AN ENUMERATION OF THE PRIMITIVE RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS WITHOUT REPETITION

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In a theorem and its corollary [1] Friedberg gave an enumeration of all the recursively enumerable sets without repetition and an enumeration of all the partial recursive functions without repetition. This note is to prove a similar theorem for the primitive recursive functions. The proof is only a classical one. We shall show that the theorem is intuitionistically unprovable in the sense of Kleene [2]. For similar reason the theorem by Friedberg is also intuitionistically unprovable, which is not stated in his paper.

THEOREM. There is a general recursive function $\psi(n, a)$ such that the sequence $\psi(0, a)$, $\psi(1, a)$,... is an enumeration of all the primitive recursive functions of one variable without repetition.

PROOF. Let $\varphi(n, a)$ be an enumerating function of all the primitive recursive functions of one variable. (See [3].) We define a general recursive function v(a) as follows.

$$v(0) = 0,$$

 $v(n + 1) = \mu y$, where μy is the least y such that for each j < n + 1,

 $\varphi(y, a) \neq \varphi(v(j), a)$ for some a < n + 1.

It is noted that the value v(n + 1) can be found by a constructive method, for obviously there exists some number y such that the primitive recursive function $\varphi(y, a)$ takes a value greater than all the numbers $\varphi(v(0), 0), \varphi(v(1), 0), \dots, \varphi(v(n), 0)$ for a = 0

Put $\Psi(n, a) = \varphi(v(n), a)$. We first see that for any two numbers j < i, the two primitive recursive functions of variable $a \Psi(j, a)$ and $\Psi(i, a)$ are not identically equal, for by definition, $\varphi(v(i), a) \neq \varphi(v(j), a)$ for some a < i. From this it also follows that $v(j) \neq v(i)$ for $j \neq i$. This is a fact which will be used later in the proof.

It remains to show that for any number x, there is a number t such that $\varphi(x, a) = \psi(t, a)$. We distinguish two cases of x. Case 1. There is a number p such that v(p) = x. In this case we have already a number p such that $\varphi(x, a) = \varphi(v(p), a) = \psi(p, a)$. In the following we shall consider case 2, the

opposite of case 1.

In case 2 $v(n) \neq x$ for all *n*. In this case we first see that for any number *n*, there is a number *r* such that $\varphi(x, a) = \varphi(v(r), a)$ for a < n. Suppose this were false. Then there would be a number n_0 such that if *t* is any number $> n_0$, then for each j < t, $\varphi(x, a) \neq \varphi(v(j), a)$ for some $a < n_0 < t$. Since $v(t) \neq x$, then according to the definition of v(t), we would have v(t) < x. This implies that the infinitely many numbers $v(n_0 + 1)$, $v(n_0 + 2)$,...., would all be less than *x*. This is impossible.

For each number *n*, let r(n) be the least number *r* such that $\varphi(x, a) = \varphi(v(r), a)$ for a < n. We can show that v(r(n)) < x for all *n*. In case r(n) > n, we have that for each j < r(n), $\varphi(x, a) \neq \varphi(v(j), a)$ for some a < n < r(n), because r(n) is the least number *r* such that $\varphi(x, a) = \varphi(v(r), a)$ for a < n. Since in case 2 $v(r(n)) \neq x$, then according to the definition of v(a), we have v(r(n)) < x. Now suppose $0 < r(n) \leq n$. We have (1) $\varphi(x, a) = \varphi(v(r(n)), a)$ for each $j < r(n), \varphi(v(r(n)), a) \neq \varphi(v(j), a)$ for some a < r(n). According to the definition of v(a), we have (2) for each $j < r(n), \varphi(v(r(n)), a) \neq \varphi(v(j), a)$ for some a < r(n). Again by the definition of v(a), (1) and (2) implies that $v(r(n)) \leq x$. In case $0 = r(n) \leq n$, since v(0) = 0, we have also $v(r(n)) \leq x$. Since $v(r(n)) \neq x$, we still have v(r(n)) < x.

Since v(r(n)) < x for all n, and $v(j) \neq v(i)$ for $j \neq i$, then r(n) takes only finitely many numbers as its values. Thus there must be a value, say, qsuch that q = r(n) for infinitely many values of n. According to the meaning of r(n), this implies that $\varphi(x, a) = \varphi(v(q), a)$ for a < n, for infinitely many values of n. Thus in case 2 we also find a number q such that $\varphi(x, a) = \varphi(v(q), a) = \psi(q, a)$ identically in a. This completes the proof.

That the theorem can not be proved intuitionistically in the sense of Kleene [2] can be seen from the following consideration. Suppose it could be so proved. Then we would have two general recursive functions $\Psi(n, a)$ and f(a) having the two properties: 1) $\Psi(i, a) \neq \Psi(j, a)$ for some a, if $i \neq j$; 2) for every number x, $\varphi(x, a) = \Psi(f(x), a)$ identically in a. To show that this is impossible we let p be such a number that $\varphi(p, a)$ is identically equal to zero. Then any primitive recursive function $\varphi(x, a)$ is identically equal to zero, if and only if f(x) = f(p). This would imply that the predicate $(a)(\varphi(x, a) = 0)$ be effectively decidable. But it is well-known that this predicate is not effectively decidable. (This can also be seen from the fact that the predicate of Kleene $(a)\overline{T}_1(x, x, a)$ [4, p. 301] is not effectively decidable, while the decision problem for $(a)\overline{T}_1(x, x, a)$ adapted to show that Friedberg's Theorem 3 in [1] is also intuitionistically unprovable. To do this we only need to note that a primitive recursive function $\varphi(x, a)$ is identically equal to zero, if unprovable. To do this we only need to note that a primitive recursive function $\varphi(x, a)$ is identically equal to zero, if and only if the set $\widehat{w}(Ey)$ ($w = \varphi(x, y)$)

consists of the single element 0.

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