

An algorithm for bounding non-minimum weight differentials in 2-round LSX-ciphers

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Abstract

This article describes some approaches to bounding non-minimum weight differentials (EDP) and linear hulls (ELP) in 2-round LSX-cipher. We propose a dynamic programming algorithm to solve this problem. For 2-round Kuznyechik the nontrivial upper bounds on all differentials (linear hulls) with 18 and 19 active Sboxes was obtained. These estimates are also holds for other differentials (linear hulls) with a larger number of active Sboxes. We obtain a similar result for 2-round Khazad. As a consequence, the exact value of the maximum expected differential (linear) probability (MEDP/MELP) was computed for this cipher.

Keywords: Kuznyechik, Khazad, SPN, LSX, differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, MEDP, MELP

1 Introduction

Differential [2] and linear [3] cryptanalysis are the two most known statistical attacks applicable to block ciphers. In this paper we will focus on the first method. The analogous results for linear cryptanalysis will be obtained in a similar way, due to the existing well-known duality [4].

There are several approaches to estimating the security of ciphers against differential attacks. Many papers are devoted to the differential characteristics. The maximal probability of such characteristics (EDCP) decreases when the number of active Sboxes within R rounds increases. The upper bound on such probability can be analytically obtained for many LSX-ciphers (AES [11], Khazad [12], Kuznyechik [1], etc.). In particular, these results are presented in [11, 17].

However, many researchers note that differential cryptanalysis exploits differentials and not characteristics (see for example [16, 14, 5]). The probability (EDP) of a differential $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$ corresponds to the sum of the probabilities of all characteristics with input difference Δx and output difference

Δy [8]. So from this point of view security of a cipher against differential attacks is based on the maximum expected differential probability (MEDP) over $R \geq 2$ rounds.

Related works. For 2-round LSX-ciphers, some approaches to computing upper bounds on the MEDP are known [13, 14, 15].

An algorithm for computing the exact MEDP of 2-round AES was proposed in [5]. Article [10] describes upper bounds on the MEDP for so-called «nested» LSX-ciphers (e.g. 4-round AES).

In [16] was shown that for some 2-round LSX-ciphers the MEDP is achieved by differentials involving a number of active Sboxes which exceeds the branch number of the linear layer (non-minimum weight differentials).

Some results about differential properties of 2-round Kuznyechik was obtained in [18]. The cited paper contains an algorithm for constructing the best minimum weight differentials and a proof that all other differentials have a lower EDP. Thanks to these two results, the exact value of the 2-round MEDP was computed.

Our contribution. We propose a dynamic programming algorithm designed for bounding non-minimum-weight differentials in 2-round LSX-ciphers. It uses only the difference distribution table and the differential branch number of the linear layer. The algorithm minimizes the number of high probability differential trails and does not try to minimize the total number of trails. Because of this reason, the algorithm is not effective for ciphers with small block size (for example, 32-bit 2-round AES).

We applied the developed algorithm to the 2-round Kuznyechik (Section 4 and Appendix B): the probability of any 2-round differential (linear hull) with $n + 3 = 19$ active Sboxes is bounded by $2^{-88.34}$ ($2^{-79.63\dots}$ correspondingly). These bounds also holds for any differential (linear hull) with $a \geq n + 3$ active Sboxes. Similar results were obtained for 2-round Khazad (Appendix C), and as a result, the exact values of $\text{MEDP} = 2^{-45} + 2^{-60}$ and $\text{MELP} = 2^{-37.80\dots}$ are also proved.

The set of estimates obtained by us can be used in further researches to calculate the bounds on the MEDP (MELP) for more rounds. We plan to use our new results together with a modified KMT2-DC (KMT2) algorithm [6, 7]. The approach [7] allows to incorporate other upper bounds when those bounds are superior to the values determined directly by the original algorithm [6]. In this way, we hope to prove the greater security of Kuznyechik to differential and linear cryptanalysis.

2 Notations and definitions

An LSX cipher E consists of sequence of rounds. Each of them contains three operations: \mathbf{X} – modulo 2 addition of an input block with an iterative key, \mathbf{S} – parallel application of a fixed bijective substitution \mathbf{s} , \mathbf{L} – linear transformation which may be represented as multiplication by the binary matrix.

To simplify the text and notation we consider only byte-oriented LSX-ciphers.

Let us denote:

n – block size in bytes,

\oplus – bitwise XOR operation,

$v[i]$ – i -th element of vector or sequence v , $1 \leq i \leq l$, where l is the number of elements of v ,

$\text{Supp}(v) = \{i: v[i] \neq 0\}$ – the support of a vector v ,

$\text{wt}(v) = \#\{i: v[i] \neq 0\}$ – the weight of a vector v ,

\mathbf{F}_q – finite field of q elements,

\mathbf{F}_q^* – set of all nonzero elements of the field \mathbf{F}_q ,

\mathbf{F}_q^l – set of l -element vector over \mathbf{F}_q .

Depending on the context, we will interpret a value $z \in \overline{0, 2^l - 1}$ as element of \mathbf{F}_{2^l} or \mathbf{F}_2^l or as an integer.

Definition 1. Let $\mathbf{s}: \mathbf{F}_2^8 \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_2^8$, let $a, b \in \mathbf{F}_2^8$ be fixed, and let x be a random variable having uniform distribution on \mathbf{F}_2^8 . The differential probability of (a, b) is defined as

$$\text{DP}(a, b) = \Pr_x(\mathbf{s}(x) \oplus \mathbf{s}(x \oplus a) = b).$$

Definition 2. Let E be a cipher with key-size κ and block-size l . Let x be a random variable having uniform distribution on \mathbf{F}_2^l . Then the expected (over keys K) differential probability of $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$ is defined as

$$\text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y) = 2^{-\kappa} \sum_{K \in \mathbf{F}_2^\kappa} \Pr_x(E_K(x) \oplus E_K(x \oplus \Delta x) = \Delta y),$$

where E_K is a cipher with key K .

Definition 3. The maximum expected differential probability is

$$\text{MEDP} = \max_{\Delta x \neq 0, \Delta y} \text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y)$$

Definition 4. Let \mathbf{s} be a function $\mathbf{F}_2^8 \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_2^8$. The differential distribution table DDT is a $2^8 \times 2^8$ matrix of transition probabilities such that

$$DDT[a][b] = \frac{\#\{x \in \mathbf{F}_2^8, \mathbf{s}(x) \oplus \mathbf{s}(x \oplus a) = b\}}{2^8} = DP(a, b), \quad a, b \in \mathbf{F}_2^8,$$

and $p_{\max} = \max_{a \neq 0, b} DDT[a][b]$.

Definition 5. Let \mathbf{L} -transformation (from $\mathbf{F}_{2^8}^n$ to $\mathbf{F}_{2^8}^n$) be \mathbf{F}_{2^8} -linear. We associate with \mathbf{L} the code $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbf{L}}$ of length $2n$ over \mathbf{F}_{2^8} defined by

$$\mathcal{C}_{\mathbf{L}} = \{(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{L}(\mathbf{c})), \mathbf{c} \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^n\}.$$

The differential branch number $\mathcal{B}_{\mathbf{L}}$ of the linear transformation \mathbf{L} is the minimum distance of the code $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbf{L}}$

$$\mathcal{B}_{\mathbf{L}} = \min_{\mathbf{c} \neq 0} \text{wt}(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{L}(\mathbf{c})).$$

Further, to simplify the text, we assume that $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbf{L}}$ is an MDS code and $\mathcal{B} = \mathcal{B}_{\mathbf{L}} = n + 1$.

2-round LSX-cipher may be represented as a sequence of operations

$$y = K_3 \oplus \mathbf{S}(K_2 \oplus \mathbf{LS}(K_1 \oplus x)),$$

where $x, y \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^n$ are the plaintext and the ciphertext, $K_1, K_2, K_3 \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^n$ are round keys derived from the masterkey K . The linear transformation on the last round was omitted without loss of generality.

A differential trail $\Omega = (\Delta x, \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta y)$ in 2-round LSX is a collection of four differences, where $\Delta x = x \oplus x'$, Δ_1 is the difference after the first nonlinear transformation, $\Delta_2 = \mathbf{L}(\Delta_1)$, $\Delta y = y \oplus y'$, x and x' are plaintext blocks, y and y' are the corresponding ciphertext blocks.

Definition 6 ([16]). The expected 2-round trail Ω probability is defined as

$$EDCP(\Omega) = 2^{-\kappa} \sum_{K \in \mathbf{F}_2^{\kappa}} \Pr_x \left(\Delta_1 = x_1 \oplus x'_1 \text{ and } \Delta_2 = x_2 \oplus x'_2 \text{ and } \Delta y = y \oplus y' \right),$$

where x is a random variable with the uniform distribution, $x' = \Delta x \oplus x$, x_1, x'_1 are states after the first \mathbf{S} -transformation, x_2, x'_2 are states before the second \mathbf{S} -transformation, κ is a size of the masterkey K .

We further assume that all round keys are independent and uniformly distributed (so-called Markov assumption [8]). Under this assumption we have

$$EDCP(\Delta x, \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta y) = \left(\prod_{j=1}^n DP(\Delta x[j], \Delta_1[j]) \right) \left(\prod_{j=1}^n DP(\Delta_2[j], \Delta y[j]) \right).$$

Note that if $\text{EDCP}(\Delta x, \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta y) \neq 0$, then $\text{Supp}(\Delta x) = \text{Supp}(\Delta_1)$, $\text{Supp}(\Delta_2) = \text{Supp}(\Delta y)$ and (Δ_1, Δ_2) is a codeword of the code $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y) = \\ = & \sum_{\substack{(\Delta_1, \Delta_2) \in \mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}, \\ \text{Supp}(\Delta x) = \text{Supp}(\Delta_1), \\ \text{Supp}(\Delta_2) = \text{Supp}(\Delta y)}} \prod_{j \in \text{Supp}(\Delta x)} \text{DP}(\Delta x[j], \Delta_1[j]) \prod_{j \in \text{Supp}(\Delta y)} \text{DP}(\Delta_2[j], \Delta y[j]). \end{aligned}$$

The equality between the above formula for $\text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y)$ and the definition 2 was proved in [8].

We define the weight (number of nonzero bytes) of the differential $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$ or the differential trail $(\Delta x, \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta y)$ as $\text{wt}(\Delta x) + \text{wt}(\Delta y)$. Denote

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MEDP}_w &= \max_{\Delta x \neq 0, \Delta y, \text{wt}(\Delta x) + \text{wt}(\Delta y) = w} \text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y), \\ \text{MEDP}_w^+ &= \max_{\Delta x \neq 0, \Delta y, \text{wt}(\Delta x) + \text{wt}(\Delta y) \geq w} \text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y), \quad \mathcal{B} \leq w \leq 2 \cdot n. \end{aligned}$$

Note that all mentioned definitions EDP , EDCP , MEDP are related to 2-round case unless otherwise stated.

Our main goal is to compute the nontrivial upper bound on $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+$, $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+$ etc.

3 Upper bound on non-minimum weight differentials

The strategy of our approach is as follows. Each differential trail $\Omega = (\Delta x, \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta y)$ in 2-round differential $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$ uniquely corresponds to codeword (Δ_1, Δ_2) in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$. All possible trails (codewords) in the differential have the form $\text{Supp}(\Delta x) = \text{Supp}(\Delta_1)$, $\text{Supp}(\Delta_2) = \text{Supp}(\Delta y)$. Derive constraints («maximum cost») for the entire set of such codewords. Divide the set into several subsets. Compute contribution to the constraints («cost») and the corresponding upper bound («value») for each possible subset. Select subsets so that the upper bound («total value») is maximum and the selection satisfies all constraints («total cost» does not exceed «maximum cost»). Thus, we obtain the upper bound on the differential.

3.1 Auxiliary lemmas

Lemma 1 (The rearrangement inequality [9]). *Let $l \in \mathbb{N}$, and suppose c_1, c_2, \dots, c_l and d_1, d_2, \dots, d_l are sequences of nonnegative values. Let*

$\tilde{c}_1, \tilde{c}_2, \dots, \tilde{c}_l$ and $\tilde{d}_1, \tilde{d}_2, \dots, \tilde{d}_l$ be the sequences obtained by sorting original sequences in nonincreasing order. Then

$$\sum_{i=1}^l c_i d_i \leq \sum_{i=1}^l \tilde{c}_i \tilde{d}_i.$$

Lemma 2. Let $l \in \mathbb{N}$, and suppose c_1, c_2, \dots, c_l , and $\tilde{c}_1, \tilde{c}_2, \dots, \tilde{c}_l$, and d_1, d_2, \dots, d_l are sequences of nonnegative values. Each of them sorted in nonincreasing order. Suppose there exists l' , $1 \leq l' \leq l$, such that

- 1) $\tilde{c}_i \geq c_i$, for $1 \leq i \leq l'$
 - 2) $\tilde{c}_i \leq c_i$, for $l' + 1 \leq i \leq l$
 - 3) $\sum_{i=1}^l c_i \leq \sum_{i=1}^l \tilde{c}_i$
- Then $\sum_{i=1}^l c_i d_i \leq \sum_{i=1}^l \tilde{c}_i d_i$.

Proof. The proof of the lemma is given in particular in [6]. \square

If statements 1-3 holds for some sequences $\tilde{\mathbf{c}}$ and \mathbf{c} , then we will say that $\tilde{\mathbf{c}}$ is greater than \mathbf{c} under the conditions of Lemma 2. Let D be a $h \times v$ matrix such that

$$D[i][j] \in \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_t, p_{\max}\}, \quad 1 \leq i \leq h, \quad 1 \leq j \leq v, \quad t \in \mathbb{N},$$

$$0 \leq p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_t < p_{\max} \leq 1, \quad p_k, p_{\max} \in \mathbb{R}, \quad 1 \leq k \leq t.$$

Denote

$$\nu_k(D) = \#\{(i, j) : D[i][j] = p_k, \quad 1 \leq i \leq h, \quad 1 \leq j \leq v\}, \quad 1 \leq k \leq t, \quad (1)$$

$$\nu_{\max}(D) = \#\{(i, j) : D[i][j] = p_{\max}, \quad 1 \leq i \leq h, \quad 1 \leq j \leq v\}.$$

Denote by $\omega_l(D)$ the number of rows containing exactly l elements p_{\max}

$$\omega_l(D) = \#\{i : \#\{j : D[i][j] = p_{\max}, \quad 1 \leq j \leq v\} = l, \quad 1 \leq i \leq h\},$$

$$\sum_{l=1}^v \omega_l(D) \cdot l = \nu_{\max}(D), \quad l_{\max}(D) = \max_{\omega_l(D) \neq 0} (l). \quad (2)$$

Let \tilde{D} be the reordered matrix D (see Fig. 1). The reordering procedure consists of three following steps:

- 1) sort each row of \tilde{D} in nonincreasing order;
- 2) sort each column of \tilde{D} in nonincreasing order;
- 3) reorder each unequal to p_{\max} element:

$$\forall i, j, i', j' : \tilde{D}[i][j] = p_{\max} \text{ or } \tilde{D}[i'][j'] = p_{\max} \text{ or}$$

$$\left(\tilde{D}[i][j] \geq \tilde{D}[i'][j'], \quad i' > i \text{ or } i' = i, \quad j' > j \right),$$

$$1 \leq i, i' \leq h, \quad 1 \leq j, j' \leq v.$$

Lemma 3. *Let D and \tilde{D} be defined as above, then*

$$\nu_k(D) = \nu_k(\tilde{D}), \quad \nu_{\max}(D) = \nu_{\max}(\tilde{D}), \quad 1 \leq k \leq t,$$

$$\omega_l(D) = \omega_l(\tilde{D}), \quad l_{\max}(D) = l_{\max}(\tilde{D}), \quad \forall l \in \mathbb{N},$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^v D[i][j] \leq \sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^v \tilde{D}[i][j].$$




Figure 1: Example of matrix \tilde{D} after the reordering procedure.

Proof. Let $\tilde{D} = D$ before reordering. We show that at each of three step the value

$$\sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^v \tilde{D}[i][j] \tag{3}$$

does not decrease. We also show that the final form of \tilde{D} is given uniquely (up to permutation of identical elements).

The first step of the reordering procedure does not change the value (3) due to commutativity of multiplication.

By the rearrangement inequality it follows that the second step does not decrease (3).

Note that after these two steps

$$\prod_{j=1}^v \tilde{D}[i][j] \geq \prod_{j=1}^v \tilde{D}[i+1][j], \quad \forall i = \overline{1, h-1}. \tag{4}$$

The set of $\omega_0, \dots, \omega_{l_{\max}}$ is also the same as before. Therefore, the positions of all elements p_{\max} are known (the gray area in figure 1).

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1: for pos := 1 to  $N - 1$  do
2:   valmax := max  $\left( \tilde{D}[i_{\text{pos}+1}][j_{\text{pos}+1}], \tilde{D}[i_{\text{pos}+2}][j_{\text{pos}+2}], \dots, \tilde{D}[i_N][j_N] \right)$ 
3:   posmax := min  $\left\{ p: \tilde{D}[i_p][j_p] = \text{val}_{\text{max}}, \text{pos} + 1 \leq p \leq N \right\}$ 
4:   if  $\tilde{D}[i_{\text{pos}}][j_{\text{pos}}] < \text{val}_{\text{max}}$  then
5:     swap  $\left( \tilde{D}[i_{\text{pos}}][j_{\text{pos}}], \tilde{D}[i_{\text{pos}_{\text{max}}}] [j_{\text{pos}_{\text{max}}}] \right)$ 
6:     nonincreasing_sort  $\left( \tilde{D}[1][j_{\text{pos}_{\text{max}}}], \dots, \tilde{D}[h][j_{\text{pos}_{\text{max}}}] \right)$ 
7:   end if
8: end for

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Algorithm 1: Step 3 of the reordering procedure

For step 3, we will use a procedure similar to the well-known selection sort. Let's write a row-by-row coordinates of all elements

$$(1, 1), (1, 2), \dots, (1, v), (2, 1), (2, 2), \dots, (2, v), \dots, (h, 1), (h, 2), \dots, (h, v). \quad (5)$$

Remove from (5) all elements (i, j) such that $\tilde{D}[i][j] = p_{\text{max}}$. We obtain the sequence of indexes

$$\text{Indexes} = (i_1, j_1), (i_2, j_2), \dots, (i_N, j_N), \quad N \leq h \cdot v.$$

Reorder the table elements according to the pseudocode.

We have got the table as in figure 1. Let us show further that value (3) has never decreased in the reordering process.

Let's consider line 5 of the pseudocode (Algorithm 1). If $i_{\text{pos}} = i_{\text{pos}_{\text{max}}}$ then (3) remains the same due to commutativity of multiplication. If $i_{\text{pos}} < i_{\text{pos}_{\text{max}}}$ then (3) is not decreased due to (4). But after the exchange of elements, inequality (4) may not be true any more.

Line 6 has a technical role and does not affect the final appearance of \tilde{D} . This sort does not decrease (3) because of the rearrangement inequality. Inequality (4) becomes true after this sorting. Also note that sorting does not change the previously reordered elements.

The Lemma is proved. □

Lemma 4. *Let D and \tilde{D} be given as in Lemma 3. Suppose c_1, c_2, \dots, c_h is a sequence of nonnegative values. Let $\tilde{c}_1, \tilde{c}_2, \dots, \tilde{c}_h$ be obtained by sorting the above sequence in nonincreasing order. Then*

$$\sum_{i=1}^h c_i \prod_{j=1}^v D[i][j] \leq \sum_{i=1}^h \tilde{c}_i \prod_{j=1}^v \tilde{D}[i][j].$$

Proof. Directly follows from Lemmas 1 and 3. □

3.2 Representation of trails in the differential

Consider an arbitrary differential $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$, $\text{wt}(\Delta x) + \text{wt}(\Delta y) = \mathcal{B} + 1$. The differential consists only of trails $(\Delta x, \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta y)$ such that $\text{Supp}(\Delta x) = \text{Supp}(\Delta_1) = \{k_1, k_2, \dots, k_t\}$, $\text{Supp}(\Delta y) = \text{Supp}(\Delta_2) = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_r\}$, $t + r = \mathcal{B} + 1 = n + 2$.

It is easy to show that the number of differential trails does not exceed $T \leq (2^8 - 1)^2$. Otherwise, there is a pair of codewords (Δ_1, Δ_2) and (Δ'_1, Δ'_2) such that

$$\text{wt}((\Delta_1, \Delta_2) \oplus (\Delta'_1, \Delta'_2)) < \mathcal{B}.$$

Let's imagine a set of differential trails in the form of a table. Such a table, called Trails, has a size of $T \times (n + 2)$. Each row is non-zero bytes of the corresponding codeword

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Trails}[i] &= \Delta_1[k_1], \dots, \Delta_1[k_t], \Delta_2[m_1], \dots, \Delta_2[m_r], \quad 1 \leq i \leq T, \\ \text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y) &= \sum_{i=1}^T \prod_{j=1}^t \text{DP}(\Delta x[k_j], \text{Trails}[i][j]) \cdot \prod_{j=t+1}^{t+r} \text{DP}(\text{Trails}[i][j], \Delta y[m_{j-t}]). \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

For definiteness let's sort the table by the byte value in the first column (see Fig.2).

Let an arbitrary byte of Δx with an index k_j , $1 \leq j \leq t$ be fixed. Consider j -th column of Trails. Bytes with the same value \mathbf{x} will have the same probability $\text{DP}(\Delta x[k_j], \mathbf{x})$. Similarly for Δy . Let us denote the corresponding table by $\text{DP}^*(\text{Trails})$, where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}[i][j]) &= \text{DP}(\Delta x[k_j], \text{Trails}[i][j]), \quad 1 \leq i \leq T, \quad 1 \leq j \leq t, \\ \text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}[i][j]) &= \text{DP}(\text{Trails}[i][j], \Delta y[m_{j-t}]), \quad 1 \leq i \leq T, \quad t < j \leq t + r. \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

We will divide table columns into 3 groups (subtables). The group C contains exactly 1 column. In the group Trails_I there are u columns. The third group has v columns, $1 + u + v = n + 2$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Trails} &= \text{C} || \text{Trails}_{\text{I}} || \text{Trails}_{\text{III}}, \\ \text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}) &= \text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}_{\text{I}}) || \text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}_{\text{I}}) || \text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}), \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where $||$ is concatenation. We also denote

$$\text{Block}_j = \{\text{Trails}_{\text{I}}[i] || \text{Trails}_{\text{III}}[i] : \text{C}[i] = j, \quad 1 \leq i \leq T\}, \quad j \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*. \quad (9)$$




Figure 2: Representation of Trails

3.3 DDT simplification

Let all elements in each row (column) of the DDT be sorted in nonincreasing order. The row and the column with zero indexes are ignored. Let us denote the such table DDT_{row} (DDT_{col} correspondingly)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{DDT}_{\text{row}}[x][1] &\geq \text{DDT}_{\text{row}}[x][2] \geq \dots \geq \text{DDT}_{\text{row}}[x][2^8 - 1], \quad x \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*, \\ \text{DDT}_{\text{col}}[1][y] &\geq \text{DDT}_{\text{col}}[2][y] \geq \dots \geq \text{DDT}_{\text{col}}[2^8 - 1][y], \quad y \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*. \end{aligned}$$

We define sequences \mathbf{m}_x , \mathbf{m}_y and \mathbf{m} as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{m}_x[i] &= \max_{a \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*} \text{DDT}_{\text{row}}[a][i], \quad \mathbf{m}_y[i] = \max_{a \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*} \text{DDT}_{\text{col}}[i][a], \quad i \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*, \quad (10) \\ \mathbf{m}[i] &= \max(\mathbf{m}_x[i], \mathbf{m}_y[i]), \quad 1 \leq i \leq 2^8 - 1. \end{aligned}$$

The sequence \mathbf{m} is «greater» than any sorted nontrivial row/column of the DDT. Let \mathbf{r} be any nontrivial sorted row/column of the DDT. Then, $\mathbf{m}[i] \geq \mathbf{r}[i]$, $1 \leq i \leq 2^8 - 1$. Denote $\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}) = \#\{i : \mathbf{m}[i] = p_{\max}, 1 \leq i \leq 2^8 - 1\}$. Note, that $\sum_{i=1}^{2^8-1} \mathbf{m}[i] \geq 1$.

We also define the sequences $\boldsymbol{\rho}$, $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$, $\boldsymbol{\rho}_y$ as follows. Let $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$ ($\boldsymbol{\rho}_y$) be one of the nontrivial sorted row (column) of the DDT. The sequence $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$ ($\boldsymbol{\rho}_y$) must be greater than any other sorted row (column) of the DDT under the conditions of Lemma 2, $\sum_{i=1}^{2^8-1} \boldsymbol{\rho}_x[i] = \sum_{i=1}^{2^8-1} \boldsymbol{\rho}_y[i] = 1$. If $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$ is greater than $\boldsymbol{\rho}_y$ under the conditions of Lemma 2, then $\boldsymbol{\rho} = \boldsymbol{\rho}_x$ otherwise $\boldsymbol{\rho} = \boldsymbol{\rho}_y$.

3.4 Constraints

We formulate a Lemma giving us some restrictions on the set of code-words.

Lemma 5. *Let table $\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}$ and sequence \mathbf{m} be given as above. The table $\text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}_{\text{III}})$ is defined by analogy with (7). Let us denote $\omega_l(\text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}))$ the number of rows containing exactly l elements p_{\max} :*

$$\omega_l(\text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}_{\text{III}})) = \#\{i : \#\{j : \text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}[i][j]) = p_{\max}, 1 \leq j \leq v\} = l, 1 \leq i \leq T\}. \quad (11)$$

Then

$$\omega_2 \leq \binom{v}{2} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2, \quad (12)$$

and finally

$$\sum_{l=2}^v \omega_l \cdot \binom{l}{2} \leq \binom{v}{2} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2. \quad (13)$$

Proof. Let's consider two arbitrary columns of $\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}$. These columns do not contain any identical byte pairs. The total number of different byte pairs does not exceed $T \leq (2^8 - 1)^2$. In each column not more than $\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m})$ values are mapped in p_{\max} . Hence, not more than $(\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2$ byte pairs are mapped in (p_{\max}, p_{\max}) . The number of ways to select 2 columns is $\binom{v}{2}$.

Thus we have (12).

Suppose there is a row containing 3 elements p_{\max} . Then $\binom{3}{2} = 3$ pairs of columns are generated, each of which contains a pair (p_{\max}, p_{\max}) . Similarly for rows with l elements p_{\max} . Each of them «takes» $\binom{l}{2}$ pairs. Thereby we obtain (13). \square

3.5 Bounds on $\text{DP}^*(\text{Block})$

Suppose that we are given an arbitrary $\text{Block} \in \{\text{Block}_j, j \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*\}$. The block dimensions are $h \cdot (n + 1)$, $h \leq 2^8 - 1$. We will give an upper bound on Block 's contribution to the differential $\sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^{n+1} \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}[i][j])$. We will use Lemmas 2, 3, 4.

Consider $v = 0$ and $u = n + 1$. Then we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^u \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}[i][j]) \leq \max \left(\max_{x \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*} \sum_{i=1}^{2^8-1} (\text{DDT}[x][i])^u, \max_{y \in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}^*} \sum_{i=1}^{2^8-1} (\text{DDT}[i][y])^u \right). \quad (14)$$

The inequality (14) is so-called «FSE 2003 bound» on MEDP [14]. Lemma 2 allows us to select a row (column) that maximizes expression (14). Then

we can rewrite inequality (14)

$$\sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^u \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}[i][j]) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{2^8-1} (\rho[i])^u. \quad (15)$$

Let $v > 0$. We will divide Block into two parts:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Block} &= \text{Block}_{\text{I}} || \text{Block}_{\text{III}}, \\ \sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^{n+1} \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}[i][j]) &= \sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^u \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}_{\text{I}}[i][j]) \prod_{j=1}^v \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}_{\text{III}}[i][j]), \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

where Block_{I} contains u columns, and $\text{Block}_{\text{III}}$ contains v columns, $u + v = n + 1$. We will evaluate the contribution of Block_{I} by using the sequence

$$(\rho[1])^u, (\rho[2])^u, \dots, (\rho[2^8 - 1])^u. \quad (17)$$

We will also get a bound on the contribution of $\text{Block}_{\text{III}}$ by using Lemma 3. Suppose that each column of $\text{DP}^*(\text{Block}_{\text{III}})$ contains elements from the sequence \mathbf{m} . Assume also that we know

$$\omega_l(\text{DP}^*(\text{Block}_{\text{III}})) = \#\{i : \#\{j : \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}_{\text{III}}[i][j]) = p_{\max}, 1 \leq j \leq v\} = l, 1 \leq i \leq h\},$$

$$0 \leq l \leq v,$$

$$\sum_{l=1}^v \omega_l \cdot l \leq \nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}) \cdot v. \quad (18)$$

In other words, ω_l is the number of rows containing exactly l elements p_{\max} . Let $\widetilde{\text{Block}}_{\text{III}}$ be a table obtained by the reordering procedure from Lemma 3. Then we get

$$\sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^v \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}_{\text{III}}[i][j]) \leq \sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^v \text{DP}^*(\widetilde{\text{Block}}_{\text{III}}[i][j])$$

Thanks to Lemma 4, we finally obtain

$$\sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^{n+1} \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}[i][j]) \leq \sum_{i=1}^h (\rho[i])^u \prod_{j=1}^v \text{DP}^*(\widetilde{\text{Block}}_{\text{III}}[i][j]). \quad (19)$$

Thus, if we know the distribution ω_l , $0 \leq l \leq v$, then we can calculate the upper bound on $\sum_{i=1}^h \prod_{j=1}^{n+1} \text{DP}^*(\text{Block}[i][j])$.

3.6 Optimization problem

Let's will form all possible sets

$$s_i = \{(l, \omega_l), 0 \leq l \leq v\}, \quad 1 \leq i \leq N. \quad (20)$$

For each set $\sum_{l=1}^v \omega_l \cdot l = \nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}) \cdot v$ is true. In fact, we construct all possible partitions of the number $\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}) \cdot v$. The maximum term in the partition does not exceed v .

For each set s_i , calculate the estimate π_i using (19) and «contribution» ζ_i for constraints (13): $\zeta_i = \sum_{l=2}^v \omega_l \cdot \binom{l}{2}$. We can choose such u and v , which would *minimize* the final estimation. For most practical cases we use $u = 1$ and $v = n$. We get a set of pairs

$$(\pi_1, \zeta_1), (\pi_2, \zeta_2), \dots, (\pi_N, \zeta_N). \quad (21)$$

Pairs with the same ζ_i value can be removed. The pair with the largest π_i must be left. Hence $N' \leq \binom{v}{2} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2$.

We can estimate the first column of DP^* (Trails) using the sequence $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$ (or $\boldsymbol{\rho}_y$). Due to the fact that $\text{wt}(\Delta x) \geq 1$ and $\text{wt}(\Delta y) \geq 1$, we can choose $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$ or $\boldsymbol{\rho}_y$. We will choose so as to *minimize* the final value. For certainty, we assume that $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$ has been chosen.

Denote $I = i_1, i_2, \dots, i_{2^8-1}$, $1 \leq i_j \leq N'$, $1 \leq j \leq 2^8 - 1$. Then

$$\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1} \leq \overline{\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}} = \max_I \sum_{j=1}^{2^8-1} \boldsymbol{\rho}_x[j] \cdot \pi_{i_j} \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{i \in I} \zeta_i \leq \binom{v}{2} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2. \quad (22)$$

The optimal I is chosen by us using dynamic programming (see non-optimized version of the pseudocode in Appendix A, Algorithm 2).

There is a trivial estimate on $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2} \leq \sum_{i=1}^{2^8-1} \boldsymbol{\rho}[i] \cdot \overline{\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}} = \overline{\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}}$. Similar can be done for $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+3}$ etc. Thus, we proved that $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq \overline{\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}}$.

3.7 Another constraints

We can compute the estimate on $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+$ more precisely.

Consider the table DP^* (Trails_{III}). The number of rows that contains many elements p_{\max} is quite small.

Recall that $\text{wt}(\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}[i] \oplus \text{Trails}_{\text{III}}[j]) \geq v - 1$, $i \neq j$. Otherwise, there is a codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}_L$, $\text{wt}(c) < \mathcal{B}$. Thus, any two rows of Trails_{III} have exactly one equal byte, or these rows do not have any matches.

In each column of $\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}$, no more than $\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m})$ bytes are mapped in p_{\max} . $\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}$ has v columns. Denote $W = \nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}) \cdot v$.

Suppose that some row of $\text{DP}^*(\text{Trails}_{\text{III}})$ contains w_1 elements p_{\max} .

Let's say w_1 bytes of W were involved. Let the other row contain w_2 elements p_{\max} . These two rows can intersect at most one byte. Therefore, at least $w_2 - 1$ bytes are selected from W . The third row can intersect with the first and the second rows. Hence we subtract $w_3 - 2$ from W . Continue until $W \geq 0$.

Let us have a series $w_1, w_2, w_3, \dots, w_T$ sorted in nonincreasing order, where T is the number of rows in $\text{Trails}_{\text{III}}$. Then

$$\left(W - \sum_{i=1}^l (w_i - (i - 1)) \right) \geq 0 \quad (23)$$

must be true for all $l \leq T$.

Let's form all series $\psi = w_1, w_2, \dots, w_l$ for which the inequality (23) is true. Denote the set of such series by Ψ . We will use a relatively small value of l (about 5, 6).

We can modify the algorithm from Subsection 3.6 as follows. For each set s_i from (20), we form a series $\psi = w_1, w_2, \dots, w_l$. We obtain a sequence similar to (21): $(\pi_1, \zeta_1, \psi_1), (\pi_2, \zeta_2, \psi_2), \dots, (\pi_N, \zeta_N, \psi_N)$.

Hence, another constraint is added to the optimization problem (22):

$$\text{sort}_l \left(\psi_{i_1} \|\psi_{i_2}\| \dots \|\psi_{i_{2^8-1}}\| \right) \in \Psi, \quad 1 \leq i_j \leq N, \quad 1 \leq j \leq 2^8 - 1,$$

where sort_l is l largest elements of the sequence. Note that we do not need to store the entire sequence $\psi_{i_1} \|\psi_{i_2}\| \dots \|\psi_{i_{2^8-1}}\|$ in memory. We only need the first l values. Using the limitations described in this subsection requires a lot of computing resources. Therefore, this modification is not used in the calculation of bound on $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+$.

3.8 Computing $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+$ and other

Let us have $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$ such that $\text{wt}(\Delta x) + \text{wt}(\Delta y) = \mathcal{B} + 2 = n + 3$. Then Lemma 5 can be reformulated by analogy as follows.

Lemma 6. *Let the conditions of Lemma 5 be hold, but weight of the differential be equal to $n + 3$. Then*

$$\sum_{l=3}^v \omega_l \cdot \binom{l}{3} \leq \binom{v}{3} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^3. \quad (24)$$

The algorithm is similar to Subsection 3.6, but the optimization problem is solved in two steps. As in Subsection 3.6:

- form all possible sets
- $s_i = \{(l, \omega_l), 0 \leq l \leq v\}, 1 \leq i \leq N, \sum_{l=1}^v \omega_l \cdot l = \nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}) \cdot v;$
- for each set s_i , calculate the estimate π_i by (19); $\zeta_i = \sum_{l=2}^v \omega_l \cdot \binom{l}{2};$
- $\eta_i = \sum_{l=3}^v \omega_l \cdot \binom{l}{3}.$

We obtain the sequence $(\pi_1, \zeta_1, \eta_1), (\pi_2, \zeta_2, \eta_2), \dots, (\pi_N, \zeta_N, \eta_N).$

Let's solve first optimization problem for all values $\eta' \leq \binom{v}{3} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^3.$
Denote $I = i_1, i_2, \dots, i_{2^8-1}, i_j \in \mathbb{N}, 1 \leq j \leq 2^8 - 1.$

$$\pi' = \max_I \sum_{j=1}^{2^8-1} \rho_x[j] \cdot \pi_{i_j}, \text{ under condition } \sum_{i \in I} \zeta_i \leq \binom{v}{2} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2 \text{ and } \sum_{i \in I} \eta_i = \eta'.$$

We can get all the values η' by solving the optimization problem once.

Thus, the sequence $(\pi'_1, \eta'_1), (\pi'_2, \eta'_2), \dots, (\pi'_{N'}, \eta'_{N'})$ will be obtained, $N' \leq \binom{v}{3} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^3.$

We will solve the second optimization problem

$$\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq \overline{\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}} = \max_I \sum_{j=1}^{2^8-1} \rho_x[j] \cdot \pi'_{i_j} \text{ and } \sum_{i \in I} \eta'_i \leq \binom{v}{3} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^3.$$

The pseudocode in Appendix A contains a non-optimized version of the algorithm. Application of the described approach is computationally infeasible for $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+$ in most cases. Furthermore, the potential estimation shift is very small (see summary table 1).

4 New bounds on MEDP for 2-round Kuznyechik

Kuznyechik block cipher [1] consists of a sequence of 9 rounds and a post-whitening key addition. The block size is 128 bits ($n = 16$ bytes), the key has a size of 256 bits. The cipher Sbox has no explicit analytical form [19], such as in AES. The rows and columns of the DDT have different unbalanced distributions. The sequence \mathbf{m}_y is «greater» than $\mathbf{m}_x.$ L-transformation is defined as a LFSR over $\mathbf{F}_{2^8},$ the differential branch number $\mathcal{B} = n + 1.$

In [18] was proved that each 2-round best differential contains only one differential trail

$$\text{MEDP} = \text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}} = \max_{\Omega \neq 0} \text{EDCP}(\Omega) = \left(\frac{8}{256}\right)^{13} \left(\frac{6}{256}\right)^4 = 2^{-86.66\dots}$$

Using the proposed algorithms we showed that

$$\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq 2^{-87.54\dots}, \quad \text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq 2^{-88.34\dots}$$

The calculation $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+$ and $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+$ used the fact that $\text{wt}(\Delta x) \geq 2$. We can use ρ_x instead of ρ (the rows of DDT instead the columns) in at least two coordinates. Obtained bound on $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+$ will be not less than $2^{-88.42\dots}$.

Table 1 shows all computed values. The numbers are rounded to the second decimal place. The second data column presents the bounds we obtained using «FSE 2003 bounds» [14]. The last column (*) shows the limitation on the capabilities of the presented algorithm. For information about the linear method, see Appendix B.

$(p_{\max})^{\mathcal{B}}$	FSE2003 $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\leq}$	$\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}} =$	$\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq$	$\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq$	(*) $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+ \leq$
-85	-83.97	-86.66	-87.54	-88.34	-88.42
$(p_{\text{lin},\max})^{\mathcal{B}}$	FSE2003 $\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\leq}$	$\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}} =$	$\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq$	$\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq$	(*) $\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+ \leq$
-74.54	-73.54	-76.73	-77.15	-79.63	-80.50

Table 1: Summary table of results for Kuznyechik (\log_2 scale).

5 Conclusion

We propose a dynamic programming algorithm for bounding non-minimum weight differentials (linear hulls) in 2-round LSX-ciphers. Thanks to the presented algorithm, we derive some new bounds on differentials and linear hulls for 2-round Kuznyechik (Table 1). Similar results were obtained for 2-round Khazad (Table 2), and as a result, the exact values of $\text{MEDP} = 2^{-45} + 2^{-60}$ and $\text{MELP} = 2^{-37.80\dots}$ are also proved.

The source codes of the presented algorithms can be found at:

<https://gitlab.com/v.kir/diff2rLSX>

For any LSX-cipher with independent round keys, the R -round MEDP (MELP) is the upper bound for $(R + 1)$ -round MEDP (MELP). The presented results are a step towards obtaining new nontrivial bounds on R -round MEDP (MELP), i.e. new proofs of Kuznyechik strength against differential and linear cryptanalysis.

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A Pseudocode of algorithms

Require: $(\pi_1, \zeta_1), (\pi_2, \zeta_2), \dots, (\pi_{N'}, \zeta_{N'})$, and $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$, and $s = \binom{v}{2} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2$

Ensure: $\overline{\text{MEDP}}_{\mathcal{B}+1}$

```

1:  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\rho}}_x := \text{nondecreasing\_sort}(\boldsymbol{\rho}_x) // 0, \dots, 0, \frac{2}{256}, \dots, p_{\max}$ 
2:  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\rho}}_x := \text{nonzero\_elements}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\rho}}_x) // \frac{2}{256}, \dots, p_{\max}$ 
3:  $\text{state}[s] := [0, \dots, 0] // \text{indexing from } 0$ 
4: for  $j := 1$  to  $\text{len}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\rho}}_x)$  do
5:    $\text{new\_state}[s] := [0, \dots, 0] // \text{indexing from } 0$ 
6:    $\text{pr}_x := \tilde{\boldsymbol{\rho}}_x[j]$ 
7:   for  $c := 0$  to  $s$  do
8:     for  $i := 1$  to  $N'$  do
9:        $\text{pr} := \text{pr}_x \cdot \pi_i + \text{state}[c]$ 
10:       $\text{pairs} := \zeta_i + c$ 
11:      if  $\text{pairs} \leq s$  then
12:        if  $\text{new\_state}[\text{pairs}] < \text{pr}$  then
13:           $\text{new\_state}[\text{pairs}] := \text{pr}$ 
14:        end if
15:      end if
16:    end for
17:  end for
18:   $\text{state} := \text{new\_state}$ 
19: end for
20: return  $\max(\text{state})$ 

```

Algorithm 2: Computing $\overline{\text{MEDP}}_{\mathcal{B}+1}$

The pseudocode above (Algorithm 2) contains a non-optimized version of the algorithm. The complexity of the algorithm is

$$O\left(\text{len}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\rho}}_x) \cdot N' \cdot \binom{v}{2} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2\right),$$

where $\text{len}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\rho}}_x)$ is a number of nonzero elements in $\boldsymbol{\rho}_x$.

If $v = 16$, $\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}) = 2$, $\text{len}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\rho}}_x) \leq 2^7$ (Kuznyechik), then the approximate number of operations is 2^{25} (less than a minute on a common PC). The number of distinct pairs $N' = 7665$.

Require: $(\pi_1, \zeta_1, \eta_1), (\pi_2, \zeta_2, \eta_2), \dots, (\pi_N, \zeta_N, \eta_N)$, and ρ_x , and
 $s_{\text{pairs}} = \binom{v}{2} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^2$, $s_{\text{triplets}} = \binom{v}{3} \cdot (\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}))^3$

Ensure: $\overline{\text{MEDP}}_{\mathcal{B}+2}$

```

1:  $\tilde{\rho}_x := \text{nondecreasing\_sort}(\rho_x) // 0, \dots, 0, \frac{2}{256}, \dots, p_{\max}$ 
2:  $\tilde{\rho}_x := \text{nonzero\_elements}(\tilde{\rho}_x) // \frac{2}{256}, \dots, p_{\max}$ 
3:  $\text{state}[s_{\text{pairs}}][s_{\text{triplets}}] := [0, \dots, 0] // \text{indexing from } 0,0$ 
4: for  $j := 1$  to  $\text{len}(\tilde{\rho}_x)$  do
5:    $\text{new\_state}[s_{\text{pairs}}][s_{\text{triplets}}] := [0, \dots, 0] // \text{indexing from } 0,0$ 
6:    $\text{pr}_x := \tilde{\rho}_x[j]$ 
7:   for  $c_{\text{pairs}} := 0$  to  $s_{\text{pairs}}$  do
8:     for  $c_{\text{triplets}} := 0$  to  $s_{\text{triplets}}$  do
9:       for  $i := 1$  to  $N$  do
10:         $\text{pr} := \text{pr}_x \cdot \pi_i + \text{state}[c_{\text{pairs}}][c_{\text{triplets}}]$ 
11:         $\text{pairs} := \zeta_i + c_{\text{pairs}}$ 
12:         $\text{triplets} := \eta_i + c_{\text{triplets}}$ 
13:        if  $\text{pairs} \leq s_{\text{pairs}}$  and  $\text{triplets} \leq s_{\text{triplets}}$  then
14:          if  $\text{new\_state}[\text{pairs}][\text{triplets}] < \text{pr}$  then
15:             $\text{new\_state}[\text{pairs}][\text{triplets}] := \text{pr}$ 
16:          end if
17:        end if
18:      end for
19:    end for
20:  end for
21:   $\text{state} := \text{new\_state}$ 
22: end for
23:  $(\pi'_1, \eta'_1), \dots, (\pi'_{N'}, \eta'_{N'}) := (\text{state}[s_{\text{pairs}}][0], 0), \dots, (\text{state}[s_{\text{pairs}}][s_{\text{triplets}}], s_{\text{triplets}})$ 
24: return call Algorithm 2  $((\pi'_1, \eta'_1), (\pi'_2, \eta'_2), \dots, (\pi'_{N'}, \eta'_{N'}), \rho_x, s = s_{\text{triplets}})$ 

```

Algorithm 3: Computing $\overline{\text{MEDP}}_{\mathcal{B}+2}$

The complexity of Algorithm 3 is estimated as trivial as Algorithm 2. If $v = 16$, $\nu_{\max}(\mathbf{m}) = 2$, $\text{len}(\tilde{\rho}_x) \leq 2^7$, then $N = 7665$ and the approximate number of operations is 2^{41} (about an hour on common PC).

B Application to Linear Cryptanalysis

There is a certain duality between differential and linear cryptanalysis [4]. It allows us to apply the algorithms described above to calculate linear characteristics.

We make the appropriate substitutions.

Differential probability (DP, EDP, EDCP, MEDP) is replaced by linear probability (LP, ELP, ELCP, MELP correspondingly). DDT is replaced by Linear Approximation Table (LAT). Input/output differences Δx and Δy

are replaced by input/output masks μ_x and μ_y correspondingly.

$$\text{LP}(\mu_x, \mu_y) = (2 \Pr(\mu_x \bullet x = \mu_y \bullet f(x)) - 1)^2, \quad \mu_x, \mu_y \in \mathbf{F}_2^l, \quad f : \mathbf{F}_2^l \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_2^l,$$

where \bullet is the inner product over \mathbf{F}_2 , and $x \in \mathbf{F}_2^l$ is a uniformly distributed random variable.

Differential branch number is replaced by linear branch number. If a linear transformation generates an MDS code both values are equal to $n + 1$.

The value $p_{\max} = \max_{a \neq 0, b} \text{DDT}[a][b]$ is replaced by

$$p_{\text{lin}, \max} = \max_{a \neq 0, b} \text{LAT}[a][b] = \text{LP}(a, b), \quad a, b \in \mathbf{F}_2^8.$$

By analogy with the differential trail a linear characteristic $\Omega = (\mu_x, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_y)$ for 2 rounds is introduced. $\text{ELCP}(\Omega)$ is equal to

$$\text{ELCP}(\Omega) = \left(\prod_{j=1}^n \text{LP}(\mu_x[j], \mu_1[j]) \right) \left(\prod_{j=1}^n \text{LP}(\mu_2[j], \mu_y[j]) \right),$$

where $\mu_2 = \mathbb{L}^T \cdot \mu_1$, \mathbb{L} is a binary matrix such that $y = \mathbb{L}(x) = \mathbb{L} \cdot x$ and \mathbb{L}^T is a transposed matrix.

The linear code \mathcal{C}_L is replaced by the code $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{L}^T}$.

The linear hull (similar to differential) is the set of all linear characteristics having input mask μ_x and output mask μ_y .

The expected probability of the 2-round linear hull (μ_x, μ_y) is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ELP}(\mu_x, \mu_y) &= \sum_{(\mu_1, \mu_2) \in \mathbf{F}_2^{2 \cdot 8 \cdot n}} \left(\prod_{j=1}^n \text{LP}(\mu_x[j], \mu_1[j]) \right) \left(\prod_{j=1}^n \text{LP}(\mu_2[j], \mu_y[j]) \right) \text{ and} \\ \text{MELP} &= \max_{\mu_x \neq 0, \mu_y} \text{ELP}(\mu_x, \mu_y). \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

In order to go to linear cryptanalysis, one needs to replace all formulas in Section 3 according to the above analogies.

For 2-round Kuznyechik the only best linear hull containing 37 linear characteristics $\Omega_1, \Omega_2, \dots, \Omega_{37}$ is found [18].

$$\text{MELP} = \text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}} = \sum_{i=1}^{37} = \text{ELCP}(\Omega_i) = 2^{-76.73\dots}$$

We show that

$$\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq 2^{-77.15\dots}, \quad \text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq 2^{-79.63\dots}$$

A bound on $\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+$ will be not less than $2^{-80.50\dots}$.

C Khazad

Khazad [12] is a 64-bit ($n = 8$ byte) block cipher using a 128-bit key. It is an 8-round SP network. The plaintext is initially XORed with the whitening key and then undergoes 8 identical rounds.

S-transformation and L-transformation are involutions, $\mathbf{S} = \mathbf{S}^{-1}$, $\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{L}^{-1}$.

The sequences \mathbf{m}_x and \mathbf{m}_y are equal (see definition 10).

Due to this involution structure, we can consider only half of the subsets of codewords. Let's assume that for some 2-round differential $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$ we know the value of $\text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y)$. Then we know the value of $\text{EDP}(\Delta y, \Delta x) = \text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y)$.

We have shown that each best differential contains two differential trails Ω_1 and Ω_2 .

$$\text{EDCP}(\Omega_1) = p_{\max}^{\mathcal{B}} = \left(\frac{8}{256}\right)^9 = 2^{-45}, \quad \text{EDCP}(\Omega_2) = 2^{-60}.$$

Eight best differentials $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$ and eight differentials $(\Delta y, \Delta x)$ were found. For each of them $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}} = \text{EDP}(\Delta x, \Delta y) = \text{EDP}(\Delta y, \Delta x) = \text{EDCP}(\Omega_1) + \text{EDCP}(\Omega_2)$.

We proved that $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq 2^{-44.99\dots}$ and with improvements described in Subsection 3.7 $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq 2^{-45.02\dots}$. Using algorithm from Subsection 3.8, we get $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq 2^{-45.09\dots}$. Thus

$$\text{MEDP} = \text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}} = 2^{-45} + 2^{-60}.$$

We also found 16 best linear hulls: eight in the form (μ_x, μ_y) and eight in the form (μ_y, μ_x) . Each of them contains 108 linear characteristics $\Omega_1, \Omega_2, \Omega_3, \dots, \Omega_{108}$.

$$\text{ELCP}(\Omega_1) = 2^{-37.80\dots} < p_{\text{lin}, \max}^{\mathcal{B}} = 2^{-36}, \quad \text{ELCP}(\Omega_2) = 2^{-67.70\dots}.$$

$$\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}} = \sum_{i=1}^{108} \text{ELCP}(\Omega_i) = 2^{-37.80\dots}. \quad (26)$$

$$\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq 2^{-37.83\dots}, \quad \text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq 2^{-37.92\dots}.$$

Because of this, we get

$$\text{MELP} = \text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}} = 2^{-37.80\dots}.$$

The obtaining of $\text{MEDP}_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+$ and $\text{MELP}_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+$ is computationally infeasible task for us. Furthermore, the result of the algorithm will be not less than $2^{-45.11\dots}$ and $2^{-37.94\dots}$ respectively.

Khazad					
$(p_{\max})^{\mathcal{B}}$	FSE2003 MEDP $_{\mathcal{B}}^{\leq}$	MEDP $_{\mathcal{B}} =$	MEDP $_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq$	MEDP $_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq$	(*)MEDP $_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+ \leq$
-45	-43.36	-44.99	-45.02	-45.09	-45.11
$(p_{\text{lin},\max})^{\mathcal{B}}$	FSE2003 MELP $_{\mathcal{B}}^{\leq}$	MELP $^{\mathcal{B}} =$	MELP $_{\mathcal{B}+1}^+ \leq$	MELP $_{\mathcal{B}+2}^+ \leq$	(*)MELP $_{\mathcal{B}+3}^+ \leq$
-36	-35.86	-37.80	-37.83	-37.92	-37.94

Table 2: Table of results (\log_2 scale).

The best differentials

We show only 8 of the 16 differentials $(\Delta x, \Delta y)$. The remaining differentials $(\Delta y, \Delta x)$ can be easily obtained by swapping Δx and Δy .

Δx	1208f0000000000f		\log_2 EDCP(Ω_i)
Ω_1	1248f0000000000f	0000b548fbefb4800	-45
Ω_2	c8070a0000000023	0000130753a60700	-60
Δy		0000bf0818910800	
Δx	081200f000000f00		\log_2 EDCP(Ω_i)
Ω_1	481200f000000f00	000048b5ebfb0048	-45
Ω_2	07c8000a00002300	00000713a6530007	-60
Δy		000008bf91180008	
Δx	f0001208000f0000		\log_2 EDCP(Ω_i)
Ω_1	f0001248000f0000	b54800004800fbefb	-45
Ω_2	0a00c80700230000	13070000070053a6	-60
Δy		bf08000008001891	
Δx	00f008120f000000		\log_2 EDCP(Ω_i)
Ω_1	00f048120f000000	48b500000048ebfb	-45
Ω_2	000a07c823000000	071300000007a653	-60
Δy		08bf000000089118	
Δx	0f00000000f00812		\log_2 EDCP(Ω_i)
Ω_1	0f00000000f04812	0048ebfb48b50000	-45
Ω_2	2300000000a07c8	0007a65307130000	-60
Δy		0008911808bf0000	
Δx	000f0000f0001208		\log_2 EDCP(Ω_i)
Ω_1	000f0000f0001248	4800fbefb5480000	-45
Ω_2	00230000a00c807	070053a613070000	-60
Δy		08001891bf080000	
Δx	00000f00081200f0		\log_2 EDCP(Ω_i)
Ω_1	00000f00481200f0	ebfb0048000048b5	-45
Ω_2	0000230007c8000a	a653000700000713	-60
Δy		91180008000008bf	
Δx	0000000f1208f000		\log_2 EDCP(Ω_i)
Ω_1	0000000f1248f000	fbefb48000000b548	-45
Ω_2	00000023c8070a00	53a6070000001307	-60
Δy		189108000000bf08	

Table 3: The best 2-round Khazad differentials

The best linear hulls

As in the previous subsection, we show only 8 of the 16 linear hulls.

μ_x	6f078e0000000500	μ_x	076f008e00000005
μ_y	00006f0eb400e153	μ_y	00000e6f00b453e1
μ_x	8e006f0705000000	μ_x	050000008e006f07
μ_y	6f0e0000e153b400	μ_y	e153b4006f0e0000
μ_x	008e076f00050000	μ_x	00050000008e076f
μ_y	0e6f000053e100b4	μ_y	53e100b40e6f0000
μ_x	000005006f078e00	μ_x	00000005076f008e
μ_y	b400e15300006f0e	μ_y	00b453e100000e6f

Table 4: The best 2-round Khazad linear hulls

Ω_i	μ_1	μ_2	$\log_2 \text{ELCP}(\Omega_i)$	Ω_i	μ_1	μ_2	$\log_2 \text{ELCP}(\Omega_i)$
1	8e4c6f0000002c00	00008ee31300e11e	-37.80	22	e9645e0000004000	0000e973a800b716	-75.71
2	a3a9c1000000e300	0000a3fccd0062d8	-67.71	23	b1476b0000007f00	0000b15d3000dae4	-75.71
3	039d5d0000007100	00000319b6005e40	-70.37	24	2de5ae000000cf00	00002d1fde0083c6	-75.71
4	f15a660000008b00	0000f19f540097eb	-70.71	25	1deceb0000008800	00001dceb500f602	-75.81
5	8803e10000001e00	000088d8ec0069a1	-70.92	26	05d2d30000004300	000005224900d6ff	-75.91
6	a4927b0000000100	0000a4cfa000df58	-71.47	27	daf0460000007600	0000dabb75009c92	-76.03
7	f9639d0000007d00	0000f9c371006455	-71.77	28	32e02c000000e600	000032c04f001ebb	-76.34
8	1ba365000000ba00	00001bf54a007ebd	-71.85	29	465283000000c600	000046f99b00c5b0	-76.40
9	0ba4a60000008700	00000b459300adfe	-72.05	30	af36dd0000008600	0000af8a330072a6	-76.54
10	849cfd0000007b00	000084ae120079df	-72.56	31	d66f5a0000001300	0000d6cd8b008cec	-76.88
11	2f0cc700000006e0	00002f0efa00e8b9	-72.71	32	6167bf0000005e00	000061ab4400deb7	-76.92
12	bb97f90000002800	0000bb1031004225	-72.90	33	bf311e000000bb00	0000bf3aea00a1e5	-76.96
13	d3bd890000005000	0000d3efc2005a13	-72.98	34	c5f5c40000005f00	0000c564e40001ef	-77.40
14	ecb68d0000000300	0000ec51e10061e9	-73.32	35	42f4640000005500	000042d340002670	-77.51
15	67283100000006c0	00006790bb005608	-74.23	36	a0349c0000009200	0000a0e57b003c98	-77.54
16	064f8e0000003200	0000063bfb0088bf	-74.28	37	4726b70000001600	000047f10900f08f	-77.81
17	9aed4b0000008200	00009a791100d19d	-74.62	38	bae3cd000000f800	0000ba18a300771a	-77.85
18	b5e18c000000ec00	0000b577eb003924	-74.92	39	d020d40000002100	0000d0f674000453	-78.15
19	35db960000000400	000035f32200a33b	-75.32	40	c96ad80000003a00	0000c9121a001191	-78.15
20	f715e8000000b900	0000f7a4ab001f54	-75.51	41	a80d670000006400	0000a8b95e00cf26	-78.30
21	1007c30000003d00	000010b0d900d343	-75.66	42	9804220000002300	000098683500bae2	-78.49

Table 5: One of the best 2-round Khazad linear hull,
 $\mu_x = 6f078e0000000500$, $\mu_y = 00006f0eb400e153$ (part 1)

Ω_i	μ_1	μ_2	$\log_2 \text{ELCP}(\Omega_i)$	Ω_i	μ_1	μ_2	$\log_2 \text{ELCP}(\Omega_i)$
43	e5fb42000002500	0000e5055600a768	-78.68	76	a70f26000007000	0000a7d616008118	-85.22
44	ff2c130000004f00	0000ff88e00ecea	-78.76	77	82d3730000004900	00008295ed00f160	-85.32
45	701448000000b300	000070130f0038cb	-78.90	78	2943490000005c00	0000293505006006	-85.40
46	665c05000000bc00	0000669829006337	-79.02	79	903dd9000000d500	000090341000495c	-85.60
47	f02e520000005b00	0000f097c600a2d4	-79.20	80	9f3f98000000c100	00009f5b58000762	-85.85
48	7e623d0000007700	00007e74d50043ca	-79.32	81	de56a1000000e500	0000de91ae007f52	-85.85
49	aae40e000000c500	0000aaa87a00a459	-79.54	82	b708e50000004d00	0000b766cf00525b	-86.19
50	b67cd10000009d00	0000b66e5d006764	-79.71	83	d96d1b0000000700	0000d9a2c300c2d2	-86.49
51	6f11ca0000009a00	00006fcc9e00a5b6	-79.85	84	9dd6f10000006000	00009d4a7c006c1d	-86.49
52	93a084000000a400	0000932da600171c	-80.03	85	4950c2000000d200	00004996d3008b8e	-86.49
53	71607c0000006300	0000711b9d000df4	-80.15	86	8f385b000000fc00	00008feb8100d421	-86.49
54	2ade140000002d00	00002a2cb3003e46	-80.25	87	be452a0000006b00	0000be32780094da	-86.71
55	6bb72d0000000900	00006be645004676	-80.34	88	b2da36000000e000	0000b244860084a4	-86.83
56	75c69b000000f000	000075314600ee34	-80.37	89	9ca2c5000000b000	00009c42ee005922	-86.83
57	b0335f000000af00	0000b055a200efdb	-80.83	90	8977d5000000ce00	000089d07e005c9e	-87.60
58	c481f00000008f00	0000c46c760034d0	-81.02	91	a67b12000000a000	0000a6de8400b427	-87.66
59	1f05820000002900	00001fdf91009d7d	-81.34	92	8dd1320000005d00	00008dfaa500bf5e	-87.85
60	fb8af4000000dc00	0000fbd25500f2a	-81.40	93	caf7850000004b00	0000ca0bac004fd1	-88.19
61	6df8a30000003b00	00006ddd8ba00cec9	-81.85	94	a5e64f000000d100	0000a5c73200ea67	-88.49
62	6c8c97000000eb00	00006cd52800fbf6	-82.05	95	5c85d2000000ac00	00005c0443008e32	-89.02
63	7dff600000000600	00007d6d63001d8a	-82.19	96	fe58270000009f00	0000fef01c00d9d5	-89.66
64	814e2e0000003800	0000818c5b00af20	-82.37	97	4e6b780000003000	00004ea5be00360e	-89.91
65	217ab2000000aa00	00002169200093b8	-82.57	98	52f3a70000006800	000052639900f533	-90.19
66	04a6e70000009300	0000042adb00e3c0	-82.82	99	682a700000007800	000068fff3001836	-90.49
67	eaf9030000003100	0000ea6a1e00e956	-82.83	100	e48f76000000f500	0000e40dc4009257	-90.49
68	d8192f000000d700	0000d8aa5100f7ed	-82.90	101	317d710000009700	000031d9f90040fb	-91.22
69	74b2af0000002000	00007439d400db0b	-83.66	102	738915000000c200	0000730ab900668b	-91.66
70	c027170000001c00	0000c046ad00d710	-83.74	103	62fae20000002f00	000062b2f20080f7	-92.19
71	eb8d37000000e100	0000eb628c00dc69	-83.85	104	0c9f1c0000006500	00000c76fe00107e	-92.19
72	15d5100000007e00	00001592900005bc	-84.03	105	173c79000000df00	00001783b4006ec3	-92.49
73	ccb80b0000007900	0000cc305300c76e	-84.57	106	dcbf80000004400	0000dc808a00142d	-93.02
74	28377d00000008c00	0000283d97005539	-84.68	107	0f02410000001400	00000f6f48004e3e	-94.49
75	55c81d00000008a00	00005550f40048b3	-85.02	108	3ad9d70000001000	00003a9c6a00ed05	-97.66

Table 6: One of the best 2-round Khazad linear hull,
 $\mu_x = 6f078e0000000500$, $\mu_y = 00006f0eb400e153$ (part 2)