

# Athenian Terms of Civic Praise in the 330s: Aeschines vs. Demosthenes

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**I**N 336 B.C., when Ctesiphon moved to crown Demosthenes, he included a phrase, standard for such motions, which summarized Demosthenes' worthiness in two abstract terms of civic praise. Most scholars state simply that the terms of this summary clause, the *ἔνεκα*-clause, were *ἀρετή* and *ἀνδραγαθία*. That claim is erroneous or at best incomplete, and it impedes further analysis of the use of the abstract terms in the speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes as well as in fourth-century Athenian civic life at large. To correct this and to deepen our understanding of the rhetoric of these two speeches and of the use of such abstract terms in the 330s, it is necessary to examine thoroughly the relevant passages in the two speeches and to compare the use of these abstract terms in contemporary epigraphical evidence in far greater depth than has yet been done. This analysis will reveal that Aeschines and Demosthenes used competing abstract terms as a way to essentialize their attack and defense respectively, and that their dispute over abstract terms is part of a broader development in civic praise in Athens as evidenced by both literary and epigraphic sources.<sup>1</sup>

The two relevant parts of Ctesiphon's motion, the *ἐπειδή*-clause and the *ἔνεκα*-clause, can be reconstructed, to a great extent, from passages in the two speeches.<sup>2</sup> Blass set the

<sup>1</sup> See David Whitehead, "Cardinal Virtues: The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens," *ClMed* 44 (1993) 37–75 (hereafter "Whitehead"), whose methods I attempt to follow, while complicating his use of Aeschin. 3.49 and pursuing, in some small way, the challenge set at the end of his article.

<sup>2</sup> Aeschin. 3.17, 34, 49, 101, 105, 155, 236, 237, 246; Dem. 18.57, 59, 86,

modern stage of reconstructions in his 1890 commentary on Demosthenes' speech by including two *ἔνεκα*-clauses, one in the *ἐπαινέσαι*-clause—*ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων*—and another in the *ἀνειπεῖν*-clause—*ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας*.<sup>3</sup> By repeating the *ἔνεκα*-clause, Blass gave himself an opportunity to replace *εὐνοία* with *ἀνδραγαθία*, thereby answering the apparent demands of the two versions present in Aeschines' speech,<sup>4</sup> but inventing a sort of variation absent from surviving contemporary inscriptions.<sup>5</sup> Martin and Budé offered a shorter reconstruction, with only one *ἔνεκα*-clause, “pour sa vertu et sa bonne volonté,” choosing *ἀρετή* and *εὐνοία*.<sup>6</sup> Schläpfer repeated the *ἔνεκα*-clause as Blass did but kept the objects the same, *ἀρετή* and *εὐνοία*, while examining the ancient testimonia supporting the presence of *εὐνοία* in Ctesiphon's motion.<sup>7</sup> Wankel agreed with Schläpfer about the presence of *εὐνοία* in the motion and insisted on the overall importance of *εὐνοία* in Demosthenes'

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88, 110, 250. On the two inserted documents at Dem. 18.53 and 118, a Hellenistic reconstruction of Aeschines' *graphé* and of Ctesiphon's motion respectively, see still J. G. Droysen, “Die Urkunden in Demosthenes' Rede vom Kranz,” *Zeitschrift für die Alterthumswissenschaft* 6 (1839) 537–599, 699–720, 799–824, 910–965 (repr. *Kleine Schriften* I 95–256); for further bibliography see Harvey Yunis, *Demosthenes, On the Crown* (Cambridge 2001) 29–31.

<sup>3</sup> F. Blass, rev. K. Fuhr, *Demosthenes, Die Rede vom Kranze* (Leipzig 1910) 6 n.l.

<sup>4</sup> Aeschin. 3.46 has *ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας* (cf. 3.155, 189) while 3.246 has *ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας καὶ εὐνοίας*. Cf. the solution of following *Paris.gr.* 2998 (saec. XIII/XIV = MS. **κ**) and its copies, which leave out *καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας καὶ εὐνοίας* in 3.246, adopted by Andreas Weidner, *Aeschinis in Ctesiphontem oratio* (Leipzig 1872).

<sup>5</sup> See however two later inscriptions, *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1263.20–22, 37–43 (300/299) and 1214.7–10, 28–33 (300–250).

<sup>6</sup> V. Martin and G. de Budé, *Eschine, Discours* II (Paris 1928) 9 (followed by D. J. Ochs, “Demosthenes' Use of Argument,” in J. J. Murphy, ed., *Demosthenes' On the Crown* [New York 1967] 51).

<sup>7</sup> P. Lothar Schläpfer, *Untersuchungen zu den attischen Staatsurkunden und den Amphiktyonenbeschlüssen der Demosthenischen Kranzrede* (Paderborn 1939) 79–92; the ancient testimonia for *εὐνοία* in Ctesiphon's motion include schol. Aeschin. 3.42 (p.114 Dilts); Cic. *De opt.gen.orat.* 19 (cf. 20); Liban. *Hyp.Dem.* 17.5.

speech.<sup>8</sup>

Yet more recent scholarship, in commentaries, translations, and broader political analyses, ignores the role of εὔνοια in Ctesiphon's motion, speaks solely of ἀνδραγαθία, or avoids specific language altogether, and does not examine the tension between these two terms in the case and in contemporary Athens. Even Yunis, who has integrated so much of earlier scholarship in the concise form of a Cambridge "green," states: "in the decree Ctesiphon used more general terms to justify the honor, praising D. for his 'merit and rectitude'," i.e. ἀρετή and ἀνδραγαθία.<sup>9</sup> What recent scholarship there is on Aeschines says the same or nothing at all,<sup>10</sup> and such is the case in scholarship that focuses on the broader socio-political issues in classical Athens. For example, David Whitehead states: "Ctesiphon's motion, as we see, called for Demosthenes to be crowned ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας (Aischin. 3.49)."<sup>11</sup> His ensuing and important question, "But what is to be made of it [the pair of terms] from a semantic point of view?" cannot, however, be applied to the crown case nor to contemporary Athens if Aeschines was, in fact, manipulating the terms of the phrase. It is necessary first to examine how Aeschines and Demosthenes employed ἀνδραγαθία and εὔνοια in their speeches.

Aeschines first speaks of ἀνδραγαθία as he begins the third

<sup>8</sup> Hermann Wankel, *Demosthenes, Rede für Ctesiphon Über den Kranz* (Heidelberg 1976), esp. 110, and see 12, 109–111, 361–363.

<sup>9</sup> Yunis, *Demosthenes 7*, though see 106 on εὔνοια. See also H. Yunis, *Demosthenes, Speeches 18 and 19* (Austin 2005) 25. The other recent commentary on Dem. 18 by Stephen Usher, *Demosthenes, On the Crown* (Warminster 1993), gives no details about Ctesiphon's motion in his introduction and rarely mentions it in the notes to the text, though see on Dem. 18.1; cf. the claim in Stephen Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford 1999) 288 n.18, "For the text [of Ctesiphon's decree] see 18 *Cor.* 118."

<sup>10</sup> Chris Carey, *Aeschines* (Austin 2000) 159–160, gives no specifics on the language of Ctesiphon's motion. E. Harris also avoids specifics in *Aeschines and Athenian Politics* (Oxford 1995) and in articles that touch on the case, though in "Open Texture in Athenian Law," *Dike* 3 (2000) 27–79, he says that Demosthenes "is praised for his merit and virtue (ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας)" (62).

<sup>11</sup> Whitehead 57; cf., though somewhat hedged, Peter Liddel, *Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens* (Oxford 2007) 174–175.

and most important charge of his attack against Ctesiphon's motion, that praise of Demosthenes' public career would be a lie and, as such, cannot appear in official documents (3.49–167). He appears to quote from Ctesiphon's motion (49):

λέγει γὰρ οὕτως ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι: “καὶ τὸν κήρυκα ἀναγορεύειν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὅτι στεφανοῖ αὐτὸν ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας,” καὶ τὸ μέγιστον: “ὅτι διατελεῖ καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ.”

For he says thus in his decree: “And the herald is to announce in the theater to the Hellenes that the people of Athens crown him for his virtue and manly/civic excellence,” and most importantly, “because he continually says and does the best things for the people.”

The latter phrase, ὅτι διατελεῖ καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ, was surely in Ctesiphon's motion; Demosthenes uses it repeatedly and it is common in inscriptions,<sup>12</sup> but it speaks *generally* of civic excellence. ἀρετή, *virtue*, is ubiquitous, appearing in the quotations of Ctesiphon's motion that are made by both Aeschines and Demosthenes as well as constantly in the inscriptions,<sup>13</sup> so its presence is not to be questioned, but neither is it noteworthy since it too is so generic. The second term, the abstract ἀνδραγαθία, serves as the focusing term, embodying a more specific civic character. In its oldest, traditional sense it speaks of manly excellence in battle, and clauses in inscriptions make this clear, such as a contemporary decree honoring Asclepiodorus, a metic, it seems, who was praised for his ἀνδραγαθία “since he became a good man ([ἀνὴρ] ἀγαθὸς ἐγένετο) while fighting against the enemy.”<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Dem. 18.57, 59, 86, 88, 110, 250; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 223.A.5, 11–12 (343/2); 498.12–15, 21–22 (303/2); 1270.7–8 (298/7); cf. Chryssoula Veligianni-Terzi, *Wertbegriffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der klassischen Zeit* (Stuttgart 1997: hereafter “Veligianni-Terzi”) 213–216. Demosthenes uses τὰ ἄριστα and τὰ βέλτιστα interchangeably.

<sup>13</sup> On ἀρετή in inscriptions see Whitehead, esp. 57–60, and Veligianni-Terzi 219–222, 294–298.

<sup>14</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 276.6–11, [ἀνδραγαθίας ἕνεκα; C. J. Schwenk, *Athens in the Age of Alexander* (Chicago 1985) 62, persuasively dates the inscription to 337/6. On the use of ἐγένετο, Veligianni-Terzi 265–267, 270, insists that we must distinguish between the phrase ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ and ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐγένετο, claiming that the latter always refers to courage in battle; at 272 n.887 she

The term, however, had expanded in meaning as the means whereby citizens and non-citizens could help Athens had expanded. At the end of the fifth century, it was already possible to be praised for one's ἀνδραγαθία while serving as a *choregos*.<sup>15</sup> Context, then, and qualifying phrases must be considered before an attempt at a translation is made, whether “manly excellence” or “civic excellence” proves best.<sup>16</sup>

If a certain flexibility has developed in the use of ἀνδραγαθία since the end of the fifth century, Aeschines makes clear that he is old-fashioned and believes that the only real ἀνδραγαθία is that shown on the battlefield. When he dramatically imagines the proclamation of Demosthenes' crown, he portrays Shame herself speaking forth to contradict the words of the herald: as the herald reads aloud the decree, “The people crown this man,” Shame interjects, “if indeed he is a man,” and to the phrase “for his virtue, ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα,” Shame counters “virtue” with “the most base man,” and, lastly, she responds to the phrase “for his manly and/or civic excellence, ἀνδραγαθίας ἕνεκα,” with “the coward who deserted his post” (3.155). Then, near the very end of his speech, when Aeschines gives his expanded version of the ἕνεκα-clause, there too in opposition to ἀρετή, ἀνδραγαθία, and now also εὐνοία, he warns the *dikastai* about Demosthenes' ἀνανδρία, his unmanliness, his cowardice (246–247). This stress on the older, traditional “manly” excellence, with no regard for the broader, contemporary use of the term, is part of Aeschines' overall framing motif of Demosthenes' abandonment of his post at Chaeroneia and thus abandonment of being a good Athenian citizen as a whole.

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wrongly faults David Whitehead, “Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: Φιλοτιμία in Democratic Athens,” *ClMed* 34 (1983) 55–74, for failing to observe this distinction between the verbs: see esp. 69–70 and consider *IG I<sup>3</sup> 101* (410/09) which uses ἐγένοντο (9) and identifies *financial* not military support.

<sup>15</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 1138.3–4* (403/2); see Whitehead 43–62, and M. J. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens IV* (Brussels 1983) 141–150.

<sup>16</sup> D. Whitehead, *Hypereides, The Forensic Speeches* (Oxford 2000) 138, speaks of the word's “extra, translation-defying dimension as part of the phraseology of the honorific decrees themselves,” and transliterates rather than translates it.

Aeschines' focused or old-fashioned use of ἀνδραγαθία is linguistically plausible, even if it disregards contemporary practice. But Demosthenes does not explicitly respond to Aeschines' use of this word. In fact he does not use the word anywhere in this speech, and, except when he quotes it in a phrase from a generic decree in the 350s, the word is not used in his preserved speeches.<sup>17</sup> Its absence from Demosthenes' vocabulary and Aeschines' variant version of the ἔνεκα-clause with three objects raise further questions. Aeschines' early version of the ἔνεκα-clause with only ἀρετή and ἀνδραγαθία has been restored in two mid-fourth-century inscriptions but does not appear securely in inscriptions until the end of the fourth century and into the third.<sup>18</sup> This pair together with εὔνοια never occurs, and the earliest epigraphical example in Athens of three, or four, objects in a ἔνεκα-clause does not appear for at least two generations, and such inscriptions are nearly always concerned with the activities of ephebes, although some of the earliest examples, *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1278 and 677, are for religious activities.<sup>19</sup> ἀνδραγαθία never appears in the ἔνεκα-clause of any of these inscriptions.<sup>20</sup>

εὔνοια, on the other hand, appears with ἀρετή in the ἔνεκα-clauses of dozens and dozens of inscriptions, for non-Athenians since the end of the fifth century and for Athenians, at least in deme decrees, since the 330s.<sup>21</sup> And Aeschines' treatment of

<sup>17</sup> Dem. 22.72 and 24.180. Contrast the presence of the term in Apollodoros' *Against Neaira*, [Dem.] 59.75, 89, 94.

<sup>18</sup> ἀνδραγαθία is mostly restored in *SEG* III 83.10–11 (365–335) and completely restored in XXIII 78.21–22 (361/0), but is sufficiently or fully extant in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 456.25–26 (307/6); 500.30–31 (302/1); 694.5–6 (early III); 1209.16–17 (post 319). Whitehead (49 n.38) suggests adding to this list *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 652 (290/89); on *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1.70–71 see Whitehead, *ClMed* 44 (1993) 49.

<sup>19</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1278.11–12 (ca. 277/6); 677.11–14 (ca. 250); *SEG* XXIX 116.30–31 (214/3); XXVI 98.33–34 (late III); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1319.4–6 (end of III?); and a dozen more down to the first century B.C. Cf. Whitehead 66 and n.106; Alan S. Henry, *Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees* (Hildesheim 1983) 43–44. Beyond Athens, cf. *IG* XII.7 5.19–21 (350s).

<sup>20</sup> The most frequent objects of ἔνεκα are εὐσέβεια, εὐταξία, φιλοτιμία (εὔνοια in a few).

<sup>21</sup> See Veligianni-Terzi 218–219, 274–276, and Whitehead 52–54. For the earliest examples see e.g. *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 113.17 (ca. 410–407) [ε]ὔνοιας; 125.29

the term is revealing. He is aware of the most general use of εὔνοια for goodwill or favor that polite people may have in general toward another person, such as when an orator asks for the goodwill of the *dikastai* at the beginning of a speech.<sup>22</sup> In the crown speech his focus is on the more formalized version of εὔνοια that manifests goodwill through actions that benefit Athens, such as military aid, the ransoming of prisoners of war, the supplying of grain (3.70, 116).<sup>23</sup> In the second half of the fourth century, Athenians start to be thanked formally for such εὔνοια, their “civic loyalty” or “patriotism,” and Aeschines himself preserves the earliest evidence for such a use. Demosthenes, Aeschines tells us, moved that the ambassadors returning from the first embassy to Philip, early in 346, be honored with a crown of leaves and fed in the Prytaneum εὐνοίας ἕνεκα τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον, “for their civic loyalty to the people” (2.46; cf. 2.121 and Dem. 19.234). In that speech Aeschines usually suspects every word that Demosthenes utters, but there he quotes Demosthenes’ εὔνοια as good evidence that initially he told the truth in praising the ambassadors, whereas he later reviled them and is now attacking Aeschines. That was 343/2. Now, however, Aeschines has grown suspicious of Demosthe-

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(405/4) εὐν[οίας]; for the earliest extant example for an Athenian see *I. Eleusis* 85.11–12 (332/1).

<sup>22</sup> See Aeschin. 2.1, 7; cf. e.g. Isae. 2.2, 6.2, 8.5, 10.3. Aeschines also speaks hypothetically of the “goodwill” or “favor” of another *polis* for an Athenian whom it is honoring with a crown which could compete with the goodwill of Athens for its own citizen (Aeschin. 3.46). εὔνοια can also be more emotional and mean “affection,” as Aeschin. 1.139, 142, 147.

<sup>23</sup> See Veligianni-Terzi 200–202, 218–219, for the surviving inscriptional evidence down to 322, at least, and on the difficulty in pinpointing the earliest use of the noun or adjective. For examples that mention the physical manifestation of the εὔνοια, see e.g. *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 212.32 (347/6) εὐνοίας and 360.12, 15 (325/4) εὔνοους and εὐνοίας for management of grain supply; 237.10 (338/7) [εὔ]νοιαν for military aid; 283.11, 16 (ante 336/5) εὔνοιαν and εὐν[οίας] and 399.11 (328/7) εὔνοιαν for the ransoming of Athenian prisoners of war. Cf. Aeschin. 2.17, 26. Demosthenes speaks of this sort of interstate goodwill, Dem. 18.94, 311. See Lynette G. Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World* (Cambridge 1997), esp. 38–41, and, “Φιλία, εὔνοια and Greek Interstate Relations,” *Antichthon* 31 (1997) 28–44; J. de Romilly, “Eunoia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will,” *JHS* 78 (1958) 91–101, esp. 94.

nes' use of this term.

εὐνοία appears in three other passages in *Against Ctesiphon* and these reveal that Aeschines finds the term tainted and so hopelessly connected with Demosthenes that he refuses to use the word and rejects its new semantic function of “civic loyalty” and its resulting socio-political power. Aeschines uses it first very early in the speech, when he is presenting the initial charge against Ctesiphon’s motion, that Demosthenes was still in office, subject to audit, and could not be honored until after the audit at the end of the year (3.9–31). Demosthenes will admit, Aeschines says, that he was in charge of the upkeep of the walls but, by stressing that he donated 100 minas of his own money to the work, he will ask “For what, then, am I subject to audit? Unless there is an audit for civic loyalty, εὐνοία?” (17; cf. Dem. 18.111–119). Aeschines calls this a πρόφασις, “excuse,” and proceeds, at length, to offer one of his lessons in Athenian constitutional history and jurisprudence, about what is both “just and beneficial” (3.17). Minutes later, when he restates Demosthenes’ argument, he characterizes Demosthenes as particularly offensive (μάλιστα θρασύνηται, 23), and, rather than being civically loyal, as circumventing ancestral and judicial procedure, trying to seize honor and snatch the ballots from the hands of the *dikastai* and to put himself ahead of the laws. With this charge, Aeschines rejects Demosthenes’, and Ctesiphon’s, generalized and vague terms of “loyalty” and he insists on adherence to specific, quotable ancestral laws and traditions.

For nearly the rest of the speech Aeschines will shun εὐνοία as the general, new referent for civic excellence, until the very end of the speech. In his conclusion, though, as he reviews Ctesiphon’s motion and Demosthenes’ person and career, he restates how Demosthenes is venal, a coward, a deserter of his post who betrayed the soldiers at Chaeroneia: his cowardice must not be honored or all subsequent Athenians will follow his shameless example (3.244–245). Aeschines then allows himself to add εὐνοία to the two terms that he used when he first “quoted” Ctesiphon’s motion, ἀρετή and ἀνδραγαθία: ὅτι στεφανοῦται ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας καὶ εὐνοίας, “that he be crowned for his virtue and manly excellence and civic loyalty” (246). The appearance of a third object of ἕνεκα here



is odd. It is epigraphically odd, as noted above, but it is also odd that Aeschines, who appears generally to be such a nit-picker about terms, would add a third term seemingly out of the blue, and do so here in his final remarks to the *dikastai*. Has εὐνοια been added to Ctesiphon's motion by Aeschines or has he been avoiding it, and, if he has been avoiding it, should we then doubt ἀνδραγαθία?

In the concluding sections of the speech there is strong evidence that εὐνοια is a key term about which Aeschines is worried. He has been doing plenty of linguistic manipulation throughout the speech, and he wants to warn the *dikastai* against similar such linguistic manipulation on the part of his opponents. So he explains to the *dikastai* the semantic seduction that Demosthenes, and Ctesiphon, have been employing and will employ and how Athens may avoid the disgrace that this linguistic deception signifies. These men, he warns, are usurping the very language of public discourse, the ability to say what is the common good, τὰ κοινὰ καὶ φιλόπολις τῶν ὀνομάτων, and, in light of their character, they are not to be trusted (3.248).<sup>24</sup> He specifies the terms at stake: εὐνοια, civic loyalty, and τὸ τῆς δημοκρατίας ὄνομα, the term “democracy.” He explains that these very terms are most employed τῷ λόγῳ, “in speech,” by those who are most distant from them τοῖς ἔργοις, “in deed.” Here then is the explanation why Aeschines shuns this word εὐνοια—people like Demosthenes have made the term suspect, so Aeschines avoids it and warns the *dikastai* to distrust its newfangled use and its users.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> A scholiast glosses τὰ κοινὰ with “that is to say ‘I am patriotic’ (φιλόπολις) and the like” (p.159 Dilts). Aeschines probably has in mind not φιλόπολις but δημοτικός; φιλόπολις does not appear in the extant texts of Aeschines, though contemporary orators do use the term. Aeschines presents a similar argument in 2.177 about persons, Demosthenes and Timarchus among them, who are “serving the name of democracy not with their character but with their flattery,” and there too the scholiast says that Aeschines speaks of their character “so that he can say that they are not truly by nature patriotic (φιλοπόλιδες) but are acting” (p.100).

<sup>25</sup> Distrusting Demosthenes as a sophist and abuser of words is a constant motif for Aeschines: 3.16, 28, 35, 37, 61, 64, 76, 77, 99, 101, 119, 125, 137, 162, 167, 172, 174, 193, 200, 207, 215, 216, 218, 223, 225, 226, 231, 234, 254, 255, 256.

Aeschines' handling of εὔνοια highlights his emphasis on ἀνδραγαθία all the more. He was trying to capitalize on the established civic status of the phrase “he is/has become a good man” (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός).<sup>26</sup> He twice inverts the abstract form ἀνδραγαθία back to these standard phrases “being” or “becoming a good man.” He uses γίγνομαι in the first and εἰμί in the second: “It is not possible that a man who so shamelessly takes bribes ‘has become a good man’ (ἄνδρα γεγονέναι ἀγαθόν), which is what this man has dared to write in his decree” (ὁ τετόλμηκεν οὗτος ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι γράψαι, 3.105); “And if you come to the second part of the decree, in which he has dared to write that he is a good man” (ἐν ᾧ τετόλμηκας γράφειν ὡς ἔστιν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός (237). The phrase ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, with either verb, appears so often in the ἐπειδή-clause of honorary inscriptions that there is every reason to think that ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός was in Ctesiphon's motion and that Aeschines has falsely introduced the abstract ἀνδραγαθία as part of the ἔνεκα-clause, so as to exaggerate etymologically the phrase “he is/became a good man,” pointing to courage (and cowardice), while he shuns and even tries to hide the term εὔνοια, which Demosthenes will emphasize.

Demosthenes places great importance on εὔνοια in his speech, and it becomes evident that he was a leader in the growing use of the term to summarize and mark what he saw as the most important characteristic of the good citizen, civic loyalty.<sup>27</sup> Demosthenes introduces εὔνοια in his very first sen-

<sup>26</sup> Veligianni-Terzi 192–195, 247–254, 265–267.

<sup>27</sup> Yunis, *Demosthenes* 106; Whitehead 53; Felipe Hernández Muñoz, “Eunoia como elemento estructural del discurso *Sobre la corona*,” *Minerva* 3 (1989) 171–188; L. Pearson, *The Art of Demosthenes* (Meisenheim am Glan 1976) 178–199, esp. 180 and 199; Wankel, *Demosthenes* 145–146; Blass, *Demosthenes* 21. Demosthenes speaks of his own εὔνοια/being εὔνοος for Athens in 18.1, 8, [54], [84], 110, 171, 172, 173, 281, 286, 311, 320, 321, 322; of that of the good citizen for Athens in 18.80, 291, 301, 311, 316; of that of the *dikastai* (those present and/or in general) for Demosthenes/a defendant in 18.1, 2, 3, 5, 7 (εὔνοικῶς), 8, 10, 199, 277, 314; of that of Athens for other Hellenes and vice versa in 18.80, 94 (of that of the Thebans for Philip in 18.[167]); of that of the gods for Athens in 18.153, 195; and sarcastically of that of Aeschines for Athens in 18.198, 276, 312, and even for Demosthenes in 18.273. Cf. the list in Hernández Muñoz 186 n.18.

tence: *πρῶτον μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομαι πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις, ὅσῃν εὐνοίαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν, τοσαύτην ὑπάρξει μοι παρ' ὑμῶν εἰς τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα*, “First, men of Athens, to the gods I pray, to all the gods and goddesses, that as much goodwill as I continually have for both the city and for all of you, there be just as much [goodwill] for me from you in this trial” (18.1). This request for the *εὐνοία* of the *dikastai* looks like the initial “goodwill” that is often sought in the opening of speeches, even by Aischines (2.1, 7), and that is one of the meanings intended by Demosthenes. Even as this opening sentence ends, he defines the legal, sworn duty of the *dikastai* to listen to both sides in like manner as “not only not to judge anything beforehand, and to give equal goodwill (*εὐνοία*) [to both sides], but also to allow each to follow the arrangement and argument that he has decided upon and has chosen” (2). And, when he rephrases this definition, he describes the act of listening to the second speaker, i.e. himself, *εὐνοϊκῶς*, “with goodwill,” as a sacred act, of one who “guards his devotion to the gods” (7). It is unambiguous, then, that one sort of *εὐνοία* in this introduction is a generalized goodwill that arises without respect to the persons involved but due solely to the circumstance of being in a courtroom.

It is just as clear in his introduction that Demosthenes is also referring to a specific, established goodwill that would best be called loyalty. The opening relative clause, “as much goodwill as I continually have both for the city and for all of you,” speaks not of some occasional goodwill that is appropriate or required by legal custom but of an established, long-term relationship between specific persons, Demosthenes and the *dikastai* and, by extension, all Athenians. In turn Demosthenes immediately reveals that he fears to lose the goodwill/*εὐνοία* of the *dikastai* (18.3) and stresses that the loss of their *εὐνοία* and *φιλανθρωπία* would be so painful because its possession is the greatest of all things (5).<sup>28</sup> In these two invocations of *εὐνοία* Demosthenes has moved from the *dikastai*’s initial, obligatory show of kindness to an unknown litigant to their long-estab-

<sup>28</sup> Contra Wankel, *Demosthenes* 123, and his understanding of *διαμαρτάνειν*.

lished, respectful appreciation of Demosthenes and all that he has done in the service of Athens. The public manifestation of such an appreciation would be the decreeing of a gold crown.<sup>29</sup> He repeats and expands his appeal, however, for a fair, open-minded hearing and reminds them to listen εὐνοϊκῶς, with goodwill, as noted above, since that is what the laws order, the laws established by Solon εὐνοῦς ὧν ὑμῖν καὶ δημοτικός, “in his goodwill for you and as a supporter of the people” (6). As this iterated call for a fair hearing serves to shake off the accusations that have been piling up over the hours of Aeschines’ speech, so too Demosthenes invokes Solon to counteract Aeschines who only moments earlier called on Solon, ἄνη φιλόσοφος καὶ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός (3.257). Their judicial obligation here becomes a democratic duty, their goodwill to the defendant, a continuation of their long-held support for the man most like Solon.

When he closes his introduction by repeating his opening prayer (18.8, as 18.1), he has come full circle and has neatly intertwined two aspects of εὐνοια: generic, judicial goodwill and personal, established loyalty to Demosthenes, their Solonian democrat. The carefully repeated phrase, ὅσῃν εὐνοίαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν (1, 8), stresses the importance of εὐνοια. This phrase calls to mind not simply the parallel phrase in Ctesiphon’s motion as quoted by Aeschines and Demosthenes but also invokes the language of public decrees as preserved in inscriptions.<sup>30</sup> The verb διατελεῖν, stressing the on-going, long-term service of individuals for Athens, is also joined with εὐνοῦς in contemporary inscriptions,<sup>31</sup> but it is far more common to find the fuller πράττων καὶ λέγων τὰ ἀριστα (βέλτιστα) τῷ δήμῳ / τῇ πόλει.<sup>32</sup> Demosthenes inter-

<sup>29</sup> Cf. schol. Dem. 18.3 (p.201 Dilts).

<sup>30</sup> Aeschin. 3.49, 101, 237; Dem. 18.57, 59, 86, 88, 110, 250. See Wankel, *Demosthenes* 109–110; Veligianni-Terzi 231–232.

<sup>31</sup> E.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 220.16–17 (344/3); 346.15 (332/1); 347.12–13 (332/1); *Hesperia* 9 (1940) 333 no. 39.3 (ca. 330); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 409.6–8 (ca. 330; see Veligianni-Terzi 90–91); 360.12 (325/4). On the phrase, see Veligianni-Terzi 200–201.

<sup>32</sup> Contemporary examples are *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 223.A.5, 11–12 (343/2); *SEG* XXVIII 52.6–9, cf. 29–30 (ca. 333) (heavily restored); *Agora* XVI 82.[1], 3–5

weaves with this language another term that is intrinsically paired with εὐνοια, namely προθυμία, zealousness, or its adjective πρόθυμος (110, 286, 301, 312).<sup>33</sup> The pair first appears just as Demosthenes has finished defending the first phase of his public service (53–109). He sums up his detailed account with language that parallels the justification-phrase of Ctesiphon’s motion: τὸ γὰρ ὡς τὰ ἄριστα τ’ ἔπραττον καὶ διὰ παντὸς εὐνοῦς εἰμὶ καὶ πρόθυμος εὐ ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἰκανῶς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δεδηλώσθαι μοι νομίζω, “that ‘I acted as nobly as possible and always was loyal and zealous to labor on your behalf I think has been sufficiently made clear from what has been said’” (110). At the very beginning of this long section he had begun with a similar quotation (57): πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστά με τῷ δήμῳ διατελεῖν καὶ πρόθυμον εἶναι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν δύνωμαι ἀγαθόν, “that I consistently do and say what is best for the people and that I am zealous to do whatever good I can”<sup>34</sup>—in this version εὐνοια would be held over for the following ἔνεκα-clause.<sup>35</sup>

It may strike us as odd to speak of Demosthenes’ zealousness or wholeheartedness. The language of the motion has just spelled out that he “*was constantly doing and saying things* for the best of the people,” and in the ἐπειδή-clause the most recent, specific deeds were enumerated. Is not, then, his loyalty obviously “wholehearted” and the πρόθυμος-phrase redundant? Certainly not, in light of the common use of such pairs both by Demosthenes and in Athenian honorary decrees.<sup>36</sup> Such doubling can be labeled hendiadys but “it is reasonable to expect

(330–320) (heavily restored); and see Veligianni-Terzi 213–216.

<sup>33</sup> On προθυμία and on the pairing of abstracts see Whitehead 51, 65–67.

<sup>34</sup> For this language cf. 18.59, 86, 88, 250, and see Veligianni-Terzi 213–216, 264–265, 282–283. Elsewhere Demosthenes insists that earlier decrees and Ctesiphon’s decree use τὰς αὐτὰς συλλαβὰς (18.83 and 223) and ταῦτα ὀήματα (223), but such claims appear to assume some degree of synonymic usages, as with the interchange between τὰ ἄριστα and τὰ βέλτιστα.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Wankel, *Demosthenes* 12 and 363 (on Dem. 18.57).

<sup>36</sup> On Demosthenes’ use of doublets see G. Ronnet, *Étude sur le style de Démosthènes dans les discours politiques* (Paris 1951) 71–73; F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*<sup>2</sup> III.1 (Leipzig 1893) 96–100; C. Rehdantz, *Demosthenes, Neun Philippische Reden*<sup>4</sup> II.2 *Indices* (Leipzig 1886) 13–18 (on *Erweiterung*).

that each of them say something that the other does not.”<sup>37</sup> Such is the case here. Demosthenes’ εὐνοία is proved by his record, but that is the past; that he is ready and will continue in his loyalty to Athens is claimed by calling him πρόθυμος. This latter point is made absolutely clear in the inscriptional language through the addition of an exegetical infinitive and indefinite relative clause: ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται ἀγαθόν, a clause used in numerous decrees.<sup>38</sup> By combining πρόθυμος with εὐνοία Demosthenes, Ctesiphon, and the Athenians passing decrees with these terms emphasized their concern for and praise of an enthusiastic loyalty that promised to continue into the future its past record of devotion to Athens.<sup>39</sup> Such past and current constancy is frequently stressed in inscriptions by the phrase καὶ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, “both now and in the past,” as too with the shorter phrase, ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, “on every occasion,” which is the very phrase used by Demosthenes to qualify the good citizen’s εὐνοία in the conclusion of his speech (18.321).<sup>40</sup>

<sup>37</sup> K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford 1974) 64; cf. Whitehead 57.

<sup>38</sup> Or ὅ τι δύναται ἀγαθόν: e.g. *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 102.7–8 (410/09); II<sup>2</sup> 76.10–13 (ca. 378/7) with the added phrase καὶ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ; see the list of phrases with πρόθυμος at Veligianni-Terzi 195 n.639, cf. 194–198, 213–214.

<sup>39</sup> Whitehead (73) suspects that προθυμία was not quite an “altruistic, community-oriented virtue,” at least in inscriptions, until the third century; he notes that the abstract noun προθυμία is absent from surviving inscriptions until 226/5 (*Agora* XVI 224.23); he questions (50) the restorations in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 145.5 (ca. 402/1; cf. Veligianni-Terzi 46); *SEG* XXI 336.6–7 (306/5); XIV 58.22–23 (302); and *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 836.18 (paullo post 229) (cf. Henry, *Honours* 61 n.136, whose note Whitehead 50 n.41 appears to have confused); Veligianni-Terzi (47 and 267 n.873) merely states that the abstract does not appear in inscriptions “bis 322.” In light of my analysis, however, προθυμία is already an “altruistic, community-oriented” term as Demosthenes uses it.

<sup>40</sup> On καὶ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ in general as well as with πρόθυμος, see Veligianni-Terzi 228–231; the surviving examples of relevant state decrees from the classical period are for non-Athenians but a couple of deme-decrees survive, including *SEG* XXVIII 102.6–9 (332/1), which has the variant καὶ [ν]ῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ (cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 347.14–15 [332/1]); on the variations of this phrase see K. J. Dover, “The Language of Classical Attic Documentary Inscriptions,” *TPhS* 1981, 1–14 (repr. *Greek and the Greeks: Collected Papers* I [London 1987] 31–41, esp. 35). For ἐν παντὶ και-

The intertwining of εὐνοία and προθυμία appears three more times in Demosthenes' long and elaborate closing arguments and the conclusion proper (18.227–324). His overarching goal in this third of the speech is to portray himself to be the good citizen and to make this even more marked by revealing Aeschines to be the bad citizen. He uses the pair εὐνοία and προθυμία to summarize his excellence and to contrast Aeschines' foulness. In the first of these three passages, Demosthenes introduces one of the most famous and oft-repeated proofs against Aeschines' whole attack on his public career, namely, that the Athenians chose Demosthenes to deliver the public funeral oration over the war dead after the battle at Chaeroneia (285–290). Why did the people choose him, he asks, even when Aeschines challenged a vote for Demosthenes back then, just as he is doing in the present contest. Because, he answers, “they knew both my loyalty and zeal, τὴν τ' ἐμὴν εὐνοία καὶ προθυμία, which motivated all my actions, and your baseness, ἀδικία” (286). ἀδικία functions as an antonym for the duo εὐνοία and προθυμία, so that they are synonymous with δικαιοσύνη, upright justice. In like manner, when Demosthenes reviews all his good deeds (297–305) and contrasts the utter absence of such good deeds on the part of Aeschines (306–313), he asks, “What was a loyal citizen, ὁ εὖνους πολίτης, to do, one who was politically active for his fatherland with all forethought, πρόνοια, and zeal, προθυμία, and justice, δικαιοσύνη?” (301). Then, after listing more examples of the products of his loyal forethought, zeal, and justice, he sets in stark contrast what opposed all his zealous efforts: “the might of some deity or of fortune, or the foulness of the generals, or the wickedness, κακία, of those who were betraying your cities” (303). Aeschines is the embodiment of the last of these three.

Demosthenes continues this list of his deeds and Aeschines' misdeeds, of his activities and Aeschines' “wicked and deceitful inactivity,” ἡσυχία ἄδικος καὶ ὑπουλος (307). Inactivity, to Demosthenes, is evidence of treachery. He uncovers this treachery of inactivity through a long string of questions, pointing to the record of his own many accomplishment and the total absence

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οἶ see Veligianni-Terzi 230.

of any such deeds by Aeschines. He speaks of alliances, aid, embassies, service, local and international relations, triremes, armaments, shipyards, walls, cavalry, cash donations (311). This list recalls all the services and deeds that Demosthenes has recounted as his own, none of which Aeschines can claim for himself. Then, with the utmost sarcasm, he imagines Aeschines responding: “But my dear fellow, ὄταν, if none of these are mine [i.e., Aeschines’], at least there is my goodwill and zeal, εὖνοιά γε καὶ προθυμία” (312). Demosthenes has taken the two terms that he has empowered to embody his civic character and put them in Aeschines’ mouth to striking effect. This dummy utterance equates to: “Well, I did not *do* anything, but I *meant* well.” Such invented misuse of these terms highlights all the more Demosthenes’ use of these very terms to embody his civic character: (true) loyalty and zeal are manifested in actions, such actions as Demosthenes has just listed (311) and continues to describe as he draws the speech to a close.<sup>41</sup>

προθυμία has been joined to εὖνοια to highlight the intrinsic established and long-term character of loyalty and of Demosthenes’ active loyalty in particular. At the end of the speech, however, εὖνοια stands loudly alone, and it is the stark contrast between Demosthenes’ abundant and continued active loyalty to Athens, his εὖνοια, and the vile absence of any such long-term loyalty on the part of Aeschines that dominate the conclusion of the speech. Demosthenes recalls the goodwill/εὖνοια that the *dikastai* have for the great men, ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, of past generations (314). Aeschines had twice cited in his speech The-

<sup>41</sup> Among the meager number of state inscriptions honoring Athenians that survive, some twenty or thirty for the classical period, it has been observed that πρόθυμος never appears (Veligianni-Terzi 195; repeated by Yunis, *Demosthenes* 142). But so few inscriptions survive; so many of those few preserve only enough letters to permit the most general of identifications, and details, such as ἔνεκα-phrases, are most often missing and/or completely restored; there are available, then, only a handful, if that, of relevant inscriptions in which πρόθυμος is absent. Cf. the (intact) presence of προθύμως in a tribal decree (Pandionis) of 403/2 honoring Nicias for fulfilling his role as *choregos* for a chorus of boys εὖ καὶ προθύμως (and he won) and as a *choregos* for a chorus of men (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1138.4–5; second copy 1139.4); see Veligianni-Terzi 198 for the surviving or restored presence of the adverb in inscriptions honoring non-Athenians.



mistocles, Miltiades, the democrats from Phyle, and Aristeides (3.181, cf. 258–259). Demosthenes complains that it is unfair to compare the living with the dead and insists that he be judged in comparison to his peers, and especially Aeschines (18.314–315). Demosthenes accomplishes two goals with this argument. He recalls the goodwill/εὐνοία that the *dikastai* have for him and of which he spoke repeatedly in his introduction, and aligns their goodwill for the heroes of the past with their goodwill for him, effectively turning Aeschines' assault into praise. And, by shifting the comparison away from heroes of the past to his contemporaries, he reveals the vast difference in accomplishments not between himself and past heroes but between himself and Aeschines, thereby not merely turning Aeschines' attack into praise for himself but into an attack on Aeschines. How then does he epitomize himself, and those heroes of the past? He speaks of “those who do even the slightest thing in loyalty,” ὅσοι τι μετ' εὐνοίας πράττουσι. Such a person is Demosthenes and such, he continues, were those men of old (316–317).

To bolster his argument Demosthenes illustrates how a fair comparison should work by offering an analogy to athletics (319). Demosthenes' excellence and his victorious crowning must be judged relative to those who compete with him, not with the great men, or athletes, of the past. What, however, is being “contested,” as in athletics? It is not merely virtue, ἀρετή, or ἀνδραγαθία, or φιλοτιμία; it is εὐνοία (320):

When it was possible for the city to choose the very best things, when loyalty to our fatherland was the object of competition for all (ἐφ' αὐτῶν τῆς εἰς τὴν πατρίδα εὐνοίας ἐν κοινῷ πᾶσι κειμένης), I was manifestly the one speaking most effectively, and by my decrees and laws and diplomacy everything was being managed, and not one of your [Aeschines'] people was around (ὑμῶν δ' οὐδεὶς ἦν οὐδαμῶς).

Not only did no one come close to Demosthenes in such a competition, no one at all even challenged him in loyalty to Athens. To speak of loyalty as an “object of competition,” ἐφ' αὐτῶν, may seem overly athletic. His language, however, is again precisely what is found in honorary inscriptions. Follow-

ing the crowning clause, in the hortatory intention,<sup>42</sup> there appears the very word that Demosthenes used: So-and-so is crowned (and the inscription is set up) “so that it may be an objective of competition,” ἐφάμμιλον, to compete for the sake of Athens, for the freedom or salvation of the Hellenes, etc.<sup>43</sup>

The earliest inscription with an ἐφάμμιλον-hortatory intention clause of this sort dates to around 303/2.<sup>44</sup> An earlier instance is restored in a decree of 336/5 honoring a *hieropoios*, but the restoration seems unlikely.<sup>45</sup> What is particularly well preserved for the 330s, however, is a hortatory intention clause that focuses on φιλοτιμία, love of honor. The decree for a *hieropoios*, a decree of the *boule*, is in fact appended to a similar decree of the people of 335/4 in which the hortatory intention reads: [ὅπως ἄ]ν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ καθιστάμε[νοι ἱεροποιοὶ φιλοτιμώντα]ι πρὸς τε τὴν βουλήν καὶ τὸν δῆμον ἄρχειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμου]ς καὶ εἶναι χρήσιμοι τῷ δήμ[ωι Ἀθηναίων], “so that also others who have been appointed as *hieropoioi* may vie in their love of honor for both the *boule* and the people by governing according to the laws and by being beneficial to the people of Athens.”<sup>46</sup> This φιλοτιμείσθαι-hortatory intention clause survives in a number of inscriptions from this decade and later,<sup>47</sup> and the use of φιλοτιμείσθαι parallels the common use of φιλοτιμία in ἔνεκα-clauses for the period.

Does Demosthenes’ use of ἐφάμμιλον mark a step away from

<sup>42</sup> Or manifest-clause or formula of disclosure; see Alan S. Henry, “The Hortatory Intention in Athenian State Decrees,” *ZPE* 112 (1996) 105–119 and n.4, for further bibliography on the term, and recently Liddel, *Civic Obligation* 165; Whitehead, *C&M* 34 (1983) 63, uses the term “manifesto-clause”; on “formulae of disclosure” see Charles W. Hedrick Jr., “Democracy and the Athenian Epigraphical Habit,” *Hesperia* 68 (1999) 387–439, esp. 408–410.

<sup>43</sup> E.g. *Agora* XVI 120.4–7 (303–300); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 558.11–14 (ca. 303/2); 663.30–31 (283/2?); *Agora* XVI 185.17 (275/4).

<sup>44</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 558 (ca. 303/2); *Agora* XVI 120.4 (303–301).

<sup>45</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 330.II.36–37; see Veligianni-Terzi 112.

<sup>46</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 330.I.20–23.

<sup>47</sup> E.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 300.2–5 (ante 336/5); 338.21–24 (333/2); 360.63–65 (330/29); etc. See Hedrick, *Hesperia* 68 (1999) 422–423 (discussion), 434–435 (examples).

the use of an inherently ambiguous φιλοτιμ-root word toward a word that had become public-oriented, εὔνοια? Competition is, of course, implied in φιλοτιμείσθαι, but φιλοτιμία is not inherently public-spirited, though it is argued that it was moving in that direction in the fourth century B.C.<sup>48</sup> In one of the two uses of φιλοτιμία in his speech, Demosthenes speaks of φιλοτιμία ἰδία and φιλοτιμία δημοσία, private pursuit of honor and a public pursuit of honor (18.257); this passage, like others of the period, reveals the two parallel and potentially opposed goals of this term.<sup>49</sup> ἐφάμλλον is not inherently public-spirited either, but, lacking any of the possibly selfish and/or aristocratic baggage of φιλοτιμ-words, it derives its character from the noun or infinitive it qualifies. Inscriptions of the end of the century have ἐφάμλλον qualified by infinitives, such as “to labor together without hesitation, [συναγωνίζ]εσθαι ἀπροφασίστω[ς], of the policy of the kings (Antigonus and Demetrius) and for the freedom of the Hellenes,” “to labor, ἀγ[ωνίζεσθαι], for the people of Athens and for the freedom of the Hellenes,” “to fulfill their duties of office in pursuit of honor (φιλοτιμῶς) and justly,” and such.<sup>50</sup> Such language appears in Demosthenes’ speech, especially forms of ἀγωνίζεσθαι: Athens *labors* for preeminence, honor, and glory, πρωτεία, τιμή, δόξα (66, 203), and for the benefit of others (101).<sup>51</sup> Demosthenes’ phrase,

<sup>48</sup> So Whitehead, *ClMed* 34 (1983) 55–74, and *The Demes of Attic* (Princeton 1986) 242–243, followed by, e.g., D. M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes, Against Meidias* (Oxford 1990) 378–379 (cf. his *Demosthenes, On the False Embassy* [Oxford 2000] 223–224); cf. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* 230–233.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Dem. 21.159 and MacDowell, *Demosthenes, On the False Embassy* 378–379; see too Lycurg. *Leocr.* 139–140.

<sup>50</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 558.11–17 (ca. 303/2); *Agora* XVI 120.4–7 (303–301); *Agora* XVI 185.16–17 (275/4); cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 808.21–22 (280s, according to Alan S. Henry, “Bithys Son of Kleon of Lysimacheia: Formal Dating Criteria and *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>.808,” in E. M. Craik [ed.], *Owls to Athens* [Oxford 1990] 179–189; previously dated ca. 239–229).

<sup>51</sup> Demosthenes uses συναγωνίζεσθαι and συναγωνιστής throughout this speech of treasonous cooperative effort, usually Aeschines’ (18.20, 25, 31, 61, 136, 139). Note that the restoration by Traill of ἐφάμλλοι in *SEG* XXVIII 52.29 (ca. 333 B.C.), which gave the very interesting hortatory intention clause [ὅπως ἂν ἐφάμλλοι ὦσι] καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι λέγειν [καὶ πράττειν τὰ ἄριστα], should be revised to [ὅπως ἂν φιλοτιμῶνται], as Alan S. Henry

highlighting loyalty to Athens as the basis and goal of the competition, shuns the old term φιλοτιμία and its potential if not inherent selfishness and sets a new terminological trend that stresses loyalty to the community through an ἐφάμμιλον over εὔνοια.

In the last moments of the speech, the contest over εὔνοια takes a rhetorical, momentary volte-face to turn then back for the final blow against Aeschines and treason, and for Demosthenes and civic loyalty. Demosthenes euphemistically recalls the contest in arms lost at Chaeroneia. “When,” he says, “what I wish had never happened, happened,” then the call-up, ἐξέτασις, was not for public advisors but for toadies, traitors, and sycophants, such as Aeschines and his kind. This is a stark admission that any action against Philip was impossible, thus inaction was the only proof of loyalty to Athens and her honor. So, at being a toady, traitor, or sycophant, Demosthenes admits that he was weak, ἀσθενής, which proves in fact that “he was loyal, more so than you,” Aeschines, to “these men here,” εὔνους μᾶλλον ὑμῶν τουτοισί, the *dikastai* themselves. Then, with a sudden turn to the *dikastai*, he elaborates this contrast by defining loyalty as the final, guiding principle of the responsible citizen (321):

δύο δ', ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν φύσει μέτριον πολίτην ἔχειν δεῖ (οὕτω γὰρ μοι περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ λέγοντι ἀνεπιφθονώτατον εἰπεῖν), ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τὴν τοῦ γενναίου καὶ τοῦ πρωτείου τῆ πόλει προαίρεσιν διαφυλάττειν, ἐν παντὶ δὲ καιρῷ καὶ πράξει τὴν εὔνοιαν.

Two things, men of Athens, must a truly *responsible* citizen have—for to speak of myself in such a way is the least invidious—when in a position of power, to preserve his policy of nobility and preeminence for the city, and, at every moment and in every act, to preserve his loyalty.

After Chaeroneia the only thing such a citizen could hold to was his loyalty, his εὔνοια; anything else was treason. Such continuous loyalty is his defense, as evidenced by the particular deeds of his whole public career, as he has just said seconds

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(according to Lambert 98), Veligianni-Terzi 114, and Stephen D. Lambert, “Athenian State Laws and Decrees, 352/1–322/1: I. Decrees Honouring Athenians,” *ZPE* 150 (2004) 85–120, esp. 96–99.

earlier as he listed his “decrees, laws, and diplomacy” (320), and as he repeats here: “I have never betrayed my loyalty to you, τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς εὐνοίαν, for from the beginning straightway I chose the path of politics that was upright and just, to support the honor, power, the glory of my fatherland, to increase these, to live by them” (322). Through these closing moments εὐνοία rings repeatedly, just as in his introduction (1–8), and just as he has used the term to summarize his civic excellence, so the term has acquired a famous champion to make it the civic virtue of the day.

That εὐνοία was very much on the minds of the Athenians in the 330s is evidenced by two of the few inscriptions that survive from just after the battle at Chaeroneia. In *IG II<sup>2</sup> 237*, two Acarnanians, Phormio and Carphinas, are praised for fighting alongside the Athenians in 338/7. In doing so they διαφυλάττουσιν [τὴν εὐ]νοίαν ἣν οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτοῖς παρέδωσαν πρὸς [τὴν δ]ῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων, “preserve the loyalty which their forefathers handed down to them, their loyalty to the people of Athens.”<sup>52</sup> In *IG II<sup>2</sup> 238*, two men of Andros, Dracontides and Hegesias, are crowned ἀνδραγα[αθίας ἐν]εκα καὶ εὐνοίας, “on account of their noble excellence and loyalty.”<sup>53</sup> Sadly, the ἐπεὶ-clause explaining their deeds is missing. We know, however, from Lycurgus, that at this very time the Athenians sought help from Andros, Ceos, Troizen, and Epidaurus, at the least (*Leocr.* 42). Demosthenes himself went out just after the battle to seek help from states friendly to Athens.<sup>54</sup> Interstate loyalty, εὐνοία, had always been impor-

<sup>52</sup> See Osborne, *Naturalization* D16 for text (I 61–65), commentary (II 84–85).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. this pairing in *IG I<sup>3</sup> 125b.2–3* and 11–12 (405/4).

<sup>54</sup> Demosthenes speaks of being elected to collect grain, which would have to come from outside Attica (18.248); Aeschines speaks of Demosthenes taking a trireme and τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀργυρολογήσας, “gathering tribute from the Hellenes” (3.159, cf. 226, 253); later, in 322, Dinarchus speaks of Demosthenes going out as an ambassador and taking eight talents to do so (1.80); see A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*<sup>2</sup> III (Leipzig 1887) esp. 15–16. On *IG II<sup>2</sup> 237* see Schwenk, *Athens* 17; on the great importance of the grain supply in the inscriptional evidence of this period see Stephen D. Lambert, “Athenian State Laws and Decrees, 352/1–322/1: III. Decrees Honouring Foreigners. A. Citizenship, Proxeny and Euergesy,” *ZPE*

tant, but as the new rule of Macedon grew greater, loyalty, within the city-state and between Athens and anyone who would support her, became all the more important. Demosthenes' stress on εὐνοία/loyalty, both to defend himself and to honor Athens, reflects this new civic culture.<sup>55</sup>

The role given to εὐνοία in Demosthenes' speech reveals how loyalty became ever more prized and honored in the intra- and interstate struggles of the period, loyalty both for Athenians and for those pro-Athenians who found themselves at odds with Macedonian rule. Comparanda, literary and epigraphical, bear witness to the growing importance of such loyalty. That Ctesiphon cited εὐνοία in the ἔνεκα-clause of his motion corresponds to the importance given to the term by Demosthenes. Though Aeschines' emphasis on ἀνδραγαθία (3.49) may have misled many, his own slips and failed arguments (17 and 248), and his second "quotation" of the ἔνεκα-clause with three objects, ἀρετή, ἀνδραγαθία, and εὐνοία, argue that Aeschines was actively trying to tie Demosthenes to the traditional and often martial ἀνδραγαθία and to avoid εὐνοία and its increasingly prominent role in civic assessment when loyalty to Athens and its traditions was becoming the crucial question. That Ctesiphon included εὐνοία in his motion fits best with all the surviving textual evidence, and Demosthenes' championing of the term and Aeschines' avoidance of it reveals a development in the terminology of civic ideology that stressed that continued community service, active loyalty, εὐνοία, had become a most or possibly *the* most highly valued civic virtue in the tumultuous era that Athens was facing.<sup>56</sup>

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158 (2006) 115–158, esp. 117.

<sup>55</sup> See Whitehead 52–54 on εὐνοία; cf. Veligianni-Terzi 276–277, 304.

<sup>56</sup> I wish to express my thanks to Kerri J. Hame for her help on all stages of this article and to the readers and editor for aid in clarifying my argument and in dealing with various infelicities.