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An Impact Study of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAS) in the Six ACP Regions

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Non-technical Summary

The EU's trading relations with the 77 members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries have historically been framed by a series of conventions, most recently Lomé, which granted unilateral preferences to the ACP countries on the EU market. Although the ACP countries are amongst the most vulnerable countries in the global trading system, the conventions nevertheless violated WTO rules as they established unfair discrimination between developing countries. A change was therefore required. The Cotonou Agreement in 2000 paved the way for a new trading regime based on reciprocal preferences. On this basis, in 2001 the WTO agreed to give a waiver to the EU to continue providing unilateral preferences until January 2008.

Under the Cotonou Agreement, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) had to be established between the EU and the ACP countries. EPAs define a new stage in the policy of the EU towards the ACP developing countries, establishing a framework which is fully compatible with the WTO trading rules, in the sense of GATT Article XXIV.

However, the EPAs, will pose important challenges for many ACP countries. The negotiations with the EU to establish EPAs began in September 2002. For the purposes of negotiations, the 77 ACP countries have been grouped into six negotiation regions (West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community, the Caribbean and the Pacific) based on existing regional integration institutions. The outcome of this negotiation provides with GATT conformity since the issue of market access for goods and services has been addressed; Further negotiation will last in 2008 on additional issues. In total EPAs have been signed between the EU and 9 LDCs and 26 non-LDCs; 32 LDCs benefit from the Everything But Arms agreement, and 10 non-LDCs are eligible to the GSP.

The EPAs indeed raise several concerns amongst ACP countries. Firstly, ACP countries fear that giving preferential access to EU products, under a reciprocal arrangement, would put their producers in numerous sectors at risk of increased competition. Secondly, they also fear that cutting tariffs for EU products would result in a sizeable loss of tariff revenue that would hurt their public budgets. Thirdly, they claim that the timetable for the negotiations and their implementation is extremely tight given the numerous modalities still to be precisely determined. For example, what will be the scope and pace of liberalisation? Which products will be considered to be sensitive for ACP regions and thus excluded from liberalisation? How will integration inside each region be linked with ACP-EU liberalisation?

In order to better address these concerns, our study intends to present a very detailed analysis of the trade-related aspects of EPAs negotiations. We use a dynamic partial equilibrium model at the HS6 level (covering 5,113 HS6 products). The main source of trade data are Comext and BACI, while ad-valorem tariffs and Tariffs-Rate-Quotas are provided by MacMapHS6v2. The use of these data sources means

that we can accurately deal with the crucial aspect of sensitive products. Two alternative lists of sensitive products are constructed, one giving priority to the agricultural sectors (H1 option), the other focusing on tariff revenue preservation (H2 option). The dynamic aspect of the model allows us to measure the impact of the agreement over different time periods.

It is important to remember the strong asymmetry existing between the two trading partners. ACP countries are highly dependent on the EU market, largely due to their historical links. For the EU, on the other hand, despite this longstanding partnership, the ACP region remains of more modest economic importance, accounting for very little in terms of trade. The ECOWAS group alone accounts for half of total EU imports from the whole region. On the export side, ACP countries tend to be highly specialised in a few key products. This strong concentration mainly derives either from the abundance of minerals and natural resources in many African countries (petroleum, gold, diamonds and uranium and radioactive elements) or a heavy reliance on a few unprocessed agricultural commodities such as coffee or cotton.

Looking at protection levels, ACP regions apply differing tariff rates on EU exports. CEMAC, COMESA and Pacific regions appear to be the most protective. Tariff structures present the usual shape. The highest level of protection is in agriculture, with high peaks in agro-food and vegetable production. In manufacturing, CEMAC and SADC still protect textiles while COMESA has high tariff rates in the metallurgic sector. On the other hand, EU trade policy is quite generous to ACP countries. The Cotonou agreement gives largely free access on all industrial products. The only protection remains in agriculture. However, given the high level of specialisation of many ACP countries on agricultural products, some of which are still protected, the average protection they face is often higher than that applied by the EU to the rest of the world.

To be WTO compatible, the EPAs had to satisfy GATT's Article XXIV, including the liberalisation of 'substantially all' trade. However, this reciprocity is not the only objective of EPAs and, as the European Parliament has rightly pointed out there is the need "to be vigilant that the issue of compatibility does not take precedence over the overall aim of sustainable development". In this sense, EPAs include several other elements, including support for deep integration and development assistance.

Although both of these elements can be important catalysts for growth, due to difficulties in their integration into the model, they are not quantified in this study. On the other hand, such elements are missing in the intermediary agreements signed with most ACP. However they should not be overlooked when it comes to the interpretation of the results. In other words our results need to be seen in the light of broader positive effects that can be expected from EPAs, but which are not modelled here. To define what 'substantially all trade' means in terms of share of trade, we have followed the guidelines of the EU Commission. They consider that a Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) is WTO compatible if 90 percent of bilateral trade is fully liberalised . We use this criterion to simulate EPAs for each negotiating regional block. We assume that the full implementation of EPAs will be achieved within 15 years. To reflect the asymmetry between partners, the EU is modelled as granting free access to all ACP exports in 2008. The selection of sensitive products for the ACP is a key issue. Two approaches have been chosen in our modelling, inspired by the actual negotiation. Under the H1 scenario, priority is given to agricultural products, to reflect the political sensitivity of the sector. Under the H2 Scenario, sensitive products are selected such that tariff revenue losses are minimised at the regional level.

The framework for the analysis is a partial equilibrium model focusing on the demand side. Different

simulations are performed in order to assess the impact of both potential outcomes from the EPA negotiations and alternative scenarios in the event that EPAs are not signed. This counterfactual is particularly relevant for ACP that ultimately did not embark in agreements with the EU. In the latter context, firstly, we consider the end of Cotonou, no EPA and GSP tariffs applied to non-LDC ACP countries (Everything But Arms-EBA-will still provide market access for LDCs). Secondly, we model the end of Cotonou, no EPA and the GSP+ tariffs applied to non-LDC ACP countries (EBA for LDCs). Lastly, we consider the end of Cotonou following successful EPA negotiations, using the H1 and H2 scenarios. As a sensitivity analysis, we also examine the H1 case in circumstances where the Doha round of multilateral negotiations is also completed, in order to measure the magnitude of potential preference erosion.

The consequences of EPAs are assessed through different indicators: changes in exports and imports, changes in tariff income and the countries' current accounts. We avoid to put emphasis on the effects on domestic production, due to the fact that information at the product level is scarce and of low quality. However our analysis seems to indicate that in general there would be minor effect on ACP domestic production due to EPAs (see Table 13). This result is in line with the fact that EU products are not in direct competition with ACP production (in particular in H1 where agricultural commodities are excluded from the liberalization process).

All the results have to be interpreted as deviations from the reference situation, which is not the status quo (which is no longer legally tenable) but rather the only current legal alternative, which is a combination of GSP for ACP-non LDCs and EBA for ACP LDCs.

For instance, when considering the impact on trade, ACP exports to the EU are forecast to be 10 percent higher with the EPAs than under the GSP/EBA option. In percentage terms, the largest increases in exports will occur in the livestock sector, which is forecast to at least double in the EPA scenario. Exports of agricultural products (excluding meat and cotton) and textile products are forecast to increase by 40 percent. On the import side, a 7 percent average increase overall is forecast for ACP countries in 2015, against 17.7 percent in 2022. This low forecast in the short run is explained by the limited liberalization of ACP imports over this time horizon.

On average ACP countries are forecast to lose 70 percent of tariff revenues on EU imports in the long run, under the central scenario (H1). The most affected region is ECOWAS. Yet imports from other regions of the world will continue to provide tariff revenues. Thus when tariff revenue losses are computed on total ACP imports, losses are limited to 26 percent on average in the long run under H1, and 19 percent under H2 (when the product lists are optimised).

Furthermore, the final impact on the economy depends on the importance of tariffs in government revenue and on potential compensatory effects. Some positive impacts can be expected from EPAs, whenever an enlargement of the fiscal basis upon which other public incomes are based is achieved. However this long term and less visible effect will mainly depend on the capacity of each ACP country to reorganise its fiscal base, shifting to other forms of taxation. Some improvements in the efficiency of the customs administration could be attained, as a consequence of diminished trade flows to tax and monitor. Considering a 50 percent increase in the collection rate, we find that tariff revenue losses could be significantly alleviated.

ABSTRACT

This study intends to present a very detailed and dynamic analysis of the trade-related aspects of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiations. We use a dynamic partial equilibrium model- focusing on the demand side - at the HS6 level (covering 5,113 HS6 products). Two alternative lists of sensitive products are constructed, one giving priority to the agricultural sectors, the other focusing on tariff revenue preservation. In order to be WTO compatible, EPAs must translate intof 90 percent of bilateral trade fully liberalised . We use this criterion to simulate EPAs for each negotiating regional block. ACP exports to the EU are forecast to be 10 percent higher with the EPAs than under the GSP/EBA option. On average ACP countries are forecast to lose 70 percent of tariff revenues on EU imports in the long run. Yet imports from other regions of the world will continue to provide tariff revenues. Thus when tariff revenue losses are computed on total ACP imports, losses are limited to 26 percent on average in the long run and even 19 percent when the product lists are optimised. The final impact on the economy depends on the importance of tariffs in government revenue and on potential compensatory effects. However this long term and less visible effect will mainly depend on the capacity of each ACP country to reorganise its fiscal base

JEL Classification: F13, F15, O55

Keywords: Preferential Trade Agreements, Africa, EPAs

Une étude d'impact des Accords de Partenariat Economique (APEs) entre l'UE et les six régions ACP

RÉSUME NON TECHNIQUE

Les relations commerciales de l'Union Européenne avec les 77 pays de la zone Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP) ont été historiquement encadrées par plusieurs traités successifs. Le plus récent en date, la convention de Lomé, permettait aux pays de la zone ACP de bénéficier d'un accès préférentiel unilatéral aux marchés de l'Union.

Bien que les pays ACP figurent parmi les membres les plus vulnérables du système commercial international, les conventions successives n'en violaient pas moins les règles de l'OMC en établissant une forme de discrimination à l'import entre les pays en voie de développement. Une mise en conformité était par conséquent inévitable. L'accord de Cotonou de 2000 a ouvert la voie vers un nouveau régime commercial fondé sur des préférences réciproques. Sur cette base, l'OMC avait accordé en 2001 à l'Union Européenne une dérogation permettant de prolonger le régime de préférences unilatérales jusqu'en janvier 2008. En vertu de l'accord de Cotonou, des Accords *intérimaires* de Partenariat Economique (APE) établis entre les pays de l'Union Européenne et les pays ACP au premier janvier 2008 mettent la politique européenne en conformité avec les règles multilatérales de l'OMC, et plus particulièrement l'article XXIV du GATT. Ils répondent en effet à la critique concernant l'accès au marché des biens et services et devront être élargis dans le courant de l'année 2008 aux autres domaines non couverts. Au total 9 PMAs et 26 non-PMAs ont signé des EPAs, 32 PMAs relèvent de Tout Sauf les Armes, et 10 non-PMAs passent dans le régime SPG.

Dans le cadre des négociations démarrées en septembre 2002, les 77 pays ACP ont été répartis en six groupes régionaux (Afrique de l'Ouest, Afrique Centrale, Afrique Australe et Orientale, Communauté de Développement de l'Afrique du Sud, Caraïbes et Pacifique), basés sur les institutions régionales en place.

Les APE soulèvent plusieurs inquiétudes dans les pays de la zone ACP. Tout d'abord, les pays ACP craignent de voir leurs producteurs mis en difficultés par la compétition accrue qu'implique l'ouverture de leurs marchés aux produits européens, en vertu de la clause de réciprocité.

La baisse des droits de douane devrait également entraîner une perte significative de recettes budgétaires, ce qui constitue un deuxième sujet d'inquiétude pour la continuité de leurs politiques publiques.

Troisièmement, les pays se sont plaints de ce que le calendrier de négociation est extrêmement serré face au nombre de points techniques qui doivent être précisément définis. Par exemple, quel doit être le périmètre et l'ampleur de la libéralisation ? Quels produits doivent être classés sensibles pour chaque région ACP et, de sorte, être exclus de la libéralisation ? Comment l'intégration au sein de chacune des régions ACP va-t-elle s'articuler avec la libéralisation liée aux APE ?

Afin d'étudier au mieux ces questions, notre travail s'attache à examiner à un niveau très détaillé les

aspects liés aux questions commerciales au sein des négociations APE. Nous conduisons notre analyse au niveau HS6 (soit 5 113 produits) à l'aide d'un modèle d'équilibre partiel dynamique.

Les sources principales de données de commerce sont Comext et BACI, tandis que les droits de douanes ad valorem et les contingents tarifaires proviennent de la base MAcMap-HS6 v2. L'utilisation de ces données à un niveau fin permet de traiter avec précision la question des produits sensibles. Deux listes alternatives de produits sensibles sont construites, l'une donnant la priorité aux secteurs agricoles (option H1) et l'autre cherchant à minimiser les pertes de recettes tarifaires (option H2). La conception dynamique du modèle permet de mesurer les impacts des accords sur différentes périodes de temps.

Il est primordial de garder à l'esprit la profonde asymétrie entre les deux partenaires commerciaux. Les pays de la zone ACP sont très dépendants des marchés européens, principalement pour des raisons historiques. En revanche, pour l'Union Européenne, et ce malgré un partenariat de longue date, le commerce avec la zone ACP constitue un enjeu économique beaucoup plus modeste, et compte pour une part infime des flux échangés avec de fortes disparités. Le groupe ECOWAS représente à lui seul la moitié des exports de la zone vers l'Union Européenne. Les pays ACP sont pour la plupart spécialisés dans un petit nombre de produits clés. Cette forte concentration provient principalement de l'abondance de certaines ressources naturelles dans de nombreux pays d'Afrique (pétrole, or, diamant, uranium et éléments radioactifs). Elle s'explique également par la forte dépendance à quelques produits primaires agricoles, tels que le coton ou le café. Une telle concentration rend ces pays particulièrement sensibles à la volatilité des prix sur ces marchés.

En ce qui concerne les niveaux de protection, les pays de la zone ACP appliquent des droits de douanes hétérogènes aux exportations de l'Union Européenne. La CEMAC, le COMESA et la région Pacifique se révèlent être les moins ouvertes. La structure tarifaire présente des caractéristiques classiques. La protection est plus grande pour les produits agricoles, avec des pics tarifaires pour l'agroalimentaire et la production végétale. En ce qui concerne l'industrie, la CEMAC et la SADC protègent toujours leur textile tandis que le COMESA présente un haut niveau tarifaire dans le secteur de la métallurgie. De son côté, l'Union européenne applique une politique plus ouverte aux produits de la zone ACP. L'accord de Cotonou procure un libre accès pour tous les produits industriels, l'agriculture seule restant protégée. Cependant, étant donnée la forte spécialisation dans l'agriculture de certains pays ACP, la protection effectivement ressentie par la zone est souvent plus forte que celle à laquelle le reste du monde est confronté.

Afin d'être compatibles avec les règles de l'OMC, les APE doivent satisfaire à l'article XXIV du GATT qui inclut la libéralisation d'une part substantielle du commerce. Cependant, cette réciprocité de l'ouverture commerciale n'est pas le seul objectif des APE et, comme le parlement européen l'a très justement précisé, la Commission se doit " d'être vigilante afin que la question de la compatibilité ne prévale pas sur l'objectif global de développement ". C'est pourquoi les APE comprennent aussi d'autres éléments comme le soutien à un approfondissement de l'intégration régionale et l'assistance au développement. Bien que ces deux éléments puissent être d'importants vecteurs de croissance, ils ne sont pas quantifiés dans cette étude du fait de la difficulté à les intégrer dans le cadre de notre modélisation. Ils ne doivent toutefois pas être négligés dans l'interprétation des résultats, considérés comme une limite inférieure de ce que l'on peut attendre des APE.

Nous avons respecté les critères habituels de l'Union européenne pour définir ce que recouvre l'ex-

pression 'une part substantielle du commerce', soit 90 pour cent du commerce bilatéral complètement libéralisé. Nous utilisons cette spécification afin de simuler les effets des APE. Nous faisons l'hypothèse que la mise en œuvre complète des APE prend place sur une durée de 15 ans. Les engagements des partenaires étant asymétriques, l'accès complet au marché européen est accordé aux pays ACP dès l'année 2008.

Le choix des produits sensibles reste une question essentielle pour les pays ACP. Deux approches ont été considérées sur les conseils des experts de la DG Commerce. Dans le scénario H1, la priorité est donnée aux produits agricoles pour tenir compte de la grande sensibilité politique de ce secteur. Dans le scénario H2, les produits sensibles sont choisis de telle sorte que les pertes de recettes douanières soient minimisées au niveau régional. Le cadre d'analyse est un modèle d'équilibre partiel représentant de manière détaillée la structure de la demande.

Différentes simulations ont été réalisées afin d'évaluer l'impact des APE ou de solutions alternatives. Concernant les pays ne signant pas les APE, nous considérons tout d'abord que les droits de douane SPG sont appliqués aux pays ACP non-PMA (les accords Tout Sauf les Armes (TSA) continueront à fournir un accès privilégié aux PMA). Dans un second temps, nous modélisons l'impact du système SPG+ sur les pays ACP non-PMA. La sensibilité du scénario H1 à la réussite des négociations de Doha est aussi analysée, ce qui permet de mieux apprécier l'importance de l'érosion des préférences.

Les conséquences des APE sont mesurées à l'aide de différents indicateurs : changement dans les exportations, les importations, les revenus douaniers et les balances courantes. Il faut interpréter tous les résultats comme des déviations à une situation de référence. La situation de référence ne peut pas être le statu-quo, qui n'est plus tenable légalement, mais plutôt la combinaison du SGP pour les pays non PMA et de TSA pour les PMA.

Les exportations des pays ACP vers l'Union Européenne devraient être plus élevées de 10 pour cent dans le cadre des APE que sous le régime SGP/TSA. Les gains les plus importants, en pourcentage, devraient concerner les exportateurs de viandes, dont les ventes vers l'Europe devraient au moins doubler. Les exportations de produits agricoles (hors viande et coton) et de produits textiles pourraient augmenter de 40 pour cent. En ce qui concerne les importations, une augmentation moyenne de 7 pour cent est prévue pour les pays ACP en 2015 et 17,7 pour cent en 2022. La faiblesse des effets de court terme s'explique par l'ouverture commerciale limitée des pays ACP à cet horizon temporel.

Dans le scénario H1, les pays ACP perdent en moyenne 70 pour cent des recettes douanières sur les importations en provenance de l'UE. L'ECOWAS est la région la plus affectée. Les importations en provenance d'autres régions du monde continuant à fournir des revenus douaniers, les pertes de revenus pour l'ensemble des pays ACP sont de 26 pour cent sur le long terme dans le cas du scénario H1 et de 19 pour cent avec le scénario H2 (lorsque la liste des produits est choisie de façon optimale).

L'impact final dépend en outre de l'importance des recettes douanières dans l'ensemble des prélèvements publics et des mesures compensatoires mises en œuvre. Des impacts positifs additionnels des APE sont probables si les pays de l'ACP accompagnent l'augmentation de leur base fiscale d'une politique de prélèvement appropriée (TVA). Cependant, ces effets de long terme, plus difficiles à discerner, dépendent avant tout de la capacité de chaque pays à mettre en œuvre ces réformes fiscales. Des améliorations sont aussi envisageables au sein de l'administration douanière. Le nombre moins élevé de produits à taxer

devrait conduire à une meilleure efficacité des contrôles. Avec l'hypothèse d'une augmentation de moitié du taux de collecte, nous obtenons une diminution significative des pertes budgétaires.

RÉSUMÉ COURT

Cette étude tente de présenter une anlyse dynamique très détaillée des impacts des Accords de Partenariat Economique. Nous utilisons un modèle d'équilibre partiel dynamique - centré sur la demande - au niveau sh6 (couvrant 5113 produits). Deux listes altenatives de produits sensibles sont construites, l'une donnant priorité à l'agriculture, l'autre optimisant les recttes douanières. Afin d'être OMC compatibles, les APEs doivent déboucher sur 90 pour cent du commerce bilatéral totalement bilatéralisé. Nous utilisons ce critère pour simuler l'impact des APEs pour chaque groupe régional impliqué dans les négociations. Avec les APEs, les exportations des ACP vers l'UE devraient augmenter de 10 pour cent par rapport à la situation SPG/TSA. En moyenne, les pays ACP devraient perdre à long terme 70 pour cent de leurs recettes douanières sur leurs importations en provenance de l'UE. Toutefois, les importations en provenance des autres régions du monde continueront à être taxées et les pertes globales de recettes douanières devraient être limitées à 26 pour cent en moyenne et à long terme, voire 19 pour cent si la liste de produits sensibles est optimisée. L'impact final sur l'économie dépendra à la fois de l'importance des recettes dounières dans le budget public des différents pays, et d'effets de compensation potentiels. Mais ce dernier effet de long terme, moins visible, dépendra de la capacité de chaque pays ACP à réorganiser son assiette fiscale.

Classification JEL :   F13, F15, O55

Mots clés :   Accords comemrciaux préférentiels, Afrique, APES

AN IMPACT STUDY OF THE EU-ACP ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (EPAS) IN THE SIX ACP REGIONS

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1. INTRODUCTION

The negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) involving the European Union (EU) and six African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) negotiation groups were scheduled to be concluded by 31 December 2007. In 2007, seven Interim Agreements and a Caribbean EPA were negotiated and signed. All establish free trade areas for goods between the EU and various ACP countries that are compatible with the provisions of GATT Article XXIV [1] and, in the case of the Caribbean EPA, a services agreement compatible with the provisions of GATS Article V. In total, 36 of the 77 ACP countries have concluded an Interim Agreement or EPA with the EU: 10 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 26 non-LDCs. Among the remaining ACP countries, 31 LDCs benefit from duty and quota free access to the EU under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 'Everything But Arms' (EBA) arrangement. The remaining 10 non-LDCs are eligible for the standard GSP. Since then, negotiations have been aimed at full regional EPA, including a large range of trade in goods, services and trade related areas, to replace the Interim Agreements.

For these agreements to be World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible they need to include reciprocal market access, which covers "substantially all" the trade. [2] However, EPAs include several other elements, such as support for deep integration and development assistance. Moreover, it was hoped that these agreements would promote regional integration among sub-groups of ACP countries. [3]

ACP negotiation groups are a combination of relatively poor developing countries and LDCs, most of which are highly dependent on trade relationships with the EU. In countries where tariff

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1. Article XXIV, provides exceptions to MFN treatment for customs unions (CUs) and free-trade areas (FTAs).

2. The EU Commission considers that a PTA is WTO compatible if 90% of bilateral trade is fully liberalized.

3. Deep integration involves integrating policies and institutions that facilitate trade by reducing or eliminating regulatory or behind- the-border impediments to trade.

revenues constitute a significant amount of government budgetary resources, this dependence may engender sizeable losses in tax revenue.

Looking at the nature of the trade relations between the EU and the ACP,[4] it is clear that in these negotiations, the stakes are far higher for the ACP than for the EU. Despite the preferences afforded by the EU in the course of a longstanding partnership, less than 2.5% of EU imports come from the ACP region, with West Africa accounting for half of this amount. In contrast, nearly 30% of ACP exports go to the EU and 28% of their imports come from there.[5]

Moreover ACP economies are often very specialized. One single product category (out of the 5,113 categories of products in the HS6 classification) accounts for more than 50% of total exports in one country in two, and more than 70% in one country in three.

Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models may be appropriate to assess the overall trade and welfare effects of these agreements. Social accounting matrices are required, with comprehensive information on each economy. However for most ACP countries these data are of poor quality, when available, and CGE modeling is not an option.[6] Moreover, due to the high level of product specialization in numerous of the ACP countries, applying a CGE model that describes the whole economy at an aggregated level (or even at sector level) risks missing key impacts. Finally, working at product level is crucial to produce results with policy relevance because of the need to select "sensitive products" which will be excluded from liberalization.

Given the trade-off between detailed product representation and general equilibrium effects, some studies employ a partial equilibrium (PE) model: we adopt the same approach in the present study. PE models normally address the issue of welfare simply by comparing trade creation and trade diversion effects, and ignoring other sources of welfare effects such as the impact of more efficient reallocation of resources in the economy or changes to the terms of trade. Thus, we choose not to analyze welfare effects within this framework. Also, PE models usually rely on the assumption of common price elasticity for all imports, and perfect substitutability between goods. In our study we pay particular attention to this latter issue.

Both types of approaches tend to ignore some adjustment costs, such as those that emerge from the reallocation of factors of production across sectors, or the reorganization of the fiscal base and the shift to other forms of taxation to replace tariffs. Both also generally assume that tariff cuts will translate into proportional reductions in prices to the benefit of the final consumer. In reality, it is likely that some of the cut will be appropriated by the producers/importers, and/or

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4. See Section Data Sources to know the different sources used to calculate the trade figures presented.

5. Large heterogeneity exists, not only among the different regional groups, but also within them. Countries such as Cameroon, for which the EU is the major trading partner, contrast with countries in the Caribbean and Pacific areas, for which the EU is a more marginal trading partner, mainly because of geographical distance.

6. Using the GTAP model and database Keck & Piermartini (2008) tentatively estimate the impact of a fully reciprocal EPA between SADC countries and the EU. The authors find that the welfare of the SADC sub-region would grow by USD 1.5 billion, due in part to the improvement in their terms of trade. Using the same methodology Perez (2006) examines whether EPAs are preferable for ACP countries compared to other main alternatives.

by the exporter due to an incomplete pass-through of tariff changes to consumer prices (see Gasiorek & Winters, 2004).

Overall, studies that employ PE models tend to show that EU exporters are the main beneficiaries of EPAs, since their sales to ACP markets increase substantially after their implementation (Karingi et al. 2005, Busse et al. 2004, COMESA Secretariat 2003, Ndlela & Tekere 2003, Scollay 2002). EPAs push down the prices of imports from the EU, thus reducing imports from non-EU countries. At the same time, the welfare of ACP consumers increases due to a reduction in prices. In some cases, however, if less efficient EU producers replace more efficient non-European producers, this type of import substitution is associated with a relative loss in overall economic efficiency, a situation that tends to reduce the welfare of ACP countries. Additionally, PE studies emphasize the potential negative impact of EPAs on the public revenues of ACP countries, with potential large tariff revenue losses.

Milner et al. (2005) provide an innovative analysis of the decomposition of welfare effects in a PE framework. Along with trade creation and trade diversion, they explicitly model the resulting consumption effects. The method is applied to an EAC (East African Cooperation: Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda)-EU EPA, as an illustration and effects for Tanzania and Uganda are estimated. The analysis points to only limited welfare effects (excluding revenue effects), whether positive (for Uganda) or negative (for Tanzania).

Our analysis aims to improve on existing PE studies in several ways:

- The model is designed to allow for a detailed evaluation of negotiations over EPA and the alternatives. We use data at the HS6 level for both trade and protection. Working at the HS6 level permits a better handling of tariff heterogeneity across products and partners, avoiding problems of aggregation. In fact, the gains from tariff removal will depend on reductions to tariff dispersion (Anderson & Neary, 2007), which is heavily cushioned by increasing levels of tariff aggregation. Moreover the way tariffs are aggregated plays a crucial role.[7] Although some sophisticated aggregators are available (Anderson & Neary, 2003) they have some severe flaws that can lead to important biases in the results (Anderson, 2006).

- We deal with the situation of concessions to ACP countries to exclude some products from liberalization. We consider different selection methods in order to establish whether the approach to selection makes a difference. We also take account of the products currently covered by special protocols. Finally, we implement a capacity constraint for some specific products.

- Different scenarios are simulated in order to assess the impact of EPA and alternatives. In

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7. For instance a simple average between tariffs has a poor level of relevance since it gives the same weight to an important product than to a marginal one. On the contrary the widely used trade weighted average keeps the ranking between the relative importance of the different products, but there is still a problem of endogeneity between tariff and trade. When a tariff is prohibitive there is no trade or low trade, which means no weight. In the end this method downwards protection level.

assessing the impact of EPAs we use the GSP/EBA combination of market access (which is the actual alternative) as the counterfactual rather than the status-quo (Cotonou-Lomé). [8]

- We do not rely on the hypothesis of perfect import substitutability. Instead, we introduce horizontal and vertical differentiation between products. In order to take account of the difference in the levels of development between the two regions, we give centrality to the hypothesis that local or regional products in the ACP countries are different from European products and thus less substitutable.

Although the various computations are made at the level of national economies and HS6 level, most of the results are presented at the level of ACP negotiating regions and aggregated sectors. This is done for reasons of space. However, we provide some tentative insights into the heterogenous impacts on countries and sectors. Geographical coverage is constrained by data availability (see in Appendix: **List of Countries included in the study**). It should be borne in mind that there is strong heterogeneity between and within regions. One of the key differences is the number of LDC countries within each group, which has an important potential impact on the possible alternatives should the EPA not be signed.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides with a brief overview of past and future relationships between the EU and ACP countries. Section 3 describes the model, the data and the design of the experiment. Section 4 presents the results of the simulations, and Section 5 conducts a sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. CURRENT AND FUTURE TRADE POLICIES INVOLVING THE EU AND THE ACP COUNTRIES

First we provide a snapshot of the protection applied and faced by ACP countries, using detailed tariff data at HS6 level. Second, we discuss current and future trade policies involving the EU and ACP countries. Third, we design a WTO compatible EPA, optimizing the flexibility provided by the "substantially all trade" clause.

2.1. Current protection pattern

Table 1 displays the average rate of protection applied by ACP regions to EU and regional imports. With the exception of the CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) and CARIFORUM (Carribean countries) areas, important gains can be expected from regional integration of the ACP countries. For SADC (Southern African Development Community), the intra regional tariff is around 15%, twice as high as that applied to EU exports to the

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8. Many commentators erroneously compare EPA negotiations to the status-quo (Cotonou-Lomé). In reality, it has been clearly stated by EU officials, in the absence of EPAs, ACP countries would revert to the situation of other developing economies in the WTO: the GSP or potentially the GSP+ for those developing countries that have signed and implemented a number of international conventions on sustainable development. See for instance the EU Commissioner Peter Mandelson speech in front of the EU Parliament on the 5th of November 2007 excluding any solutions that will maintain Cotonou preferences outside the EPA framework.

region. ACP regions apply different levels of protection to EU exports. CEMAC, COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and the Pacific regions appear to apply the most protection, with average duties of 13.5%, 13.1% and 12%, respectively and SADC and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) regions are the most liberal (7.1% and 8.1% respectively).

The structure of tariffs has the usual shape - the highest level of protection is in agriculture, with peaks in agrofood (COMESA, 36%) and vegetables (Pacific, 56%). In manufacturing, CEMAC and SADC still protect textiles (for both protectionist and fiscal reasons) while COMESA protects the metallurgic sector.

– Table 1 to be included –

Regarding EU trade policy towards the ACP, the Cotonou agreement gives free access to all industrial products, while applying some protection for agricultural goods. Moreover, ACP-LDCs enjoy duty and quota free market access under the EU's unilateral EBA initiative which provides market access to all LDCs.

– Table 2 to be included –

Nevertheless, some ACP countries face an average tariff rate that is higher than that applied by the EU to imports from the Rest of the World (**Table 2**) due to the concentration of their exports on some agricultural products which are heavily protected in the EU. [9]

2.2. Trade policies involving the EU and ACP countries

Strictly speaking, the EU introduced a policy of cooperation with the ACP states in 1975. Up to 2000 these relations were governed by the regularly updated Lomé Conventions. Economic cooperation, implemented through a system of trade preferences, ensured that manufactured and agricultural products (not in direct competition with products covered by the Common Agricultural Policy - CAP) could enter the European Community free of customs duties or quantity restrictions. Most importantly, this access was on a non-reciprocal basis, in the sense that ACP states were merely requested to apply the most favored nation (MFN) clause to the EU and to refrain from discriminating between EU countries. Specific regimes were applied to products of extreme importance for ACP states such as sugar, beef and veal, rum, and bananas. In the years before expiry of the Lomé IV convention, the non reciprocal preferential trade regime provided by the Lomé convention was increasingly seen as unacceptable and "incompatible" with international trade rules.

The new Cotonou Partnership Agreement was signed by the ACP countries and the EU, on June 23, 2000. It covered a 20-year period and included a clause requiring mid-term reviews every 5 years. The preparation of a new WTO compatible trade policy constituted a major change from

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9. This is the case, for example, for developing countries in the SADC region where producers are disadvantaged by the high level of EU protection in tobacco and rice.

the Lomé Convention regime. In 2001, the EU was granted the most recent waiver to the Lomé conventions, which allowed it to maintain the current non reciprocal tariff preferences for ACP countries to 31 December 2007. Negotiations for the so-called new EPAs, began in September 2002 and were due to be completed by 2007, to comply with the requirements of the waiver.

It was clear that reciprocity and free trade were to be phased in progressively by the EPAs, "within a reasonable period of time", as required by GATT Article XXIV. However, interpretation of the "substantially all trade" rule-of-thumb proved contentious. What would happen were the EPAs not signed on time?

EPA negotiations are not mandatory for ACP countries. ACP countries are invited to sign either as groups or individually, building on their own regional integration schemes. ACP-LDCs will still benefit from the EBA initiative whatever their decision. However, LDCs need to compare alternatives including other "variables" than duties (e.g. rules of origin). The main problems lie with the non-LDC ACP countries, which are not in a position to enter into an EPA. One alternative, is that these countries avail themselves of access to the GSP, the general scheme available to all developing countries. A more attractive alternative would be the GSP+ scheme, which provides improved market access for "vulnerable" countries which show commitment to a sustainable approach to development by ratifying and implementing a series of international conventions. However, both the GSP and GSP+ provide for less favorable treatment.

Table 3 displays the impact in terms of the average tariff applied by the EU to ACP exports were ACP countries to move from Cotonou preferences to those provided by either GSP or GSP+ for non LDCs, or by EBA for LDCs. Even for ECOWAS and CEMAC, which export mainly raw products which tend to have low or zero MFN tariffs (oil, cocoa, cotton), the effects are still visible. Also, the reduction in preferential margins is large for Caribbean and Pacific regions for sugar and bananas, key exports from both regions. For COMESA, moving to GSP would double the average tariff rate faced. Overall, the difference between GSP and GSP+ is not significant except for Eastern Africa, where several countries, especially Mauritius, are significant exporters in the textiles and apparel sector, where GSP+ eliminates protection and GSP provides only limited advantages.

– Table 3 to be included –

2.3.   Designing a WTO compatible EPA

According Article XXIV of the GATT, the desire of most ACP countries to maintain some tariffs for protectionist and tax reasons can be fulfilled to some extent. The "substantially all trade" quantitative requirement is achieved here, following EU guidelines , considering 90% of bilateral trade in volume or 90% of tariff lines in the Harmonized System (HS). Choosing sensitive products with the constraint of liberalizing 90% of trade in volume would produce 90% (or more) liberalization in tariffs lines, due to the high concentration of ACP trade with the EU, in a few products.

Assuming full liberalization on the EU side, this would imply liberalization of 80% of ACP imports if trade flows were balanced. However, if this criterion is applied at regional level, important differences appear. Depending on the extent to which ACP regions display negative or positive trade balances with the EU, the extent of liberalization of imports required to meet the 90% target will vary. For instance, the Pacific region, which exports much more to the EU than it imports (distance effect), could potentially shelter up to 42% of its original imports and still cover 90% of trade. In contrast, in the Caribbean region, which has a negative trade balance with the EU, the share of excluded imports would represent less than 20%. For the other regions, ECOWAS would be entitled to exclude 21% of its imports originating from the EU, CEMAC 23% and SADC 25%.

In terms of timing, we assume that EPA will be implemented over a period of 15 years. However, to reflect the asymmetry among partners, the EU is assumed to grant free access to all ACP exports by 2008. Even were such a choice to exceed the general recommendations of Article XXIV, it could be justified on the grounds of the specific weaknesses of African countries and the number of LDCs.

The last question then is how are sensitive products selected? Two approaches are used following the guidelines provided by EU experts (Directorate-General for Trade).

H1 Scenario: in this scenario, priority for protection is given to agricultural products. Agricultural products are selected first for exclusion, following which, the most sensitive manufactured products, identified here as those contributing the most to tariff revenues, are excluded, up to the overall level of residual protection assumed to be acceptable. Adopting such a strategy does not optimize the choice of products in order to minimize the losses in tariff revenues, but it does provide some way to reflect the political sensitivity of the agricultural sector in most ACP countries. The ranking within this category is given by the theoretical value of tariff revenues (imports from the EU multiplied by the tariff). All computations are at regional level, derived by adding up national effects by product.

H2 Scenario: in this scenario, the objective is to reduce tariff revenue losses at regional level. A discrete choice model was built to ensure that products were chosen in order to minimize tariff losses, at the initial trade level, subject to two constraints: share of excluded trade should not exceed the amount allowed and number of products in the regional list should not be above 20% of total tariff lines.

The products included in the exclusion lists vary considerably depending on the approach: agricultural products under H1, manufacturing goods (e.g. cars, clothes) under H2. The consequences of the exclusion lists are displayed in **Table 4**. The result is far from full liberalization. Due to the extensive list of excluded products which the Pacific region could potentially include, the effects of liberalization are completely neutralized in that region. Other regions could retain between one-fifth and half of their initial protection. Under the H2 scenario, COMESA could still keep half of its initial level of protection by excluding just 19% of EU imports from

liberalization.

– Table 4 to be included –

3. METHODOLOGY

In this section we describe the structure of the model as well as the calibration procedure employed. The model equations are contained in the Appendix **Equations of the model**. The data are described in the second sub-section. This section concludes with a discussion of the scenario simulated and the choice of relevant counterfactuals, namely the status-quo versus GSP.

3.1. The Model

In this paper, the quantitative impact of EPAs is addressed using a PE model, expressly built for this purpose. The model, which is based on the usual assumptions in PE analysis, is designed to allow very detailed evaluation of the impact on trade and government budgets of the ongoing EPA negotiations. The model focuses on the demand side.

The supply side is assumed to be perfectly adjustable and thus, the elasticity of supply is equal to infinity. [10] There are two main consequences of this hypothesis for the results: we might over-estimate the effects on EU exports (in volume) from ACP liberalization since ACP producers might not reduce their prices in the face of increasing competition, and we might overestimate the effects of EU liberalization on ACP exports (in volume) since we assume that there are no constraints on supply. In terms of this latter possibility, forecast increases in ACP exports should be interpreted as potential gains. To transform them into real gains, specific policies would have to be formulated to support production in the sectors where the highest increases are forecast.

We represent the demand side as a nested CES structure, where the initial regional income is assumed to be fixed (see **Figure 1**). Subscripts iii, ii and i denote aggregated sectors at a decreasing level of aggregation; $hs6$ are the detailed products; and r and s are respectively, the source and destination regions. The exact sectoral mapping used in the model is provided at the aggregated level in the Appendix (see **Sectoral aggregation**), the correspondence between the GTAP and the HS6 classifications can be downloaded from the GTAP web site. [11]

– Figure 1 to be included –

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10. This means that production prices are constant over all scenarios, while consumer prices follow the changes in product taxes, in this case tariffs. As a result of this assumption, volume changes and value changes at producer prices will be the same for all the results presented. This assumption, while realistic for the EU side, may seem crude for ACP countries which may suffer severe capacity constraints when adapting to changes in demand. However this is the price to be paid to maintain the model tractable at a very disaggregated level (HS6).

11. $https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID = 320$

Initially the representative consumer arbitrates between two aggregated sectors: agriculture and agro-food ($Dem_{k1,s}$) and other industry ($Dem_{k2,s}$). Here we assume complementarity between the two (Leontief preferences).

Then, total demand for the aggregated category ($Dem_{k,s}$) is allocated between different broad sectors ($Dem_{ii,s}$) with a weak substitution $\sigma_{Dii} = 0.8$). The demand for each sector ($Dem_{ii,s}$) is further split across GTAP-defined sectors (see Hertel & Tsigas, 1999), ($Dem_{i,s}$) with an elasticity of substitution, σ_{DGtap}, of 0.95. The last stage in the product disaggregation will be from GTAP level to HS6 nomenclature ($\sigma_{Dhs6} = 1.5$). Although the exact level of substitution is difficult to define, increasing substitutability with the level of disaggregation appears a sounded assumption.

As far as consumption choices within each HS6 category are concerned, we make use of a nested Armington assumption (Armington, 1969) which allows representation of geographical differentiation, both vertical and horizontal. This is crucial in the context of EPAs, since in most cases, EU products are not in direct competition with ACP products. Indeed, as documented in (Schott, 2004), products originating in developed and developing countries remain strongly vertically differentiated within a given HS6 position.

For every HS6 product, a CES (σ_{GEO}) allocates demand among goods originated from countries with the same level of development ($DU_{hs6,s}$) and originating in countries in different categories ($DV_{hs6,s}$). Then, DU is distributed between the local ($M_{hs6,s,s}$) and imported varieties ($M_{hs6,s}$), based on a CES function with an elasticity of substitution of σ_{ARM}. A final stage defines the exact origins of products across groups of similar countries (CES with σ_{ImpU}). DV is distributed across different importers using a CES with elasticity σ_{ImpV}. The allocation of disaggregated imports among the various sources depends also on detailed bilateral prices and detailed imports in volume. In particular the detailed bilateral import price, ($P^M_{hs6,r,s}$), is defined as the CIF price multiplied by the power of the ad valorem duty.

To have a consistent tree, we need to have $\sigma_{GEO} < \sigma_{ARM} < \sigma_{ImpV}$ and $\sigma_{GEO} < \sigma_{ImpU}$, *e.g.* for an ACP country, a products will be more substitutable by those from other ACP countries (included in DU) than by EU products (included in DV). While the choice of product origins is at HS6 level, we have access only to Armington elasticities drawn from the GTAP database. At the HS6 level, estimations provided by the World Bank (Kee et al., 2008) give import demand elasticities for a number of countries. [12] However, the structural form of the model (nested CES) introduces a relation between all elasticities and particularly between direct price elasticities and the elasticities of substitution. We calibrate elasticities at product level in order to comply with Armington elasticities of substitution at GTAP level and the direct price elasticities computed by

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12. Since some elasticities are missing for some countries and products, we fill the elasticities matrix by an iterative process. For one product, trade weighted average are computed across group of countries (same level of development and same continent) to fill the missing values. If the value is missing for the reference group, we compute an average by continent, then by level of development. We ultimately compute a world average to double-check that we have all the elasticities needed.

the World Bank at HS6 level. This last source of information allows for country heterogeneity in import demand behavior, reflecting both preferences and availability of local production. Import elasticities are defined by the gap between the parameters for domestic demand and domestic supply. If we consider our CES nesting, we can quite easily establish the relation between the Armington elasticity, the direct price elasticity and the other substitution elasticities, as in (Rutherford, 2002): [13]

$$
\sigma_{GEO} = \frac{M_{hs6,s}}{M_{hs6,s} - MV_{hs6,s}} \times \left(|\eta_{i,s}| + MV_{hs6,s} \right) \times
$$
$$
\left(\sigma_{Dii} + \frac{\sigma_{DGtap} - \sigma_{Dii}}{Dem_{ii,s}} + \frac{\sigma_{Dhs6} - \sigma_{DGtap}}{Dem_{i,s}} - \frac{\sigma_{Dhs6}}{M_{hs6,s}} \right)
$$

where $\eta_{i,s}$ is the direct price elasticity estimated by the World Bank (Kee et al., 2008). More precisely we interpret it as the direct price elasticity of the aggregate MV (imports from a different region) rather than overall imports. [14]

Finally, to avoid unrealistic results from the simulations, we limit σ_{GEO} in the range $[1.05, 8]$ and limit σ_{ARM} to $[1.1, 8]$, and assume $\sigma_{ImpU} = Min(2 \times \sigma_{ARM}, 12)$, $\sigma_{ImpV} = Min(2 \times \sigma_{ARM}, 12)$ applying the usual "rule of two" used in the GTAP database to move up in the Armington tree.

This framework is suitable to measure trade creation and trade diversion effects, where one of the central questions is how the EPA affects the regional integration process through the diversion of intra ACP trade. As already stated, we do not consider the issue of welfare as we are unable to handle it properly: we ignore important sources of welfare changes such as the impact of more efficient allocation of resources or changes to the terms of trade. Ignoring terms of trade effects in a context of unilateral liberalization, such as EPAs, would be misleading: it has been well established that such effects can be detrimental to liberalizing countries.

Before concluding the section we should emphasize an important difference between our model and two PE models widely used by the World Bank, namely SMART (Jammes & Olarreaga, 2005) and TRITS (Brenton et al., 2007). Both consider the import demand function at a very detailed level, using a classical Armington assumption. However, they model one market at time (i.e. demand of country s from country r of commodity i), which means that there is no link between different products and countries. To obtain total trade creation or trade diversion resulting from a trade reform, one needs simply to sum the relevant dimensions (e.g. products and countries). However, in measuring trade diversion, it is necessary to impose an *ad hoc* constraint to ensure that the level of the trade diversion is not larger than the initial level of

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13. See Rutherford, 2002, p.32 for a demonstration.

14. This assumption leads to a slight underestimation of the σ_{GEO} parameter, but in this way we can avoid a more complex calibration procedure due to the fact that in our model imports are distributed among different branches.

imports from a given country. In our model, there is no need to apply this constraint, since we obtain consistent results based on the fact that all products and markets are linked and initial regional revenue is unchanged.

3.2. Data Sources

Although we set our analysis within a partial equilibrium framework, the model requires data which unfortunately are not always available. So we have to make some assumptions to account for missing data.

For trade data, we use a number of sources in order to complete our data, mostly for African countries' trade. Specifically, we employ COMEXT (source Eurostat) for EU-ACP relations and BACI (CEPII), which is a harmonized trade database based on UN-COMTRADE, for all other importers. To reduce annual volatility in trade data we calibrate the model using a mean figure based on three years (2002-2004).

Tariff data for 2004 are obtained from MAcMapHS6 version 2 (Boumellassa et al., 2009). We made an adjustment to take account of the 2006 EU GSP reform. We consider both ad valorem tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs). We do not model TRQs directly, but we consider the standard MAcMapHS6 methodology which consists of looking at the quota fill rate to decide which protection rate to apply. More precisely we apply the outside rate if the fill rate is above 98% and the inside rate if the fill rate is below 90% and if the fill rate is between 90% and 98% we use an average of the two rates. The main consequence of this procedure is that, like any other EU partner, all countries filling their quotas de facto liable for the MFN rate to enter the EU market.

Since our partial equilibrium framework means we have infinite supply capacity, the removal of EU barriers would lead to very high gains for all countries facing high levels of protection. However, it is well known that only the most productive countries (e.g. Brazil for sugar, Ecuador for bananas) would benefit from increased market access, while the gains for other countries would be more limited or even negative whenever initial preferences are eroded. To avoid both massive gains for ACP countries facing high initial tariffs, and large losses for those facing lower initial protection, we adopt a specific approach for sugar and bananas, which represent a high proportion of ACP exports and EU protection.

For sugar and bananas we calibrate the equivalent marginal rate of protection taking into account the production costs of each country, such that the impact on ACP countries differs depending on their efficiency in producing particular products. We assume that the EU domestic price p_a is defined as the sum of the MFN tariff t and the producer cost $\underline{c}$ on the EU market (F.O.B. export price + transportation costs) for the most efficient country. Then the ad valorem equivalent for each ACP country is defined considering the difference between the price p_a and its export price in the EU market p_b, including delivery cost: $AVE = (\underline{c} + t - p_b)/p_b$. For sugar we rely on information in LMC (2004) and the data in Chaplin & Matthews (2005); for bananas our main

source is Chambron (2000). For missing countries use FAOSTAT yield data to create a ranking among countries. [15]

In reality governments never receive 100% of their theoretical tariff duty receipts (computed as the sum of the official tariff rates multiplied by import values). Imperfect tax collection can be explained by legitimate exemptions (food aid, diplomatic services, public and private investment goods) and tax avoidance (corruption, smuggling). Detailed data from the customs services are not easily accessible. Some aggregated figures on tariff revenues are collected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, using these data can be misleading as some countries mix several tax resources that are not stricto sensu tariffs, e.g. sales taxes, phytosanitary taxes, statistical taxes, etc., in their "customs duties" category. Thus, we rely on a series of figures suggested by the recent literature. In COMESA, Brenton et al. (2007) finds the tariff collection rate to be 53% on EU imports (72% on all imports) for Ethiopia, and 74% (77%) for Madagascar, 56% (73%) for Malawi, and 77% (66%) for Zambia. For Mauritius, the reported rate is below 50%. In CEMAC, Gallezot & Laborde (2007) report tax collection rates of 83% (44%) for Cameroon and 59% (62%) for the Central African Republic. Lastly, Decaluwe et al. (2008) report tariff collection rates for ECOWAS, ranging between 38% for Togo and 88% for Burkina Faso. [16] Based on this partial evidence, we make an optimistic assumption of an average collection rate of 80% for developing countries and 60% for LDCs.

To include the share of domestic production in domestic consumption for agriculture we use highly disaggregated data compiled by the FAO. Where data at this level are not available or are inaccurate, we determine the proportion from the GTAP 6.2 database, assuming that the same share holds at the most disaggregated level. There are UNIDO data on industry sectors, but for only a small number of countries. Consequently, we rely on the assumption made in the case of non-accessible agricultural data (i.e. we draw on the GTAP database).

3.3. Experiment design

Two main scenarios, with different "sensitive products" are simulated.

• The end of Cotonou, successful EPA negotiations with full duty-free, quota-free access to the EU for ACP countries and liberalization of ACP imports under the H1 scenario (sensitive products are not liberalized and are concentrated in agriculture). H1 is our central scenario for the presentation of results.

• The end of Cotonou, successful EPA negotiations with full duty-free, quota-free access to the EU for ACP countries and liberalization of ACP imports under the H2 scenario (sensitive products are not liberalized and they are chosen in order to reduce fiscal losses at regional level).

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15. The information on yields in different sectors and countries is available on the following website http://faostat.fao.org/.

16. Other countries include Ghana 84%, Guinee 81%, Nigeria 51%, Benin 45%, Mali 86%, Niger 63%, Senegal 67%, Cote d'Ivoire 67%).

In both cases, [17] we assume that complete implementation of EPA by the ACP countries will be staggered over 15 years. From 2008 to 2015, a cut of 20% is applied to customs duty on non-sensitive products imported from the EU, with complete elimination of duty achieved in 2022. Also in both cases, the 90% criterion is applied as follows: we select sensitive lines up to 10% of the value of bilateral trade and check that no more than 10% of these lines are still liberalized. In addition to the liberalization process, we deepen trade integration within each negotiating block. More precisely, we assume that each region will become a free trade area in 2015. [18] The EU gives free access to all ACP products in 2008. While our comments are focused on results at the regional level, specific comments are offered on the heterogeneity of the impacts on individual countries. Detailed results at country and product level can be downloaded from a dedicated webpage. [19]

4. ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF EPAS

This section provides an analysis of forecast trade and the fiscal impacts of EPAs.

4.1. Choosing the right counterfactual

The debate over the consequences of EPA is often based on misguided assumptions - in particular that the alternative to EPA is the status quo. In the context of the WTO waiver, there is a commitment to move towards WTO compatibility. This means that FTAs (free trade areas), or, in their absence, ACP countries would revert to the situation of other developing economies in the WTO.

LDCs are already eligible for EBA preferences. This alternative, therefore, is the next best option for them. The remaining ACP countries mostly would have to return to the preferences provided under the GSP scheme, which would mean a considerable downgrading of their preferential access although for a limited number of ACP countries there might be the possibility of claiming GSP+ benefit.

Two reference scenarios are simulated. We first present the case where, at end 2007, *no EPA has been signed*: EBA is applied to LDCs (including removal of the last restrictions on sugar, rice and bananas in 2009) and GSP is applied for non-LDC ACP. We take this as *the reference situation*. The loss of preferences associated with the lapse of the Cotonou scheme will result

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17. We also performed a scenario of successful EPA negotiations with 100% liberalization on both sides. We will refer to it when presenting the results, whenever necessary, to confirm the importance of sensitive products and to address potential trade diversion.

18. This choice of a FTA and not a customs union is justified by the fact that the current regional negotiations do not appear to envisage common external tariffs in the near future. Furthermore, the complex pattern of existing trade agreements, in particular in the Eastern Africa region, makes FTAs the most likely scenario. This movement will be considered as a part of the EPA process, meaning that the tariff revenue losses computed will also include the losses related to the elimination of tariffs between countries within the same region.

19. See http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/membre/fontagne/data.htm

in a fall of 4.9% ACP exports to the EU. The reduction will be even greater for the Pacific countries (-8.4%), the Caribbean (-9%) and COMESA (-12.1%). Alternatively, we can consider the situation of a combination of EBA for LDCs and GSP+ for non-LDC ACP. This option makes little difference for most ACP countries -3.5% on average for ACP countries, with the exception of the the COMESA region, where the impact is much greater due to the more favorable treatment of textile products in the GSP+ (the fall in exports to the EU is -5.1%).

EPAs are expected to bring a 10.7% increase in the volume of ACP exports to the EU in 2022 (See **Table 5**). This gain is the result of improved market access compared to a benchmark that is less advantageous than the status quo. If we were to use the status quo as our benchmark, keeping in mind the already mentioned 4.8% drop in ACP exports to the EU, signing EPAs would lead to a more limited gain: 5.4% ((1.107 x (1-0.048)-1). This difference in expected trade impact illustrates the importance of choosing the right counterfactual.

– Table 5 to be included –

The sectoral cost of not signing an agreement is concentrated in products associated with specific protocols - sugar and bananas (exports to the EU would drop by 54.2%), which also explains the difficult situation of the Caribbean countries. For sugar the impact of the EU's domestic reform is not directly considered here. However, the consequent fall in sugar prices in the EU market will reduce the preferential margins granted to ACP countries in any case. Other products that are strongly affected are livestock (30% fall in exports) and textiles (-27%). For the latter, under GSP+ losses are canceled out. But the sectoral level is not the appropriate level of analysis because of the concentration of gains and losses in certain categories of products.

Changes in exports are much more concentrated across countries and products, than changes in imports. The top panel of **Figure 2** plots the distribution of import volume change by country. There are some outliers for the Caribbean countries and ECOWAS. But the import volume changes never reach 60%. In contrast, the bottom panels of this Figure illustrate the distribution of export volume changes by country with and without outliers: clearly, few countries concentrate most of the gains. Moreover, few products are concerned, as only 3% of HS6 lines represents more than 90% of new exports in value.[20] Large variations in values are found in agricultural products, while textiles and apparel is the only manufacturing sector registering sizable changes in value. Gains also are concentrated in a limited number of countries within regions. For instance the large exports gains for COMESA in textiles and apparel are driven by only one exporter: Mauritius (see **Table 6**).

– Figure 2 to be included –

– Table 6 to be included –

Only 20% of the liberalization of ACP countries in relation to EU imports will be achieved in 2015, while full access will be provided to the EU market. Accordingly, an average 17.7% in-

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20. Due to constraints of space the distribution of exports by product is not displayed here.

crease in ACP imports from the EU is forecast at the 2022 time horizon, and 7.9% in 2015 (see **Subsection 5.2**). This in turn implies a transitory gain for ACP countries' trade balances over the corresponding period. The sectoral composition of these import increases points to concentration in industrial goods, mirroring traditional trade specialization in the EU and ACP. [21] **Subsection 4.2** examines how the strategy adopted for sensitive products would restrict manufactured imports, while providing greater opening of ACP borders to EU agricultural products.

4.2.   The role of sensitive products

Two contentious issues in the EPA debate are the percentage of products to be excluded from liberalization (on the ACP side) and the choice of which products to exclude. If we apply the 90% guideline, we achieve a non negligible smoothing of the liberalization process.

The outcome of the EPA negotiations is very different from the hypothetical situation where all products are fully liberalized. Without sensitive products, we can forecast a 23.8% increase in total ACP imports from the EU in 2022, compared with 17.7% (for H1) or 13.1% (for H2). Under H2, optimally choosing tariff lines in order to secure tariffs revenues will reduce the amount of ACP imports from the EU, at the expense of a much more liberalized agricultural sector than in H1. For instance, H2 forecasts a 12.1% increase for Livestock and 8% for Vegetable products; in H1 the respective increases would be 0.6% and 0.8%. If we assume H2, in the manufactured sectors with tariff peaks numerous products will be excluded, which explains why the surge in ACP imports of textiles products from the EU (+ 36.8% in H1) would be curbed (+ 7.3% in H2).

– Figure 3 to be included –

Other important effects of alternative selections of sensitive products are highlighted if we look at the results at HS6 level. As depicted in **Figure 3**, the reduction in imports increase under H2 is actually the effect of two changes in combination. Firstly, there is an enlargement in the scope of HS6 products for which a *decline* in imports is recorded (36% of tariff lines in H2 compared to 17.7% in H1). Secondly, there is a reduced scope of those products showing sizeable increased imports (more than 50% increase): 17.6% of products under H1, but only 8.8% under H2. In both cases most of the positive changes correspond to small variations in value: under H2 (H1), only 1.4%(1%) of HS6 lines will vary by more than 0.5 Mios euros of 2004. Consequently, changes in value are concentrated in a limited number of products: in H1(H2) 90% of HS6 lines correspond to 17%(14%) of total import changes in value (see **Figure 4**).

– Figure 4 to be included –

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21. The exception is textiles and apparel, where exports and imports will both increase; this is related to the existing international division of labor in these sectors and the heterogeneity among ACP countries that include both exporters and importers of these products.

Reducing potential increases in imports is not the only issue. If imports affect industrial inputs, restraining them and making them more expensive could have a negative impact on overall competitiveness. Unfortunately, the structure of the model does not allow us to address this issue.

4.3. Impacts on tariff and government revenues

The effects of EPA on ACP countries' public finances have been widely debated but their different impacts have rarely been disentangled.

The elimination of customs duties on many European imports produces two main effects: a direct effect (elimination of duties on existing import flows from the EU); and a trade diversion effect. In the first scenario, the overall effect of cutting tariffs will depend on the combined effect of reduced tariffs and increased imports as a result of falling import prices, until liberalization is complete. The second effect of EPA is trade diversion, expected from any FTA. Here, untaxed imports from the EU - or from countries belonging to the same ACP region - will replace currently taxed imports from the rest of the world. Accordingly, trade diversion produces additional negative impacts on tariff revenue.

Trade diversion is presented in the left panel in **Table 7** which shows fiscal losses for the central scenario (H1) and for a hypothetical scenario of full liberalization between the EU and the ACP countries (Full FTA). The direct loss for the ACP as a whole will amount to euro 1,390 mn in 2022 under H1. The trade diversion effect will add another euro 467 mn losses. [22]

The combination of these effects will result in a forecast average loss in tariff revenue on EU imports for all ACP of 71% in 2022 (702 million of 2004 euro). [23] The lowest relative losses are forecast to occur in the SADC region (58%), while the region most heavily affected will be ECOWAS, where the trade diversion effect will be particularly detrimental (losses of 700 millions of euro annually in the long run or 82% of tariff revenue in 2022).

However, this threat needs to be viewed in the wider context. Firstly EPA will not be fully fledged FTAs in that there will not be completely symmetric liberalization among the parties. Tariff revenues will continue to be collected on EU imports, as a certain number of products can be excluded from tariff cuts. As can be seen from **Table 7** total losses for the ACP under scenario H1 are only 73% of the fiscal cost of a full FTA. Moreover, if the objective of ACP countries is to minimize tariff revenue losses, scenario H2 becomes more relevant. In this case, tariff losses would be drastically reduced: from 71% to 52% for all ACP regions (from

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22. On the top of the direct and diversion effects, a last and limited impact is the domestic effect: additional imports replace to some extent informal domestic transactions escaping the VAT. Under the conservative assumptions of 50% of domestic transactions escaping indirect taxation, half of the value of additional imports replacing domestic sales is a new tax base in the formal economy. We assume a VAT rate of 16%. This effect ultimately cushions the negative impact of the liberalization on public revenue. Controlling for the domestic effect we would end up with 1,806 mn losses.

23. See **Section 5.1** for the sensitivity analysis on tariff revenues.

82% to 57% for ECOWAS, from 58% to 37% for SADC). Thirdly, the EU is not the only trade partner of the ACP countries. They still collect tariff revenues from third country imports: while scenario H1 may reduce the tariff revenue collected on imports from the EU by 71%, it would represent just a 25% decline in total tariff revenue for the ACP countries when all importers are considered (or 19% under scenario H2, when the exclusion list is optimized).

– Table 7 to be included –

Finally, tariff revenue is not the only source of income for government. It is clear that the effects of EPA on the ACP countries' public finances will differ across countries depending on the initial importance of tariff revenue in total government income. **Table 8** [24] provides some insight on this aspect for a relatively small number of countries. Some countries, which are highly dependent on tariff revenue, seem to be those that would register the smallest relative losses. For example, Swaziland, where 47% of public revenue comes from customs duty, would lose only 5.7% of its customs revenue. At the other extreme countries such as Congo, where tariff revenue losses are forecast to be high (almost 33%), depend relatively little on this source of revenue (7.1%). However, several West African countries, such as Ghana and especially Côte d'Ivoire, which are heavily dependent for their budget on this revenue source, may experience difficult transition phases due to heavy predicted losses in customs receipts.

LDCs should benefit the most from an adjustment package allowing them to move progressively from a taxation system based on imports to a more stable, domestic focused, system. The transition to other forms of taxation will be particularly difficult in post-conflict countries where central government power is weak and the whole administration is in a phase of "rebirth" (e.g. Central African Republic).

– Table 8 to be included –

5. SENSITIVITY

5.1. Sensitivity to elasticities

In this section we examine the sensitivity of our results on trade and tariff revenues to some key elasticities. We conduct six more simulations for the ACP region: the results are reported in **Table 9**. We take the H1 scenario and the 2022 horizon as our reference (Column 1 of **Table 9**). With respect to initial levels, we alternatively cut by half and double the following parameters:

- the substitution elasticities between sectors at the most aggregated level $\sigma_{Dii,s}$, and consequently $\sigma_{DGtap,s}$ and $\sigma_{Dhs6,s}$.
- the Armington elasticities at the HS6 level, $\sigma_{ARM,s}$.
- the import demand elasticities at the HS6 level provided by the World Bank (WB).

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24. The analysis is limited to countries where reliable data on collected duties and government income is available from the IMF.

Since the value of $\sigma_{Geo,s}$ is determined endogenously, it will be affected by any changes in the other elasticities.

– Table 9 to be included –

Table 9 shows that the different elasticities lead to results in the expected direction. More interesting is that tariff revenue losses on imports from the EU are stable across all the sensitivity experiments, because they are mainly the results of the direct effect of trade liberalization and are principaly impacted by the choice on products exclusion list.

5.2.   FTAs within ACP regions at the 2015 horizon

Table 10 presents the percentage changes in ACP imports from the EU and the world following two different shocks. The first two columns present the central scenario (H1) of EPA referred to above, at the 2015 horizon. Columns 3 and 4 simulate a reduction in tariffs on only a regional basis (i.e. excluding tariffs within regional FTAs). Basically the effect of FTAs signed within ACP countries would slightly increase intra-country trade at the expense of the other trade partners, as a result of the expected trade diversion effect. However, this impact would be very limited. The order of magnitude of this type of trade diversion is quite small compared with the size of the figures in the two first columns. On average, this effect represents a tenth of the impact of EPA for all ACPs. The only region where it makes a substantial difference is SADC, where the trade diversion effect would be large enough to compensate for the overall effect of EPA on total imports. The reason why the changes are generally so small is that intra ACP region tariffs are initially low, except for SADC, (see diagonal of 1) intra ACP trade, on average, is quite small in our dataset. Overall, our main conclusions are robust to the inclusion in the simulations of regional FTAs.

– Table 10 to be included –

6.   CONCLUSION

This article provides an accurate assessment of the market access component of EPA between the EU and the six ACP regions, with a focus on trade and budgetary aspects. In particular, the paper investigates the role played by the choice of sensitive products. Using a PE model at the HS6 level for the EU25 and the 60 ACP countries, we built realistic EPA scenarios assuming partial liberalization of the ACP regions in respect of EU interpretation of GATT Article XXIV. While ACP exports to the EU will be 10% higher with EPA than under the GSP/EBA option, these countries are forecast to lose 70% of tariff revenues on EU imports. However, imports from other world regions will continue to provide tariff revenues. Thus, when tariff revenue losses are computed on total ACP imports, losses are limited to 26% on average, and over the long run, and could even be 19% if product lists are optimized. The final impact depends on

the importance of tariffs in government revenue, and on potential compensatory effects. The absolute values of customs revenue losses computed in this article provide a starting point for defining the financial needs of ACP governments. However, long term solutions will depend on the capacity of each ACP country to reorganize its fiscal base.

In the long run, the establishment of EPA with the EU may have further beneficial impacts derived from the trade liberalization measures undertaken by ACP countries becoming irreversible and therefore more credible – the so called "lock-in" effect (Collier & Gunning, 1995). This, in turn, may bring benefits in terms of increased domestic and foreign investment in ACP countries, although the history of foreign investment in these countries is not very encouraging, making the possibility of a major impact unlikely.

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7. TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1 – ACP average applied tariffs. Regional level. (Percent)

	ECOWAS	CEMAC+	COMESA	SADC	CARIFO-RUM	Pacific	European Union
ECOWAS	4.0	4.2	7.5	7.3	5.2	6.0	8.1
CEMAC+	11.7	1.3	14.0	16.1	11.9	30.0	13.5
COMESA	11.2	8.6	3.7	12.7	19.7	3.8	13.1
SADC	8.7	10.3	9.6	14.6	3.3	36.4	7.1
CARIFORUM	1.0	0.1	14.0	1.3	0.3	14.0	9.5
Pacific	8.8	16.2	9.2	5.5	12.0	40.9	12.0

Source: Authors' calculations using MAcMapHS6-v2. Reference group weighting scheme.

Table 2 – Initial EU applied protection by sectors. (Percent)

| Sectors	ECOWAS	CEMAC+	COMESA	SADC	CARIFO-RUM	Pacific	Rest of the World
Total	0.2	0.6	5.4	3.8	3.8	12.9	2.6
Vegetal Prod.	1.0	6.1	13.8	48.2	13.9	20.0	10.8
Livestocks	43.4	27.7	11.3	83.2	84.8	28.8	61.3
Agr. Food		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.1	8.5
Primary							0.4
Elec. and Machinery							1.8
Metallurgy							1.2
Textiles and Apparel						0.3	6.4
Other Industries	0.1		0.7	0.4	0.1	0.4	1.7

Source: Authors' calculations based on updated version of MAcMapHS6-v2. Reference group weighting scheme.

Table 3 – Average protection rates faced by the ACP regions on the EU market. Different regimes. (Percent)

Regions	Cotonou	GSP	GSP+
ECOWAS	0.2	1.7	1.7
CEMAC+	0.6	2.9	2.8
COMESA	5.4	13.7	11.9
SADC	3.8	4.5	4.3
CARIFORUM	3.8	16.3	15.9
Pacific	12.9	27.6	27.2
Rest of the World	2.6	2.6	2.6

Source: Authors' calculations based on MAcMapHS6-v2.
Reference group weighting scheme.

Figure 1 – Demand tree

**Figure 2 – ACP trade with the EU. Distribution of trade volume changes by country.**

Source: Simulation results.

Note 1: Pacific region is excluded due to the lack of representativity in terms of country coverage.

Note 2: The box extends from 25% to 75% of the distribution. The black segment in the centre shows the median value. The extreme notches indicates the 5% and 95%. Outliers are drawn outside the 5% limits.

Figure 3 – ACP trade with the EU. Distribution of trade changes by hs6 product.

Source: Simulation results.

Table 4 – ACP Average tariffs on EU products at the end of EPA process. (Percent)

| Regions	Reference Situation	EPA H1-2022	EPA H2-2022
ECOWAS	8.1	1.5	3.6
CEMAC+	13.5	3.8	6.4
COMESA	13.1	4.8	6.7
SADC	7.1	2.9	4.4
CARIFORUM	9.5	3.1	4.1
Pacific	12.0	12.0	11.9

Source: Authors' calculations based on MAcMapHS6-v2.
Reference group weighting scheme.

Table 5 – Trade consequences for ACP regions. Volume changes, (Percent) .
(Implementation of EPAs)

Regions	Exports to the EU (EPA-2022-H1)	Imports from the EU (EPA-2022-H1)	Imports from the EU (EPA-2022-H2)
All ACP	10.7	17.7	13.1
ECOWAS	4.0	15.1	10.3
CEMAC+	7.3	17.2	12.6
COMESA	25.5	20.7	16.0
SADC	6.6	10.6	6.6
CARIFORUM	25.2	27.1	22.5
Pacific	37.1	-0.2	1.0

Source: Simulation results.

Figure 4 – Distribution of ACP imports from EU by HS6 products in value.

Source: Simulation results.

Note: Only positive variations have been considered.

Table 6 – ACP changes in export values towards the EU, main HS6 products

Products	Gains in value (Mios of 2004 Euro)				
	15-25	25-50	50-100	100-150	>150
Raw sugar - 170111				Zimb. 145	Guyana 178.6 Fiji 180.6 Swaz. 397.6 Maur. 511
Bananas - 080300	Jam. 16.9	S. Lucia 25.1 Belize 36.9	Dom. Rep 59.2		C. d'Ivoire 245.9 Camer. 309.8
Rice brown - 100620		Surin. 26.4 Dom. Rep 35.9			Guyana 259.3
Rice, semi or wholly milled - 100630		Surin. 28			
Rice, broken- 100640		Guyana 36			
Tuna - 160414		Ghana 27.8 Maur. 28.1	C. d'Ivoire 54 Seych. 68.7		
Fish fillets, frozen - 030420		Namib. 28.2			
Bovine meat, fresh or chilled - 020130		Botsw. 29.5 Namib. 40.8			
Bovine meat, prepared - 160250		Zimb. 28.3			
Poultry, fresh or chilled - 020714		Nigeria 16.6			
Pineapples - 200820	Kenya 15.5				
Flowers - 060310		Kenya 47.7			
Tobacco - 240120		Zimb 41.1			
Olive oil - 151000		Ghana 16.4			
Corn flour - 110220		Ghana 18.8			
Cocoa butter - 180400	C. d'Ivoire 17				
Aluminium - 760110	Ghana 15	Camer. 23.1			
T-shirts -v610910				Maur. 108	
Men overcoats Knitted - 610110	Maur. 22.47				
Men shirts Knittedv- 610510	Maur. 16.06				
Men overcoats - 610910	Maur. 23.01				
Men shirts- 620520	Maur. 19.84				

Source: Simulations results.

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Table 7 – Tariff revenue losses under different scenarios

Regions	Losses in Value (Mios of 2004 Euro)				Losses in %			
	Direct Effect		Trade Diversion Effect		EPA-2022-H1		EPA-2022-H2	
	EPA-2022-H1	Full FTA	EPA-2022-H1	Full FTA	EU products	All origins	EU products	All origins
All ACP	1390	1970	467	569	-71	-25	-52	-19
ECOWAS	530	648	172	178	-82	-38	-57	-27
CEMAC+	246	345	27	32	-71	-41	-53	-30
COMESA	297	478	128	160	-62	-21	-47	-16
SADC	91	157	49	51	-58	-22	-37	-16
CARIFORUM	226	337	84	137	-67	-16	-58	-13
Pacific	0	5	7	11	-1	-9	-2	-9

Source: Simulations results.

Table 8 – Tariff revenue losses and fiscal dependence (selected countries)

Country	Share of Government income in GDP*	Share of Duties in Government income*	Forecast decline in collected duties***(%)	Value of forecast lossess** (Euro m.)	Share of forecast losses in GDP (%)**
Ghana	30.1	10.6	-29.7	70.4	1.0
Côte d'Ivoire	16.8	28.0	-43.9	55.3	0.4
Togo	14.2	19.2	-40.1	40.2	2.4
Burkina Faso	18.1	9.9	-41.5	16.2	0.4
Central African Rep.	10.1	14.5	-31.3	3.7	0.3
Congo	29.6	7.1	-31.8	46.1	1.3
RDC	7.2	27.8	-32.1	22.7	0.4
Ethiopia	16.7	33.2	-25.9	43.5	0.6
Kenya	21.1	9.3	-22.7	92.1	0.7
Mauritius	20.1	22.0	-23.4	70.2	1.4
Uganda	22.0	15.9	-17.2	7.2	0.1
Namibia	28.2	31.8	-11.2	9.3	0.2
Swaziland	26.8	47.3	-5.7	2.1	0.1
Barbados	35.4	9.8	-17.6	21.3	0.9
Dominican Rep.	16.4	12.6	-10.9	49.3	0.3
Jamaica	31.8	8.6	-7.5	14.1	0.2

*IMF,GFD database, **Simulation results.

Table 9 – Sensitivity of trade effects and tariff changes to elasticities, total ACP countries. (Percent)

	Base results*	$0.5\sigma_{Dii}$	$2\sigma_{Dii}$	$0.5\sigma_{Arm}$	$2\sigma_{Arm}$	$0.5\sigma_{WB}$	$2\sigma_{WB}$
Imports total	2.7	2.2	4.2	2.4	4.1	2.6	3.2
Imports from the EU	17.7	13.3	32.0	16.9	24.4	17.5	21.2
Exports to the EU	13.7	8.8	21.4	12.1	13.8	14.0	13.7
Tariff losses from the EU	-70.53	-70.56	-70.70	-70.35	-71.05	-70.52	-70.66

Source: Simulation results. *Base results correspond to EPA-2022-H1.

Table 10 – Sensitivity of trade effects to FTA within ACP regions

ACP regions	Import total Base results*	Import from the EU Base results*	Import total FTA only	Import from the EU FTA only
ALL ACP	1.0	7.9	-0.1	-0.1
ECOWAS	1.2	7.0	-0.2	-0.1
CEMAC+	2.6	7.8	0.0	0.0
COMESA	0.7	8.8	-0.1	-0.1
SADC	0.2	4.8	-0.3	-0.1
CARIFORUM	1.0	11.9	0.0	0.0
Pacific	-0.3	-0.2	-0.3	-0.8

Source: Simulation results. *Base results correspond to EPA-2015-H1.

APPENDIX

A.   Sectoral Aggregation

Table A.1 – Sectoral Aggregation

Macro Sector k	Sector ii	Sector i (GTAP)
	Livestocks and Animal Prod.	cmt - Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse
	Livestocks and Animal Prod.	ctl – Cattle.sheep.goats.horses
	Livestocks and Animal Prod.	mil – Dairy products
	Livestocks and Animal Prod.	oap – Animal products nec
	Vegetal Prod.	c-b – Sugar cane. sugar beet
	Vegetal Prod.	gro – Cereal grains nec
	Vegetal Prod.	ocr – Crops nec
	Vegetal Prod.	osd – Oil seeds
	Vegetal Prod.	pcr – Processed rice
AgriAgro = K1	Vegetal Prod.	pdr – Paddy rice
	Vegetal Prod.	pfb – Plant-based fibers
	Vegetal Prod.	sgr – Sugar
	Vegetal Prod.	v-f – Vegetables. fruit. nuts
	Vegetal Prod.	vol – Vegetable oils and fats
	Vegetal Prod.	wht – Wheat
	Vegetal Prod.	wol – Wool. silk-worm cocoons
	Other Agr. Food	b-t – Beverages and tobacco products
	Other Agr. Food	fsh – Fishing
	Other Agr. Food	ofd – Food products nec
	Primary	coa – Coal
	Primary	frs – Forestry
	Primary	gas – Gas
	Primary	nmm – Mineral products nec
	Primary	oil – Oil
	Primary	omn – Minerals nec
	Primary	p-c – Petroleum. coal products
	Elec. and Machinery	ele – Electronic equipment
	Elec. and Machinery	mvh – Motor vehicles and parts
	Elec. and Machinery	ome – Machinery and equipment nec
OtherInd = K2	Elec. and Machinery	omf – Manufactures nec
	Metallurgy	fmp – Metal products
	Metallurgy	i-s – Ferrous metals
	Metallurgy	lum – Wood products
	Metallurgy	nfm – Metals nec
	Other Industries	crp – Chemical.rubber.plastic prods
	Other Industries	omt – Meat products nec
	Other Industries	ppp – Paper products. publishing
	Textile	lea – Leather products
	Textile	tex – Textiles
	Textile	wap – Wearing apparel

B.   List of countries included in the study

Table B.2 – Six ACP groups

ECOWAS	CEMAC+	COMESA	SADC	CARIFORUM	Pacific
Benin*	Cameroon*	Burundi*	Angola*	Ant. and Barb.*	Cook islands
Burkina faso*	Centr. afr. rep.*	Comoros	Botswana*	Bahamas*	East timor
Cape verde	Chad*	Djibouti*	Lesotho*	Barbados*	Fiji
Côte d'Ivoire*	Congo*	Eritrea*	Mozambique*	Belize*	Kiribati
Gambia*	Congo (DR)*	Ethiopia*	Namibia*	Dominica*	Nauru
Ghana*	Eq. Guinea*	Kenya*	Swaz.*	Dominican rep.*	Palau
Guinea*	Gabon*	Madagascar*	Tanzania*	Grenada*	P.N. Guinea*
Guinea-bissau*	Sao Tome	Malawi*		Guyana*	Samoa
Liberia		Mauritius*		Haiti	Solomon isls*
Mali*		Rwanda*		Jamaica*	Tonga
Mauritania*		Seychelles*		S. kitts*	Vanuatu*
Niger*		Sudan*		Saint lucia*	
Nigeria*		Uganda*		Saint Vinc.*	
Senegal*		Zambia*		Suriname*	
Sierra leone*		Zimbabwe*		Trin. and Tob.*	
Togo*					

Countries included in the study are those with an *.

C.   Model Equations

C.1.   Demand tree

Regional income is assumed to be fixed.

$$Inc_s = Dem_s = \sum_k P^D_{k,s} Dem_{k,s} \tag{1}$$

Leontieff relation between the two main categories, $k1$ **for AgriAgro and** $k2$ **for OtherInd:** $Dem_{k,s}$. (First Stage)

$$Dem_{k,s} = a_{k,s} Dem_s \qquad (k = 1, 2) \tag{2}$$

CES to allocate the demand $Dem_{k,s}$ **within each main category** ($k1$ **and** $k2$) **to different broad sectors:** $Dem_{ii,s}$. (Second Stage)

$$Dem_{ii,s} = Dem_{k,s} a^D_{ii,s} \left(\frac{P^D_{k,s}}{P^D_{ii,s}} \right)^{\sigma_{Dii,s}} \tag{3}$$

CES to define the consumption between the GTAP sectors ($Dem_{i,s}$) ($\sigma_{DGtap,s}$). (Third Stage)

$$Dem_{i,s} = Dem_{ii,s} a^D_{i,s} \left(\frac{P^D_{ii,s}}{P^D_{i,s}} \right)^{\sigma_{DGtap,s}} \tag{4}$$

CES from Gtap to HS6 level. (Fourth Stage)

$$D_{hs6,s} = Dem_{i,s} a^D_{hs6,s} \left(\frac{P^D_{i,s}}{P^D_{hs6,s}} \right)^{\sigma_{Dhs6,s}} \tag{5}$$

Nested Armington. (Fifth Stage)
Differentiation between quality range

Regions with the same level of development

$$DU_{hs6,s} = a^U_{hs6,s} D_{hs6,s} \left(\frac{P^D_{hs6,s}}{P^{DU}_{hs6,s}} \right)^{\sigma_{GEO,s}} \tag{6}$$

Regions with different levels of development

$$DV_{hs6,s} = a^V_{hs6,s} D_{hs6,s} \Big(\frac{P^D_{hs6,s}}{P^{DV}_{hs6,s}} \Big)^{\sigma_{GEO,s}} \tag{7}$$

Same quality range: Differentiation between Import and Domestic demand

$$M_{hs6,s} = a^M_{hs6,s} DU_{hs6,s} \Big(\frac{P^{DU}_{hs6,s}}{P^M_{hs6,s}} \Big)^{\sigma_{ARM,s}} \tag{8}$$

$$M_{hs6,s,s} = a^{Dom}_{hs6,s} DU_{hs6,s} \Big(\frac{P^{DU}_{hs6,s}}{P^M_{hs6,s,s}} \Big)^{\sigma_{ARM,s}} \tag{9}$$

Same quality range: Differentiation between origins

$$M_{hs6,r,s} = a^M_{hs6,r,s} M_{hs6,s} \Big(\frac{P^D_{hs6,s}}{P^M_{hs6,r,s}} \Big)^{\sigma_{ImpU,s}} \tag{10}$$

Different quality range: Differentiation between origins

$$M_{hs6,r,s} = a^M_{hs6,r,s} DV_{hs6,s} \Big(\frac{P^{DV}_{hs6,s}}{P^M_{hs6,r,s}} \Big)^{\sigma_{ImpV,s}} \tag{11}$$

C.2.   Prices

$$P^M_{hs6,r,s} = P^{Cif}_{hs6,r,s} (1 + \tau^{Adv}_{hs6,r,s}) \tag{12}$$

$$P^M_{hs6,s} = \Big(\sum_{r \in U(s)} a^M_{hs6,r,s} P^M_{hs6,r,s}{}^{1-\sigma_{ImpU,s}} \Big)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{ImpU,s}}} \tag{13}$$

$$P^{DU}_{hs6,s} = (a^{Dom}_{hs6,s} P^M_{hs6,s,s}{}^{1-\sigma_{ARM,s}} + a^M_{hs6,s} P^M_{hs6,s}{}^{1-\sigma_{ARM,s}})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{ARM,s}}} \tag{14}$$

$$P_{hs6,s}^{DV} = \left(\sum_{r \in V(s)} a_{hs6,r,s}^{M} P_{hs6,r,s}^{M} {}^{1-\sigma_{ImpV,s}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{ImpV,s}}} \tag{15}$$

$$P_{hs6,s}^{D} = \left(a_{hs6,s}^{U} P_{hs6,s}^{DU} {}^{1-\sigma_{Geo,s}} + a_{hs6,s}^{V} P_{hs6,s}^{DV} {}^{1-\sigma_{Geo,s}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{Geo,s}}} \tag{16}$$

$$P_{i,s}^{D} = \left(\sum_{hs6} a_{hs6,s}^{D} P_{hs6,s}^{D} {}^{1-\sigma_{Dhs6,s}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{Dhs6,s}}} \tag{17}$$

$$P_{ii,s}^{D} = \left(\sum_{i} a_{i,s}^{Gtap} P_{i,s}^{D\,1-\sigma_{DGtap,s}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{DGtap,s}}} \tag{18}$$

$$P_{iii,s}^{D} = \left(\sum_{ii} a_{ii,s}^{D} P_{ii,s}^{D} {}^{1-\sigma_{Dii,s}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{Dii,s}}} \tag{19}$$

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