



**FDTC 2012**

# An Efficient Countermeasure against Fault Sensitivity Analysis Using Configurable Delay Blocks

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GSIS, TOHOKU UNIVERSITY

# Outline

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- Introduction
- Proposed countermeasure using Configurable Delay Blocks (CDBs)
- Evaluation
  - Validation of CDB function
  - Area overhead based on standard cell library (SCL) based design
- Conclusion and future works


# Introduction

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

- Fault Sensitivity Analysis (FSA) [Li 2010]
  - Exploits new side-channel called fault sensitivity (FS)
  - FS depends on intermediate value in crypto circuits
- FSA defeated conventional countermeasures against physical attacks
  - Masked AND-OR [Moradi 2011]
  - RSL [Moradi 2011]
  - WDDL [Li 2012] etc.
- No implementation of countermeasure against FSA exists

# Fault Sensitivity Analysis (FSA)

## ■ Observing fault sensitivity



# Fault Sensitivity Analysis (FSA)




- Methods that recover intermediate value
  - Hamming weight in PPRM S-box, collision FSA

# Fault injection techniques for FSA


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- Means of fault injection on general fault attacks
  - Exposure to laser/light , excessive temperature, overclocking, under voltage etc.
- Overclocking, under voltage are often used for FSA
  - Inducing setup time violation faults
  - Advantages
    - Depackaging is not required
    - Timely fault injection into the target operation

# FSA with overclocking





# FSA with under voltage






# Concept of countermeasure against FSA



■ Li et.al. 2012

# Related work: countermeasure using delay elements

- Attack detection method using sequential delay elements [Selmane 2009]
  - Attack detection signal  $F$  is asserted when the clock signal rises before the signal passes through the delay elements



- Delay elements could be used for enable signal generation in Li's countermeasure

# Goal of this work

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
- Implementation of a countermeasure against FSA
- Our contributions
  - First concrete implementation of Li's countermeasure
    - “Enable signal” generation method
  - Configurable Delay Blocks (CDBs)
    - Can be adjusted after manufacture
    - Provide fine delay-time tuning
    - Efficient countermeasure with low overheads

# Outline


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# Overview of proposed countermeasure





## Block diagram of countermeasure




Post-manufacture configuration of CDBs

# Timing chart of enable signal




■ Condition that enables countermeasure:  $t_{en} > t_{cp}$

# Ideal configuration of $t_{en}$




# Behavior of countermeasure (1/2)



■ When clock period is shortened




# Behavior of countermeasure (2/2)



■ When supply voltage was lowered

# Configuration of $t_{en}$ based on STA



- Configuration method based on delay time estimation by Static Timing Analysis (STA)
- $t_{STA}$  is always larger than  $t_{cp}$ 
  - $t_{STA}$  is the longest delay time estimated by maximum gate chain
- We can prevent leakage of FS when we set  $t_{en} > t_{STA}$

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# Evaluation of proposed countermeasure


- Implementation of AES module with proposed countermeasure
- Validation of CDB function on FPGA prototype
- Estimation of area overhead based on Static Cell Library (SCL) design

## Experimental conditions


Platform	SASEBO-G
FPGA	Xilinx XC2VP7




# Implementation of CDB



# Validation of CDB function



# Validation of CDB function






# Gate counts based on SCL design

Components	Gates	%
AES core	28702	100
Multiplexers	1882	6.56
CDBs	1068	3.72
Control logic	35	0.12
Total	31687	110.4

- TSMC 65nm cell library
- 8-stage CDB
- Overhead is much smaller than conventional countermeasure such as masking





# Conclusion and future work

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- Proposal of countermeasure against FSA using configurable delay blocks (CDBs)
  - Enable signal generation method
  - Post-manufacture configuration of CDB based on measurement of real chips
- Evaluation
  - Validation of CDB function on FPGA prototype
  - Area overhead of countermeasure
- Future work: evaluation of countermeasure on ASIC

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Thank you!

# Enable signal generator

