

# Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride

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*One view in the study of intergroup conflict is that pride implies prejudice. However, an increasing number of scholars have come to view in-group pride more benignly, suggesting that such pride can be accompanied by a full range of feelings toward the out-group. In this article, we focus on a substantively interesting case of in-group/out-group attitudes—national pride and hostility toward immigrants. We explore the relationship in two fundamental ways: first by examining the prejudice associated with various dimensions of pride, and second by embedding these relationships in a comprehensive model of prejudice. We find that national pride is most validly measured with two dimensions—patriotism and nationalism—two dimensions that have very different relationships with prejudice. While nationalists have a strong predilection for hostility toward immigrants, patriots show no more prejudice than does the average citizen.*

Does pride imply prejudice? A long record of ethnic and national conflict suggests that it does. Consistent with this evidence is a tradition of research on group conflict which suggests that group pride—whether it be ethnic, national, or gender based—is the positive half of prejudice (Sumner 1906; Adorno et al. 1950). On the other side is a growing number of scholars who point out that a strong group identity can be an empowering, affirming mechanism in the face of discrimination and chauvinism (Allport 1954; Anderson 1991). The debate may be most poignant in tragic cases of violent ethnic and national conflicts. However, even in multiethnic states that are not war-torn, the question of group pride's vices divides politicians and intellectuals alike. In these societies, the division surfaces in discussions over the merits of "multiculturalism," with one side celebrating group differences and the other arguing that they be deemphasized. Both sides, ironically, are often united by their expressed distaste for ethnocentrism. Their disagreement turns on whether group pride—or *particularism*, more generally—is the solution to ethnocentrism, or its very embodiment. In order to settle this dispute, it seems natural to appeal to social psychology—a field of

study devoted to understanding intergroup attitudes and behavior. Unfortunately, social psychologists also disagree about the chauvinistic inclinations of group pride. To clarify matters, we analyze evidence from a substantively interesting case of in-group/out-group attitudes—*national pride and hostility toward immigrants*. Our intention is to develop a reliable understanding of whether, how, and when pride overlaps with prejudice.

There are two central thrusts to our approach, each of which is intended to remove a source of confusion surrounding the relationship between pride and prejudice. The first focuses on the proposition that the confusion derives from multiple understandings of group pride. As we describe below, a reconsideration of the components of group pride reveals at least two dimensions—each of which has conceivably different implications for feelings toward relevant out-groups. Our solution is to identify such multidimensionality and to evaluate the relationship between prejudice and each of the dimensions of group pride. The second thrust of the analysis incorporates our belief that other emotions, attitudes, or conditions might interfere with the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes. These variables can confound our

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understanding of pride and prejudice in two ways—either by their direct effect on one of the two emotions, or by their effect on the *relationship* between the two emotions. We therefore consider the relationship between pride and prejudice after compensating for the direct and moderating effects of other attitudes and conditions.

Our focus is on one particular kind of in-group/out-group relationship: attitudes toward one's nation and attitudes toward immigrants to that nation. The choice of these target groups is useful for both analytic and substantive reasons. Analytically, it is important that we have identified two groups which are reciprocally related, in that each is defined in terms of the other. This condition is necessary in order to assure that we know the direction, and therefore can measure, any prejudice emanating from in-group pride. In this sense, the choice of *ethnic* pride would be problematic since the multitude of ethnic groups makes it difficult to identify two reciprocal targets. In our case, however, the connection between groups is direct: the reference group for natives is clearly non-natives.

Substantively, the connection between national pride and xenophobia—the term we use to summarize hostility toward immigrants—is of profound interest. A suspicion that one breeds the other has long prompted dark warnings about national pride. Diderot considered such feelings for the nation-state immoral, Voltaire identified their constituent parts as self-love and prejudice, and Lessing regarded esteem for the nation as a “heroical weakness” in an individual, a sentiment reminiscent of Samuel Johnson's well-known epigram, “patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel” (Stewart 1917). These pronouncements tend to surface after major wars and large-scale national conflicts (Stewart 1917; Adorno et al. 1950), and the unabated ethnic and nationalist conflict of recent years has generated a lively contemporary debate on the topic. On one side is the view, articulated elegantly by Walzer (1980), that love of country and tolerance hang in a careful balance and that the increase of the former comes at the expense of the latter. On the other side are those such as Anderson (1991) and MacIntyre (1984) who maintain that national pride is not at all rooted in a hatred of the outsider.

We conclude that this disagreement stems from a highly generalized understanding of national pride. We find that there are two strongly correlated dimensions of pride which are just as strongly divergent in their relationship with prejudice. In this sense, our findings accord with a persuasive essay on the theory of national pride by Viroli (1995). Viroli insists that “love of country can be generous, compassionate, and intelligent, but it can also be exclusive, deaf, and blind” (1995, 6). Indeed, these two versions of national pride—*patriotism* and *nationalism*—are easy to identify and distinguish. Theorists like Viroli

have long been arguing for just such a differentiation. We agree, and show clearly why it is important that they be distinguished. While nationalists are more ethnocentric than the average citizen, patriots are not necessarily so.

## Previous Theory and Evidence

### Pride Implies Prejudice<sup>1</sup>

One of the fundamental tenets in social science is that comparisons to another are central to personal identity. Festinger's (1954) theory of social comparison and Merton's (1968) work on reference groups are prominent statements of this doctrine. The intuition underpins much of the scholarly work on inter-group conflict. Brewer (1999) in her survey of the evidence concludes that the “prevailing approach to the study of ethnocentrism, in-group bias, and prejudice, presumes that in-group love and out-group hate are reciprocally related.”<sup>2</sup> Early structural accounts assumed a competitive battle over scarce resources in which the out-group's loss was the in-group's gain. For example, Sumner's classic formulation of the concept of ethnocentrism explicitly fuses attitudes toward the two target groups into a sentiment which includes “loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without” (Sumner 1906). This contention seemed to be clearly demonstrated at Sherif's famous summer camp *cum* laboratory. By pitting the Bull Dogs against the Red Devils in a series of competitive events, Sherif produced both in-group pride *and* out-group aggression in the campers (Sherif 1966).

In their monumental study of the origins of fascism, Adorno et al. (1950) incorporated even more formally the same belief in the unity of in-group pride and out-group derogation. The Adorno group developed an influential measure of ethnocentrism (the E-scale) which included an entire dimension labeled “patriotism.” To be sure, Levinson (who wrote the measurement chapters) was quick to clarify that by “patriotism” they meant not merely “love of country” but “blind attachment” (Adorno et al. 1950, 107). However, that these authors—as careful

<sup>1</sup>Following more modern conceptualizations of *prejudice*, we employ a general definition of the term which does not require derogatory attitude or opinion to be incorrect in order to be prejudicial. Prejudice, for us, is “the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behavior towards members of a group on account of their membership in that group” (Brown 1995). Consequently, we use the terms “prejudice,” “ethnocentrism,” “out-group hostility,” “bigotry,” and the more targeted “xenophobic” and “jingoistic” interchangeably throughout.

<sup>2</sup>Brown's (1986) filigreed treatment of group processes (especially Chapter 15) reviews the literature from this perspective.

and comprehensive as they were about conceptualization and measurement—would combine elements of in-group favoritism in a measure of out-group hostility is noteworthy. Indeed, the unity of national pride and ethnocentrism could not be more explicitly or classically stated.

Finally, the influential social identity theorists, starting with Tajfel (1978, 1982) and his students (Turner 1981), seem to imply this connection as well.<sup>3</sup> In a series of arresting experiments, these scholars went beyond structural arguments by showing that classification alone—let alone group competition—could produce fierce in-group loyalty. A typical experiment would assign subjects to groups based on purported differences in performance on certain tests (e.g., an expressed preference for Klee's vs. Kandinsky's art, or the tendency to over- or undercount a set of dots). Of course, in reality, the experimenters would divide subjects randomly. Nevertheless, given the opportunity to pass judgment or distribute rewards, subjects were quick to demonstrate favoritism toward members of their own "group" at the expense of the other. While these experiments have never produced actual intergroup hostility, the implication was clear. For many, the step from the in-group favoritism shown in the laboratory to out-group hostility and aggression in the real world is a short, necessary, and sufficient one.<sup>4</sup>

### Pride Does Not Imply Prejudice

Allport (1954), a popular starting point for work on prejudice, maintains that in-group loyalty is unrelated to out-group hostility. His argument is grounded on the idea that attitudes to the in-group are "psychologically primary" (Allport 1954, 42). He allows that hostility toward the other—or at least the recognition of a common enemy—can increase in-group *cohesion*, but claims that hostility does not necessarily follow from in-group favoritism. Indeed, he suggests that in-group favoritism can be accompanied by a full range of feelings toward the outsider (everything from hatred to tolerance to full appreciation). In Allport's model, outsiders are not always outsiders. He imagines a series of concentric loyalties in which an individual may be considered an outsider at the micro level (say, the family) but an insider at a larger level (say, the village). While Allport intends his theory to apply to a range of groups, some of his most important examples emphasize the compatibility of patriotism and "world-loyalty" (Allport 1954, 44).

<sup>3</sup>Turner has continued this tradition of theory under the name "self-categorization theory," an extension and redefinition of social identity theory (see Turner 1981 for a description of the evolution of the theory).

<sup>4</sup>This is despite Tajfel's (1982) warning against extending Social Identity Theory in this way.

A burgeoning literature dedicated to reproducing cases of in-group and out-group harmony has sprung from Allport's hopeful conviction. By manipulating conditions of contact and cooperation, scholars have shown that individuals can very quickly "re-categorize" erstwhile out-groups into in-groups. Sherif (1966), for example, manufactured harmony between the Red Devils and the Bull Dogs by disabling a school bus carrying the two groups and then combining their efforts to push the vehicle to a "miraculous" running start. Collaboration, in that case, attenuated intergroup hostility. Perhaps Gaertner, Dovidio, and their colleagues have gone the farthest in formalizing these sorts of processes in their "Common In-group Identity Model" (Gaertner et al. 1993). In over ten years of experimentation, Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) show that activating superordinate identities—whether triggered by contact, cooperation, common fate, or interdependence—does indeed reduce intergroup hostility. In other words, the theoretical apparatus behind Allport's claim of independence of in-group and out-group attitudes appears sound.<sup>5</sup>

Even the Tajfel minimal-group experiments do not support the unity of in-group love and out-group hate. Although these experiments offer a consistent and remarkably vivid demonstration of group favoritism, in not one of these studies is such favoritism accompanied by actual hostility or even dislike of the out-group.<sup>6</sup> Subjects liked members of their group better, even preferring to maximize relative differences over absolute gains, but they did not actively dislike the other (see Mummendey et al. 1992 for an explicit illustration of this).

Outside the laboratory, there is some evidence—albeit inconclusive—that individuals can hold equally positive (or negative) attitudes toward both in-groups and out-groups. For example, in a study of 30 ethnic groups in East Africa, Brewer and Campbell (1976) found that individuals who showed favoritism toward their own ethnic group were not especially hostile toward the other. Others have found this same nonrelationship (e.g., Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 1999; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Feshbach 1994; Sniderman et al. 2000).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup>There is, of course, another interpretation of these findings: that in-group pride and out-group prejudice are still inextricably linked with the only difference that the experimenter has managed to manipulate the lines of identity such that neither in-group nor out-group identities are as they were. As such, a finding that in-group love and out-group hate do not go hand in hand may be a result of a failure to identify the relevant lines of identity.

<sup>6</sup>Turner (1975), Brewer (1978), and finally Tajfel (1982) all stress in their conclusions that intergroup bias in these experiments takes the form of in-group enhancement, *not* out-group derogation.

<sup>7</sup>Sniderman et al. (2000) conclude their recent book with a discussion of this phenomena suggesting that a consistently negative

## Pride Implies Prejudice Only Under Some Conditions

Scholars may resist the previous classification, preferring an interpretation of the relationship between pride and prejudice as one complicated by other psychological and ecological influences. Indeed, it is plausible that the relationship depends upon the kinds of groups in question, their environment, or any number of the individual's characteristics. This sort of thinking is very much evident in the research on prejudice by the influential *social dominance* theorists (e.g., Sidanius et al. 1997; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). These scholars—drawing on authoritarian personality theories, Marxist class analysis, and social identity theory—emphasize that high status groups within society are significantly more likely to take hierarchy-enhancing positions than are lower status groups. An implication of their theory is that the association between expressions of pride and those of prejudice will increase with group status precisely because higher status groups feel a greater sense of “ownership” of the national identity. Of course, the social dominance perspective is not alone in emphasizing such moderating effects. Surveying the accumulated wisdom on group dynamics leads us to suspect other conditions that might confound the direct relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes. In particular, we may expect that situations of realistic conflict among groups (e.g., Campbell 1965; Bobo and Kluegel 1993), a record of personal frustration (e.g., Dollard et al. 1939), or certain personality traits (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950), might moderate this relationship. We develop and test such hypotheses in more detail below.

### How to Reconcile These Competing Claims?

Most of the relevant empirical studies to date offer piecemeal, context-specific insights. Our strategy, therefore, is to assemble a more comprehensive set of evidence, available in the major cross-national public opinion studies, on the relationship between national pride and xenophobia. We begin by building general measures of these concepts across six different surveys in over 50 countries and observing how often those who express national pride also express hostility toward immigrants.

Having established a more comprehensive benchmark, we test the stability of this relationship in a number of ways. Specifically, we reason that three analytical problems may confound the results: conceptual invalidity, errors in measurement of the concepts, and spurious

(hate-hate) or consistently positive view (love-love) towards *both* in-group and out-group may be just as common a set of feelings as the inverse one.

ness. We begin by exploring the concept of national pride more carefully and specifying its dimensions and core components. With these guidelines, and the insights from exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we develop more precise measures of the relevant concepts. We then use structural equation (LISREL) methods to take account of measurement error and test the bivariate correlations more rigorously. Next, still within a structural equation approach, we test the relationship in a series of multivariate models to rule out spurious associations. Finally, we incorporate a number of interaction terms to determine whether certain conditions magnify or minimize the relationship. The results, we believe, represent a rather comprehensive and robust statement about the association between national pride and xenophobia.

## Conceptualization and Measurement

We consider data from six major public opinion surveys: the 1995 International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the 1981, 1990–91, and 1995–97 waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), and the 1994 and 1996 General Social Surveys (GSS). Each of the studies has relative advantages for our analysis. The ISSP, for example, includes multiple measures of both national pride and hostility toward immigrants. Its breadth in the two primary concepts, however, comes at the cost of other measures. The survey does not include relevant independent variables, especially the psychological variables, which are useful in building the full structural model. The GSS and the WVS on the other hand, are more complete in this area. Furthermore, both the ISSP and the WVS are attractive in their cross-national coverage—an asset in testing various contextual effects. The 1996 GSS includes the questions from the ISSP for a subset of respondents, thus providing the most complete set of variables, albeit for only the United States. Our strategy is to lean heavily on the ISSP for understanding the conceptualization and measurement of national pride and ethnocentrism and, retaining these insights, to move to the 1996 GSS to test the structural hypotheses in the United States.

### A One Dimensional Conception of National Pride and Its Relationship to Prejudice

There are a number of ways to express national pride in a survey. Interviewers have variously asked respondents about how close they feel to their nation, how proud of it they are, what aspects they are proud of, how they compare their nation to others, and so on.<sup>8</sup> While these questions

<sup>8</sup>Details on the measures used for all of the relevant concepts are available from the authors upon request.

allow respondents to express their pride in a number of different domains and degrees of loyalty, what is common to them is positive affect toward the nation. With respect to xenophobia, most surveys ask respondents to attribute positive or negative adjectives to immigrants or assign them responsibility for improving or deflating the quality of life in the country (Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Feshbach 1994; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sniderman et al. 2000).

We begin by assuming that each set of questions, the national pride set and the anti-immigrant set, contains one predominant meaning. Such an assumption is not inviolate. As we describe below, some scholars treat national pride multidimensionally. However, there is little empirical evidence that statements of national pride come in distinctly different breeds. Accordingly, it makes sense to start with a general conception of national pride, one in which we assume that the variety of positive expressions about the nation tap one essential attitude. We construct a one-factor measurement model with data from the ISSP, the survey with the most complete set of measures on these concepts. This is a structural equation (LISREL) model which allows us to identify the correspondence between each of the measures and the concept they measure, the amount of measurement error, and the association between the latent constructs.<sup>9</sup>

The estimates of the various parameters of this model (Table 1, column 1) tell us something about the validity of the measures, as well as the relationship between the latent variables. With respect to the relationship between the two latent variables, the one-factor model indicates a weakly positive relationship between national pride and anti-immigrant attitudes ( $r = 0.03$ ). As Table 2 shows, the association ranges from 0.01 to 0.18 across the six data sets, with the estimates in single digits in five of the six sources.

These results suggest that national pride, understood as the collection of a wide variety of statements of pride in one's nation, has a negligibly positive relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes. A preliminary finding, then, is that Allport and his followers are right. At a very general level, those who express group pride do not tend to disparage the other group to any appreciable degree. Nevertheless, given our skepticism about the measurement of national pride—namely, that it may indeed be multidimensional—we subject this relationship to greater scrutiny. Specifically, we are concerned that aggregating national pride measures conceals a relationship between one of its components and xenophobia.

<sup>9</sup>Given the complications involved in pooling observations across countries, we also tested these models on a country-by-country basis. Results varied across countries, but not significantly.

## A Multidimensional Conception of National Pride and Its Relationship to Prejudice

Theorists of national identity often distinguish between two dimensions of national pride. One dimension, *patriotism*, refers to an attachment to the nation, its institutions, and its founding principles. The other, *nationalism*, refers to a belief in national superiority and dominance—that is, a commitment to the denigration of the alternatives to the nation's institutions and principles. Certainly, meanings and distinctions vary across scholars and research purposes, but this sense of a “positive” species of national pride and a more “negative” relative are widely held (e.g., Habermas 1992; Feshbach 1994; Viroli 1995).<sup>10</sup> Those who have tried to *measure* national pride also suggest that the empirical manifestations of the concept are multidimensional (Doob 1964; Conover and Feldman 1987; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Feshbach 1987, 1991, 1994; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992; Sidanius et al. 1997), with most emphasizing an empirical division between a group of measures that appears to indicate patriotism and one that appears to indicate nationalism.

These two dimensions of national pride imply very different consequences for attitudes and behavior toward outsiders. While we may expect nationalists to express negative feelings toward foreigners, it is unclear whether such a tendency is prevalent among patriots. This difference in behavior, indeed, is often the motivation for the development of a two-dimensional understanding of national pride. Viroli's (1995) well-told story of the evolution of nationalism as a corrupt form of patriotism is a very good example of this drive. Viroli's intention is to distinguish the two concepts in order to encourage a reawakening of a more positive, less chauvinistic version of national pride. However, his premise that the two sentiments have diverging relationships with prejudice is unproven. Shreds of indirect evidence exist. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) administered a rich set of patriotism and nationalism items to a sample of 239 college students to find that nationalism is strongly associated with pro-nuclear arms positions ( $r = 0.68$ ) while patriotism's association was only moderate ( $r = 0.18$ ). In similar-sized samples of Israelis and Americans, Sidanius et al. (1997) report that a social dominance orientation (that is, an inclination toward hierarchy-enhancing attitudes) relates more strongly to nationalism than to patriotism. Finally, Conover and Feldman's (1987) memo on the patriotism and nationalism items on the 1987 National Election

<sup>10</sup>These two dimensions parallel differentiations scholars make with respect to ethnic pride. See, for example, Herring, Jankowski, and Brown (1999, 366–67) categorization of black pride.

**TABLE 1 Measurement Models of National Pride**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		
	One Factor Results	National Pride	Two Factor Predictions	Nationalism	Exploratory Factor Results	Patriotism	Nationalism	Patriotism	Nationalism	Reduced Two Factor Results	Patriotism	Nationalism	Two Factor Model with Correlated Method Errors
Measure													
If you could improve your work or living conditions how willing would you be to move out of your country?	-0.23		X		0		-0.38		-0.32				-0.36
Would you rather be a citizen of your country than any other?	0.43		X		0.17		0.61		0.57			0.54	0.63
Do you agree that the world would be a better place if other countries were like ours?	0.45		X		0.25		0.47		0.59			0.69	0.60
Generally, would you say that your country is better than any other?	0.55		X		0.40		0.40		0.62			0.76	0.59
People should support their country even if it is in the wrong?	0.28		X		0.06		0.47		0.41				0.46
When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud.	0.31		X		0.02		0.61		0.44				0.51
Proud of your country's political influence in the world?	0.67		X		0.67		0.17		0.54				0.43
Proud of your country's achievements in sports?	0.46		X		0.27		0.43		0.46				0.42
Proud of your country's armed forces?	0.56		X		0.39		0.43		0.57				0.55
How important is it that your country remain one nation?	0.18		X		0.11		0.16						
Are there things about your country that make you ashamed?	-0.24		X		-0.28		0.03		-0.28				-0.20

(continued on next page)

**TABLE 1 Measurement Models of National Pride (continued)**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	One Factor Results	National Pride	Two Factor Predictions	Nationalism	Exploratory Factor Results	Nationalism	Two Factor Results	Nationalism	Reduced Two Factor Results	Nationalism	Two Factor Model with Correlated Method Errors	Nationalism
Are you proud of the way democracy works here?	0.64	X	X	0.73	0	0.70	0.73	0.73	0.43			
Are you proud of economic achievements here?	0.64	X	X	0.73	0.02	0.70	0.72	0.40				
Are you proud of your country's social security system?	0.54	X	X	0.68	-0.09	0.64		0.30				
Are you proud of your country's science and technology achievements?	0.58	X	X	0.54	0.20	0.57	0.55	0.41				
Are you proud of your country's achievements in arts and literature?	0.34	X	X	0.21	0.29	0.29		0.28				
Proud of your country's history?	0.38	X	X	0.17	0.45	0.29		0.48				
Are you proud of your country's fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?	0.58	X	X	0.59	0.12	0.62	0.59	0.45				
How close do you feel to your country?	0.32	X	X	0.15	0.38	0.25		0.42				
<b>Correlations Among Latent Variables</b>												
Xenophobia and Patriotism/Nationalism	<b>0.03</b>			<b>-0.23</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>-0.18</b>	<b>0.35</b>	<b>-0.19</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>-0.08</b>	<b>0.45</b>	
Patriotism and Nationalism	—				<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.67</b>		<b>0.53</b>		<b>0.79</b>		
<b>Goodness of Fit Indices</b>												
AGFI	0.74				0.79	0.83		0.65		0.89		
RMSEA	0.09				0.08	0.07		0.11		0.04		

Notes: (a) Values are standardized factor loadings.

(b) In column (2), an "X" represents our prediction based on analysis of the content.

(c) Both the AGFI and the RMSEA range from 0 to 1. Better fitting models are close to 1 for the AGFI and close to 0 for the RMSEA.

(d) In column (3), V12 and V28 are constrained to zero for patriotism and nationalism respectively in order to identify the model.

(e) All factor loadings and correlations are significant at at least 5%. Almost all are significant at 1%.

Data Source: ISSP 1996

**TABLE 2 One Factor Model Results Across Data Sets**

Data Source	Correlation of National Pride and Xenophobia
ISSP (1996)	0.03*
GSS (1996)	0.07*
GSS (1994)	0.18*
WVS (1981)	0.00
WVS (1990–91)	0.08*
WVS (1995–97)	0.10*

\*Statistically significant at 5%.

Study (NES) pilot study revealed a moderately different relationship between each of the two scales and items related to international cooperation and prospects for war. In short, there is good reason to think that patriotism and nationalism compose two important dimensions of national pride with diverging effects on prejudice.

Given these expectations, we return to the interpretation of public opinion data on national pride. Three principal questions are before us. First, do responses to the national pride items hang together in two dimensions that are recognizable as patriotism and nationalism? Second, in the interest of building a structural model, how valid are the individual measures of the two dimensions? Third, and most importantly, do these two dimensions have diverging associations with prejudice?<sup>11</sup>

### Content Analysis of the Measures

Our first step is to clarify our understanding of the differences between patriotism and nationalism in order to classify our measures into one or the other category. Consider a number of definitions already in circulation. Feshbach writes, “*Patriotism* . . . entails attachment to one’s nation as characterized by love of one’s nation and pride in one’s national identification. *Nationalism*, while related to patriotism, entails feelings of national superiority, of competitiveness with other nations, and of the importance of power over other nations” (1994, 281). According to Peffley and Hurwitz, *patriotism* is a “heavily affect-laden . . . positive regard that a citizen holds toward his or

<sup>11</sup>Some readers will note that the last concern has implications for the first two. A finding that the two dimensions have meaningfully different relationships with prejudice can be taken as strong evidence for the *construct validity* of a two-dimensional concept. Since our focus is on estimating the direction and strength of these relationships themselves, it is tautological to rely on them to establish the validity of our measures. Rather, our faith in the validity of our measures will rest on content validity as well as exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (see Adcock and Collier 2001 for a useful clarification of validity issues).

her own homeland,” while *nationalism* is an, “implicit evaluation of one’s country vis-à-vis foreign countries or international groups” (1999, 536). Alternatively, in Viroli’s terms, “The language of *patriotism* has been used over the centuries to strengthen or invoke love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of the people, that is love of the republic; the language of *nationalism* was forged in late eighteenth-century Europe to defend or reinforce cultural, linguistic, and ethnic oneness and homogeneity of people” (1995, 1). Finally, according to Conover and Feldman, “. . . [W]e define [*patriotism*] as a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation . . . [and] [*nationalism*] as feelings of superiority of one’s own country vis-à-vis other countries” (1987, 1).

The common ground among definitions of patriotism and nationalism provides guidance about the core components of the two concepts. A central distinction between the concepts is their point of reference. Whereas patriotism is *self-referential*, feelings of nationalism are inherently *comparative*—and, almost exclusively, downwardly comparative. Some theorists conceive of this distinction as one of competition: the patriot is noncompetitive and the nationalist competitive. For example, in historical perspectives on the concepts, both Dietz (1989) and Viroli (1995) show that the original concept of *patria* is one of noncompetitive love of country, a concept which develops nationalist elements when competitive attributes are added in the nineteenth century. A second distinction concerns the content of patriotic and nationalist expressions. Patriotism often takes the form of beliefs in the *social system* and *values* of one’s country. Expressions of nationalism, on the other hand, are often appeals to advance the *national interests* in the international order.

Guided by these *a priori* criteria, we classified the ISSP national pride items as measures of patriotism or nationalism. Column 2 in Table 1 lists these assignments. Some measures were fairly straightforward. For example, the item, “Generally, would you say that your country is better than any other?” appears clearly to be a measure of nationalism. For others (e.g., “How important is it that your country remains one nation?”), the relationship with either of the two constructs is ambiguous or overlapping. For some of the more ambiguous items, our coding decisions conform with the decisions other researchers have made with similar items, thus adding to our sense of content validity. For example, the two items that relate to national sporting achievements—“Are you proud of your country’s achievements in sports?” and “When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud”—are analogous to Kosterman and Feshbach’s nationalism item, “It is important that the US win in



international sporting competitions like the Olympics” (1989, 274). We assign both items to nationalism, although the former appears to be a clearer indicator of it than the latter.<sup>12</sup> In the empirical analysis below, we address the uncertainty surrounding some of these items more explicitly.

### Exploratory Factor Analysis

To examine the validity of the two-factor model we begin with an exploratory factor analysis of the national pride items. Here we begin by assuming that there are two factors for national pride, but otherwise impose no structure on the way the indicators combine.<sup>13</sup> This sort of exploratory model, which allows the items to load on either factor, serves as a rough guide to the structure of the measurement items. According to the results (Table 1, column 3), allowing each indicator to load on two factors produces a pattern of factor loadings which appear, based on our expectations above, to represent patriotism and nationalism.<sup>14</sup> With some exceptions, the items we identified with either patriotism or nationalism load more heavily on that latent variable than they do on the other.<sup>15</sup> Thirteen of the 19 items load heaviest on the predicted

<sup>12</sup>There are other ambiguous cases for which we sought validation from previous research. For example, the items “Are there things about your country that make you ashamed?” and “How close do you feel to your country?” are very close to the language of the American National Election Study of 1987’s patriotism scale items, “How strong is the respect you have for the United States these days?” and “How proud are you to be an American?,” as well as Kosterman and Feshbach’s (1989) items “I love my country,” “I am proud to be an American,” and “In general, I have very little respect for the American people.” Similarly, our patriotism scale includes the item, “People should support their country even if it is wrong” which echoes the item in Kosterman and Feshbach’s patriotism scale, “Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to the U.S. always remains strong.” Further, Kosterman and Feshbach’s scale includes a number of items which emphasize the importance and pride individuals place on American success in the international arena which are analogous to the ISSP item, “Are you proud of your country’s influence in the world?” Finally, “Proud of country’s history” is included in the patriotism scale as it is clearly self-referential, but its appropriate classification remains somewhat ambiguous.

<sup>13</sup>Of course, the number of factors is an issue in itself. The choice of two factors fits our theoretical model but it also makes sense empirically. Tests with truly exploratory multifactor models returned only two factors with eigenvalues over 1.00, the cutoff most scholars require for a meaningful dimension. Below, we test the validity of the choice of two factors versus one more rigorously with confirmatory factor analytic methods.

<sup>14</sup>We report the *standardized* factor loadings in order to ensure comparability across the differently scaled items (see Bollen 1989).

<sup>15</sup>In order to ensure that the model was identified, we constrained two factor loadings to zero (“If you could improve your work or living conditions how willing would you be to move out of your country?” on patriotism and “Are you proud of the way democracy works here?” on nationalism).

latent variable. Two of the remaining six items load almost equally on both latent variables. The item we had trouble classifying (v14) loads lightly, and equally so, on each of the two factors. Three of the 19, then, do not load as expected.

### Confirmatory Factor Analysis

The exploratory analysis gives us confidence that a two-factor model with two dimensions akin to patriotism and nationalism makes sense. Confirmatory factor analysis, in which we stipulate which items measure which dimension, allows us both to test the dimensionality further and to evaluate individual measures more precisely. Table 1 presents the results for a number of confirmatory models.<sup>16</sup>

How valid are the measures of patriotism and nationalism? First consider the two-factor model (Column 4), the model we had specified based on the content of the items. The standardized factor coefficients in Table 1 serve as useful measures of validity. The items with the highest validity for patriotism are those which ask about pride in democracy and in economic achievements, while the most valid nationalism item appears to be the one which asks the respondent to agree that his country is superior to any other. On the whole, the validity assessments conform to our intuitions about the concept. Of course, we are particularly concerned about the validity of items whose classification was ambiguous. The results present some guidance about these items. For example, the ambiguous item “How important is it that your country remain one nation?” demonstrated low levels of validity. Also, the coefficients for the two sports questions were roughly equal, suggesting that the two are equally meaningful measures of nationalism. Does the inclusion of the ambiguous items distort our estimates of the association among the latent variables? In order to address this question, we build a reduced model (column 5) in which the ambiguous items are removed. Both the factor scores and the estimated correlations among latent constructs appear to be unaffected by these specification changes. However, a comparison of the fit indices recommends the full model as superior in reliability to the reduced.<sup>17</sup>

These results also allow us to evaluate our decision to divide national pride into two dimensions. The

<sup>16</sup>In addition to the confirmatory analysis we report here, we also conducted a full confirmatory analysis on the GSS data as well. While space limitations prevent us from fully reporting these here, they generally confirm these results. The complete analysis is available from the authors upon request.

<sup>17</sup>We report the AGFI and the RMSEA. The chi-square is not valid in large samples.

conventional test for bi- versus unidimensionality is to compare the two-factor model to an identical one in which the correlation is constrained to 1.00 (e.g., Bollen and Grandjean 1981). We do this for model 5 and find that constraining the correlation to 1.00 significantly decreases the fit of the model, further confirmation that a two-factor model of national pride makes sense.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, we can improve the model, and our estimates of the parameters of interest, by specifying likely cases of correlated measurement error. For example, items with a similar question format like the battery of pride questions (pride in the nation's sports, pride in the nation's literature, etc.) are likely to produce highly correlated responses due to the *format* rather than the *content* of the question. Failing to account for these correlated errors of measurement can bias the estimates of the association among the latent constructs. In column 6, we allow for correlated measurement error within the set of items which ask about pride in certain features of the country, those which ask about immigrants' contributions to social problems, and two pairs of items for which a specification test revealed a high degree of correlated measurement error. As the fit indices suggest, adding these parameters results in a much improved model with roughly similar estimates of the factor scores and latent variable correlations.<sup>19</sup>

### Correlation among the Factors

Now that we are satisfied with the measurement of the three latent variables of interest, we estimate their relationship. In Table 1, we report the correlation among the constructs for each of the measurement models. For each of the models, even the unconstrained exploratory model, the results are clear. Nationalism's relationship with prejudice is strongly positive (with a correlation ranging from 0.35 to 0.50). Patriotism, however, is inversely related to prejudice, albeit only moderately (estimates range from -0.23 to -0.08). Our best estimate of the relationship is model 5, in which we control for correlated measurement error. In that model, nationalism and prejudice correlate at 0.45 and patriotism and prejudice at -0.08, with both estimates significant at 1 percent.

Such findings offer a conceptual explanation for the ambivalence among scholars on the question of pride's connection with prejudice. If by pride, one includes feelings of group superiority, then yes, pride is very much

associated with negative statements toward out-groups. In this respect, warnings that feelings of group superiority lead to denigration and hostility toward others are well founded. However, there is solid evidence that a qualified version of Allport's nonaggression argument holds up. Patriots, defined as those who express a love of their country, *are no more likely to disparage immigrants than are nonpatriots*. In some sense, this finding may be taken by some to be a full confirmation of the Allport thesis, for *patriotism* is arguably the concept more relevant to the debate. Nonaggression proponents would most likely concede that *nationalism*—given its chauvinistic overtones—will correspond closely with out-group hostility. The contested question, then, is whether attitudes of pure group love are associated with prejudice. The answer, at this point, appears to be no.

## A Structural Model of National Pride and Xenophobia

As we discussed above, the initial finding of a weak association between hostility toward immigrants and a generalized measure of national pride can have a number of confounding effects. In the previous section we examined one of them, finding that national pride has not one but two components: a negative dimension (nationalism) and a positive dimension (patriotism). The finding that the two are positively correlated, but have very different (perhaps even opposite) relationships with xenophobia, explains in part the lack of a strong relationship between this variable and a more generalized measure of national pride.

However, a more contextualized analysis of these relationships is warranted. Here, we incorporate wisdom from the rich tradition of prejudice theory in order to build a more complete model of out-group hostility. These theories of prejudice have two important implications for our analysis. On the one hand, each theory suggests a set of *main effects* for which we need to control. Without accounting for these explanations, we cannot be sure that the relationships we observe are not products of more deeply rooted psychological or contextual conditions. The second implication of this theoretical work is that the conditions which give rise to prejudice may also serve to intensify the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes. Brewer (1999), for example, has suggested several situations in which the relationship between pride and prejudice will be more pronounced. We move to a multivariate structural model of prejudice in order to explore these potentially confounding and interacting effects.

<sup>18</sup>The difference in the AGFI between the two models is 0.12. While it is not possible to perform significance tests on this difference, it appears substantial.

<sup>19</sup>The specific correlation structure imposed is available from the authors upon request.

Social psychology is not short on theories of prejudice, each of which has by now been subject to much empirical investigation. We make use of four such theories. Our goal is not to test their validity so much as to understand how they affect the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes. In each case, the prediction is that the primary variable of interest will have either a direct effect or an indirect effect (through nationalism or through patriotism) on xenophobia.

**Authoritarian Personality Theory.** Psychologists have long suspected that certain personality types are more given to prejudice than others. Following the atrocities of World War II, a highly influential body of theory posited that prejudice results from a personality orientation characterized by submissiveness, the glorification of superiors, and the distrust of those considered weak or socially deviant (Fromm 1941; Adorno et al. 1950). Early theorists, heavily influenced by psychoanalysis, attribute such an orientation to a childhood typified by humiliation, deprecation, and an emphasis on obedience for external validation. The resentment that arises from such treatment, they argue, reveals itself in a curious mix of deference to authority and hostility toward weaker, marginal, or deviant groups. An important prediction of the theory is the relatively untargeted nature of the subject's hostility. Borrowing the psychoanalytic concept of *displacement*, proponents argue that an authoritarian disposition leads to generalized resentment and hostility toward a relatively indiscriminate range of targets (Fromm 1941; Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988). While the theory and its variations have come under much criticism over the last 40 years (for a review see Duckitt 1989), its predictions have held up very well empirically.<sup>20</sup> Those determined to be high on "authoritarianism"—by any number of a wide range of measures—demonstrate a degree of out-group hostility. A recent study by Feldman and Stenner (1997) suggests that authoritarian traits manifest themselves in intolerance or hostility only under certain conditions, in particular perceived threat. We suspect that nationalism or patriotism might activate and direct authoritarian impulses toward immigrants. We reason that since aggression resulting from authoritarianism can be untargeted, the presence of national pride—whether it be nationalism or patriotism—increases the chances that such aggression will be directed toward immigrants. We, therefore, construct product terms which combine authoritarianism with both nationalism and patriotism.

<sup>20</sup>See Sniderman et al. (2000) for a view (which we share) on the utility of personality-based explanations for prejudice.

**Realistic Conflict Theory.** Fairly simple and intuitively appealing, Realistic Conflict Theory predicts that zero-sum competition among groups will lead to feelings of group threat and, consequently, intergroup prejudice and discrimination. Such prejudice and discrimination will be accompanied by an increased awareness of group identity and boundaries, in-group solidarity and cohesion, and negative stereotyping of the out-group (Campbell 1965; Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Under such conditions of competition, when one group's gain could be interpreted as another's loss, it is likely that attitudes toward in-groups and out-groups will be highly correlated. Indeed, there is evidence of both reduced in-group favoritism and reduced out-group derogation under noncompetitive conditions (e.g., Sherif 1966; Rabbie et al. 1974). For our purposes, the most vivid demonstration of these effects is the prevalence of xenophobia which accompanies international economic and military conflict (see Brown 1995 for a narrated history of such public opinion findings). It is important to note, if only to anticipate issues of measurement, that such competition can be real or imagined (see Sherif 1966 or Brown 1995, 169). As we describe below, we adopt a broad approach in which we test for both real (that is, objectively demonstrable) competitive conditions as well as perceived competition. We expect two possibilities: either economic threat leads directly to xenophobia or that it results in xenophobia only when triggered by feelings of nationalism or patriotism. Again, Feldman and Stenner's (1997) findings strengthen our suspicion that certain attitudes (in our case national pride) might target punitive responses to economic insecurity toward immigrants. Brewer (1999) suggests a similar interactive hypothesis in her essay on the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes.

**Frustration-Aggression Theory.** If realistic conflict theory is a sociological, group-based explanation of hostility, Frustration-Aggression Theory is the individual, psychological analog. The hypothesis is straightforward and immediately plausible. Essentially, aggression toward others results from an individual's frustration at not achieving highly desirable goals (see, e.g., Dollard et al. 1939; Berkowitz 1969). Like personality theories, Frustration-Aggression Theory uses the psychoanalytic idea of *displacement*. Accordingly, the source of frustration and target of aggression can be unrelated. There is a fair degree of evidence in support of the theory (e.g., Mallick and McCandless 1966; Hanratty, O'Neal, and Sulzer 1972). More recently, scholars have used the theory to emphasize the aggression associated with feelings of relative deprivation in which an individual's goals and expectations are

measured by the achievement of others (e.g., Gurr 1970; Brown 1995). Like authoritarianism and economic threat, we expect that frustration can have direct effects on xenophobia or an interactive effect in which the target of the frustration focuses on immigrants only in the presence of nationalism or patriotism.

**Social Dominance Theory.** In recent years, Sidanius and his colleagues have disseminated a synthetic explanation of prejudice which they label Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 1997). The theory is an impressive combination of personality theory, social identity theory, and Marxist class analysis (among other influences). The ideas are premised upon the assumption of a deeply embedded set of group-based social hierarchies within society. Individuals differ to the degree that they are committed to sustaining this hierarchy (this commitment is their “social dominance orientation”). Since Social Dominance Theory is a combination of a set of ideas, its predictions are many and varied. Here, we limit ourselves to an especially interesting prediction of Social Dominance Theory: an ideological asymmetry in individuals’ commitment to hierarchy-enhancing positions (Sidanius et al. 1997). The implication of this asymmetry is that higher-status individuals, occupants of the upper levels of the hierarchy, will be more inclined to make hierarchy-enhancing distinctions among groups than will lower-status individuals. Following the formulation in Sidanius et al. (1997), we hypothesize that members of a racial group with an elevated status (whites) will express a combination of national pride and xenophobia.

**Other relevant conditions.** The above theories imply that individuals’ personality, their emotional state, and their economic position with respect to others influence how they view outsiders. We must also remember that certain political beliefs, family backgrounds, or norms of expression will also affect their response. For example, prejudice is often associated with political conservatism (e.g., Sniderman et al. 2000). While it is not clear how tightly these attitudes hang together, they are correlated at the first order, as is nationalism with conservatism. In order to control for this potential confound, we include a measure of political ideology in the model. Also, while we have excluded noncitizens from the sample for obvious reasons, there are certainly individuals in the sample who are close to immigrants or who are one or two generations removed from immigrants themselves. For this reason, we include a measure of the length of time, by number of generations, an individual’s family has resided in the United States. Finally, we believe that social and

cultural norms condition the way individuals respond to interviewers’ questions about immigrants. For example, it is reasonable to suspect that people of different educational backgrounds, age groups, and geographic regions will voice hostility to different degrees, not only because of internal beliefs or attitudes, but also because of different norms of expression within their peer group. This tenet is the foundation of the influential symbolic racism (also known as aversive racism, racial resentment, and modern racism) literature (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Sears 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996). According to these theories, the decline in expressed racism over the years derives not from actual reduced racism but from a decline in willingness to express outright racism. That is, societal norms no longer permit such expression. We suggest this sort of effect likely exists with respect to immigrants and varies across urban and rural settings, age, educational experience, and social status.

## Data and Measurement

In order to test the implications of the full structural model we rely on the 1996 GSS and so focus on the United States.<sup>21</sup> As we discussed earlier, the GSS—unlike the other surveys we consider—includes a complete set of both endogenous and exogenous variables. Moreover, the dataset includes multiple measures of our concepts, an advantage that permits us to incorporate measurement error in our analysis through structural equation modeling (see below). To operationalize each of the concepts, we use the set of multiple indicators detailed in the appendix. While we do not report the measures of validity as we did for national pride, we construct measurement models of each of the concepts and evaluate the validity of their items. For the structural equation 2SLS method we describe below, the items enter as either scaling variables or instrumental variables. For the OLS analysis, we build additive scales of the concept after standardizing the items.

For realistic conflict, we use a number of measures of economic threat such as the respondents’ expectations that they will be laid off, and how they compare their standard of living to others (full details of the measures are available from the authors).<sup>22</sup> For Authoritarian

<sup>21</sup>Since we have limited ourselves in this part of the analysis to one country (USA), we control for national factors as well.

<sup>22</sup>We note here that these indicators are not perfect measures of realistic conflict, which is largely conceptualized as a group-level threat. Unfortunately, in our data set, group-focused measures of threat are not available. While we are confident that these individual measures will be correlated with measures of group threat, we

Personality Theory, we combine measures of submission, obedience, conventionalism, intolerance, and cynicism. For Frustration-Aggression Theory, we select measures of economic and personal unease and frustration. For the social dominance prediction of ideological asymmetry we construct an interaction term composed of a dummy variable for whites and each of the national pride dimensions. We measure political ideology with a seven-point liberal-conservative scale. Our measure of ancestry is an ordinal measure of whether the individual is a first-, second-, or third-generation United States citizen. In order to control for differences in behavioral norms, we include measures of educational experience, social status, age, and size of locality.

**Econometric issues.** To specify the relationship between the structural variables and the dependent variables, we need to account for a number of complications. First, as we suggest in the earlier section, the concepts we operationalize are *latent*, for which we have multiple indicators. Second, and relatedly, they are measured with *error*, both systematic and random. Third, the direction of causality is unclear. While it seems most plausible to us that feelings of national pride would lead to hostility toward immigrants, it is probable that the reverse is also true. The former direction would be consistent with Allport's conception of in-group attitudes as psychologically primary as well as social identity findings which privilege *in-group* attachment as the primary motor behind intergroup conflict (Turner 1978; Brewer 1979). However, as we note earlier, most scholars acknowledge that hatred of an out-group can provoke a stronger attachment to the in-group. It is likely, then, that the two attitudes are mutually reinforcing. Indeed a preliminary diagnostic test in an initial model of hostility reveals some feedback between hostility and nationalism.<sup>23</sup>

To address the first two issues—of multiple measures and measurement error—we employ a variation on traditional structural-equation modeling techniques which specify both latent and observed variables in the model and so factor in measurement error explicitly. LISREL models are generally estimated via maximum likelihood (MLE). However, like ordinary least squares (OLS), MLE

recognize that there will be potentially significant measurement error associated with them.

<sup>23</sup>Working from a simple system of hostility, patriotism, and nationalism equations, we ran endogeneity tests on both patriotism and nationalism using a version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (also known as the augmented regression test) described in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). OLS was found to be inconsistent for nationalism but not for patriotism (the residual from the hostility equation was a strong predictor of nationalism) ( $F(1,1337) = 2249.46$ ,  $pr > f = 0.00$ ).

will give asymptotically biased estimates for simultaneous models. Therefore, to take account of the third issue—simultaneity—we use a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimator which has been adapted for structural equation models (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993; Bollen 1996) and utilized in this context in Sniderman et al. (2000). Although we discuss the method in detail below, in plain terms, Bollen's method allows us to at once correct for errors in measurement and simultaneity. The approach exploits our use of multiple measures of each construct to factor out each of these two problems. In particular, multiple measures of single constructs are utilized to weed out measurement error. Further, since we have multiple measures of exogenous variables, we are able to use the “left out” exogenous measures of a particular construct as instruments for the endogenous constructs.

**Bollen's 2SLS estimator.** Bollen's method starts with the standard equation for specifying the structural model.<sup>24</sup> Following convention, the general structural-equation model can be written as:

$$\eta = \alpha + B\eta + \Gamma\xi + \zeta \quad (1)$$

where  $\eta$  is an  $m \times 1$  vector of latent endogenous variables,  $B$  is a  $m \times m$  matrix of coefficients of the effect of the  $\eta$ 's on each other,  $\xi$  is an  $n \times 1$  vector of latent exogenous variables,  $\Gamma$  is an  $m \times n$  matrix of  $\xi$ 's impact on  $\eta$ ,  $\alpha$  is an  $m \times 1$  vector of intercept terms, and  $\zeta$  is an  $m \times 1$  vector of random disturbances with an expectation of 0 and which are uncorrelated with  $\xi$ . Each of the latent constructs (the combination of  $\eta$ 's and  $\xi$ 's) is measured with a set of observed  $x$ 's and  $y$ 's, commonly termed “indicators.” The objective of the analysis is to estimate the parameters of Equation (1) using the observed indicators.

As in standard LISREL analysis, one of the  $x$ 's or  $y$ 's for each latent construct is selected to scale the factor loadings (the loading for the scaled factor is set to 1 and its intercept set to 0).<sup>25</sup> Following the standard equation for the measurement model in LISREL we can express the scaled variables as:

$$y_1 = \eta + \varepsilon_1$$

and

$$x_1 = \xi + \delta_1$$

Substituting into the general model in Equation (1), a substitution which provides the key step in Bollen's insight,

<sup>24</sup>In the following discussion, we borrow heavily from the discussion in Bollen (1996) and summary from Sniderman et al. (2000).

<sup>25</sup>The scaling variables were chosen based on their face validity and intercorrelation with the other items. Details of this choice are available from the authors.

we can then write,

$$y_1 = \alpha + \beta y_1 + \Gamma x_1 + u \quad (2)$$

where  $u = \varepsilon_1 - \beta \varepsilon_1 - \Gamma \delta_1 + \zeta$ . Note, therefore, that  $u$  which contains  $\delta_1$ , will only be uncorrelated with  $x_1$  when it is measured without error. A 2SLS estimator with suitable instrumental variables will give unbiased estimates of Equation (2).

We need, then, instrumental variables which will be able to predict  $y_1$  and  $x_1$  but will not be correlated with  $u$ . As Bollen describes, this means all the nonscaled indicators of the  $x$ 's and  $y$ 's on the right side of the equation, any  $x$ 's and  $y$ 's which pertain to constructs which are not further down the causal chain, as well as the exogenous variables in the system of equations, are valid instruments for Equation (2). Indicators for constructs which enter the structural model at posterior levels of the model, however, are ruled out since these indicators will have correlated measurement errors with the  $x$ 's included in Equation (2).<sup>26</sup>

In our case, we have two structural equations, one for each of the two endogenous variables (hostility and nationalism).<sup>27</sup> That is,

$$\begin{aligned} \eta_1 = & \alpha_1 + \beta_{12}\eta_2 + \gamma_{11}\xi_1 + \gamma_{12}\xi_2 + \gamma_{13}\xi_3 + \gamma_{14}\xi_4 \\ & + \gamma_{15}\xi_5 + \gamma_{16}\xi_6 + \gamma_{17}\xi_7 + \gamma_{110}\text{ANCESTRY} \\ & + \gamma_{111}\text{IDEOLOGY} + \zeta_1 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \eta_2 = & \alpha_2 + \beta_{21}\eta_1 + \gamma_{21}\xi_1 + \gamma_{28}\xi_8 + \gamma_{29}\text{AGE} \\ & + \gamma_{210}\text{ANCESTRY} + \zeta_2 \end{aligned}$$

where  $\eta_1 =$  xenophobia,  $\eta_2 =$  nationalism,  $\xi_1 =$  patriotism,  $\xi_2 =$  citizenship status,  $\xi_3 =$  frustration,  $\xi_4 =$  economic insecurity,  $\xi_5 =$  authoritarianism,  $\xi_6 =$  social status,  $\xi_7 =$  education, and  $\xi_8 =$  size of locality.<sup>28</sup> Age, ancestry, ideology—concepts for which we have single measures—enter as standard nonlatent variables. The latent variables, for which we have multiple measures, are

<sup>26</sup>As interaction terms are fundamental to our substantive analysis, it might occur to the reader that this complicates the specification of our model, particularly since some of these interactions are with the endogenously determined variables. While this is certainly a concern, Bollen (1995) shows that the inclusion of interactions is valid using this method, as long as none of the indicators for the endogenous variables are used as instruments.

<sup>27</sup>For the sake of simplicity, we do not include the interactions in the equations below. Also note that specification tests indicate patriotism is exogenous.

<sup>28</sup>In order to ensure that this system of equations is identified, we assume that neither age nor size of locality—two variables in the nationalism equation—has much of an effect on attitudes toward immigrants. Preliminary tests suggested that these restrictions were reasonable.

represented in the system of equations by their scaling variable. Substituting the appropriate scaling variables minus their respective measurement error for the latent constructs leads to the following specifications:

$$\begin{aligned} \eta_1 = & \alpha_1 + \beta_{12}\text{AMCITIZN} + \gamma_{11}\text{CLSEUSA} \\ & + \gamma_{12}\text{CITIZEN} + \gamma_{13}\text{SHAKEBLU} + \gamma_{14}\text{FINRELA} \\ & + \gamma_{15}\text{HELPFUL} + \gamma_{16}\text{INCOME} + \gamma_{17}\text{EDUC} \\ & + \gamma_{110}\text{ANCESTRY} + \gamma_{111}\text{IDEOLOGY} + \zeta_1 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \eta_2 = & \alpha_2 + \beta_{21}\text{LETIN} + \gamma_{21}\text{CLSEUSA} + \gamma_{28}\text{RES16} \\ & + \gamma_{29}\text{AGE} + \gamma_{210}\text{ANCESTRY} + \zeta_2 \end{aligned}$$

Our next step is to identify the appropriate instrumental variables for these equations. Following the criteria we set forth above, the choice is fairly straightforward. All nonscaling variables before the endogenous variables in the chain of causality (that is, indicators other than those for hostility and nationalism) are eligible.

While Bollen (1996) has demonstrated that this method has desirable statistical properties, its use is not yet common among researchers. Therefore, in order to verify our results, we also estimate the equations with two more conventional methods: (1) a standard MLE structural-equations model, and (2) a single-equation, ordinary least-squares model. For the latter method, we combine multiple indicators of each concept into simple additive indices.<sup>29</sup>

## Results

We find the estimates to be fairly consistent across different specifications and different methods. In Table 3 we report the effects on hostility toward immigrants estimated by the 2SLS analysis described above for four models: the baseline model of prejudice, the baseline model including the dimensions of national pride, and third and fourth models which include the interaction terms of nationalism and patriotism.<sup>30</sup>

First, consider the explanatory power of the structural model of prejudice, independent of national pride. Examining the particular *main effects* of realistic economic conflict, frustration, and personality we see mixed

<sup>29</sup>Each indicator was standardized before being scaled.

<sup>30</sup>The multitude of estimators, equations, and specifications provides a multiplicity of results. Here we present only the hostility equation, the most plausible direction of causality, from the 2SLS analysis, the most appropriate method. Estimates for the two other equations of the 2SLS analysis, as well as the full results from the standard structural-equation model analysis fitted with MLE and the OLS analysis are available from the authors.

TABLE 3 Effects on Xenophobia (Bollen's 2SLS estimator)

Variable	Baseline Model of Prejudice	Adding National Pride Items	Adding Nationalism Interactions	Adding Patriotism Interactions
Patriotism		-0.15 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.27 (0.36)
Nationalism		0.48** (0.15)	0.82** (0.40)	0.51** (0.14)
Frustration	0.07* (0.03)	0.08 (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.08* (0.04)
Economic Insecurity	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Authoritarianism	0.11** (0.02)	0.10** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)
Status	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Education	-0.17** (0.02)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.14** (0.03)	-0.12** (0.03)
Age	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Ancestry	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
Size of Locality	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Ideology	0.04** (0.00)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Nationalism*Authoritarianism			0.07 (0.05)	
Nationalism*Race			-0.46 (0.35)	
Nationalism*Education			0.06 (0.04)	
Patriotism*Frustration			0.09 (0.08)	
Patriotism*Economic Insecurity			-0.06 (0.08)	
Patriotism*Authoritarianism				0.10 (0.06)
Patriotism*Race				-0.03 (0.27)
Patriotism*Education				0.09* (0.04)
Patriotism*Frustration				0.02 (0.08)
Patriotism*Economic Insecurity				-0.11 (0.09)
Constant	-0.06 (0.04)	0.07 (0.11)	0.03 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)
N	1216	562	553	553

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: GSS 1996

results. On the one hand, the effect of economic insecurity seems to have little direct contribution to attitudes toward immigrants, once we account for other factors. In contrast, both an authoritarian personality and personal frustration seem to be linked directly to prejudice. Such results suggest that hostility toward immigrants does not derive from any direct and specific threat immigrants pose but rather from a more general state of dissatisfaction within the individual. This conforms to consistent findings in the literature on immigration policy that economic self-interest is not a strong predictor of attitudes toward immigration policy (Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; although see Kessler 2001). With respect to the other conditions we include in the model, we also see mixed but clear results. Independent of personality, economic security, and emotional happiness, those with more education as well as those whose family arrived in the United States more recently are less likely to deride immigrants.<sup>31</sup> Ideology is a significant predictor only when nationalism and patriotism are excluded from the model, suggesting that national identity somehow taps the aspect of ideology which is associated with xenophobia. Again, these results are extremely robust, surviving multiple specifications and estimation methods.<sup>32</sup>

Our primary concern, of course, is whether national pride has anything to do with anti-immigrant hostility once included in a more general model of prejudice. The results are unambiguous. In all the specifications of the model, with all alternative estimation methods, the split effect of national pride is preserved. That is, nationalism is strongly associated with hostility toward immigrants while patriotism is unrelated to or, if anything, negatively associated with hostility.<sup>33</sup>

The direct effects of nationalism and patriotism are therefore quite clear. What can we say about the conditional effects? Are those who express national pride more likely to be bigoted under certain circumstances? More to the point, can patriots, who we have observed in bivariate analyses to have no particular predisposition for xenophobia, evince some hostility under special circumstances? We find no evidence for these assertions: with the exception of the interaction between patriotism and education, none of the interaction terms in the case of

<sup>31</sup> Recall that education is coded as increasing in educational attainment and ancestry is coded as increasing with how recently one's family immigrated to the United States.

<sup>32</sup> As far as the other controls are concerned, it appears that socioeconomic status, age, and size of locality do not have consistently significant results.

<sup>33</sup> The patriotism coefficient is always negative, but statistically insignificant.

either nationalism or patriotism is statistically significant at even the 10 percent level.<sup>34</sup> On the whole, the ethnocentrism of nationalists and the absence of such for patriots remains at essentially the same level irrespective of their economic plight, personality, race, or emotional state.

These regression results are similar regardless of the choice of estimator. We estimated the model both with a standard structural equations approach using MLE, as well as with OLS by combining multiple measures into indices. The sign and significance of each of the coefficients is constant across each of the three methods. We are left, therefore, with two consistent results. Nationalists are on average bigoted, but patriots are not.

## Conclusion

This article began with a sense of ambivalence about in-group pride, in particular, national pride. A subsequent analysis of the survey evidence of patriots, nationalists, and bigots explains this ambivalence. Pride, it seems, reveals itself in two very different forms, one positive (patriotism) and one negative (nationalism). Moreover, these two dimensions of pride have very different implications for prejudice toward immigrants. True, the average *nationalist* is hostile toward immigrants. However, the average *patriot* is *no more antagonistic to immigrants than is the average citizen*. That is, those who express feelings of national superiority tend to derogate immigrants but those who express admiration for their country's principles and values tend to appreciate outsiders as much as anyone else. We can assert these relationships with surprising certainty. They hold up across six data sets, 50 countries, and a variety of subsamples. They remain after accounting for measurement error, controlling for direct and indirect effects of other factors, and employing different model specifications and estimation methods.

For theorists like Maurizio Viroli who are optimistic about the existence of such an empowering, tolerant brand of national pride, our results amount to an empirical validation. Of course, the results also confirm the sobering connection between feelings of national superiority and the denigration of immigrants. However, our findings with respect to such nationalism should surprise no one. Nationalists—as scholars have come to define

<sup>34</sup> It strikes us as possible that these null effects result from the loss of statistical power in a highly collinear model. To determine if we had inadvertently washed out an important result, we entered the terms one at a time. Still, none of the interaction terms returned a statistically significant result.



them—announce themselves as bigots almost as soon as they speak of their nation. That patriots tend to be tolerant and generous toward nonnatives, however, is indeed striking. It is striking, we should emphasize, precisely because patriots and nationalists are alike in their deep esteem for the nation. Patriotism is *not* some sort of indiscriminate “world pride” or “internationalist spirit” which Allport (1954), James (1971), and others have suggested as a way to surmount bigotry. No, what we are conceptualizing and measuring as patriotism is a monogamous love of nation. It is particularism, not universalism. It is a German’s love of Germany, an American’s love of the United States, and a Brazilian’s love of Brazil. What is intriguing is that such exclusive group loyalty does not come at the expense of tolerance.

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