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# Autonomous Path Identity-Based Broadcast Proxy Re-Encryption for Data Sharing in Clouds

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**ABSTRACT** Cloud computing with massive storage and computing capabilities has become widespread in actual applications. It is critical to ensure secure data sharing in cloud-based applications. Currently, numerous identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption (IB-BPRE) schemes have been proposed to resolve the privacy issue. However, the existing IB-BPRE schemes cannot reach the transformation of the decryption right for outsourced encrypted data between the broadcast receiver sets (data user sets) delegated by the data owner (Alice) because it is difficult for the IB-BPRE to hold the character of multi-hop. Consequently, a new cryptographic primitive called autonomous path identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption (APIB-BPRE) is presented to address the above issue. In an APIB-BPRE scheme, the delegator establishes an autonomous path involving preferred multiple broadcast receiver sets and the proxy can convert the decryption right for the broadcast receiver set into the decryption right for the next broadcast receiver set by the re-encryption key from the delegator. This solution is convenient and flexible for cloud users and utilizes the benefits of cloud computing. The evaluation and comparison indicate that our APIB-BPRE system is effective and practical.

**INDEX TERMS** Proxy re-encryption, broadcast encryption, cloud data sharing, autonomous path

## I. INTRODUCTION

CLOUD computing has been widely used in data sharing because it is effective and flexible. However, there exist the privacy issues (e.g., data confidentiality) when cloud computing is used for data sharing. Identity-based encryption (IBE) as an efficient approach is available to ensure data confidentiality in a cloud-based data sharing system because of simple public key infrastructure (PKI) [1], [2]. In a real-world scenario, the data owner would like to share outsourced encrypted data with the data users if he has no time to deal with encrypted sensitive data stored in the server cloud. For example, a data owner Alice with an identity  $id$  from the disease research unit wants to safely share the disease record  $m$  about volunteers with his  $n$  colleagues with identities  $id_1, \dots, id_n$ , note that we denote a colleague set (a data user set)  $S_1 = \{id_1, \dots, id_n\}$ . When IBE is applied in the above scene for achieving data confidentiality, Alice needs to perform the encryption algorithm  $Enc$  of IBE to generate the encrypted disease data  $c$  about the disease record  $m$  (note that  $c = Enc(id, m)$ ) and upload the ciphertext to the cloud

server.

Obviously, there are some shortages with identity-based encryption to ensure data confidentiality in outsourced data sharing. First, the data owner Alice needs to download the outsourced encrypted disease data  $c$  from the cloud server and decrypt the ciphertext  $c$  to obtain the data  $m$ , and re-set a ciphertext for every colleague. In other words, Alice has a high computing cost to share outsourced encrypted data with the data users because the number of ciphertexts shows a linear correlation with the size of data users. Second, Alice has to completely keep online for converting the decryption right for outsourced encrypted data  $c$  into the decryption right for outsourced encrypted data  $c_j$  because he needs to re-set the ciphertext  $c_j = Enc(id_j, m)$  under identity  $id_j$  for each colleague  $id_j$  ( $j = 1, \dots, n$ ). Third, if all users in a data user set  $S_1 = \{id_1, \dots, id_n\}$  obtain the data  $m$ , Alice wants to transfer the decryption right for outsourced encrypted data from a data user set  $S_1 = \{id_1, \dots, id_n\}$  to another data user set  $S_2 = \{id'_1, \dots, id'_n\}$  he trusts. In such a scenario, the traditional IBE guarantees data confidentiality but it is not

flexible for the data owner to perform the transformation of decryption right between the data user sets delegated by the data owner.

Alternatively, it might be an idea to outsource the amount of computing overhead for Alice to the cloud server. That is, the cloud server needs to obtain Alice's private key so that it has ability to decrypt the encrypted disease data and reset the ciphertext for each colleague. However, if the cloud server is an untrusted server, this solution cannot maintain data confidentiality. We did not expect the untrusted server to obtain the disease record about volunteers via Alice's private key because the disease data involves a lot of personal sensitive data, such as illness and allergies. Prior, Blaze et al. [3] introduced the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) that is a potential approach to dealing with outsourced encrypted data. In a PRE scheme, a proxy (e.g., a cloud server) can convert the decryption right for outsourced encrypted data between the users without exposing the underlying data to the cloud server. This approach uses the benefits of cloud computing because the cloud server takes on the abundant computation cost of re-setting ciphertexts.

**Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (IB-PRE).** Green et al. [4] presented identity-based PRE (IB-PRE) to simplify PKI since the concept of PRE was introduced. In an IB-PRE scheme, the proxy has the ability to convert the ciphertext under a delegator's identity into ciphertext under a delegatee's identity without obtaining any information about sensitive data. One may think that we can utilize the solution of IB-PRE to solve the drawbacks of IBE applied in cloud data sharing. Unfortunately, IB-PRE is still an inefficient approach for the data owner. For example, if IB-PRE is applied in the outsourced data sharing, Alice needs to set  $n$  re-encryption keys  $rk_{id \rightarrow id_1}, \dots, rk_{id \rightarrow id_n}$  for a data user set  $S_1 = \{id_1, \dots, id_n\}$  and secretly send these re-encryption keys to the proxy during the process. It is flexible for the proxy to set the ciphertexts for these data users via these re-encryption keys. Additionally, IB-PRE resolves the issue of complete online for the delegator by outsourcing the computation cost of re-setting ciphertexts to the proxy. However, IB-PRE is still an inefficient approach for the data owner because the size of re-encryption keys is equal to the number of delegates. Therefore, IB-PRE is not suited to actual applications if there exist many delegates.

**Identity-Based Broadcast Proxy Re-Encryption (IB-BPRE).** Chu et al. [5] introduced the concept of broadcast proxy re-encryption (BPRES) to solve the linear computing issue of the re-encryption key for the delegator. In a BPRES scheme, the proxy can convert the ciphertext for the delegator into the ciphertext for a broadcast receiver (delegatee) set. In the process, the delegator only generates a re-encryption key for multiple delegates and the proxy (e.g., a cloud server) sets a re-encryption ciphertext for a broadcast receiver set without obtaining any information about sensitive data. Lately, Xu et al. [6] introduced the notion of identity-based BPRES (IB-BPRE) to take the identity of the user as his public key. Despite IB-BPRE solving the heavy computing

issue of re-encryption keys for the delegator, the transformation of decryption rights between the broadcast receiver sets authorized by the delegator is still an issue in IB-BPRE schemes. Therefore, our challenge point is how to implement a cloud data sharing system to achieve the transformation of decryption rights for outsourced encrypted data from a data user set  $S_1 = \{id_1, \dots, id_n\}$  to another data user set  $S_2 = \{id'_1, \dots, id'_n\}$ , where sets  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  are chosen by Alice.

## A. MOTIVATION

The existing IB-BPRE schemes are effective in addressing the issues of IBE applied in the outsourced data sharing system, but they cannot solve the issue of autonomous path multi-hop. In other words, the existing IB-BPRE cannot achieve the transformation of decryption rights between the broadcast receiver sets delegated by the delegator. However, autonomous path multi-hop is very critical in IB-BPRE since we can perform flexible data sharing according to the data owner's wishes. Consequently, this motivates us to discover an autonomous path identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption (APIB-BPRE) as a new cryptographic mechanism that supports to easily achieve an autonomous path multi-hop in IB-BPRE. More specifically, in an APIB-BPRE scheme, the delegator designates a delegation path involving preferred broadcast receiver sets. The delegation path comprises multiple broadcast delegatee sets, if all receivers of a broadcast receiver set in the path complete the decryption, the proxy automatically transforms decryption rights to the next broadcast receiver set in the path. By the method, the delegator guarantees that the decryption right is carried out among these broadcast receiver sets he trusts.

Imagine a data owner Alice from the disease research unit holds the diseases data  $m$  about volunteers. If Alice is too busy to deal with the disease data  $m$ , he may share the outsourced encrypted data with a data user set  $S_1 = \{id_1, id_2, id_3\}$ . Meanwhile, if all users in  $S_1$  gain the disease data, decryption rights will be automatically delegated to next set of data users  $S_2 = \{id'_1, id'_2, id'_3\}$  chosen by Alice. Our APIB-BPRE is suitable to the above cloud data sharing system, the data owner Alice encrypts his sensitive data as  $c = Enc(id, m)$  and sets an autonomous path  $Pa = (id = S_0, S_1, S_2)$ , and then uploads  $c$  and  $Pa$  to the cloud server. The proxy can transform the ciphertext  $c$  for Alice into the ciphertext  $c_1$  for a data user set  $S_1$  by the re-encryption key  $rk_{id \rightarrow S_1}$  from Alice, and convert the ciphertext  $c_1$  for a data user set  $S_1$  into the ciphertext  $c_2$  for a data user set  $S_2$  via the re-encryption key  $rk_{S_1 \rightarrow S_2}$  from Alice. The idea of our APIB-BPRE for data sharing in clouds is shown in Figure.1. With this motivation in mind, we designed APIB-BPRE, in which the proxy can achieve the transformation of decryption right for the encrypted data between the broadcast receiver sets delegated by the delegator.




FIGURE 1. APIB-BPRE in a cloud data sharing system

## B. RELATED WORKS

Blaze et al. presented the concept of PRE and classified it into single-hop and multi-hop according to the permitted times of transformation [3]. In a multi-hop PRE scheme, the proxy can convert the ciphertext from Alice to Bob, from Bob to Carol and so on. In a single-hop PRE scheme, the proxy only transforms the ciphertext under Alice into the ciphertext under Bob. Since Blaze et al. proposed the concept of PRE, numerous works [4], [7]–[20] with different properties have been designed to meet kinds of actual demands. In traditional multi-hop PRE schemes, the delegator cannot dominate the selection of all delegates with the decryption right for the encrypted data, he only chooses the first delegatee. For example, the proxy converts the decryption right from a delegator Alice to a delegatee Bob, and from a delegatee Bob to the delegatee Carol. In the process, Alice only chooses the first delegatee Bob, but the delegatee Carol is authorized by the delegatee Bob. It indicates that the delegator has no right to control all delegatees he trusts when decryption rights have been transformed from a delegatee to another delegatee. It is desirable for the delegator that he is able to control the decryption rights for his encrypted files among the authorized delegatees in actual application demands. This ensures that the encrypted data of the delegator can be decrypted by his authorized delegatees. Recently, Cao et al. [21] proposed an autonomous path PRE (AP-PRE) as a new cartographic primitive to resolve the above issue. This approach has better fine-grained access control for encrypted data because AP-PRE has the property of autonomous path multi-hop. Put simply, autonomous path multi-hop in AP-PRE means that the delegator sets an autonomous delegation path Pa including multiple delegatees and the proxy can transform the ciphertext for the delegatee in Pa into the ciphertext for the next delegatee in Pa via the re-encryption key from the delegator.

Berkovits [22] introduced the concept of broadcast encryption (BE) that a sender broadcasts encrypted data to

a broadcast receiver set and each receiver in the broadcast receiver set can decrypt the encrypted data via his private key. However, the user outside of the broadcast receiver set cannot get any information about the sensitive data. Since Fiat and Naor [23] gave the formal definitions about broadcast encryption and its security model, various BE works [24] [25] have been designed to increase efficiency. Broadcast proxy re-encryption (BPRES) is another interesting research field that the proxy can convert the decryption right for a delegator into the decryption right for a broadcast receiver (delegatee) set [5]. After that, Xu et al. [6] proposed a conditional IB-BPRE with constant re-encrypted ciphertext. Such a construction is significantly adapt to the cloud email system. After this work, Sun et al. [26] designed an IB-BPRE with CCA secure that is also suitable for the cloud computing environment application (e.g., cloud data sharing). Lately, Ge et al. [27] proposed an IB-BPRE with a revocation function that the proxy can revoke decryption rights for left delegatees. Unfortunately, none of these works addressed the property of autonomous multi-hop to IB-BPRE.

## C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

In this work, we adopted the autonomous path multi-hop mechanism proposed for AP-PRE [21] to address the autonomous path multi-hop for IB-BPRE. One may think that this exists a direct connection between the autonomous path multi-hop for AP-PRE [21] and IB-BPRE. However, there are technical difficulties in applying the solution of autonomous path multi-hop showed in work [21] to the IB-BPRE scheme because there is a one-to-one correspondence between the re-encryption key and the delegatee in work [21]. That is, a delegator cannot set a re-encryption key for a broadcast receiver set by executing a re-encryption key generation algorithm. One might think that a possible attempt is to address the character of the autonomous path to the multi-hop IB-BPRE. Nevertheless, the existing IB-BPRE schemes do not have the character of multi-hop, mainly because it is changeable to set a re-encryption key  $rk_{S_1 \rightarrow S_2}$  from a broadcast receiver set  $S_1$  to another broadcast receiver set  $S_2$ . Therefore, reaching an autonomous path multi-hop for IB-BPRE is a challenging task.

This paper presents a new mechanism called autonomous path identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption to guarantee the function of autonomous path multi-hop in IB-BPRE. Our APIB-BPRE allows the proxy to convert the decryption right for outsourced encrypted data from the data user set  $S_1$  to the next data user set  $S_2$ , where  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  are delegated by the data owner. We give the formal definitions of our APIB-BPRE and its security model. Meanwhile, we give the concrete construction for our APIB-BPRE and prove its security in the decision  $n$ -BDHE problem. Additionally, the evaluation and comparison indicate that APIB-BPRE is efficient and practical.

## D. ORGANIZATION

In Section II, we give the definitions of bilinear pairing and hard problem assumption. Then, we define our APIB-BPRE and give the security model in Section III. In Section IV, we present a concrete construction of APIB-BPRE. Section V proves that our scheme is semantic security. In Section VI, The evaluation and comparison indicate that our scheme is efficient. Finally, we give a conclusion in Section VII

## II. PRELIMINARIES

We give the definition of the bilinear pairing and state the complex assumption needed for our proof of security.

### A. BILINEAR PAIRING

Let  $\mathbb{G}$  and  $\mathbb{G}_T$  are two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order  $q$ , and  $g$  is a generation of  $\mathbb{G}$ . A bilinear pairing [28], [29] is a map  $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$  with the following three properties:

- Bilinearity. For all  $u, v \in \mathbb{G}$  and  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , we have  $e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab}$ .
- Non-degeneracy. The map is not degenerate, i.e.,  $e(g, g) \neq 1$ .
- Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute the map  $e$ .

### B. COMPLEX ASSUMPTION

The security of our APIB-BPRE scheme is based on the following assumption.

Assumption (decision  $n$ -bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption (decision  $n$ -BDHE) [30]). Let  $\mathbb{G}$  and  $\mathbb{G}_T$  are two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order  $q$ , and  $g$  is a generation of  $\mathbb{G}$ . The decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption is stated as follows: given a vector  $\vec{y}_{g,\alpha,n} = (h, g, g_1, g_2, \dots, g_n, g_{n+2}, \dots, g_{2n}) \in \mathbb{G}^{2n+1}$  and an element  $Z \in \mathbb{G}_T$  as input, decide whether  $Z$  is equal to  $e(g_{n+1}, h)$ . Note that we use  $g_i$  to denote  $g_i = g^{\alpha^i} \in \mathbb{G}$  ( $i = 1, \dots, n, n+2, \dots, 2n$ ), an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  that outputs  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  with advantage  $\epsilon$  in solving the decision  $n$ -BDHE problem in  $\mathbb{G}$  if

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{g,\alpha,n}, e(g_{n+1}, h)) = 0] - \Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{g,\alpha,n}, Z) = 0]| \geq \epsilon,$$

where the probability is the choice of random generation  $g$  and random  $h$  in  $\mathbb{G}$ , the choice of random  $\alpha$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , the choice of random  $Z$  in  $\mathbb{G}_T$ , and the random bits consumed by  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Definition 1:** The decision  $(t, \epsilon, n)$ -BDHE assumption holds in  $\mathbb{G}$  if any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm with an negligible advantage  $\epsilon$  in solving the decision  $n$ -BDHE problem in  $\mathbb{G}$ .

## III. DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL

We define our APIB-BPRE and the security model.

### A. AUTONOMOUS PATH IDENTITY-BASED BROADCAST PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION (APIB-BPRE)

An APIB-BPRE refers to three types of entries: the delegator, the proxy, and the delegatee (receiver). In an APIB-BPRE system, the delegator  $id$  is able to choose multiple broadcast receiver sets  $S_1, \dots, S_m$  he trusts and generates a path  $\text{Pa} = (id = S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m)$  involving  $m$  preferred broadcast receiver sets (note that we denote  $id$  as  $id = S_0$ ). To simplify the discussion, we suppose that each broadcast receiver set  $S_\mu$  includes  $k$  receivers, where  $S_\mu = \{id_{\mu_1}, \dots, id_{\mu_k}\}$ , for  $\mu = 1, \dots, m$ . Meanwhile, the delegator uploads the ciphertext about his sensitive data to the proxy and sends the re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$  to the corresponding proxy through a secure channel for  $\mu = 1, \dots, m$ . After obtaining the re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$  from the delegator, the corresponding proxy converts the ciphertext under broadcast receiver set  $S_{\mu-1}$  into the ciphertext under the next broadcast receiver set  $S_\mu$  without revealing sensitive data. In this way, we can gain the property of multi-hop from  $S_{\mu-1}$  to  $S_\mu$  in the autonomous path  $\text{Pa}$  for identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption. The definition of APIB-BPRE is illustrated as follows.

**Definition 2:** (APIB-BPRE). An autonomous path identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms:

- Setup  $(1^\lambda, n) \rightarrow (msk, mpk)$ . A trusted party key generation center (KGC) runs the setup algorithm *Setup* to generate the master public/secret keys. On input a security parameter  $1^\lambda$ , and the maximum number of receivers  $n$  in one encryption. It outputs the master public key  $mpk$  and the master secret key  $msk$ .
- Extract  $(msk, id) \rightarrow (sk_{id})$ . KGC runs the key extraction algorithm *Extract* to set the private key. The algorithm inputs the master secret key  $msk$  and an identity  $id$  for the user (delegator or delegatee). It outputs a private key  $sk_{id}$ .
- CreatPath  $(mpk, id) \rightarrow (\text{Pa})$ . The delegator  $id$  runs the path creation algorithm *CreatPath* to generate an autonomous path. It inputs the master public key  $mpk$ , and the identity  $id$  and outputs an autonomous path  $\text{Pa}$  of length  $m$ . The autonomous path  $\text{Pa} = (id = S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m)$  is a sequence of ordered  $m$  different broadcast receiver sets, where  $id$  is denoted to be  $S_0$  and  $S_\mu = \{id_{\mu_1}, \dots, id_{\mu_k}\}$  is a set of broadcast receivers with identities  $id_{\mu_j}$ , for  $1 \leq \mu \leq m, k \leq n$ . Note that, we implicitly assume that the size of each broadcast receiver set is  $k$  in order to simplify the discussion. Meanwhile, we denote a set  $S_\mu$  in path  $\text{Pa}$  by  $S_\mu \in \text{Pa}$  and denote that the length of  $\text{Pa}$  is equal to the number of broadcast receiver sets.
- RKeyGen  $(mpk, id, \text{Pa}) \rightarrow (rk)$ . The delegator  $id$  performs the re-encryption key generation algorithm *RKeyGen* to set the re-encryption key. It inputs the master public key  $mpk$ , identity  $id$ , and an autonomous path  $\text{Pa}$  created by the delegator  $id$ . It outputs the re-



encryption key  $rk = \{rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}\}_{\mu=1, \dots, m}$ . Note that the proxy can convert the ciphertext under  $S_{\mu-1}$  into ciphertext under  $S_{\mu}$  in the autonomous path Pa via the re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$ .

- **Enc** ( $mpk, id, m$ )  $\rightarrow c_0$ . The delegator  $id$  runs the encryption algorithm  $Enc$  to set the ciphertext. It inputs the master public key  $mpk$ , the identity  $id$ , and a message  $m$  from the message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and outputs the ciphertext  $c_0$ . For simplicity, we call  $c_0$  the original ciphertext.
- **ReEnc** ( $Pa, S_{\mu-1}, S_{\mu}, rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}, c_{\mu-1}$ )  $\rightarrow c_{\mu}$ , where  $1 \leq \mu < m$ . The proxy performs the re-encryption algorithm  $ReEnc$  to convert the ciphertext under  $S_{\mu-1}$  into ciphertext under  $S_{\mu}$ . On input an autonomous path Pa, two broadcast receiver sets  $S_{\mu-1}$  and  $S_{\mu}$ , a re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$ , and a ciphertext  $c_{\mu-1}$  under the broadcast receiver set  $S_{\mu-1}$ . It first checks whether  $(S_{\mu-1}, S_{\mu}) \in Pa$  and outputs " $\perp$ " if not. Otherwise, the algorithm outputs the re-encrypted ciphertext  $c_{\mu}$  for the set of broadcast receivers  $S_{\mu}$ . For simplicity, we denote call  $c_{\mu}$  the re-encryption ciphertext.
- **Dec** ( $mpk, c_0/c_{\mu}, sk_{id}$ )  $\rightarrow (m, \perp)$ , where  $\mu = 1, \dots, m$ . The delegator (delegatee) runs the decryption algorithm  $Dec$  to recover the message. It inputs the master public key  $mpk$ , the original ciphertext  $c_0$  (re-encryption ciphertext  $c_{\mu}$ ), and a private key  $sk_{id}$  and outputs the message  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , or an error symbol  $\perp$ .

**Correctness.** Our APIB-BPRE is correct, if for autonomous path Pa set by the delegator  $id$ , the following equations hold for any  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ :

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, \text{Enc}(mpk, id, m), sk_{id}) = m, \\ id \notin S_{\mu}, 1 \leq \mu \leq m;$$

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, c_{\mu}, sk_{id}) = m, id \in S_{\mu}, 1 \leq \mu \leq m;$$

where for any  $\mu, 1 \leq \mu \leq m,$

$$\text{ReEnc}(Pa, S_{\mu-1}, S_{\mu}, rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}, c_{\mu-1}) \rightarrow c_{\mu}.$$

## B. SECURITY MODEL FOR APIB-BPRE

We consider the security of APIB-BPRE in chosen plaintext attack model for the original ciphertext and the re-encryption ciphertext, respectively. We use the following two indistinguishable games between a  $\mathcal{PPT}$  adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  and a challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  to define the security for the original ciphertext and the re-encryption ciphertext separately.

**Game 1.** We define the following indistinguishable game of our APIB-BPRE scheme for the original ciphertext in the chosen plaintext model. The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  and the challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  perform the following indistinguishable game:

- **Init.**  $\mathcal{A}$  chooses an identity  $id^*$  as a challenging identity.
- **Setup.**  $\mathcal{C}$  generates the master key public  $mpk$  and the master secret key  $msk$  via executing the setup algorithm  $Setup$ . It outputs  $mpk$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- **Query phase 1.**  $\mathcal{A}$  makes key extraction query  $\mathcal{O}_{sk}(mpk, id)$ . It inputs an identity  $id$  and the master public key  $mpk$ , if  $id = id^*$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  outputs an error symbol  $\perp$ ; otherwise,  $\mathcal{C}$  generates the private key  $sk_{id}$  by run-

ning the key extraction algorithm  $Extract$  and returns  $sk_{id}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

- **Challenge.** After receiving two messages  $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  chooses a random bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and sets the challenging ciphertext  $c_0^*$ . It returns  $c_0^*$  to the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- **Query phase 2.**  $\mathcal{A}$  continues making key extraction query and  $\mathcal{C}$  responds to the query like as in the query phase 1.
- **Guess.**  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs the guess  $b'$ . The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  wins if  $b' = b$ .  
Let  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CPA-Or}(\lambda)$  denote the advantage that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the above indistinguishable game in chosen plaintext attack model for the original ciphertext (IND-CPA-Or), where  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CPA-Or}(\lambda) = |\Pr[b' = b] - 1/2|$ .

**Definition 3:** Our APIB-BPRE scheme is  $(t, q_{sk}, \epsilon)$ -CPA secure at the original ciphertext if for any  $\mathcal{PPT}$  adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who makes at most  $q_{sk}$  key extraction queries, we have  $AdvBr_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CPA-Or}(\lambda) \leq \epsilon$ .

**Game 2.** We define the following indistinguishable game of our APIB-BPRE scheme for the re-encryption ciphertext in chosen plaintext model. The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  and the challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  perform the following indistinguishable game:

- **Init.**  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs the challenging broadcast receiver set  $S_{\mu}^* = \{id_{\mu_1}^*, \dots, id_{\mu_k}^*\}$  for any  $\mu$ , where  $1 \leq \mu \leq m, k \leq n$ .
- **Setup.**  $\mathcal{C}$  generates the master public key  $mpk$  and the master secret key  $msk$  via running the setup algorithm  $Setup$  and returns  $mpk$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- **Query phase 1.**  $\mathcal{A}$  makes the following queries:
  - a) Key extraction query  $\mathcal{O}_{sk}(mpk, id)$ . It inputs an identity  $id$  and the master public key  $mpk$ , if  $id \in S_{\mu}^*$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  returns an error symbol  $\perp$ ; otherwise  $\mathcal{C}$  generates the private key  $sk_{id}$  via executing the key extraction algorithm  $Extract$  and returns  $sk_{id}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
  - b) Path creation query  $\mathcal{O}_{cp}(mpk, id)$ . On input the master public key  $mpk$  and an identity  $id$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  generates a path  $Pa = (id = S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m)$  via running the path creation algorithm  $GreatPath$  and returns Pa to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
  - c) Re-encryption key generation query  $\mathcal{O}_{rk}(mpk, id, Pa, S_{\mu-1}, S_{\mu})$ . On input the master public key  $mpk$ , an identity  $id$ , broadcast receiver sets  $S_{\mu-1}$  and  $S_{\mu}$ , where  $(S_{\mu-1}, S_{\mu}) \in Pa$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  retrieves  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$  from  $rk$  via running the re-encryption key generation algorithm  $RKeyGen$  and returns  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- **Challenge.** After receiving two messages  $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  chooses a random bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and sets the challenging ciphertext  $c_{\mu}^*$ . It returns  $c_{\mu}^*$  to the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- **Query phase 2.**  $\mathcal{A}$  continues making key extraction, path creation, and re-encryption key queries and  $\mathcal{C}$  responds to these queries like as in the query phase 1.
- **Guess.**  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs the guess  $b'$ . The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  wins if  $b' = b$ .

TABLE 1. Summary of notations

Notation	Description
$mpk$	the master public key
$msk$	the master secret key
$Pa = (id = S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m)$	an autonomous path delegated by delegator $id$
$S_\mu = \{id_{\mu_1}, id_{\mu_2}, \dots, id_{\mu_k}\}$ , for $\mu = 1, 2, \dots, m$	the set of broadcast receivers/delegateses
$K = \{1, 2, \dots, k\}$	an index set about $S_\mu$ , where $k$ is the size of $S_\mu$
$rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$ , $\mu = 1, 2, \dots, m$	the re-encryption key from $S_{\mu-1}$ to $S_\mu$
$sk_{id}$	the private key for the user $id$
$c_0$	the original ciphertext
$c_\mu$ , for $\mu = 1, 2, \dots, m$	the re-encryption ciphertext

Let  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CPA-Re}(\lambda)$  denote the advantage that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the above indistinguishable game in chosen plaintext attack model for the re-encryption ciphertext (IND-CPA-Re), where  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CPA-Re}(\lambda) = |\Pr[b' = b] - 1/2|$ .

Remark 1: The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  does not need to make the re-encryption query because there is to be no limitation on making re-encryption key query.

**Definition 4:** Our APIB-BPRE scheme is  $(t, q_{sk}, q_{cp}, q_{rk}, \epsilon)$ -CPA secure at re-encryption ciphertext if for any  $\mathcal{PPT}$  adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who makes at most  $q_{sk}$  key extraction queries,  $q_{cp}$  path creation queries, and  $q_{rk}$  re-encryption key queries, we have  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CPA-Re}(\lambda) \leq \epsilon$ .

**Definition 5:** Our APIB-BPRE scheme is semantic security (CPA secure), if  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CPA-Or}(\lambda) \leq \epsilon$  and  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{IND-CPA-Re}(\lambda) \leq \epsilon$ .

## IV. PROPOSED APIB-BPRE SCHEME

This section presents a concrete construction of APIB-BPRE. For ease of reference, Table 1 summary important notations.

### A. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW

The autonomous path multi-hop is a significant property in PRE schemes that the proxy can transform decryption rights between the delegates delegated by the delegator. However, it is a difficult for IB-BPRE schemes to support autonomous path multi-hop. We proposed an autonomous path identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption to realize the autonomous path multi-hop in IB-BPRE. In our scheme, the delegator  $id$  sets an autonomous delegation path  $Pa = (id = S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m)$  including  $m$  broadcast receiver sets  $S_j$  ( $j = 1, \dots, m$ ) and the proxy can transform the ciphertext for a broadcast receiver set  $S_{\mu-1}$  into the ciphertext for  $S_\mu$  via the re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$  from the delegator  $id$ , for  $\mu = 1, \dots, m$ . Here we simply describe the technical method of our APIB-BPRE. Suppose that the ciphertext  $c_{\mu-1}$  for a broadcast receiver set  $S_{\mu-1}$  consists of three elements  $c_{\mu-1,1} = h^{t_{\mu-1}}$ ,  $c_{\mu-1,2} = e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_{\mu-1}}$ , and  $c_{\mu-1,3} = (v \cdot \prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j})^{T_{\mu-1}} \cdot \prod_{j \in K} H(id_{\mu-1_j})^{\alpha^{n+1-j}}$ . If the proxy needs to convert the ciphertext  $c_{\mu-1}$  for  $S_{\mu-1}$  into ciphertext  $c_\mu$  for  $S_\mu$ , we can view the ciphertext  $c_\mu$  for  $S_\mu$  as  $c_{\mu,1} = c_{\mu-1,1} \cdot rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_1}$ ,  $c_{\mu,2} = c_{\mu-1,2} \cdot rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_2}$  and  $c_{\mu,3} = rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_3}$  via the re-encryption

key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu} = (rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_1}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_2}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_3})$ , where random  $t_{\mu-1}, T_{\mu-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ .

### B. CONSTRUCTION

Generally, an APIB-BPRE scheme consists of the following algorithms.

- **Setup**( $1^\lambda, n$ ). To set the master public key  $mpk$  and the master secret key  $msk$ , it generates a bilinear pairing group  $\mathbb{PG} = (q, g, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ . Let  $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$  is a bilinear pairing,  $\mathbb{G}$  and  $\mathbb{G}_T$  are multiplicative groups with the same prime order  $q$ ,  $g$  be a generation of group  $\mathbb{G}$ . The algorithm selects random  $\alpha, s, r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and computes  $h = g^s$ ,  $\hat{h} = h^s$ ,  $v = h^r$ ,  $g_n = g^{\alpha^n}$ ,  $h_i = h^{\alpha^i}$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n, n+2, \dots, 2n$ , and  $d_i = (h_i)^r$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . Next, it selects a cryptographic hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ . The master public key is  $mpk = (\mathbb{PG}, h, \hat{h}, v, g_n, H, \{h_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n, n+2, \dots, 2n}, \{d_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n})$  and the master secret key is  $msk = (s, \alpha)$ . Note that it sends the secret key  $\alpha$  to the delegator via the secure channel.
- **Extract**( $mpk, id$ ). To generate the private key for the user  $id$ , if the user  $id$  is the delegator, it sets private key  $sk_{id} = H(id)^s$ ; otherwise, it sets private key  $sk_{id} = H(id)^{s\alpha}$ , where the user  $id$  is the delegatee.
- **CreatPath**( $mpk, id$ ). To set an autonomous path for the delegator  $id$ , it chooses  $m$  broadcast receiver sets  $S_1, \dots, S_m$  and generates an autonomous path  $Pa = (id = S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m)$  of length  $m$ . Note that the broadcast receiver set  $S_\mu = \{id_{\mu_1}, id_{\mu_2}, \dots, id_{\mu_k}\}$  is a set of ordered  $k$  different receivers, for  $\mu = 1, 2, \dots, m$  and  $k \leq n$ .
- **RKeyGen**( $mpk, Pa$ ). To generate the re-encryption key  $rk = \{rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}\}_{\mu=1, \dots, m}$  for any broadcast receiver set  $S_\mu$  in an autonomous path  $Pa$  delegated by the delegator  $id$ , it randomly chooses  $t_0, t_\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and sets  $rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_1} = h^{t_\mu}$ ,  $rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_2} = e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_\mu}$ , and  $rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_3} = (v \cdot \prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j})^{T_\mu} \cdot \prod_{j \in K} H(id_{\mu_j})^{\alpha^{n+1-j}}$ , where  $T_\mu = t_0 + \dots + t_\mu$ . Finally, it sets  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu} = (rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_1}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_2}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_3})$  and returns the re-encryption key  $rk = \{rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}\}_{\mu=1, \dots, m}$  to the corresponding proxy. Note that  $e(h, h_{n+1})$  be constructed as  $e(h_1, h_n)$ .
- **Enc**( $mpk, id$ ). To encrypt a message  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  under  $id$ ,

the delegator computes

$$c_{0,1} = h^{t_0}, c_{0,2} = m \cdot e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_0},$$

and

$$c_{0,3} = e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_0} \cdot e(\hat{h}, H(id))^{t_0}.$$

Finally, it returns the ciphertext as  $c_0 = (c_{0,1}, c_{0,2}, c_{0,3})$ .

- **ReEnc**(Pa,  $S_{\mu-1}$ ,  $S_\mu$ ,  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$ ,  $c_{\mu-1}$ ), where Pa =  $(id = S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m)$  designed by the delegator  $id$  and  $S_\mu = \{id_{\mu_1}, \dots, id_{\mu_k}\}$  for  $1 \leq \mu \leq m$ . To convert a ciphertext under the broadcast receiver set  $S_{\mu-1}$  into a ciphertext under next broadcast receiver set  $S_\mu$ , it first checks whether  $(S_{\mu-1}, S_\mu) \in \text{Pa}$ , and outputs " $\perp$ " if not. Otherwise, the proxy has the ciphertext  $c_{\mu-1} = (c_{\mu-1,1}, c_{\mu-1,2}, c_{\mu-1,3})$  and the re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu} = (rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_1}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_2}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_3})$ . The proxy computes the ciphertext  $c_\mu$  as  $(c_{\mu,1}, c_{\mu,2}, c_{\mu,3})$ , where  $c_{\mu,1} = c_{\mu-1,1} \cdot rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_1}$ ,  $c_{\mu,2} = c_{\mu-1,2} \cdot rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_2}$  and  $c_{\mu,3} = c_{\mu-1,3} \cdot rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_3}$ . Note that, we have  $c_{\mu,1} = h^{T_\mu}$ ,  $c_{\mu,2} = m \cdot e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu}$ , and  $c_{\mu,3} = (v \cdot \prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j})^{T_\mu} \cdot \prod_{j \in K} H(id_{\mu_j})^{\alpha^{n+1-j}}$ .
- **Dec**( $mpk$ ,  $c_0/c_\mu$ ,  $sk_{id}$ )  $\rightarrow (m, \perp)$ . To decrypt the original ciphertext  $c_0$ , the delegator  $id$  has the original ciphertext  $c_0$  as  $(c_{0,1}, c_{0,2}, c_{0,3})$ . It computes  $X_0 = \frac{c_{0,3}}{e(c_{0,1}, sk_{id})}$  and  $m = \frac{c_{0,2}}{X_0}$ . To decrypt the re-encryption ciphertext  $c_\mu$ , the delegatee  $id_{\mu_j}$  in  $S_\mu$  has the re-encryption ciphertext  $c_\mu$  as  $(c_{\mu,1}, c_{\mu,2}, c_{\mu,3})$ . For any  $1 \leq \mu \leq m$ ,  $j \in K$ , the delegatee  $id_{\mu_j}$  computes

$$\begin{aligned} \text{-- } X_{\mu_j}^1 &= e(h_j, c_{\mu,3}), \\ \text{-- } X_{\mu_j}^2 &= e(c_{\mu,1}, d_j \cdot \prod_{k \in K, k \neq j} h_{n+1-k+j}), \\ \text{-- } X_{\mu_j}^3 &= \prod_{k \in K, k \neq j} e(h_{n+1-k+j}, H(id_{\mu_k})), \\ \text{-- } X_{\mu_j}^4 &= \frac{X_{\mu_j}^1}{X_{\mu_j}^2 \cdot X_{\mu_j}^3}, \\ \text{-- } X_{\mu_j}^5 &= \frac{X_{\mu_j}^4}{e(g_n, sk_{id_{\mu_j}})}. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the delegatee  $id_{\mu_j}$  outputs  $m = \frac{c_{\mu,2}}{X_{\mu_j}^5}$ .

**Correctness.** Here we explore the correctness of the original ciphertext  $c_0$  and the re-encryption ciphertext  $c_\mu$  in our APIB-BPRE scheme.

1) For an original ciphertext  $c_0 = (c_{0,1}, c_{0,2}, c_{0,3})$ , the delegator  $id$  computes

$$X_0 = \frac{c_{0,3}}{e(c_{0,1}, sk_{id_i})} = e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_0},$$

and decrypts  $m = \frac{c_{0,2}}{X_0} = \frac{m \cdot e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_0}}{e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_0}} = m$ . The decryption is obviously correct.

2) For the re-encryption ciphertext  $c_\mu = (c_{\mu,1}, c_{\mu,2}, c_{\mu,3})$ , we have  $c_{\mu,1} = h^{T_\mu}$ ,  $c_{\mu,2} = m \cdot e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu}$ , and  $c_{\mu,3} = (v \cdot \prod_{k \in K} h_{n+1-k})^{T_\mu} \cdot \prod_{k \in K} H(id_{\mu_k})^{\alpha^{n+1-k}}$ . The delegatee  $id_{\mu_j}$  in the set  $S_\mu$  computes

$$\begin{aligned} X_{\mu_j}^1 &= e(h_j, c_{\mu,3}) \\ &= e(h_j, (v \cdot \prod_{k \in K} h_{n+1-k})^{T_\mu} \cdot \prod_{k \in K} H(id_{\mu_k})^{\alpha^{n+1-k}}) \\ &= e(h_j, (v \cdot \prod_{k \in K} h_{n+1-k})^{T_\mu}) \\ &\quad \cdot e(h_j, \prod_{k \in K} H(id_{\mu_k})^{\alpha^{n+1-k}}) \\ &= e(h, h)^{T_\mu (r\alpha^j + \sum_{k \in K} \alpha^{n+1-k+j})} \\ &\quad \cdot e(h, \prod_{k \in K} H(id_{\mu_k})^{\alpha^{n+1-k+j}}), \end{aligned}$$

then, the delegatee  $id_{\mu_j}$  computes  $X_{\mu_j}^2$ ,  $X_{\mu_j}^3$ ,  $X_{\mu_j}^4$ , and  $X_{\mu_j}^5$ . We have

$$\begin{aligned} X_{\mu_j}^2 &= e(c_{\mu,1}, d_j \cdot \prod_{k \in K, k \neq j} h_{n+1-k+j}) \\ &= e(h^{T_\mu}, h^{r\alpha^j} \cdot \prod_{k \in K, k \neq j} h_{n+1-k+j}) \\ &= e(h, h)^{T_\mu (r\alpha^j + \sum_{k \in K, k \neq j} \alpha^{n+1-k+j})}, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} X_{\mu_j}^3 &= \prod_{k \in K, k \neq j} e(h_{n+1-k+j}, H(id_{\mu_k})) \\ &= e(h, \prod_{k \in K, k \neq j} H(id_{\mu_k})^{\alpha^{n+1-k+j}}), \end{aligned}$$

and

$$X_{\mu_j}^4 = \frac{X_{\mu_j}^1}{X_{\mu_j}^2 \cdot X_{\mu_j}^3} = e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu} \cdot e(h_{n+1}, H(id_{\mu_j})),$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} X_{\mu_j}^5 &= \frac{X_{\mu_j}^4}{e(g_n, sk_{id_{\mu_j}})} \\ &= \frac{e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu} \cdot e(h_{n+1}, H(id_{\mu_j}))}{e(g_n, H(id_{\mu_j})^{s\alpha})} \\ &= e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu}. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the delegatee  $id_{\mu_j}$  computes  $m$ , where

$$m = \frac{c_{\mu,2}}{X_{\mu_j}^5} = \frac{m \cdot e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu}}{e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu}} = m$$

The decryption for re-encryption ciphertext is obviously correct.

## V. SECURITY PROOF

This section proves that our APIB-BPRE system is the semantic security by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.

**Theorem 1:** Our APIB-BPRE scheme is IND-CPA-Or secure under the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption in  $\mathbb{G}$  without random oracle.

**Proof 1:** We suppose that there is a  $\mathcal{PPT}$  adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  with advantage  $\epsilon$  in breaking the IND-CPA-Or security of our APIB-BPRE scheme in time  $t$ . We construct a simulator  $\mathcal{B}$  to solve the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption with the advantage

$\epsilon'$  in time  $t'$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  is given the decision  $n$ -BDHE instance  $(h', h, h^\alpha, \dots, h^{\alpha^n}, h^{\alpha^{n+2}}, \dots, h^{\alpha^{2n}}, Z)$ , where we denote  $h = g^s$  and  $\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h} = (h', h, h^\alpha, \dots, h^{\alpha^n}, h^{\alpha^{n+2}}, \dots, h^{\alpha^{2n}})$ .  $\mathcal{B}$ 's task is to decide whether  $Z \stackrel{?}{=} e(h', h_{n+1})$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  needs to maintain an initially empty table  $T_{sk}$  that is a private key table used to record tuples  $(id, sk_{id})$ . The simulator  $\mathcal{B}$  interacts with  $\mathcal{A}$ , and works as follows:

- **Init.**  $\mathcal{B}$  gains a challenging identity  $id^*$  from the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- **Setup.** To generate the master public key  $mpk = (\mathbb{P}\mathbb{G}, h, \hat{h}, v, g_n, H, \{h_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n, n+2, \dots, 2n}, \{d_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n})$ . Firstly,  $\mathcal{B}$  generates a bilinear pairing group  $\mathbb{P}\mathbb{G} = \{q, g, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e\}$ . Next,  $\mathcal{B}$  randomly chooses  $r \in Z_q^*$  and sets  $\hat{h} = h^s$ ,  $v = h^r$ ,  $g_n = h_n^{s^{-1}}$ , and  $d_i = (h_i)^r$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , where the elements  $h, \{h_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n, n+2, \dots, 2n}$  are from the problem instance. Finally,  $\mathcal{B}$  selects a secure hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$  and returns the master public key  $mpk$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Note that the distribution of the master public key is identified as the distribution of the real world from the view of adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , because these parameters  $r$  and  $s$  are uniforms and random distributions.
- **Query phase 1.**  $\mathcal{A}$  makes key extraction query for  $id$  in this phase. If  $id = id^*$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  outputs  $\perp$ ; otherwise  $\mathcal{B}$  searches  $T_{sk}$ ,
  - if  $T_{sk}$  includes  $(id, sk_{id})$ , returns  $sk_{id}$ .
  - Otherwise,  $\mathcal{B}$  computes  $sk_{id} = H(id)^s$  and returns  $sk_{id}$ . Finally,  $\mathcal{B}$  adds  $(id, sk_{id})$  to  $T_{sk}$ .
- **Challenge.** After receiving two messages  $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  randomly chooses  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and sets the challenging ciphertext  $c_0^*$  as
 
$$c_0^* = (h', m_b \cdot Z, Z \cdot e((h')^s, H(id^*))).$$
 Let  $h' = h^{t_0}$ , if  $Z = (h, h_{n+1})^{t_0}$ , we have
 
$$c_0^* = (h^{t_0}, m_b \cdot (h, h_{n+1})^{t_0}, e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_0} \cdot e(\hat{h}, H(id^*))^{t_0})$$
 Therefore,  $c_0^*$  is a correct challenging ciphertext to encrypt message  $m_b$  for  $id^*$ .
- **Query phase 2.**  $\mathcal{A}$  continues to issue the key extraction query and  $\mathcal{B}$  responds to the query like as in query phase 1.
- **Guess.**  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a guess  $b'$  of  $b$ . If  $b' = b$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  returns 0 to indicate  $Z = e(h', h_{n+1})$ ; otherwise, it returns 1 to indicate that  $Z$  is random in  $\mathbb{G}_T$ .

This completes the simulation and the solution.  $\mathcal{B}$  has the advantage  $\epsilon'$  in solving the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption in time  $t'$ . We here analyze the advantage  $\epsilon'$  and time  $t'$ . If  $Z \neq e(h', h_{n+1})$ , we have  $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h}, Z) = 0 \mid Z \neq e(h', h_{n+1})] = \frac{1}{2}$  (indicating that  $\mathcal{B}$ 's view is independent of  $b$ ). If  $Z = e(h', h_{n+1})$ , we have  $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h}, Z) = 0 \mid Z = e(h', h_{n+1})] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}$  (indicating that  $\mathcal{B}$ 's output is dependent on  $\mathcal{A}$ 's output). Thus,  $\mathcal{B}$ 's advantage in solving the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption is  $\epsilon' = |\Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h}, Z) = 0 \mid Z = e(h_{n+1})] - \Pr[\mathcal{B}(h', \vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h}, Z) = 0 \mid Z \neq e(h', h_{n+1})]| = |\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} -$

$\frac{1}{2}] = \frac{\epsilon}{2}$ . We denote the time cost of the simulation  $T_s = O(q_{sk})$ , where key extraction queries mainly dominate the time cost of the simulation  $T_s$ . Thus,  $\mathcal{B}$  will solve the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption with time  $t' = t + T_s$ .

**Theorem 2:** The proposed APIB-BPRE scheme is IND-CPA-Re secure under the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption in  $\mathbb{G}$  with the random oracle model.

**Proof 2:** We suppose that there is a  $\mathcal{PPT}$  adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  with the advantage  $\epsilon$  in breaking the IND-CPA-Re security of our APIB-BPRE scheme in time  $t$ . We construct a simulator  $\mathcal{B}$  to solve the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption with the advantage  $\epsilon'$  in time  $t'$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  is given the decision  $n$ -BDHE instance  $(h', h, h^\alpha, \dots, h^{\alpha^n}, h^{\alpha^{n+2}}, \dots, h^{\alpha^{2n}}, Z)$ , where we denote  $h = g^s$  and  $\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h} = (h', h, h^\alpha, \dots, h^{\alpha^n}, h^{\alpha^{n+2}}, \dots, h^{\alpha^{2n}})$ .  $\mathcal{B}$ 's task is to decide whether  $Z \stackrel{?}{=} e(h', h_{n+1})$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  maintains private key table  $T_{sk}$ , re-encryption key table  $T_{rk}$ , and autonomous path table  $T_P$ . These tables are initially empty. Let  $T_{sk}$  record tuples  $(id, sk_{id})$ ,  $T_{rk}$  record tuples  $(id, S_{\mu-1}, S_\mu, rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu})$ , and  $T_P$  record tuples  $(id, Pa = (\dots, S_{\mu-1}, S_\mu, \dots))$ . The simulator  $\mathcal{B}$  interacts with  $\mathcal{A}$ , and works as follows:

- **Init.** The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a challenging broadcast receiver set  $S_\mu^* = \{id_1^*, \dots, id_k^*\}$ , for any  $\mu$ ,  $\mu = 1, \dots, m$  and  $k \leq n$ .
- **Setup.** To generate the master public key  $mpk = (\mathbb{P}\mathbb{G}, h, \hat{h}, v, g_n, H, \{h_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n, n+2, \dots, 2n}, \{d_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n})$ . Firstly,  $\mathcal{B}$  generates a bilinear pairing group  $\mathbb{P}\mathbb{G} = \{q, g, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e\}$ . Next,  $\mathcal{B}$  selects a secure hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$  as the random oracle. Finally,  $\mathcal{B}$  randomly chooses  $r, u \in Z_q^*$  and sets  $\hat{h} = h^s$ ,  $g_n = (h_n)^{s^{-1}}$ ,  $v = h^u (\prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j})$ , and  $d_i = (h_i)^r$  (note that the elements  $h, \{h_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n, n+2, \dots, 2n}$  are from the problem instance). It returns the master public key  $mpk$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Note that since these parameters  $r$  and  $u$  are uniforms and random distributions, the master public key is an identical distribution as the real construction from the view of adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- **H-Query.** In this phase,  $\mathcal{A}$  issues the hash query.  $\mathcal{B}$  needs to maintain a hash table  $T_H$  that is initially empty and used to record queries and responses. For a query on  $id$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  chooses random  $x_{id} \in Z_q^*$  and sets as

$$H(id) = h^{x_{id}}.$$

$\mathcal{B}$  responds to the query on  $id$  with  $H(id)$  and adds tuples  $(id, x_{id}, H(id))$  to  $T_H$ .

- **Query phase 1.**  $\mathcal{A}$  makes the following queries.
  - a) Key extraction query  $O_{sk}(mpk, id)$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  makes key extraction query on  $id$ . If  $id \in S_\mu^*$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  outputs  $\perp$ ; otherwise  $\mathcal{B}$  searches  $T_{sk}$ ,
    - if  $T_{sk}$  includes  $(id, sk_{id})$ , returns  $sk_{id}$ .
    - Otherwise,  $\mathcal{B}$  first makes hash query on  $id$  and gets  $x_{id}$ . Then,  $\mathcal{B}$  computes

$$sk_{id} = (h_1)^{x_{id} \cdot s} = H(id)^{s \cdot x_{id}}.$$

Finally,  $\mathcal{B}$  adds  $(id, sk_{id})$  to  $T_{sk}$ .



b) Path creation query  $\mathcal{O}_{cp}(mpk, id)$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  makes path creation query for  $id$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  generates a path  $\text{Pa} = (id = S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m)$  for  $id$  via running the path creation algorithm *GreatPath* and returns the path  $\text{Pa}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

c) Re-encryption key generation query  $\mathcal{O}_{rk}(id, S_{\mu-1}, S_{\mu-1})$ . To query the re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$  for  $id$ . The simulator  $\mathcal{B}$  first checks whether  $T_p$  includes a path  $\text{Pa} = (\dots, S_{\mu-1}, S_{\mu}, \dots)$  for user  $id$ . If not,  $\mathcal{B}$  returns  $\perp$ ; otherwise  $\mathcal{B}$  searches  $T_{rk}$ ,

- if  $T_{rk}$  includes  $(id, S_{\mu-1}, S_{\mu}, rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu})$ , returns  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$ .

- Otherwise,  $\mathcal{B}$  sets re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu} = (rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_1}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_2}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_3})$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  chooses  $t_\mu, T_\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and computes

$$rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_1} = h^{t_\mu}, rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_2} = e(h, h_{n+1})^{t_\mu},$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} rk_{(\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu)_3} &= \left( v \cdot \prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j} \right)^{T_\mu} \cdot \prod_{j \in K} (h_{n+1-j})^{x_{id, \mu_j}} \\ &= \left( v \cdot \prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j} \right)^{T_\mu} \cdot H(id_{\mu_j})^{\alpha^{n+1-j}} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the re-encryption key  $rk_{\mu-1 \rightarrow \mu}$  is a valid re-encryption key.

- **Challenge.** After receiving two messages  $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  randomly chooses  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ . We write  $h' = h^{T_\mu^*}$  for some unknown  $T_\mu^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  sets the challenging ciphertext  $c_\mu^*$  as

$$c_{\mu,1}^* = h' = h^{T_\mu^*}, c_{\mu,2}^* = m_b \cdot Z.$$

If  $Z = e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu^*}$ , we have  $c_{\mu,2}^* = m \cdot e(h, h_{n+1})^{T_\mu^*}$  and

$$\begin{aligned} c_{\mu,3}^* &= (h')^u \cdot \prod_{j \in K} (h_{n+1-j})^{x_{id, \mu_j}^*} \\ &= (h^u \cdot \left( \prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j} \right)^{-1} \cdot \left( \prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j} \right)^{T_\mu^*}) \\ &\quad \cdot H(id_{\mu_j}^*)^{\alpha^{n+1-j}} \\ &= \left( v \cdot \prod_{j \in K} h_{n+1-j} \right)^{T_\mu^*} \cdot H(id_{\mu_j}^*)^{\alpha^{n+1-j}}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,  $c_\mu^*$  is a correct challenging ciphertext to encrypt message  $m_b$  for  $id$ .

- **Query phase 2.**  $\mathcal{A}$  continues making private key, path creation, and re-encryption key queries and  $\mathcal{B}$  responds to these queries like as in the query phase 1.
- **Guess.**  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a guess  $b'$  of  $b$ . If  $b' = b$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  returns 0 to indicate  $Z = e(h', h_{n+1})$ ; otherwise, it returns 1 to indicate that  $Z$  is random in  $\mathbb{G}_T$ .

This completes the simulation and the solution.  $\mathcal{B}$  has the advantage  $\epsilon'$  in solving the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption in time  $t'$ . We here analyze the advantage  $\epsilon'$  and time  $t'$ . If  $Z \neq e(h', h_{n+1})$ , we have  $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h}, Z) = 0 \mid Z \neq e(h', h_{n+1})] = \frac{1}{2}$  (indicating that  $\mathcal{B}$ 's view is independent of  $b$ ). If  $Z = e(h', h_{n+1})$ , we have  $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h}, Z) = 0 \mid Z = e(h', h_{n+1})] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}$  (indicating that  $\mathcal{B}$ 's output is dependent on  $\mathcal{A}$ 's output). Thus,  $\mathcal{B}$ 's advantage in solving the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption

is  $\epsilon' = |\Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h}, Z) = 0 \mid Z = e(h', h_{n+1})] - \Pr[\mathcal{B}(\vec{y}_{\alpha, n, h}, Z) = 0 \mid Z \neq e(h', h_{n+1})]| = |\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} - \frac{1}{2}| = \frac{\epsilon}{2}$ . We denote the time cost of the simulation  $T_s = \mathcal{O}(q_{sk} + q_{rk} + q_{cp} + q_H)$ , where private key generation, re-encryption key generation, path creation, hash function queries mainly dominate the time cost of the simulation  $T_s$ . Thus,  $\mathcal{B}$  will solve the decision  $n$ -BDHE assumption with time  $t' = t + T_s$ .

## VI. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON ANALYSIS

We first define the notations used in Table 2. Let  $k$  denote the size of each broadcast receiver set. Notations  $t_p$  and  $t_e$  denote the times consumed for a pairing operation, and a modular exponentiation in  $\mathbb{G}$  or  $\mathbb{G}_T$ , separately. Notations  $\text{Dec}(\text{Or})$  and  $\text{Dec}(\text{Re})$  denote the decryption execution for the original ciphertext and the re-encryption ciphertext, respectively. Here, we omit the computing time of addition, multiplication, and hash function operations because these operations are much less modular exponentiation and pairing operations. As shown in Table 2, the computation overhead of our APIB-BPRE scheme in each algorithm is compared to other works [21], [6], [26].

- **Extract.** In the key extraction algorithm, KGC in works [21], [6], [26] and our APIB-BPRE only executes a modular exponentiation operation to generate the private key for each user. However, broadcast proxy re-encryption schemes [6] and [26] cannot realize the property of autonomous path multi-hop, and the work [21] has no the character of broadcast encryption.
- **Enc.** Our APIB-BPRE and work [21] has lower computing cost to set the original ciphertext. Nevertheless, the delegator in works [6] and [26] has to undertake the amount of computing overhead in the encryption phase. For example, the delegator in work [26] needs to undertake  $\mathcal{O}(k)$  modular exponentiation operations and a pairing operation for setting ciphertext.
- **RKeyGen.** Table 2 shows that schemes [6], [26] and our APIB-BPRE have lower computation overhead to generate the re-encryption key. However, the delegator in work [21] needs abundant computing overhead to set the re-encryption key because each receiver in the broadcast receiver set needs one re-encryption key.
- **ReEnc.** In this phase, our APIB-BPRE has no modular exponentiation and pairing operations. In fact, only a few lightweight multiplication calculations are required in APIB-BPRE. On the contrary, the related works [21], [6] and [26] need to perform a large number of modular exponentiation and pairing operations to set re-encryption ciphertext.
- **Dec(Or).** In the decryption algorithm for the original ciphertext, the delegator in APIB-BPRE and work [21] only executes a pairing operation to decrypt the original ciphertext. However, there are heavy computing overhead in works [6] and [26].
- **Dec(Re).** Table 2 shows that our APIB-BPRE has less computing cost to execute the decryption algorithm for

TABLE 2. Computation Comparison

Schemes	Extract	Enc	RKeyGen	ReEnc	Dec(Or)	Dec(Re)
[21]	$e$	$e + p$	$\mathcal{O}(3k)e + \mathcal{O}(k)p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)p$	$p$	$e + 2p$
[6]	$e$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + 2p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + 2p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + 3p$
[26]	$e$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + 8p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + 8p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + 7p$
Ours	$e$	$2p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)e + p$	$0e + 0p$	$p$	$\mathcal{O}(k)p$

the re-encryption ciphertext compared with IB-BPRE schemes [6] and [26]. While our APIB-BPRE is less efficient compared with work [21] in the decryption algorithm for the re-encryption ciphertext. However, it cannot support the broadcast encryption functionality.

The comparison results displayed in Table 2 clearly show that our APIB-BPRE has the least computation overhead compared to related works.

## VII. CONCLUSION

This paper designed an autonomous path broadcast proxy re-encryption as a new cryptographic primitive to support flexible data sharing in clouds. We formally define autonomous path identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption and its security model, and demonstrate that our APIB-BPRE is CPA secure in the decision  $n$ -BDHE problem. More importantly, through performance analysis, our APIB-BPRE system is efficient and practical. In addition, our APIB-BPRE must be a multi-hop IB-BPRE, so that our APIB-BPRE system can provide much better fine-grained access control to delegation broadcast receiver sets than the traditional IB-BPRE employed in a cloud environment. It motivates researchers to design other APIB-BPRE schemes to support many interesting applications.

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