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Peter Nannestad, Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

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Bridge over troubled water?

Migration, social capital and the welfare state

Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase; Nannestad, Peter; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard

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Bridge Over Troubled Water? Migration and Social Capital

Peter Nannestad, Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

The problem of integrating immigrants from non-western countries into western welfare states is the focus of this paper. To cope with this problem, we suggest a social capital approach by applying the conceptual pair of bridging social capital (BR), which connects an individual to the broader social structure, and bonding social capital (BO), which closely binds an individual to his narrow social group. By this we hope to grasp both the sunny and more shadowy side of network cooperation and trust in relation to the integration of immigrants. Our data on non-western immigrants in Denmark show a positive relationship between the levels of bridging and bonding capital, suggesting that bonding social capital in the immigrant group does not seem to work as an impediment to the establishment of the bridging social capital needed for integration.

Keywords: Social capital; Migration; Integration; Welfare State

Introduction

Migration, Integration and the Modern Welfare State

The modern welfare state is basically a formal institution that redistributes a substantial fraction of income among total strangers. This collective insurance system against ‘bad luck’ and inequality enjoys strong popular support (Fong et al. 2004). For example, the Nordic welfare states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) are supported by very large majorities of the populations.ⁱ All Nordic political parties with more than a marginal share of the vote are strongly in favour of keeping the existing welfare state largely unchanged.ⁱⁱ

Large-scale migration into welfare states over the past three decades, mainly from less developed non-western countries, has given rise to an integration problem

in most host countries. Until now this integration problem has remained largely unsolved. This is most dramatically illustrated by the emergence of so-called 'parallel societies' in which immigrants live in their own neighbourhoods, speaking their own languages and generally leading their lives quite isolated from the rest of society. Labour market integration has arguably failed due to the insufficient education and qualifications of large parts of the immigrant population, incentive problems, or discrimination in the labour market (SOPEMI 2002). When the level of social assistance is relatively high and universal, as in the Nordic welfare states, it follows that the financial burden of poorly integrated immigrants can be substantial (Andersen 2004; Baldwin-Edwards 2002).

The provision of integration can be considered a collective good for overall society in analogy with for instance public security (Nannestad 2004). From a societal point of view, integration is superior to a situation in which socially and economically marginalised immigrants linger at the fringes of society. However, integration requires cooperation between immigrants and natives with a view to bringing about this mutually beneficial situation, and this cooperation is not costless, either for natives or for immigrants. Thus a strong incentive for free-riding exists, since the benefits from integration are available to all individuals, whether or not they cooperate in bringing it about.ⁱⁱⁱ Thus with respect to the integration of immigrants a classical collective action dilemma arises.

The traditional means for solving collective action problems are either regulation (enforcement) or selective incentives, or some mix of the two (Olson, 1965). However, both encounter problems when it comes to the collective action problem of integration. Regulation is of limited use in the context of immigrant integration. The basic problem is that regulation can be applied only to what people do or do not do, but – at least in democratic societies – not to what they think. Thus behavioural discrimination against immigrants, hate speeches and similar overtly anti-immigrant acts can be forbidden and are indeed prohibited in most western countries. But it is not possible to forbid the attitudes behind such acts. Furthermore, there are limits to the regulation of individual behaviour in democratic countries. It would hardly be possible by means of regulation to force natives to live in the same neighbourhoods as immigrants, if natives do not want to live there, or to force native employees to stay in their workplace if they do not want to work together with immigrants.

Selective incentives for cooperating in bringing about immigrant integration are generally quite weak in western welfare states. This is most easily seen in the case of the universalistic Nordic welfare state where social benefits are generous – approaching the level of the minimum wage –

and access to social benefits depends on legal residence in the country only. As a consequence the individual economic gain from integration will be rather small for the typical low-skilled immigrant, while the cost – in terms of time and effort spent on learning the language and the unfamiliar *mores* of the new country – is most likely rather high.

Here, we consider the potential role of social capital, which has been defined as the ability to co-operate in a group for the purpose of achieving a collective good (Coleman 1988). Note that this co-operation is voluntary and self-enforcing, thus establishing an informal institution without any written rules or enforcement by a third party (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). It should also be noted that social capital has both a ‘sunny’ and ‘dark’ side. Thus in recent research, authors such as Portes (1998) and Putnam (2000) have considered both positive and negative social capital, the latter potentially harmful to society as a whole. In the following, we will use the twin concepts of bridging and bonding social capital (BR/BO) in order to grasp the two sides of social capital. We will in this respect follow Putnam, who defines BR as open networks that are ‘outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages’, while BO consists of ‘inward looking [networks that] tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups’ (Putnam 2000: 22).

Due to poor co-operation between economists and social scientists, the social capital concept has until recently been the ‘missing link’ in political and economic debates. In other words, it was not until the beginning of the new millennium that we discovered that for far too long we had not taken the important production factor of *social* capital into consideration! It is precisely this ‘missing link’, which may be used as one explanation for the wealth of nations in specific contexts, that is, in historic as well as in contemporary societies.^{iv} Thus, social capital – grasped both in its bridging and bonding dimensions – may be one of the missing links in creating a coherent theory of integration and disintegration, combining the transaction cost approach from economics to the norm approach from sociology.

Social capital, broadly understood as network cooperation based on mutual trust, can help solve the collective action problem of integration since it can weaken or eliminate one particular incentive for free-riding: the fear of ending up with the “sucker’s pay-off” if one does not free-ride, while all others do. As long as an individual cannot trust that others will cooperate in the collective effort, this individual risks a double loss by cooperating, since he has made a (costly) contribution that nevertheless does not result in the collective good (because the others chose to free-ride). As soon as there is mutual trust that everybody will do their share, this consideration becomes less important.

Trust of others is probably the best indicator of social control and valuable social structures that facilitate cooperation (Bjørnskov 2005). In these social networks, relations are established in which reciprocity is enforced so that individuals make contributions to collective goods that are contingent on others making contributions. Such relations may be further strengthened by the enforcement of social norms that force contributions to collective goods.

The less the regulatory capacity and the weaker the selective incentives for cooperation, the more important positive types of social capital must become for solving collective action problems. While the strictly regulatory capacities with respect to integration probably do not vary much across welfare states, selective incentives do so to a higher degree. They are clearly weakest in the most universalistic and most generous welfare states. For that reason social capital must be considered a key variable in the context of immigrant integration in the universalistic Nordic welfare state type to which Denmark belongs.

A BR/BO Approach in Migration Studies

The problem of integrating immigrants from non-western countries into western welfare states is the focus of this paper. How can parallel societies be integrated into the wider society? To cope with this overall question, we suggest an interdisciplinary BR/BO approach. By this we hope to grasp *both* the sunny and more shadowy side of network co-operation and trust relations. Thus we try to incorporate the sociological critique of the “one-sided picture of social capital” (Portes and Landolt 1996: 20). As we mentioned, BR can be identified as network cooperation that transcends group cleavages, while BO is exclusive and group-specific in nature. Both types involve trust, but whereas BR is based on general trust, i.e. trust in strangers, BO is based on concrete trust, i.e. trust in people you already know. BO in the form of exclusive friendship and kinship groups often implies positive externalities, while excessive BO in the form of ‘superglued’ groups such as the mafia, Al-Qaida and KKK involves negative societal outcomes. Hence, we propose three types of social capital: BR+, BO+ and BO–.

Building on this conceptual approach, our research question can basically be defined as follows: how do bridging and bonding social capital affect the integration of immigrants? More specifically we ask if the poor integration of non-western immigrants in Denmark can be related to low levels of bridging social capital (BR) in this group. If this turns out to be the case, we further ask if this has something to do with the level and type of bonding social capital (BO) in the immigrant groups. Does bonding social capital crowd out bridging social capital, i.e. is it BO-? Or is there just too little

positive bonding social capital (BO+) to raise the level of bridging social capital sufficiently? To our knowledge, such an approach to the integration of immigrants, based on our new social capital database, has not yet been undertaken.

In the next section, we start by elaborating theoretically upon the BR/BO distinction, focusing mainly on BO+. We present examples from the migration literature of the formation of BO+ and then suggest how BO+ arguably may affect BR positively through the channel of voluntary associations. In the section that follows, we discuss our collection of data and some methodological problems. Next, we empirically analyse the relationship between BR and BO, as well as the prevailing type of BO (BO+/BO-), using our survey of social capital in five non-western immigrant groups in Denmark. In the final section, we discuss some policy recommendations.

The BR/BO Framework

Social Capital as 'Cutting Both Ways'

The recent BR/BO distinction certainly takes into account the important critique of a 'dominant celebratory view of social capital' since the 1990s (Portes and Landolt 1996: 21) and a general tendency to neglect the downside or dark side of social capital, which has been raised by sociologists.

Until now, the social capital approach has been rare within migration studies. Portes (1998, 2000) has applied research on migration to show that, first, social capital has a negative side; and second, that social capital explanations often are teleological, implying that one should always look for other, alternative explanations (the 'spurious effect' argument, cf. Portes 2000). At the macro level, Hammar *et al.* (1997), Massey (1998) and Schiff (1998) see social capital as a good which influences migration patterns, without however distinguishing between different qualities of social capital (BR/BO).

Portes (1998) was the first to make the distinction between positive and negative types of social capital. Positive social capital derived from social control is typically found in the form of what Portes (*op.cit.*: 10) calls 'rule enforcement', 'bounded solidarity' and 'enforceable trust' (see also Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). However, Portes (1998) argues that social capital *cuts both ways*, meaning that negative types of network cooperation also exist, for example in networks where costs tend to exceed profits for individual members through loss of personal freedom or possibilities for upward social mobility.

We find that the recognition of social capital as ‘cutting both ways’ is crucial. This idea deeply roots in the sociological theories of Durkheim and Weber, focusing on the *moral* character of economic transactions within a group. For example, Durkheim ([1893] 1984: 162) wrote in his analysis of the so-called noncontractual elements of contract: “The contract is not sufficient by itself, but is only possible because of the regulation of contracts, which is of social origin”. This supports his seminal idea of an evolutionary leap from ‘mechanical solidarity’, belonging to pre-modern societies where members share working functions and norms (i.e. BO), to ‘organic solidarity’ belonging to modern societies based on formal contracts between different occupational groups (involving formation of both BO and BR, in our terminology) (ibid.). Likewise, Weber ([1922] 1947) distinguished between ‘formal’ and ‘substantial’ rationality when considering economic transactions. Transactions consistent with a formal rationality are based on universal norms and inclusive networks and are therefore not directed by narrow group interests. Transactions consistent with a substantial rationality are, in contrast, directed by group norms and narrow group interests. The purpose in the latter is typically that of establishing or maintaining monopoly status in the market. Weber’s overall point is that individual group members are capable of suppressing their own egoistic wants here and now, in anticipation of future and lasting advantages, that is, future net gains, from undertaking social action (ibid). Besides, the BR-BO distinction can be traced in other influential social theories, such as Tönnies’ *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and, more recently, Granovetter’s strong and weak ties (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004).

Still, we think Portes (1998) has carried this discussion a step further when he argues that, first, social capital also may be harmful to society and, second, that the distinction between positive and negative types of social capital can be very subtle indeed.

At the individual level, the processes alluded to by the concept [of social capital] cut both ways. Social ties can bring about greater control over wayward behaviour and provide privileged access to resources; they can also restrict individual freedoms, and bar outsiders from gaining access to the same resources through particularistic preferences [Portes 1998: 21].

This is so because a group of people – say, a group of Puerto Ricans in New York, or a Turkish community in Brussels – can get to know and trust each other ‘too much’, not allowing other people access to their network (what Putnam termed ‘superglue’). Thus, the radius of exchange of information, knowledge and reciprocal services is restricted, leading to negative externalities and zero-sum games (BO–). In worst cases, such group isolationist strategies result in symbolic violence

between groups of insiders and outsiders ('us' and 'them'). Not infrequently, this involves marginalisation of social groups, reinforced by prejudices and group isolation, such as unemployed urban migrants in peripheral rural Denmark (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). Even more dramatically, it manifests itself in riots and killings as in the case of enduring conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in India (Varshney 2002). The migration literature is particularly rich on cases of good provision within ethnic networks cutting both ways.

In most immigrant studies, social capital is seen as belonging exclusively to a certain immigrant group and being used 'against' the surrounding society, implying both positive and negative outcomes – that is, *BO+* and *BO-* in our terminology (e.g. Portes and Stepick 1985; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou and Bankston 1994; Ooka and Wellman 2000; Favell 2003; Hagan *et al.* 2005). While being fully aware of the negative dimensions of immigrant networks, in this paper we will draw attention to their positive dimensions, or potentialities. This is in line with a major part of the immigrant literature, which often focuses on types of prevailingly *BO+*.

With respect to empirical evidence, *BO-* has been detected on a large scale in eastern Europe. For example, Stephenson (2001) notes that social capital works in negative and positive ways in post-communist Russia, supporting groups of children on the streets of Moscow, but also enabling and supporting the Russian mafia. The negative social capital heritage can be traced to the communist era, as in Poland (Chloupkova *et al.* 2003) and Romania (Almond 1991; Coplin and O'Leary 2001; Ivanec 2001; Ledeneva 1998), but harmful bonding social capital can also be traced historically in countries with democratic traditions, such as Denmark in the decades following World War II (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004).

By now the distinction between 'good' bridging and 'bad' bonding social capital is in widespread usage in applications of a social capital framework. We argue, however, that the theoretical framework could be sharpened by using a simple and operational distinction between a positive, bridging type of social capital (*BR+*) and *two* types of bonding social capital (*BO+* and *BO-*). While bridging social capital consists of inter-group networks, cooperation and trust that transcend group cleavages, bonding social capital resides in intra-group networks, cooperation and trust of an excluding and, at times, economically harmful nature. Normally *BR* is identified with inclusive, outward-oriented relationships ("lubricants"), while *BO* is considered exclusive and inward-oriented ("glue").

While we accept the characterisation of bridging social capital as "good" social capital from the point of view of society, we suggest that bonding social capital need not always be "bad" social

capital. We want to keep open the possibility that under certain circumstances bonding social capital may facilitate the development of bridging capital. To the extent that this happens, we call the bonding social capital ‘good’ as well (BO+). To the extent that bonding social capital crowds out or destroys bridging social capital we call that type of bonding social capital “bad” social capital (BO-). Linking our terminology to Portes’ (1998) important findings within migration studies, we may say that BR only cuts one way, while BO cuts both ways, leading to varying positive and negative outcomes at all levels.

Add to this the *simultaneous* existence of negative and positive types of social capital in a society, and even as two qualities within *the same network* (Portes 1998: 20), and it becomes clear that we are faced with various mixes of BR/BO+ –.

From BO+ to BR

Both the ‘family’ theory and the BO+ ‘group solidarity’ theory have been promoted by one of the most influential authors in the early formation of a social capital research agenda during the 1980s and 1990s, James Coleman (1988, 1990). Coleman stressed the importance of common, intra-group norms and closure, as well as family resources.^v Granovetter (1995) also states that it is the level of group solidarity that gives immigrants and other minorities advantages in the construction of enterprise. Similarly, Portes and Zhou (1993: 96) point to the advantages obtained by children of non-white immigrants, who remain ‘securely ensconced in their coethnic community [enabling them to capitalise] on otherwise unavailable material and moral resources’. A cultural argument is also advanced by Waldinger (1995), who finds that success in adaptive strategies among Caribbean and Korean Americans, and failure among African Americans, can be explained by differences in ethnic organisation. Using the Vietnamese case, Zhou and Bankston (1994: 841) explain successful integration as resulting from ‘a coherent complex of immigrant cultural orientations and the significant positive influence of this cultural complex on the adaptation of Vietnamese youth’. In our terminology, they identify a BO+ building process, which functions as a safeguard against formation of harmful BO–:

[Ethnic] social integration creates a form of social capital that enables an immigrant family to receive ongoing support and direction from other families and from the religious and social associations of the ethnic group. Consequently, community standards are established and reinforced among group members who may otherwise assimilate into an underclass subculture (op. cit.: 842).

Nee and Sanders (2001) have proposed an interesting ‘forms-of-capital’ approach, which aims to shed light on the importance of various *mixes* of financial, human-cultural and social capital among immigrant groups, as important determinants for careers. However, in contrast to cases of BO+ based on ethnic solidarity cited above they emphasize the role of the *family*. Thus, immigrants ‘with the lowest stock of family capital rely more on social ties embedded in the ethnic community as a substitute for the social support provided by a family. These social connections more often lead to jobs [in the ethnic economy] characterized by low wages and poor working conditions’ (op.cit.: 407). In contrast, more independent families rich in human and financial capital are better equipped to participate in the open economy and establish inter-ethnic networks, i.e. BR in our terminology.

Besides getting access to resources and jobs, the positive side of BO may also, as Putnam argues (1993), lead to BR due to participation in voluntary organisations. One example could be the social interaction in a sports club where friendship ties are formed. This regular face-to-face interaction in the sports club arguably facilitates BO+, which again is carried out into society and thereby transformed to BR. In other words, the positive specific experience with other people in a voluntary organisation will ‘spill over’ into overall society and eventually enhance economic growth due to reduced transaction and monitoring costs in the economy.

Data: Bonding and Bridging Social Capital in Five Non-Western Immigrant Groups in Denmark

Data and Measurements

In the following, we present survey data from Denmark’s SoCap (2005) project as collected in April – May 2004. This new survey allows us to highlight the levels of BR and BO and the relationships between these measures for five different ethnic groups in Denmark. We will measure social capital based on surveys of trust, friendship patterns and voluntary association memberships, both within and outside own groups.

The data were collected by bilingual interviewers using a mixture of phone and personal (face-to-face) interviews. The respondents consisted of a representative sample from the five largest groups of non-western immigrants and refugees in Denmark (see Table 1), defined according to the criteria developed by Statistics Denmark (SoCap, 2005).

Table 1 about here

Using bilingual interviewers from the respondents' own ethnic groups is likely to have resulted in a higher proportion of completed interviews. It may also have enhanced the reliability of the responses since the respondents had no reason to reflect on how their answers would tally with Danish norms and expectations. Consistency checks were performed wherever possible and did not indicate problems.

Measuring Bridging and Bounding Social Capital

We approach the measurement of social capital in the five non-western immigrant groups in three ways, drawing on the responses to three different clusters of questions. These three clusters of questions represent three different instruments that have been suggested in the literature and used for measuring social capital.

The first cluster of questions deals with trust. The respondents were asked if they thought one could usually trust members of their own ethnic group in Denmark, or if one could not be too careful in dealing with them. We consider the responses to this question a measure of bonding social capital. Furthermore the respondents were asked the same question with respect to four other groups – all outgroups from the perspective of the respondent, although to varying degrees: other immigrants and refugees now living in Denmark, native Danes, Danish Jews, and Danish Catholics. We consider the responses to these questions to be a measure of bridging social capital.

The second set of questions deals with friendship ties. The respondents were asked if they had many, quite a number, a few, or no Danish friends. We consider the responses to this question still another measure of bridging social capital. The respondents were also asked if they had many, quite a number, a few, or no friends among other immigrants and refugees in Denmark. We consider the responses to this question a measure of bonding social capital.

The third set of questions deals with participation in voluntary associations. In his seminal study of social capital in Italy, Putnam (1993) has emphasised the importance of voluntary associations in building social capital. Voluntary associations contribute to building social capital mainly through the experience of mutually beneficial cooperation and the development of trust from this experience. Hence the density of memberships in voluntary associations, sometimes called Putnam's instrument, provides an indication of the amount of social capital in individuals, in groups, or in society as a whole. Here, we differentiate between memberships in voluntary associations with both native and immigrant members and memberships in voluntary associations

with only immigrant members. We consider the former an indicator of bridging (BR) and the latter an indicator of bonding social capital (BO).

In analysing the responses to these three clusters of questions we start out at the group level. This allows us to assess the level of different types of social capital in the five immigrant groups. In order to determine if bonding social capital is BO+ or BO- we have to move to the individual level. We consider bonding social capital BO+ if it correlates positively with bridging social capital across individuals and BO- if it correlates negatively. If there is no significant correlation, we cannot decide if bonding social capital is BO+ or BO-.

Response Set?

In the empirical analyses we shall compare the respondents' trust in their own group and in various outgroups, the density of their friendship ties with Danes and with other immigrants and refugees, and the density of their memberships in intra- and in inter-ethnic voluntary associations. The validity of the outcomes of these comparisons depends critically on the absence of response set patterns in the recorded answers. If the respondents – or many of them – automatically answered the relevant questions in the same way, for instance by saying that they had 'many' Danish friends *just because* they had said earlier in the interview that they had many friends among immigrants and refugees, the associations found would just be artefacts.

We cannot rule out response set problems with absolute certainty. It is possible, however, to check for indications that they may be occurring. Here we can take advantage of a variable the values of which are not determined by the respondent but by the interviewer. This variable is Danish language proficiency. It seems reasonable to assume that there must be a relationship between Danish language proficiency and a respondent's number of Danish friends. Furthermore, this relationship should be stronger than the relationship between Danish language proficiency and a respondent's number of friends among immigrants and refugees in Denmark. Finding such a pattern would indicate the absence of response set problems with the answers to the friendship questions. In fact the expected pattern can be found: Danish language proficiency is much more strongly correlated with the number of friendships with native Danes (Spearman's $\rho = 0.56$, $t = 25.97$, $p = 0.00$) than with the number of friendships with immigrants and refugees (Spearman's $\rho = 0.17$, $t = 6.76$, $p = 0.00$).

By the same logic one should expect the number of memberships of inter-ethnic voluntary associations to be more strongly correlated with Danish language proficiency than the number of

memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations. Again, we find this pattern in the data: the correlation is stronger and statistically more reliable for inter-ethnic voluntary associations (Spearman's $\rho = 0.21$, $t = 8.24$, $p = 0.00$) than for intra-ethnic ones (Spearman's $\rho = 0.05$, $t = 2.06$, $p = 0.04$). Again this meaningful pattern would be difficult to explain if we were to assume some built-in automatic relation between how the respondents have answered the two sets of questions concerning membership in intra- and in inter-ethnic voluntary associations.

With respect to the trust question, Nannestad and Svendsen (2005) have shown that trust in Danes is more strongly dependent on trust in the even-handedness of Danish institutions in their dealing with native Danes and with immigrants than is trust in other immigrants. This finding makes sense, since institutions that are even-handed in their dealings with native Danes and immigrants reduce the risk created by trusting Danes, but not necessarily the risk created by trusting other immigrants. Again, this pattern would be hard to account for if we assumed that many respondents indicated trust in native Danes just because they had indicated trust in other immigrants and refugees.

Given these results, we can be confident in ruling out response set as the cause of the correlations reported in the next section.

Empirical Results

In the following we present empirical results on the level of bridging and bonding social capital in the respondents from five non-western immigrant groups in Denmark and on the relationship between the two types of social capital.

The Trust Questions

Table 2 shows the patterns in the responses to the trust questions.

Table 2 about here

The results suggest that the level of bonding social capital is surprisingly low with the Turkish, the Pakistani and the Yugoslav groups, where less than one half of the respondents indicate trust in members of their own ethnic group in Denmark. At the other extreme the Somalis indicate high levels of bonding social capital as measured by the trust question, with 80 per cent expressing trust

in other Somalis in Denmark. The Palestinian group occupies an intermediate position with about one half of the respondents expressing trust in other Palestinians in Denmark.

With respect to the level of bridging social capital, Table 2 exhibits two somewhat contradictory trends. On the one hand, trust in Danes is at about the same level as trust in the respondents' own group, or even exceeds it in the case of Turks, Pakistanis, Palestinians and Yugoslavs, while it is considerably lower with Somalis. On the other hand the level of trust in outgroups other than native Danes tends to be lower than the level of trust in the respondents' own group, except for in the case of the Yugoslavs.

Table 3 demonstrates the patterns above in a slightly different way by ranking outgroups according to which are most widely trusted (left panel), and which non-western immigrant groups trust outgroups most (right panel). Danes form the most trusted outgroup (53.5 per cent) followed by own group (49.2 per cent) whereas Danish Jews are trusted by the smallest proportion (36.1 per cent). Somalis are the most trusting immigrant group (66.2 per cent), followed by Palestinians (52.2 per cent), with Turks at the bottom (33.1 per cent).

Table 3 about here

Tables 2 and 3 do not suggest that bonding social capital – trust in members of the respondents' own ethnic groups – crowds out bridging social capital, at least as far as trust in native Danes is concerned. Indeed, the percentage of respondents trusting Danes and trusting members of their own ethnic groups is rather similar and close to 50 per cent. The question is, however, to what extent those who trust members of their own group and those who trust Danes are actually the same or different respondents. This can be seen in Table 4 which gives the individual level correlations between trusting members of one's own group and trusting various outgroups, including Danes.

Table 4 about here

The tetrachoric correlations in Table 4 strongly indicate that respondents who express trust in their own ethnic group also tend to express trust in members of outgroups and that those who do not trust outgroups are likely not to trust their own group either. This means that trust in one's own ethnic group is BO+. It is certainly bonding social capital, but it would seem to have a positive spillover effect with respect to trust in outgroups, that is, BR.

Thus from the perspective of social capital as a means of solving the collective action problem of integration, the problem seems not to be that immigrants in Denmark hold too much bonding social capital at the expense of the bridging social capital that is needed. Rather, the problem would seem to be that they hold too little bonding social capital (trust in members of their own group) which can spill over into bridging social capital (trust in members of outgroups, especially native Danes).

The Friendship Questions

The overall distribution of the answers to the questions on friendships with native Danes and with other immigrants and refugees in Denmark is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 about here

Figure 1 indicates that immigrants tend to hold more bonding than bridging social capital when social capital is measured by the number of friendship ties. The proportion of respondents reporting 'many' or 'quite a number' of friends among immigrants and refugees in Denmark significantly exceeds the proportion reporting 'many' or 'quite a number of' friend among native Danes. The proportion of respondents reporting 'a few' or no friends among immigrants and refugees in Denmark is significantly smaller than the proportion reporting 'a few' or no friends among native Danes.

In order to determine how friendship ties with other immigrants and refugees (BO) and friendship ties with native Danes (BR) are related, and hence what type of bonding social capital friendship with other immigrants and refugees represents, we need to turn to Table 5.

Table 5 about here

The interesting thing to notice in Table 5 is that having Danish friends and having friends among other immigrants is strongly correlated. Thus ethnic friendship ties are not crowding out friendship ties to Danes - rather to the contrary.

Largely the same picture emerges when we examine the relationship between having many Danish friends and having many friends among other immigrants across our five immigrant groups.

Table 6 about here

As can be seen in Table 6, immigrant groups with an above-average percentage reporting many immigrant friends (the Turks and the Ex-Yugoslavs) also report an above-average percentage of many Danish friendships, while the Pakistanis and the Somalis are below average in both respects. With the Palestinian group the picture is a little less clear. This group is lower than the Turkish and the Ex-Yugoslav group with respect to *both* the percentage reporting many friendships with other immigrants *and* the percentage reporting many friendships with Danes. Thus there is a clear tendency for differences between the five immigrant groups with respect to the amount of bonding social capital (percentage reporting many friendships with other immigrants) to also appear in their amount of bonding social capital (percentage reporting many friendships with Danes).

If we consider ethnic friendship ties as bonding (BO) and friendship ties with Danes as bridging social capital (BR), then we can interpret Table 5 and Table 6 as suggesting a spill-over effect from BO to BR, meaning that ethnic friendship ties are BO+.

As with the trust questions, from an integration perspective the problem seems not to be that immigrants in Denmark hold too much bonding social capital at the expense of desirable bridging social capital. Rather, the problem would seem to be that they hold too little bonding social capital (friendships with other immigrants and refugees), thus limiting the potential for a spill-over into bridging social capital (friendships with native Danes).

Putnam's Instrument

Finally we turn to an analysis of the measures provided by Putnam's instrument. We begin by examining the levels of bridging and bonding capital, cf. Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2 about here

At first sight Figure 2 would seem to suggest that the immigrants in question possess more bridging than bonding social capital. After all, the proportion of respondents reporting no memberships at all in intra-ethnic voluntary associations is significantly higher than the proportion reporting no memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary associations. Furthermore, the proportions reporting one or several memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary associations consistently exceed the proportions reporting one or several memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations.

This interpretation may be somewhat misleading, however. On closer inspection of the data, it is evident that the difference between the proportions reporting memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic associations, respectively, is driven by membership in one single group of (inter-ethnic) associations only. These are the trade unions. From the perspective of bridging social capital, trade union membership is not very likely to contribute much to building bridging social capital by immigrants, even though trade unions are (at least in a formal sense) voluntary associations and have both natives and immigrants as members. The main reason is that to most members trade unions are ‘wallet associations’, where normally little interaction between the rank-and-file takes place. For that reason, little building of trust in native co-members can be expected. If we exclude trade union membership, the pattern of memberships in voluntary associations changes rather dramatically.

Now the proportion not reporting any memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary associations exceeds the proportion not reporting any memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations by a significant margin. Moreover, the proportions reporting one or several memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations consistently exceed the proportions reporting memberships in inter-ethnic ones. Thus according to Putnam’s instrument we now find more bonding than bridging capital in the five non-western immigrant groups surveyed.

The data on memberships in voluntary associations so far suggest two main conclusions concerning the social capital of immigrants in Denmark. In the first place, the stock of social capital possessed by immigrants in Denmark is rather low when measured by Putnam’s instrument, and this holds true for bonding and bridging social capital alike. This is clearly brought out in Table 7.

Table 7 about here

In the second place, there are no signs of bonding social capital (membership(s) in intra-ethnic voluntary associations) crowding out bridging social capital (membership(s) in inter-ethnic voluntary associations) – or vice versa. This situation would have been implied if high levels of membership in intra-ethnic voluntary associations had been found to occur with low levels of membership in inter-ethnic ones. This, however, is not what the data show.

This conclusion is confirmed when looking at the relationship between memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations at the individual level. As can be seen in Tables 8, 9 and 10,

there is a positive individual-level relationship between the numbers of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations.

Table 8 about here

Table 9 about here

Table 10 about here

However, Tables 8 and 9 also reveal that the positive and significant relationship between numbers of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations is strongly driven by the high number of respondents reporting no memberships in either one of the two types of voluntary associations. If we omit respondents who report no memberships in either intra- or inter-ethnic voluntary associations and exclude membership in trade unions, the relationship between numbers of memberships in the two types of voluntary associations vanishes. This implies that membership in intra-ethnic associations does not affect the likelihood of a membership in one or more inter-ethnic associations, and vice versa, as soon as we disregard respondents who are not members of any kind of voluntary association.

But it should also be noted that there is still no evidence that intra-ethnic association membership is crowding out membership in inter-ethnic associations. A crowding out effect would be indicated by a significant negative relationship between the numbers of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations, respectively.

This conclusion is confirmed if we look at the differences between the average numbers of memberships in inter- and intra-ethnic voluntary associations between our five immigrant groups.

Table 11 about here

As can be seen the Turkish group has an above-average participation in both intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations, which suggests a positive relationship. The Somali group has below average participation in both intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations, which likewise suggests a positive relationship. The Pakistani group is above average with respect to memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary associations, but on average with respect to memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary

associations, suggesting no relationship between memberships in the two types of voluntary associations. Thus the results from these three groups suggest that the amount of bonding social capital, when measured by memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations, is either positively related to the amount of bonding social capital, measured as memberships in inter-ethnic voluntary associations, or that there is at least no negative relationship between bonding and bridging social capital.

However, the results for the Palestinian group and the group of Ex-Yugoslavs might seem to suggest a different conclusion. The Palestinian group is below average with respect to memberships in inter-ethnic and above average with respect to memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations. With the group of Ex-Yugoslavs, the pattern is reversed. This group is above average with respect to memberships in inter- and below average with respect to memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations. But with the Palestinian group the average number of memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations is not significantly greater than the overall average ($p > 0.10$). With the group of Ex-Yugoslavs the difference between their average numbers of memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations and the overall average is just marginally significant ($p = 0.10$). Thus the results for these two groups should most appropriately be interpreted as suggesting no relationship between the amounts of bridging and bonding social capital, when social capital is measured by memberships in voluntary intra- and inter-ethnic associations.

In conclusion, the analysis of social capital of immigrants in Denmark based on Putnam's instrument (membership in voluntary associations) indicates that their bonding social capital, measured as the individual respondent's number of memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations, does not appear to be negative bonding social capital (BO-). At best, it may even represent a kind of positive bonding social capital (BO+) with a positive spill over into bridging social capital (BR). At worst, the amount of bonding social capital as indicated by Putnam's instrument has no reliable negative effect on the amount of bridging social capital of the immigrants.

From the perspective of integration, then, membership in intra-ethnic voluntary associations should not be considered a problem in its own right, even though it constitutes bonding social capital. Since the amount of bonding social capital, as measured by Putnam's instrument, has turned out to have either no relationship, or perhaps even a positive relationship, with bridging social capital, concerns about immigrants retreating into their own system of ethnic voluntary institutions cordoned off from associations in the host society seem largely unfounded. Bonding social capital,

as indicated by memberships in intra-ethnic voluntary associations, is not necessarily an obstacle to the acquisition of the bridging social capital needed for integration. Rather, it is the immigrants' generally low level of social capital of any kind revealed by Putnam's instrument that could be a cause for concern.

Building Bridges over Troubled Waters

It is important that isolated networks be better integrated through building bridging social capital in positive-sum games. If not, we risk the formation of excessive bonding in the form of one-sided, intra-communal engagement (Varshney 2002:12), within parallel immigrant societies. This leads to a fragile social order in isolated communities, which can easily be destabilized, for example by rumours and tensions from the outside world, perhaps reinforced by public media. This might lead to symbolic violence and, in extreme cases, physical violence – as in the already mentioned case of conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India. Similar cases have emerged in European immigration countries, for example the murder of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in 2004, the recent riots in Paris (October-November 2005) or the cartoon controversy caused by the publication of 12 cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper (30 September 2005).

Hence, while our data and results indicate that the situation in Denmark at present is generally far from the situation characterising the French suburbs in 2005, this does not guarantee that the situation will remain so forever, or that it will develop of its own accord in a positive direction. We have found bonding social capital in five immigrant groups in Denmark to be largely positive (BO+) in the sense of being positively related to bridging social capital (BR). But this may conceivably change, and we have limited knowledge about when and how this might happen.

Thus building bridges between groups becomes essential before they become increasingly superglued. Parallel societies should not only be seen as private, 'monopolised' network resources that are not being effectively exploited by the rest of society. They might lead to a number of societal problems such as corruption, black markets, criminality, decrease in generalised trust, deteriorating human capital and, ultimately, economic backlash. But, as our findings indicate, they can also be building blocks in the acquisition of bridging social capital.

One way of building bridges could be to facilitate voluntary organisations, as they may secure regular interaction between different ethnic or social groups. (e.g. Putnam 2000; Warren 2001; Giri 2002; Varshney 2002; Svendsen and Svendsen 2004).

Numerous historical examples such as the voluntary dairy movement in Denmark or sports hall buildings suggest that organisations which appeal to members across group cleavages and are situated in decentralized meeting-places owned by the members themselves, may function as platforms for integration. When prejudices and myths about other groups are contested and where information and services are exchanged for mutual benefit, the likelihood that BO is transformed into BR is increased significantly.

Conclusion

Economists and other social scientists have increasingly come to focus on social capital as a means for solving collective action dilemmas. Here, social capital may be one of the missing links in creating a coherent theory to understand and measure social integration. Thus, we wanted to adapt our social capital approach to a new sociological setting: immigrant groups. This motivated us to avoid what has been termed the one-sided picture of social capital, meaning a focus on solely beneficial, inter-group social capital. Therefore we applied the recent inventions of bridging and bonding social capital (BR/BO). In line with Putnam, we identified BR as networks that transcend group cleavages, while BO is much more exclusive and, at times, aggressively exclusive. We argued that both types involve trust, but whereas BR is based on trust of strangers, BO is based on trust of people who are known. Thus, BO in the form of friendship and kinship groups often imply positive societal outcomes, while excessive BO in the form of ‘superglued’ groups such as the mafia, Al-Qaida and KKK involve negative outcomes. Accordingly, we proposed three types of social capital: BR+, BO+, BO–.

Building on this conceptual approach, our research question can basically be defined as follows: how does bridging and bonding social capital affect the integration of immigrants? Overall, in line with a major part of the sociological immigrant literature, our results call attention to what appears to be a surprisingly great potential for BO+ and BR among Danish immigrant groups from non-western countries. Such a positive relationship between the levels of bridging and bonding capital in these groups suggests that bonding social capital does not work as an impediment to the development of the bridging social capital needed for integration.

However, this conclusion should not invite complacency. Rather, in the short run, we would recommend the encouragement of open voluntary organisations as a means of inter-group bridging. These associations should be situated in decentralized, shared meeting-places securing regular face

to face interaction across group cleavages, and hence aiding the potential transformation of BO to BR.

More theoretical and empirical work is needed if we are to make the bridging/bonding approach helpful in studies of immigrant parallel societies. How do we establish the optimal mix between BO+ and BR, for example? Such challenges do indeed call for sophisticated quantitative and qualitative analysis in future research.

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Figure 1 Friendships with native Danes and with other immigrants and refugees in Denmark




Figure 2. Memberships in voluntary associations




Figure 3 Memberships in voluntary associations, excluding trade unions




Table 1 The immigrant respondents in the sample

Group	Group size in population	Group size in sample	Composition	Original type of migration	Migration onset	Religious composition
Turks	53.465	302	Turks and Kurds	Guest workers	1960's	Muslim
Pakistanis	19.049	300	Pakistani	Guest workers	1960's	Muslim
Somalis	17.849	276	Somalis	Refugees	1990's	Muslim
Palestinians	21.202	322	Mainly from Lebanon	Refugees	1980's	Muslim
Ex-Yugoslavs	38.314	303	Serbs and Bosnians	Serbs: guest workers Bosnians: refugees	1960's 1990's	Christian and Muslim

Source: Nannestad and Svendsen (2005).

Table 2 Trust in own group, other immigrants, native Danes, Danish Jews and Danish Catholics (per cent of valid answers, number of observations in parentheses)

Group	Trust in				
	Own group	Other immigrants	Danes	Jews in Denmark	Catholics in Denmark
Turks	34.5 (296)	30.6 (294)	36.1 (294)	31.8 (285)	32.6 (288)
Pakistanis	39.2 (286)	33.2 (280)	38.3 (282)	26.7 (258)	28.8 (253)
Somalis	80.2 (267)	70.5 (264)	71.9 (263)	48.1 (241)	58.1 (248)
Palestinians	52.6 (314)	48.1 (289)	69 (300)	30 (190)	53.1 (193)
Yugoslavs	41.4 (268)	34.7 (248)	53.1 (258)	45.2 (208)	51.1 (231)

Source: SoCap (2005).

Table 3 Groups most trusted and most trusting (weighted averages) in per cent

Trust in	Average pct. of all respondents trusting		Average pct. in respondent group trusting at least one outgroup
Danes	53.5	Somalis	66.2
Own group	49.2	Palestinians	52.2
Catholics	43.8	Yugoslavs	45.0
Immigrants	43.2	Pakistani	33.5
Jews	36.1	Turks	33.1

Source: SoCap (2005).

Table 4 Tetrachoric correlations between trust in own ethnic group and trust in other groups

Group	Other immigrants in Denmark	Native Danes	Danish Jews	Danish Catholics
Turks	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98
Pakistanis	0.99	0.95	0.94	0.97
Somalis	0.89	0.84	0.82	0.83
Palestinians	.96	0.74	0.86	0.79
Ex-Yugoslavs	0.95	0.94	0.98	0.98
All	0.97	0.90	0.92	0.90

Table 5 Individual-level relationships between friendships with other immigrants and refugees and friendships with native Danes (in per cent)

	Immigrant friends	Danish friends: Many	Danish friends: Quite a number	Danish friends: A few	Danish friends: None	Row
Count	Many	64	68	92	40	264
Column Percent		26.02	19.77	17.83	10.10	
Row Percent		24.24	25.76	34.85	15.15	
Total Percent		4.26	4.53	6.13	2.66	17.58
Count	Quite a number	65	160	197	82	504
Column Percent		26.42	46.51	38.18	20.71	
Row Percent		12.90	31.75	39.09	16.27	
Total Percent		4.33	10.65	13.12	5.46	33.56
Count	A few	70	61	174	142	447
Column Percent		28.46	17.73	33.72	35.86	
Row Percent		15.66	13.65	38.93	31.77	
Total Percent		4.66	4.06	11.58	9.45	29.76
Count	None	47	55	53	132	287
Column Percent		19.11	15.99	10.27	33.33	
Row Percent		16.38	19.16	18.47	45.99	
Total Percent		3.13	3.66	3.53	8.79	19.11
Count	All Groups	246	344	516	396	1502
Total Percent		16.38	22.90	34.35	26.36	

Table 6 Friendships with other immigrants and refugees and friendships with native Danes (in per cent), by immigrant group

	Turks		Pakistanis		Somalis		Palestinians	
	Immigrant friends	Danish friends	Immigrant friends	Danish friends	Immigrant friends	Danish friends	Immigrant friends	Danish friends
Many	24.83	20.59	14.67	6.67	14.86	10.14	12.73	17.08
Quite a number	32.78	22.19	39.33	18.00	37.32	26.81	33.54	14.60
A few	23.51	34.11	39.00	45.33	23.55	30.80	37.58	31.37
None	18.87	23.18	7.00	30.00	24.28	32.25	16.15	36.96
(n)	(302)		(300)		(276)		(322)	

	Ex-Yugoslavs		All	
	Immigrant friends	Danish friends	Immigrant friends	Danish friends
Many	20.63	26.82	17.58	16.38
Quite a number	25.17	33.77	33.56	22.90
A few	24.17	30.13	29.76	34.35
None	29.80	9.27	19.11	15.36
(n)	(302)		(1502)	

Table 7 Statistics on number of memberships in voluntary associations

	Average no. of memberships	Standard deviation	Max.	Min.	n
Intra-ethnic associations	0.22	0.54	4	0	1503
Inter-ethnic associations	0.65	0.76	7	0	1503
Inter-ethnic associations (excluding trade unions)	0.16	0.51	6	0	1502

Table 8 Number of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations (in per cent)

No. of memberships	Intra-ethnic	Inter-ethnic 0	Inter-ethnic 1	Inter-ethnic 2	Inter-ethnic 3	Inter-ethnic 4	Inter-ethnic 5	Inter-ethnic 6	Inter-ethnic 7	Row Total
Count	0	620	537	65	17	1	2	1	0	1243
Column Percent		86.96	81.61	67.01	68.00	16.67	100.00	100.00	0.00	
Row Percent		49.88	43.20	5.23	1.37	0.08	0.16	0.08	0.00	
Total Percent		41.25	35.73	4.32	1.13	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.00	82.70
Count	1	73	88	22	7	4	0	0	1	195
Column Percent		10.24	13.37	22.68	28.00	66.67	0.00	0.00	100.00	
Row Percent		37.44	45.13	11.28	3.59	2.05	0.00	0.00	0.51	
Total Percent		4.86	5.85	1.46	0.47	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.07	12.97
Count	2	19	29	7	0	1	0	0	0	56
Column Percent		2.66	4.41	7.22	0.00	16.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Row Percent		33.93	51.79	12.50	0.00	1.79	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total Percent		1.26	1.93	0.47	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.73
Count	3	1	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	8
Column Percent		0.14	0.61	3.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Row Percent		12.50	50.00	37.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total Percent		0.07	0.27	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.53
Count	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Column Percent		0.00	0.00	0.00	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Row Percent		0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total Percent		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07
Count	All Grps	713	658	97	25	6	2	1	1	1503
Total Percent		47.44	43.78	6.45	1.66	0.40	0.13	0.07	0.07	100

Table 9. Number of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations, excluding trade unions (in per cent)

No. of memberships	Intra-ethnic	Inter-ethnic 0	Inter-ethnic 1	Inter-ethnic 2	Inter-ethnic 3	Inter-ethnic 4	Inter-ethnic 5	Inter-ethnic 6	Row Total
Count	0	1129	88	20	2	1	2	0	1242
Column Percent		85.08	66.17	64.52	28.57	100.00	100.00	0.00	
Row Percent		90.90	7.09	1.61	0.16	0.08	0.16	0.00	
Total Percent		75.17	5.86	1.33	0.13	0.07	0.13	0.00	82.69
Count	1	151	31	8	4	0	0	1	195
Column Percent		11.38	23.31	25.81	57.14	0.00	0.00	100.00	
Row Percent		77.44	15.90	4.10	2.05	0.00	0.00	0.51	
Total Percent		10.05	2.06	0.53	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.07	12.98
Count	2	43	11	1	1	0	0	0	56
Column Percent		3.24	8.27	3.23	14.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Row Percent		76.79	19.64	1.79	1.79	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total Percent		2.86	0.73	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.73
Count	3	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	8
Column Percent		0.30	2.26	3.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Row Percent		50.00	37.50	12.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total Percent		0.27	0.20	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.53
Count	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Column Percent		0.00	0.00	3.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Row Percent		0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total Percent		0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07
Totals	All Grps	1327	133	31	7	1	2	1	1502
Total Percent		88.35	8.85	2.06	0.47	0.07	0.13	0.07	100.00

Table 10 Statistics on association between numbers of memberships in intra- and inter-ethnic voluntary associations

	Pearson's χ^2	M-L χ^2	τ_b	τ_c	Spearman's ρ
Intra- and inter-ethnic (all)	$\chi^2 = 127.75$ df = 28 p = 0.00	$\chi^2 = 61.58$ df = 28 p = 0.00	0.13	0.07	$\rho = 0.14$ t = 5.38 p = 0.00
Intra- and inter-ethnic (excluding trade unions)	$\chi^2 = 115.12$ df = 24 p = 0.00	$\chi^2 = 58.7$ df = 24 p = 0.00	0.17	0.05	$\rho = 0.18$ t = 6.99 p = 0.00

Table 11 Average number of memberships in intra- and in inter-ethnic voluntary associations, by immigrant group

	Turks		Pakistanis		Somalis		Palestinians	
Number of memberships	Intra-ethnic	Inter-ethnic	Intra-ethnic	Inter-ethnic	Intra-ethnic	Inter-ethnic	Intra-ethnic	Inter-ethnic
Average	0.29	0.80	0.22	0.72	0.15	0.40	0.25	0.48
Std. Dev.	0.59	0.71	0.57	0.22	0.46	0.79	0.58	0.78
(n)	(302)	(302)	(300)	(300)	(276)	(276)	(322)	(322)

	Ex-Yugoslavs		All	
Number of memberships	Intra-ethnic	Inter-ethnic	Intra-ethnic	Inter-ethnic
Average	0.19	0.83	0.22	0.65
Std. Dev.	0.47	0.81	0.54	0.76
(n)	(303)	(303)	(1503)	(1503)

Notes

- i The hallmark of the Nordic welfare model is its universal character in the sense that basic welfare arrangements (such as education, hospital care, social benefits, care of the elderly, and pensions) are a citizen's right defined for the individual and the financing is collective via taxation. Therefore, the Nordic countries have the highest average tax burdens and relative shares of the public sector among OECD countries (some 50% of GDP) (Andersen, 2004, see also Esping-Andersen, 1990).
- ii Paldam (2004). The contemporary centre-right government in Denmark, for example, is based on a firm promise to the voters that the scope of the welfare state will not be reduced (ibid.).
- iii An example of free-rider behaviour in natives is given by native parents who transfer their offspring to a private school, because the proportion of immigrant children in their municipal school exceeds some threshold. An example of free-rider behaviour in immigrants is given by immigrants who do not invest time and effort in learning the language of their host country.
- iv Bourdieu (1986) is also considered as one of the 'fathers' of the concept (see Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003 on 'Bourdieuconomics' and the wealth of nations).
- v Abundant discussions on this issue exist in the literature, for example Offe (1999), Bowles and Gintis (2004), Ostrom (1990), Coleman (1987), Svendsen and Svendsen (2003). An assessment of Coleman's relevance for migration studies can be found in Waldinger (1995: 559-60).

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