation work by describing the 625 labourers brought to Queensland between 1883 and November 1884 as "a number large enough to demonstrate the unfitness ascribed to them." *Ibid.* p. 196.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp.199-200.

note that New Guinea had excellent agricultural prospects, which could be a way out of this recurrent problem of administrative expenditure. The land, he said, was “specially well adapted for plantations of sugar-cane, tea, coffee, vanilla, cocoa, kola nut, cotton, sisal fibre, gutta percha, maize, tobacco, cinchona, spices of all kind and every form of tropical fruit.” For British New Guinea to develop investment plantations were required; indeed they were the obvious area for commercial expansion. This process was facilitated by allowing Europeans to select unoccupied land for the purpose of cultivation and to purchase it from the administration under the provisions of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1890. Settlers could not purchase directly from New Guineans and the government would not remove settled communities for their lands.¹³ The Europeans, who had a total population of about 300,¹⁴ paid New Guinean labourers in trade tobacco but the administration hoped to interest New Guineans in the economic development of their own lands and held great hopes for their future prosperity. MacGregor noted that “practically all the pearls, sandal-wood, trepang and copra exported are got and prepared by the natives”. In the ten or so years of British administration to 1895 the government had planted 30,000 coconut trees and native cultivators a further 60,000.¹⁵

While British involvement in New Guinea was welcomed by the Australian colonies it was also regarded as having come too late to prevent Germany establishing a foothold in the region. Commercial trading companies had been operating in New Ireland and New Britain since the 1870s and by 1880 there were five German trading firms

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 204

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.

operating in the area.¹⁶ German traders had an expanding business with the purchase of coconuts and their subsequent cutting, drying, shredding and export as copra. In 1884 two firms *Hernsheim* and *Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen-Gesellschaft der Sudsee Islen zu Hamburg* (DHPG - The German Traders and Planters Association for the Southsea Islands and Hamburg) were exporting 1,350-2,000 tons of copra annually.¹⁷

The German settlers formed the New Guinea Company in May 1884,¹⁸ floated it on the Berlin stock exchange and petitioned the German Emperor Wilhelm to declare a Protectorate over the New Guinea islands and that part of the mainland not under British or Dutch sovereignty, the north-east quadrant of the island which the Company wished to be called Kaiser Wilhelm's Land. On the mainland the land boundary crossed from the 141st meridian of longitude to the coast near the Huon Gulf in a series of straight lines. The border was largely imaginary, as no European had set foot in the highlands region. The German flag was raised in November 1884 in several locations and the New Guinea Company was granted the rights of administration by the Kaiser in May 1885. The capital was set at Finschhafen, which proved to be a poor choice of capital due to its high incidence of malaria. In a move that gave due recognition to the real power behind Germany's rise to international prominence the Company suggested that the New Guinea islands up to the 154th meridian of longitude be named the Bismark Archipelago.

¹⁶ P. J. Hempenstall, *Pacific Islands under German Rule: a study in the meaning of colonial resistance*, ANU Press, Canberra 1978, p. 123.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.123.

¹⁸ B. Jinks, P. Biskup and H. Nelson, eds, *Readings in New Guinea History*, *op. cit.*, p.151.

German interests in their New Guinea Protectorate quickly split into mainland and islands spheres of interest. On the mainland the New Guinea Company's penchant for enacting legislation, ordinances and regulations reached absurd levels. Hempenstall notes the first draft (1887) of ordinances contained 185 provisions that had a strong emphasis on corporal punishment for labourers.¹⁹ Berlin financiers attempted to exercise much control over the New Guinea venture and some decisions created animosity and resentment among the small European population. Economic activity in the Islands centred on the copra industry of New Britain's Gazelle peninsula where the Tolai people adapted swiftly to the new industries and quickly became the providers of vegetables for the settlers and their largely imported labour force.²⁰ Poor returns led to the New Guinea Company petitioning the German government to take over full administrative responsibility in 1896, which it finally did in 1899, although the company retained many concessions.

By 1900 Germany was the administrative power in the northeast quadrant of the mainland and the main New Guinea Islands while the British administered the southeast. Administrative control over British New Guinea passed to the new Australian Commonwealth government in 1906, a move that merely formalised existing financial and political arrangements, and the region became known as the Territory of Papua.

¹⁹ P. Hempenstall, *Pacific Islands under German Rule op. cit.*, pp.165-166.

²⁰ For Hempenstall's discussion of relations between the Tolai and the German settlers see *ibid.*, Ch 5. During the 1890s Tolai society attempted resistance, often in successful military skirmishes, but eventually realised that they had become economically dependent on the German settlers and thus halted their military activities.

In terms of its approach to administration and development the German New Guinea colony existed to make money and the interests of the German plantation owners and traders were paramount. German colonial government was characteristically authoritarian.²¹ Under the able administrative direction of Dr. Albert Hahl, Imperial Judge (1896-99) and later Governor (1901-1914) the limited reach of the German administration was expanded through a system of indirect administration that bestowed powers on the recognised or apparent leaders of villages. The position of *luluai* was first introduced in 1896 among the Tolai of New Britain and *luluais* had the power to settle local disputes and small court cases. They represented the wishes of the people to the administration and vice-versa. The position was unpaid, but a uniform was supplied, and responsibility for poll-tax collection was added later.²² Under German administration the *luluai* had the respect of their villages and the authorities were appointed on the basis of their local status. A *tutul* was appointed to act as an administrative assistant to the *luluai* and as an interpreter between the German officer (the *kiap*) and the people. Under German rule the *luluai* was not a functionary of the administration.²³

In the Australian Territory of Papua the European settlers felt that the policy of 'peaceful penetration' pursued by the Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, J. H. P. Murray was not enough like the German example. Acting on behalf of a disinterested Australian

²¹ E. P. Wolfers, *Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea*, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1975, p.65.

²² *Ibid*, pp. 65-68.

²³ Wolfers notes that the German government was "simply not interested in the administrative aspects of development, nor overly concerned with the indigenes long-term welfare", *Ibid.*, p.69.

government, Murray attempted to ensure that Papuans were not exploited. To this end he developed a system of regulations that severely limited the actions of Europeans and

Papuans alike. Murray attracted much criticism for his policies of ‘peaceful penetration’ in which administration officers could not use their weapons unless threatened, a policy aimed at minimising the casualties of initial contact. The closest that many Papuan villagers came to European government in the years before the World War I was often through the *Native Regulations* imposed by the occasional visit of a resident magistrate, the forerunner of the patrol officer. These provided a legal standard of behaviour while Administration rule was backed by the Armed Native Constabulary (originally Fijians and Solomon Islanders, but later Papuans) set up by MacGregor in 1890. Village constables were another MacGregor initiative and were appointed to give the administration a presence. In contrast to the *luluai* of German New Guinea the village constable was appointed, paid an annual allowance, was a servant of the government and was to follow the directives of the resident magistrate.²⁴

The advent of World War I in 1914 left German New Guinea unable to be properly defended and it was captured in the first weeks on the request of the British government and, as Hudson notes, ‘... on the clear understanding that Australia was to act merely as an agent’ of the Empire.²⁵ At the 1919 Versailles Conference, Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes argued vociferously for Australian annexation of German New Guinea but, in a climate of Wilsonian idealism, Australia was awarded only part of the spoils of war. Under the Mandate system the administration of territories was to be scrutinised, albeit infrequently, by the international community and

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 18-20.

²⁵ W. J. Hudson. ‘Australia’s experience as a mandatory power’, in F. S. Stevens ed., *Racism: The Australian Experience, Volume 3: Colonialism*, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Artarmon NSW, 1972, p. 52. For a discussion of the Australian Mandatory system in New Guinea between the wars see H. Radi, ‘New Guinea under Mandate 1921-1941’, in W. J. Hudson ed., *Australia and Papua New Guinea*, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1971, pp. 74-137.

the Mandatory power was not to include the territory in its claimed territory. Hobsbawm notes, in a somewhat tongue in cheek manner that

... in deference to the growing unpopularity of imperialism, they were no longer called “colonies” but “mandates” to ensure the progress of backward peoples, handed over by humanity to imperial powers who would not dream of exploiting them for any other purpose.²⁶

The Mandate system²⁷ represented a shift away from total freedom in the affairs of a dependent territory toward a sort of colonial accountability. It was on precisely this basis of international standards that Britain argued the case for the unsuitability of German administrative control of territories on the grounds of misrule.²⁸

²⁶ E. Hobsbawm. 1994, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*, Abacus, London, p. 34.

²⁷ Mandates were divided into three categories: (A) the ex-colonies of the Ottoman Empire - Iraq, Palestine and Syria; (B) the ex-German colonies of Central Africa; and (C) the ex-German colonies in south West Africa and the Pacific. Only in Class A Mandates was independence considered and these emerging nations would be helped to that point by the Mandatory Powers, in this case Britain and France. Mandatory Powers with Class B responsibilities in Cameroon, Togo and Tanganyika, again Britain and France, were required to “maintain public order and to promote the moral and material welfare of the people”. The Mandatory powers in Class C were three of the self-governing dominions of the British Empire and Japan. South Africa was awarded German South West Africa (Namibia), Australia the German New Guinea, both the mainland and Islands, New Zealand took Samoa and Japan the German Pacific territories north of the equator, the Marianas and the Carolines. Nauru was placed under a tripartite administration of Britain, Australia and New Zealand due to the value of its phosphate reserves. Class C Mandatory powers were allowed to administer their new territories under domestic law as they would their own territory, provided that they safeguarded the interests of the indigenous inhabitants. Lord Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 5th edition, Cass, London, 1965, p. 50. Ironically, it was the supposed scrutiny of the Mandate System that had allowed the administration of the Congo Free State to exist, with results that later prompted the Belgian government to assume control and declare it a colony.

²⁸ Lugard felt the Germans were no worse than any other colonial power operating at the time. *Ibid*, p.52.

The concept of a Mandate appealed to the idealist perspective of many states and to the notion that all people had a right to self-determination. The stipulation of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant was that for the former German and Turkish colonies, for these

.... peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.²⁹

The crucial provision for Australia was contained in Paragraph 6 of Article 22 which declared that there were territories in the Pacific Islands which

owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contingency to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards ... in the interests of the indigenous population.

New Guinea was just such a territory. The safeguards to which the above passage refers were quite specific, but not particularly onerous. A mandatory power was required to

... guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals; to prohibit such abuses as the slave trade, arms traffic and liquor traffic; to prevent the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases; to prevent the

²⁹ The Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22.

military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of the territory...³⁰

Mandatory powers were also to allow equal opportunities in their administered territory for trade and commerce by nationals of other League of Nations members.³¹ Provided that Australia abided by these requirements and submitted annual reports to the Permanent Commission, which advised the Council of the League of Nations on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates, the League was happy for Australia to run New Guinea fairly much as it pleased. As Heather Radi has noted, the League decision to award German New Guinea to Australia under a class C Mandate gave Hughes what he wanted: “control of an area of strategic importance and commercial potential.”³² Australia thus acquired administrative control over the entire eastern half of the main island of New Guinea and the New Guinea islands.

The Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (ANMEF) assumed administrative control of New Guinea after the defeat of German forces and retained most of the existing legal and administrative framework.³³ With Germany excluded from the League of Nations, Australia had no duty to allow German trade so German property and plantations were expropriated and many Germans repatriated, including all of the officials.³⁴ Despite Australia having responsibility for both territories they were

³⁰ Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22 Paragraph 5.

³¹ This did not include Germany which was not permitted to join.

³² H. Radi, ‘New Guinea under Mandate 1921-41’, in W. J. Hudson, ed., *Australia and Papua New Guinea, op. cit.*, p. 74.

³³ Wolfers, *Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, op. cit.*, p. 85.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 85 and fn 24, p. 87.

administered as separate entities as Papua was a Territory and New Guinea a Mandate.³⁵

7.2 *Australian administration in New Guinea*

In 1920 a Royal Commission examined the notion of combining the administrations of the Territory of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea but recommended against it.³⁶ When the issue was re-examined in the late 1930s the same decision was reached. The main points of contention stemmed from the perceived differences between the two systems and while there was undeniable rivalry and occasional enmity between Australian settlers in Papua and New Guinea, the financial position of the New Guinea administration was viable — it actually made money — whereas the Papuan administration was subsidised by the Australian parliament to the tune of not more than £50,000 per year.³⁷ Despite these differences Wolfers argues that

Generally... the two administrative services and the territories' expatriate populations, thought of themselves as following two separate traditions. In fact, however, the Papuan Native Regulations and the Native Administration Regulations which were promulgated in New Guinea from 1923 on were very much alike and tended to change in much the same ways at the same times as one another. By the time that World War II reached the area in 1941-42, they differed only in details, and especially in their style of execution. The

³⁵ In 1921 the ANMEF was replaced by a civilian administration in New Guinea once the Mandate was declared.

³⁶ E. P. Wolfers, *Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea*, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 89.

paternalism and interventionist protectionism of the pre-war Papuan system had gradually come to New Guinea.³⁸

The Australian governing authorities of the two territories thus developed basically similar systems of government, which is not surprising considering the shared history and the similarities in the basic social organisation of the indigenous population.

Papuans and New Guineans lived mainly in villages with clearly understood regional boundaries and were primarily agricultural people. The small populations made direct rule impossible so the administrations sought to increase contact through periodic patrolling. Neither territory aimed to provide representative democratic government. The New Guinea administration did allow for the continuance of commerce, but restricted immigration and retained many of the features of the German labour provisions. The main requirement as far as the Australian government was concerned was for New Guinea not to be a burden on the Australian taxpayer. After all, what was the point of administering an area that you could not fortify militarily if you were required to pay for the privilege?

The responsibility for economic development in New Guinea thus fell to individual entrepreneurs, most of whom were Australian. New Guinea's Chinese, Japanese, Malay, and Micronesian communities who had been present prior to 1914 were permitted to remain, as were the Germans of the religious orders.³⁹ Expropriated German properties

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 90.

³⁹ The Japanese community in New Guinea was limited after the war by a one-in one-out immigration restriction system which prompted an official complaint by the Japanese government to the League of

were distributed to individual Australian interests by the civilian administration, with British and Australian companies taking up the rest. Copra remained the principal export product until the mid 1930s when gold revenues began to overtake the proceeds of plantation agriculture.

The Mandated Territory of New Guinea had competing, and often mutually exclusive, priorities. On one hand if the Mandate was to pay its own way it had to be developed. On the other hand, despite the often intransigent stance of the Australian Government in answering — the not particularly admonishing or probing — questions of the Mandate Commission,⁴⁰ there was a tradition of humane treatment that was inherited from the Papuan administration of Murray. The *luluais* and *tultuls* who had functioned as the basis of German village administration now worked for the Australian administration. The same men also found that the powers they had held under German rule — amongst others, to decide local court matters — were taken from them. The result was that the status and position of *luluai* was decreased and the position of *luluai* no longer carried or represented any real power, and certainly no kudos or influence.

Under Australian administration it was not unusual for the real powers in a New Guinean village to put forward a man of no status within his own community for the position of *luluai* so as to limit the authority and effectiveness of the government.⁴¹ Any attempt to bring the people of New Guinea to the point where they could ‘stand by

Nations — a factor that delayed the granting of the Mandate. See C. D. Rowley, ‘Occupation of German New Guinea’, in W. J. Hudson, ed., *Australia and New Guinea, op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁴⁰ W. J. Hudson, ‘Australia’s experience as a mandatory power’, in F. S. Stevens, *Racism: The Australian Experience, Volume 3: Colonialism, op. cit.*, p.57.

⁴¹ H. Radi, ‘New Guinea under Mandate 1921-41’, in W. J. Hudson, ed., *Australia and Papua New Guinea, op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world' was thus frustrated by a system of administration in which the very people for whom the administration supposedly existed were denied any real opportunity for participating.

New Guineans were exposed to a system of administration which, for the most part, protected them from the activities of the rulers through a combination of paternalism, underfunding and benign neglect. It was both a form of direct and indirect rule with the organisational difficulty for Australia being the small political units of New Guinean society. Australian policy in New Guinea sought firstly to use the territory as a strategic buffer against growing fears of Japanese expansion, and later German calls for the restoration of its colonies; secondly to restrict non-British investment; thirdly to settle ex-servicemen in the Territory; and finally to prevent Asian labour from gaining a foothold in the region.⁴² What resulted was an administration that was paternalistic, authoritarian and well-meaning, but above all contradictory.

7.3 *The New Guinea highlands, gold and the Pax Australiana*

Like the Germans before them the Australian administration in New Guinea was oblivious to the roughly one million people who lived in the highlands region. In the areas of established administration, mainly the lowland coastal areas, the authority of the administration was not often challenged. The central part of the island was regarded by Europeans as impassable, uninhabited mountain ranges, and this view held until the profits from the gold rush at Eddie Creek in 1926 turned the attention of miners to the

⁴² *Ibid*, p.80-81.

interior. The altitude of the Wau-Bulolo gold fields (4000 feet), and the fact that the gold bearing rivers flowed from higher up, convinced many that over the top of the mountain ranges there was more gold to be discovered. This led to the financing of prospecting expeditions and the eventual European discovery of the highlands. The search for gold indirectly brought the peoples of the high valleys into contact with the peoples of the outside world.

Highlanders were not however unknown to other New Guineans. Territorial boundaries still permitted trade and particular commodities were highly valued. Goods from the Gulf of Papua were traded up over the highlands to the Sepik river region with salt, shell currency and pigs being the main commodities.

Lutheran missionaries are reported to have entered the highlands in 1919 from their base in the Ramu valley at Kaiapit.⁴³ They were invited by their New Guinean evangelists to meet the trading partners of the Atzera people of the Upper Markham region in what is now Gadsup in the eastern highlands.⁴⁴ They remained for one night only in what is now the Kainantu area. The next year another party got as far as Pundibassa, on the eastern edge of the eastern highlands, but came under attack. Gradually however, the presence

⁴³ M. Donaldson & K. Good. *Articulated Agricultural Development: Traditional and Capitalist Agricultures in Papua New Guinea*, Avebury, Aldeshot, 1998, p. 41. Also M. Uyassi, *The Eastern Highlands*, Eastern Highlands Provincial Government, Goroka, 1990, p. 17.

⁴⁴ M. Donaldson and K. Good, *Articulated Agricultural Development*, *op. cit.* p. 41. For a discussion of early (European) highlands history see R. Radford, 'Missionaries, miners and administrators in the Eastern Highlands', *Journal of the Papua New Guinea Society*, 6:2, p. 87.

of the Lutherans was established in the extreme eastern parts of the eastern highlands, although not always peacefully.⁴⁵

From 1929 onwards, gold prospectors began to wander through the eastern highlands around the Kainantu region, despite the best efforts of the Lutherans to keep the knowledge that the highlands was inhabited a secret from the Australian administration.⁴⁶ The first major exploratory trek through the highlands was made in 1930 by two gold miners, Michael Leahy and Michael Dwyer, who were outfitted and financed by the New Guinea Goldfields company and accompanied by a dozen New Guinean coastal and lowlands carriers.⁴⁷ While this and subsequent expeditions were not able to locate the source of any payable gold, reports of settled populations in the highlands reached the Australian administration. Subsequent expeditions financed by private capital and the Australian New Guinea administration during the mid 1930s brought to the knowledge of the Australian authorities the whole of the central highlands, from the Kassam pass in the east, up through the Wahgi valley and almost to the Dutch border. This was perhaps the last densely populated area in the world that had not been explored by Europeans.

⁴⁵ M. Donaldson and K. Good, *Articulated Agricultural Development, op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

⁴⁶ B. Connolly & R. Anderson. 1987, *First Contact*, Viking Penguin Inc., New York, NY, p. 23.

⁴⁷ M. J. Leahy. 1994, *Explorations into Highland New Guinea 1930-1935*, Crawford House Press, Bathurst NSW, pp. 6-7. The full story of Leahy and Dwyer's expedition has been well documented and needs no relating here. The Anderson and Connolly film *First Contact*, and the book of the same name, utilises the original film shot by Leahy and his pictures from his expeditions. C. Simpson, *Adam in Plumes*, 2nd edition, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1955, describes the expeditions of the 1930s that were made by Leahy and Jim Taylor, and Leahy himself co-wrote, *The Land that Time Forgot* (1937) with a ghost writer as well as several of his own articles for geographic journals based on his experiences. B Gammage, *The Sky Travellers: Journeys in New Guinea 1938-1939*, Carlton South, Melbourne University Press, 1998, is an account of the famous Hagen-Sepik patrol of 1938-39.

Several dozen different tribes inhabited the highlands and had done so for many thousands of years. Apart from the geographic isolation from each other caused by the high mountains that cradled the valleys, highlanders were divided by linguistic and cultural barriers.⁴⁸ Social customs ranged widely: some groups married outside of their group (exogamous) and others within (endogamous). Ritualistic cannibalism was practised in much of the eastern highlands but not in the western highlands. The rights of women to divorce their husbands varied, as did rules for the care of children if the father or mother died or left by agreement. There was a wide range of creation myths and spiritual beliefs, mostly revolving around ancestor worship and animist practices. Eastern highlanders were shorter in stature than their western counterparts.⁴⁹ Traditional costumes for a celebration (*sing-sing*) included feathers, ochre paint, oil and large quantities of shell. The Mother of Pearl shell, from which the crescent shaped *kina* was extracted, was particularly prized although *giri-giri* and *tambu* shells were important items of exchange and served as currency.

Warfare was an established method of conflict resolution and was systemic throughout the highlands region. Political alliances were forged through trade in pigs, marriage and commodities such as shell, salt (a vital component of diet) at large exchange meetings (*moka*) in which political leaders would demonstrate their wealth and influence by participating, and giving much of it away. In such a manner local alliances were formed to shore up a tribe's position against war or aggression. In general, roaming and free

⁴⁸ These observations have been compiled from the ARCHD and AREHD for 1947-1957 from the sections on anthropology and excerpts from patrol reports included for annual reports.

⁴⁹ In *Life's Grandeur*, Johnathon Cape, London, 1996 (also known as *Full House*) Stephen Jay Gould makes the point that variation in stature is to be expected within any group of humans as much as it is present between such groups. Differences in physical size may have more to do with the date of arrival in

passage through land of other tribes was not possible unless neighbouring tribes were allies so the geographic knowledge of the people may have extended only to their tribe's territory and to neutral areas such as sing-sing grounds.

Despite such ceremonial occasions, war was a constant factor in the lives of all highlands peoples and was the reason why the fertile valley floors were virtually uninhabited. Ridges offered better protection from ambush and attack. The prevalence of tribal fighting was the major obstacle to the effective control of the region by Australian officers. While landholding patterns vary across Papua New Guinea, the highlands are exclusively patrilineal and patrilocal with sons inheriting land and specific trees that acted as boundary markers from their fathers or male relatives. Initiation ceremonies were an important feature in the lives of boys and girls and they were taught the roles their society expected from them — warrior/gardener or tiller/mother — as well as secrets rites of passage for their gender. The basic unit of social organisation across Papua and New Guinea was the village, which Charles Rowley, Principal of the Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) from 1951-1964, described as:

... most bearing a group of households so small that the term 'village' is generally an overstatement. Many of these settlements are movable according to the requirements of convenience or of shifting agriculture. Very few villages indeed have a thousand or more people. Two hundred make a large one; probably most New Guineans think of themselves as members of living communities smaller than this. As in some Highlands areas, people may live in hamlets of two or three houses, of twenty souls or so; though they are linked by

the highlands which in the Eastern highlands has been estimated at 18,000 years ago. See also Uyassi,

kinship and tradition with others living similarly, and with whom they will forgather at the dancing ground for special ceremonies.⁵⁰

Anthropological studies since Rowley's writing have basically argued that in the highlands the social structure and allegiances derive firstly from tribes, then clans and then sub-clans.⁵¹ Tribes vary in size but rarely live together on common land as the smaller clan units are more able to defend commonly held territory and produce their own food. Wayne Warry note that clans in the Chauve (eastern Simbu) region range from 80-488 people while the Gahuka-Gama studied by Kenneth Read in the early 1950s averaged about 100. Sinasina and central Simbu clans averaged 600-700 people but could be as low as 200 and as high as 1,200.⁵² As a general rule the farther west one goes through the highlands the larger the tribal and clan groups become.⁵³ While tribes might gather together for important ceremonies or to reforge their alliances against neighbouring peoples, they were most often dispersed across the entirety of their tribal territory in much smaller communities. In the highlands, as in other New Guinean communities, kinship is the tie that binds.

The political leadership of such small communities was contested by men of influence with strength, fighting capability, wealth and oratory all playing their part to make an individual a 'big man' (a leader). Such communities had no hereditary system of chiefs

The Eastern Highlands, op. cit., p.12.

⁵⁰ C. D. Rowley, *The New Guinea Villager, op. cit.*, p.14.

⁵¹ For a brief discussion of Anthropological studies in the highlands and the difficulties of generalisation see W. Warry, *Chuave Politics: Changing Patterns of Leadership in the Papua New Guinea Highlands*, Political and Social Change Monograph 4, Australian National University, Canberra, 1987, pp. 13-55.

See also D. Howlett, *A Decade of Change in the Goroka Valley New Guinea: Land Use and Development in the 1950s*, PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1962, at Chapter 2.

⁵² Wayne Warry, *Chuave Politics: Changing Patterns of Leadership in the Papua New Guinea Highlands, op. cit.*, p. 33.

but while big men had influence over decision-making, the Melanesian way was to reach agreement by consensus, and issues were debated in public. The largesse of the big man enforced loyalty both within and between highlands tribes and communities. The highlands peoples were technologically reliant on stone tools and had no mastery of metal. The first wheels that highlanders saw were attached to aeroplanes.⁵⁴

7.4 *Australian administration in the highlands*

In the Mandated Territory of New Guinea the work of exploration, pacification and consolidation fell to the Department of District Services and Native Affairs (DDSNA). The administration divided their territory into seven districts, each placed under the direction of a District Officer. In the Report to the League of Nations for 1936-37 the entire administration of New Guinea had 338 staff. The DDSNA was the largest government Department with 142 officers. Of these District Officers (DOs), Assistant District Officers (ADOs), Patrol Officers (POs) and Cadet Patrol Officers (CPOs) accounted for ninety-nine positions.⁵⁵ In each district the District Officer (DO) was the law. Assistant District Officers (ADOs) were more experienced than POs and were often given charge of their own subdistricts or cared for the administrative running of a district when the DO was on leave.

⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 34.

⁵⁴ See for example the description of a plane landing on a prepared strip in the middle Wahgi in C. Simpson, *Adam in Plumes*, 2nd ed. Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1955, pp. 26-28.

⁵⁵ *Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of New Guinea for 1936-1937*. Staffing levels of other departments were as follows: Department of the Government Secretary - 34; Treasury - 24; Public Health - 74; Lands, Surveys, Mines and Forests - 24; Agriculture - 17; Public works - 14; Customs - 9.

The seven New Guinea districts in 1936-37 were Sepik, Madang and Morobe on the mainland, and Manus, New Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville. The entire highlands region was considered a subdistrict of Morobe.

The front line agent of discovery, pacification and administration was the Patrol Officer, the *Kiap* (pidgin for ‘Captain’), who had two primary tasks: to explore the land and to consolidate the influence of the administration. Apart from the administration presence on the goldfields there was little effective presence farther inland. In his capacities as an Assistant District Officer (Morobe), James Lindsay Taylor was posted to the eastern edge of the highlands and established the first administration station at Kainantu in 1932. Taylor had an immense influence on the way in which the administration established initial contact with the disparate highlands communities and he played a crucial role in the discovery, pacification, economic development and settlement by Europeans in the highlands. He accompanied the Leahy brothers, Mick and Dan, on the first expedition into the Wahgi valley of the western highlands in 1933 and in 1938-39 went farther west as far as the Enga region and out to Telefomin with Patrol Officer John Black.

7.5 *Police and control in Papua and New Guinea*

Like the British the Australians believed that particular tribes of Papua New Guinea were suited for work as soldiers. For Papua this was first the Kiwai (Western Division), then the Orokiava (Eastern division), and in New Guinea the Buka (Bougainville) and

the Manus Islands, then the Waria of Morobe District.⁵⁶ This preference for men from one region or another was part of a stereotype developed by colonial rulers. Men could not of course be police in their own communities because of the temptations of granting favours to particular people — or as the colonial administrators saw it, ‘abusing police power’. While theoretically under the command of kiaps, when deployed away from family and friends police acted as much in their own interests as in the interests of the colonial state.

Yet like the kiaps, police were also agents of colonial rule. Apart from the times when they followed the orders of the District Officers or the Patrol Officer, police played no small part in the pacification of the highlands and, interestingly, in the training of patrol officers. More experienced police were regarded as valuable assets to a patrol or a station. They used their firepower to dominate others and to induce change. As Gammage notes:

Whereas increasingly Europeans thought of themselves as civilizers, the police proudly remained warriors and usually victors, destroying one political system in favour of another. To the limit their masters allowed, or could not prevent, they asserted the traditional prerogatives of power. Some actually enlisted for this, and most grew skilled at running a line between seizing opportunities and risking anger at their own presumption. They brought to the police what they learnt in the village, then took back to a village, either their own or one that they adopted, what they gained from the police.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ B. Gammage, ‘Police and Power during contact in the Papua New Guinea Highlands’, in H. Levine and A. Pleog, eds, *Work in Progress: Essays in New Guinea Highlands Ethnography in Honour of Paula Brown Glick*, Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 1996, pp. 123-141, at p. 123.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

For local tribes the idea of having a policeman marrying into your community was attractive as such ties could bring protection from the administration. Early police work in the Highlands was dominated by exploratory patrols in which police were able to gauge the metal of the kiap who was their leader. By cultivating local relationships the police could build their own power bases to assert their influence in local politics.

Even when based in camp the kiap was not always aware of the actions of his police and they did often use their power to settle issues to their own advantage. This included bashing those still tribal fighting with rifle butts and locking prisoners together.⁵⁸

Such actions may have been common during the early exploratory period but were less common after World War II. The Australian administration still relied on the police for apprehension of offenders, but over time both the police and the people became more attuned with the new logic of administrative colonialism. More frequent patrolling and the beginnings of visible economic benefit worked a change in the attitude of those being governed who began to an extent to self-police. They engaged in tribal fighting much less frequently, the incidence of revenge killings plummeted, and reports of cannibalism declined.

Police were a large part of this spread of new influence, but they were not always allowed to get away with implementing their own agendas. The administration wanted police to act for its benefit and Jim Taylor dismissed nine police officers for rape and

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

had them imprisoned. Other police preferred physical discipline as handed out by some other kiaps and Taylor's methods were thought tough as they involved loss of status and employment for what police saw as the spoils of war. As such officers like Taylor introduced the notion that being in the police was part of a higher calling and one of his old sergeants remembered that Taylor "wanted his police to work for the day when law would replace war."⁵⁹

Kituai notes that pre-war recruitment for police depended on six criteria. A potential policeman had to be of superior physique and intelligence; of good character; 5 feet 4 inches or greater in height, with at least a 33 inch chest; between seventeen and forty; unmarried; speak English, Police Motu and Tok Pisin; and know something about government work.⁶⁰ Police, once chosen were armed and represented the front line of the administration. Kituai argues that in general a police force is given the legal authority to use force and that coercion is part of the job of being a policeman. Citing an authority who claims that "coercion is present in both the act of enforcing the law and in that of peacekeeping",⁶¹ Kituai then assumes that all police force is coercive.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁶⁰ A. Kituai, *My Gun My Brother: The World of the Papua New Guinea Colonial Police 1920-1960*, Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, Pacific Islands Monograph Series 15, 1998, p. 75

⁶¹ M. Brown cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

While this thesis does not argue that physical coercion never happened in Papua New Guinea — and Kituai details several incidents where it was, including the shooting of five men of Dika men of the Chimbu Region in 1947 by police⁶² — it does argue that there is a qualitative difference between shooting and bashing people with rifle butts and essentially ‘monitoring’ populations who change their behaviour to obey a new legal system. On one hand the police use the instruments of violence to ensure compliance with law— physical coercion — and on the other they allow people to obey a law — structural coercion. In the highlands structural coercion depended on the prior establishment of physical coercion for peace. Yet as peace settled, the police played an important part in keeping people behaving in accordance with the new regime. Force is not therefore just using physical might to achieve ends but changing the operations of life to achieve the same ends. Administrative colonialism achieved the same ends as physical coercion through inducement and promise. The frontier remained, and good police were still held in high regard by kiaps. But closer to administration influence in the years after the war, the purpose of policing changed from a force of conquest to a force of monitoring. Those imprisoned learnt about the ways of the administration and were later made luluais and tultuls so that they could spread the influence of the administration.

As early as 1937 Ian Downs, a future District Commissioner of the EHD, felt that the only proper way to manage a line of native constabulary was to be strong on discipline

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 144-151. This incident resulted in the suspension of two administration officers from active duty, one of whom was the DO of the CHD, Jim Taylor; the other was the patrol officer Symons who authorised his police to fire. See p. 150.

and make sure that all legal instructions were obeyed.⁶³ This was a method of handling people shared by Jim Taylor. This approach coincides with the observation of Dinnen that “Colonial peace could not have been achieved, even in the gradual and piecemeal fashion that it was, without the active acquiescence of local groups.”⁶⁴ The prohibition on force, and the shift away from using it, is thus part of a wider negotiated process of changing the way people lived. Eastern highlanders were responsive to the new order as the colonial state offered incentives and benefits for good behaviour.

As more knowledge was gained about the highlands and its people, contact between patrol officers, missionaries and highlanders became more frequent and further sub-districts of Morobe and Madang were established at Bena Bena (Goroka), and Chimbu (50 miles west of Goroka).⁶⁵ With his few officers Taylor patrolled the highlands on foot urging the people to stop their tribal fighting. The locations that had first served as base camps and temporary airstrips, through which supplies were brought for exploratory expeditions, were gradually made more permanent. Government offices, patrol posts and houses were built around the airstrips. Eventually these small settlements became the towns of Kainantu, Goroka, Kundiawa and Mt Hagen, today the main centres of highlands commerce.

The entry of patrol officers had the effect of freezing the *status quo*. In a fluid political and territorial situation kiaps attempted to introduce peace. Departure from the *Pax Australiana* meant transgression of the law of the administration (*gavman*). Offenders,

⁶³ I. Downs cited in B. Gammage, *The Sky Travellers*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

⁶⁴ S. Dinnen, *Challenges of Order in a Weak State: Crime, Violence and Control in Papua New Guinea*, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1996, p. 24.

⁶⁵ Downs' pre-war reports from Chimbu list it as a subdistrict of Madang.

when they could be apprehended, were punished with imprisonment. While the administration regarded murder as a capital crime it was a common and accepted method of dispute resolution in the highlands and if murderers were apprehended they would be imprisoned for periods of up to six months.

Attacks on missionaries, patrols and miners led the administration to restrict the entry of Europeans in 1936 but those already in the highlands were permitted to stay. As the financial resources for the administration of New Guinea were stretched, the kiaps developed a culture of self-reliance. They would frequently patrol in unexplored and potentially hostile territory for two to three months at a time with no contact with their bases. In these patrols New Guinean police assisted administration officers. The tradition of peaceful penetration remained. One of the largest of such patrols was the Taylor-Black (Hagen-Sepik) patrol of 1938-39 which lasted some sixteen months and involved around 400 carriers, mostly from the Bena Bena and Chimbu area.

In the Department of District Services and Native Affairs the policy of peaceful penetration was regarded with some amusement and rankled a number of kiaps who felt that an officer had to be almost killed before being permitted to return fire.⁶⁶ The officers in the main attempted to avoid firing indiscriminately and used their weapons mainly to demonstrate the superiority of their firearms, which appeared to the highlanders to be just sticks, but the entry of the administration into the highlands was by no means bloodless. Early contact sometimes resulted in deaths but a more usual tactic would entail shooting a pig from a distance or smashing a bottle to pieces. Those

who felt that such demonstrations were purely magic and attacked the patrols were shot, and although such action was against official policy it often went unrecorded.⁶⁷ Conventional bows, arrows, spears, clubs and axes were no match for rifles but a surprise attack in the best tradition of highlands fighting caused a number of casualties in DDSNA and missionary ranks. Donaldson and Good noted

In 1934 a mission house was burned to the ground in Simbu [Chimbu], and in the east, native evangelists were involved in clashes in May 1936. Patrol officers came under more frequent attack. Taylor was forced to shoot in the Siane and Sinesine areas in August 1933. In August 1938, Medical Assistant Walsh and 7 native police were attacked by 6,000 warriors at Wabag. Two police died, and Taylor, Downs, Edwards and 15 police reinforcements, came in by air to relieve the beleaguered garrison. Downs was attacked three times in the Gai valley near Hagen shortly afterward while repatriating carriers from the Taylor Black patrol.⁶⁸

The men who were posted to the highlands stations were often young but not necessarily inexperienced. In contrast to the range of colonial services aspiring and adventurous Britons could enter, there was then little formal training in Australia's empire. Twenty-six year old Jim Taylor had been a police officer and detective with the

⁶⁶ See I. Down, *The Last Mountain: A Life in Papua New Guinea*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1986, pp. 2-3.

⁶⁷ B. Connolly and R. Anderson, *First Contact*, *op. cit.*, p.210. Mick Leahy's sorties are reported to have killed around forty-one highlanders and Taylor later admitted that in some cases he did not report shooting incidents that led to death.

⁶⁸ M. Donaldson and K. Good, *Articulated Agricultural Development*, *op. cit.* p.40. Ian Downs was sent from Lae to relieve the patrol which had split into two to explore more territory (and to escape radio interference from headquarters) and left most of the party at Wabag as a base camp. He notes that while there were probably 6,000 warriors they did not all attack at one time and would see how others fared before deciding to join in. The source of the attack appears to have been the burden placed on local supply of food. After securing the area Downs notes "We were able to arrange settlements with the Enga people and for food trading to be resumed at the camp. The Enga agreed to give safe passage to those

New South Wales Police force in Sydney before coming to New Guinea and taking a police job in Rabaul in 1926. He transferred to DDSNA after five months and had postings in Salamaua, the main goldfields port, Bululo, and the Sepik river.⁶⁹ It was common for a single Patrol Officer to work at his station, with his non-highlands New Guinean police for support, bringing the *gavman* to the many people in his sub-district, most of whom he either saw on patrol perhaps once, or at the most twice, a year.

Ian Downs came to New Guinea aged nineteen in 1936 after entering the Royal Australian Navy at thirteen and working in a variety of jobs during the depression. His first port of call was Rabaul where senior officers of the Department of District Services and Native Affairs interviewed him, then sent him on to Manus.⁷⁰ There was no official training and Downs, like other patrol officers, learnt his trade in what was known as 'native administration' through routine patrols: he surveyed land using triangulation, observed how to outfit a patrol and what trade goods to take with you, how to conduct a census and how to best treat diseases such as malaria, which he, like many other Europeans, contracted. He then was transferred to the Morobe district headquarters at Salamaua on the strength of his two census patrols in Manus and assisted in recording a census of the 60,000 people on the Huon peninsula.⁷¹ After returning from Sydney University⁷² he was appointed Officer in Charge in the Chimbu sub-district in the

more distant hamlets who wanted to trade." Ian Downs, *The Last Mountain, op. cit.*, pp. 111-112. Such free passage was not common and in this case was arranged to meet exceptional circumstances.

⁶⁹ C. Simpson, *Adam in Plumes, op. cit.*, p.16-17.

⁷⁰ I. Downs. 1986, *The Last Mountain, op. cit.*, pp. 20-50

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-76.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 101-103. Academic training for selected patrol officers who had survived the patrols and tropical diseases during their first two years in New Guinea was in the form of a twelve month course in law, anthropology and tropical medicine at the University of Sydney for which the officers were required to enter into a £2,000 bond and agree not to marry for two years on return to the Territory on pain of dismissal. But by and large most patrol officers were thrown in at the deep end and it was not until after

highlands (present day Kundiawa) in September 1939 at the age of twenty-one. Chimbu covered the area from the Dauilo divide to about 35 km east of Hagen. It was then the largest sub-district in the territory and contained approximately 300,000 people; the administration knew of perhaps one third of these.⁷³ As Officer-in-Charge at Chimbu, Downs later wrote that this was ‘Naked Power’ — the power that Bertrand Russell has described as involving no acquiescence on the part of the subject.⁷⁴

After the closing of the highlands in 1936 the European presence was confined to officers of the administration at the four patrol posts of Kainantu, Bena Bena, Chimbu and Hagen; missionary stations in those same areas, mostly run by German Lutheran with a few Americans; and selected gold miners such as the Leahy brothers. The Australian administration classified the highlands as ‘uncontrolled’.

Ian Downs’ monthly and annual reports for 1939 demonstrate the methods used in establishing the writ of the Australian administration in the areas of the highlands where its had entered only a few years before. His annual report for Chimbu in the 1939-1940 (financial) year gives an impression of a man anxious to achieve, and keen to demonstrate to the administration the work done by all in his sub-district. He was careful to include all his officers, both European and New Guinean, in the credit. He was not, however, overly concerned about operating within official government

the war that the Australian government developed any cadet training program. Downs commented that “The cadet system, as it was called, created an extraordinary gulf between those in authority who arranged it and those who benefited from a year of books and lectures.” (*Ibid.*, p. 103)

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁷⁴ See I. Downs, *The Last Mountain*, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-127. See also B. Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis*, Allen and Unwin, London, [1938], 1975, p. 57.

guidelines⁷⁵ and either challenged the administration to stop him or withheld information about how his results were achieved. His techniques for bringing a halt to tribal fighting were unorthodox but highly effective. He gives credit to the work of those officers who had preceded him at Chimbu for their mapping and charting of the region and for identifying which groups occupied which regions. An extract from this report⁷⁶ summarises his approach well.

The basis of the present policy	The policy since September 1939 has been built on six key factors. These are:
1. Prestige	Establishing the prestige of the Administration as second to no other institution and making the ideals and aims of the Administration the aims and ideals of the natives. Eliminating anything that harms our prestige.
2. Headmen	An extraordinary drive to build the old fighting leaders and orators into Administrative headmen capable of carrying part of the burden of the Administration's work and capable of operating without the assistance of native constabulary.
3. Roads	The construction of real roads; in particular, the construction of a road capable of taking a petrol driven vehicle from Chimbu Post to Mount Hagen and later to Bena Bena.
4. Confidence	The continual search for information and the continual drive for getting the confidence of every man, woman and child.

⁷⁵ With the war approaching Downs had already been contacted by the Navy but had been refused a transfer by the New Guinea administration. During the war he became a Coastwatcher. He has written that his desire to get to the war, and frustration at not being permitted to go, explained the urgency with which he attacked the job at Chimbu. *The Last Mountain, op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁷⁶ I. Downs, Annual Report Chimbu Sub-district 1939-1940, p. 2. Downs' papers form part of the Australian National University Pacific Manuscripts Bureau (PMB 607), copies of which are held on microfilm at the Mitchell Library and Sydney University.

**5. Practical
Anthropology**

The application of practical anthropology to administration problems.

6. Enthusiasm

The firm belief that difficulties and obstructions can all be removed by bold initiative, enthusiasm and drive and that every problem is a challenge to effort and not to complacent consideration

Downs' blueprint was a model for colonial rule on a shoestring. It relied on local rulers but required the gathering of information. There was a commitment to providing infrastructure and to destroying traditional social forces that could rival the administration. As such it was underfunded administrative colonialism; it has elements of paternalism and of modernising; of persuasion rather than physical force and the use of technology to promote progress.

Downs' first task was to distinguish the actions of the administration from the actions and presence of other Europeans, especially the "Alien [German] Mission societies" which he felt were actually hindering his progress.⁷⁷ The second task was to give traditional political leaders a measure of respect, both from the administration and their own people, which the prohibition on tribal fighting had to some extent removed.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.1.

In this endeavour, Downs claims he called together over three hundred clan headmen and selected only those who were demonstrably able to dominate others, thus assuring that he actually had the most powerful political representatives of the communities into which the administration was advancing.

This was a stepping stone to the eventual establishment of the luluai system and relied upon breaking the cross-clan kinship ties that bound the highlands societies together in adversity thus creating more fragmented communities with divided loyalties. Dominant leaders could thus direct affairs more toward the goals of the administration. Of these three hundred leaders, Downs regarded sixty as having potential and recommended that twenty be made luluais. The others were useful in exerting a restraining influence over a conflict between two individuals who, until the ban on tribal fighting, could have brought in several hundred people. Offenders were brought in by their own communities and presented to Downs who decided their punishment.⁷⁸

One would normally query why communities traditionally beholden to no one were so apparently cooperative, but no mention is made of this in his report. His autobiography however tells how he approached ending tribal fighting and established the rule of law: he sequestered the resources of dissident communities through mass actions. In one such move against the Yongamugl people who had stolen pigs from their neighbours and ambushed the rescue party, Downs rallied 2,000 men from adjacent tribes. Advancing with great noise he frightened the Yongamugl people into their defensive

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

caves. He then held their pigs hostage and demanded that the perpetrators and fight leaders be handed over.

The result was devastating because the people faced both economic and social ruin. We had effectively destroyed all bride price agreements in marriage contracts and driven the Yongamugl out of the circle of ceremonial festivities for which pigs were an essential part. The punishment was harsh: we returned only some of their breeding pigs. From the rest we repaid those who had been plundered, paid our helpers and established a government pig farm. In quick succession we took similar action in four troublesome locations. Each time we used different tribal groups to help us. This was the end of serious tribal fighting in the Chimbu and the statistics prove it. The end justified what we had done and we took comfort from being able to persuade people by capturing pigs instead of men. I did not embarrass my superiors by seeking official support. The approval of tribal leaders was enough and Rabaul was a long way from Kundiawa.⁷⁹

Distance created opportunity, and Patrol Officer George Greathead in Hagen also followed Downs' techniques. In the prewar era the *Pax Australiana* in the highlands was absolute power with little scrutiny. Beyond pacification for pacification's sake there was little in the way of policy: stop tribal fighting and introduce the Native Administration Regulations to people who were beginning to learn Tok Pisin, the *lingua franca* promoted by kiaps in their dealings with New Guineans.

⁷⁹ I. Downs, *The Last Mountain*, *op. cit.*, p.120-121.

Fortunately Downs and George Greathead were not megalomaniacs. They recognised that peace was fragile if there was no development and mobilised the clans through the headmen to build roads, well before cars could be flown in. This third objective of his regime allowed the surplus labour resulting from the absence of tribal fighting to be directed toward administration works. The roads allowed better access between the communities and the administration and helped to brake down the geographic isolation of tribes by creating a notion of neutral space. The road was administration property and remained central to Downs' ideas on development in the eastern highlands throughout his life.

It is important to note that although some areas of the highlands became acquainted with the *Pax Australiana* and the knowledge of the power of a gun, particularly in the densely populated Chimbu, Asaro, Goroka and Wahgi valley regions, the level of administration influence was not extensive if judged by the estimates of the kiaps themselves. Downs felt that expansion for expansion's sake should be discouraged and the administration should concentrate on getting the areas already under administration influence firmly under control. Of the around 300,000 people in the Sub-District (which he claims in *The Last Mountain*) the census for 1939-40 totalled 31,275. His estimated population for 1939-40 is around 100,000 but still the point is clear: the influence of the administration was patchy⁸⁰ and confidence — especially self-confidence — and enthusiasm were essential if a kiap was to survive the isolation and the dangers of patrolling.

⁸⁰ I. Downs, *Annual Reports, Chimbu Sub-District, 1939-40, op. cit.*, p.7.

At the beginning of the Pacific War the highlands was still a restricted area. During the war the pattern of patrolling adopted by the administration was disrupted by the secondment of patrol officers to military duties and by the influx of Allied forces. There was no actual fighting in this region but it was used to provide logistical support to campaigns against the Japanese on the northern New Guinea coast. The rough landing strips that had been used to supply patrol stations were adapted for military use and later dictated where the central nodes of the administration network were placed. Goroka, a few miles west of the first base camp of Bena Bena, was adapted to land large aircraft such as DC3s. It became the focus of later Australian efforts to order the lives people of the people of the eastern highlands through the administrative region of the eastern highlands, the Eastern Highlands District.

7.6 *The goal of 'partnership'*

The conclusion of the war brought about a change to the legal administration of the Mandate of New Guinea. The outbreak of WWII had shown the League of Nations to be woefully inadequate in its desired aims of regulating international relations along peaceful lines. Following the defeat of Germany negotiations started in earnest to create a successor body, the United Nations. The victory of the Japanese forces over the Dutch and British in East Asia had demonstrated that Europeans were not in fact invincible and, on their retreat, the Japanese had granted independence to many formerly colonial nations. In the aftermath of the war resistance against European colonialism, and the resumption of European colonial control, stiffened throughout Asia. Political tensions and the desire for independence arose in the Asia Pacific region and the USSR was a strong supporter of independence movements in Asia and Africa. The Soviet Union's

role in the new balance of power ensured that the practices of imperialism (which by definition was a practice of only capitalist states) were regarded with disdain in a new international climate. Following the Atlantic charter there was a general commitment to end the domination of peoples and to disband the colonial empires.

The United Nations Trusteeship Council ensured that the degree of surveillance over the former Australian Mandate in New Guinea would be tightened. Indeed Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter states, amongst other stipulations, that the territories (to be known as trust territories) were to be placed under individual agreements and that a basic objective of the trusteeship system would be to

... promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.⁸¹

This was, in principle, a more demanding agreement between an international body and an administering power than the previous agreement between the League of Nations and Australia. The Trusteeship at least stipulated that the eventual goal for non-self-governing territories would be either self-government or independence, whereas the Mandate had granted the Allies the spoils of German and Turkish possessions.

⁸¹ United Nations Charter, Chapter XII, Articles 75 & 76.

Mandatory powers had accepted their responsibility as part of a 'sacred trust of civilisation'; the same nations after World War II had at least to recognise the claim of peoples all over the world to self-determination. New Guinea would one day be self-governing or independent, something not always conceded by Australian administrators or policy makers.

The decade 1947-1957 covers the initial gazettal of the Central Highlands District in 1947, the division of the Central Highlands District into the Western, Southern and Eastern Highlands Districts in 1951, and up until 1957. This decade represents the first concerted attempt by the Australian administration to gain effective control over the region and its people and to make significant changes to their everyday lives. It illustrates the paradoxical situation in which the colonial 'middle managers' of the eastern highlands found themselves: they were attempting to establish administrative colonialism at the very time when dependent countries around the world were coming to independence.⁸² In an emerging climate of anti-colonialism, the Australian administration in Papua New Guinea, and in the eastern highlands in particular, attempted to establish itself in the areas classified as under its control.

Throughout this period the dominant Australian government official was the long-serving Minister for External Territories, Paul Hasluck who held the position from 1951-1964 and exercised considerable influence on the direction of policy for Papua

⁸² In the decade under consideration India, Indonesia, Egypt and Malaya all gained their independence, and other countries such as Vietnam, Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Algeria, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria were well on the way to gaining theirs. Inspired by nationalist movements, which were sometimes socialist in world-view, the peoples of dependent territories in the world fought against racism, exploitation, capitalism and colonialism.

New Guinea's economic and social development. He consistently refuted accusations that the Australian presence in Papua and New Guinea was colonial and described the relationship of Papua New Guinea to Australia as

... neither a colony nor a territory; it is in the experimental stage which the world has not yet seen and which it may not be possible to create anywhere else in the world — an attempt at co-operation and mutual service between two peoples, a guardianship ...⁸³

Hasluck's ideal for Papua New Guinea represents a purer form of an ideal type of administrative colonialism than does the example of British rule in Kelantan. The effect of the evolving discourse of human rights may be seen in the development of the notion of 'partnership'. The building of the colonial state in the eastern highlands was again not often physically coercive and genuinely attempted to live up to its responsibilities toward the people. Despite the official claims that Papua New Guinea was never a colony, (and the official history, for which the Australian government employed the services of Ian Downs as author), this study of district administration in the eastern highlands is a study of administrative colonialism. The administration of Papua New Guinea was almost identical to that of other dependent territories around the world, classed as colonies or Protectorates, many of which were moving to accommodate nationalist movements by developing more sophisticated and inclusive methods of rule that served to delay the granting of independence.⁸⁴

⁸³ P. Hasluck, cited in R. Porter, *Paul Hasluck: A political biography*, University of Western Australia Press, Nedlands, 1993, p.107.

⁸⁴ B. Schaffer, 'The Concept of Preparation: some questions about the transfer of systems of government', *World Politics*, Vol XVIII, No. 1, pp. 42-67.

Exploration and pacification were conducted along humane and paternalistic lines, mirroring the emerging post-war practices of European colonial powers. In terms of the colonial bureaucracy, ultimate control over all affairs rested with the Australian government Minister in Canberra. To professionalise the administration the Australian government established the Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) in 1945. In November 1949 the Registrar, W S Arthur, wrote to established schools and colleges of colonial administration including the Ecole Colonial in Paris, London University, Cambridge University, Oxford University, the Colonial Office School in London and the School of Colonial Studies in Leyden, the Netherlands, seeking details of their methods of instruction and course outlines.⁸⁵

During the 1950s and 1960s ASOPA was the finishing school for Australian colonial officials and they were instructed in matters of anthropology, colonial government and law. The syllabus was shaped with an eye to what was being taught in other parts of the imperial world, renowned lecturers such as Lucy Mair were obtained from England and gave courses on 'primitive government' and anthropology.⁸⁶ Specific texts included such classics as Lord Lugard's *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* and Lord Hailey's *African Survey*. Cadets and senior officers were lectured in anthropology, tropical hygiene, law, and colonial development, with little or no linguistic training.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ NSW Archives Series SP 974/1 Folder 212 File 32.

⁸⁶ Lucy Mair in fact wrote a book of this exact title. L. Mair, *Primitive Government: A Study of Traditional Political Systems in Eastern Africa*, The Scholar Press, London, [1962] reprinted 1977.

⁸⁷ NSW Archives Series Folder 497 (No. 7 Short course and No. 3 Refresher).

Australia responded to United Nations Visiting Commissions and their recommendations that more emphasis be placed on Papua New Guinean self-government.

When it came, independence in Papua New Guinea was not a gradual devolution and withdrawal but closer to 'abandon ship'. The impetus for the 1973 move to self-government in Papua New Guinea came mainly from Australian politicians attempting to deliver on election promises with some effective but none the less disjointed nationalist stirrings. In the period under consideration, Papua New Guinea was nowhere near as politically or economically advanced as Britain's African colonies which achieved independence in the decade of the 1960s. Indeed, in the late 1940s, the New Guinea highlands was mostly tribal, traditional and 'uncontrolled'.

7.7 *Conclusion*

From the early 1930s the administration's presence grew stronger in certain parts of the highlands. *Pax Australiana* was a child of *Pax Britannica*, with a few distinctly Australian mannerisms. Up to the start of World War II the Australian administration came to influence the social relations and politics of the various tribes, clans and communities of the highlands. One analogy for the administration's presence is of dropping pebbles in a lake; the ripples start at central points (the base camps and later the patrol posts) and eventually wash over the whole area. In an area where warfare was not only accepted as a legitimate form of politics, but was in fact the normal solution to many problems, the imposition of peace eventually had far reaching consequences on the social and political lives of highlanders.

Administrative colonialism in the eastern highlands occurs at a fascinating juncture in international relations. In the post-war period, the constant Australian denials that Papua New Guinea was a colony indicates a prolonged self-delusion or what may be termed ‘high colonialism’ — a denial of colonial reality. Behind this rested deeply held altruistic and philanthropic notions of good governance and a desire to help Papua New Guineans help themselves.

As the next three chapters demonstrate, administrative colonialism in the eastern highlands in the 1947-1957 period fundamentally altered the way in which highlanders related to the world. It promoted peace, economic development, education, hygiene, health care and agricultural extension, and, when it considered that the people had enough understanding of the new structures of democracy, it granted local self-government. This was done with limited physical coercion and was achieved, as in Kelantan, primarily through regulation and persuasion. It was perhaps the closest exemplar of the ideal type of administrative colonialism that has existed in any colonial dependency.

The next three chapters of this thesis outline the structure of district administration in the eastern highlands within a larger framework of the Australian colonial state. By studying the creation of the colonial state in a specific district these chapters examine the modernising influence of colonial ‘middle managers’. By analysing the actions of the colonial administrators and how they attempted to transform traditional societies, they explore the sociology of power at the colonial interface and the construction of governmentality by the colonial state.

Through regulation the administrative district closed off avenues of dissent. Furthermore it created 'legitimate' forms of social and economic engagement that were regulated by the state. The following chapters reveal that the administrative colonial state regulated the entry of capital, and capitalism, in the interest of the welfare, social progress and 'development' of eastern highlanders. District analysis further reveals that official policy and local implementation frequently diverged on how to best achieve these ends.

Chapter 8: Fashioning the colonial district: Australian administration in the Eastern Highlands, 1947-1951

This chapter examines the establishment of administrative colonialism in the eastern highlands of New Guinea between 1947 and 1951. It assesses the gradual expansion of the Australian administration's network of patrol posts, the creation of urban centres, and the introduction of administrative and legal frameworks to promote peace. It aims to explore the nexus between colonial power and colonial policy and argues that the trade-off for New Guineans subjected to Australian colonial rule came in the form of increased economic opportunities, improved medical treatment and greater social mobility.

The expanding power and reach of the colonial state was enhanced through the building of roads which themselves increased the mobility of officers and the possibilities for greater surveillance of the district. Such communications infrastructure was achieved with very little in the way of equipment and underpinned the future economic growth of the eastern highlands. Furthermore the roads allowed highlanders greater exposure to the outside world than was the case in the pre-war years of the 1930s.

By studying the implementation of the *Pax Australiana* – the rule of white men if not white law – and by analysing the purposes for which land was used, chapters eight, nine and ten identify and examine six main elements of the Australian colonial presence. Taken together, these elements indicate that the eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea

was administered as a *de facto* colonial possession. In attempting to view how colonial power operated at the level of day-to-day administration in this district, no specific attempt has been made to explore questions of the highlanders' attitudes to the new system.¹ While conscious of the absence of 'history from below' this chapter examines specific issues of governance relating to the mechanisms and institutions of colonial power and administration in the eastern highlands, in particular the establishment of structures of administration and dominance organised around technocratic and functional divisions of knowledge and responsibility in a bureaucracy. The gaze offered is that of the administrator, but with an eye on the capacity and growth of the overall colonial state system. New Guineans' resistance to this system is mentioned only where it threatens the imposed order of the colonial state – it is not a priority here in analysis of archival material.

The eastern highlands chapters utilise the administrative reports of the officers themselves, principally the annual reports of the chief administration figures, the District Officer (DO) and, after 1951, the District Commissioner (DC). Annual reports have been chosen for the administrative gaze they provide over a decade of administration, and for their holistic view of activities over a wide and linguistically diverse geographic area. They provide a fascinating picture of a region in the midst of a

¹ Other writers have already covered this aspect of colonial history in some detail. See for example B. Connolly and R. Anderson, Connolly, B. and Anderson, R, *First Contact: New Guinea's Highlanders Encounter the Outside World*, Viking, New York, 1987, which takes the Leahy expeditions of the early 1930s and checks the recollections and writings of Michael and Dan Leahy, along with Jim Taylor, against the oral histories and memories of the still-living highlanders who witnessed events. *First Contact* asserts that European versions and official histories of events often glossed over the physical violence and bloodshed that accompanied initial first contact. Actions that may have reflected poorly upon the character of the officers/explorers or the aims of the expedition were either omitted or later excised or glossed over for posterity from their "official" diaries and reports. For example the violent incident of 1947 that led to the death of five highlanders and to Taylor's suspension (Chapter 7) is not listed in *ARCHD 1947/48*.

profound social transformation. They further show that the ‘middle management’ level of colonialism — the district — may illuminate regional factors and variations that are obscured by a study of overall colonial policy, or those that may be grossly exaggerated by a micro study of change in a small village or in a local community. The district provides a manageable unit of analysis and is large enough for one to reveal trends in administrative colonialism over a decade of massive change.

While all types of studies are necessary for an overall understanding of the politics and processes occurring in a colonial setting, district analysis in particular enables comparison of similarities in patterns of rule and techniques of control both within and across empires. The chapters on Kelantan and those of the eastern highlands open up a variety of issues concerning the entry of colonial power into a region and the events that occur during the first crucial decade of establishment of colonial structures of rule. Comparative district analysis across time, such as is being conducted in this thesis, further allows the testing of the notion of if there is one colonialism (an amorphous totalising concept across several centuries, continents and peoples) that makes little or no sense, or a number of separate “colonialisms”. A comparison of how a colonial state actually operates at a regional level, a district, where policy and practice merge, having taken on trust the existence of same, can illuminate the processes that permit control and domination.

In the post war years the notion of ‘managing’ the social transformation of highlanders from subsistence gardeners and warriors to market gardeners and co-operative coffee growers held sway in Australian administrative and policy circles. Australian Minister for Territories Paul Hasluck, the dominant figure in post-war PNG policy, was a

committed believer in progressive and equal development. While policy was unashamedly paternalistic the overall project of bringing Papua New Guinea into the twentieth century was very much a ‘work-in-progress’ with no set deadline for independence. Skewed development was to be avoided if possible. In the eastern highlands this ‘hasten slowly’ policy eventually came into conflict with the opinions and wishes of a small and influential clique of European officers and settlers who were both the wielders and implementers of colonial power and the founders of the plantation coffee industry. The interaction between official colonial policy for New Guinea and the interests of settler capitalism is specifically addressed in chapter ten.

8.1 *The administrative structure*

In all districts of PNG in the civilian post-war period the District Officer (DO) had general responsibility for the operation of administration business in any defined territorial area. The DO was an officer of the Department of District Services and Native Affairs (DDSNA) who was directly responsible to the Director of the DDSNA in Port Moresby. The DO had responsibility for the work of his officers in initial contact, pacification, census and introduction of the rule of law. Specialist officers from the Departments of Education, Health and Agricultural extension were theoretically not responsible to the DO but to their separate Directors in Port Moresby. From January 1951 the position of District Commissioner (DC) was created. This inserted an administrative level above that of the DO and had overall responsibility for everything that occurred within the district. As district supremo, the position of DC was at first placed within the Department of the Government Secretary, a curious placement that

left the DC no district staff of his own and therefore dependent on personal qualities to further successful administration.

The DO and the DC were the principal officers of the Australian administration in the period under consideration in the eastern highlands and, in practice, both positions had wide responsibilities for the pacification of the people, the introduction of law, health, the development of local industries, educational advancement, district infrastructure and regional economic development. The patrol officer (PO) and other officers of the administration implemented the colonial policy of the Australian state. Five objectives have been identified as having been pursued simultaneously throughout the period of 1947-1957.

1. establishing administrative control over the geographic region of the eastern highlands;
2. the provision of social services, particularly medicine, to the indigenous population;
3. the extension and entrenchment of state surveillance;
4. the use of local land to generate economic development; and
5. the use of local labour to generate economic development.

This chapter examines all five objectives for the period 1947-51; chapter nine examines objectives one, three and five; and chapter ten objectives two and four.

Australian politicians generally had little interest in New Guinea and the Minister for Territories devised policy with the assistance of his chosen advisers. The Administrator in Port Moresby was responsible to the Minister for Territories and below the

Administrator there were the various Departments with their Directors and sections. On the ground, the responsibility for implementation of colonial policy through colonial practice fell to the staff engaged in day-to-day administration in each district. In this sense all districts are similar in that they were attempting to implement similar policies. In the eastern highlands the administration brokered a trade off between Europeans and New Guineans that depended upon accepting the rule of law and the authority of the administration in exchange for the benefits of western civilisation. The five objectives addressed below show how these factors determined the power dynamics of the eastern highlands between 1947 and 1951.

8.2 *Pax Australiana: control*

In 1947 the civilian administration² made the decision to gazette the entire highlands region as a separate administrative area, the Central Highlands District (CHD). James Lindsay (Jim) Taylor, who had established the first administration station at Kainantu in 1932, was the first District Officer appointed to the CHD. On the basis of pre-war exploratory work the region was divided into ten sub-districts (SDs). Kainantu, Bena Bena (later Goroka) and Chimbu were based around patrol posts in the eastern part of the highlands; further to the west were Hagen and Wabag SDs, also pre-war patrol posts. These five stations formed the core region of highlands administration and were staffed by Assistant District Officers (ADOs).³ Each SD was meant to have an ADO in charge but Hagen was staffed by a Patrol Officer for much of 1947/48 due to staff

² The civilian administration took over from the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) region by region beginning in October 1945. On 28 June 1946 Minister Eddie Ward announced that civilian government now operated in all parts of New Guinea. I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship Papua New Guinea 1945-1975*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1980, p. 24.

shortages. Taylor⁴ commented that the shortages meant greater responsibility for highlands people who exhibited “latent qualities of leadership and indicate the fallibility of the charge that New Guinea people differ from those of nations of higher material culture in not having a sense of responsibility”.⁵ Owing to the excellent airstrip built at Goroka by the Allies (principally the US Fifth Squadron) during June 1943, the district headquarters were based there.⁶

The other five CHD SDs were administered in a theoretical rather than real sense. The annual report for 1947/48 reveals that Aiome, north east of Hagen over the Bismark range and close to the Ramu river, and Huri had been penetrated by patrols but had not been the subject of any administrative expansion whatsoever. Kutubu, south west of Hagen in what later became the Southern Highlands District (now an important natural gas producing region) was administered from Port Moresby due to its remoteness; and Telefomin (far west on the Victor Emmanuel Range and close to the border of Dutch New Guinea) was administered from the Sepik District. Hoiyamo, west of Wabag on the Pogera River was closed in March of 1949 due to staff shortages.⁷

³ *Annual Report Central Highlands District (ARCHD) 1947/48*, p 2.

⁴ Although the report is unsigned Jim Taylor was the District Officer at this time. ADO Alan Timperley may have written it, but some of the expression leads to the conclusion that the author was Jim Taylor.

⁵ *ARCHD 1947/48*, p. 1.

⁶ During the war Japanese bombers attacked the highlands in May and June of 1943. To counter the threat of Japanese occupation of the highlands, which would have provided Japan with airfields from which to attack Port Moresby, the Allies placed a small force (700) between Kainantu and Hagen known as the Bena force for its proximity to Bena Bena patrol post. The Allies press-ganged local clans of Chimbu, Asarozuha, Faniufa and Gama into building roads and airstrips, some real and some fake, to give the impression that a much larger Allied force was occupying the highlands. A small patrol of Japanese soldiers was spotted near Bena on May 10 1943 but the Japanese Army did not launch any large infantry attacks to obtain the highlands. M. Uyassi, *The Eastern Highlands*, Eastern Highlands Provincial Government, Goroka, 1990 pp. 28-29.

⁷ *ARCHD 1947/48 & 1948/49*, (District Officer Jim Taylor), pp. 1-2.

Like other districts of Papua and New Guinea the CHD was defined spatially and geographically by the Australian administration, not on the basis of linguistic groups. However the scant resources and impossibly large area forced the impractical situation of highlands administration to be revised in 1951 and the Territory administration split the vast CHD into three districts: the Eastern (EHD), Western (WHD) and Southern Highlands Districts (SHD), all of which had independent regional administrations based respectively at Goroka, Mt Hagen and Tari. This thesis concentrates on the region that became the EHD, which were the three easternmost SDs of the CHD, namely Kainantu, Bena Bena (Goroka) and Chimbu.⁸

The main task for the Australian administration in the post-war years was to re-establish government influence in the areas of the highlands where people had been contacted previously. Each patrol officer's patrol report provided pieces of information that served to inform the hierarchical structure and knowledge base of the administration. Based on the reports received, the DO could decide to allocate resources to areas of the district that exhibited special conditions, needs or requirements.

⁸ Chimbu sub-district was eventually given its own district administration in July 1966. In Papua New Guinea it is now written as 'Simbu' as the colonial 'Chimbu' carries pejorative connotations. The original spelling is retained here for consistency with the original reports and carries no intent to offend any person from that province.

For example, in areas where patrols had come under attack, more intensive and supplementary patrolling was often necessary for some years; in other areas where the people demonstrated a willingness to adopt European crops the DO could use the monthly and annual reports written to his Director in headquarters to lobby the administration to post an agricultural extension officer to the district.

Knowing the geography of the district enabled administration officers to attempt to increase the status of the government, and the influence of the Territory of New Guinea law, among people who had no written tradition. In a region where languages had developed over millennia, people were multilingual due to the necessity for tribal affiliations, principally for trade, defence and marriage. However there was no *lingua franca* among highlands peoples before the introduction of pidgin. The use of pidgin enabled administration officers to conduct governmental and legal affairs. In the eastern highlands, interpreters were thus required to render government business from pidgin into local languages such as Gahuku, Bena Bena, Kamano/Kafe, Fore, Frigano, Lunumbe, and Agarabi. Few languages had more than 50,000 speakers and due to staff rotation policies, DDSNA officers seldom had the opportunity to learn indigenous languages to the level of complexity required to translate complex notions. A sound knowledge of pidgin was however essential for POs in dealing with their carriers and servants, some of who were not highlanders and could not communicate except in pidgin and their own language groups.

Interpreters were therefore required in each village to convey the wishes of the government to the people, and those of the people to the government. Over time pidgin became the language of administration, business and everyday communication between

Europeans and New Guineans, and between mutually unintelligible New Guinean language groups. Another gradual feature of the new political rule was the reintroduction of the old German New Guinea luluai system, which was common in controlled areas by the time the EHD was gazetted in 1951.

As part of the push toward knowing the population and territory in every square mile under district jurisdiction, the whole area of the district was routinely estimated as being either 'controlled', 'under administration influence', 'penetrated by patrols' or 'uncontrolled'. These estimates were based on the patrol work conducted through villages and non-sedentary (i.e. nomadic and semi-nomadic) populations, and on the observations of the patrol officers of how well the people were obeying the prescriptions of the law, specifically with respect to village sanitation, the outlawing of cannibalism and bans on sorcery. The 1947/48 report estimated that the population of the three eastern SDs was 250,000 although the actual number of people counted in the census was far less: 8,600 of an estimated 60,000 for Bena; 16,911 of an estimated 50,000 for Kainantu; and 71,636 of an estimated 140,000 for Chimbu.⁹ The first estimate of the extent of government control (Table 8.1) is provided in the 1948/49 year.

⁹ *ARCHD 1947/48*, p. 10.

Table 8.1: 1948/49 Administration estimates of degree of government control (in m²)

Sub-District (estimated area)	Fully Controlled	Under Government Influence	Under Partial influence	Uncontrolled
Bena (2,930)	250	1,000	700	980
Kainantu (2,560)	700	1,160	200	500
Chimbu (2,240)	300	1,100	240	600
Total (7,730m ²)	1,250	3,260	1,140	2,080
(as percent of combined SD area)	16	42	15	27

Source: *ARCHD 1948/49*, p 15.

The table shows that only 16 percent of the land area of what was to become the EHD was under full administration control, but over 70 percent was under some sort of influence. More thorough patrolling corrected gross underestimations of population (although overestimations of area continued) and by the 1948/49 year the estimated population of Chimbu had climbed to 250,000 people, of whom over 110,000 had been counted in the census. The administration's overall objective was to shift areas classified as 'uncontrolled' or 'under partial influence' into areas of stronger government influence and, eventually, toward full control. Re-classification of uncontrolled areas as controlled space was determined by the ability of peoples to conform with the legal obligations of the *Pax Australiana*.

While the presence of war-time Allied forces had shown highlands peoples the material products of western civilisation, the resumption of civil administration meant a return to the underfunded regime that had existed in the pre-war era. The work of contact and pacification resumed with Taylor's CHD officers conducting fifteen major patrols for a total of 284 days in 1947/48 across the five highlands SDs controlled from Bena Bena. The importance of containing possible disturbances to peace is indicated by a patrol by a/ADO R. I. Skinner in Kainantu SD to recover a rifle that had come into the possession of a local man during the war.¹⁰ General problems of 'native unrest' kept the patrols busy with a/ADO J. J. Searson patrolling in the southwest of Bena Bena SD and government influence extending to Kono in Chimbu SD where "A patrol in that locality was at one stage gravely imperilled but order was restored and the patrol returned safely".¹¹ These early patrols mainly went to the areas where the people were already under some administration influence, or just past the fringe of those areas where other groups and clans had no doubt heard about the *gavman*.

The authority of the government was at times questioned by groups of highlanders. In 1947/48 the Damogu people to the north of the Wahgi river (Hagen SD) were tricked by some southern neighbouring Gai people into believing that in return for pigs and women they would be shown how to drive the government out through the intervention of ancestors who would extract goods from the rivers.¹² This scheme was described by

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.

¹² The goods referred to are not specified but most likely parallel the ubiquitous 'cargo' of the coastal peoples. Basically "cargo cults" attempt to explain the material wealth of western civilisation in terms of great storehouses of goods that are available to all if the right procedures for obtaining them are followed. See for example P. Lawrence, *Road Belong Cargo - a study of the cargo movements in the southern Madang district New Guinea*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1964.

DO Taylor as 'Vailala Madness'¹³ – a local cargo cult which appears to have arisen due to anti-government propaganda and the lack of stable and consistent government influence. PO Searson noted in his report

Requests [to the administration] for assistance to obtain the return of the pigs and other presents given to the people of the south were many. Unfortunately the writer could do no more than point out that nothing could be done by him, and that the loss would have to be regarded as just retribution for being gullible enough to have been deceived by people who have not had the benefit of a wise and paternal government to educate and guide them.¹⁴

The government would act against murder and theft, but not, it would appear, against exploiters of gullibility. The administration was not in the business of correcting past wrongs but of educating people to realise that such pre-modern spiritualist notions were not compatible with the modern world.

Knowledge of local peoples and conditions was a critical element in establishing the unchallenged presence of the administration. Patrol officers reported on the kinship structures, legends, customs and practices of each group they encountered and selections were incorporated into Annual Reports. As such, a body of knowledge was created that informed later administration decision making. Much of the early patrol work was consolidatory, that is revisiting established populations, and in 1949/50 the densely populated valleys of Chimbu SD were extensively patrolled, however only two

¹³ The term 'Vailala madness' dates back to 1919 and comes from the area of the Vailala River in Papua, west of Kerema in Gulf province. D. A. Lea and P. G. Irwin, *New Guinea: The Territory and its People*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1967, p 96, claim that a villager was inspired by one of his ancestors to induce others to build a wharf and storehouses, destroy gardens and pigs and adopt European behaviour while awaiting the arrival of the ship bringing the cargo.

¹⁴ *ARCHD 1947/48*, p. 3.

patrol reports were received by district HQ. DO George Greathead noted that this absence was “disappointing, detrimental to the Officers conducting patrols and results in the loss of valuable data for the efficient administration of areas patrolled.”¹⁵ Such attitudes show that the bureaucratic mentality was functioning and that the efforts of individuals were seen as reflections on the efforts of the administration as a whole.

Yet for the district to be ‘controlled’ fully, exploratory work was also necessary. A patrol to the area south of Henganofi (Bena SD) in the same year revealed that actual contact did not have to occur for people to know of the new conditions and presence of the administration. PO Leabeater’s writings were reproduced in the 1949/50 annual report:

Despite the fact that most of the area had not previously been visited by a European Officer the natives had gleaned some idea of the fundamentals of administrative activity from a few who had visited Kainantu. From information gathered it would appear that fighting had been dying out for some months and no altercation had taken place anywhere in the area since the advent of the opening of the Patrol Post at Henganofi. Some of the headmen from this locality had been to pay a visit to the post and had expressed willingness to co-operate with instructions issued, stating that now they realised what was required of them they would do their best to prevent further trouble.¹⁶

The entry of the administration and the attempts to introduce the *Pax Australiana* in the eastern highlands upset the delicate and shifting political balances reached through intermarriage, exchange ceremonies, fighting and sing-sings. PO Leabeater was given an enthusiastic reception in this newly patrolled area and buildings were erected for his

¹⁵ *ARCHD 1949/50*, p. 6.

party. He felt this was because all people wanted contact with a white man and wrote that “The explanation for this attitude was that the natives closer to the main road used their knowledge of the white man to stand over them during dealings between the two.”¹⁷ The Noumaga and Tarabo groups in this area wished for a New Guinea Police Force (NGPF) member to educate them: the PO found their attitude commendable and obedience to instructions unusual. The New Guinean officer posted at Henganofi had informed these people that cannibalism was not approved by the administration and Leabeater was confident that the practice had ceased. His opinion was based on the fact that clans were talking and not fighting which gave no opportunity to obtain victims. DO Greathead felt the general situation with regard to administration was good as there was no instance of a patrol meeting with opposition and there were “only minor native disturbances.”¹⁸

Throughout the 1948/49 year a greater emphasis was placed on patrolling the five CHD districts administered from Goroka. A total of 29 long patrols and over 624 patrol days more than doubled the tally of the previous year, and there were numerous short two-day patrols for which no reports were completed. This was achieved by a still understaffed administration.¹⁹ Of these 29 patrols, five were in Bena Bena SD over 70 days where “Apart from one or two minor disturbances, the general native situation was good throughout the year”. In Kainantu SD there were seven patrols over 93 days, of which two were to consolidate government influence in the south-east Barabuna-Suwaria sector which in the past had been subjected to irregular patrols and where as a

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁹ *ARCHD 1948/49*, pp. 1-2.

result inter-tribal unrest had developed. In Chimbu SD there were six patrols over 119 days, one of which was attacked on 30 August 1948. ADO J. E. Wakeford was able to effect arrests and ward off the attackers without firing. The concentrated population in Chimbu SD was noted to require more field staff for active consolidation. ADOs patrolled in their own subdistricts so as to become familiar with the people and the area. The estimated population in Chimbu SD in that year rose from 140,000 to 200,000, and later in the same report it appears as 250,000, proving that estimates of populations were indeed nothing more than wild guesses.²⁰

By the end of 1951 the system of patrol posts from east to west provided small circles of influence from which the rule of law emanated. There was no 'march across the highlands' with a westward moving frontier. The patrol posts themselves were frontiers, supplied by aeroplane, and the piecemeal influence of the administration in the surrounding areas was enhanced gradually. Kainantu had been established in 1932, Goroka in 1935, Chimbu (Kundiawa) and Hagen in 1937. After the war, Henganofi (half way between Kainantu and Goroka) was established in 1946 but was only staffed permanently from 1949. In Chimbu SD the large population created a need for a number of Patrol posts that was not met until the early 1950s. In the early years administration officers constructed buildings from what they could gather in terms of local bush materials such as timber, kunai grass and pitpit although the administration presence was made more permanent through the construction of some weatherboard houses and kit homes in main centres such as Goroka.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-3 and pp. 14-15.

One difficulty for Taylor, Greathead and their officers was their ability to differentiate themselves from other Europeans in the highlands. In 1947/48 the number of administration personnel was 51: there were 31 adult males, 11 adult females, and nine children in the five administrative districts of the highlands. Of these it is likely that the 31 men were the only active officers. There were more male missionaries (40) than administration officers, and they were more dispersed. In the three eastern-most SDs the Roman Catholics had 12 missionaries in Chimbu SD (Mirani, near Kundiawa; Kurugu, near Mingende; and at Goglme); the Lutherans three each in Bena (Asaroka) and Kainantu (Kamebidam and Onerunka/Kaipinka) and five in Chimbu (at Ega and Kerowagi); and the Seventh Day Adventists three each in Bena (Sigoya) and Chimbu, and two in Kainantu.²¹ In Chimbu alone there were twenty male and five female missionaries. With the entry of two new missions, the Mission of the East-West Bible Society and the Baptists, into the CHD in 1948/49, there was increased mission activity, and competition for souls, in all SDs.²²

²¹ There were also 17 women missionaries in the entire CHD but it would appear that the administration did not regard the work of female missionaries as important enough to count. *ARCHD 1947/48*, p. 7.

²² *ARCHD 1948/49*, p. 8. There were also 22 other adult Europeans (19 male and 3 female and 2 children) who were not administration and not missionaries. Mostly this group were miners in Kainantu SD where twelve European miners worked the rivers. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

For the Australian administration distinguishing its actions from those of other European religious or commercial influences was critical to the future success of operations. However convincing eastern highlanders that the administration, missionaries and miners were not one and the same was more difficult. In the early 1950s this issue was further complicated by European settlers interested in farming coffee, many of who had been officers in the administration. Staffing and the lack of administration numbers remained a problem.²³ Taylor noted that all administration buildings were on land that was recognised by the people as administration land,²⁴ although it is dubious whether the concept of sale of land to the government was entirely understood by the vendors, nor whether the highlanders saw missions and their land as separate from government.

8.3 *Pax Australiana: the provision of services in peace*

Eastern highlanders received certain services from the colonial state. In exchange they surrendered their political liberty and accepted the rule of the Australian administration. The DO was not in charge of officers from other departments but this does not appear to have been a specific problem during the initial years of district building in 1947-1951 as there were few non-DDSNA officers posted to the eastern highlands. The allocation of health, education and agricultural services depended largely on the work of DDSNA

²³ The priorities of Australian rule appear to be indicated by the staffing levels: the purpose was to control and to cure while education was left to the missionaries. The imbalance of administration personnel to missions of the late 1940s did not improve greatly in the 1950s. By 1953/54 the entire DDSNA staff of the EHD was sixteen officers, five of whom required supervision: the ratio of experienced officers to the population was 1:26,000 (using a population estimate of 285,000). The Department of Public Health was the next best equipped Department with a ratio of 1:32,000 (around 9 officers). Education and Agriculture had only one officer each. *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 4.

²⁴ *ARCHD 1947/48*, p. 5.

officers who worked in tandem with public health officers on patrols to inoculate and vaccinate large numbers of people.

8.3.1 *Health*

The CHD administration was understaffed and underfunded but nonetheless was able to make some quite startling changes to the lives of highlanders through the provision of simple health services and medicines.²⁵ In 1947/48 the hospital at Goroka that had existed before the war had been rebuilt after being hit by a ‘tornado’²⁶ and in the following year the report noted that there were European Medical Assistants at Goroka, Kainantu, Kundiawa and Kup (Chimbu SD). In March of 1949 the first dozen students graduated from the Medical and Hygiene Training School that had been established at Goroka, and by 30 June there were thirty students enrolled.²⁷

In terms of facilities, the health system consisted of a European only hospital in Goroka, several native hospitals and a number of aid posts staffed by trained New Guinean orderlies, known as ‘doctor boys’. These men were posted to isolated communities and were able to treat minor abrasions and ailments. They demonstrated that western medicines were often superior to sorcery in eliminating illness.

²⁵ For a full discussion of health in Papua New Guinea see D. Denoon, K. Dugan and L. Marshall, *Public Health in Papua New Guinea. Medical possibility and social constraint 1884-1984*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

²⁶ It is more likely that it was a severe tropical storm (a cyclone) rather than a tornado as such circular wind patterns generally require large low-lying flat areas to form. The altitude and geography of the highlands make a tornado unlikely.

²⁷ *ARCHD 1948/49*, p. 4.

By 1949 native hospitals were maintained at Goroka, Kainantu, Kundiawa and Kup/Kerowagi, each of which was staffed by European medical assistants. These efforts were to counter outbreaks of introduced diseases such as dysentery, chicken pox and pneumonic influenza.²⁸ During 1949/50 there was a massive immunisation campaign against tuberculosis, with over 100,000 people being vaccinated by Dr Jamieson of Public Health.²⁹ The following year (1950/51) the report notes that Dr G. Randmae vaccinated over 200,000 people against tuberculosis.³⁰ In the same year whooping cough (pertussis) broke out in Kainantu and spread through to Goroka, affecting around 25,000 people. The disease was contained and the number of deaths was reported as being “not great”, but was not quantified.³¹ Other European diseases affected the highlands populations and an outbreak of measles in Kainantu SD in February 1950 was contained around the Henganofi Patrol Post with around 600 people treated.³² The large numbers of people vaccinated against TB indicates that a significant portion of the population was receiving western medicine.³³

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *ARCHD 1949/50*, p. 11.

³⁰ *ARCHD 1950/51*, p. 15. The report does not mention exactly where in the CHD these vaccinations occurred but it is likely that all five CHD SDs were involved.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³² *ARCHD 1949/50*, p. 12.

³³ The counted population of the five highlands SDs administered from Bena was 252,658 with a further 230,000 estimated. The vaccination of over 200,000 people was presumably the ones who had some experience of the administration and medicine as uncontacted people would hardly be prepared to permit themselves to be vaccinated. This means that health services perhaps reached around 87 percent of the known population. Even if the vaccinations occurred among the estimated total population the figure would still be around 40 percent, a significant achievement. Population figures from *ARCHD 1949/50* p. 26. TB vaccinations were for the Highlands Labour Scheme (HLS) that began in January 1950. No labourer left without being vaccinated. The number of HLS labourers are however just a fraction of the total number vaccinated. The close living conditions would have permitted the disease to take hold in local populations to devastating effect, so vaccination was perhaps a preventative measure.

8.3.2 Education

Before the war the entire Australian Administration in New Guinea had run a total of six schools with 491 pupils: the religious missions had 2,566 schools with 65,578 pupils. Government schools cost money to maintain — the six pre-war schools had cost £8,274 — while the Mission schools were no burden on the government.³⁴ In a vast district such as the CHD where the rule of law was yet new, the provision of education was therefore a low priority for the administration. The adults were regarded as a lost cause, but some effort was directed toward the children. Miss Pryor of the Department of Education provided such government education services as existed in 1947/48; she taught at the school run by the Society of the Divine Word at Mingende (Chimbu SD).

Education services were mainly left to the missions but this policy was not favoured in the eastern highlands. Annual reports were frequently critical of the missions for aiming to produce religious teachers rather than promoting education for its own sake.³⁵ They claimed the missions aimed to produce New Guinean evangelists, to the detriment of instruction in English or even pidgin. But while no funds were provided to finance better district education services the aims and activities of the missions in education continued to annoy colonial ‘middle managers’ in the highlands into the 1950s.³⁶ By the end of 1951 the administration had opened one native school at Kundiawa (Chimbu SD)

³⁴ Dr J. S. Burton, ‘Talk to students of ASOPA’, 3 December 1946, in *Monthly Notes*, December 1946, p 12 and 16. In the same edition an American journalist, Mr Harold Smith of the *Chicago Tribune*, was quoted as saying that “The educational situation in New Guinea is even worse than in the Netherlands East Indies; the Australian Government had abandoned the educational field entirely, and is leaving the problem to missionaries” *Ibid.*, p 15.

³⁵ *ARCHD 1947/48*, pp. 4-5; *ARCHD 1948/49*, p. 5.

³⁶ A honourable mention was made of Reverend Freyberg of Ega Lutheran Mission in Chimbu who was reported to be teaching natural sciences, psychology, geography and arithmetic, but he appears to have been the exception rather than the rule.

while the various missions maintained schools at Kabiufa, and Bena Bena (Goroka SD), Kainantu and Omaura (Kainantu SD), Mingende, Moruma, Iani and Kumal (Chimbu SD). The lack of suitably trained Education staff severely hampered the administration's efforts to educate eastern highlanders.

Some effort was directed toward technical and handicraft skills. At the Hallstrom trust, a privately run experimental sheep and livestock station in Nondugl (in the Wahgi Valley just outside of Chimbu SD), Miss Archer of the Arts and Crafts section of the Department of Education spent two weeks giving classes on spinning and weaving, presumably to New Guinean women who traditionally made the bilum bags used to carry goods, pigs and children.³⁷ These classes appear to have been an exceptional occurrence.

8.3.3 *Agriculture*

The Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries maintained a station at Aiyura in Kainantu SD. Coffee seedlings were grown here, then distributed *en masse* to the highlands peoples in an effort to interest them in a cash crop. At the same time a reforestation program commenced in the valleys of the Bena and Kainantu SDs which had been cleared perhaps thousands of years ago.³⁸ This was done to encourage settlement in the flat lands of the valleys, abandoned due to their indefensible positions during the era of tribal fighting.

³⁷ *ARCHD 1947/48*, p. 4. Early indications at the Hallstrom trust were for a good lambing season, hence the wool used for weaving. A bilum is a woven bag that stretches to accommodate most loads.

Native foods were apparently plentiful in all SDs (except Bena between October 1949 and January 1950) and large quantities were sold to the administration, to missions and to private enterprise. The main native vegetable was sweet potato (*kau kau*) although European vegetables such as cabbages, beans, lettuces and carrots were also grown. Between January and June 1950 the administration purchased over 550,000 lbs of native foods just from Goroka in the Bena Bena SD.³⁹ In 1948/49 the ADO Kainantu, Alan Timperley, purchased 7,000 lbs of English potatoes monthly in the Kainantu area at 1.5d per pound and arranged for them to be marketed in Lae and Madang.⁴⁰ The quantity of vegetables was obviously in excess of the requirements of the administration personnel of the eastern highlands. Aircraft were used to carry the goods to other centres of production and areas of the highlands became centres of food production for the administration. After Kainantu, Bena Bena SD adjusted most rapidly to the new economy and in both areas there was an increasing demand for cash payment for crops, an indication that the destruction of the traditional economy was almost complete further east. Outside these two SDs salt, beads, steel and shell remained key items of barter trade.⁴¹

³⁸ P. Brown, *The Chimbu: a study in change in the New Guinea Highlands*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, p. 15, notes that pollen analysis suggests the upper Wahgi was cleared between 5-6,000 years ago.

³⁹ *ARCHD 1948/49*, p. 8.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Other highlands centres such as Wabag were not so fortunate in the land they occupied and sweet potato was reported to take 9 months to mature. The people around the Wabag station still produced about one ton per week that was purchased by the patrol post. In Hagen the supply of food dried up until the administration discovered that the people desired tambu shell in exchange for their vegetables. when the shell arrived, so did the vegetables. *Ibid.*

The administration's purchase of foodstuffs was both a necessity and generated job creation: the highlands were earmarked to be New Guinea's garden. Greathead wrote that

It is keenly desired that this District should play an increasing part in the alleviation of fresh vegetable shortages in costal towns, particularly Port Moresby, Lae, Madang and Wewak. However it is not considered that any great progress in this objective can be achieved until an Agricultural Extension Officer is posted to the District.⁴²

The main effort of administration officers was however the introduction and promotion of cash crops that could provide people with consistent income and link them to the world economy, a subject covered in greater detail below and in chapter nine.

8.3.4 *Communications and infrastructure*

Most communication in the eastern highlands was by aeroplane or radio.⁴³ The 1948/49 report gives a good indication of transport logistics with a list of aerodromes (airstrips and surrounding areas) in the subdistricts. In Bena Bena SD, Goroka had two, and there was one at the old Bena Bena patrol post and one at Asaroka in the lower Asaro valley, NW of Goroka, where there was a mission. In Kainantu SD there were aerodromes at Kainantu, at the government experimental agricultural station at Aiyura (just SE of Kainantu) and at Arona, on the extreme edge of the eastern highlands. In Chimbu SD there were airstrips at Chimbu post (Kundiawa) and at Kerowagi. European

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴³ There were radio communications between subdistricts, District HQ and Madang on twin daily schedules but deterioration of equipment meant occasional interruption. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

administrative communications relied on radio contact and the logistical support of regular air services from Lae and Madang that stopped regularly at highlands centres.

The cost of air services, and the desirability of linking stations with each other and with outlying districts, drove the construction of roads. In 1949 the CHD was connected by 350 miles of rough roads. Most of this had been constructed by Downs and Greathead in the pre-war years but had deteriorated. These roads were around the patrol posts and toward main population centres. Highlands people also maintained around 2,000 miles of bridle (walking) tracks that connected the various clans and communities.⁴⁴ The administration's resources were scarce with three jeeps, one in each subdistrict, and one tractor at Goroka. Owing to the remoteness of all highlands patrol stations, all supplies not able to be obtained locally were flown in to the main centres. In 1948/49 Bena averaged 26.5 aircraft arrivals per month, Kainantu 23 and Chimbu 8.4. There was a post office facility at the District Office in Goroka.⁴⁵ Bank facilities were provided for the people at patrol posts and deposits increased as cash circulated and saving caught on.⁴⁶

Despite unusually heavy rain and some bridges being destroyed, the roads were in fairly good condition. Greathead noted the road between Goroka and Chimbu had only some fifteen miles to go to completion.⁴⁷ While the administration was trying to get a road

⁴⁴ While some road building was done before 1952, the main development of the trunk road occurred with the posting of Ian Downs as DC of the EHD in September 1952.

⁴⁵ *ARCHD 1948/49*, pp. 5-7.

⁴⁶ *ARCHD 1950/51*, p. 14.

⁴⁷ *ARCHD 1948/49*, p. 5.

link to connect all of their points of influence, and thus increase its own ability to respond to disturbances, the lack of funds and difficult geographic conditions, such as high mountain passes and sometime heavy rains, made the establishment and maintenance of roads difficult.⁴⁸ Road transport was mainly intended for administration vehicles but the road was promoted as a way by which food supplies could be conveyed to the administration. As more groups used the roads the concept of the road as government space, and therefore neutral space, began to take hold. The construction of roads eventually permitted greater state surveillance by colonial ‘middle managers’.

8.4 *Pax Australiana: state surveillance*

Most highlands peoples welcomed the provision of educational, health, agricultural and other services. The trade off was a higher degree of colonial state control and surveillance over their everyday lives. The reach of the colonial state increased with consistent patrolling the gradual expansion of the road network. With it came an increase in the administration of the law, in particular offences against the Queensland criminal code, the Police Offences Ordinance and the Native Administration Regulations (NAR) that applied in all the Territory of New Guinea. This suite of laws did not exclude indigenous institutions or customs except when they were inconsistent with an ordinance or “repugnant to humanity”.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ The establishment of the highlands highway is covered in the chapter nine.

⁴⁹ D. Jones, ‘Native Customs and New Guinea Law’, *Monthly Notes*, May 1947, pp. 1-3. The Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance of 9th May 1921 allowed for the creation of law in the Territory of New Guinea. The laws of New Guinea were an ensemble of British Common Law, Commonwealth of Australia Acts, Legislative Acts of the Territory while under military administration, Queensland Acts, Papuan Ordinances and British Parliamentary Acts.

The reach of the administration depended upon local compliance and the ability of influential highlands men to enforce the intentions and designs of the government. The system of justice in New Guinea had three tiers: the Supreme Court, the District Court and the court of Native Affairs. In the eastern highlands the District Court dealt with Europeans (one was convicted of assault in 1947/48) and with highlanders tried for serious crimes such as wilful murder, murder, rape and stealing. The court of Native Affairs was a “kiap” court where POs upheld the NAR. Offences against the NAR for which people were charged and convicted in 1947/48 included escaping from custody (4); assault (59); behaving in an indecent (15), threatening (47) or offensive (5) manner, using abusive language (1); riotous behaviour (396); adulterous behaviour (27); inducing a female to have intercourse with a man not her husband (2); stealing (26); receiving stolen goods (2); practising sorcery (2); possession of sorcery implements (1); gambling (5); and failure to comply with an order of a luluai to carry out provisions of the Roads Maintenance Ordinance (6).⁵⁰ Decisions in the Court of Native Affairs were reached by the kiap and court was commonly held wherever the patrol came in contact with the people. The conviction rate was usually 100 percent in all cases, save for 48 of the 444 people charged with riotous behaviour.⁵¹

While ‘native custom’ was recognised by the administration with the exception of homicide and cannibalism, the concerns of the new system are obvious from the court records. Murder and rape trials were held in a District Court convened in Goroka with the District Officer presiding as judge.

⁵⁰ These figures are for the entire CHD.

⁵¹ *ARCHD 1947/48*, pp. 11-13.

The colonial state captured and paraded the transgressor, then passed judgement on his actions. In serious cases a prisoner was removed from his community and sent on a plane to Port Moresby, into an even more unfamiliar environment where he could not be understood and would be incarcerated with other indigenous murderers. The separation of people from their communities was likely intended to scare those who remained but it was thought inappropriate for the death sentence to actually be carried out, and some of those sent to prison were later returned and used to spread government influence amongst their own people.

The 1948/49 year shows a tendency to move serious transgressors away from the CHD and to the centre of colonial power, the Supreme Court in Port Moresby. Of the 34 wilful murder cases considered by the District Court in 1948/49, only two were dismissed and 32 were remanded for trial by the higher court. This was the same for murder (13 remanded) and rape (2). Some people were charged with offences that had not been recorded in the previous year, such as grievous bodily harm (2) and unlawful killing (14), and all of these were likewise remanded to the Supreme Court.⁵² The tendency then was for the District Court to refer the more complex legal decisions to the Supreme Court, and this appears to have been part of an overall move to impart the seriousness of crimes upon the perpetrators through their physical removal from the highlands. The Court for Native Affairs continued to have an impressive trial-to-conviction ratio with only 8 of 694 (1.15 percent) of people charged being acquitted, lower than the 48 from 647 (7.4 percent) of the previous year. The types of charges were almost identical with the addition of “escaping from custody” which indicates the

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 12. There is no breakdown by subdistrict for court figures before 1949-1950.

priorities of the administrative and legal regime: eliminate murder, beliefs that retard 'progress' and any threats to administrative authority.

Homicide was the main serious crime as disputes involving honour were confined to males and settled by combat. The 1948/49 report noted "tribal warfare is a mechanism that is applied between groups where a remedy cannot be otherwise obtained in a manner comparable to that which is employed by the natives of the world". Despite the tribal fighting the crime rate "cannot be considered high" in the areas that were under strong government influence.⁵³ Assault and any behaviour that led to a possible breach of the peace were of slightly lesser concern to the administration, but still needed to be dealt with as such behaviour went against the *Pax Australiana*, the edicts of the government and threatened the administration's authority and system of rule. Punishment could be in the form of loss of valuables (pigs or fines in shells) or in compulsory labour. The growing realisation that sorcery was ineffective against the white invaders, coupled with the influence of Christian missionaries, meant a gradual decline in traditional magical practices. The administration hunted down occurrences and charged the practitioners and owners of sorcery implements in order to discredit both the practitioners and their beliefs. The other element that was rooted out in the highlands was cannibalism which remained a problem only in remote and restricted parts of the eastern highlands (around Marawaka) until the area was fully pacified in the late 1960s.⁵⁴

⁵³ ARCHD 1948/49, p 3.

⁵⁴ See Map 8 of the Degree of Administration control for 30 June 1963 which shows the remaining restricted areas.

The 1949-1950 report provides statistics for the five sub-districts administered from Goroka. For the first time it is possible to measure the growing influence of the administration in specific regions.⁵⁵ The District court tried the relatively simple cases of stealing (2 in Bena Bena, 1 in Chimbu) and one in Kainantu for wilful and maliciously damaging property. Committals from the District Court to the Supreme Court for wilful murder in this year were relatively few with Kainantu Bena Bena and Chimbu each registering two cases, while the western 'frontier' of Wabag registered fifteen. In Kainantu SD other cases that merited the attention of the Supreme Court were indecent treatment of girls under the age of twelve years (2), grievous bodily harm (GBH) (2), wounding and similar acts (1) and rape (1). In Bena Bena there were four cases of acts intended to cause GBH, one of GBH, one unlawful killing, three acts occasioning bodily harm, one rape and one wounding and similar acts. Apart from its two murders Chimbu recorded two acts intended to cause GBH. The Court for Native Affairs was again kept busy with breaches of the Native Regulations, particularly riotous behaviour: in Bena Bena 237 people were found guilty of this offence, in Chimbu 148, but in Kainantu only five. Adultery (Kainantu 51, Bena Bena 29 and Chimbu 17) and assault (Kainantu 26, Bena Bena 30 and Chimbu 115) were the next most common offences dealt with by the administration in the eastern highlands. The only other offences to reach double figures in the three eastern sub districts were Assisting to escape from custody (22 in Chimbu) and failure to assist the DO to comply with a road maintenance order (40 in Bena Bena).

In the 1950/51 year the District Court continued to send its more serious cases to the Supreme Court although the numbers were well down on previous years. The most

⁵⁵ All figures in this paragraph are taken from the *ARCHD 1949/50*, pp 23-24.

common offence was murder with seven cases in Chimbu, followed by five of rape in Goroka the new name for the old subdistrict of Bena Bena. The District Court handled a few offences itself: stealing, assault, escaping from jail, dangerous driving and goods unlawfully obtained.⁵⁶ The Court for Native Affairs again saw the offence of riotous behaviour as the most common with 337 charged and convicted in Goroka, 361 in Hagen and 30 in Kainantu. Failure to assist in road building had 61 convictions in Goroka and is further evidence of the attempt to connect the various patrol posts by road in that subdistrict. Assault (Kainantu 14, Goroka 34, Chimbu 60) and adultery (Kainantu 51, Goroka 48 and Chimbu 36) were again the next most common crimes. The relatively low number of serious crimes in Kainantu in comparison with Goroka (roughly comparable SDs in population) are most likely due to the longer exposure to Europeans and European law.

The form of social contract in the administrative colonial state that provided the basis for indirect colonial rule in the highlands was an exchange of political freedom and autonomy for educational, health, agricultural services and submission to the legal scriptures of European law. It was not however a voluntary association of peoples for mutual protection, but a process directed and enforced from above. The importance of expanding the road network is seen in the number of people charged with failing to assist an officer in road building or road maintenance. Roads were an essential part of the administration's plan for increased economic development.

8.5 *The use of land to generate economic development*

⁵⁶ The dangerous driving charge would have to have been a European owing to the dearth of motor vehicles in the region and the high price of obtaining them. Another European was charged and convicted

The economic development of Papua New Guinea was one objective of Australian policy, the aim being that the Territory contribute a greater proportion over time to the cost of its own administration. Funds were however advanced by the Australian government, and under Hasluck expenditure increased as policy became more defined. In the 1947/48 year the estimates for Papua New Guinea was £2,779,000 which was over a million pounds more than the previous year. By 1952-53 the Commonwealth government provided just under £5,000,000 to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, and over £7,000,000 by 1954-55.⁵⁷

In comparison with the British empire the Australian administration would appear somewhat generous. The British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 committed £50,000,000 for expenditure on development and welfare over 10 years throughout its entire colonial empire, along with £500,000 a year for research programmes and relief in loans to colonies for infrastructural development.⁵⁸ This figure was increased in 1945 to £120,000,000 made available over 10 years, with no more than £17,500,000 in any one year, and the research programme budget increased to £1,000,000 annually.⁵⁹ The objective of British colonial policy was to reverse the *laissez faire* economic doctrine that had resulted in unequal growth between sectors of

of an offence but the annual report does not specify the nature of the offence.

⁵⁷ *South Pacific*, Vol 2, No. 3 p .1, and *Territory of New Guinea Report for 1955-56*. The Department of External Territories accounted for just £67,000 of the 1947/48 Papua New Guinea budget. *Monthly Notes* was renamed *South Pacific* in September 1947.

⁵⁸ J. McCauley, 'Colonial Development and Welfare I', *Monthly Notes*, December 1946, pp. 1-3

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* France attempted a similar transition from liberal-capitalist colonial policy to state funded assistance through a ten year plan in the law of April 30th and Presidential Decree of 24th October, 1946, which created an Investment Fund for Social and Economic Development (FIDES) to finance the plan. This was to consist of an annual endowment from the metropolitan country and contributions voted by the assemblies of each of the territories. Non-profit loans would then be extended to develop territories under the direction of the Ministry for Overseas France. See N. Robinson, 'Colonial Development and Welfare IV: French Plan', *Monthly Notes*, March 1947, pp. 6-7.

the economy (e.g. minerals) and which had failed to improve the general welfare and progress of indigenous peoples. International public opinion and the scrutiny of the UN dictated that the humanitarian mission, exemplified as an improvement in material standards of living, was seen as necessary in the government of colonial territories. The shift in policy was designed to provide funds for balanced development in the colonies and to create purchasing power among colonial populations.

The situation in New Guinea was not so clear. In September 1949, J. H. Jones the acting Secretary of Planning and Development in the Territory wrote to all DOs requesting that they instruct members of their field staff to keep an eye out for any sparsely populated land that would be suitable for agricultural purposes, and to note incidental aspects such as accessibility, water supply, approximate area and any other relevant factors.⁶⁰ In the same month the Administrator, Colonel J. K. Murray, told the second Conference of District Officers that all economic development in Papua and New Guinea, let alone balanced development, had been “rather overlooked”. Some products such as copra were purchased from growers by the government and then marketed, thus ensuring that the price remained constant. Murray hoped that the same could be done with other cash crops such as rubber, cocoa, coffee, tea, fibres and spices.⁶¹ In May 1950 the Secretary for Territories in Canberra, J. R. Halligan, wrote to Murray asking that he examine the possibilities of growing a number of commodities which were, in order of priority: jute; other fibres; cocoa, tea and coffee; sugar and rice; cotton; pepper;

⁶⁰ PNG National Archives *File DD 26/1 AN 243 Box 188*: Jones to all DOs 19th September 1949.

⁶¹ PNG National Archives *File SN098 DOs Conference 1949*, p. 3.

tobacco; peanuts; kapok; cassava; ginger; cinchona; nutmeg and vanilla; fruits including pineapple, citrus fruits and pawpaw; cocaine; and sago.⁶²

In July 1950 the Director of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries, W. Cottrell Dormer, wrote to J H Jones in Planning and Development predicting the market prospects and possible production levels over the next 5, 10 and 15 years. In his estimates he suggested that coffee production could reach 200 ton in 5 years, could be 400 ton by 1960 and 800 ton by 1965.⁶³ These estimates for the territory as a whole proved to be conservative as the eastern highlands quickly became the centre of coffee production for New Guinea. So strong was the lure of potential wealth that the first three chief officers of the administration, DO Jim Taylor, DO George Greathead and DC Ian Downs, all retired from the service and became coffee planters.

Jim Taylor had long recognised the potential of the highlands and of the people themselves as agriculturalists,⁶⁴ and the natural beauty and temperate climate of the region gave the highlands a reputation among Australians in Papua New Guinea as a salubrious region with great agricultural potential. It was likened to the valleys of Kenya and the officers were well informed as to administrative systems and production in other parts of the colonial world through the small magazine style publication *Monthly Notes* — “Produced by the Australian School of Pacific Administration for the Administrative Staff of Papua-New Guinea”— which was sent to them.

⁶² PNG National Archives *File DD 26/1 AN 243 Box 188*: Halligan to Murray 26th May 1950.

⁶³ PNG National Archives *File DD 26/1 AN 243 Box 188*: Cottrell-Dormer to Jones, 7th July 1950

While Australian policy moved from one of benign neglect toward paternalistic encouragement of economic development, it was not however government policy to encourage white settlement in areas that were already densely populated. Neither was it policy to force indigenous peoples from their land to accommodate the interests of foreign capital. As no Europeans were allowed to own land in the highlands, Europeans with an eye for the future, such as Taylor and other former administration officers, used their knowledge of the local area and their kudos as kiaps and squatted on land that looked promising for future agricultural enterprises. When Taylor retired from the administration in March 1949 he took up some land a few miles outside of Goroka and set about growing coffee.⁶⁵

George Greathead replaced Taylor as DO in June 1949 and made a significant contribution to economic development through his emphasis on road building throughout the CHD and with the promotion of alternative cash crops.⁶⁶ Recognising

⁶⁴ Taylor had taken part in the initial exploration of the highlands and had been much impressed by the horticultural exertions of the highlands in the maintenance and preparation of ceremonial dancing grounds. C. Simpson, *Adam in Plumes*, 2nd edition, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1955, pp. 20-55.

⁶⁵ The New Guinean highlands coffee industry has its origins in early experimental plots grown in the 1930s by Lutheran missionaries at Ogelbeng outside Mt Hagen, by Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) officers agents during the war at Goroka and by the Highland Agricultural Experimentation Station at Aiyura in Kainantu. During the war the Aiyura station had been under the direction of James Luby Leahy, a younger brother of explorer Mick Leahy, who started the first commercial plantation at Erinvale, south of Goroka, in 1948, and exported the first coffee in 1953. His estate Erinvale eventually grew to some 240 acres. Munare Uyassi, *The Eastern Highlands, op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

⁶⁶ Greathead had pre-war highlands experience also having been OIC at Hagen during 1938-39.

that prosperity would not come through the absence of war alone, Greathead arranged for ten small trial coffee plantations to be set up in villages with the intention of sharing knowledge of growing techniques with New Guinean growers.⁶⁷ Owing to the relatively long development time required for the coffee bush to mature and produce a significant number of ripe berries, usually a minimum of 6-7 years,⁶⁸ many of the early European coffee pioneers sought licences to run trade stores which sold steel knives and axes, foodstuffs and clothing, or to plant short-term cash crops such as peanuts or passionfruit in order to provide cash income. While the land rush of 1952-1954 and expansion in the coffee economy is addressed more fully in chapter nine, the significant thing about coffee as a crop is that it was widely promoted by the administration and distributed to New Guineans who planted it on their lands. Passionfruit was developed through the investment of the Cottees Company that George Greathead had attracted to the highlands. He left the administration in 1952 to become Cottees' manager of operations in the highlands, and also squatted on some land with the intention of growing coffee. As an employee of Cottees, he arranged for the purchase and collection of passionfruit from local growers.

While commerce and industry in the eastern highlands remained limited to trade stores and a sawmill, the potential of coffee was recognised by the administration. In 1948/49 the administration purchased 3,200 lbs of coffee from villagers at 3d-6d per pound of parchment.⁶⁹ With the administration a guaranteed buyer, the incentive for other villagers to plant coffee was strong. However coffee was not something from which

⁶⁷ ARCHD 1948/49, p 8.

⁶⁸ I. Downs, *Australian Trusteeship*, *op. cit.*, pp. 177 and 180.

⁶⁹ ARCHD 1948/49, p. 8.

highlanders could quickly derive benefit and their main cash income remained selling vegetables to supplement the stores of the administration.

Further efforts toward economic diversification in the CHD are shown in the establishment of the E. J. Hallstrom Livestock and Fauna Trust at Nondugl, NW of Kerowagi, situated administratively in Hagen SD. This enterprise was initially 330 acres but arrangements were being made to purchase a further 500 acres⁷⁰ and on this land animals strange to many highlanders were placed — 800 Romany Marsh Kent sheep brought over from Australia, the first wool from which was sold in Sydney in 1951.⁷¹

The administration espoused a doctrine of partnership between European and New Guinean farmers as a means of developing the eastern highlands. In order to find land to settle experienced white settlers so as to provide long term social stability and economic prosperity, the administration pursued a policy of alienation of land disputed by two clans. The conversion of New Guineans from warriors to peaceful cash crop growers required the cooption of local indigenous political elites attracted by new possibilities to expand their wealth and power. The intention of partnership was to make the geographic region economically profitable and to reverse the flow of resources; self-sufficiency was an interim aim with the ultimate goal being export production of fresh vegetables and coffee. Under the regimes of Taylor and Greathead there was no official European settlement and relations between the colonial administrators and the highlanders appear to have been harmonious. Land alienation and settlement became a

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

much more complex issue when the highlands were opened late in 1951 and is covered in greater detail in chapter ten.

8.6 *Use of labour to generate economic development*

While administration stations did trade goods and money for foodstuffs there were few other avenues for New Guinean participation in the cash economy. Twelve New Guinean men from Finschhafen in Morobe worked small alluvial gold plots on the Wanton river in Kainantu SD and their gold was purchased by the administration.⁷² The largest problem for the administration was the lack of industries to keep people occupied so that the *Pax Australiana* would hold. Highlanders regarded gardening as women's work, and the men were mainly engaged in part-time activities such as building houses, fences and pig-proofing gardens. Peace therefore created a relatively large population of surplus male labour. The administration's fear was that boredom would set in and (as Table 8.2 demonstrates) it attempted to soak up some labour for public and private works to prevent highlanders from reverting to warfare.

⁷¹ First Sale of New Guinea Wool in Sydney', *South Pacific*, May 1951, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 45. The entire clip sold for £2,243 or £106/16/- a bale.

⁷² The *ARCHD 1948/49*, p. 3, gives both the location of the mining and the place from where the miners came.

Table 8.2: Labour employment in Bena, Chimbu and Kainantu sub-district 1947/48

	Bena	Chimbu	Kainantu	Totals
<i>Administration</i>				
Police	64	34	37	135
Administration servants	111	41	54	206
Casual labourers	731	179	260	1170
				1511
<i>Private</i>				
Non-indentured	28	109	358	495
Indentured			21	21
				516

While this permanent and casual employment involved over 2,000 people, this was a drop in the ocean for the eastern highlands SDs where an estimated 250,000 people lived.⁷³ Of those employed by the administration about two thirds were casual labourers. In the post-war years private enterprise was being reigned in by a colonial state increasingly concerned with the treatment of highlanders. Evidence for this trend is seen in the gradual removal of indentured servitude and its replacement by government regulated service contracts. Apart from vegetables, another export that had been considered for some time was the physical labour of highlanders themselves and the potential manpower of the highlands made it an attractive target for plantation owners in New Britain and the Madang coast.

⁷³ There were an estimated 60,000 in Bena, 50,000 in Kainantu and 140,000 in Chimbu. *ARCHD 1947/48*, p. 10. Census patrols had counted 8,600 in Bena (1941), 16,911 in Kainantu (1947), and 71,636 in Chimbu (1945).

The Australian Administration's Director of Public Health Dr John Gunther reached the conclusion that the only safe way to permit highlanders to work in coastal areas was by vaccination. As Downs notes "With increasing conviction he believed that the people should be medically protected from malaria and tuberculosis regardless of cost and effort, realising that when this was done they would be able to live and work anywhere."⁷⁴ The highlands were restricted to Europeans however in the 1949/50 year the CHD was finally opened to labour recruitment for outside and coastal areas under government supervision. The coffee grower James Leahy was the first and only person to hold a recruiting licence and was authorised to recruit labour throughout the highlands. Housing for the recruits was created at the main labour highlands depot, the Goroka Native Labour compound, which had 72 'native material' labour quarters constructed in order to meet the need.⁷⁵

The first recruiting was carried out in January 1950 in the Bena Bena SD and in Chimbu SD in March. The first quota of 210 men from the Bena Bena SD went to New Guinea Goldfields for their Wau operations and no highlands labourer left without being immunised against tuberculosis. The importance placed on returning highlands labourers alive demonstrates the commitment to humane treatment. Gunther's attitude that this should be done regardless of cost is further proof that the administration was serious in its commitment to protecting the health of New Guineans.

⁷⁴ I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship, op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁷⁵ These houses were 19 foot in diameter and 7 foot tall at the centre pole and slept 15 comfortably. Thirty-six were for the recruit pool, sixteen for station general labourers and twenty-five for married quarters. Even with thirty-six houses for the recruits this still meant 540 men moving through the compound. *ARCHD 1949/50*, p. 13.

By 30 June 1950, 3,562 recruits had been dispatched from Goroka for commercial employment and 583 for employment by the Administration. Destinations varied from Port Moresby to Momote (Manus)⁷⁶ but many found themselves employed in plantation agriculture, principally copra production, along the Madang coast and in New Britain. At the end of June 1950 an estimated 5,000 men were waiting for transfer.⁷⁷ Between January 1950 and June 1951, 8,420 highlanders went to employment outside of the CHD of which 7,447 went to commercial employers and 973 to the administration. This pattern continued throughout the 1950s as the administration diverted what it regarded as surplus labour from the highlands, usually for two years at a time. Paula Brown notes that in some areas the rate of recruitment was as high as 50-60 percent but the average was closer to 15-20 percent of the young men in most groups, and that by 1960 “most young adult Chimbu men had spent time away at work in highlands areas if not on the coast”.⁷⁸

On the plantations or in the service of the administration, the men were housed, fed and received their wages upon leaving their employment. This was often a combination of cash and trade goods such as knives and axes. On their return from the coast they were wealthier and could contribute to bridal exchanges, thereby acquiring local status; they could also speak pidgin and were thus in a position to be utilised by the administration to translate and convey the wishes of the administration. This brought money to highlanders and increased the monetisation of highlands societies. The highlands labour scheme was thought to enable the maintenance of peace and the enrichment of

⁷⁶ *ARCHD 1949/50*, p. 18-20.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ P. Brown, *The Chimbu, op. cit.*, p. 27.

communities through resource pooling, providing both an economic basis for future investment and a new way to achieve wealth and social status.

8.7 *Overview: the project of modernity to 1951*

In September 1951 the CHD was split into three and the three SDs of the eastern highlands were united into the EHD. This new district was seen as having a large and industrious population with varying degrees of exposure to the new colonial economic and political order. It had the beginnings of a cash economy, and was partially integrated into the wider colonial economy of Papua New Guinea. It was however still administratively centralised with the powers of government residing mostly in the person of the District Commissioner. Devolution of power and responsibility to highlanders were distant aspirations. There was no thought of introducing village councils as the people were not judged to be sufficiently developed. The district's staff were still predominantly comprised of officers from the Department of District Services and Native Affairs, with a few officers from other departments such as Public Health. Education was mainly in the hands of religious missions but the administration sought to distinguish itself from them at every turn.

There was a semblance of western economic and cultural institutions and the administration arranged postal and banking services, which became more popular among highlanders as the shift from barter trade goods to cash strengthened. The development of a cash economy was apparent through the increased use of money,

especially coins.⁷⁹ There was by the end of 1951 a semblance of recognisable administration and a system of introduced law, but the hold of the administration over the people was not yet entrenched, the conversion from stone age warriors and gardeners to modern cash cropping farmers not yet complete. It is through the expansion of the road network and increased promotion of coffee as a cash crop that the eastern highlands began to fulfil some of the potential that its colonial 'middle managers' always believed it had.

8.8 *Conclusions*

In 1951 the EHD was regarded as one of the more prosperous districts in PNG and regularly held up as an example to others on how to introduce an administration. What was achieved in the EHD was however done with limited staff, inadequate funding, and through the personal efforts of administration officers. Development and government were imposed on highlanders. Development was initially a simple matter of creating paths for travel where no paths had existed before, and indigenous people were apparently much taken with the new freedom permitted by the road, and travelled for upward of 100 miles along it. Nowhere was the presence of the administration more obvious than in the fact that people were coming to it.

⁷⁹ The administration initiated the Native Commonwealth Savings Bank Accounts which in the Kainantu district alone held 36 accounts with £540/6/6 deposited. Bena had £358/2/- deposited in 60 accounts and Chimbu had 33 account holders who had deposited £360/8/11. *ARCHD 1948/49*, p. 14.

An interesting feature of the district is the large number of people who visit Government station daily to discuss native matters and receive aid in the adjustment of disputes. It is an indication of the consolidation and expansion of Administration influence.⁸⁰

It was in 'controlled' regions that the highlands peoples co-operated with the colonial state and sought to learn and prosper from it. The colonial state itself relied upon co-operation and persuasion rather than coercion to achieve their aims of imposing government and development on people. It attracted adherents through public announcements that warfare was over and that peace was the way forward. It enforced this ideal, created employment opportunities, improved people's health and distributed new crops. In all this time the administration paid for its own upkeep and the only income it received was through fines, which in any case were mostly confiscated goods rather than money. At no time in the period 1947-1951 was there any regime of taxation imposed on eastern highlanders.

The eastern highlands is an example of an ideal type of administrative colonialism that believed it was acting in the best interests of the indigenes. Through the extension of state services such as road building, health, agricultural advice and, to a much lesser degree, education, the Australian colonial state in the eastern highlands state operated by regulation and co-operation rather than physical coercion. In a difficult environment with no established central authority, the administrative colonial state created a government and made itself a key actor in local politics and society. In doing so it eliminated many aspects of 'traditional' highlands life that it considered incompatible

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

with the modern world. Colonial 'middle managers' in the eastern highlands were introducing 'modernity', including the export of agriculture and human capital.

Through the extension of state services the Australian administration between 1947-1951 was able to induce co-operation rather than being obliged to enforce obedience. It attracted adherents through its decrees of law, order and security, through its promotion of health and cash crops. What is more they were doing so amongst people who had just fifteen years previously rarely travelled outside their tribal boundaries. Chapters nine and ten make some observations on the characteristics of the operations of the administration in the period 1952-1957.

**Chapter 9: *Pax Australiana*, surveillance and the use of labour: Australian
Administration in the Eastern Highlands, 1952-1957**

This chapter examines Australian administrative colonialism in the Eastern Highlands District (EHD) of Papua New Guinea in the period 1952-57. Three objectives, control, increased surveillance, and labour use, are examined in this chapter. At this time the area classified as being under administration control was expanded, the rule of law was introduced into new areas, and the Highlands Labour Scheme was expanded to divert the energies of young men who may have threatened the stability of colonial control. These objectives provided the basis for the delivery of colonial services in education, health and agriculture that are addressed in the next chapter, along with an examination of colonial land policy. This chapter continues to explore the central question of how 'modern' structures of power operated at the district level of colonial administration and utilises annual reports and government records to explore the 'middle management' mentality.

This period of the 1950s in the eastern highlands was the golden age of partnership envisaged by Australian Minister for Territories Paul Hasluck.¹ It was embodied in the

¹ From May 1951 until 1963, Paul Hasluck was the Minister for Territories and was more active in this portfolio than any previous minister had been. Whereas the ALP Minister Eddie Ward had never visited the Territory, Hasluck went four times a year. I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship Papua New Guinea 1945-1975*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1980, p. 86. His policies have been criticised as paternalistic and causing delays to the independence process of Papua New Guinea through the concentration on building an administrative machinery rather than developing politics. He read everything that crossed his desk and paid particular attention to the apparent economic success of the EHD and visited Goroka a number of times. His caution with respect to development irked Ian Downs and this subject is addressed later in this chapter in the analysis of land settlement.

actions of a number of European settlers who shared their knowledge of crops, growing techniques and business sense with New Guineans. However at the same time as providing economic opportunity, the concentration on coffee exposed the region to the economic fluctuations of the international commodity market for the first time. In an era when the Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) services bulletin, *Monthly Notes*, carried regular updates on trends and colonial governance in the British and French empires, partnership was also an example of mass delusion as Australian administrators and settlers went to some lengths to deny that what they were engaged in was in any way colonial.

In the defence of this position the Australian administration aimed not to exploit but to improve the quality of life for people. It was not colonial in the sense of the late nineteenth century understanding of the word. However, in its concentration on enforcing the rule of law within a defined territory, attempting to gain knowledge of the peoples and land of the eastern highlands, and its attempts to induce highlanders to shake off traditional cultural practices and embrace cash cropping and wage labour — to have them become ‘modern’ people — it was an example of administrative colonialism.

9.1 *The structure of district administration*

Before these points are examined it is important to review the changes made to Australian policy and district administration with respect to decentralisation, as they are important in understanding the events that occurred in the eastern highlands. In January

1951 Minister for External Territories, Percy Spender, imposed a new level of command in Papua New Guinea district administration, the District Commissioner (DC), a coordinative position with wide ranging general responsibilities.² The position of the DC aimed to provide balanced and informed decisions affecting the development of the natural resources and skills of the people of a district. However, while having wide responsibilities, a DC was given dual functions and asked to report to two masters. The position was initially located within the Department of the Government Secretary and charged with co-ordination of all administration activities except native administration, for which the DC was responsible to the Director of Department of District Services and Native Affairs (DDSNA). In the EHD the DC had no staff of his own until 1955,³ and then only one assistant. In June 1955 DCs were transferred wholly within the Department of the Administrator and were urged to correspond with the various heads of administrative departments or with the Assistant Administrator.⁴ As regional supremos they were required to attend annual meetings at which issues of welfare, education and development were discussed.⁵

² Prior to this change, overall responsibility within a district had been in the hands of the District Officers — the most senior officers of the Department of District Services and Native Affairs (DDSNA) and the explorers, peacemakers/conquerers and initial administrators throughout contact — with specialist departments such as health, education and public works being responsible to their individual centralised departments.

³ P. J. Degeling, *The “Role” of the District Commissioner in Post-War Papua New Guinea: The Management of Area and the Structuring of Relations in a Colonial Setting*, PhD (Government) University of Sydney, 1985, p. 397, Appendix IV Table 5. After 1955 the DC was transferred to the Department of the Administrator.

⁴ P. Parker, ‘The Growth of Territory Administration’ in E. K. Fisk ed, *New Guinea on the Threshold: Aspects of Social Political and Economic Development*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1966, p. 203.

⁵ The District Commissioners Conference of May 1952 was attended by DCs from twelve districts, along with the Director of DDSNA, J. H. Jones, three of his assistant directors, of which Ian Downs was one, the Government Secretary, S A Lonergan, and the Assistant Administrator Donald Cleland. At this meeting they discussed a range of issues affecting the administration of the territory including decentralisation of administration, the role of ASOPA in the training of officers, the introduction of local government through Native Village Councils, agricultural and economic prospects for the Territory of

The DCs were overwhelmingly former Native Affairs Officers and had little interest in the Australian government's attempts to professionalise their service. Many of them had learnt the ropes in the pre-war administration, and they had a low opinion of the benefits of ASOPA for training cadets, regarding it as a waste of time. Degeling has noted that the DCs of the highlands were all former DDSNA officers up until 1962⁶ and exercised a degree of influence in structuring social and economic relations in their districts that was far greater than their contemporaries in the more developed coastal and inland districts.⁷

Where the DO was responsible for all the activities of the staff of DDSNA, specifically for patrolling, exploration and pacification and administration, the DC had overall authority for the administrative, political and economic development of the region. The shift to District Commissioners created a position of overall coordinative authority that was hamstrung by the failure to provide the DC with any staff. 'Development' was therefore dependent upon the ability of the DC to command authority, to cajole others into action and to manage people. This required a forceful personality as well as a degree of long-term vision if it was to work. From September 1952 to January 1956 the DC of the EHD was Ian Downs.

New Guinea, land settlement by Europeans, general land policy, mixed race people, and the future of the Territory's relationship with Australia.

⁶ R. S. Parker, *op. cit.*, p. 203, ft. 7. Parker notes that one of the reasons provided for the creation of DCs in the firstplace was that the existing DOs were men of insufficient education, yet the administration continued to appoint its DCs from the ranks of the DOs of DDSNA until 1962.

⁷ P. J. Degeling, *The "Role" of the District Commissioner in Post-War Papua New Guinea op. cit.*, pp. 323-333.

Downs' appointment as District Commissioner was partly due to his personal ambition to return to the highlands. Downs reasoned that he was young enough to move sideways within the administrative structure without harming his career prospects significantly and so he applied for the post of District Commissioner EHD. The Administrator, Brigadier Donald Cleland, who had been Assistant Administrator to Colonel Murray and was acting Administrator from May 1952 when Hasluck sacked Murray,⁸ appointed Downs to the position of DC in October of 1952.⁹ This action was mainly due to Downs' investigations and proposed solutions into what both George Greathead and he had identified as a looming crisis in the highlands due to the lack of administration progress in providing opportunities for New Guineans.

Downs argued that the failure to provide an appropriate outlet for the energies of highlanders would mean a return to the days of tribal warfare and the good work of the administration in pacification would be lost. The scenario was dramatic but realistic, and the job of pacification and control would be so much harder if economic opportunity was not provided. An unwritten agreement with Central Highlands District DO (and later DC) George Greathead meant that Downs had foreknowledge of the Greathead's own plans for retirement and the upcoming vacancy as DC of the EHD. At the time he was an Acting Assistant Director of DDSNA in Port Moresby, was just over forty and quite experienced in Territory administration, having joined the administration

⁸ P. Hasluck, *A Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951-1963*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1976, pp. 50-53

⁹ Cleland had been Assistant Administrator since September 1951 and was confirmed as Administrator on 23rd January 1953. See I. Downs, *The Last Mountain*, *op. cit.*, p. 219 and *The Australian Trusteeship*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

before the war, served in Manus, Morobe, New Ireland, the highlands and in the central administration in Port Moresby. In his own opinion, if he had elected to stay in Port Moresby Downs could have made it up to Administrator one day if he played the bureaucratic game.¹⁰ He was undoubtedly talented, ambitious and effective, but all too aware that his outspoken nature and his “natural abrasive attitudes” would eventually be his downfall. Downs was in Sydney during 1953 attending ASOPA. During this time the district functioned along the same principles under acting DC H L Williams.¹¹ Downs’ personal views on how best to achieve development and prosperity brought his regime into direct conflict with the policies of Paul Hasluck, the careful paternalism of the Minister eventually winning the day.

9.2 *Pax Australiana: control*

The elimination of tribal fighting was the first objective of any Australian district administration. The absence of warfare allowed for a deepening of understanding of European ways, greater exposure to Europeans themselves and greater freedom for New Guineans to move about and see more of their own region. Peace led to the ultimate objective of controlling all of the bounded territory of the district and in the eastern highlands the patrol officers aimed to bring as much area as possible under administration control. If all of the district was controlled, by which was meant patrols

¹⁰ I. Downs, *The Last Mountain*, op. cit., pp. 222-224.

¹¹ The annual report for that year repeats much of Downs’ *AREHD 1952/53* report verbatim.

could pass freely into any area, apprehend any person who had been brought to the notice of administration officers, dispense justice in the court of native affairs, and depart without animosity, then the administration could pursue its plans for developing the people and the region. Regular patrolling¹² allowed for greater understanding of the relationships between groups of highlanders and of their customs, practices and culture.¹³

In terms of the area of the EHD brought under administrative control, the task was made more manageable with the linking by road of every patrol post in the district to Goroka during late 1952 and early 1953, a feat discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Two new patrol posts were established in 1952/53 at Chuave (Chimbu SD along the road to Hagen, about half way between Goroka and Kundiawa) and Kumiava (in a restricted area of Goroka SD, southeast of Mt Michael). Administration officers conducted more patrols in 1952/53 and spent more time on them than any previous twelve month period. These patrols also recorded more people by census than in any other district in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.¹⁴

¹² A number of former kiaps have written accounts of their years in Papua and New Guinea. See for example J. Sinclair, *Kiap - Australia's Patrol Officers in Papua New Guinea*, R Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1984. Sinclair later became a DC of the EHD.

¹³ The Papua New Guinea National Archive holds extensive patrol reports for the EHD. For Goroka alone there were 133 patrol reports for the period 1943-1955 - a total of some 2,073 pages. The decade 1955-1965 has 98 reports covering 2,183 pages. For Kaiantu the 1943-1961 period covers 119 reports and 2,086 pages. In physical size the combined files for some 30,000 Patrol Reports from Papua and New Guinea from 1900-1980 measure 80 metres in height. J. Havelawa, *Guide to the Records of the Department of the Administrator, Papua New Guinea National Archives*, Port Moresby, 1991. This is one reason why annual reports have been used to provide an overall picture of a district.

¹⁴ *AREHD 1952/53*, p 2. According to DC Downs, the staff of the EHD recorded some 20,000 more people than any other district.

Patrol posts were the points from which administration influence emanated. An expansion of patrol posts meant an effort to consolidate administration influence in a region. Each post was charged with patrolling and mapping the surrounding area and by dividing all of the inhabited regions into census units the whole of the EHD was eventually mapped and counted. In the 1954/55 year, four new posts were opened at Lufa (South western slopes of Mt Michael - Goroka SD) and Okapa (south west of Kainantu on Lamari river - Kainantu SD), Kerowagi (Koringal Valley northwest of Kundiawa - Chimbu SD), and Watabung (Upper Mairi valley along the main road between Asaro and Chuave - Chimbu SD).¹⁵ By 1955/56 there were a further two posts at Kassam (the high pass in the far east of the connecting road from Kainantu to the Markham valley - Kainantu SD) and Gumine (SSW of Kundiawa near Mt Wikauma - Chimbu SD).¹⁶

Where staffing levels permitted patrol posts were manned throughout the year, but some new posts were manned only for short periods.¹⁷ By the end of the 1957/58 year the Department of Native Affairs (DNA)¹⁸ officers who staffed the patrol posts were supposed to have 29 officers but had to make do with an average of 17. This staff shortage was overcome by employing female assistants, some of whom were part-time. In 1956/57 the area to the south and south east of Mt Michael was de-restricted. This left just the portion of Kainantu SD, between the Lamari and Azana rivers, bounded by Morobe District to the east, and Gulf District to the south, as the only restricted area in

¹⁵ *AREHD 1954-55*, p 5.

¹⁶ *AR (DNA) EHD 1955-56*, p 3.

¹⁷ In 1955/56 Lufa PP was manned for 10 months, Kassam PP for 2 months, Kerowagi for 8 months and Gumine for 6 months. *Ibid.*.

¹⁸ The DDSNA changed its name to DNA in 1955.

the EHD.¹⁹ This area was in the Aziana census division in high country in the Kratke Range between 7000 and 11000 feet.²⁰ It was inhabited by the Kukukuku people who were shifting cultivators and nomadic hunters. There was no permanent station here until 1968 when one was built at Marawaka.²¹ The Acting DO William Tomasetti wrote in 1956/1957 that there were plans to create a further five subdistricts in the EHD.²²

Even in areas that were regarded as controlled the work of patrolling was often arduous and occasionally dangerous. In late May 1952 Patrol Officer Neil Desailly, the Officer in Charge (OIC) Henganofi, was visited by a group of men from Erhi village. They told him that following a murder of one of their kinsman at Wapega, a village of around 840 people some 12 miles due south of Henganofi (close to modern Tarabo), a native constable from Kainantu had visited the region and arrested two men.²³ It was claimed by the men of Erhi that the arrested men had been handed over to appease the government but were not the actual murderers. Desailly took a patrol to the scene of the crime and examined the week-old decomposing body. His investigations concluded that Kigupa of Erhi village had been killed by an arrow. He questioned the two men detained by Constable Pakau from Kainantu who replied they had been told to say they had killed the man because he had been making sorcery against them. The questioning was done in the Kafeke language, which was the first language of none of the parties involved, but was understood by some of the participants.

¹⁹ AR (DNA) EHD 1956-57, p 1. See Maps.

²⁰ AR (DNA) EHD 1957/58, p. 3.

²¹ Munare Uyassi, *The Eastern Highlands, op. cit.*, p 76.

²² AR (DNA) EHD 1956-57, pp. 1-2. Okapa eventually became a subdistrict in its own right and Chimbu was excised from the EHD in 1966.

²³ All the detail of this patrol is taken from the file *Series AA1975/241 Native Affairs - Native Unrest Item 14/1/60* (Native Unrest, Wapegu - Goroka SD) of the Australian National Archives. The file consists of Desailly's report to Wapegu village and a report by Acting DC H L Williams who led a subsequent patrol to the area in June 1952. Williams however consistently refers to the village as "Wapegu".

Desailly then decided to speak to the Wapega people at their village “rather than have the patrol proceed without doing anything to allay probable fear of punitive action against the whole group”. Using several intermediaries a message returned from Wapega village that the patrol could enter and the people would not run away. In the village, negotiations continued as Desailly explained that he had come to hear their version of events as the Government liked to hear both sides of a dispute. He also informed the Wapega of some of the elements of the legal system.

A simple explanation was given of what happens in court and of the working of our legal machinery, and it was emphasised that the Administration did not send punitive patrols to kill indiscriminately when one or two of a group had committed an offence, although we did have sufficient police and weapons to do this. ... I also stated that we were not allies of the Erhi people, bent on revenge, but representing an unbiased Government which wished to know what had happened to make them forget the law which forbade violence.

Whether anyone understood or believed him is not known. Desailly remained one night in the village attempting to satisfy his investigations but eventually decided to take three Wapega men, whom he felt were withholding evidence, to Goroka to speak to “Number One” [the District Commissioner]. The Wapega people were aware that the bows and arrows were no match for the police firearms but harassed the retreating patrol and seized a member of the patrol. Desailly then fired his revolver into the air and ran at the group who had seized the man, driving them off. The Wapega men did not fire any arrows at the patrol and Desailly formed the impression they were afraid of the Government. The Wapega did however attempt to exchange the three captured men

with three others but Desailly refused and they were taken to Goroka. Desailly ended his report by saying “Since none of these people have ever, to my knowledge, seen anything of Europeans except a few patrols and two or three missionaries, it is hoped that even if nothing else is accomplished they will at least learn something and perhaps be of assistance in spreading Government influence”.

Once in Goroka (and confronted by the lockup and other apparatus of the colonial state), one of the men confessed to his part in the killing, and the other two named the other participants. The time in Goroka was used to show the Wapega men some of the benefits of European civilisation and they were later most cooperative and helpful to Acting DC H. L. Williams. The subsequent patrol to Wapega by Williams left Goroka on 18 June 1952 and arrived in Wapega on 20 June. With him was PO Desailly eight armed police constables and the three men who had been taken in for questioning. Williams noted that “the Wapega natives had never impressed as being a co-operative community” but whether this was from independence or timidity he could not say. Once at Wapega, the three men who had been taken to Goroka were able to induce the two others responsible for the murder to come forward. Williams impressed upon the whole village the seriousness of what they had done and they were warned about further shows of defiance.

This incident is remarkable for several reasons. First, the Erhi had come to Desailly at the Henganofi post which had been established since 1949, a period of just three years. To do so, they had travelled through the territory of several other clan groups including Korofu, Fore, Henkifaro and Imaka people. This indicates that they felt they were able to do so without retribution.

Second, they had appealed to the administration to fix a situation in which they suspected the men in custody were not the guilty parties, but lesser men offered to placate the wrath of the government. This demonstrates a level of understanding of a European legal system where the guilty are prosecuted and punished, as opposed to the clan retribution that had been prevalent in the highlands.

Third, it shows that in an area already believed controlled, the extent of control diminished the farther one went from the patrol post. Although the people of Erhi had come to Desailly, the people of Wapega some six miles farther away were reluctant to assist him and had probably only seen patrols sporadically. They did not have officially appointed luluais but nonetheless this area was considered to be ‘controlled’ space.

Fourth, the administration responded to the threatening behaviour not with an overwhelming show of force, but with a measured and intelligent approach that aimed to win the Wapega people over as administration allies. Rather than arrest anyone for “riotous behaviour” Williams decided to take some young Wapega men back to Goroka for instruction in pidgin and medical first aid, and according to his report this was at the request of the villagers themselves. Williams felt that in the time between the two patrols the Wapega villagers had become fearful of reprisal but had been relieved to find that they were not singled out as a group and that only the guilty men were charged with wilful murder.

The Wapega example shows the discrepancy between claimed and actual controlled areas. The bureaucracy was impatient to consider an area as controlled even though it

was obvious that the people were not fully adapted to administration ways. It also indicates that Australian administration was responsive to events that threatened the *Pax Australiana* upon which all social stability rested. As the Australians came into contact with more and more remote peoples the number of attacks grew. In the 1953/54 year two patrols came under attack, the first such occurrences since 1949/50.²⁴ Both of these attacks were in Kainantu SD. The first attack was by the people of the Lamari area (about 30 km due south of Okapa station which was established in 1954/55) on an exploratory patrol, and H. L. Williams (acting DC in Ian Downs absence at ASOPA) noted that it “could have been made on any of the patrols which had penetrated the Lamari area and it is perhaps surprising that earlier patrols to this area had been without incident”. The Lamari attack was basically expected to happen and indicates that government influence in this part of Kainantu was still tenuous, despite earlier patrolling. The other attack occurred in June 1954 in an area that had had some fourteen patrols, five of which had been through in the past fourteen months.²⁵ The people of Obura, about 33 km SE of Kainantu, and a good day’s march for a patrol, had been counted in the census and had appointed village officials although the patrol led by PO Burge is thought to have entered the region shortly after some fighting with the people of Atiera. The fact that a patrol was attacked in an area that had been routinely patrolled indicates that the *Pax Australiana* depended largely on the willingness of the eastern highlanders to go along with it.

The Australian response to the attack of the Obura people was well equipped and orchestrated; it was calculated to impress and inform, but at the same time convert. In

²⁴ *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 7 and *ARCHD 1949/50*, p. 6. In 1949/1950 a patrol to Kume in Chimbu SD had been ambushed at Jigga and at Ongl.

December of 1954, some six months after the attack, the ADO Kainantu, W T Brown, led a patrol into the Obura region and was accompanied by Patrol Officer J R McArthur, as well as “21 Police, one native Medical Orderly and 45 carriers”. Downs noted that aircraft flew overhead to view potential ambushes and armed bands of warriors.²⁶ The object of the patrol was primarily to educate the people of the Obura region and they contacted “all the separate native groups”. Forty highlanders then visited Goroka and Kainantu – whether they were induced to come or taken is not clear – and were paid as casual labourers for their time when in the towns.

By demonstrating the achievements of the government in town building and with technology, such as the aeroplanes, guns and medicine, the administration sought to win over any who felt that their lives under the *Pax Australiana* would be worse than under the traditional political systems of the eastern highlands. Rather than punish the breakers of the new law, the administration sought to inspire them with the power of the government, awe them with the potential wealth that could be at their hands if they cooperated, and woo them with promises of development. In part this approach evolved directly from Ian Down’s own experience and interpretation of what drove highlanders, what was behind their psychological make up. In the 1954/55 report Downs wrote at length on the subject of native situation and development and made candid observations. One remark was that the pre-administration life of the highlanders, according to the available anthropological data collected by patrols, was so wretched that the administration did not have to actually achieve very much in order to improve

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *AREHD 1954/55*, p. 9.

upon it.²⁷ Simply providing peace was enough for the older generation, but that in itself would not satisfy the demands of younger highlanders who were to grow up under the *Pax Australiana*.

In the ten years from 1947 the EHD was accurately mapped and measured and the size of each sub-district was found to have been overestimated: Goroka was adjusted from 2,930 m² to 2,700 m²; Chimbu from 2,240 m² to 1,700 m² and Kainantu from 2,560 m² to 2,500 m². By June 1958 the day-to-day routine patrolling work of the officers of the DNA had reduced the amount of uncontrolled territory in the whole district to 760 m² all of which was located in Kainantu SD south east of the Okapa Patrol Post. All the rest of the district was classified as 'controlled'. This area had grown from 1,250 m² in 1948/49 to 6,140 m² by 1958. Continuous routine and census patrolling had counted virtually all the New Guineans of the eastern highlands. Where the whole of the highlands had once been imagined uninhabitable, in just the three subdistricts of the eastern highlands the administration counted 313,909 people, with a further 10,000 estimated to be living in the restricted area.²⁸ The task of monitoring the situation and enforcing the *Pax Australiana* involved significant time and energy in the creation of communications infrastructure.

9.3 *Roads, colonial law and surveillance*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p 20.

²⁸ *AR (DNA) EHD 1957/58* Statistical Table 5. The census statistics show that there were more males than females among the indigenous population both for children (over 6,000 more) and adults (almost 10,000 more), but whether this was a natural population pattern or a result of the cessation of tribal fighting is difficult to determine without accurate population statistics from earlier periods which do not exist.

Where the first five years of the *Pax Australiana* saw the establishment of law and order through patrolling, the period from 1952-57 is characterised by the gradual entrenchment of the Australian legal system and the shift from exploratory to routine patrolling. The number of patrols during each year in the 1950s was pushed higher and higher as DCs Downs, Williams and H P Seale (appointed after Downs' departure in January 1956) brought the colonial state to eastern highlanders. The change in the political culture of the highlands from an autochthonous agricultural society based on negotiated alliances for marriage, trade and defence, to a mostly peaceful agricultural population supervised by an Australian political elite (at least in terms of New Guinean perceptions), necessitated the process of acquisition of social status by means other than tribal fighting. The administration would no longer tolerate the clan warriors of yesteryear whose prowess in raids and battle had been the source of their social power and legitimacy as leaders. Once able to operate with impunity, they were now apprehended for transgressing the law and imprisoned.

In a political culture where payback killing was the norm, the imposition of the *Pax Australiana* disrupted ongoing territorial and clan disputes and ossified the land boundaries. For those who sought to continue the unfinished business of revenge, or those who chose to instigate new attacks, their apprehension, trial and incarceration was no doubt a bewildering experience. Prisoners seldom had any notion of why they were being held in gaol, apart from the fact that they had done something that the administration disapproved of. The Australian administration utilised the prison mostly as a reformatory: the gaol existed to deny the prisoner the liberty of movement and removed his labour from the clan, thus affecting communal economic output.

For those detained at Her Majesty's pleasure the language and organisation of the Australian administrative system could be used as a source of power among their own people. On their release prisoners could teach others the language (pidgin) that they had learned in gaol, and whatever other information they had picked up about the workings of the administration. Such knowledge was vitally important in attempting to understand why the *administration* wanted a village to be tidy, or in a particular place. As the luluai system of German New Guinea began to be re-implemented in the highlands, albeit with relatively more power and social status than had been the case in Australian New Guinea, many former prisoners were appointed by the administration to act as its agents. Luluais and tultuls assisted in rallying their people for large-scale labour activity that the government argued was in their interest. The 1952-57 period saw an enormous involvement by eastern highlanders in the construction of the infrastructure of the colonial state through their utilisation in roadworks. Road building and regular road maintenance involved groups living near to the routes that went through the main valley regions and the numbers employed in creating the network of roads were considerable. Approximately one third (at least 100,000 people) in the EHD was press-ganged into road construction at some time. In the four pages Downs devotes to the construction of the highlands access road in 1953 the only mention of the contribution of New Guinean sweat and toil is in the short paragraph that runs "To the public including every native to the most prosperous European I owe my thanks for much unselfish help. It has indeed been a co-operative effort."²⁹ The nature of this co-operation warrants further explanation, which is provided in his autobiography.

²⁹ AREHD 1952/53, p. 38.

Under Downs' direction a road was constructed during 1952/53 from Gusap in the Markham valley, over the Bismark ranges to Kainantu, to Goroka, then over the Daulo pass and down into Kerowagi to link up to the Mt Hagen road. This was done in less than one year and at a cost of £10,000 "including every bridge, culvert, spade, labourer, shilling, salt or tambu shell".³⁰ Vegetables were planted along the proposed route to provide an ongoing food supply for labourers, as the process of road building involved gangs of many thousands of New Guineans who were marched in periodically to carve the land into a flat path. New Guineans built the road with very few modern materials; they utilised the traditional gardening implement, the digging stick, to break up the earth; cut and hauled the wood for bridges, including one over 80 feet in length, 23 over forty feet, and 59 culvert bridges over twenty feet; and with very little explosive they lit fires in rock cavities in the high mountain passes. When the cool evening came, the rocks splintered and they could then be broken apart by picks and crowbars.³¹ The Administrator, Brigadier Cleland, arrived at Dumpu in the Markham, was collected by Ian Downs and driven up to Goroka. Cleland was then able to inform the Minister about the completed road, and Downs wrote that Hasluck was surprised "because up to that time he was not aware that it had even been attempted",³² an indication that district analysis can reveal details lost when considering macro studies of larger administrative units.

The labourers were provided from local communities with the rationale that a road would mean better government services including more visits by kiaps to listen to

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36. Further details of the road building may be found in C. Simpson, *Adam in Plumes*, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-130.

³¹ *AREHD 1952/53*, p. 36. and I. Downs, *The Last Mountain*, *op. cit.*, p 244. Downs claims to have paid all of his roadworkers by October 1953, see p. 249.

problems, the agricultural officers to bring coffee and passionfruit seedlings and the doctor to care for sick people. The road itself was a neutral space that allowed free and direct passage to the town so that produce could be sold there and trucks could collect the produce grown in the communities. In June 1953 money was paid for labour and for the actual land on which the road rested and Downs notes “The people believed they were being paid again for their work and we did not mind”.³³

The road was a vital element in the colonial infrastructure as it facilitated ease of access and faster movement of the kiaps and other officers of the administration. Instead of trekking from Kainantu to Goroka, about 2 full days with a patrol, a road trip by jeep took around two hours. It linked all existing patrol posts and consequently the supervision of the patrol posts by senior officers increased through ease of access. This enabled the DC, DO and the ADOs to reach even the remote patrol posts to the south of the main towns on a regular basis and make sure that matters were being well run at each of them.

By the 1957 year the road network ran from Lae to Kainantu-Henganofi-Goroka-Watabung-Kundiawa-Kerowagi. There were radials from Kainantu through Aiyura to Okapa and from Goroka to Lufa. The road facilitated the reforestation of the previously treeless valleys. While the flat land of the valley provided no defensive positions, the emergent peace enabled people to recolonise these lands from which they had fled when warfare was the norm. New communities built up along the road, both

³² Downs, *Last Mountain*, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

³³ *Ibid.*, p 248.

New Guinean and European. The other effect of the road was that it dispersed European settlement from around the Goroka town area.

The ability of administration officers to move around more quickly permitted greater social control and apprehension of crime in communities close to the road. The increase in crime numbers coming to the attention of the kiaps is also related to the number of patrols and the days spent on patrol. These increased markedly during the early 1950s until all parts of the EHD territory had been explored.

By mid 1956 no area of the district remained unpatrolled or unmapped; the colonial district had knowledge of its own boundaries and the work of pacification was essentially over. Both the number of patrols (Table 9.1) and the number of days on patrol (Table 9.2) showed a steady increase.

Table 9.1 EHD Patrols by sub-district 1952/53-1956/57

<i>Patrols by SD</i>	<i>1952/53</i>	<i>1953/54</i>	<i>1954/55</i>	<i>1955/56</i>	<i>1956/57</i>
Goroka	13	13	na	13	11
<i>Goroka</i>				2	6
<i>Henganofi</i>				4	2
<i>Lufa</i>				2	3
<i>Watabung</i>				5	
Kainantu	6	9	na	11	11
<i>Kainantu</i>				7	5
<i>Okapa</i>				4	6
Chimbu	13	12	na	14	17
<i>Kundiawa</i>				8	6
<i>Chuave</i>				2	3
<i>Kerowagi</i>				2	4
<i>Gumine</i>				2	4
Total patrols	32	34 ^a	41 ^b	38	39

a To April 27. A further six patrols were planned before June 30 a probable total of 40.

b To 15 June 41 reports had been received, three more were being written up and 8 more planned before June 30 - a probable total of 52.

No official breakdown by SD post is available before 1955.

Table 9.2 EHD patrols days by sub-district 1952/53-1956/57

<i>No of days on patrol</i>	<i>1952/53</i>	<i>1953/54</i>	<i>1954/55</i>	<i>1955/56</i>	<i>1956/57</i>
Goroka SD	236	283		388	327
Kainantu SD	108	320		312	310
Chimbu SD	364	296		314	323
Total days	708	899	900+ *	1013	960

Adapted from: AR EHD 1952/53; 53/54; 54/55 and AR EHD (DNA) 1955/56 and 1956/57.

* While no figure is given the figure was presumably over 900 days, of which Downs noted more than half were spent on patrol in the restricted areas. AR EHD 1954/55, p. 8.

Once the limits of the district were reached the work of patrolling became routine. The ability to reach populations more quickly along the road allowed for short one-day visits to specific communities to supervise construction projects and to the road centres at which, on specific days, an officer would arrive to discuss grievances with the people.

The exploration of the district's boundaries (including maps of census divisions)³⁴ and the administration's communications network of aid posts, patrol posts and towns, all linked by roads, indicate a broadening of the colonial state's reach and its ability to assert its influence away from its main centres of district power. This resulted in an increase in the number of offences that came before the Court for Native Affairs, presided over by the patrol officers. The types of laws that the colonial state began to enforce were also widened. In 1954/55 prosecutions under the Native Administration Regulations (New Guinea) in the EHD included an array of offences that directly involved the colonial state in matters of freedom of movement, including limiting where people could go and when they had to stay somewhere; sexual behaviour, specifically adultery; general health and the need to obtain medical treatment; the manner of dress, upholding the status of European clothes as clean; belief systems, including sorcery;

³⁴ *AR (DNA) EHD 1956/57*, p. 3. Patrols were grouped under Subdistrict and census divisions with each census division usually corresponding and being named after the main resident tribe. Census divisions in 1958/59 were Kainatu SD: (Kaiantu Area) Agarabi, Kamano, Lamari, Tairora, Aziana, (Okapa Area) Gimi, Keiagana-Kanite, North Fore, South Fore; Goroka SD (Goroka Area) Bena Bena, Lower Asaro, Unggai, Upper Asaro, Watabung, (Henganofi Area) Dunantina, Kafe, Fayantina, (Lufa Area) Yagaria, Karimui, Labogai; Chimbu SD (Kundiawa Area) Central, Dom, Sinasina, Upper Chimbu, Yongganugl, (Kerowagi Area) East Koronigal, West Koronigal, Kup, (Chuave Area) Chuave, Elimbari, Nambaiyufa, (Gumine Area) Bomai, Marigl, Wikauma, Nomane, Salt. The brackets indicate the post from which patrols departed.

social and family issues including the treatment of children; and general comportment toward others, under which the majority of offences were for riotous behaviour.³⁵

The records for criminal offences indicate that the serious crimes that attracted the attention of the Supreme Court (murder rape, etc) decreased in number from the previous five year period. In 1951/52 a total of 43 Eastern highlanders had been committed to the Supreme Court on charges of homicide and rape.³⁶ This number fell to seven in the first nine months of 1952/53 and to 4 in 1953/54, before exploding again to fifty in 1956/57. Although no reason was given for the increase, the rise is likely related to the administration's increased surveillance. ADO W E Tomasetti noted in the 1956/57 report: "The fact that 17 officers and about 150 police can maintain law and order among about 318,000 people, most of whom are less than 20 years removed from continual tribal fighting, speaks for itself."³⁷ In 1957/58 all judicial work was still carried out by DNA officers with the occasional visit by the Stipendiary Magistrate from Lae or Madang for District Court hearings in Goroka. DNA officers heard over 3,000 cases in the 1957/58 year while the District Court heard 200.³⁸ The most common cases were concerned with riotous behaviour and threats to the peace, followed by

³⁵ For the EHD in 1954/55 the relevant section, charge and number of charges (ie convictions) were as follows: 67(a) Neglecting a child (3); 67(b) Failing to obtain medical treatment (24); 80(b) Entering an employers quarters without permission (43); 81(1)(a) Failing to appear before the court (25); 82(a) Escaping from custody (3); 82 (b) Assisting Escape (2); 82 (e) Supplying goods to prisoners (1); 83 (a) Unlawfully laying hold of (10); 83 (b) Unlawfully striking (246); 83 (c) Using insulting language (7); 83 (d) Spreading false reports (50); 83 (e) Riotous behaviour (706); 84 (1) Enticing from husband (8); 84 (2) Adultery and sexual intercourse (249); 87 Practising prostitution (2); 88(2) Non appearance for medical examination (48); 88 (3) Leaving hospital without permission (5); 92 Failing to report deaths (2); 93 (a) Non reporting veneraeal disease (1); 95 Stealing (54); 97 Sorcery (31); 98 Bribery (2); 101 Trespass of animals (6); 103 Playing cards for money (33); 106 Unlawfully lighting fires (66); 110 Wearing dirty cloths (1); 113 Evading census (35); 119 Neglecting to carry out orders (218); 125 Pretending to be in government service (3); 129 Remaining in town without permission (2). Of the 1902 cases 16 were discharged – a "clear up" rate of over 99 percent. *AREHD 1954/55*, p 31.

³⁶ *AREHD 1952/53*, p 29.

³⁷ *AREHD 1952/53*, p. 29; *AREHD 1953/54*, p.27;

³⁸ *AREHD (DNA) 1957/58*, p. 12.

adultery as the state began to regulate sexual practice among highlanders. While the former reflects a concern with keeping the peace, the later may also have had this same objective as disputes over women could lead to larger problems between men and their clans, with the possibility of creating tribal warfare.

Kiap justice was swift and the number of cases mirrored the number of convictions. In 1954/55 for example of the 1902 cases, only 16 were discharged. The trend though during the 1950s was for an increasing number of cases (Table 9.3) and even the administration was surprised at the low 1953/54 figure which occurred “despite an ever widening patrol area and the increasing accessibility of the Courts.”³⁹

Table 9.3 EHD Court of Native Affairs 1952/53-1957/58

	<i>1952/53</i>	<i>1953/54</i>	<i>1954/55</i>	<i>1955/56</i>	<i>1956/57</i>	<i>1957/58</i>
Cases/ convictions	1479	1308	1902	na	2500	3000

Such an increase was made possible by a steady expansion in the number of luluais and tultuls (Table 9.4) recognised by the administration who acted as agents of the colonial state in bringing breaches of the law to the attention of kiaps on their visits.

³⁹*AREHD 1953/54*, p 27.

Table 9.4 EHD luluais and tultuls 1952/53-1958/59

	<i>1952/53</i>	<i>1953/54</i>	<i>1954/55</i>	<i>1955/56</i>	<i>1956/57</i>	<i>1957/58</i>	<i>1958/59</i>
Luluais	na	621	649	667	674	678	644
Tultuls	na	770	915	926	961	1034	976
<i>Total village officials</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>1391</i>	<i>1564</i>	<i>1593</i>	<i>1635</i>	<i>1712</i>	<i>1620</i>

The number of luluais and tultuls stabilised from 1957/58 due to the gradual introduction of moves toward decentralisation of administration through the creation of Native Local Government Councils (NLGCs). By 1962/63 there were 655 Luluais and 1001 tultuls, with 362 local government councillors and 2018 village officials and councillors.⁴⁰ Throughout the 1950s the administration had been preparing the ground for the NLGCs, especially in the areas of the eastern highlands where coffee and cash crops had taken off.

The first NLGCs were in Lowa and Waiye, both in Goroka SD to the west of Goroka town, and both were created in December of 1958. Some five years later there were nine NLGCs in total in the EHD: Agarabi, Asaro, Bena, Chuave, Kafe, Koringal, Lowa, Waiye, Yonggamugl. The NLGC administrative unit contained a number of villages in the region and usually covered around 10,000 people. The table below shows how the work of the administrators in pacification and census taking, encouraging New Guinean economic growth and establishing the rule of law, finally allowed the administration to do what colonial governments the world over sought to do: tax the people who were

⁴⁰ *Territory of New Guinea Report 1962/63*, p. 197.

being governed so as to pay for their own occupation. Tax rates (Table 9.5) were however dependent on what was judged to be the level of a community's development.

Table 9.5 Eastern Highlands Native Local Government Councils 1962/63

<i>Council</i>	<i>Date of creation</i>	<i>No. of village groups</i>	<i>Approx. population</i>	<i>No. of councillors</i>	<i>Tax rates declared for 1963 (in £ s d)</i>	<i>Tax rates for male 17-21 and females over 17</i>	
						<i>M</i>	<i>F</i>
					Male over 21		
Agarabi	14.6.60	31	9,394	34	1.10.0	1.10.0	0.5.0
Asaro	14.12.62	83	15,101	49			
<i>(least advanced)</i>					1.0.0	1.0.0	0.5.0
<i>(more advanced)</i>					1.10.0	1.10.0	0.2.0
<i>(most advanced)</i>					2.0.0	2.0.0	0.5.0
Bena	20.6.60	67	13,558	48	1.5.0	1.5.0	0.5.0
Chuave	8.11.61	42	9,131	35	1.0.0	1.0.0	0.1.0
Kafe	21.5.62	36	9,260	36	1.0.0	1.0.0	0.3.0
Koringal	7.7.60	109	17,691	53	1.5.0	1.5.0.	0.2.0
Lowa	3.12.58	80	11,027	36	2.0.0	2.0.0	0.10.0
Waiye	19.12.58	51	10,452	37			
<i>(normal rate)</i>					2.5.0	2.5.0	0.3.0
<i>(if paid early)</i>					2.0.0	2.0.0	0.3.0
Yonggamugl	14.12.62	56	9,625	34	0.15.0	0.15.0	0.2.0

From: *Territory of New Guinea Report 1962/63*. Page 199.

While staff shortages continued to be a problem for the DDSNA/DNA in the EHD,⁴¹ by the mid 1950s it was becoming obvious that the number of people in the district was large. In 1956/57 ADO Bill Tomasetti had felt that the administration required a reconsideration as the three sub-districts and patrol posts were “impossibly large”.⁴² He therefore recommended that four new subdistricts be created.⁴³ By 1962/63 the figure for patrols had almost tripled (114) and the number of patrol days had grown to 2,428.⁴⁴ Greater decentralisation was required for effective administration with Chimbu, the most populous of the EHD SDs, eventually requiring its own administrative apparatus.⁴⁵

9.4 *Use of Labour*

With a population of over 300,000 eastern highlands societies had presented a significant challenge to pacification. In the areas where the *Pax Australiana* was implemented (which by 1957 was all of the EHD except for 760 m² in Aziana census division, Kainantu SD) the new challenge for the administrators was how to occupy the time of the people, especially the men, so that they would not become bored and revert to tribal fighting. This need is a continuous theme in the annual reports for the EHD from 1947-1957 and the argument can be summarised in the following way:

⁴¹ In 1952/53 Downs had only 54 percent of this staff establishment and in 1956/57 the number of field staff officers was 29 but “varied a little below or above 17” (58 percent) *AREHD 1952/53*, p 5; *AREHD (DNA) 1956/57*, p. 2.

⁴² *AR (DNA)EHD 1956/57*, p. 2. Of the three EHD SDs Chimbu contained 150,000 people and the Okapa patrol post in Kainantu SD alone administered 35,000.

⁴³ *Ibid.* And the following year suggested five. *AR (DNA) EHD 1957/58*, p 2.

⁴⁴ *Territory of New Guinea Report 1962-63*, p 197.

⁴⁵ A break eventually came on 1 July, 1966 when the Chimbu District was created from the Chimbu SD of the EHD, with parts of the Southern Highlands District and the Gulf District of Papua.

1. Peace denied highlands men the opportunity to gain social status through the traditional means of warfare.
2. The absence of warfare did not negate the need for status, but it would severely test the willingness of the people to hold to the *Pax Australiana*.
3. A large and underemployed labour force posed a significant risk to plans for economic development, the administration's prior effort and, by extension, to European plans for settlement and the safety of a white community.
4. Alternative methods had to be found to provide status so that highlands societies could still function as before, only without war.
5. Education was for the children, health was for everyone but New Guinean men would become marginalised and the *Pax Australiana* could not survive if boredom was not curtailed. The traditional warriors and fighters were the greatest threat to the present and future plans of the administration, and to peace in the highlands; they required enterprises into which their efforts could be diverted.

The construction and maintenance of a road network linking towns in the highlands to each other and to the coast was one use to which the administration put the available human labour of the highlands. Creating luluais and tultuls provided a small portion of New Guinean male society with some position and status. But overall there was a mass of fit young men who had the administration very concerned. The Australian administration moved to open the highlands to labour recruitment as a way of providing a release valve for surplus energies and potential troublemakers. Highlands labour was

employed in many areas of Papua and New Guinea, primarily on plantations of copra. This was part of a larger plan for the economic and social development of the Territory as a whole, but it was also crucial for the success of the administration in the highlands for two reasons: it removed a potentially violent group from resisting administration plans; and it strengthened the use of money through the savings of the returned labourers. While the first was important in itself, the second allowed status and brides to be acquired through currency wealth, and allowed men the opportunity to acquire wealth through work. The growth of the highlands labour scheme is viewed in these two contexts.

As noted in the previous chapter recruitment began in 1950. Most New Guineans did not need to work as they were subsistence agriculturalists and were fully inserted into village life and catered for by village institutions. In those areas where competition for land and resources was strong, the decision of New Guineans to take contract work was based on the promise of money. The Australian administration in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea sought to regulate the labour flows and the conditions of the labourers. The Territory of New Guinea Report for the 1955/56 year notes that at the close of 1956 there were some 45,570 New Guineans in paid employment which included those employed as police. Of this total 35,272 were in private industry, 23,082 of which worked on plantations, principally copra and cocoa (20,185) and these were overwhelmingly male (20,077 male and 108 female). The Administration employed 10,298 people. Just over 12,000 of the over 45,000 labourers employed were classified as being engaged in skilled and semi-skilled occupations.⁴⁶ Within this group of copra and cacao plantation workers roughly twice as many were single than were married

(13,281 to 6,904) and the largest group in age breakdowns was the 21-25 year olds (8,490) followed by the 16-20 years olds (6,346) and the 26-30 year olds (3,939).⁴⁷ We may see then that plantation labour was unskilled work dominated by men under thirty, a commodity that the highlands enjoyed in abundance.

While contracts for more than 9,000 labourers were filled in just the first six months of 1950 the figures were not as remarkable in future years. Between July 1952 and March 1953, 2,816 labourers were engaged, with the highest monthly total being January (676), and the lowest July (90).⁴⁸ Slightly more labourers (2,946) were repatriated and local employers, the settler farmers, could also acquire seasonal labour.⁴⁹ A pool of highlands labour was maintained at Goroka so if a contract came up quickly it could be filled without delay. The colonial state thus acted as a labour broker between private industry and “it is quickly seen that Highland natives are employed to very good effect where employers or overseers of labour are experienced in the handling of native labour.”⁵⁰

In 1954/55 Downs noted that labour problems in the EHD were associated with the ability of the administration to supply other districts with indentured labour and that the

⁴⁶ *Territory of New Guinea Report 1955-56*, p. 81.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 186 Appendix XVII, Statistical Table 2.

⁴⁸ As one would expect from the gardening seasons.

⁴⁹ *AREHD 1952/53*, p. 51.

⁵⁰ *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 51.

cost of recruitment greatly exceeded the costs being recovered by the administration from employers. Downs' main criticism was that highlands labour was being recruited by the administration as part of a subsidy to copra planters.

At the very best the Highlands Labour Scheme is an extreme method of providing sufficient extra labour to keep the Territory running.

It is contrary to any other useful or important aim.

It is being exploited now as cheap labour rather than essential labour.⁵¹

He argued that highlands labour was cheap in comparison to other districts and that the Administration needed to study the labour trends and try to encourage districts to meet their own requirements, rather than push people around to no good effect, simply because it was cheap to do so. While not sparing the government he also underlined his opinion that "The thinking of plantation managers has not changed substantially since 1922" in their reliance on fear and threat of government sanction, but argued that there was no tie for the labourer between the "proper performance of duty and the reward he receives." Without being trained to work correctly the native would perhaps return to the highlands with an incorrect sense of duty. He contrasted this with employer-employee relations in the EHD where no labourer had been assaulted by an employer in the past twelve months.⁵² Apparently the combination of enlightened paternalism in administrative direction and proscriptions on the 'right type' of settler could make New Guineans work hard for their pay and stop Europeans beating them.

⁵¹AREHD 1954/55, p. 102.

⁵²AREHD 1954/55, p. 102.

Nevertheless Downs' comments are misleading in as much as the settlers who would have contracted labour did so on a casual, not a contract basis, and did so in the areas of Goroka and Kainantu SDs where their farms were located. The high populations density of Chimbu SD had precluded alienation of land for white settlement so 80 percent of the EHD labour contracted for coastal plantations came from Chimbu SD. Williams noted in 1953/54 that Kainantu natives did not volunteer for coastal employment as there were a number of other industries that kept them in the region. In Goroka the labourers came from outside of the more developed areas where cash crops had not yet become a means of gaining wealth.⁵³

The period of contract was two years and the minimum salary was 15/- per month, raised to 25/- per month from 1 June 1955. Over two years this meant that a labourer could make a minimum of £30 before any overtime or benefits were added and before any debts incurred during the period of indenture were deducted. The employer was required to provide accommodation, medical attention, food, clothing, cooking utensils and the cost of the travel to and from his place of recruitment. If the wife or children of an employee were also to come, this cost was met by the employer.⁵⁴ While the government prescribed a minimum wage, highlands labourers frequently received more for work within the EHD. Average wages in 1953/54 were 19/- per month for unskilled work, rather than the government minimum of 15/-.⁵⁵

⁵³ Industries in Kainantu SD included gold mining, chinchona bark growing, pit-sawing and farming of vegetables for European consumption. Economic development is addressed in Chapter Ten.

⁵⁴ *Territory of New Guinea Report, 1955/56*, p. 82.

⁵⁵ *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 52.

Despite Downs trenchant criticisms of the Highlands Labour Scheme, the EHD organised for the employment of 4,741 labourers between March 1954 and April 1955, with 3,962 of these going to private employers under Native Employment Agreements (NEAs). Labourers were being socialised into the ways of plantation labour, returning with money and a glory box of tools and axes. The 1956/57 report mentioned that money, goods and ideas were the product of the returned labourers and held hopes that what they had learnt of sanitation would have a beneficial effect on highlands village life.⁵⁶

As the years went on the Highlands Labour Scheme continued to provide the Territory administration with cheap labour. In 1955/56, 3,597 men left the highlands for plantation work and 1,693 returned. The EHD capped the involvement rate at 25 percent in each community and found that they had problems keeping up with the demand due to stories of ill treatment on the coast. Chimbu men were examining their options and wondering if better deals could be struck. They remained however the bulk of the labour force but were supplemented by men from newly pacified areas in Lufa (Goroka SD) and Kainantu SD.⁵⁷

Not all labourers returned to the EHD and the administration regarded 25 deaths from 3,250 highlanders contracted to be a very low figure that “must be regarded as satisfactory”. District administrators acted as labour brokers between areas of demand

⁵⁶AR (DNA)EHD 1956/57, p 9-10.

⁵⁷AR (DNA)EHD 1955/56, pp. 16-17.

and supply. Finally by 1957/58 the system showed signs of developing permanent structures to house the attested labourers, and films for up to 600 people were shown in Goroka, for which a small charge was levied. Of the 4,621 labourers who left the eastern highlands in that year 3,634 went to private employers.⁵⁸

The Highlands Labour Scheme took advantage of what was perceived as a massive pool of surplus labour. An annual average outflow of around 3,500 workers in the 1952-57 period allowed for the more rapid introduction of currency as a means of exchange, generated economic investment through the purchase of European commodities and most importantly provided an outlet for the energies of some 20,000 highlands men. Those who returned had money, and money could be used to purchase brides, pigs or to be invested in coffee or other economic activities. The *Pax Australiana* had eliminated fighting as a means of acquiring status: the Highlands Labour Scheme allowed for those who might challenge that peace, young men with something to prove, to be removed from the EHD and to return with wealth and knowledge. In so doing it directed male eastern highlanders to take a particular path to achieve an end. The system of administration closed off traditional paths of status acquisition and opened one that would imbue elements of modernity through exposure to capitalist labour and economic conditions.

⁵⁸AR (DNA)EHD 1957/58, pp. 10-11.

9.5 *Conclusions*

Pacification, the extension of colonial control and the use of highlands labour by the administration provided a base on which the administration could build development. In counting, dividing, registering and introducing the basics of law and colonial government to the multitude of tribes in the eastern highlands the Australian administration acted in a rational, bureaucratic and peaceful manner and used personal example and regulation to induce a shift to what they considered to be proper behaviour. By closing off fighting as a means of resistance, the legal framework of the colonial state directed eastern highlanders to act in certain ways. This shift was not physically coercive but still had the desired effect of changing patterns of behaviour. The administrative colonial state increased its capacity for surveillance by expanding the roads system, the mapping of census divisions and through constant patrolling. The continued presence of the administration both as a political and an economic force led to the demise of the traditional barter economy and its replacement by money. In all of its endeavours the Australian administration in the EHD exhibited a desire to assist the people of the eastern highlands to reach a type of modernity. The effect of the first ten years of administration was the beginnings of a rapid social transformation. It was done with a minimum of force, a maximum of effort by an understaffed and underfunded district administration, and the goal of progress was partially realised. By its own measures at least the Australian administration in the EHD was successful in bringing eastern highlanders to a level where social and economic integration with the outside world would not be so drastic.

**Chapter 10: The extension of colonial services and a dispute
over land policy: Australian Administration in the
Eastern Highlands, 1952-1957**

District administration in the Eastern Highlands District (EHD) in the early 1950s was committed to development and while this was a goal for Papua New Guinea as a whole, the way in which EHD District Commissioner Ian Downs pursued economic development prompted Minister Paul Hasluck to intervene to check a potentially dangerous situation. He reigned in what he considered some of the excesses of land allocation and effectively halted what had until then been a generous but selective system of granting land to Europeans. Downs was in favour of having Europeans settle alongside New Guineans but sought to limit both the number and type of European settlers in the eastern highlands. Only people who were genuinely interested in the economic and social development of the highlands and of the highlanders were encouraged to settle. Those Downs regarded as profiteers, absentee landlords and freebooters were quickly rebuffed or not granted land. With an active settler class and an expanding coffee industry the EHD came to be seen in government circles in PNG and Australia as an exemplar of what could be achieved with careful planning, dedicated staff and limited funding.

The objectives outlined in the previous chapter, control, increased surveillance and labour use, provided the basis for the extension of services and the development of cash crop agriculture during 1952-1957. This chapter builds on those themes in its review of

administration lands policy and the growth in the production of agricultural products linked directly to the external marketplace, all of which were encouraged and purchased by the administration.

10.1 *The Extension of Colonial Services*

As the previous chapter has shown the officers of the DDSNA (renamed the Department of Native Affairs in 1955) were the front line of the colonial government and paved the way for specialist service providers within the Australian administration. During the post-war years the CHD and EHD were consistently understaffed and this situation was not rectified until Hasluck was able to convince the Australian Commonwealth Government and its Treasury that more funds should be devoted to its administration in New Guinea.¹ By June of 1958 the official distribution of Native Affairs staff in the EHD (Table 10.1) was as follows²:

¹ Hasluck was able to lift the Commonwealth grant from £5.5 million in 1954 to £23.5 million in 1963 and the total territory budget from £7 million to £37 million in the same period. P. Hasluck, Hasluck, P, *A Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951-1963*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1976, p. 64.

² Table adapted from *AR (DNA) EHD 1957-58*, p. 2.

Table 10.1 Native Affairs Staff in the EHD 1958

<i>Sub District</i>	<i>Station</i>	<i>Designation</i>	<i>Staff</i>	<i>Quantity</i>			
GOROKA	Goroka	<i>District Headquarters</i>	District Officer	1			
			Assistant DO	1			
			Clerk	1			
			Typist	1			
			Labour Inspector	1			
			Labour Officer	1			
			Auxiliary Clerks	2			
			KAINANTU	Goroka	<i>Sub district office</i>	ADO	1
						PO	1
						Cadet PO	1
						Female Assistant	1
						Auxiliary Clerk	1
						Henganofi	Patrol Post
Lufa	Patrol Post	PO	1				
CHIMBU	Kainantu	<i>Sub district office</i>	ADO	1			
			PO	1			
			Cadet PO	2			
			Clerk	1			
			Okapa	Patrol Post	PO	1	
CHIMBU	Kundiawa	<i>Sub district office</i>	ADO	1			
			PO	2			
			Cadet PO	2			
			Chuave	Patrol Post	PO	1	
			Gumine	Patrol Post	PO	1	
			Kerowagi	Patrol Post	PO	1	
Total				29			
DDSNA staff							
in EHD							

While the twenty nine positions for the EHD in 1958 were a vast improvement on the nineteen for the CHD of ten years before, a/DO W E Tomasetti wrote that for the most

part the district was chronically understaffed with 17 as an average number of officers.³

The staffing levels of specialist departments were equally inadequate.

10.1.1 *Education*

The educational needs of the children of the EHD during the 1950s were generally not met by the administration. It left the critical task of educating children to the various missions and, as a result, the Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Seventh Day Adventists and the New Tribes Mission were able to instruct in whatever language they felt appropriate. They also devised their own syllabus. While this was not the preferred position of the administration the lack of money in education services meant that there was little point in criticising the activities of the missionaries. The Australian administration judged that the missions had more expertise in education and even provided them with grants.⁴ Effectively it subcontracted a prime duty of the colonial state to the private sector, all be they church organisations.

The use of missions as proxy educators was not favoured by EHD DC Downs who noted in the 1952/53 report that “The total anaemic gesture towards the Education of this mass of 267,00 people at even date is one school at Chimbu catering for 104 pupils.” He hoped to establish another two schools around Goroka but felt the administration’s handling of education services was pathetic. For eastern highlanders in the 1950s pidgin was still a relatively new language, not the customary lingua franca of communication trade, politics and social intercourse that it became. Downs felt that this

³ *AREHD 1957/58*, p. 1.

was an opportunity to teach English directly to the children, and that it should be part of a package that would also include vocational training such as carpentry. Above all he felt education should be targeted toward economic development and agricultural instruction was therefore a method of enabling better use of land for crops.⁵ In the following year's report Williams wrote that the education section could be covered by a blank page. Since 1952/53 a 'Higher Village School' (VHS)⁶ had been established at Okiufa in the Asaro valley, perhaps not coincidentally a centre of European settlement and coffee farming; this brought the number of administration schools to two.

The administration pursued its separate development from the missions with education, Williams noting that work had commenced on a Boys' School and land put aside for a Girls' Schools, both in Goroka, but that the pupils would need to be graduates of Higher Village Schools. He felt the missions did no more than teach scripture. Rather than improve an inadequate situation the central administration had in fact withdrawn New Guinean staff from the Higher Village Schools throughout the year and money for a school in Goroka had been diverted for a school in Port Moresby. Further plans to withdraw two New Guinean teachers from the Higher Village School system of the EHD, both with two years' teaching experience in the highlands, prompted Williams to write:

The Department of Education has had eight post-war years in which to build its machinery and get it into action. That it operates with greater or

⁴ I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship Papua New Guinea 1945-1975*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1980, p. 49.

⁵ *AREHD 1952/53*, p. 32. He wrote that "It seems conclusive that there is an absence of organised and efficient use of available manpower in relation to the Educational and general training of these people in fundamental literacy, land use and elementary technical knowledge."

lesser efficiency in the main centres of Port Moresby, Rabaul and Finschhafen gives only limited satisfaction, and none at all to the natives of this District. The result of years of planning and documentation seems to be a cart-before-horse arrangement - with a very small horse supplying the power.

When one can see fundamentals being tackled in this District, one will be encouraged to propose technical and agricultural training but, until that happens, local official despair must continue to be a close partner to native ignorance and illiteracy.⁷

After two consecutive stinging critiques from the EHD administration Downs noted that the Department of Education had done more than any other department in the 1954/55 year. A school at Goroka was completed and was able to take up to 200 enrolments. It was also adequately supplied with stores and teachers. The existing administration Higher Village Schools at Kundiawa and Okiufa were being improved and a new school was set to open at Kainantu by the end of June 1955.⁸ The number of children being taught by the administration totalled 241 (44 of them girls) and Downs was confident that this number could be doubled by the next year.⁹ The Department of Education had posted six trained European teachers and one untrained New Guinean to the EHD, as well as an Area Education Officer to the whole highlands region. The Education Officer was tasked with visiting all administration and mission schools in the EHD as well as going up to Minj and Mt Hagen. Always keen to share his opinions with his superiors, Downs commented that:

⁶ A primary school.

⁷ *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 31-32.

Administration Higher Village Schools should be established as a matter of urgency at Kerowagi, Chuave, Watabung and Okapa. Experience has shown that the establishment of schools at Patrol Posts leads to better co-operation and simplifies supply and administration. As Patrol Posts are all established in centres of population no useful purpose can be served by establishing schools in places where the population is less dense and the means of supply not organised.¹⁰

The desire to link Patrol Posts with educational facilities illustrates the importance of creating a pedagogical role for the colonial state so it could be distinguished from that provided by the missions. Combining a centre of administrative power with a centre of learning was a further step in the delivery of the package of development. Downs' push for schools to be set up at these patrol posts "as a matter of urgency", was partially heeded by the administration and by 1955/56 there were government schools at Kerowagi, Chuave, Henganofi, Goroka and Kainantu. The Goroka and Kainantu schools had European and New Guinean staff, while the other administration schools were staffed exclusively by New Guineans, the product of the administration's teacher training programmes in other districts in previous years.¹¹ The requirements of educational instruction could not keep up with the geographic expansion of the EHD administration and a/DO Harry West noted "whenever a new village or station school is opened hundreds of eligible children are turned away".¹²

⁸ Such an increase reflected Hasluck's education directive of 1955. I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship*, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁹ *AREHD 1954/55*, pp. 41-42.

¹⁰ *AREHD, 1954/55*, p. 41-42.

¹¹ *AR (DNA) EHD 1955/56*, p. 14. There were New Guinean teachers at Kerowagi (3), Henganofi (3) Chuave (2) and one at Kainatu.

¹² *Ibid.*

The Lutheran mission schools instructed in the Kate language and while the Administration would have preferred instruction in English, the mission was adamant and would not change its policies.¹³ The numbers of students taught by missions still vastly exceeded those taught by the administration and in 1956/57 the Missions collectively operated around 200 schools in the EHD.

In that year the District Education Officer inspected 35 schools, both mission and administration, registering two and recognising eight. The rest were substandard or regarded as places where people were evangelised rather than educated.¹⁴ By 1958/59 the number of children attending the fifteen schools of the administration had grown to 1,345. A 1957/58 estimate was that literacy throughout the EHD was 1 percent with 3 percent of the population attending recognised or registered schools, while literacy in any language was estimated at 10 percent.¹⁵ The people of the eastern highlands embraced the inadequate provision of education and sought to supplement it by gathering their own resources. The Gena people of East Koronigal census division in Chimbu SD collected £330, which they put toward the construction of a semi-permanent school. They had been told that if they could build a school the administration would provide a teacher.¹⁶ Despite a delay of two years the people of Gena were eventually sent two teachers, as the statistical appendix of the report for 1958/59 (Table 10.2) for the EHD indicates.

Table 10.2 EHD Administration Schools in 1958/59

¹³ *AR (DNA) EHD 1955/56*, p 13. By 1956/57 Tomasetti reported that it was doubtful Kate was a vernacular, and that there was a growing body of opinion within the Lutheran Mission opposed to its use.

¹⁴ *AR (DNA) EHD 1957/58*, p, 9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Location	Type	Enrolment	European Staff	Native Staff
<i>Kainantu SD</i>				
Kainantu	Station	81	1	1
Okapa	Station	68		2
Kamano	VHS	73		2
Kemiya	VHS	71		2
Kainantu SD		293	1	7
<i>Goroka SD</i>				
Goroka	Intermediate	110	4	2
Okiyufa	VHS	181	1	4
Henganofi	Station	88	1	2
Ikisau	VHS	53		2
Lufa	VHS	73		2
Yufa Yufa	VHS	80		2
Asaro	VHS	71		2
Emagave	VHS	70		2
SD total		726	6	18
<i>Chimbu SD</i>				
Kundiawa	Station	106	1	2
Kerowagi	Station	91	1	3
Wandi	VHS	63		2
Chuave	Station	90	1	2
Gena	VHS	70		2
SD total		420	3	11
District total		1449	15	36

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Of the seventeen administration schools, six were built around patrol posts and the others were within a day's walk from patrol posts.¹⁷ More children still attended mission schools¹⁸ than administration schools but the administration number had expanded from just over 100 in 1952/53 to over 1400 in 1958/59. This increase represented an acknowledgment that colonial control had an element of reciprocity: if the people of the highlands were to remain passive they had to be provided with services. The increased effort in providing education services was in part a recognition that earlier efforts had not met expectations.¹⁹ By mid-1959 the EHD still did not have secondary education, and only one Intermediate school (middle primary) at Goroka. The mass of effort was therefore in primary education, working with very young children.²⁰

Despite the official rhetoric of partnership between New Guineans and Europeans, segregation was practised in education at the most basic level: white children and black children did not attend the same schools. A European Primary School at Goroka started in 1953/54 attended by twenty-three students.²¹ Throughout Papua New Guinea secondary education for European children was usually at boarding school in Australia.

¹⁷ The schools at Kamano and Kemiya serviced the educational needs of villagers from Obiyufa, Ikisau, Lufa, Yufa Yufa, Asaro, and Amagave.

¹⁸ By 1958/59 4,487 children were taught in mission schools by 19 European staff and 114 Indigenous staff.

¹⁹ There was some scepticism within the administration of the readiness of eastern highlanders to embrace schooling with a/DOs Tomasetti, *AR (DNA) EHD 1957/58*, p. 9, and Holmes *AR (DNA) EHD 1958/59*, p. 15, believing that there was a good deal of "cult" thinking associated with education that stemmed from inter-group rivalry. Holmes further noted that eastern highlanders could however clearly see that education had its advantages and were determined to rectify the situation where many non-highlanders were employed in clerical, artisan and semi-skilled employment throughout the district.

²⁰ *AR (DNA) EHD 1958/59*, p. 15. The 1959 UN Mission to New Guinea observed Hasluck's policy of universal primary education was retarding political progress toward self-government by failing to provide adequate higher schooling. I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship*, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

²¹ *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 32.

10.1.2 *Health*

Because of the steady elimination of warfare the birth rate came to exceed the death rate which meant that the population was increasing. Downs' 1952/53 report summed up the situation with respect to health in no uncertain terms when he stressed that the EHD, with its current staffing levels in health, just could not cope.

The hospital accommodation and the medical staff, transport and facilities are TOTALLY INADEQUATE to cope with a counted population of 267,000 people.

Medical patrols are virtually non-existent in most areas and the number of hospitals should be at least doubled.

The Medical Training School should double its intake of trainees.

There is a response and need for medical treatment out of all proportion to the services required. It seems to be forgotten that this is the heaviest populated district in the combined Territories.

The health service that existed was a network of nodes feeding into regional hospitals. In 1953/54 Williams' more expansive comments indicate that aid posts in Chimbu SD (37) Goroka SD (17) and Kainantu SD (16) acted as feeders for the four native hospitals at Kerowagi, Chimbu, Goroka and Kainantu. These hospitals together treated a combined monthly average of 574 in-patients.²² The aid posts were staffed exclusively by New Guinean native Medical Assistants and Native Medical Orderlies. In the

hospitals the staff of three New Guinean Medical Officers were joined by six European Medical Assistants. While the aid posts were geographically dispersed, and therefore far closer to places where eastern highlanders actually lived than were the hospitals, they were “limited in their scope and value to care largely for those minor ills which may be cured by aspirin, Epsom Salts or cough mixture.”²³ Their primary function was as a point of referral of serious cases to the base hospitals in the towns and Williams noted that there could be nothing more certain than that the EHD, with its large population, had a far greater number of sick than the 574 that were able to be treated.²⁴ Williams also commented that infant or child welfare, ante- and post-natal care had not been touched. The fact that he even felt the need to comment shows that he believed more could be done. He further noted that the DNA’s own plans for the EHD involved the creation of four new patrol posts. Each of these he felt should have an adjoining facility of a Native Hospital with a European Officer, but even this would not be enough to satisfy demand for medical services.²⁵

By 1954/55 Downs was happier with the effort being put in by the Department of Health. The European staff consisted of the District Medical Officer, Dr Symes, assisted by two medical assistants and three nursing sisters. The Goroka SD employed seventy-nine New Guinean medical staff.²⁶ Downs made special mention of the work of Sister A. Goodall of the Department of Public Health who was based in Goroka.

Sister Goodall’s rounds included stops at thirteen other centres in the Goroka region: Asaro, Korefeign, Mando, Mirima, Lunipe, YufiYufa, the SDA mission (at YufiYufa),

²² *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 29.

²³ *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 29.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Mohoweto, Bena-Bena, Dunantina, Henganofi, Ababe and Watabung. She treated pneumonia, influenza, diarrhoea, dysentery, scabies, sipoma (tinea), malnourished children, conjunctivitis, and malaria. In May 1955 her work brought her into contact with over 1,400 children under two years of age, and she encouraged women to come into the Goroka clinic to give birth.²⁷

By 1955/56 there were 93 aid posts, each staffed by a New Guinean medical orderly who often went on patrol with the DNA officers. Some of the adult diseases among the highlands populations were imported, either from Europeans or from labourers returning from the coast: diarrhoea, gonorrhoea, influenza, varicella, rubella and diphtheria were all treated. Acting DO Harry West praised the work of the Infant and Maternal Welfare sisters who were based at Goroka, Kundiawa and Kerowagi, one of whom cared for more than 2,000 infants on daily runs out of Goroka. West noted that because of their work, "...an increasing number of native women are voluntarily attending hospital for confinement, with a resultant noticeable decrease in infant mortality".²⁸ The design of highlands houses, with their round beehive type construction and central pit for fire, made treatment for burns common as both sleeping adults and children occasionally rolled into the centre and into the fire.²⁹ Communal sleeping arrangements gave rise to increased risk of spreading tuberculosis, contracted from returning labourers despite treating highlands labour recruits with anti-TB

²⁶ *AREHD 1954/55*, p.37. The main diseases treated were malaria, pneumonia, dysentery, URTI (Upper Respiratory Tract Infection), *Ulsus Tropicum* (tropical ulcer) and Varicella (chickenpox).

²⁷ Statistical Table pp. 39-40 of *AREHD 1954/55* shows 144 children were born in the Goroka clinic.

²⁸ *AR (DNA) EHD 1955/56*, p 15. By mid 1956 there were three sisters.

²⁹ C D Rowley, *The New Guinea Village*, F W Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965, p. 29.

Mantoux tests³⁰ and BCG (*bacille Calmette-Guérin*) injections. Malarial quarantine was also employed to alleviate the possibility of infecting whole highlands populations.³¹

By 1956/57 the ratio of health professionals to the EHD population was 1:22,000 and included four qualified medical personnel and ten medical assistants. By the end of the 1957/58 year there were nine administration hospitals, 99 aid posts and infant welfare had further expanded. One of the great successes of the Australian health services was the treatment of the disease yaws that left deep scarring and disfigurement on victims. By 1957/58 72 percent of the EHD population had been treated for yaws³² and in the following year only around 40,000 people from an estimated population of 328,000 remained untreated in the EHD.³³ Medical expertise at the time could however do little for the victims of the disease 'Kuru' which was present in some EHD populations in remote areas. Around 16,000 people in Okapa SD, 11,000 of them Fore people, were affected by this progressively deteriorating neurological condition then thought to be similar to Parkinson's but was perhaps more like CJDv (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease variant).³⁴

³⁰ An intradermal tuberculin test named after French physician Charles Mantoux (1877-1947).

³¹ AR (DNA) EHD 1955/56, p 15.

³² AR (DNA) EHD 1957/58, p. 9.

³³ AR (DNA) EHD 1958/59, p 16. The Territory wide program called for three injections of dissolved sulfur in sterile solution and was astonishingly successful, with few mishaps. One mishap claimed the lives of seventeen people in the hamlet of Faita in Madang province when coconut milk was substituted for sterilised water as the dissolving liquid and left exposed to bacteria. P. Hasluck, *A Time for Building*, op. cit., p 106. Hasluck wrote that he was deeply touched by the diseases he saw New Guineans experience: "Hitherto in Australia I had been too healthy and too clean. I had not been sufficiently aware of bodies as something just as real, as sensitive, as transitory as flowers that are trodden on crushed and bruised as they lie on the earth or fade on the broken stalk. I saw babies enfeebled with dysentery and youngsters suspected of having internal parasites. I saw others suffering from malnutrition, starving to death not through lack of food but from other causes. ... I saw men and women with parts of their features eaten away or disfigured with yaws." *Ibid*, p. 102.

³⁴ The human equivalent of BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), better known as "Mad cow" disease. Many factors including genetically predetermined degeneration, infection, deficiency, intoxication, and hypersensitivity were studied in the victims, but it is no surprise that Kuru was not able to be treated in the late 1950s. In 1976 Dr D C Gajdusek won the Nobel Prize for Medicine and Physiology for his work on Kuru. One possible explanation for the high prevalence of Kuru in the Fore was the after-effects of

The Australian administration's provision of health services to the peoples of the EHD was a great boon to New Guineans. By their own standards however the administration officers working in the highlands felt that they could have done a great deal more if given adequate staff and resources. Health services got off to a slow start but eventually were widely dispersed and most EHD communities had access to aid posts that referred serious cases to the native hospitals. But as in education the rhetoric of partnership, of a new form of social relations, went only so far. All European sick were cared for in the European hospital at Goroka.

10.1.3 *Agriculture*

For the balance between the absence of conflict and the promise of economic development to be maintained, healthy people living under the *Pax Australiana* required opportunities, activities and legal methods of generating wealth. The administration, driven by Downs' personal belief that highlands societies revolved around personal power and innate despotism,³⁵ banked on the rapid development of wealth through the development of cash crops. Agricultural Extension thus became an important plank in the delivery of the economic development package that introduced wage labour and the capitalist mode of production to the highlands, as well as linking the region to the international economy, and the world commodities market, for the first time.

infected brain tissue contracted through ritualistic cannibalism. The DNA estimated that between 1953-1958 half of Fore deaths were due to Kuru. *AR (DNA) EHD 1958/59*, p. 16.

³⁵ *AREHD 1952/53*, p 25.

In the period 1947-1951 the Australian administration in the EHD promoted market gardening in European and native vegetables as a cash generating exercise. These crops were consumed locally and sent to other districts of Papua and New Guinea. In the period 1952-57 agricultural crops that could be grown for European markets were widely promoted. The main proponents of this push were the officers of the Division of Agricultural extension, a bureau of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries.

In 1955-56 in the Territory of New Guinea this Division employed 122 people, thus making it the largest Bureau within ASF.³⁶ Sixteen ASF officers were in the EHD by 1955, although only four of these were concerned with agricultural extension.³⁷ Up until 1952/1953 there had not been an agricultural extension officer in the EHD.³⁸ The increased staffing from the mid-1950s reflects the importance placed on developing cash cropping as a means of economic development, the benefits of which could provide social stability thus lessening the potential for challenges to the colonial state.

The principal cash crops promoted for the eastern highlands were passionfruit, peanuts and coffee. Today coffee from the New Guinea highlands is widely exported but in the early 1950s only the Europeans who had planted coffee in the late 1940s were able to produce and sell this crop. The length of time taken for a coffee plant to mature from the seedling, usually between five to seven years, meant that even while being widely

³⁶ *Territory of New Guinea Report, 1954-55*, p. 131-134.

³⁷ *Territory of New Guinea Report, 1954-55*, p. 139. While these figures indicate a high number of officers the EHD tended to operate from as low as 54 percent of its entire staff ratio (1952/53).

³⁸ Downs' report of 1952-53 mentions the appointment of one officer and the need for more. *AREHD 1952/53*, p. 55.

promoted and planted among highlands communities, by the end of the 1950s coffee was just emerging as a valuable export crop for both Europeans and New Guineans. Several excellent studies have been made of the growth of the coffee industry in the eastern highlands³⁹ and rather than retread this ground, this section examines the rationale behind the push toward increased agricultural diversification as a means of deepening the economic ‘development’ upon which the *Pax Australiana* depended.

Cash crops were the basis for wealth generation in the highlands and the development of a landed peasantry mitigated the frustration and resentment of New Guineans for whom development was held up as compensation for colonial control. Because of the intrusion of capitalist farming techniques and the monetisation of the economy, traditional forms of wealth, such as shell money, became increasingly devalued. This trend was exacerbated by the seemingly inexhaustible quantities of trade shell that the administration was able to provide, and by the administration’s use of it when considered appropriate, and that was when they felt people would accept it. The consequent devaluation of shell money, caused by increased supply, meant that cash money gained in importance and began to be circulated and widely used throughout the eastern highlands. Cash came to be demanded by many in the EHD as payment for goods and labour.

While the introduction of money was an intentional policy of the administration it is unlikely that the resulting devaluation and demise of traditional means of exchange was

³⁹ M. Donaldson, and K. Good, *Articulated Agricultural Development: Traditional and Capitalist Agricultures in Papua New Guinea*, Avebury, Aldeshot, 1998 and B. Finney, *Big Men and Business: Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the New Guinea Highlands*, University Press of Hawaii,

foreseen. There is no comment on any deliberate attempt to wreck the traditional economy, but its demise correlates with the administration's objectives. The linking of agriculture with monetised currency eliminated previous forms of wealth and introduced a method by which the highlands could engage in trade with the outside world. In any case the administration was attempting to introduce new economic techniques that shifted the emphasis from barter transactions to economic exchange using tokens accepted and redeemable throughout all districts of Papua and New Guinea and beyond. The role of agriculture in this process is especially important as the administration set standard rates for the purchase of crops, which were at times altered to reflect varying quality and quantity. The market, although regulated, was introduced to the highlands in the 1950s by the EHD administration.

The administration initially purchased all agricultural commodities and even increased the price of purchase in order to generate interest in growing cash crops. In September 1952 Downs raised the price to be paid to New Guineas from 1/4 d/lb (a quarter pence per pound) of vegetables to 1/2 d/lb.⁴⁰ The administration's behaviour can only be explained by non-economic objectives as it doubled the cost of vegetables such as sweet potato, corn and taro, for settlers, missions and for itself. It did however double the amount of cash going to EHD producers. Each load of sweet potato (*kau kau*) was suddenly worth twice what it had been. Stable markets were assured for passionfruit and peanuts through the purchasing policies of the administration and while vegetables,⁴¹

Honolulu, 1973, both deal with the development of the coffee industry in the highlands in the 1950s to 1970s.

⁴⁰ *AREHD 1952/53*, p. 27.

⁴¹ In the late 1940s the CHD administration bought vegetables to keep away scurvy and to supply coastal towns. With the influx of a settler population and their plantation farming techniques, based on a small core labour force (the settler and his family), and a large amount of crop output, day labourers were required at times of increased activity, such as harvesting. By law the employers were required to pay and

passionfruit⁴² and peanuts⁴³ were honest high yield-per-acre crops, on a per capita basis the amount of money being earned by eastern highlanders was small. As the coffee industry developed among Europeans, New Guineans became increasingly attracted.

Despite its long period of maturation, coffee was the most valuable cash crop. In the 1953/54 year from October to June the administration paid a set rate of one shilling per pound of parchment coffee and collected 1,345 lbs for £67.5.0. Coffee was therefore some 24 times more valuable than vegetables.⁴⁴ In that year the single Agricultural Extension Officer for the entire EHD organised the planting of 57 plots of coffee in Goroka and Chimbu SDs for New Guinean growers and was training a squad of local Agricultural Assistants.⁴⁵ In June 1957 Acting DO W. E. Tomasetti recorded that there were approximately 2,300 New Guineans growing coffee on 540 acres.⁴⁶ This generated around £18,500 for eastern highlands farmers and represented about 20 percent of their potential coffee crop, many of the trees having been only recently planted.

feed their labour force and therefore sourced root vegetables (sweet potato and taro) from local suppliers, or purchased vegetables from European middle men who drove along the roads buying vegetables from the more distant communities.

⁴² The *Cottees* factory in Goroka, which employed former DC George Greathead as its agent, purchased the fruit directly from growers. It was crushed and the pulp and juice exported to Australia. On arrival it was injected into carbonated water, bottled and sold as the popular refreshment *Passiona*. The purchase price for passionfruit was 1d/1lb when the fruit was collected from villages and 3d/1lb from the factory. Many eastern highlanders walked to the factory at Goroka to get the higher price. In February 1959 Cottees threatened to pull out, but the DNA brokered a deal whereby a fixed price of 2d/1lb was offered for all fruit brought to the factory, with no fruit collected elsewhere. The Assistant Administrator of the Territory presided over this conference to save the passionfruit industry in the Goroka area. *AR (DNA) EHD 1958/59*, p. 7-8.

⁴³ Peanuts were promoted for their dietary value due to their high content of oils and fats. As a rotational crop for replenishing gardens it was also found to be most valuable. With three crops a year people could grow peanuts alongside sweetpotato, essentially for pocket money.

⁴⁴ In the imperial measurement system there were 12 pence (d) to a shilling (s) and 20 shillings to a pound (£).

⁴⁵ *AREHD 1953/54*, p. 25.

⁴⁶ *AR (DNA) EHD 1956/57*, p 4.

New Guinean coffee plots in the EHD varied widely in size and management techniques; the smallest could contain as few as 100 trees, the largest up to 4 acres of coffee. Many plots were individually owned, but groups operated some. Certain of these groups were clan based and others were not. The larger plots even employed casual migrant labour from other clans, and from other parts of the highlands. Interestingly the administration made efforts to “individualise the ownership” of group managed coffee plots, presumably because it felt that non-clan based co-operative management would be a source of tension in the future. The diversity of approaches to the growing of coffee indicates the adaptability of the highlanders both to new crops and to the new capitalist economic climate. In the face of marked social change eastern highlanders engaged with the new system at a variety of levels, and in a wide range of enterprises.

But as noted in the 1950s coffee was not the main cash for New Guineans in the EHD, even in Goroka which became the centre of the coffee industry. Table 10.3, adapted from the report for the 1954/55 year (July to April), indicates the crops from which Gorokans received the most income.

Table 10.3 Crop value Goroka SD 1954-55 July to April⁴⁷

<i>Crop</i>	<i>Quantity (lbs)</i>	<i>Value Goroka SD (£)</i>
Coffee	1,852	92. 12. 0
Passionfruit	508,564	3,297. 5. 6
Peanuts	61,446	1,536. 3. 0
Potatoes	222,672	1,194. 15. 2
Sale to Private employers^a	683,000	1,212. 14. 3
Sweet Potatoes	2,247,535	4,647. 0. 11
Total	3,651,969	£11,980. 10. 9

Notes: a (no breakdown of produce)

By the mid 1950s Gorokans were earning sixteen times more for their peanuts than for their coffee. While coffee was one shilling per pound, peanuts were paid at between sixpence and 1s 3d (1/3) per lb, depending on quality. Peanuts were more widely grown and far easier to grow than coffee and it is no surprise that they remained an important component of the eastern highlands agricultural economy until the late 1950s. Passionfruit returns were more than twice that of peanuts, and sweet potato sales accounted for over one third of all income in Goroka SD, and district wide for £18,366.10.⁴⁸ By 1959 however the shift toward coffee cultivation was in full swing and the relative value of the activity in the EHD is shown in Table 10.4.

⁴⁷ From *AREHD 1954/55*, p. 30.

⁴⁸ *AREHD, 1954/55*, p. 28.

Table 10.4 Economic activity by New Guineans in EHD 1958/59⁴⁹

	<i>Coffee</i>	<i>Misc. agric. & market gardening</i>	<i>Mining</i>	<i>Firewood trading timber handicrafts etc</i>	<i>Building</i>	<i>Roadwork</i>
Dependent on activity for economic growth						
Native employers	1,600	800	1,300	0	6,500	1,200
Self employed	1,850	900	950	600	1,900	350
Communal profit sharing	0	31,000	7,500	1,300	0	0
Not predominantly dependent on activity for economic growth						
Native employers	0	0	180	0	250	600
Self employed	5,100	6,250	375	150	180	0
Communal profit sharing	10,400	12,750	1,100	2,750	1,150	16,000
Totals (£)	18,950	51,700	11,405	4,800	9,980	18,150

By mid-1959 income to New Guineans in the EHD from these industries accounted for £114,985 of the £116,755 earned. As can be seen, the trend toward coffee farming this does not appear to have come at significant cost to other cash crops. From the twenty-five plots of 1952/53 and the £67 worth of coffee produced in 1953/54, New Guinean coffee growers in the eastern highlands expanded their plantings to over 3,850 acres by

⁴⁹ Adapted from *AR (DNA) EHD 1958/59*, p 44. Statistical Table 15. Figures were adjudged to be 75 percent accurate based on records, enquiries of commercial channels and personal knowledge of officers.

March of 1959.⁵⁰ But contrary to the administration's desire to individualise land tenure for permanent tree cropping,⁵¹ communal profit sharing still accounted for over half of all coffee revenue. It did however aim to educate and assist growers in techniques for planting coffee and held educational field days involving DNA, the DC and Agricultural Extension Officers at central points, with people from up to 30 miles walking in to attend. The administration felt the success of such days was seen in the large number of correctly planted, shaded and tended nurseries as well as the improved quality of bean.⁵²

Apart from coffee a number of cash crops remained important sources of income for highlanders. All cash crops facilitated a shift from a barter economy to direct exchange. While coffee was not the most important cash crop in the period under review it soon became so. By 1963 New Guinean agricultural production in coffee and other highlands crops exceed expatriate plantation production.⁵³ For people who had dealt in shells and pigs it became obvious that there was money to be made, and money could be used to purchase items from trade stores to assist in farming (axes, hoes, spades) and even cars and tractors. Ben Finney's *Big Men and Business* illustrates this point well:

⁵⁰ In contrast the only European to export coffee in 1953/54, James Luby Leahy, produced 12,000 lbs of coffee the price for which varied between £580 and just over £700 lbs per ton. With 2240 lbs per ton this quantity of coffee, even at the lowest rate, would have given him an income of over £3,000 for his crop. To put this figure in perspective and going by the 1954-55 service grades salaries, Leahy would have earned more than all official Australian administration personnel with the exception of the His Honour the Administrator (paid out of Canberra from the Department of Territories budget) and possibly the Assistant Administrator who was the second highest paid official in the country.

⁵¹ *AR (DNA) EHD 1955/56*, p. 6.

⁵² *AR (DNA) EHD 1958/59*, pp. 6-7. Former DC Ian Downs also attended these meetings in his capacity as Association President of the Highlands Farmers and Settlers Association (HFSA).

⁵³ I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship*, *op. cit.*, p. 181, 185. In 1965 indigenous coffee production (the vast majority of which was in the EHD) was 4,319 tons from 35,037 acres. Australian settlers produced 3,374 tons from 12,229 acres. By 1970 the figures had risen to 22,425 and 6,258 tons respectively.

What Baito Heiro, [former DO Jim] Taylor's *protege*, did with the four thousand dollar payment for his first coffee harvest in 1957 should have alerted the local Europeans that the Gorokans had more than consumer goods in mind when it came to spending their coffee money. Baito wanted to use his to buy a four-wheel-drive Land Rover utility truck (which along with the jeep was about the only available vehicle capable of operating on Goroka's primitive roads). He therefore ordered one from England, which after being landed at a coastal port had to be airfreighted into Goroka, for the road link to the coast was not completed then. Baito did not want the Land Rover for just his private use; he wanted it to give rides to his clansmen and others who had helped him get started in coffee, carry paying loads of passengers and freight around Goroka and simply show off his success by being the first Gorokan *bisnisman* to own and operate a commercial vehicle.⁵⁴

The Australian administration promoted agricultural diversification in the eastern highlands in an effort to create wealth. During the 1950s an increasing amount of cash circulated within the eastern highlands economy, some of which was deposited to the patrol posts (which acted as banks) and actual banks (the Bank of New South Wales and the Commonwealth) that set up in Goroka and Kainantu. In a wider sense, by providing agricultural assistance to New Guinean highlands communities, the administration linked the district with commodity markets in other parts of the Territory and overseas. As a result of the diversification of agriculture, the eastern highlands was slowly incorporated into the complex commodity chains of international capitalist production. Passionfruit grown in the highlands were crushed at the Cottees plant in Goroka and were later consumed by Australians in milk bars. The peanuts were purchased by the

⁵⁴ B. Finney, *Big Men and Business*, *op. cit.* p. 71. While Finney claims the road to the coast was not complete it is more likely that it was being remade after the initial efforts of 1953. In November of 1965 the Commonwealth Department of Works began reconstruction of the Lae-Kainantu section which was falling apart after heavy usage. I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship*, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

administration and sold at markets in Port Moresby, Rabaul and Sydney. Gorokan coffee beans went to Australia, West Germany and some to the Dutch in West New Guinea.⁵⁵

With the administration buying the agricultural product that derived from their experiment in creating a cash-cropping peasantry, eastern highlanders soon learned about fluctuations in the international commodities markets the hard way, but were in no position to do other than accept the administration's set prices for their goods.⁵⁶ But by far the most noticeable change within the eastern highlands in the 1952-57 period was the creation of a European settler community predominantly interested in large scale plantation agriculture of coffee. The creation of this white planter society, promoted vociferously by DC Ian Downs, was designed to foster 'partnership' and provides a useful example of the benefits of district analysis in colonial history.

10.2 *Land policy: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*⁵⁷

The highlands had been closed to European settlement from 1935 when administration officers and missionaries had been murdered. Immediately after the war there were a number of Europeans who settled in the EHD, many of whom were former administration officers who had stayed on, essentially squatting on land that they were

⁵⁵ *Territory of New Guinea Report 1955-56*, pp. 160-162.

⁵⁶ Australia's trade relationship with its colony in PNG was a consistent cause for concern with both New Guinean and white farmers. The Territory took just under 65 percent of the value of its imported goods from Australia in 1956 and exported 46 percent of the value of its produce to Australia (a wide variety of products) and just under 48 percent to the UK (almost all copra products). *Ibid.* Despite this, Ian Downs wrote that "We are now being subjected to the selfish representations of Australian growers, chiefly those at Kingaroy [the centre of the Queensland peanut growing industry], who are bringing political pressure to bear to prevent the entry of New Guinea Peanuts to Australia". *AREHD 1954/55*, p 77. See note 61 on passionfruit.

not permitted to own.⁵⁸ The first three chief officers of the administration, Taylor, Greathead and Downs, all resigned their posts to grow coffee, and a number of more junior officers were also attracted to the settler life in the highlands. For settlement to occur land was required, and as land was the property of New Guineans it could only be bought by the administration and leased to settlers. The problem for the highlands came when the interests of the District Commissioner were identical to those of the settlers; it became a case of “who will guard the guardians” and an examination of this brief period of land rush for coffee plantations in the highlands indicates the tensions between colonial policy decided by the government of the colonial power, and the actual implementation of colonial practice at the district level.

In the 1952/53 report Downs commented on how the philosophy of partnership, espoused by Minister Hasluck, was to work in the EHD.

This District is a place of hope for the future, with no past commitments and with no obligations to the past. We, who work here, have faith in this future and are doing our best to give the native people and the European settlers a chance to travel together along a road of fair progress in an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect.⁵⁹

Ian Downs felt that the main factors in the lives of the highlands peoples were, in order, land, money, power, European settlement and the Highland Labour Recruiting Scheme.⁶⁰ He argued that because of the interest of European settlers in the eastern highlands as an agricultural production area, the indigenous people were being forced to

⁵⁷ “Who will guard the guardians?” Attributed to Juvenal.

⁵⁸ I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁵⁹ *AREHD 1952/53*, p. 63.

⁶⁰ *AREHD 1952/53*, p. 22.

settle their differences and colonise parts of their claimed lands to stave off any European influx. Alienation of land for European settlement in the highlands was a matter to which Downs gave his “personal care” and one which brought him into direct conflict, not with the Administrator in Port Moresby, but with the Minister for Territories in Canberra.

In his 1952/53 annual report Downs, noted:

This is not a normal District. It is abnormal in its population, subnormal in its state of native advancement, extraordinary in its economic and defence potential and in its urgent and crying need for development — both European and native.

The eventual success or failure of the Administration in this District will depend on our efforts of the next five years. If we succeed, the Territory will have something of inestimable value, economically and from a point of security. If we fail, the repercussions could be dangerous and might require ten times our present staff to handle them.⁶¹

The main problem, as DCs George Greathead and Ian Downs saw it, was that the *Pax Australiana* had denied the people of the eastern highlands the ability to acquire status and power through participation in warfare. If no substitute was provided the situation could fast deteriorate. The *Pax Australiana* ossified political alliances and relationships, confirmed as victors those who had occupied the lands of others and denied the vanquished any chance to reclaim their tribal or clan territories.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p 7.

The solution that Downs in particular championed was to allow limited European settlement on disputed land to create a white planter class growing coffee, and to have them live alongside New Guineans, sharing farming techniques. The purpose of this was to encourage economic activity and the generation of wealth as a substitute to acquiring status through tribal fighting. Pressure for economic development of the EHD, in order to curb potential social problems brought about by pacification, led to the lifting in May 1952 of the restriction on white settlement by the Territory Executive Council. Applicants could request to be granted not more than 200 acres of land. These requests initially found their way to the District Headquarters at Goroka and to the District Commissioner.

Ian Downs' comments on the importance of the five years from 1952 onward came from a position of considerable highlands experience and were aimed toward prompting the administration to act so as to capitalise on the solid administrative foundation of pacification that had been laid by the DDSNA. This forthright advocacy of the economic potential of the highlands brought Downs into direct conflict with the rather paternalistic policies of Hasluck who regarded Downs as "something of a prima donna" but had great regard for his capabilities and capacity for organisation. Hasluck was not in favour of Downs' centralist approach to the issue of European land settlement whereby "anybody wanting land just saw the district commissioner"⁶² and did not

⁶² P. Hasluck, *A Time for Building*, *op. cit.*, p. 121. Hasluck admits that Downs was not one of his admirers and that the situation of land in the highlands was partly due to the inability of the Lands Office to get its house in order. In contrast to Downs, Hasluck thought Grethead a "quiet, good and reolute man" wholly dedicated to the indigenous people. Hasluck notes that Grethead had more of an influence on Hasluck's development of policy than any other person due to his clear, careful and exact explanation of the situation in the highlands on Hasluck's first visit to the region in 1951. Hasluck personally regretted Grethead's departure from the administration and continued to meet with him when possible when in Goroka. *Ibid.* p. 120.

approve of Downs' pro-active approach of snapping up land parcels for later sale to appropriate Europeans.

The Minister felt that Downs was somewhat dramatic but could see that he was also efficient, and this view was shared by Hasluck's chief public servant in PNG. The Administrator Brigadier Donald (later Sir Donald) Cleland regarded Downs as his best DC and supported him in his efforts to develop the EHD.⁶³ Hasluck thought that Downs was energetic and self-confident, and that he acted out of the best interests of the people. However Hasluck also felt that no single officer should decide administration policy on the spot. This conflict between Downs and Hasluck over land is an excellent example of the problems of examining colonial policy from the perspective of official policy alone and indicates that at the district level of administration and implementation, the structures of power that emerge are often far more arbitrary and dependent upon the abilities and personalities of particular individuals.

Everyone recognised the central position of land in Melanesian society. Within clan boundaries were contained ancestor spirits, legends and creation myths: land was integral to Papua New Guinean identity and this was recognised from the earliest days of Australian administration in the highlands. Only the administration could purchase land and all land alienation theoretically occurred through the administration. Land was acquired for government patrol posts, airstrips, roads and facilities such as hospitals and schools. Missions wanted land for their churches and schools and settlers wanted land for plantations. The administration therefore purchased some land from New Guinean owners — at least those whom it considered to be the rightful owners — for its own

purposes and this became crown land. All other lands were supposedly rented from the tribal owners, but some former government officers who wished to settle in the district were able to use their local influence as kiaps to buy land directly before regulation.

At the opening of the highlands the direct application system was still in use. Under this system a prospective planter would arrive in the EHD, find an appropriate plot of land, offer money to the owners for its sale and report to the administration that he and they had reached an agreement to sell. This system presumably allowed New Guineans a certain amount of agency and discretion in deciding whether or not they would sell their land, and if so to whom, but was also open to abuse through inadequate provision by highlanders themselves for their own future needs. The EHD administration favoured this system as they could keep a tight reign on the types of people settling in the highlands and felt that the right sort of settler could encourage, promote and assist their New Guinean neighbours under the philosophy of partnership.

After just two years as Minister, Paul Hasluck had increasing concerns for self sufficiency in highlands food production, given that European settlement had by then led to something of a land grab. Hasluck felt the direct application system was fraught with problems and from 1953 attempted to curb the practice. Land alienation in the highlands basically halted during 1954 as Hasluck aimed to ensure land policy in the Territory was consistent. He introduced a new lands policy that rested on allocation by tender which involved the Lands Department acting in consultation with DDSNA, Health, Agriculture and Forests. His reforms stopped direct negotiation between settler and landholders and took into account the future needs of communities for their own

⁶³ *Ibid.* Hasluck claims that Cleland was effusive in his praise for Downs.
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requirements in food production. Existing land held by the administration was examined to determine what best possible use could be made of it. If it was found that parcels of land could be utilised, applications for farming were to be forwarded to the Land Board for consideration.⁶⁴ By October of 1954 the new system was in place and the land rush was over. One immediate result was the lack of comment on land matters by Downs in the 1954/55 report.⁶⁵

While the regulated system gave more importance to the future needs of all New Guineans and was in theory more equitable for European settlers, eastern highlanders now had no influence over who was to be their neighbour as the selection process depended on applications submitted to the centralised administration. The new system also required a new lands ordinance that would list the ownership of land in the Territory. The crucial question of what it meant to “sell” land to the administration, and the understanding by New Guineans of this process, was initially ignored.

During the 1950s a procedure emerged by which administration officers were to establish the boundaries of land to be acquired. The patrol and lands officers first ascertained (as best they could) who were the traditional owners, calculated the rate of population growth and prospective population in 25 years, 50 years and 99 years and the ability of available resources of the clan to meet these figures. If these calculations showed that even in 99 years the owners and their clan would not require the land for food production, only then could the administration acquire a parcel of land and rent it

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 126. For Hasluck’s interpretation of events see pp. 114-127.

⁶⁵ *AREHD 1954/55*, p. 108 provides only figures for the total amount of alienated land, land alienated during the year and the new total whereas previous reports had waxed lyrical for several pages on the benefits of the new system.

to a settler. In practice the change of system froze the area of alienated land in the EHD and there were only slight increases after 1954. Because of population density no land was available for alienation in Chimbu SD and ADO West noted that if the road could be extended south from Goroka perhaps ten small properties could be created.⁶⁶

An examination of the growth in alienated land during the 1950s reveals the effectiveness of Hasluck's policy. During 1957/58 land alienation was suspended "except for those areas intended to provide further social services for the native public".⁶⁷ While Table 10.5 demonstrates that the amount of alienated land doubled within the four years from 1951/52-1955-56, the main jump occurs in first two years of de-restriction of the highlands from 1952, and the main group to benefit were private European interests with over 6,000 acres of the best land being given over to private lease.

Table 10.5 Alienated land in the EHD (acres) 1951/52 to 1962/63

	1951/2	1952/3	1953/4	1954/5	1955/6	1956/7	1957/8	1958/9	1962/63
Total alienated area (to nearest acre)	8841.71	14,294	17,676	17,884	19,000	19,010	19,126	19,489	21,687
increase from previous year (acres)		5,452	3,382	848	1,162	10	116	363	na
Increase in									
<i>Administration</i>		320.24	262.4	142					
<i>Private</i>		3,797.87	2,702.55	680.5					
<i>Missions</i>		1334	416.98	25.4					

In 1954/55 Downs records the 1953/54 figure as 17,035.87 acres.

⁶⁶ AR (DNA) EHD 1955/56, p 17-18. He did note however that it was unrealistic to think that vast areas were awaiting exploitation.

⁶⁷AR (DNA) EHD 1957/58, p 12.

Despite submitting statistics of the amount of land alienated in the EHD the report on the Territory of New Guinea to the United Nations underestimated the figure. In 1954/55 Downs wrote that at 30 May there were 17,883 acres alienated which was recorded as 14,642 acres; and even in the following year the figure recorded for the United Nations was still only 15,160 acres while West had told head office that it was approximately 19,000 acres.⁶⁸ The only logical explanation for this, apart from incompetence in arranging statistical tables, is that Australia was attempting to down-play the amount of alienated land in the EHD.

One result of this land alienation was an increase in European population. In the whole of the Central Highlands District in 1948/49 there had been 170 Europeans (129 adults and their 41 children).⁶⁹ By 30 June 1954 the combined non-indigenous total in the EHD was 363 people, an increase of over two and half times in six years.⁷⁰ By 30 June 1956 this had risen to 487 non-indigenous (314 of them in Goroka SD) and by 30 June 1958 there were 789 non-indigenous, including 21 Chinese.⁷¹

⁶⁸ *AREHD 1954/55*, p 107 and *AREHD 1955/56*, p. 17; *Territory of New Guinea Reports 1954/55*, p. 162 and *Territory of New Guinea Reports 1955/56*, p. 167.

⁶⁹ In the three SDs that were to make up the EHD there were 132 people in total: 38 adults categorised as administration and their 14 children (52); 47 missionaries and their 17 children (64) and 14 others with 2 children (16). *ARCHD 1948/49*, p. 8.

⁷⁰ There were 318 Europeans in the EHD alone: 188 'British' (ie Australian) males, 113 British women and girls, and 17 other European races. There were 39 American citizens, 6 stateless, but no Asian people present.

⁷¹ *AREHD 1955/56*, Table 6, *AR (DNA) EHD 1957/58*, Table 6. By mid-1958 over 500 Europeans lived in Goroka SD; 108 in Chimbu and 150 in Kainantu.

The peak interest group for European settlers was the Highlands Farmers and Settlers Association (HFSA), formed in 1953.⁷² This influential body was founded by the first three head officers of the eastern highlands, Jim Taylor, George Greathead and Ian Downs, along with the region's most prosperous businessman, James Leahy.⁷³ After he retired⁷⁴ Downs became the President of the HFSA and his papers relating to it (1956-1968) contain the constitution which notes that the objects of the association were to “serve and protect the interests of farmers and settlers: to uphold the charter of the Association; to improve agricultural methods and standards amongst all people of whatever race engaged in primary production.” Membership was not exclusive and

⁷² D. Howlett, *A Decade of Change in the Goroka Valley*, PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1962, pp. 263-264. The HFSA is first mentioned in AREHD 1955/56.

⁷³ M. Donaldson and K. Good, *Articulated Agricultural Development*, *op. cit.* p. 71.

⁷⁴ The architects of the white settler movement in the EHD were also officers of the administration and, like Taylor and Greathead before him, Ian Downs resigned from the service in January of 1956 to grow coffee in the highlands. He became manager for a plantation of 400 acres, on three relatively close together areas in the upper Asaro Valley, run on behalf of a group of Australian investors. He used his superannuation to buy into the syndicate with a one-sixth share. The syndicate exercised an option of just under 100 acres at Nomba on land disputed by the Korfena and Miruma people which had been purchased by the government at an earlier date. While Downs claims that he could not use his official position to secure land, he had in fact been in charge of land alienation since 1952 and was thus well aware of what land was available for purchase. The company took the name Korfena and by 1966 had the whole 400 acres under tree. Downs, *The Last Mountain*, p 261. As perhaps the most influential white man in the highlands Ian Downs represented the interests of planters and highlanders to the administration from the time of his resignation from the administration. He was an elected member of the Papua New Guinea Legislative Council from 1956-63, representing the Highlands Open electorate and he balanced this political activity with managing the coffee plantation, his presidency of the HFSA and overseas travel to coffee growing regions. See I. Downs, *The Last Mountain*, *op. cit.*, p. 282. He resigned from the Council in April of 1959, along with all other elected members, in a dispute over the introduction of income tax to the Territory. For a short history of the development of PNG's early institutions of governance, see C. A. Hughes, 'The Development of the Legislature: the Legislative Councils', in D. G. Bettison, C. A. Hughes, and P. W. van der Veur, eds, *The Papua New Guinea Elections 1964*, Australian National University, Canberra, 1965, pp 8-27. The first house of assembly elections comprised 44 Open electorates and 10 Special electorates. The special electorates were designed to provide expertise to the house that would otherwise not have been available. When the House of Assembly elections were introduced in 1964 as the first step toward self-government for Papua New Guineans, Downs stood as a candidate for the Highlands Special electorate (a region of 14,900 m² and 533,000 population) and won. See Colin Hughes and Paul van der Veur, 'The Elections: An Overview', in *ibid.* pp 388-429. His promotion of the highlands and of Papua New Guinea extended to advocating a union of PNG with Australia, along the lines of Puerto Rico with the United States of America. In his annual report to the HFSA in 1962 Downs responded to the criticism of Sir Hugh Foot, head of the UN Mission to PNG in 1961, of Australia's failure to impose a plan for self-government on the Territory writing that “If Australia will not speak for us we must act for ourselves — it is not our intention to deliver the highlands people so recently won to civilization into the hands of the decadent, degenerate

persons who qualified for membership could be: financial members (a joining fee of three guineas and an annual subscription of three guineas); a holder of an agricultural or pastoral lease in the Highlands; any person engaged in primary production in his own interest; any other approved person.⁷⁵ New members were invited to join the HFSA which was governed by a President with four Vice Presidents, a Secretary a Treasurer and six members of the committee. The HFSA had annual elections by ballot and was based in Goroka with branches in Wahgi (Western Highlands District), Wau (Morobe District), Kainantu (EHD) and Mt Hagen (Western Highlands District).⁷⁶

The HFSA was affiliated with the National Farmers Union of Australia⁷⁷ and published the *New Guinea Highlands Bulletin*, which Ben Finney noted carried under its masthead the motto “We Are Here to Stay”.⁷⁸ In theory nothing (except perhaps the cost of membership) prevented New Guineans from joining the HFSA and the association had a long-standing policy of encouraging New Guinean members. In the early 1970s Finney noted:

European members of the association make it clear that they want Gorokans in their organization so that they will identify with European growers and oppose any disruption of the coffee industry by radicals who might want to break up the large plantations or otherwise reorganize the industry.⁷⁹

Indonesian bandits”. I. Downs cited in Colin Hughes, ‘The Development of the Legislature’, *Ibid*, p. 33. Downs returned to Australia before independence was granted.

⁷⁵ I. Downs, *Papers relating to the HFSA (1956-1968)* [3 reels microfilm, Mitchell Library] Reel 1, Item 2, sections 2-4. Downs prepared a charter along with Peter Maxtone Graham and Jim Taylor. See also *The Last Mountain*, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

⁷⁶ I. Downs, *Papers relating to the HFSA (1956-1968)*, section 9.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, section 16.

⁷⁸ B. Finney, *Big Men and Business*, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

The HFSA recognised that the gap between large plantations and small farms was widening and in 1968 attempted to bring more Papua New Guinean coffee estate owners into its organisation, hopefully to create common class interests across racial lines. That the HFSA was still attempting to induce New Guineans to join the association so close to independence indicates the lack of success in promoting partnership since the 1950s. The HFSA remained a white dominated and white run group identified with the interests of European plantation agriculture.

In 1962/63 the EHD had a total area of 4,416,000 acres, of which alienated land owned by the administration accounted for just 21,687 acres. Of this figure 5,257 acres was under crop, 2,225 acres were classified as establish pastures, and 2,107 acres had been cleared and was either fallow or awaiting planting. This left a total of 12,098 acres that was not being utilised. The total land controlled by the administration was just under half of one percent. The issue for the highlands in later years was that this 0.05 percent represented much of the best agricultural land in the District. It was primarily located in the areas around the Asaro valley west of Goroka and around Kainantu and it was the same 0.05 percent that had been provided to settlers in 1952-54.⁸⁰

In a region where the *Pax Australiana* had created peace those in charge of the EHD had promoted white settlement as a fillip to New Guinean social and economic development. The expansion in the area of alienated land in the early 1950s and the ending of such schemes by the Minister illustrates that colonial practice and colonial

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 168.

⁸⁰ By 1971 there were over 1,600 whites living in and around the Goroka area alone and while by this time many of them had businesses in town, the genesis of the European population boom had occurred

policy were not always marching hand in hand. In a region where the power of the kiap was law and money was fast becoming the primary means of exchange, land disputed between groups was offered to European planters or acquired by the administration to eliminate potential problems. Such acquisitions aimed to distribute the white population outside of Goroka and Kainantu towns and to share out their influence evenly within the Eastern Highlands as part of the “non-colonial” control enjoyed by Australia.⁸¹

The rhetoric of partnership at a Territory-wide level was championed early in his period of office by Paul Hasluck. In an article in 1952 in *South Pacific*, the journal of ASOPA, he claimed that

New Guinea is neither a colony nor a territory: it is in the experimental stage which the world has not yet seen and which it may not be possible to create anywhere else in the world - an attempt at co-operation and mutual service between two peoples, a guardianship....⁸²

This call had been taken up enthusiastically by DCs in the Highlands and there is no doubt that Taylor, Greathead, Williams, Downs, H P (Bill) Seale (DC EHD 1956-1964) and other former officers believed in the potential of the highlands and constantly badgered the administration to commit adequate resources to encourage growth. In 1952/53 Downs wrote in the annual report to the DDSNA that “Australia does not

with the proportionately high numbers arriving in the early 1950s to grow coffee. Jim Sinclair, *Kiap, op. cit.*, p. 256.

⁸¹ I. Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship, op. cit.*, p. 179.

⁸² P. Hasluck, ‘A Policy for New Guinea’, Address by the Minister for Territories to the William McGregor Club, Sydney 20th November 1951, *South Pacific* Vol 5, no. 11, Jan-Feb 1952 p. 225.

deserve to hold New Guinea if it intends to hold this Territory back,”⁸³ and made it clear

⁸³ *AREHD 1952/53*, p 62.

that the task of development in New Guinea should be directed to the areas where it was likely to succeed, and that districts were not all the same and should not be treated as such.⁸⁴ The belief in the uniqueness of the highlands and in its untapped economic potential were critical factors in the type of administrative colonialism that developed with its emphasis on settler capitalism and partnership, a notion espoused by all, but embraced by only a few.

While economic development was seen as a key to prosperity for all, the positions of authority of government officers and the vastly different cultural backgrounds made sincere partnership difficult. On one hand the people were to be guided and ruled by a paternalistic government; on the other they were encouraged to embrace modern clothes, cultural practices, crops and western business organisation. Many found entry into European circles difficult.⁸⁵ Jim Taylor married a highlands woman and raised a family in Goroka, but this was not usual and there was little miscegenation in the 1950s.⁸⁶ Partnership was made more difficult by the differences in land holding patterns: Europeans farmed on coffee plantations while New Guinean coffee holdings were small scale.⁸⁷ As the 1950s and 1960s passed, European settlers found the life of a coffee planter was not as easy as first thought and many sold up to corporations. By the

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p 60.

⁸⁵ One view of Highlands society is provided by Chris Harkness in her memoir *New Guinea: the Wahgi Impact*, Robert Brown and Associates, Coorparoo, 1994, notable for its almost total absence of New Guineans.

⁸⁶ Sexual intercourse between New Guineans and European women was prohibited until the repeal of the White Women's Protection Ordinance in 1958. E. P. Wolfers, *Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea*, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1975, p. 135.

⁸⁷ Finney, *Big Men and Business*, *op. cit.*, p. 160. In 1970 the largest Goroan coffee holding, that of Sinake Giregire had around 40 acres of coffee which was less than the mean for European planters; the largest European estate had around 1,000 acres.

early 1970s few plantations were operated by their original owners and Finney knew of no case in which a son or daughter had taken over the running of the property.⁸⁸

Partnership in the highlands clearly failed. The apparent benefit of New Guineans themselves knowing the settler who was to lease their land did not ultimately matter as corporations increasingly assumed leases and installed professional managers. The coffee land of Europeans remained some of the best land in Goroka and Kainantu,⁸⁹ and while there was undoubted progress in New Guinean indigenous economic development through coffee, the whole process of land alienation and the promotion of coffee growing made eastern highlands communities vulnerable to the boom-bust cycles of international capitalism. The coffee industry was however a major employer of local labour and had the effect of spreading the use of money. In doing so it augmented the cash provided to eastern highlanders by the Highlands Labour Scheme and entrenched the monetised economy.

10.3 *Conclusions*

The last two chapters have detailed five aspects of the Australian administrative colonialism in the EHD during the 1952-57 period: pacification, the extension of state control, the use of highlands labour, the extension of colonial services and the administration's land policy. Each of these objectives aimed to encourage and even to

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 160.

⁸⁹ See map 7 for a view of the proximity of European coffee lands to water.

impose 'development' on eastern highlanders. The result in 1957 was a district that was still underfunded but which showed signs of great promise. What an examination of this district's administration reveals is that there was a plan for development that depended greatly on the energies of those officers present in the district at any one time.

The relative success of the EHD in the 1950s as judged by the administrators themselves was due to their own tireless effort. While Hasluck's centralisation won out over the personal power of Downs in particular, the direction of economic development and the promotion of partnership created new industries linked perilously to the international market. Health was perhaps the greatest success of the administration, followed by the creation of a cash cropping agricultural class among New Guineans. Education was never given the resources or attention it required, but then the objective was not to develop leaders but to pacify, civilise and develop.

The allure of making money by growing vegetables, passionfruit, peanuts and coffee attracted many highlands villages, and communities derived financial benefit from this work. The administration facilitated this task by providing both seeds and seedlings, as well as by purchasing the produce. When buying produce the administration often did so above market rates and EHD casual labour was paid above the New Guinea recommended rate.

A striking absence from the EHD reports is any form of budget. Unlike Kelantan, the Australian administration in the EHD had no economy to massage into shape and indeed worked to create one. It started from scratch and could not introduce taxation until the basic operations of good government had been established. Even then it was

done gradually and on the basis of the level of development that a village was judged to have achieved.

As such the EHD in the period 1947-1957 is quite atypical of the popular view of colonialism in that the administration spent far more than it ever hoped to regain, provided services for free and went out of its way to stimulate economic growth. In all of its endeavours the Australian administration in the EHD exhibited a desire to assist the people to improve the quality of their lives and to direct them toward a particular 'modernity'. The effect of the first ten years was a social transformation unlike any other area of PNG. It was done with a minimum of force, a maximum of effort by an understaffed and underfunded district administration, and the goal of progress was partially realised. By its own measures at least the Australian administration in the EHD was successful in ushering eastern highlanders into the international economy.

In practice the actions of the administrators, given even the best of intentions, created a society in which the forms of government established were unable to cope with a breakdown of law and order following independence. The fall of coffee prices in the 1980s led to large social problems that the Eastern Highlands Provincial government, a successor to the colonial district, was unable to meet. Its reliance on the central administration in Port Moresby left it without a taxation base and consequently unable to provide the services that had, up until then, been paid for by Australia. In the end the partnership espoused and cherished by Hasluck proved a failure and turned out to be a very sophisticated justification of colonial control based on improving the welfare and lives of New Guineans. It was however far more decent and progressive than had been the case in the nineteenth century and in many twentieth century colonies and reflected

the serious intent of Australia to portray itself as a responsible administrative power in an era of international opprobrium. The colonial state in the eastern highlands began as a virtual police state in the days of first contact. It developed into a regime of administrative colonialism based on regulation, surveillance and the promotion of services. Directed in a bureaucratic and non-coercive manner by colonial 'middle managers', eastern highlanders began to police their own behaviour according to the logic of the administrative colonial state.

Chapter 11: Administrative colonialism, governmentality and the project of modernity in Kelantan and the Eastern Highlands

This study of administrative colonialism has concentrated on the colonial district, the intermediate level of colonial administration. It has focused on how colonial power ordered the day-to-day activity of districts to enable their peaceful and rational administration. This was achieved not by naked or overt force but through enactments, regulation, ordinances and notices and was backed by the policing functions of the colonial state. Colonial ‘middle managers’ made judgements on what elements of pre-modern society would have to be jettisoned if the districts were to participate in the modern world. In making such decisions they directed the peoples of Kelantan and the eastern highlands towards an acceptance of the primacy of government. The services of health and to a much lesser extent education reinforced the central position of the colonial state in people’s lives. Moreover the colonial state restructured economic and social relations to reflect the rationale of an international commodity-based economy.

The administrative colonialism of the Siamese, British and Australian ‘middle managers’ in the two cases considered have a large number of similarities, despite the fact that they were operating some thirty years apart during the twentieth century. They of course contain some differences, but overall it is possible to chart the evolution of a type of operational and technocratic power aimed at organising societies, people and production that is representative of modernity.

At the close of the periods under review neither of these colonial districts was a fully 'modern' state in the contemporary sense. By the end of their first decades of administrative colonialism there was however a form of social and governmental organisation in place that would have been instantly recognisable to any western observer. Much work was still required to entrench the changes that had been made, and in the case of the eastern highlands to encourage economic and political development. The administrations had however altered the social and political lives of the people of Kelantan and the eastern highlands, and what is more, had done it without concerted or repeated physical coercion. This is not to say that the systems themselves were not coercive, but the power of the state was subtly felt, its hand deft and its effectiveness often silent: administration by governmentality rather than force.

This final chapter draws out the similarities in administration and colonial district structure concentrating on the agents of change, the systems and institutions that allowed peaceful administrative rule and the commodification of land and labour. It argues that the administrative colonialism was not a zero-sum game of economic advantage and that the problem of theorising colonialism would be better understood viewing it as changing 'modes of domination'. The form which colonial power took in the two cases considered was administrative and bureaucratic. Unfortunately, the traditional explanations of colonialism and imperialism tell us little about how this aspect of twentieth century colonial relations evolved as they deal mainly with the causes and consequences of nineteenth century imperialism in all its principal forms.

Administrative colonialism was (and is perhaps still)¹ following a different logic. It aimed to transform the societies under its control and direct them toward acceptance of a westernised understanding of issues of social organisation. In both cases the first decade of fully integrated colonial rule was a harbinger of modernity and left the regions capable of engaging with the world market. Such a conclusion renders the legal distinction between colonies, protectorates, mandates, and trust territories essentially meaningless and shifts the focus from official and legal categories of empire to the structures of power that informed colonial rule. A study of administrative colonialism illuminates the processes of social control and reveals how the societies exposed to such regulation were shaped by it.

11.1 *The agents of change*

If tomorrow people were informed that a powerful alien race would totally reconfigure the political and social relations that had taken millennia to evolve, many would no doubt be dismayed. The invading species may perhaps claim that new laws and new political organisations are required. Change, they might argue, is necessary, as the current state of affairs does not fit with the priorities of the new organisational rationale. Some people might say they are mostly happy with the world as it is:² since we have

¹ At the time of writing an international coalition against terror had switched from pursuit of particular individuals from the Al Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden, held responsible for the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre Twin Towers and the Pentagon, to an objective of toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Negotiations in Bonn, Germany, sponsored by the UN, had the aim of getting a government for Afghanistan with which the West can deal. In the ideal types of colonialism suggested in the introductory chapter this is a variant of administrative colonialism — international administrative colonialism — which aims to restructure Afghanistan to make it have the government the west desires. The result will perhaps be a democratic state like East Timor with imposed civic institutions that will fracture at the first inkling of dissent.

² While not all people accept the right of a nation state to represent them, the national boundaries of a state, the concept of rights derived from a state, or even citizenship, such issues are at least discussed in a theoretical and philosophical framework of international relations that is understood by all participants.

laws, political organisations and institutions already, why should we be forced to abandon them and restructure our lives?

If the prospect of an alien species transforming human society dismays the reader, consider the effects that the imposition of colonial administration had on the peoples of the eastern highlands and Kelantan. To effect such a shift away from traditional social and productive relations, and to reconfigure them to reflect alien priorities, to attempt to change the *weltanschauung* of colonised peoples, required a resolute belief in the principles of one's own civilisation. The work of ushering non-Western peoples into the modern world was complicated and complex. At its heart was a singular belief that what was being done was for the benefit of the people. The colossal arrogance of colonial rule was to impose structures and institutions to govern and administer societies who had managed quite well without them.

The transformation from pre-modern to modern societies required a degree of social imitation and the structures of power created reflected the administrative systems familiar to the colonisers from Britain and Australia. For colonialism to work, the laws and institutions of state that were created to administer the people required staff who understood the organisational rationale of what was being attempted. These staff understood that the information that was being gathered had to be collated, analysed and written up according to guidelines and procedures. While eccentrics were tolerated there was no room for people who posed the fundamental question of "Why must

reports be written?”, the more challenging and deeper questions of “Why are we here at all?” or even “Would these people have been better off if we had left them alone?”

The departments and organisations that effected social change are obviously critical to understanding how colonialism functioned, but equally important are the patrol officers, land clerks, judges, agricultural extension officers, nurses, doctors, teachers, surveyors, Advisors, District Officers, District Commissioners and their staff. All were agents of change, as were the police who curbed aberrant behaviour, and indigenous peoples such as the Toh Kweng, luluai and tultul, who came to participate in the workings of the colonial state. By accepting the internal logic of their positions, or even by just doing their jobs in the bureaucratic sense, these people were working with the underlying assumption of the governing power and worked to transform the traditional into the modern.³

Of those who recognised the effects of their presence certainly not all shared the view that this transformation was necessarily beneficial and some were consciously ambiguous about their own roles.⁴ However even those who had reservations about the changes they were creating were equally sure that the changes they brought would inevitably happen. It was not a matter of if but a question of when the modern world would intrude into the sleepy valley and end the isolation of pre-modern people. The

with respect to government and international order, a small minority only argue that there should be no government and no order.

³ This is not to suggest that all people who worked in colonial administrations had much of a choice about their lot or even “knew what they were doing” in the sense that they consciously realised how they were transforming the societies in which they worked. It is however one of the reasons why the research for this thesis has concentrated on official written sources rather than oral interviews so as to get inside the administrative mentality. There are a number of former New Guinea administration officers still alive and living in Australia; those from Kelantan are long since gone.

training that the agents of administrative colonialism received — at University for British administrators in Kelantan and through ASOPA for some of the Australians in the eastern highlands — coupled with on the job experience, reinforced their obedience and commitment to the purposes of the colonial organisations in which they participated.

For the administration of Kelantan the Europeans involved were drawn from the administration of the Straits Settlements and the Federated States of Malay. They were mostly university-educated men who until the 1920s did not have formal training in anything so crude as ‘native administration’. Training for colonial rule relied rather on cultivating an ordered approach to obtaining and analysing information, and such an approach was thought best obtained from a degree in classics. The study of ancient languages provided ordered minds and continuity with the cultural product of ancient civilisations; Greek and Latin were hardly valuable in dealing with Malays but practical experience made up for any lack of specialist knowledge. In the early 1900s such Britons who worked in the service of Kelantan for both the Siamese and British governments were, above all, administrators. Secondly they were technocrats in as much as they approached their tasks in a rational and organised fashion, seeking to understand through study and observation.

An indication of this desire to measure, quantify and understand is evidenced by monthly average rainfall and temperature statistics from district offices and stations all over Kelantan, the most consistently recorded statistic in the annual reports from 1903-

⁴ See G. Orwell, ‘Shooting an Elephant’, in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. I: An Age Like This 1920-1940*, (CEJL) Penguin, London, 1970, pp. 265-27.
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1919. This was not only a matter of training but part of European culture; prior to joining the administrative service of Kelantan Dr Gimlette from the Duff Development Company submitted his observations on these matters to Graham. Rainfall and temperature measures in themselves can tell us which seasons were drier, hotter and wetter than others. Moreover they show that the minutiae of everyday life in Kelantan was being observed and recorded, and that those who were noting the changes had been either ordered to record them or did so out of interest. Either way it indicates that the task was approached with an ordered and methodical mind, a characteristic of rationality and modernity. The detailed statistics on trade, health, education, district administration, police and law courts further demonstrate this tendency.

In contrast to the British insistence on university educated graduates the Australian government was singularly unsuccessful in attracting the type of highly educated administrator that it desired, and was always conscious of this perceived inferiority in the calibre of their officers. The lack of tertiary qualifications was not however seen as any detriment to advancement, and even the forced participation of cadets in the courses offered by the Australian School of Pacific Administration was viewed with considerable suspicion by those in senior positions. Post-war period cadet training was a combination of training courses and learning on the job. Armed with a three-week course in anthropology, colonial administration, law and justice the cadets would be posted to Papua and New Guinea.⁵ With progression through the ranks more focussed

⁵ The prewar system of training for cadets in New Guinea was an eighteen months to two years stint on duty followed by one year at Sydney University's Department of Anthropology. In 1935 this was cut to two terms. They studied social anthropology, mapping, economic geography, criminal law and tropical medicine. During the war, from February 1944, staff were trained in the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) and then eased into the civil administration. They had two short courses of around three weeks duration at Duntroon Canberra and one short course at Holdsworthy Army base in Sydney. *Australian Archives (NSW Branch) Series CP 637/1, Item no. 7, Training of officers for Papua-* *C M Hawksley PhD Thesis: Administrative Colonialism Chapter 11*

courses of up to two years were provided for senior staff such as District Commissioners.⁶

When the Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) was created its teaching was consciously modelled on the colonial training schools of European empires. It was representative of the formal professional training that was seen as being required for the administration of dependent peoples.⁷ The movement away from men of good character and toward professionally trained colonial administrators reflected a growing technocratic view of government and of the task of governing dependent peoples. One peculiar feature of this view was that the lessons learned from governing so-called primitive people in Africa were readily transferable to other parts of the world. Indeed dependent peoples everywhere were not seen as being specific; culture was deemed irrelevant for effective government. What mattered most was that the systems through which colonial power was exercised were properly functioning and were ably administered. Dependent peoples adapted to changing circumstances, indeed they had to in order to survive. This was of course precisely the point: the administrative colonial state restructured social, political and economic relations so as to integrate the peoples of a dependent territory into the modern world.

New Guinea Administration. From 1947 ASOPA instituted a series of courses for POs and higher ranks ranging from six weeks to two years.

⁶ *Series SP 974/1 Long Course No. 2.*

⁷ See *Series SP 974/1*, Requests for Syllabuses from Colonial Schools (Box 32): Letters of 4 November 1949 from W S Arthur (Registrar of ASOPA) to the *Ecole Colonial*, Paris; London University; Cambridge University; Oxford University; School of Colonial Studies - Leyden; Colonial Office School - Lisbon.

11.2 *The systems of rule*

There were clear similarities in the patterns of rule in our two cases, reflected in the priorities of the colonial middle managers in their first decades of administration. The foundation of colonial rule was the rule of law, and from this all else flowed. While the administration attempted to ensure compliance through cooperation, police forces were used to apprehend transgressors and dissenters who were branded as criminals and punished for their wrongdoings. With dissent resolved through incarceration and other penalties, the way was clear to structure life through regulation. The legal system provided a framework for controlling behaviour and new regulations could be created with ease. In Kelantan these were drawn up by the colonial state as required; in the eastern highlands there were so many laws and legal codes in operation that an officer had a wide variety if he wished to charge a person with almost any offence.

Compliance with the laws of the colonial state granted access to its benefits. Any challenge to the authority of the state that could not be dealt with within the framework of legislation and regulation was met with force. Administrative colonial systems aimed to be non-coercive but demonstrated that when provoked they would resort to the key technological difference between societies — their possession of advanced weaponry. The Toh Janggut rising in Kelantan marked the boundaries of British colonial tolerance in 1915. Pacification in the highlands sometimes involved violence but following initial contact, attacks on patrols were met not so much with force, but with a show of force. The more sophisticated approach is indicative of the changed standard of international expectation in governing dependent peoples.

The main framework of introducing modernity relied on Comtean notions of order and progress, and was mainly carried out in an orderly fashion with checks and prescriptions on the actions of administrators when dealing with their charges, but there were occasions where administrative patience was exhausted. In these instances the administrative colonial state reverted to type — the ideal types of extractive and expansionist colonialism that had brute force as their main elements, and it killed or banished those who sought to challenge it.

To talk of private and public spheres in both cases is only possible after the introduction of the colonial state. Law and order came with the proscriptions of administrative colonialism; the state defined where it could intrude and regulated areas of activity that had hitherto been free from codification. By setting up such a behavioural regime the colonial state in fact created private and public spheres, or at least defined the spaces in which such activity could occur. In Kota Bharu the wearing of arms in town was prohibited; in the eastern highlands any resort to settling a dispute through traditional methods of tribal fighting was met with punishment.

The maintenance of law and order permitted the expansion of other services of the colonial state; in exchange for a reduction in personal liberty there was the benefit of better health for many, and rudimentary education for a few. This expansion of services was informed by information gathering that was itself dependent on peace and the ordered, measured and quantified analysis of information. By identifying areas of social and economic need the colonial state could develop responses and attempt to meet those needs. Thus patrolling, census taking, land estimation, health and education services were preliminary steps in fostering political legitimacy for the post-colonial

state. A basic belief of administrative colonialism was that by treating and educating people their lives were improved. This extended also to providing law and order as the colonial state allowed for greater physical freedom from harm and, in the case of the eastern highlands, a genuine geographic expansion of peoples' cultural and social horizons.

The reach of the colonial state in Kelantan and the EHD developed in parallel with the communications infrastructure: geographic and administrative expansion of the boundaries of the colonial state went hand-in-hand. The officers of the district accumulated knowledge through census taking and creating land registers. In the EHD there was extensive patrolling which aimed both to inform and enforce. People were introduced to the *Pax Australiana*, the peace that allowed all other activities to take place, and patrols required cooperation. In Kelantan regulations, enactments and orders that codified the boundaries of legitimate social and political activity were published and distributed. Literacy was not common yet the process of announcing intentions through public notices indicates the presence of an ordered system of law. In the EHD the administration used luluais and tultuls to spread the word of the government.

The discussion above has outlined the social progress of health and education services, both of which were still rudimentary at the end of the first decade of colonial control. While economic progress depended largely on the successful imposition of law and order, the main change from previous forms of colonialism was the willingness of administrators to treat people as people, not as economic units or personal property. This itself was a profound shift since the days of slavery, forced labour and brutality for

economic gain, and it refocusses our attention to the essential difference of these

examples from what are usually understood to be axiomatically exploitative relations in colonialism.

11.3 *Modes of domination*

That the task of bringing the people of Kelantan and the eastern highlands into the modern world fell to particular groups of people was mainly due to geo-political reasons. Once established in the Malay peninsula, British commercial and political interests necessitated involvement in the affairs of states to the north. Siam's handover of Kelantan and other northern Malay states was more a recognition of geo-political reality than the culmination of any serious British attempt to take Kelantan. Importantly the Siamese administration under Graham was acting in accordance with British desires. At this time Siam was itself modernising with the assistance of western experts and its administration of Kelantan was an exercise in self-induced change via rational administration and good government. The logic behind Siam's renovation was to maintain its independence but it demonstrates that a non-European state could institute western administrative techniques, an indication of the transferability of the ideals of good government and of modernity.

Graham was largely successful in his administration in Kelantan. He arranged power through institutions and regulations. These were not physically coercive in the sense of forcing people to obey, but operated through the power of budgets, appropriations, notices and bureaucratic construction. The transfer to Britain was part of a continuous process of modernisation. Their first ten years refined and extended the colonial district,

encouraging large-scale plantation agriculture while confirming the administration, and

not any commercial enterprise, as the only law. In doing so they mortgaged Kelantan to the hilt, which necessitated attacks on landholding patterns and a switch from produce to land tax. The one major rebellion was crushed and offenders removed to Singapore, while the corpse of the rebel leader was put on public display. After its foray into coercive violence the colonial district of Kelantan then reverted to its customary regulatory role, even quickening the land reforms.

As for the people of the eastern highlands, the Australian government had no idea they even existed when given the Mandate by the League of Nations to administer the former German colony of New Guinea. The Australian pre-war administration had a policy of peaceful pacification, but this was not always found possible, and coercive measures were used to kill attackers or deprive people of wealth. Post-war Australian policy concentrated on establishing peace and encouraging development. It reintroduced the luluai system, provided health care, counted people and mapped the land. It sought by regulation to direct peoples' energies toward specific outcomes, those geared toward economic development.

Both administrations sought to improve their ability to reach parts of their defined areas through road building. They also collected statistics, not only population figures, but information on crops, local customs and religious practices. By attempting to know as much as they could about the societies they were administering, colonial 'middle managers' were then able to make judgements as to what, in the ensemble of traditional life, needed to be jettisoned so that people could engage with the modern world, particularly the modern international economy. On the whole the administrations

believe that they acted in good faith and that they treated people humanely. They had

lofty goals of progress, development and “helping people to stand on their own two feet.” They did not stop to question their activities, nor to ask the colonised what they felt about the changes. The economic and social changes wrought by these administrators were a product of the cultural assumptions that underpinned the colonial endeavour.

The creation of the conditions for modernity through administrative colonialism was accompanied by a developing belief through the twentieth century that it was simply no longer possible to be insulated from the rest of the world. There was ample justification for believing this as by the late 1930s no large areas of territory remained that had not been ‘discovered’ and explored by Europeans (the New Guinea highlands was the last such densely populated region to come under the European gaze), no new lands or islands remained to be found. Nonetheless, a developing body of international opinion argued that it was morally wrong to indefinitely control others, and this feeling was accompanied by the ushering of people toward a particular and constructed modernity.

The twentieth century, known for the expansion of scientific knowledge, economic growth, war, cruelty and technological innovation, was also a period of emancipation. From the founding of the League of Nations to the Atlantic Charter and the various declarations of the United Nations, to the ‘quit India’ movement, post-war decolonisation, the Non-aligned Movement, the Group of 77 and national liberation struggles across the globe, it is possible to trace a thread of an emerging doctrine of self-determination and the belief that it was unacceptable for one people to control another. This belief grew in stature throughout the twentieth century and characterised

its political history. It was the central factor in the decolonisation movement and affected the operations of administrative colonialism.

As European states themselves developed a philosophy of civil and political rights to a higher degree, some of this discourse filtered into colonial administration. The development of administrative colonialism shifted the terrain from military control to the institutions that could maintain social order and provide economic development. The bureaucracies of administrative colonial regimes acted to transform the societies themselves, and they did so through means that were not directly coercive. As such the question of the official status of Kelantan and the eastern highlands — whether a Protected state or part of a Trusteeship — is essentially irrelevant when considering the effects of colonial rule on the structure of colonial society. The colonial ‘category’ is not important: what matters is the way in which the administration operates and the ends toward which it moves.

The mode of domination in both cases was non-coercive: both were benevolent and paternalistic administrations. They sought to inform, educate, and release people from what they considered were the unsavoury aspects of their traditional lives. For Kelantan this involved pulling the aristocracy into line by abolishing debt slavery and the right to krah, making nobles pay taxation and reducing the possibility of abuse of privilege through laws guaranteeing rights of land tenancy for peasants. In exchange they converted triennial poll tax to annual tax, then converted from poll tax and produce tax into land tax. This was done to secure a sound financial base for the administration.

In the EHD no taxation was attempted until the late 1950s and the administration was actively involved in purchasing goods produced by highlanders, encouraging them to

grow specific crops. The ultimate aim of generating wealth that would contribute to the upkeep of the administration was the same, but whereas in Kelantan there was already an economy linked to the outside world the Australian administration sought to create both a cash cropping peasantry and linkages to international and domestic markets.

This comparative district analysis has examined the structures and institutions of colonial rule, and revealed the priorities of the administrations. Such an approach based on the sociology of power allows us to move beyond arguments about whether colonialism was profitable or exploitative: in Kelantan and the eastern highlands administrative colonialism was neither. As this thesis has demonstrated, the arguments for colonialism being axiomatically exploitative simply do not apply; the sociological and geo-political arguments concerning colonialism are only partly relevant to how Kelantan and the eastern highlands came under colonial rule; and the cultural perspectives on colonialism tell us something about the ways in which cultures interacted and what made coloniser and colonised act in certain ways. However, none of these positions is particularly informative about the day-to-day activities of administrative colonialism: how it operated, how it shaped the lives of many peoples in dependent territories, how it constantly sought to improve its own operations and be more efficient. The issues involved are both more complex and more structural than reductionism allows and involve a development of an argument about the moral dimensions of modernity and good governance.

The effects of administrative colonialism were far more pervasive than previous attempts to control people. The imposition of colonial rule through governmentality achieved the objective of ordering and organising people through regulation rather than

force. Like in developed states people began to self-police their behaviour, working to the logic of the colonial state.

11.4 *Commodification of land and labour*

In both Kelantan and EHD the requirements of the administration to expand the administrative reach of the district meant that over time cash became the primary means of economic exchange. People were paid for their labour in monetary tokens, able to be exchanged at markets or accumulated to create wealth. While currency of a form existed in both regions, the colonial state entrenched its use through the introduction of regulated wage labour. This left the people of both districts able to participate in the growing world economy through both the use of their own labour and through the sale of commodities they produced.

Land was an important aspect of the identity of people and in both cases it was land itself that was commodified through a process of assessment, grading and registration. Apart from the construction of state institutions such as hospitals, schools and district offices, all of which enabled the colonial state to better administer its charges, land was leased but never taken by the state and sold outright. This is a key difference from earlier forms of colonialism where large tracts of land were seized and bequeathed to adventurers or commercial interests.

In the EHD land was owned and passed down through the male members of families.

Groups identified with clan and tribal boundaries and full use was made of prime

agricultural land for food production. The Australian administration's policy was not to

remove people from their lands and disputed land was therefore leased to foreign economic interests to stimulate development. After an initial unregulated (or at least privately controlled) land rush, this was only done in situations where it could be demonstrated that the people concerned had sufficient land to meet their needs even 99 years into the future. The Australian administration changed the policy of direct application, common in the early 1950s, taking the process of land alienation out of the hands of the District Commissioner. Rents were paid by settlers to the administration who held the land in trust for the traditional owners and paid them annual dividends. Land thus obtained an exchange value that turned it into a commodity.

In Kelantan land was theoretically the Sultan's to dispose of as he wished, apart from that which had been granted or leased by arrangement. Ownership of land was a tenuous concept, but people did have occupational rights and could grow what they wished. The British converted virtually all of the Sultan's theoretical land into state property and began to apportion it out to those who actually used it. The personal property of the ruler thus became the property of the state, which acted as central register for all land matters. Refusal to accept any land transfers other than those recorded in the land register centralised the process further. Again a similar purpose of land developing an exchange value is seen. The mapping and registration of land was completed section by section so that the entire district was slowly reshaped in the image of the functional and economic units further south in the FMS. Parts of the Ulu Kelantan were given over to plantation agriculture in an effort to stimulate economic development. Land itself was graded and taxed, and the result was a large increase over time in taxation revenue, the ultimate objective of which was to make the district

state protected the land from full alienation, both from itself and from settlers. This uncommon paternalism avoided many of the problems that later flared in other decolonised areas where the large tracts of land possessed by the colonisers caused resentment up to and following decolonisation.

New Guinean investment in coffee on their own lands shows that they were able to make the jump to accept the priorities of the new regime where land was more than a means of producing food. Land became a means of generating income and the development of export industry permitted engagement on equal terms with the world commodity market. For Kelantan large-scale plantings of crops of rubber and coconut were more European concerns and the focus remained on the small farmer's production of rice, although rubber from small farmers was a significant source of income. Still, land taxation through land assessment stimulated a similar process of commodification so that income was generated both for payment to the state and for payment to individuals.

The administrative colonial state imposed a rationale on land that allowed it to be measured, estimated, valued, divided, and leased. By establishing registers of land, and settling disputes over who owned which portions, the colonial state also defined what was not owned, what was therefore wasteland and at the disposal of the state. In Kelantan any land not listed in the records was not therefore the property of any individual and could be claimed by the state. At all levels the rationale of charging for land services was introduced. In the EHD, all land was claimed by one clan or another as part of its territory, so the colonial state did not have an opportunity to dispose of unused land.

The plantation industries of both Kelantan and EHD differed in crop and in size but both were key elements in promoting the use of money in local economies, in broadening the reach of wage labour and in creating the capacity of people to purchase commodities from outside. The plantation system allowed the produce of the land to be packaged, bundled, and exported, but it also developed a parallel system of wage labour that commodified the work of individuals. In the early years of British control of Kelantan the development of a plantation sector was restricted to the inland areas due to the densely settled coastal plain and the predominance there of existing forms of agriculture. The relative distance of the large plantations from the mass of the populace and the difficulty of getting enough Malays to work the plantations meant that imported Chinese and Tamil labour was used on these estates. Malays who worked for the police, the courts and the prisons were actually paid in wages (and did not have to find their own) so that the labour relations that involved the state increasingly took the form of payment in cash for work performed. In the EHD the plantation economy grew up alongside traditional agriculture and both were cash based.

Economic development was thought necessary to shed the trappings of feudalism in the case of Kelantan, and to eliminate what was considered to be 'primitive' society in the highlands. Both administrations aimed to remove aspects of these cultures they found unduly exploitative, repugnant or cruel; they seldom thought that what they replaced them with, capitalist wage labour and economic relations, could also be construed as little more than legalised slavery and economic oppression. The development of wage labour from the highlands labour scheme did as much to circulate cash in highlands

societies and to generate wealth than years of growing peanuts and passionfruit.⁸ The labour of young fit men was commodified along with the labour of women who remained the main actors in the traditional economy of vegetables. Income from staples could be converted into creating conditions for nurturing coffee plants. Once the mathematics was explained to them, many highlanders embraced coffee with a vengeance due to its economic value per pound when compared with sweet potato.⁹ In an effort to stimulate growth the colonial state purchased the commodities of the highlands and sold them throughout Papua New Guinea thus creating external markets for people who previously had none.

⁸ D. Howlett, *A Decade of Change in the Goroka Valley New Guinea: Land Use and Development in the 1950s*, PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1962, pp. 261-263.

⁹ Some clans, such as the Bena Bena near to Goroka, became jaded over time and withdrew “into a shell with minds centred on the past, and show little interest or cooperation in economic development of Administration plans for their benefit.” I.Holmes cited in *Ibid.*, p. 173.

In both cases road construction facilitated the deepening of economic opportunity as it enabled people to bring their produce to a market with relative ease. It also expanded the reach of the colonial state to allow for faster access to areas than had been possible by patrol or boat trips. Thus colonial surveillance was enhanced both through consistent gathering of information and through better access to communities; it was augmented by health and education services that positioned the colonial state as providers of services that would improve people's lives. Collectively the administrations set their territories on a path toward modernity, although as has been demonstrated, by the end of the first decade this shift was still embryonic. The groundwork had however been laid by a committed administration, staffed by professional officers working within a bureaucratic framework.

All social changes were made possible by the implementation of law and order. To an extent order and progress reinforced each other: the deeper the economic development went, the more likely people were to accept the law and order; without law and order the possibilities for economic development were reduced by anarchy and possible attacks on individuals or their crops. Both systems thus introduced a modern approach to agricultural that relied on the exchange value of labour and produce. As such both Kelantan and the eastern highlands were well positioned for eventual full participation in the world market.

11.5 *Conclusions*

The introduction of administrative colonial governance in Kelantan and the eastern highlands of New Guinea brought systems of rule and administrative practices to areas that had been organised along fundamentally different principles. The pace of administrative change depended largely on arbitrary human factors, the character, abilities and designs of the individual officers charged with imposing the development priorities of the colonial power. The colonial ‘middle managers’ were of course involved in a much wider process of social change and functioned as agents of change, as did colonised people. Yet individual administrators’ notions of what constituted adequate performance in their tasks was itself bound up within the logic of administrative colonialism. Their ideas about how best to manage the changes they made and the best methods of achieving their aims dictated both the pace and the thoroughness of the transition.

In Malaya the abundance of opportunities in the Federated Malay States left Kelantan fairly much on the outer in terms of large-scale development. Consequently it became something of a backwater in comparison with the western coast states. And while the Australian colonial state in New Guinea favoured economic development, in the EHD the pace of this development under District Commissioner Ian Downs occurred in opposition to the defensively paternalistic policies of Hasluck that were designed to promote even development over all districts. Hasluck’s guiding principle for Papua New Guinea may just as well have been *Festina Lente* — hasten slowly¹⁰ — and he

¹⁰ Attributed to Suetonius.

was able to assert his authority over the process of European settlement to stop the land rush that may have led to uneven development.

The intensity of plans for development thus varied with the individual Advisors and District Officers and District Commissioners. In Kelantan Graham, Mason and Bishop held off on land reform issues, Langham-Carter pushed ahead with it and while it was eventually achieved, this was done under the stewardship of a more moderate, yet equally efficient Farrer. In the EHD Taylor and Greathead were cognisant of the region's potential, and of its economic opportunities, and did what they could to keep the peace and provide what services they could despite only paltry support. Ian Downs appears to have been a 'crash-through-or-crash' leader with a burning commitment to development, the extension of the administration and to making his mark on the region. The patient work of these officers in Kelantan and the EHD, along with that of their administrative staff, are examples of administrative colonialism carried out with the best of intentions and for the general improvement of the welfare of the people.

The main feature of both cases was the imposition of governmental structures that enabled them to eventually shape these districts to the internal logic of the colonial administration, to allow for their participation in the global market. The ordering of these societies was achieved through the development of systems of rule, in particular social control through the implementation of peace, the establishment of government, law, order and rules, and a codified system of acceptable behaviour. This was supplemented by a bureaucratic machinery that collected information in an effort to know more about its territory. The efforts made in health care and the expansion of

road communications in both cases, brought the colonial state and its services closer to

more people. In the eastern highlands regular patrolling solidified the position of the administration.

The reach of the administrative colonialism in the district allowed for more information to be gathered and increased the available knowledge of the societies under review. Bureaucrats and policy makers at the centre of the colonial state then digested this knowledge and information. They were able to assess the performance of techniques of control around the empire. At both colonial state and colonial district levels this knowledge enabled the colonial administrators, both 'middle' and 'higher' managers, to allocate services where they were most required.

Colonial rule in these two areas was about refashioning traditional societies. The transformative nature of administrative colonialism and colonial 'middle management' allowed the British to establish Protectorates over states in Africa and Asia without formally annexing the territory, and allowed Australia to hold the Territory of New Guinea in trust, and to administer it for the benefit of indigenous peoples. But as the Siamese administration in Kelantan shows, it is the methods of administration that matter, rather than the people exercising the power. While individuals certainly profited from the association, there was by and large no discernible economic gain made by Siam, Britain or Australia: the motivations for their rule must lie rather in the objective of social and economic advancement.

The methodology of comparative district analysis that has informed this study demonstrates that similar processes and methods of rule can be traced across both time and empire. Administrative colonial rule may therefore be seen as part of a developing

continuum of ‘modes of domination’ (the ideal types) that were initially crude and brutal, but were later infused with the rational assumptions about the universal project of modernity that championed social management and economic development. The peculiarly twentieth century form of paternalistic colonial control glossed over the profound nature of the changes that were being forced upon dependent peoples through its insistence that the real objective was to advance and develop people who had to be assisted and guided to participate in the ‘modern world’. As such the benign (in the sense of bland, gentle and mild) and paternalistic nature of these two examples of administrative colonialism are qualitatively different from the forms of colonial rule that had as their objective economic exploitation. Yet paradoxically they were more effective than the ideal types of exploitative, commercial or expansionist colonialism in that they succeeded in eliminating traditional social institutions or adapted them to serve the new order. The result was a social transformation of traditional structure to the basic social and economic relationships and institutions of the modern state.

As a final observation these examples further show that the imposition of order and governmentality does not necessarily lead to totalitarianism and can, if humanely implemented, advance the education, health and welfare of its charges. While these two cases alone do not prove that *all* colonialism was benign and paternal (and nor does this thesis attempt to do so), they do necessitate a re-examination of the axiom that all colonialism was by definition exploitative. They have shown that it was possible for colonisers to act in a non-coercive and morally justifiable fashion according to the most enlightened principles of their own times and societies. In hindsight their actions may appear indulgent, misguided and Eurocentric, but the legacy of colonial ‘middle managers’ is the continued engagement of these and other regions in the world market.

While the level and equality of their participation may be questioned, the fact that they are participating may not. As such the modernising tendencies of administrative colonialism as introduced under non-coercive systems of colonial rule served the purpose for which they were designed, and they stand apart from previous examples of colonialism that desired economic gain. They represent two examples of fostered development and good governance conducted under morally defensible principles of rule over dependent peoples. They form part of the evolution of a doctrine of good government that was firmly linked to an evolving philosophy of freedom and the equality of man that had been developing since moves to abolish slavery. In the twentieth century administrative colonialism was the only morally defensible form of controlling other people and directing their lives.

In the twenty-first century this task has now passed to international organisations that place the same emphasis on the rule of law, but now encourage democracy and participation in civil society when attempting to structure civic institutions and encourage participation in a globalised economy. New generations of ‘middle managers’ now seek to fashion leviathan, not by using force, but through the institutions of rule inherited from the administrative colonial state.

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APPENDIX 1

Office Bearers in Malaya (1893-1934)

Governors of the Straits Settlements & High Commissioners for the Malay States (Governors of Singapore 1893-1934)

William Edward Maxwell (acting)	1893-1894
Sir Charles Bullen Hugh Mitchell	1894-1899
James Alexander Swettenham	1899-5 November 1901 (Acting)
Sir Frank Athelstane Swettenham	5 November 1901-16 April 1904
Sir John Anderson	16 April 1904- 2 September 1911
Sir Arthur Henderson Young	2 September 1911-17 February 1920
Sir Laurence Nunns Guillemard	17 February 1920-5 Feb 1927
Sir Hugh Charles Clifford	3 June 1927–5 Feb 1930
Sir Cecil Clementi	5 Feb 1930–9 November 1934

Siamese Commissioners to the State of Kelantan (1894-1902)

Praya Tipakosa (from 1894)
Phra Ong Chao Sai
Phra Surarik
Phra Sastra Tarakit (1902 treaty)
Phra Kucha

Other officers:

Luang Asgsa (military commander)
Luang Nawang (Judge - remained with Mr Graham in post 1902 - Administration)

Siamese Advisers to the State of Kelantan (1903-1909)

Adviser: Walter Armstrong Graham July 1903-July 1909
Assistant Adviser: H. W. Thomson

British Advisers to the State of Kelantan (1909-1939)

James Scott Mason	15 July, 1909-19 October, 1911
J. E. Bishop	19 October 1911-3 March 1913
T. W. Clayton	3 March 1913-end March 1913 (Acting)
William Langham-Carter	3 March 1913-17 August 1915 (on leave from end of May 1915)
Ronald John Farrer	17 August 1915-7 February 1919 (Acting)
J. W. W. Hughes	7 February 1919-23 February 1919 (Acting)
H. W. Thomson	23 Feb 1919 - 29 March 1920 (Confirmed as British Adviser on 21 October 1919).
A. F. Worthington	29 March 1920 - 28 December 1920
H. W. Thomson	29 December 1920 - 31 August 1922
A. F. Worthington	31 August 1922 - 16 April 1924

Between April 1924 and 1939 eleven officers served as the Adviser or Acting Adviser to the State of Kelantan on appointments varying from one months to three years: H. C. Eckhardt, A. F. Worthington, G. E. Shaw (twice), C. C. Brown, W. M. Millington, R. J. B. Clayton, A. S. Haynes (twice), Capt. T. P. Coe, Capt A. C. Baker (twice) , G. A. de C de Moubary and E. T. Williams.

[Adapted from W. R. Roff ed. *Kelantan, Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, p. 42, note 63, and S. Talib, *History of Kelantan 1890-1940*, Appendix L, p. 225.]

APPENDIX 2. OFFICE BEARERS, PAPUA NEW GUINEA (1945-1963)

Australian Ministers with responsibility for Papua New Guinea

Eddie Ward	1942-1949
Percy Spender	1949-1951
Paul Hasluck	1951-1963

Australian Administrators in Papua New Guinea

Colonel J. K. Murray	1945-1952 (appointment terminated and Donald Cleland was Acting Administrator from 1952)
Brigadier Donald Cleland	1953-1967

District Officers of the Central Highlands District

James Lindsay Taylor	1947-1949
George Greathead	1949-1951

District Commissioners of the Eastern Highlands District

George Greathead	September 1951-September 1952
Ian F. G. Downs	September 1952-January 1956
H. L. Williams	1953-54 (acting)
H. P. Seale	1956-1963

[From Ian Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship Papua New Guinea*, pp. xx-xxii, and Annual Reports of the Central and Eastern Highlands Districts 1947-1957.]