

# ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER

The dilemma of liberal democracy in  
the history of the market



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# CONTENTS

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<i>Preface</i>	vii
<i>Table of Cases</i>	ix
<i>Table of Legislation</i>	xiii
Antitrust: Introduction	I
On the surface—the technical profiles	I
In the foundations: the dilemma of liberal democracy	2
Part I Technical Profiles: the USA	
1. Protection of competition or of freedom of contract?	7
From the common law to the Sherman Act	7
Early years of the Sherman Act	10
Prohibitions to protect market pluralism increase	14
2. Today's Subtle Weapons	20
The Chicago School	20
Evolution in the Supreme Court	24
Trends in recent cases	27
The present position in summary	33
Part II Technical Profiles: Europe	
3. The Heritage of History	39
Europe's industrial culture	39
The Freiburger Ordoliberalen School	40
Early development of antitrust law	41
Antitrust in the European Community	43

4. "Restrictive" Agreements	46
The normative machinery	46
Vertical agreements	47
Horizontal agreements	54
5. Abuse of a Dominant Position	65
"Special responsibility"	65
Assessment of "dominant position"	67
Abuse as an "objective concept"	69
Individual types of abuse	72
In conclusion	76
6. Prohibitions of Dominant Position	78
Mergers: the ban and its limits	78
Antitrust against public monopolies	88
Part III Antitrust and the Bounds of Power	
7. Drawing together the threads	95
Original aims and later evolution	95
In the USA	96
In Europe	98
The limits to antitrust law	100
Facing concentrated, competitive firms	102
Changing markets—what remains?	105
8. The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy	109
The dilemma of liberal democracy within the dilemma of efficiency	109
Towards autonomy of European antitrust from other common policies	113
The global market and tomorrow's antitrust	124
<i>Index</i>	130