

An Improvement of the User Identification and Key Agreement Protocol with User Anonymity

Eun-Jun YOON¹, Kee-Young YOO²

¹*School of Computer Engineering, Kyungil University
33 Buho-Ri, Hayang-Ub, Kyungsan-Si, Kyungsangpuk-Do 712-701, Republic of Korea*

²*School of Computer Science and Engineering, College of IT Engineering
Kyungpook National University
1370 Sankyuk-dong, Buk-gu, Daegu 702-701, Republic of Korea
e-mail: ejyoon@kiu.ac.kr; yook@knu.ac.kr*

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Abstract. User anonymity is very important security technique in distributed computing environments that an illegal entity cannot determine any information concerning the user's identity. In 2006, Kumar–Rajendra proposed a Secure Identification and Key agreement protocol with user Anonymity (SIKA). This paper demonstrates the vulnerability of the SIKA protocol and then presents an improvement to repair the security flaws of the SIKA protocol.

Keywords: cryptography, identification, key agreement, anonymity, security, unlinkability.

1. Introduction

In distributed computing environments, it is necessary to maintain the user anonymity (Lee and Chang, 2000; Wu and Hsu, 2004; Yang *et al.*, 2004; Kumar and Rajendra, 2006; Gao *et al.*, 2009; Wang *et al.*, 2009; Wang and Hu, 2010; Liu and Huang, 2010; Sun *et al.*, 2010; Tseng and Wu, 2010; Xiong *et al.*, 2010; Ren *et al.*, 2010). That is, only the server can identify the user, while no other entity can determine any information concerning the user's identity. For example, a patient who has registered with the National Health Service (NHS) should be able to receive healthcare advice from any medical centre without disclosing their identity (Amico *et al.*, 2011; Garg *et al.*, 2011; Liang and Szeto, 2011). That is, when dealing with health sensitive information at times it is vital to protect the patient's identity and their health sensitive information from third parties (Weerasinghe *et al.*, 2008).

In 2000, Lee and Chang (2000) proposed a user identification protocol based on the security of the factoring problem (Rivest *et al.*, 1978; Schneier, 1995) and the one-way hash function (Schneier, 1995; Diffie and Hellman, 1976). In 2004, Wu and Hsu (Wu and Hsu, 2004), however, showed that Lee–Chang's user identification protocol is insecure under two attacks and proposed an improved protocol. Nevertheless, Yang *et al.* (2004) showed that Wu–Hsu's protocol has a serious weakness, by which the server can learn the

secret token of the user who requests services. To overcome the limitation, they further proposed a protocol to attain the same set of objectives as the previous works.

Thereafter, in 2006, Kumar and Rajendra (2006) showed that Yang *et al.*'s protocol is still vulnerable to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack and proposed a Secure Identification and Key agreement protocol with user Anonymity (SIKA). This paper, however, demonstrates the vulnerability of the SIKA protocol. Using our attacks, we will show the following three security flaws: (1) Impersonation attacks (Menezes *et al.*, 1997; Yoon and Yoo, 2010): a malicious user (including the server) can easily obtain a specific legal user's secret token and impersonate this specific user to request a service from the server and gain access privileges. In addition, a malicious user (including the legal user) can easily get the server's secret token and impersonate this server to exchange a common session key with a legal user (Yoon and Yoo, 2007). (2) Linkability (Menezes *et al.*, 1997; No-hara *et al.*, 2006): anyone can decide whether two transactions which were intercepted from the open channel in the SIKA protocol are of the same user or not by checking if an equation holds. (3) Identity guessing attack: by using the intercepted values from the open channel, anyone can easily get the user's identity after verifies if an equation holds. To repair the security flaws, we also present an improvement of the SIKA protocol.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the SIKA protocol. Section 3 shows the security flaws of the SIKA protocol. Section 4 presents an improvement of the SIKA protocol. Section 5 analyzes the security of our improved protocol. Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 6.

2. Review of the SIKA Protocol

This section reviews Kumar–Rajendra's SIKA protocol (Kumar and Rajendra, 2006). The SIKA protocol is composed of two phases: key generation and anonymous user identification.

2.1. Key Generation Phase

The key generation phase of the SIKA protocol, which is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this phase, the Smart Card Producing Center (SCPC) chooses

$$N = pq,$$

where p and q are two large prime numbers; selects two integers e and d such that

$$ed = 1 \pmod{\phi(N)},$$

where

$$\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1).$$




Fig. 1. Key generation phase of SIKA protocol.

SCPC chooses a generator g in the field Z_N ($g \in Z_N$), a hash function $H(m)$ on a message m , and a symmetric-key cryptosystem such as AES (Menezes *et al.*, 1997), where $E_K(m)$ and $D_K(m)$ represent encryption and decryption functions on a message m , respectively. The SCPC then publishes its public parameters e, N, g , and $H(\cdot)$ and retains d, p , and q as secret. Every user and server in the system first registers and then obtains a secret token P_i from SCPC through a secure channel. The P_i is calculated as

$$P_i = ID_i^d \pmod{N},$$

where ID_i is the identity of a user U_i or the server S_i . In addition to this, each of the servers sets up its own public and private parameters similar to SCPC. First it chooses

$$N_s = p_s q_s,$$

where p_s and q_s are two large prime numbers and then selects e_s and d_s such that

$$e_s d_s = 1 \pmod{\phi(N_s)},$$

where

$$\phi(N_s) = (p_s - 1)(q_s - 1).$$

It chooses a generator g_s in the field Z_{N_s} ($g_s \in Z_{N_s}$); retains $d_s, p_s,$ and q_s as secret; and publishes $ID_s, e_s, g_s,$ and N_s . The parameters with subscript 's' are specific to the server.

2.2. Anonymous User Identification Phase

The anonymous user identification phase of the SIKA protocol, which is illustrated in Fig. 2, is as follows:

1. U_i first submits a service request to S_s to request a service from the server S_s .
2. After receiving the request, S_s chooses a random number k and computes $z, v, u,$ and the digital signature w for z , where

$$\begin{aligned} z &= g^k P_s^{-1} \pmod{N}, \\ v &= ud_s, \\ u &= H(z, T_s, ID_s), \\ w &= g_s^v \pmod{N_s}, \end{aligned}$$

and T_s is the time stamp for z . Then, S_s sends (z, T_s, w) to U_i .




Fig. 2. Anonymous user identification phase of SIKA protocol.

3. U_i computes

$$u = H(z, T_s, ID_s),$$

and performs an integrity check on the received (z, T_s, w) as

$$w^{e_s} \bmod N_s = g_s^u \bmod N_s.$$

If successful, he/she then randomly chooses a number t , updates current time stamp T_s as T_u and computes a , K_{ij} , x , p , and y , where

$$\begin{aligned} a &= z^e ID_s \pmod{N}, \\ K_{ij} &= a^t \pmod{N}, \\ x &= g^{et} \pmod{N}, \\ p &= g^t P_i^{H(x, T_u)} \pmod{N}, \\ y &= E_{K_{ij}}(ID_i), \end{aligned}$$

and T_u is the timestamp for x . Then, U_i sends (x, p, y, T_u) to S_s . Note that K_{ij} is the common session key.

4. Finally, S_s first checks T_u . If it is old, S_s aborts the protocol. Otherwise, S_s obtains the common session key

$$K_{ij} = x^k \pmod{N}.$$

With K_{ij} , S_s proceeds to decrypt y as

$$ID_i = D_{K_{ij}}(y).$$

S_s then checks whether ID_i is on his/her maintained list. If ID_i is a legitimate user, S_s verifies the equality

$$x ID_i^{H(x, T_u)} \stackrel{?}{=} p^e \pmod{N}.$$

If the verification passes, then the service request is granted. Otherwise, the request is rejected.

The user and the server share common session key as

$$K_{ij} = a^t = x^k = g^{ekt} \pmod{N},$$

which can be used in the subsequent communications for confidentiality.

3. Vulnerability of SIKA Protocol

This section shows the security flaws of the SIKA protocol. In the protocol, an attacker can freely impersonate the users or the server. This happens because an attacker can obtain the secret token P_i (or P_s) of the user (or the server) after successful execution of the key generation phase. In addition, the protocol does not provide the unlinkability property and user anonymity because of the identity guessing attack.

3.1. Impersonation Attack to User U_i

Suppose user U_f is an attacker who knows the legal user U_i 's ID_i . Usually, because the legal user's ID_i does not require safety, an attacker can easily get the target user's ID_i by various attack methods, such as stolen-verifier attacks (Lin and Hwang, 2003) and server data eavesdropping (Yang *et al.*, 2003). For example, server S_s is always the target of an attacker, because numerous users' secrets are stored in their databases. The user ID table list stored in the server S_s can be eavesdropped and then used to impersonate the original user. By using the legal user U_i 's ID_i , in the key generation phase, U_f can register with SCPC as follows:

1. U_f obtains his/her identity ID_f by

$$ID_f = ID_i^{-1},$$

and submits ID_f as registration request to SCPC.

2. SCPC will compute the secret token P_f of U_f by

$$P_f = ID_f^d = ID_i^{-d} = P_i^{-1}(\text{mod } N),$$

and send P_f to U_f with a secure channel.

As a result, U_f can obtain the secret token P_i of the legal user U_i by computing

$$P_f^{-1} = P_i(\text{mod } N).$$

Then, by using the P_i , so obtained, U_f can freely impersonate U_i to request a service from S_s and thus gain access privilege.

3.2. Impersonation Attack to Server S_s

Suppose user U_f is an attacker who knows the the server S_s 's ID_s . Because each server S_s publishes his/her identity 's ID_s in the key generation phase, an attacker can easily get the target server S_s 's ID_s . Then, in the key generation phase, U_f can register with SCPC as follows:

1. U_f obtains his/her identity ID_f by

$$ID_f = ID_s^{-1},$$

and submits ID_f as registration request to SCPC.

2. SCPC will compute the secret token P_f of U_f by

$$P_f = ID_f^d = ID_s^{-d} = P_s^{-1}(\text{mod } N),$$

and send P_f to U_f with a secure channel.

As a result, U_f can obtain the secret token P_s of the server S_s by computing

$$P_f^{-1} = P_s(\text{mod } N).$$

Then, by using obtained P_s , U_f can impersonate S_s and exchange a common session key with legal user U_i .

3.3. Another Impersonation Attack

As another attack on the SIKA protocol, if a malicious U_i or S_s , who knows his/her P_i or P_s , computes his/her new identity ID_f by

$$ID_f = ID_i ID_s,$$

and resubmits ID_f as a registration request to SCPC. Then, SCPC will compute the secret token P_f of U_f by

$$P_f = ID_f^d = (ID_i ID_s)^d = P_i P_s(\text{mod } N),$$

and send P_f to U_f with a secure channel. Consequently, a malicious U_i can obtain the secret token P_i of the legal user U_i or P_s of the server S_s by computing

$$P_i = P_f P_s^{-1}(\text{mod } N),$$

or

$$P_s = P_f P_i^{-1}(\text{mod } N),$$

respectively.

3.4. Linkability Attack

Unlinkability (Menezes *et al.*, 1997; Nohara *et al.*, 2006) is a property which means an adversary cannot recognize whether outputs are from the same user, and this property is important with respect to the privacy problem in the anonymous user identification.

In the SIKA protocol, however, anyone can decide whether two transactions (x_1, p_1, y_1, T_{u1}) and (x_2, p_2, y_2, T_{u2}) are of the same user U_i or not by checking if the following equation holds:

$$\left((p_1)^e / x_1 \right)^{H(x_2, T_{u2})} \stackrel{?}{=} \left((p_2)^e / x_2 \right)^{H(x_1, T_{u1})} (\text{mod } N). \quad (1)$$

From (1), we know that the left side is as follows

$$\begin{aligned}
((p_1)^e / x_1)^{H(x_2, T_{u2})} &= ((g^{t_1} P_i^{H(x_1, T_{u1})})^e / x_1)^{H(x_2, T_{u2})} \\
&= ((g^{t_1} P_i^{H(x_1, T_{u1})})^e / g^{et_1})^{H(x_2, T_{u2})} \\
&= ((g^{t_1 e} P_i^{H(x_1, T_{u1})})^e / g^{et_1})^{H(x_2, T_{u2})} \\
&= P_i^{H(x_1, T_{u1})eH(x_2, T_{u2})} \pmod{N}.
\end{aligned}$$

From (1), we know that the right side is as follows

$$\begin{aligned}
((p_2)^e / x_2)^{H(x_1, T_{u1})} &= ((g^{t_2} P_i^{H(x_2, T_{u2})})^e / x_2)^{H(x_1, T_{u1})} \\
&= ((g^{t_2} P_i^{H(x_2, T_{u2})})^e / g^{et_2})^{H(x_1, T_{u1})} \\
&= ((g^{t_2 e} P_i^{H(x_2, T_{u2})})^e / g^{et_2})^{H(x_1, T_{u1})} \\
&= P_i^{H(x_2, T_{u2})eH(x_1, T_{u1})} \pmod{N}.
\end{aligned}$$

The above linkability security problem in the SIKA protocol happens because anyone can easily check whether the intercepted two transactions are from the same user or not. Therefore, the SIKA protocol does not provide the unlinkability property.

3.5. Identity Guessing Attack

The SIKA protocol fails to achieve user anonymity. First, any adversary, from the eaves-dropped the message (x, p, T_u, e) , can verify his/her guess (the user identity) by iteratively picking one identity's ID_i^* from its database and checking whether the ID_i satisfies the equation

$$x ID_i^*{}^{H(x, T_u)} \stackrel{?}{=} p^e \pmod{N}$$

holds. If it can find a match, then the identity ID_i^* is the client's identity ID_i . So, the SIKA protocol fails to commit user anonymity property. Please notice that the adversary enumerates all possible identities, and just iteratively picks up a possible one and then verifies his guess. This is a well known attack scenario of attacking low-entropy password (password guessing attack), and please notice that the entropy of identity is even lower than that of password, since identity is usually more structural than password. Therefore, it is computationally feasible to enumerate all the possible candidates of identity and verify each possible candidate.

4. Countermeasures

This section presents a modification of the SIKA protocol to correct the security flaws described in Section 3. The proposed key generation phase and anonymous user identification phase are illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively.




Fig. 3. Proposed key generation phase.

To prevent the above impersonation attacks, the proposed protocol employs the concept of hiding identity. We only modify the key generation phase which issues a “hashed” identity for every legal user and server. That is, in the key generation phase, the smart card producing center (SCPC) sends a secret token

$$P_i = HID_i^d \pmod{N}$$

to each user U_i (or server S_i) with a secure channel, where

$$HID_i = (HID_i).$$

The steps of the anonymous user identification phase are mostly similar except that ID_i is replaced by “hashed” identity HID_i in Step (3) and (4), respectively.

To provide unlinkability property and withstand the identity guessing attack in the proposed anonymous user identification phase, we include

$$p = g^t P_i^{H(x, T_u)} \pmod{N},$$




Fig. 4. Proposed anonymous user identification phase.

in the encrypted value y when he/she computes the encrypted value

$$y = E_{K_{ij}}(ID_i || p),$$

by using the session key K_{ij} . Then, the server S_s verifies the equality

$$xID_i^{H(x, T_u)} \stackrel{?}{=} p^e \pmod{N},$$

after decrypts y as

$$ID_i || p = D_{K_{ij}}(y).$$

If the verification passes, then the service request is granted. Otherwise, the request is rejected.

5. Provable Security Analysis

This section provides the enhanced security feature and the provable security analysis (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995; Bellare *et al.*, 2000; Chien, 2008) of the proposed SIKa protocol.

5.1. Enhanced Security Features

DEFINITION 1. One-way hash function assumption (Schneier, 1995; Diffie and Hellman, 1976; Menezes *et al.*, 1997): Let $H(\cdot)$ be an one-way cryptographic hash function, (1) given y , it is computationally intractable to find x such that $y = H(x)$; (2) it is computationally intractable to find $x_1 \neq x_2$ such that $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$.

Theorem 1. *In the proposed key generation phase, an illegal user cannot get the legal user or server's secret token P_i .*

Proof. The attacks on the SIKA protocol works because a malicious user can successfully register a new ID_f via ID_i or ID_s in the key generation phase. In our improved key generation phase, since the formats of

$$HID_f^d = H(ID_i^{-1})^d(\text{mod } N),$$

and

$$H(ID_i ID_s)^d(\text{mod } N)$$

are not equal to

$$ID_f^d = ID_i^{-d}(\text{mod } N),$$

and

$$P_i P_s(\text{mod } N),$$

respectively, a malicious user cannot get the legal user or server's secret token P_i or P_s . Therefore, the proposed protocol can correct the security flaws described in Section 3.

Theorem 2. *The proposed anonymous user identification phase provides unlinkability property and withstands the identity guessing attack.*

Proof. To provide unlinkability property and withstand the identity guessing attack, we include the verification value

$$p = g^t P_i^{H(x, T_u)}(\text{mod } N)$$

into the encrypted value

$$y = K_{ij}(ID_i || p),$$

when he/she computes the encrypted value y by using the session key K_{ij} . Because the verification value p which sent by user U_i in the proposed anonymous user identification

phase is protected by the session key K_{ij} , without knowing the value p , no one can decide whether two transactions (x_1, y_1, T_{u1}) and (x_2, y_2, T_{u2}) are of the same user U_i or not by checking if the following equation holds:

$$\left(\frac{p_1}{x_1}\right)^{H(x_2, T_{u2})} \stackrel{?}{=} \left(\frac{p_2}{x_2}\right)^{H(x_1, T_{u1})}.$$

That is, a malicious user cannot compute

$$\left(\frac{p_1}{x_1}\right)^{H(x_2, T_{u2})},$$

or

$$\left(\frac{p_2}{x_2}\right)^{H(x_1, T_{u1})},$$

because he/she does not know the verification values p_1 and p_2 . To obtain $ID_i||p$, the attacker must decrypt

$$y = K_{ij}(ID_i||p).$$

However, it is impossible because there is no way to obtain $ID_i||p$ without knowing the shared common session key

$$K_{ij} = g^{ekt} \pmod{N}$$

between the user U_i and the server S_s . Therefore, the proposed protocol provides unlinkability property and withstands the identity guessing attack.

5.2. Formal Proofs

This subsection first defines some hard problems and then proves the security of the improved SIKA protocol.

5.2.1. Some Hard Problems

We define the security terms (Chien, 2008) needed for security analysis of the improved SIKA protocol as follows:

DEFINITION 2. Factorization (FAC) Problem: Let $N = pq$ and $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$, where p and q are randomly safe primes. Given $y \in Z_N$, it is computationally intractable to derive x such that $y = x^e \pmod{N}$ with the knowledge of e and N .

DEFINITION 3. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Let $N = pq$ and g be a primitive root for both Z_p^* and Z_q^* , where p and q are randomly safe primes. Given $y = g^x \pmod{N}$, it is computationally intractable to derive x .

DEFINITION 4. *Computational Diffie–Hellman Problem (CDHP)*: Let $N = pq$ and g be a primitive root for both Z_p^* and Z_q^* , where p and q are randomly safe primes. Given $X = g^x \bmod N$ and $Y = g^y \bmod N$, it is computationally intractable to derive $g^{xy} \bmod N$.

DEFINITION 5. *Decisional Diffie–Hellman Problem (DDHP)*: Let $N = pq$ and g be a primitive root for both Z_p^* and Z_q^* , where p and q are randomly safe primes. Given $X = g^x \bmod N$, $Y = g^y \bmod N$ and $Z = g^z \bmod N$, it is computationally difficult to decide whether $Z = g^{xy} \bmod N$.

It is commonly believed that there is no polynomial-time algorithm to solve FAC, DLP, CDHP or DDHP with non-negligible probability.

5.2.2. Security Proofs

5.2.2.1. *Formal Security Model*. The security of the improved SIKA protocol concerns both the privacy of the authenticated session key and the privacy of the identities of the communicating parties. The proposed formal proof method is based on Bellare *et al.*'s (2000), Bellare and Rogaway (1995), and Chien's (2008) proof methods (Chien *et al.*, 2008).

In all models of BR95 (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995) and BPR2000 (Bellare *et al.*, 2000), the adversary AD is a probabilistic machine that fully controls the communications that take place between parties. However, because the identities are kept secret in the improved SIKA protocol, an adversary AD can only partially control the communications now. Therefore, AD cannot control the partner of an oracle.

In the model, the adversary AD is a probabilistic machine that partially controls the communications that take place between parties by interacting with a set of $\Pi_{U_1,*}^i$ (U_1 could be a client $\Pi_{C_1,*}^i$, or a server $\Pi_{P_1,*}^i$) oracles, because it does not know the identities of communicating parties and the matching sessions. $\Pi_{U_1,*}^i$ is defined to be the i th instantiation of an entity U_1 in a specific run. If U_1 is a registered client, then it knows the identity of its partner (through the IP address or the MAC address of the server); but if U_1 is a server, then it does not know its partner (the client) so far. We let the challenger (or the simulator) randomly determines the matching among the instantiated oracles, and keeps it secret from the adversary. The pre-defined oracle queries are described informally as follows.

1. *Hash query*: The challenger (or the simulator) answers H queries at random, just like real oracles would.
2. *Send* ($U_{1,*}, i, m$): Upon receiving the query, the oracle will compute what the protocol specification demands and return to AD the response message and/or decision. If $\Pi_{U_1,*}^i$ has either accepted with some session key or terminated, this will be made known to AD. If m has the form of λ and U_1 is a client, it initiates U_1 oracle and sends the request to its partner.
3. *Reveal* ($U_{1,*}, i$): This query allows AD to expose an old session key and its partner's identity if $\Pi_{U_1,*}^i$ has accepted; otherwise, it returns \perp .

4. *Corrupt* (U_1): This query allows AD to corrupt the entity U_1 at will, and thereby learns the complete internal state of the entity.
5. *Test* ($U_{1,*}, i$): If $\Pi_{U_{1,*}}^i$ has accepted with some session key and is being asked a *Test* ($U_{1,*}, i$), then depending on a random bit b , AD is given either the actual session key or a session key drawn randomly from the session key distribution.

The definition of security depends on the notations of partnership/freshness of oracles. In the model, partnership of oracles is defined using *sids* (session identifiers). The definition of partnership is used in the definition of security to restrict the adversary's *Reveal* and *Corrupt* queries to oracles that are partners of the oracles whose session key the adversary is trying to guess. Note that, after an oracle has accepted, it knows the identities of its partners. The notation of freshness of the oracle is used to restrict to whom the *Test* query is sent.

DEFINITION 6. *Partnership*: Two oracles $\Pi_{U_{1,*}}^i$ and $\Pi_{U_{2,*}}^i$ are partners if and only if the oracles have accepted the same session key with the same *sid*, have agreed on the same set of entities, and no other oracles besides $\Pi_{U_{1,*}}^i$ and $\Pi_{U_{2,*}}^i$ have accepted with the same *sid*. Or, we say that the two oracles are matched if they have matching conversions with the same *sid*.

DEFINITION 7. *Freshness*: $\Pi_{U_{1,*}}^i$ is fresh (or it holds a fresh session key) at the end of execution, if and only if, oracle $\Pi_{U_{1,*}}^i$ has accepted with some partner oracle $\Pi_{U_{2,*}}^i$, all the oracles $\Pi_{U_{1,*}}^i$ and $\Pi_{U_{2,*}}^i$ have not been sent a *Reveal* query, and U_1 and U_2 have not been sent a *Corrupt* query.

Security in the model is defined using the game G , played between the adversary AD and a collections of $\Pi_{U_x,*}^i$ oracles for players $U_x \in \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{N_C}\}$ or $P_x \in \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_{N_P}\}$ and instances $i \in \{1, \dots, N_S\}$, where C_i denotes a client oracle, P_i denotes a server oracle, N_S denotes the numbers of instances per oracle, and N_C/N_P , respectively, denotes the number of clients/servers. The adversary AD runs the game simulation G with setting as follows (we let the simulation G randomly determines the matching relationship among oracles, keeps it consistent through the simulation and keeps it secret from AD).

- Stage 1: AD is able to send *Hash*, *Send*, *Reveal*, and *Corrupt* queries in the simulation.
- Stage 2: At some point during G , AD will choose a fresh session and send a *Test* query to the fresh oracle associated with the test session. Depending on the randomly chosen bit b , AD is given either the actual session key or a session key drawn from the session key distribution.
- Stage 3: AD continues making *Hash*, *Send*, *Reveal* and *Corrupt* oracle queries to its choice.
- Stage 4: Eventually, AD terminates the game simulation and outputs its guess bit b' .

Success of AD in G is measured in terms of AD's advantage in distinguishing whether AD receives the real key or a random value. Let the advantage function of AD be denoted by $\text{Adv}_{\text{SICA}}^{\text{AD}}(k)$, where k is the security parameter and $\text{Adv}_{\text{SICA}}^{\text{AD}}(k) = 2\Pr[b = b'] - 1$.

5.2.2.2. *Indistinguishability of the Session Key.* The indistinguishability property based on Chien's model (2008) is adopted to proof the privacy of the session key.

DEFINITION 8. *Secure two-party key agreement protocol:* A two-party key agreement protocol is secure in our model if the following requirements are satisfied:

Validity: When the protocol is run among two oracles (a client and a server) in the absence of an active adversary, the oracles accept the same key.

Indistinguishability: For all probabilistic, polynomial-time adversaries AD , $\text{Adv}_{\text{SIKA}}^{\text{AD}}(k)$ is negligible.

Theorem 3. *The improved SIKA protocol is secure in the sense of Definition 8 if the FAC problem and the CDHP problem are hard.*

Proof. Due to space limitations, we omit the proof, as it is almost identical to the Chien's (2008) proof method (see Proof 1 of Appendix). Readers are referred to Chien (2008) for more complete references.

5.2.2.3. *Privacy of User's Identity.* The improved SIKA protocol achieves entities anonymity in the sense that an unregistered client cannot learn the identity of the server and any entity who is not a partner of a fresh session cannot learn the identity of the client.

DEFINITION 9. We say that a two-party key agreement protocol satisfies the entities anonymity (e.g., the client's identity is protected from the outsiders, but the anonymity of the server is only protected from unregistered entities) if no probability polynomial-time (PPT) distinguisher has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.

Game 1: The challenger sets the system parameters, and determines the private key/public key pair for each $U_i \in \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{N_C}\}$ or $P_i \in \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_{N_P}\}$. It hands the public parameters to the distinguisher D .

Game 2: D adaptively queries the oracles as defined above.

Game 3: Once Stage 2 is over, the challenger randomly chooses $b_1 \in \{1, \dots, N_C\}$ and $b_2 \in \{1, \dots, N_P\}$. The challenger lets C_{b_1} and P_{b_2} be two entities running a matching session, faithfully follows the protocol specification to generate the communication transcripts $trans^*$ between the two oracles. It finally hands $trans^*$ to D .

Game 4: D adaptively queries the oracles as in Stage 2 with the restriction that, this time, it is disallowed to send *Reveal* queries to the two target oracles in Stage 3.

Game 5: At the end of the game, D outputs its guess in the following two cases:

Case 1: If D is a registered client (it knows the MAC addresses of the servers), it outputs $\bar{b}_1 \in \{1, \dots, N_C\}$ and wins if $\bar{b}_1 = b_1$. Its advantage is defined to be

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{client-server}}^{\text{client,anonymity}}(D) := \Pr[\bar{b}_1 = b_1] - 1/N_C.$$

Case 2: If D is not a registered client (it does not know the MAC addresses of the servers), it outputs $\bar{b}_1 \in \{1, \dots, N_C\}$ and $\bar{b}_2 \in \{1, \dots, N_P\}$, and wins if $\bar{b}_1 = b_1$ or $\bar{b}_2 = b_2$. Its advantage is defined to be

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{client-server}}^{\text{both, anonymity}}(D) := \Pr[\bar{b}_1 = b' \text{ or } \bar{b}_2 = b_2] - 1/N_C - 1/N_P.$$

Theorem 4. *The improved SIKA protocol satisfies the anonymity property in the sense of Definition 9 if the improved SIKA protocol is secure in the sense of Definition 8.*

Proof. Due to space limitations, we omit the proof, as it is almost identical to the Chien's (2008) proof method (see Proof 2 of Appendix). Readers are referred to Chien (2008) for more complete references.

6. Conclusion

This paper demonstrated the security flaws of the SIKA protocol. Using our attacks, we have shown that a malicious user (including a server) can easily get a specific legal user's secret token and impersonate this specific user to request a service from the server and gain access privileges. Additionally, we have shown that a malicious user (including the legal user) can easily get the server's secret token and impersonate this server to exchange a common session key with a legal user. Finally, we have shown the SIKA protocol does not provide the unlinkability property and user anonymity because of the identity guessing attack. For the above attacks, we presented an improvement to repair the security flaws of the SIKA protocol.

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E.-J. Yoon received his MSc degree in computer engineering from Kyungil University in 2002 and the PhD degree in computer science from Kyungpook National University in 2006, Republic of Korea. From 2007 to 2008, he was a full-time lecturer at Faculty of Computer Information, Daegu Polytechnic College, Republic of Korea. He is currently a 2nd BK21 contract professor at the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Kyungpook National University, Republic of Korea. His current research interests are cryptography, authentication technologies, smart card security, network security, mobile communications security, and steganography. He has published over a hundred technical and scientific international journals on a variety of information security topics.

K.-Y. Yoo received his BSc degree in education of mathematics from Kyungpook National University in 1976 and the MSc degree in computer engineering from Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in 1978, Republic of Korea. He received the PhD degree in computer science from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1992, New York, USA. Currently, he is a professor at the School of Computer Science and Engineering, Kyungpook National University, Republic of Korea. His current research interests are cryptography, authentication technologies, smart card security, network security, DRM security, and steganography. He has published over a hundred technical and scientific international journals on a variety of information security topics.

Anoniminio vartotojo identifikavimo ir raktų paskirstymo protokolo pagerinimas

Eun-Jun YOON, Kee-Young YOO

Vartotojo anonimiškumas paskirstytų skaičiavimų aplinkose yra labai svarbi informacijos apsaugos metodų sąlyga, kuri užtikrina, kad piktavališkas asmuo negalėtų gauti jokios informacijos apie vartotoją. 2006 m. Kumar–Rajendra pasiūlė saugų identifikavimo ir raktų paskirstymo protokolą (SIKA), kuris garantuoja vartotojo anonimiškumą. Šiame straipsnyje parodyta SIKA protokolo pažeidžiamumas bei pasiūlytas šio protokolo pagerinimo būdas.