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**Published on:** 01 Feb 2019 - European Journal of Social Psychology (Wiley)

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**Broadening the individual differences lens on party support and voting behavior:  
Cynicism and prejudice as relevant attitudes referring to modern-day political  
alignments**

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Paper published in *European Journal of Social Psychology*

Van Assche, J., Van Hiel, A., Dhont, K., & Roets, A. (2018). Broadening the individual differences lens on party support and voting behavior: Cynicism and prejudice as relevant attitudes referring to modern-day political alignments. *European Journal of Social Psychology*.

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Word count: 4208

**Running head: New alignments in political party support**

## **Abstract**

Social-cultural and economic-hierarchical ideological attitudes have long been used to explain variation in political partisanship. We propose two additional, stable attitudes (political cynicism and ethnic prejudice) that may help explaining contemporary political alignments. In a Belgian ( $N = 509$ ) and Dutch sample ( $N = 628$ ), we showed that party support can be segmented into four broad families: left, libertarian, traditionalist, and far-right parties. Both studies revealed that social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes were negatively related to left party support and positively to libertarian, traditionalist and far-right support. Importantly, additional variance was consistently explained by political cynicism (lower libertarian and traditionalist support), ethnic prejudice (lower left support), or both (higher far-right support). Study 2 additionally demonstrated these patterns for self-reported voting.

*Key words:* authoritarianism; social dominance orientation; political cynicism; ethnic prejudice; party support; voting

Populist (primarily far-right) anti-establishment parties have been increasingly successful in attracting votes in many West-European countries (e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2008). Some political pundits designated this success to ever increasing cynicism and anti-immigration attitudes. Indeed, public opinion and political debate have become polarized, leading many citizens to become cynical about politics and politicians (Dalton, 2004, 2013). At the same time, a rise of anti-immigration sentiment has been noticed (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006).

These trends suggest that the traditional left/right alignment(s) should be extended by integrating these new themes in order to understand party preferences, especially to understand support for far-right parties (Kriesi et al., 2006). The current work therefore examines whether political cynicism and ethnic prejudice have incremental value in explaining support for political parties in general, and far-right support in particular. The aim is to construct dimensional psycho-political voter profiles for adherents of various political ‘families’. We examine our research questions in Belgium and the Netherlands, two countries with a heterogeneous multi-party system.

### **Traditional alignments underlying party preferences**

Two broad and relatively independent dimensions have been proposed to underlie people’s ideological preferences (Duckitt, 2001). The first dimension, often indicated by Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), reflects a set of conservative socio-cultural attitudes including strict adherence to conventional norms and values, uncritical subjection to authority, and feelings of aggression towards norm violators. The second dimension taps into the economic-hierarchical domain and is often indicated by Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), reflecting acceptance of inequality and support for group-based social hierarchy.

Both socio-ideological dimensions typically reflect attitudes regarding the traditional left/right alignment on which political parties and issues can be located, and as such determine support for left-wing versus right-wing parties (Altemeyer, 1981; Pratto et al., 1994). Lower levels of RWA and SDO are associated with support for left parties (e.g., the Alliance, Greens, and Labour parties in New Zealand; Duckitt et al., 2010; Sibley & Wilson, 2007), which generally appeal to more open-minded individuals because of their progressive ideas and pro-egalitarian agenda (Ignazi, 1992). Higher scores on RWA and SDO relate to support for right-wing parties (e.g., the Republican Party in the U.S., New Zealand First, New Zealand National Party, and the Likud Party in Israel; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010), albeit for different reasons (Sibley & Wilson, 2007). High authoritarians prefer law and order and defend traditional and religious values, while people high in SDO particularly favor competition-based social inequality and group dominance (e.g., free market capitalism and anti-welfare policies). This distinction is also reflected in party preferences, at least in varied political systems that contain parties that map onto these specific voter profiles. Van Hiel and Mervielde (2002), for example, found RWA to be especially predictive of preference for traditionalist parties, whereas SDO, but not RWA, particularly related to support for the libertarian party in Belgium.

Some studies have also related RWA and SDO to far-right party support. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950) even developed the F-scale with the explicit aim to identify individuals inclined to support far-right parties. Although only few studies investigated this theoretical claim (e.g., Meloen, Van der Linden, & De Witte, 1996; Van Hiel, 2012; Van Hiel, Cornelis, Roets, & De Clercq, 2007), positive correlations of RWA (and SDO) with far-right support consistently materialized. When both RWA and SDO measures were included as predictors in regression analyses, SDO tended to be a stronger correlate of far-right support than RWA (e.g., Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015).

In sum, lower levels of RWA and SDO tend to relate to increased left support, while higher levels of RWA tend to relate to preferences for traditionalist and far-right parties, and higher SDO-levels tend to accompany libertarian and far-right preferences. As such, the voter profiles constructed on the basis of these ‘old-fashioned’ attitudinal dimensions are not indicative of any single party family, but instead may apply to more than one family. In the present research, we put forward political cynicism and ethnic prejudice as relevant additional dimensions that relate to more intricate alignments in party affiliation. This will allow us to better distinguish between far-right support, libertarian right-of-center support, and traditionalist right-of-center support.

### **Integrating old and new alignments**

Where Machiavelli (1532) and Rousseau (1762; see Grant, 2008) already mentioned centuries ago that political success was inextricably connected with deception and hypocrisy, the concept of political cynicism among voters was only introduced in political sciences fifty-odd years ago as “the extent to which people hold politicians and politics in disrepute” (Agger, Goldstein, & Pearl, 1961, p. 477). Berman (1997) argued that captious anger and hostility are endemic to what constitutes cynicism, and political cynics even have a pervasive disbelief in the possibility of good intentions of politicians. Recently, Dalton (2004; 2013) noticed a rise in political cynicism in Western societies. Furthermore, Pattyn, Van Hiel, Dhont, and Onraet (2012) showed that political cynics’ skepticism towards politic(ian)s, can be considered a potential hazard to democracy, as it is accompanied by lower governmental creditability and legitimacy, lower electoral and political participation, and increased support for extreme protest parties (e.g., Bélanger & Aarts, 2006; Bergh, 2004).

In theory, radical and populist protest parties can be located at both ends of the left-right continuum, attracting political cynics by expressing grievances over political elitism and

corruption, European integration, and economic changes (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008). However, in most North-European countries the majority of populist movements are located at the right-wing side (McClosky & Chong, 1985). For these far-right populist parties, another potent mobilizing strategy resides in their anti-immigration agenda along with outspoken negativity towards ethnic outgroups (Ignazi, 1992). Indeed, many studies already revealed a link between prejudice and (far-)right preferences (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Huddy & Feldman, 2009; Pasek et al., 2009). Far-left parties, on the contrary, do not disseminate anti-immigrant prejudices and, as a result, these parties should rather attract cynics who show relatively low prejudice levels. In other words, only far-right parties target political cynics and prejudiced individuals at the same time (see Pattyn et al., 2012).

To understand the changing political landscape in contemporary society, it seems important to add political cynicism and ethnic prejudice as two additional attitudinal dimensions to increase our understanding of party preferences and voting behavior. The combination of policies and party programs that appeal to people high in cynicism and prejudice pertains to the unique strategy that only far-right, and not left, libertarian right-of-center or traditionalist right-of-center parties, apply. We therefore hypothesized that cynicism and prejudice both serve as additional predictors of far-right party support above and beyond the traditionally studied social-ideological attitudes (RWA and SDO).<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, we expected that additional variance in support for other parties (left, libertarian or traditionalist) is explained by cynicism or prejudice, but not both. Firstly, we expected that only prejudice but not cynicism shows a significant (negative) association with support for left parties (beyond the negative associations of RWA and SDO). Indeed, moderate left parties generally spread a pro-immigration message, while they try to reform the economic system and thus accept the establishment rather than wanting to abolish it. Secondly, because traditionalist parties are high in system justification (i.e., satisfied with the

status quo) and generally propagate a pro-establishment discourse, while they stand for relatively moderate immigration policies, we assumed that only lower cynicism, but not prejudice, predicts additional variance in traditionalist support. Finally, we predicted that neither cynicism nor prejudice explains variance beyond the already strong positive relation of SDO with libertarian support.

### **The present studies**

We examined this perspective in Belgium (Study 1) and the Netherlands (Study 2), two West-European countries that included a strong and popular far-right party (Flemish Bock/Interest and Party for Freedom, respectively) at the times of data collection (Van Holsteyn, 2011). Both parties embrace nationalist and Eurosceptic beliefs and are characterized by their anti-immigration platform, their focus on security, political exploitation of corruption and other scandals in the establishment parties, and their defense of traditional values (see Billiet & De Witte, 1995).

Another advantage of focusing on these countries is the presence of several other major political parties, adding more variability to the political spectrum. The programs of Socialist Party, Spirit, and Agalev/Green in Belgium, and Socialist Party, Labour Party, and GreenLeft in the Netherlands are primarily concerned with environmental issues and income redistribution, representing the (moderate) left-wing side. The libertarian parties (Flemish Liberals and Democrats in Belgium and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and Democrats66 in the Netherlands) support free-market trade and constitute one major right-of-center family. Finally, the right-of-center traditionalist parties (Christian People's Party and New Flemish Alliance in Belgium and Christian Democratic Appeal and Christian Union in the Netherlands) stress the importance of family values and Christian ethics. As in many Western countries, there are no Belgian and Dutch far-left parties that gain a substantial share



of the vote, which prevents a meaningful investigation into the profile of far-left supporters in our samples.

In both studies, we are thus able to test the associations of four relevant attitudes (RWA, SDO, cynicism, and prejudice) with support for four party ‘families’ (left, libertarian, traditionalist, and far-right parties). Furthermore, to test the role of these attitudes beyond their relationship with mere party support, Study 2 investigates self-reported voting.

## Study 1

### Method

#### Participants.

A sample of Flemish citizens ( $N = 509$ ) without migration background completed an online survey. This dataset was collected by undergraduate students, recruiting adults within their social network in order to obtain a heterogeneous community sample (OSF: <https://osf.io/sgwx2>). The mean age was 43 years ( $SD = 14.26$ ) and 57% were men. Twelve percent of the participants had completed primary school, 49% had completed high school and 39% had a college or university degree.

#### Measures.

Participants responded to all items using five-point scales ranging from one (*totally disagree*) to five (*totally agree*), except for the party support measure, which was rated on nine-point scales anchored by one (*totally disagree*) and nine (*totally agree*). RWA was assessed by a 24-item scale (Altemeyer, 1981). A sample item is ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn’ ( $\alpha = .89$ ;  $M = 2.65$ ,  $SD = 0.61$ ). SDO was measured by a 14-item scale (Pratto et al., 1994; see Van Assche, Bostyn, De

keersmaecker, Dardenne, & Hansenne, 2017). An example item reads ‘Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others’. ( $\alpha = .87$ ;  $M = 2.20$ ,  $SD = 0.64$ ).

The political cynicism scale developed by Pattyn and colleagues (2012) was administered. An example item is ‘People are very frequently manipulated by politicians’ ( $\alpha = .88$ ,  $M=3.13$ ,  $SD = 0.68$ ). To measure prejudice, the 12-item subtle racism scale was adapted from Pettigrew and Meertens (1995; see Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005). A sample item was ‘I feel sympathy for people from immigrant origin’ (*reverse coded*;  $\alpha = .86$ ,  $M = 3.21$ ,  $SD = 0.64$ ).

To assess support for the various parties in Flanders, we asked: ‘To what extent do you support the program and/or ideas of [party]?’,  $M = 4.95$  ( $SD = 2.02$ ) for Agalev (Green Party) support;  $M = 5.23$  ( $SD = 1.94$ ) for Christian People’s Party;  $M = 2.65$  ( $SD = 2.15$ ) for Flemish Block;  $M = 4.75$  ( $SD = 1.83$ ) for Flemish Liberals and Democrats;  $M = 4.32$  ( $SD = 2.05$ ) for New Flemish Alliance;  $M = 5.47$  ( $SD = 2.01$ ) for Socialist Party; and  $M = 4.71$  ( $SD = 1.88$ ) for Spirit (Left-liberal Party) support.

## **Results**

### **Preliminary Analyses.**

We first conducted principal components analysis with oblique rotation on the support ratings for the various parties on the four proposed party families (left, libertarian, traditionalist, and far-right). Support scores for the seven parties showed relatively clear-cut loadings (all coefficients  $> .70$ ) on the respective factors (Table 1, upper panel), with Spirit, Socialist Party, and Green Party loading on the “Left” factor, Flemish Liberals and Democrats loading on the “Libertarian” factor, Christian People’s Party, and New Flemish Alliance loading on the “Traditionalist” factor, and Flemish Block loading on the “Far-Right” factor. In addition to its high primary loading on the traditionalist factor, support for New Flemish

Alliance had a secondary loading on the far-right factor. Nevertheless, since confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) showed that a four-factor solution ( $\chi^2_{(12)} = 104.95, p < .001$ ) yielded a better fit compared to a three-factor model ( $\Delta\chi^2_{(1)} = 9.69, p = .002$ ) and a two-factor model ( $\Delta\chi^2_{(2)} = 94.94, p < .001$ ), we can confidently use the factor scores as dependent variables in subsequent analyses. Correlations between the four attitude dimensions and support for the four political families are presented in Table 2 (below the diagonal).

### **Main Analyses.**

We conducted regression analyses on each political family, where we first entered RWA and SDO, and then added cynicism and prejudice in a second analysis. Confirming our expectations, RWA and SDO both related to lower left and greater far-right support, SDO (but not RWA) was associated with greater libertarian support, and RWA (but not SDO) was associated with greater traditionalist support (Table 3). Most importantly, by including cynicism and prejudice, incremental variance was explained in support for left, traditionalist and far-right parties. In particular, support for left parties was related to lower levels of prejudice (in addition to lower RWA and SDO). Secondly, traditionalist support was related to lower cynicism levels (in addition to higher RWA), and far-right support was related to higher cynicism and prejudice levels (in addition to higher SDO). Finally, libertarian support was not related to cynicism or prejudice (only to higher SDO). The relative weight analyses corroborated the conclusion that cynicism and prejudice are important predictors, especially for far-right support (combined weight 84% of the explained variance).

## **Study 2**

### **Method**

#### **Participants.**

A nationally stratified sample of Dutch citizens ( $N = 628$ ) without migration background was collected through an independent survey company. The mean age was 54 years ( $SD = 15.88$ ) and 51% were men. Thirty-five percent of the participants had completed primary school, 40% had completed high school and 24% had a college or university degree. Annual gross household income showed a normal distribution.

### **Measures.**

Respondents answered using seven-point scales ranging from one (*totally disagree*) to seven (*totally agree*), except for the cynicism scale, which was rated on a scale anchored by one (*totally disagree*) and five (*totally agree*). Funke's (2005) 12-item RWA-3D-scale was administered ( $\alpha = .67$ ,  $M = 3.91$ ,  $SD = 0.77$ ). SDO was measured with eight items (Pratto et al., 1994,  $\alpha = .80$ ,  $M = 2.98$ ,  $SD = 1.08$ ). The same political cynicism scale as in Study 1 was used ( $\alpha = .91$ ,  $M = 3.35$ ,  $SD = 0.73$ ). An 8-item subtle racism scale was administered (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995,  $\alpha = .82$ ,  $M = 4.50$ ,  $SD = 1.02$ ).

Support for the various parties was assessed by the question: 'To what extent do you support the program and/or ideas of [party]?',  $M = 3.35$  ( $SD = 1.77$ ) for Christian Democratic Appeal;  $M = 2.77$  ( $SD = 1.77$ ) for Christian Union;  $M = 3.86$  ( $SD = 1.78$ ) for Democrats66;  $M = 3.53$  ( $SD = 1.81$ ) for GreenLeft;  $M = 3.47$  ( $SD = 1.75$ ) for Labour Party;  $M = 3.06$  ( $SD = 2.15$ ) for Party for Freedom;  $M = 3.32$  ( $SD = 1.81$ ) for affiliation with People's Party for Freedom and Democracy;  $M = 2.64$  ( $SD = 1.80$ ) for Proud of the Netherlands; and  $M = 3.52$  ( $SD = 1.83$ ) for Socialist Party support. In addition to mere party support, we assessed individuals' self-reported voting behavior by asking them 'Which party did you vote for in the previous European elections in June 2009?'.<sup>2</sup>

## **Results**

### **Preliminary Analyses.**

We first examined the factor loadings of support ratings (lower panel Table 1). Support scores for the nine parties showed relatively clear-cut loadings (all coefficients > .65) on the respective factors, with the Socialist Party, Green Party, and Labour Party loading on the “Left” factor, Democrats66, and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy loading primarily on the “Libertarian” factor, Christian Democratic Appeal, and Christian Union loading on the “Traditionalist” factor, and Party for Freedom, and Proud of the Netherlands loading on the “Far-Right” factor. In addition to the high primary loadings on the libertarian factor, support for Democrats66 had a smaller secondary loading on the left factor, whereas support for People's Party for Freedom and Democracy had a secondary loading on the far-right factor. Again, CFA indicated that a four-factor solution ( $\chi^2_{(21)} = 462.15, p < .001$ ) fitted significantly better to the data than a three-factor model ( $\Delta\chi^2_{(1)} = 8.75, p = .003$ ) and a two-factor model ( $\Delta\chi^2_{(2)} = 234.06, p < .001$ ), and the factor scores were used as dependent variables in subsequent analyses. Table 2 (above the diagonal) presents correlations between the four attitudes and support for the four party families.

### **Main Analyses.**

Regressions analyses on the party families showed again that RWA and SDO both related to lower left and greater far-right support, SDO was associated with greater and RWA with lower libertarian support, and RWA (but not SDO) was associated with greater traditionalist support (Table 3, lower panel). Most importantly, including cynicism and prejudice yielded incremental explained variance in support for all party families. In particular, support for left parties was associated with lower cynicism and prejudice levels (in addition to lower RWA and SDO), libertarian support was related to higher cynicism (in addition to higher SDO and lower RWA), and traditionalist support was related to lower cynicism and prejudice levels (in addition to higher RWA). Finally, far-right support was associated with higher levels of all attitude dimensions (RWA, SDO, cynicism, and prejudice)

at the same time. The relative weight analyses substantiated the importance of cynicism and prejudice, particularly for traditionalist (combined weight 70%) and far-right support (55%).

Finally, we ran several multinomial logistic regressions testing the role of the four attitudes in predicting self-reported voting. Voting responses were clustered into the four party families, with 22% individuals voting for left, 14% for libertarian, 16% for traditionalist, and 11% for far-right parties. Twenty-seven percent indicated that they did not vote, and 10% did not provide this information. Table 4 presents the exponential beta coefficients indicating the change in the odds of voting for a particular cluster of parties vis-a-vis the reference cluster, associated with a one unit change of the corresponding attitudes. For example, an increase of one point on the prejudice scale doubles the odds of voting for a far-right party compared to a left party. The results confirmed that higher RWA levels resulted in greater odds of voting for traditionalist or far-right parties compared to left or libertarian parties, and higher SDO levels resulted in greater odds of voting for libertarian or far-right compared to left or traditionalist parties.<sup>3</sup> Higher cynicism levels resulted in greater odds of voting for far-right as opposed to left and libertarian parties, and greater odds of voting for such left and libertarian parties as opposed to traditionalist parties. Finally, higher prejudice levels resulted in greater odds of voting for far-right as opposed to libertarian parties, and greater odds of voting for such libertarian parties as opposed to left and traditionalist parties.

### **Discussion**

The current contribution focused on various attitudes that tap into socio-political alignments, testing the incremental value of political cynicism and ethnic prejudice in explaining variance in party support and voting, above and beyond the often studied social-ideological attitudes RWA and SDO. We tested our model in a Flemish and Dutch sample and found similar patterns in both studies, which lead to four general conclusions.

Firstly, the political spectrum in those countries can be segmented into a taxonomy of support ratings for parties that fall into four broad and relatively independent families: left, libertarian, traditionalist, and far-right parties. Secondly, RWA and SDO were consistently negatively related to support for left parties and positively related to libertarian (only SDO), traditionalist (only RWA) and far-right affiliation (both RWA and SDO). Thirdly and most importantly, additional variance was consistently explained by political cynicism (for lower traditionalist affiliation), ethnic prejudice (for lower left affiliation), or both (for greater far-right affiliation). Finally, examinations of self-reported voting further substantiated these findings with a behavioral indicator.

### **Party profiles reconsidered**

In Belgium and the Netherlands, like in many other European countries that have a complex political party spectrum (e.g., France, Germany, Sweden), there is a relatively balanced voter potential for left, libertarian, traditionalist, and far-right parties. This diversity is important to detect different voter profiles, because in two-party systems, traditionalist and far-right voters (and some libertarian voters) have little choice but to vote for a broad right-wing party (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, & Edwards, 2006). Our findings specify that political cynicism is an additional factor demarcating voter profiles. Even beyond RWA and SDO levels, higher cynicism levels related to lower support for and lower odds of voting for traditionalist parties, and greater support and greater odds of voting for far-right parties. Indeed, ‘active’ and ‘antagonistic’ expressions of disillusionment (captured by political cynicism) signpost support for anti-establishment (mostly far-right) alternatives. While previous studies have linked either RWA and SDO with far-right voting (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015), or political cynicism with far-right voting (Bergh, 2004), our findings indicate that far-right support partly stems from simultaneous higher levels of right-wing attitudes *and* political cynicism, which are two sides of a coin that cannot be reduced to each other.

Importantly, also ethnic prejudice appeared as an influential factor in party affiliation. Specifically, even beyond individuals' levels of social-ideological attitudes and cynicism, higher prejudice levels predicted lower support and lower odds of voting for the left, and greater support and greater odds of voting far-right. Indeed, far-right parties also attract individuals because of their anti-immigration agenda.

The present findings thus demonstrate that far-right parties may rally support by propagating a variety of themes, which can explain their increased popularity. By expressing concerns about the preservation of the social-cultural and economic-hierarchical structures, far-right parties appeal to the motives of individuals high in RWA and SDO (see Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015). Yet, by expressing irritation and aversion towards the current political class, these parties also spur anti-political attitudes which make cynic individuals more likely vote against current policy makers based on the anti-establishment rhetoric of the far-right (see Bélanger & Aarts, 2006). Finally, by stressing the threat immigrants and ethnic minorities pose to the ingroup, far-right parties appeal to the anti-immigrant prejudice in right-wing individuals, leading them to vote, not merely based on ideological or anti-establishment motives, but also based on a negative stance towards migration and multicultural society.

### **Directions for future research**

Our findings point out that RWA, SDO, cynicism and prejudice all contribute to an increased attraction to far-right parties. Moreover, along with a trend of right-of-center parties “hijacking” the far-right’s anti-immigration rhetoric (as evinced by the cross-loadings of the New Flemish Alliance and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), Euroscepticism has risen (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012). This might indicate that prejudiced voters might (re-)turn to the right-of-center parties, and political cynics nowadays might turn to newly established anti-EU parties (Bakker, Jolly, & Polk, 2012).



Furthermore, since the extreme far-left spectrum is relatively marginalized in Belgian and Dutch political life, we could not study left-wing populism. One could reasonably expect that individuals high in RWA and SDO would show lower levels of support for such far-left parties. As far-left parties emphasize anti-establishment propaganda (along with a pro-immigration dialogue), incremental variance in far-left support could potentially be explained by concurrent *higher* cynicism and *lower* prejudice levels. Future research in those countries with substantial support for a far-left party (e.g., Spain and Greece) is needed to examine this tentative hypothesis. Similarly, our findings concerning traditionalist party support have yet to be replicated in other countries where such parties are less defined by Christian values.

Another limitation is the use of a non-representative convenience sample (Study 1) and the fact that no causal inferences can be drawn from our data. Nonetheless, we were able to replicate the general pattern of results with a behavioral indicator in Study 2, as such indicating that the effects for party support are robust and could not merely be attributed to biased or extreme responding. Ideally, future research might identify how individuals become more right-wing, politically cynic and prejudiced over time, and how these two changes affect each other. Exploring such bidirectional associations, other relevant factors such as post-materialist values, social/reference group membership and familial/societal political socialization should also be considered. In sum, we believe that longitudinal extensions of our model that integrate political and social-psychological theories may be valuable to further delineate the complex interplay of individual differences tapping into old and new socio-political alignments.

## Notes

<sup>[1]</sup> Although social-ideological attitudes have often been considered predictors of prejudice (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Duckitt, 2001; Van Assche, Roets, De keersmaecker, & Van Hiel, 2016), we consider them simultaneously as predictors of party support, testing the unique effects of prejudice beyond social-ideological attitudes.

<sup>[2]</sup> In our sample, SP-voters were slightly overrepresented, and voters for D66 and CDA were slightly underrepresented (see Table A in Appendix). Table B in Appendix displays 95% confidence intervals around all effects. Table C portrays the correlations between all individual party preference scores, and Table D shows the probabilities for voting for each party family at low and high levels of each attitudinal determinant.

<sup>[3]</sup> Notably, higher SDO-scores did not increase the odds of voting libertarian *versus* far-right or traditionalist.

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## Tables

**Table 1**

*Pattern Matrix Coefficients for Four Factors from Principal Components Analysis with Oblique (Direct Oblimin) Rotation of Party Support Ratings in Study 1 (Upper Panel) and Study 2 (Lower Panel)*

Political Party	Factor 1: Left	Factor 2: Libertarian	Factor 3: Traditionalist	Factor 4: Far-Right
Spirit	0.96			
Socialist Party	0.84			
Green Party (Agalev)	0.73			
Flemish Liberals and Democrats		1.00		
Christian People's Party			0.95	
New Flemish Alliance			0.80	<i>0.40</i>
Flemish Block				0.88
Socialist Party	0.89			
Green Party (GreenLeft)	0.83			
Labour Party	0.70			
Democrats66	<i>0.42</i>	0.75		
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy		0.65		<i>0.43</i>
Christian Democratic Appeal			0.93	
Christian Union			0.88	
Party for Freedom				0.94
Proud of the Netherlands				0.86

Note: Factor coefficients are shown only if > 0.30. Cross-loadings in italics.



**Table 2***Correlations among Study Variables in Study 1 (Below Diagonal) and Study 2 (Above Diagonal)*

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Authoritarianism	-	.31***	.30***	.47***	-.38***	-.22***	.12**	.45***
2. Social Dominance Orientation	.29***	-	.17***	.37***	-.38***	.04	-.01	.31***
3. Political Cynicism	.31***	.19***	-	.36***	-.25***	-.21***	-.37***	.29***
4. Ethnic Prejudice	.50***	.45***	.50***	-	-.38***	-.09*	-.12**	.49***
5. Left Parties	-.40***	-.41***	-.26***	-.51***	-	.10*	.01	-.26***
6. Libertarian Parties	.13**	.34***	.05	.12**	-.08 <sup>a</sup>	-	.18***	-.01
7. Traditionalist Parties	.40***	.15***	-.01	.12*	-.17***	.04	-	-.02
8. Far-Right Parties	.27***	.35***	.45***	.52***	-.32***	.17***	.20***	-

Note: <sup>a</sup>  $p < .10$ ; \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table 3**

*Standardized Estimates ( $\beta$ s) of the Regression Models predicting Political Party Support in Study 1 (Upper Panel) and Study 2 (Lower Panel)*

	Left Parties			Libertarian Parties			Traditionalist Parties			Far-Right Parties		
	Step 1	Step 2	% <sup>a</sup>	Step 1	Step 2	% <sup>a</sup>	Step 1	Step 2	% <sup>a</sup>	Step 1	Step 2	% <sup>a</sup>
Authoritarianism	-.30***	-.17***	.20	.04	.07	.03	.39***	.46***	.89	.18***	-.02	.00
Social Dominance Orientation	-.32***	-.21***	.31	.32***	.35***	.94	.03	.08	.03	.30***	.16***	.16
Political Cynicism		.00	.00		-.01	.00		-.13**	.07		.24***	.36
Ethnic Prejudice		-.33***	.50		-.06	.02		-.08	.02		.33***	.48
$\Delta R^2$	.25***	.07***		.11***	.00		.16***	.03***		.15***	.18***	
Authoritarianism	-.29***	-.21***	.30	-.26***	-.22***	.49	.14**	.30***	.30	.39***	.25***	.37
Social Dominance Orientation	-.29***	-.24***	.46	.12**	.13**	.18	-.05	.01	.00	.19***	.11**	.08
Political Cynicism		-.08*	.06		-.17***	.33		-.42***	.66		.09*	.06
Ethnic Prejudice		-.17***	.18		.03	.01		-.12*	.04		.30***	.50
$\Delta R^2$	.22***	.03***		.06***	.03***		.02**	.19***		.23***	.08***	

Note: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

<sup>a</sup> Percentages give an indication of the relative importance of each predictor in relation to support for the party families in the final model.

**Table 4***Results of the Multinomial Logistic Regression Models predicting Political Party Voting in Study 2*

	Reference Category	Left Parties Exp(B) (CI <sub>95</sub> )	Libertarian Parties Exp(B) (CI <sub>95</sub> )	Traditionalist Parties Exp(B) (CI <sub>95</sub> )	Far-Right Parties Exp(B) (CI <sub>95</sub> )
Authoritarianism	Left		0.95 (0.60; 1.50)	0.15 <sup>***</sup> (0.08; 0.25)	0.22 <sup>***</sup> (0.11; 0.42)
	Libertarian	1.05 (0.67; 1.66)		0.15 <sup>***</sup> (0.09; 0.27)	0.23 <sup>***</sup> (0.12; 0.44)
	Traditionalist	6.88 <sup>***</sup> (3.97; 11.95)	6.56 <sup>***</sup> (3.66; 11.76)		1.49 (0.78; 2.87)
	Far-Right	4.61 <sup>***</sup> (2.41; 8.84)	4.40 <sup>***</sup> (2.26; 8.53)	0.67 (0.35; 1.29)	
Social Dominance Orientation	Left		0.57 <sup>***</sup> (0.42; 0.78)	0.67 <sup>*</sup> (0.49; 0.92)	0.47 <sup>***</sup> (0.33; 0.67)
	Libertarian	1.74 <sup>***</sup> (1.29; 2.36)		1.17 (0.84; 1.63)	0.82 (0.58; 1.17)
	Traditionalist	1.49 <sup>*</sup> (1.09; 2.05)	0.86 (0.62; 1.19)		0.70 <sup>*</sup> (0.50; 1.00)
	Far-Right	2.12 <sup>***</sup> (1.48; 3.02)	1.22 (0.85; 1.74)	1.42 <sup>*</sup> (1.00; 2.02)	
Political Cynicism	Left		1.13 (0.74; 1.73)	2.47 <sup>***</sup> (1.56; 3.93)	0.54 <sup>*</sup> (0.30; 0.98)
	Libertarian	0.89 (0.58; 1.36)		2.19 <sup>**</sup> (1.34; 3.59)	0.48 <sup>*</sup> (0.26; 0.88)
	Traditionalist	0.40 <sup>***</sup> (0.25; 0.64)	0.46 <sup>**</sup> (0.28; 0.75)		0.22 <sup>***</sup> (0.12; 0.40)
	Far-Right	1.84 <sup>*</sup> (1.02; 3.32)	2.08 <sup>*</sup> (1.14; 3.78)	4.57 <sup>***</sup> (2.50; 8.31)	
Ethnic Prejudice	Left		0.85 (0.61; 1.19)	1.38 <sup>a</sup> (0.96; 1.97)	0.49 <sup>***</sup> (0.33; 0.75)
	Libertarian	1.18 (0.84; 1.64)		1.62 <sup>*</sup> (1.10; 2.39)	0.58 <sup>*</sup> (0.38; 0.89)
	Traditionalist	0.73 <sup>a</sup> (0.51; 1.04)	0.62 <sup>*</sup> (0.42; 0.91)		0.36 <sup>***</sup> (0.23; 0.55)
	Far-Right	2.03 <sup>***</sup> (1.34; 3.07)	1.72 <sup>*</sup> (1.13; 2.63)	2.79 <sup>***</sup> (1.81; 4.30)	

Note: <sup>a</sup>  $p < .10$ ; \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ . Exp(B) = Exponential Beta Coefficient. CI<sub>95</sub> = 95% Confidence Interval. The exponential beta coefficient represents the change in the odds of the dependent variable being in a particular category vis-a-vis the reference category, associated with a one unit change of the corresponding independent variable.

## Appendix

**Table A**

*Voting Behavior (in Percent) in the Current Sample Versus in the General Population.*

Political Party	Current Sample	General Population	Difference
Socialist Party	11.90%	7.51%	4.39%
Green Party (GreenLeft)	9.80%	9.38%	0.42%
Labour Party	13.40%	12.74%	0.66%
Democrats66	8.30%	11.97%	-3.67%
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	13.70%	12.04%	1.66%
Christian Democratic Appeal	17.30%	21.20%	-3.90%
Christian Union	8.00%	7.21%	0.79%
Party for Freedom	17.60%	17.94%	-0.34%

**Table B**

*95% Confidence Intervals (CI<sup>95</sup>) around Unstandardized Effects predicting Political Party Support in Study 1 (Upper Panel) and Study 2 (Lower Panel)*

	Left Parties	Libertarian Parties	Traditionalist Parties	Far-Right Parties
Authoritarianism	[-0.43; -0.14]	[-0.05; 0.27]	[0.60; 0.91]	[-0.17; 0.11]
Social Dominance Orientation	[-0.46; -0.20]	[0.38; 0.68]	[-0.03; 0.26]	[0.11; 0.37]
Political Cynicism	[-0.13; 0.13]	[-0.15; 0.13]	[-0.32; -0.05]	[0.23; 0.48]
Ethnic Prejudice	[-0.67; -0.35]	[-0.28; 0.08]	[-0.30; 0.05]	[0.36; 0.68]
Authoritarianism	[-0.38; -0.16]	[-0.41; -0.17]	[0.28; 0.51]	[0.22; 0.43]
Social Dominance Orientation	[-0.30; -0.15]	[0.03; 0.20]	[-0.07; 0.09]	[0.03; 0.17]
Political Cynicism	[-0.23; -0.01]	[-0.35; -0.11]	[-0.69; -0.47]	[0.02; 0.23]
Ethnic Prejudice	[-0.25; -0.08]	[-0.07; 0.13]	[-0.21; -0.03]	[0.21; 0.38]

Note: CI<sup>95</sup> portray the 95% confidence intervals around the unstandardized effect. If the intervals do not overlap, the effects are significantly different from one another.

**Table C***Correlations among Party Preference Scores in Study 1 (Upper Panel) and Study 2 (Lower Panel)*

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Spirit	-							
2. Socialist Party	.72***	-						
3. Green Party (Agalev)	.55***	.60***	-					
4. Flemish Liberals and Democrats	.02	-.07	-.12**	-				
5. Christian People's Party	-.14**	-.20***	-.16***	.01	-			
6. New Flemish Alliance	-.08 <sup>a</sup>	.30***	-.18***	.07	.60***	-		
7. Flemish Block	-.34***	-.47***	-.47***	.17***	.09*	.39***	-	
1. Socialist Party	-							
2. Green Party (GreenLeft)	.66***	-						
3. Labour Party	.58***	.71***	-					
4. Democrats66	.43***	.63***	.53***	-				
5. People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	.18***	.22***	.25***	.42***	-			
6. Christian Democratic Appeal	.23***	.31***	.47***	.39***	.54***	-		
7. Christian Union	.32***	.38***	.44***	.34***	.37***	.70***	-	
8. Party for Freedom	.22***	.04	.03	.07 <sup>a</sup>	.46***	.20***	.18***	-
9. Proud of the Netherlands	.34***	.22***	.21***	.25***	.54***	.32***	.32***	.71***

Note: <sup>a</sup>  $p < .10$ ; \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table D**

*Predicted Probabilities of Political Party Voting at Low and High Levels of Each Individual Attitude in Study 2*

		Left Parties	Libertarian Parties	Traditionalist Parties	Far-Right Parties
Authoritarianism	Low	0.54	0.28	0.14	0.05
	High	0.18	0.16	0.36	0.30
Social Dominance Orientation	Low	0.50	0.20	0.24	0.08
	High	0.19	0.25	0.27	0.28
Political Cynicism	Low	0.32	0.23	0.32	0.06
	High	0.38	0.21	0.17	0.32
Ethnic Prejudice	Low	0.46	0.23	0.28	0.04
	High	0.23	0.21	0.22	0.33

Note: Low = 1 standard deviation below the mean; High = 1 standard deviation above the mean.