

---

# Beyond the Range of Military Operations

By ANN E. STORY *and* ARYEA GOTTLIEB

**D**octrine must be clear and logical. However, the current joint doctrine model, known as *the range of military operations*, is confusing and ambiguous and should be replaced. It is time to move beyond the range of military operations in search of a model that properly portrays the Armed Forces as the military instrument of national power. Toward that end, a new model entitled *the military operational framework* is proposed here. It signifies a return to basics in combat and noncombat operations, as well as the continuing preparation needed for both.

Adopting a new model is the next step in an evolutionary doctrine development process that will ensure our forces can respond to any challenge. The proposed model may not be the ultimate solution, but it is a necessary move in the right direction. Before presenting this model, a review of the range of military operations, concentrating on the concept of military operations other than war (MOOTW is appropriate). In addition, it is necessary to explain how the concept of low intensity conflict (LIC) evolved into military operations short of war and

quickly changed into MOOTW. This leads to an examination of the lack of a framework, which is a flaw in joint doctrine, and how one service has addressed the flaw with a concept of MOOTW groupings. Finally, the proposed model will be explained and the joint doctrine hierarchy addressed.

## The Range of Military Operations

The term *the range of military operations* was first introduced in Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and in

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.<sup>1</sup> The model consists of two parts, war and military operations other than war. The model indicates that war is principally combat but also may include noncombat operations.<sup>2</sup> It presents MOOTW as principally noncombat but indicates that it may be combat. What is the difference between combat MOOTW and combat as a part of war? Moreover, what is the difference between noncombat war and noncombat MOOTW? Finally, is it possible to pronounce the acronym MOOTW? Adding to this confusion is the fact that some prefer to use the acronym OOTW.

War is clearly combat, but part of the ambiguity with the current model is that although the term *war* is discussed in joint doctrine, it is not defined. This makes it difficult to understand the *other than war* portion of the range of military operations, especially since both war and MOOTW may be combat or noncombat according to the model. For the uninitiated, *military*

**MOOTW fails to provide the fundamental principles required in joint doctrine**

*operations other than war* may imply that personnel are not put in harm's way in these operations. But one needs only to remember the October 1993 tragedy in Somalia to understand that MOOTW and casualties are not mutually exclusive; indeed, violence occurs in many of these operations.

The reason for the confusion should be apparent. MOOTW is an ambiguous concept that fails to provide the fundamental principles required in joint doctrine and is thus flawed. The model known as the range of military operations is therefore also faulty.

## Low Intensity Conflict

The process of writing Joint Pub 3-07 began in the late 1980s at the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. In 1991 the Joint Doctrine Center (now the Joint

---

Lieutenant Colonel Ann E. Story, USAF, is currently assigned to the Air Force Doctrine Center and Major Aryea Gottlieb, USAF, serves with the 16<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Wing.

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>1995</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-1995 to 00-00-1995</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Beyond the Range of Military Operations</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 260 5th Avenue SW Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

Marine during sweep for guns in Somalia.



Combat Camera Imagery (Perry Heimer)

Warfighting Center) conducted the two-phased evaluation of a test version of Joint Pub 3-07 to validate its contents. One phase was a worldwide survey and the other was JCS Exercise Balikatan held in the Philippines. While both phases validated the document, the exercise made it clear that its title, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, was misleading. According to the exercise report, that was because it did “not accurately describe the contents of the publication and . . . [was] potentially offensive to host nations.”<sup>3</sup>

Not only was the term LIC repugnant to other nations (challenging *their* national survival is anything but low intensity), but it started to lose favor for other reasons. One was that it

tended to imply Cold War or counterinsurgency. Another reason was that the lengthy definition of LIC<sup>4</sup> revolved around protracted struggles, generally in the Third World, but failed to say what the United States would do in response. Finally, while in common use, the term was absent from the language of other agencies, notably the Department of State. This presents a stumbling block in the 1990s, the decade of interagency cooperation.

### Intermediate Step

As the originator of Joint Pub 3-07, CLIC proposed a new term, *military operations short of war*, to subsume LIC. They then revised the publication. This

was within its charter, which makes CLIC the focal point for Army and Air Force matters relating to military operations in low intensity conflict. The revision reoriented the pub from Cold War to post-Cold War issues such as forward presence, crisis response, and the emergence of ethnic rivalries.

Even with a revised focus, the post-Cold War version of Joint Pub 3-07 was similar in its format to the Cold War version. Both used *operational categories* to frame the concept and focus attention, but there are significant differences. First, the category of *peacekeeping operations* was redesignated *peace support operations* to coincide with the British term, and ensuing draft versions shortened it to *peace operations*. This change to peace (support)

**Figure 1. Military Operations Other Than War**

Support and Assistance	Nonviolent	Forceful
Domestic Support Operations Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Nation Assistance* Support to Insurgency*	Arms Control Show of Force	Enforcement of Sanctions Enforcing Exclusion Zones Protection of Shipping Strikes and Raids
Combatting Terrorism Counterdrug Operations Ensuring Freedom of Navigation Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Peace Operations Recovery Operations		
<small>*Note: The United States reserves the right to use force during support to counterinsurgency (part of nation assistance) and during support to insurgency when it is in its interest to do so.</small>		

operations led to discussion of its military components, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Second, DOD support to counterdrug operations became a separate operational category rather than remaining buried under contingency operations. Third and perhaps most notable, the term *LIC* was replaced by the more encompassing *military operations short of war* based on the November 1991 version of Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*.<sup>5</sup>

The new term was quickly challenged because it inadvertently implied that postwar actions (such as Provide Comfort) were excluded. Also, the term *short of war* suggested that disaster responses (such as domestic cleanups after hurricanes) were not included. Both claims were valid, so *military operations short of war* was changed to *military operations other than war*. Moreover, a definition was proposed for the new term that stated not only what it is but what it is not.<sup>6</sup>

**The Next Step**

A later version had a condensed MOOTW definition<sup>7</sup> and one visible difference that at first glance appeared cosmetic, the elimination of operational categories that had served as a framework. Joint Pub 3-07 contained 16 *representative* types of MOOTW: arms control, combatting terrorism,

counterdrug operations, domestic support operations, enforcement of sanctions, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation, humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency.

The introduction to Joint Pub 3-07 states that some military operations other than war involve the use or

**in any military operation self-defense may be necessary and there could be casualties**

threat of force while some do not. The terms *combat MOOTW* and *noncombat MOOTW* are also used in subsequent paragraphs. However, neither the structure nor substance is developed further. In a chapter detailing different types of MOOTW, there is no attempt to indicate which side of the structure (force or no force) applies to given operations.

It is apparent that the MOOTW concept (a list of operations without

categories or structure) is flawed, but that does not mean the explanation of any of the various types of MOOTW is necessarily defective; but rather it is the *concept* of MOOTW that is in error. An alphabetical list of 16 items is just that. It neither associates an operation with a common purpose (such as combat or noncombat) nor focuses on the appropriate military role. For example, there is a vital difference between airpower for a show of force and for enforcing an exclusion zone. In other words, one cannot easily grasp the ambiguous MOOTW concept that was recently approved as joint doctrine.

**MOOTW Groupings**

A framework is needed to clarify how the military instrument is used in non-war situations. An example consistent with current joint doctrine is found in the second draft of Air Force Doctrine Document 3, *Military Operations Other Than War*.<sup>8</sup> This framework consists of three MOOTW groupings—support and assistance, nonviolent, and forceful—as shown in figure 1. The intent of an operation, not the possible level of force, is the characteristic that places it within a group. The rationale behind the proposed MOOTW groups, in addition to providing the framework that was alluded to earlier, is to make it easier to understand the role of the Armed Forces

(particularly airpower and spacepower) in non-war operations. Of the various types of MOOTW, 10 clearly fit into one of the groups; the remaining six overlap between the

second and third, depending on the situation.

The intent of the first group, as its name implies, is for the military to provide support and assistance. This does not necessarily mean the environment in which the operation is conducted is sterile or calm; certain risks may be unavoidable. As in any military operation, appropriate self-defense actions may be necessary, and there could be casualties. One example of domestic support operations was the multiservice response to the April 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City.





Air Force personnel in Oklahoma City.

Air National Guard (Mark A. Moore)



EF-111 over Italy during Deny Flight.

U.S. Air Force (Tama R. Hamilton)

noncombatant evacuation operation may be unopposed in one situation and opposed in another. Overlap can also occur if the situation deteriorates to require force beyond self-defense. For instance, a peacekeeping operation (which is a component of peace operations) is assumed to be nonviolent. If the negotiated truce that established the operation is violated by any of the parties to the conflict, or if any party withdraws its consent for the operation, there may be an abrupt transition to peace enforcement (also a component of peace operations).

The concept of MOOTW groupings is a step in the right direction, but may not be the ultimate solution. The groups deliberately stop short of taking the next step because the service doctrine writer wanted to maintain consistency with approved joint doctrine. The next step is to acknowledge that the MOOTW concept, for the reasons already cited, is flawed. Therefore, by extension the range of military operations is also flawed. The corrective action lies not in attempting to refine the MOOTW concept, but in discarding it and moving beyond the range of military operations.

### The Military Operational Framework

The hour has come to take that next step. However, this is not the first time steps were taken to change joint doctrine. The authors of the current Joint Pub 3-0 made a bold move when they replaced the operational continuum (peacetime competition, conflict, and war) with the range of military operations. The current joint doctrine model divides military operations into war and MOOTW without providing for any overlap. In addition, while the accompanying text in Joint Pub 3-07 explains that operations may occur simultaneously, this point is not clearly illustrated in the model due to its "boxlike" appearance. Once an operation is "put into a box," it should not be "confined" to the box as is the case with the current model.

While the current model includes the terms *combat* and *noncombat*, they are not the basis for the range of military operations; war and MOOTW are

The second group includes operations in which the *intent* is to be nonviolent. As with the first, this does not mean the environment is sterile or calm. Personnel should always be prepared to take appropriate defense measures for themselves, and commanders must always be prepared to defend their units. Again, casualties may occur. While the intent of operations in this group is to be nonviolent, a strong military presence is appropriate. Desert Shield is a classic case of a show of force that was active in nature but had a nonviolent intent.

The third group includes operations where the intent is clearly to be forceful. This is military power in the classic sense, bombs and bullets on target against an enemy. In recent years, our forces have participated in all four types. One example is Operation Southern Watch, initiated in 1992 to enforce an exclusion zone prohibiting Iraqi air operations in the established no-fly zone.

Completing the figure are the six operations that do not always fit neatly into any one group (shown in the lower right corner of figure 1). Depending on the situation, they may be nonviolent or forceful. For example, a

the two components. It is time for a model that accurately portrays the military instrument of national power in a framework that focuses on both combat and noncombat operations. This model must allow for overlap, a fluid transition from one operation to another, and numerous simultaneous operations at any given time. Also, it must include a solid foundation of continuing preparation. Our proposed model (the military operational framework) is depicted in figure 2 using a variation on a Venn diagram.

The military operational framework consists of intersecting areas (combat operations and noncombat operations) supported by a solid foundation of preparation. Broken lines surrounding the overlapping area (shown in green below) allow for a fluid transition from one operation to another and delimit the area in which an operation may be combat or noncombat. They also allow for simultaneous operations.

The left side of the operations portion consists of actions that involve combat. *Retaliatory actions* (formerly strikes and raids) are punitive measures to destroy an objective for political or military purposes. The reason for a new title is that current definitions are indistinguishable and are sometimes used interchangeably. Doctrine developers carefully vet definitions in classifying an operation as a strike or a raid

but still confuse the two. For example, Operation El Dorado Canyon (against Libya in April 1986) is termed a strike or a raid in Joint Pub 3-0. For clarity, these terms should be combined. An *operation to restore order* is what is now known as a *peace enforcement operation* (part of peace operations). Since peace enforcement is a misnomer the new title focuses on intent and places it in the context of a volatile and uncertain situation that is not peaceful.


The right side of the noncombat operations portion of figure 2 consists of actions that are clearly not intended to involve combat. But some risks are unavoidable and casualties may occur. Personnel should be prepared to take appropriate self-defense measures, and commanders should be prepared to defend their units. *Truce-keeping* replaces what is known as *peacekeeping*, another misnomer. There is no peace to keep; instead a negotiated truce between the parties to a conflict is maintained. This is not apparent when the misnomer is used—re-designating the operation as truce-keeping clarifies its real objective and emphasizes its unpeaceful atmosphere. The intent of *support and assistance operations*, as the term suggests, is the provision of military support and assistance for domestic and international purposes. (Support to insurgency is included since military

advice, training, and logistics are provided though forces do not normally actively engage in insurgencies.) In noncombat operations the military is used in so-called nontypical or nontraditional military roles.

Operations in the intersecting area are actions that, depending on the situation, may or may not involve combat. Therefore, personnel must be ready to conduct combat operations quickly. If combat is unavoidable, U.S. forces will have both the right equipment and appropriate mindset. Exclusion zone operations consist of what is known as *enforcing exclusion zones* (prohibiting specified *activities* in given geographic areas) and *enforcement of sanctions* (stopping movement of designated *items* into or out of given areas). The operations are similar, and like strikes and raids are often confused. For clarity, they too should be combined. Freedom of navigation operations include not only this type of operation as described in Joint Pub 3-07, but also what is known as *protection of shipping*. Again, they are similar and should be combined.

As noted, underlying each operation is a solid foundation of education, training, exercises, modeling, and simulations. They are essential in preparing to conduct operations anywhere in the military operational framework at any time. Moreover, the foundation enables mental and physical preparation to meet future operations, analyze

**Figure 2. The Military Operational Framework**



\*Note: The United States reserves the right to use force during support to counterinsurgency (part of nation assistance) and during support to insurgency when it is in its interest to do so.

**Figure 3. Existing Joint Doctrine Hierarchy**

Joint Pub 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
Joint Pub 3-07	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
Joint Pub 3-07.1	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense
Joint Pub 3-07.2	JTTP for Antiterrorism
Joint Pub 3-07.3	JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations
Joint Pub 3-07.4	JTTP for Counterdrug Operations
Joint Pub 3-07.5	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Joint Pub 3-07.6	JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Joint Pub 3-07.7	JTTP for Domestic Support Operations

**Figure 4. Proposed Joint Doctrine Hierarchy**

Joint Pub 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
Joint Pub 3-0.1	JTTP for Operations to Restore Order
Joint Pub 3-0.2	JTTP for Antiterrorism
Joint Pub 3-0.3	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Joint Pub 3-0.4	JTTP for Truce-Keeping
Joint Pub 3-0.5	JTTP for Domestic Support Operations
Joint Pub 3-0.6	JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Joint Pub 3-0.7	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (part of nation assistance)
Joint Pub 3-0.8	JTTP for Support to Counterdrug Operations

current operations, and learn lessons from recent operations and apply them in the future.

**Joint Doctrine Hierarchy**

The proposed model to move beyond the range of military operations into the operational framework impacts on the hierarchy of joint pubs but not as significantly as might be expected. It is likely that the same number of publications will be needed, but with a revised focus. Currently, there are two pertinent sources of doctrine—Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-07—as well as seven volumes of supporting joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) which are listed in figure 3.<sup>9</sup> The two doctrine pubs should be consolidated into a new version of Joint Pub 3-0 which retains the title of *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. It need not be lengthy, but it is important to put all doctrine in one document to avoid duplication and faulty perceptions of combat and noncombat operations.

At least eight JTTPs are necessary which will call for a new numbering system (some will also require new titles). Since they will be subordinate to Joint Pub 3-0, these JTTPs should be numbered 3-0.1 through 3-0.8 (see figure 4). This does not include JTTPs which may be required (such as exclusion zone operations). Future JTTPs must be formally proposed and approved for subsequent development at

semiannual meetings of the Joint Doctrine Working Party. Additional JTTPs would be numbered 3-0.9 and so forth.

When Joint Pub 3-0 undergoes assessment the range of military operations as well as the MOOTW concept should be rescinded. A revision should focus on a model of combat operations and noncombat operations with a solid foundation on preparation. After the revision, the subordinate JTTPs can also be revised as needed and then renumbered during their assessments.

The end of the Cold War brought new challenges which require that joint doctrine clearly and logically explains how the military instrument of national power is used. The model discussed herein may not be the solution, but it is a step in the right direction. It begins the quest for a new model to replace the range of military operations and the ambiguity of the MOOTW concept. Lest it go unsaid, the recent approval of the long-overdue Joint Pub 3-07 is commendable. Though the MOOTW concept is flawed, Joint Pub 3-07 was sorely needed. The assessment process and the subsequent revision of Joint Pub 3-0 can correct this flaw.

This is not a call for immediate changes in joint doctrine. Rather, it is simply the search for a model that properly represents the Armed Forces as the military instrument of national power. Doctrine, particularly joint doctrine, must focus on the fundamental principles of combat operations as well as noncombat operations to support national interests. It is time to take a

bold new step by moving beyond the range of military operations and into the military operational framework. **JFQ**

**NOTES**

<sup>1</sup> Since Joint Pub 3-07 has been recently approved but not distributed, this article has been based on the final coordination copy (December 22, 1994).

<sup>2</sup> The reformatted Joint Pub 3-0 (February 1, 1995) drops the noncombat portion of war from the model, although the MOOTW portion remains confusing and ambiguous.

<sup>3</sup> Letter, Joint Staff (J-7), 00965A-92, subject: "Final Evaluation Report of Joint Test Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," June 3, 1992.

<sup>4</sup> See Joint Pub 3-07 [test], October 1990, p. GL-6.

<sup>5</sup> The January 10, 1995 version uses the term *military operations other than war* rather than *military operations short of war*.

<sup>6</sup> See Joint Pub 3-07 [draft final pub], April 10, 1993, p. GL-13.

<sup>7</sup> Joint Pub 3-07 [final coordination], December 22, 1994, pp. GL-3, GL-4.

<sup>8</sup> The draft is dated April 3, 1995.

<sup>9</sup> Now that Joint Pub 3-07 is approved, the Joint Staff has issued a program directive to change Joint Pub 3-07.3 to *JTTP for Peace Operations*, thereby including peace enforcement.