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BRUNEI

The ASEAN Connection

Donald E. Weatherbee

Although no formal mechanism for accession has yet been announced, it is expected by Brunei and its future partners that the Sultanate will become the sixth member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1984, after it obtains full sovereignty over its external affairs.¹ The characteristic ASEAN decision-making process of formal and informal consultations (*musyawarah*) leading to consensus (*mufakat*) is in full train. Brunei's candidature was announced at the June 1981 annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Manila. Brunei was invited as an "observer" and was represented by the Sultan's brother, Prince Mohammad Bolkiah, who is the Perdana Wazir and probably will be Brunei's first Foreign Minister. In his address to the conference, Prince Mohammad stated that it was the hope of Brunei that the question of its membership in ASEAN could be favorably resolved once independence was achieved.² If the statements of ASEAN leaders to date are any guide, there would appear to be little doubt that when Brunei makes its application, it will be accepted. In fact, membership in ASEAN may be the *sine qua non* of Brunei's independence.

Brunei's inclusion in ASEAN will mark the first enlargement of the group since the original five (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) signed the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Brunei is not the only potential member. Sri Lanka has openly campaigned for membership, to the private distress of ASEAN leadership. Although questions of geographic proximity are raised concerning Sri Lanka's would-be ASEAN role, it would seem that other considerations are more significant in determining the generally negative reactions in ASEAN. Papua New Guinea too is associated with ASEAN, but its prospects for full membership, even if it desired, would

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not seem bright. Brunei as a candidate, however, seems to have all of the qualifications. Geographically it is part of the Malaysian-Indonesian core area in Southeast Asia. Culturally it is Malay—in Islam, language, and customs. Most importantly, the perception in Indonesia and Malaysia is that regional security and stability require Brunei's incorporation into the ASEAN framework. Brunei's candidate status is primarily a function of political necessity, economic and cultural criteria being secondary.

The country itself is a mini-state with petroleum punch. Once one of the greatest of the archipelago Malay states, Brunei's history from the 17th to the 19th centuries was one of incremental partition until finally, in 1888, the Sultanate, largely confined to its present borders, accepted a British protectorate as the only way to forestall absorption into either Brooke's Sarawak or the domains of the North Borneo Company. This was followed in 1904 by the appointment of a British Resident to advise the Sultan in all matters except Islamic law and Malay custom. The Resident became a High Commissioner under the 1959 Agreement which was amended in 1971 to provide for full internal self-government.

Brunei has a land area of 2,226 square miles not wholly contiguous. The northern district of Temburong (503 square miles) is separated from the rest of the state by the projection to Brunei Bay of that part of Sarawak's Fifth Division known as Limbang. This approximately one thousand square miles was grabbed by the second Raja Brooke in 1890, after the protectorate had been established. The cession was never acceded to by the Brunei government. The issue was raised in 1967 by Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, and after his abdication, by his son, the present Sultan, Sir Muda Hassanal Bolkiah, 29th in the line, who forcefully and publicly reasserted Brunei's claim to Limbang in a 1970 radio address in which he stated: "Brunei and Limbang are not separated because Limbang belongs to Brunei."³ Bruneian maps do not show any boundary between Brunei and the Limbang district of Sarawak.

Brunei's population according to the 1981 census is only 192,000, some 34,000 fewer than the 1980 population estimate based on extrapolations from the 1971 census figure of 136,000.⁴ About one-quarter of the population is ethnic Chinese of whom more than 30,000 are stateless. The exchange of notes that accompanied the 1979 *Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship between Britain and Brunei*⁵ detailing independence arrangements included an understanding that once British responsibility for British protected persons in Brunei is terminated, those who have permanent residence in the state will continue to have residence and will be granted International

Certificates of Identity for travel purposes. Nevertheless, some unease exists in the Chinese community given Brunei's stringent nationality law and limits on property rights. Already those who can afford it are emigrating. There has been some concern expressed that a post-independence flight of Chinese to Singapore might "erode ASEAN's multi-racial cohesiveness."⁶ On the other hand, given Brunei's limited population and continued reliance on immigrant labor, there seems little logic for the adoption of policies that would alter arrangements of long standing to the disadvantage of a minority that plays a vital role in the economy and labor force.

The people of Brunei have the highest per capita income in the ASEAN region, more than US \$11,000 per year. This figure, of course, only illustrates Brunei's relative wealth and small population, not income distribution. In a series of five year plans, major investments have been made in a social, welfare, and economic infrastructure that has significantly changed Brunei society. The current 1980-84 plan calls for expenditure of B \$1,700 million, more than double the B \$760 million in the 1975-79 plan. (The Brunei dollar is at par with the Singapore dollar and is worth approximately US \$.48.) There is some subsidy support for lower prices for food and fuel. More showy projects include a new stadium, which will hold a quarter of the total population at one seating, and the new royal palace. Brunei's transportation and communications links have been extended with the deep water port at Muara and a new airport, with a 12,000-foot runway, at Bandar Seri Begawan, the capital. Royal Brunei Air operates an expanding number of regional routes with Boeing 737s. By the end of 1983, Brunei, which already has color television, will have a ground station giving it satellite transmission capabilities. Still, Brunei's wealth cannot be absorbed in Brunei and the government runs huge annual surpluses larger than annual expenditures. An international Investment Advisory Board recommends the foreign investment of these surpluses.

Brunei's wealth is the product of the activities of Brunei Shell Petroleum, in which the government of Brunei holds a 50% share of the equity. Since the first well started pumping at the Seria field in 1929, BSP has produced nearly 1.7 million barrels of oil. Its reserves are given as more than 1.6 million barrels.⁷ At current rates of production of about 180,000 barrels per day, this is more than a twenty-year reserve. Production is below its highest rate of 268,000 b/d in 1979. The cuts resulted in a 27% drop in production between 1980 and 1981. The decision to reduce output seems to have been based on both market considerations (the oil glut) and the government's already existing huge surplus of revenue. Although Brunei by OPEC standards is a fairly

small producer (twenty-third in the world), unlike many petroleum states Brunei has no need for current extra income. Many of BSP's offshore fields have natural gas associated with oil, and according to BSP this decade will be dominated by gas interests. The gas from the offshore wells is pumped to the world's largest liquification plant at Lumut, jointly owned by the Brunei government, Brunei Shell, and Mitsubishi. More than five million tons of liquid natural gas (LNG) a year are exported to Japan on a twenty-year contract (through 1992). Brunei is, after Indonesia, Japan's major supplier of natural gas. Brunei's gas reserves are estimated to be 10^9 cubic feet or an energy equivalent greater than its oil reserves.

In 1980, Brunei's total exports were valued at B \$9.7 billion, of which oil and natural gas accounted for 99%.⁸ The crude oil exports went to nine customers in the following percentages: Japan (59%); Singapore (10.5%); United States (10.4%); South Africa (7.8%); Thailand (6.4%); Philippines (1.7%); and Australian and New Zealand each at less than 1%. Although Japan continues to be the largest single importer of Brunei crude, its share has been declining while the ASEAN share has increased. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether eventual ASEAN and U.N. membership will lead to the termination of crude oil sales to South Africa. The value of Brunei's oil exports has tripled since 1978, a function of price increases, not volume. All exported LNG goes to Japan and in 1980 was worth B \$3 billion.

Brunei has been running ever-increasing balance-of-trade surpluses despite the necessary importations for the development programs, as Table 1 demonstrates. For the first three quarters of 1981, the surplus was B \$800 million less than in the comparable period of 1980. This reflects oil production cutbacks. In 1981, Singapore succeeded Japan as Brunei's major import country of origin, followed by Japan, the U.S., and the United Kingdom.

It was the issue of Brunei's wealth in the regional setting that led to the collapse of an earlier decolonization scheme that would have had Brunei entering the Malaysian Federation with Sabah and Sarawak in 1963. Brunei, aware of the offshore oil and gas potential, did not want to turn over to Kuala Lumpur at the end of a decade the revenue from the exploitation of its mineral resources. It should be remembered that at this time Malaysia's own petroleum resources had yet to be explored, so that the question of the division of revenue between the central government and the state was important. The differences between the parties have been trivialized as a dispute over rank and precedence of the then ruling Brunei Sultan, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, among the Malay potentates. This interpretation can still rouse anger as in late 1981, when Tunku Abdul Rahman, who as the Malaysian

TABLE 1 *Brunei Imports, Exports, and Balance of Trade (B \$)*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Trade Balance</i>
1975	648,856,668	2,494,805,866	1,845,949,198
1976	642,529,532	3,239,150,975	2,650,621,443
1977	680,407,559	3,999,976,635	3,319,569,076
1978	639,246,103	4,195,209,695	3,555,963,592
1979	862,082,803	5,796,490,159	4,934,407,356
1980	1,230,595,450	9,852,936,235	8,622,340,785

SOURCE: Brunei, *Statistics of External Trade*

NOTE: Exports include reexports.

Prime Minister at the time, almost casually remarked in his *Star* (Penang) newspaper column that the negotiations with Brunei failed because Sir Omar wanted to be the Head of State (Yang Dipertuan Agung). The Brunei government retorted that the reason was that Brunei had not wanted to be a tribute-paying dependency of Malaya. Although Sir Omar abdicated in 1967, he has remained a very influential figure in the state.

At the same time that Brunei was discussing federation with Kuala Lumpur, traumatic internal political developments occurred. An experiment in representative government saw A. M. Azahari's Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) emerge as the dominant popular political force in the state. The PRB's leadership differed sharply with the Sultan over Brunei's future (the PRB calling for immediate, unilateral independence) and internal constitutional arrangements. In December 1962, the PRB rebelled and aided by the *Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara* (North Kalimantan National Army), with its Indonesian connections, briefly seized BSP facilities at Seria. Under the terms of the 1959 Agreement, the British quickly intervened and crushed the revolt. The Sultan sternly put an end to open politics, banned the PRB, and declared a "State of Emergency" that has remained in force through biennial renewals. The events of 1962-63 and their aftermath left lasting marks on Brunei's politics. It explains in part the great value that the Sultanate placed on the British security link (and consequent reluctance to move towards independence); the suspicion held in Brunei about the ultimate motives of its neighbors; and the absence of democratic institutions. As Brunei moves to independence in an ASEAN framework, the kinds of fears which buttressed

absolutist isolation are giving way to greater confidence in a Bruneian identity in a friendly regional environment. Without ASEAN, it might have been different.

Brunei was set on a course towards independence under the twin pressures of Malaysian hostility and British policy. The Malaysians directed a two-pronged political attack against the Sultanate. They attempted to "destabilize" the regime through poorly disguised clandestine assistance to the exiled and illegal PRB, and at the same time belabored the British in the U.N.'s Fourth Committee for its colonialism and had the issue of Brunei's independence inscribed on the agenda, despite Brunei's protests. Malaysian policy towards Brunei up to the death of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak in January 1976 was complicated by personal antagonisms; but more basically, it can be argued that Kuala Lumpur had an implicit interest in the long run to complete the federation, realistically fearful of the impact of an independent Brunei on separatist tendencies in Sarawak and Sabah or the possible spill-over effects of politics in Brunei into the politics of East Malaysia. The vigor of the Malaysian campaign to change the Brunei status quo, together with Malaysia's enthusiastic support for Indonesian intervention in East Timor, led to some speculation that as a "potential security threat," Brunei might become Malaysia's "Timor."⁹

The Malaysian pressure on Brunei and in the U.N. was congruent with the British government's desire to terminate its semi-colonial role in Southeast Asia and, in the framework of the drawdown of its military strength East of Suez, reduce its political commitments. As the British tried to hasten negotiations with the Sultanate over termination of the protectorate to the tempo of Malaysian-sponsored U.N. resolutions calling for Bruneian independence and self-determination, the sticking issue was security. Brunei's unwillingness to sever the British tie stemmed in part from its perception of the deterrent nature of the physical presence of British military strength chiefly represented by the British-officered, thousand-man-strong Gurkha (Nepalese) battalion based in Seria to defend the oil installations. The Sultanate picks up the annual bill of more than B \$5 million a year. The Gurkha's came in 1962 and have remained, but the 1971 Amended Agreement changed the functional security relationship. Article III stated that subject to consultation, defense and security were tasks to be shared, but that "internal public order" was a matter of concern only to the public security forces of the Sultan. In the case of an external threat, the British commitment was only one to "consult together to determine what means should separately or jointly be taken."¹⁰ The actual deployment of the Gurkhas is historically conditioned by the events of 1962, which were a matter of internal order

then covered by the 1959 Agreement. Their actual military role since 1971 is problematical although they might have symbolic value.¹¹ After tough negotiations it was announced officially on June 30, 1978, that Brunei would become fully independent at the end of 1983, assuming complete responsibility for its own foreign affairs and defense; the Gurkhas are to be withdrawn by September 1983.

Brunei has sought to fill the defense gap by quantitatively and qualitatively strengthening its own forces. The two battalions of the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment, raised in 1961, are to be augmented by a third infantry battalion and a prospective composite artillery regiment. As a sweetener to the 1978 decision, the British pledged \$75 million to reequip the RBMR. Actually the British financial contribution is only a small fraction of Brunei's defense spending. Although the figures are tightly held, it is estimated that at least a third of Brunei's expenditures are on defense. From a level of B \$100 million in 1975, spending reached B \$500 million in 1981. In the five years 1978-82, nearly B \$2 billion will have gone to acquire modern weapons systems such as the British "Rapier" missiles, fast-attack naval craft carrying the French Exocet missiles, helicopter gun ships armed with Swiss 81 mm air-to-ground rockets, and Scorpion tanks. Brunei's defense spending as a percentage of its budget is the highest in the ASEAN region.

Even though money might not be any object in Brunei's security planning, the demographic reality is that there is a very small human pool from which indigenous forces can be drawn. Already the role of women in the defense forces is increasing, but the limits to expansion of personnel given the other claims on the labor force is a real constraint. One partial solution is recruitment of mercenary forces. Today, a substantial part of fixed installation security is provided by a privately recruited force of Gurkhas, freeing the RBMR soldiers for other duties. Also there remains in Brunei some hope that it might still be possible to work out an arrangement that would prolong the presence of the Gurkha battalion or, failing that, to maintain some sort of British defense commitment, at least in a general way. The analogy of the Five Power Defence Agreement comes to mind.

The best guarantee of Brunei's security is to be found in the kind of international order in which it will become independent. Malaysia was not the only interested party in the evolution of Brunei politics. Post-Sukarno Indonesia shuddered at the prospect of any kind of radical regime emerging in Bandar Seri Begawan and was not particularly happy with Kuala Lumpur's backing of the PRB even if Kuala Lumpur thought it could control the outcome. Indonesia would not tolerate any Brunei regime that might become the base for subversive acts against Indonesia. Nor did Indonesia

endorse any kind of Malaysian federation solution to the decolonization question. Jakarta made it clear to Malaysia at an informal Heads-of-Government meeting at Labuan in May 1978 that Indonesia wanted Brunei to be discussed first in the context of regional security and stability. Although Indonesia denies any desire to interfere in Bruneian affairs, Indonesia nevertheless claims to be one of the countries responsible for security in the ASEAN area, including Brunei. In this role Jakarta indicated that it was prepared to provide training for Brunei security forces in a way "to contribute to the creation of a good atmosphere for political development in Brunei."¹²

From the outset Indonesia has made it plain that its preference was for Brunei's inclusion in ASEAN. Reportedly, President Suharto had that message conveyed to the Sultan in June 1978, via Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Closer ties were forged during the Sultan's "unofficial" visit to Jakarta in April 1981. Senior Indonesian officials were quoted as assuring Brunei of its support for ASEAN membership, describing the Sultan's visit as "very significant in shaping a regional order based on peace, stability, and harmonious relations."¹³ Perhaps with memories of "confrontation" in mind, the Sultan was not accompanied by any British advisors on his Jakarta trip. Prince Mohammed Bolkiah in his address to the 1981 ASEAN Foreign Minister's meeting took special note of the "firm support" given to Brunei's ASEAN membership by President Suharto.

Indonesian sponsorship of Brunei's independence in an ASEAN framework works to Brunei's advantage diplomatically as it redefines its relationship with Malaysia in a process that has moved forward surprisingly rapidly and positively. It is to the credit of Malaysia's former Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein Onn, that past irritations have been resolved. When his government took office in 1976, he had not been involved in the events scarring Brunei-Malaysian relations. Furthermore, even though Sir Omar had abdicated, Datuk Hussein was aware of his continued great influence and sensitive to the issues of personal relations. While continuing to press for decolonization, the Malaysian PM sought to establish a viable relationship with Brunei based on mutual interest and political equality. The efforts were rewarded when Foreign Minister Rithauddin went to Brunei in February 1979, after the independence agreement had been signed, to convey Malaysia's desire for a new era of friendship with the Sultanate. This was the first official visit of a Malaysian federal minister since the 1968 coronation of Sultan Sir Muda Hassanah and was viewed in Brunei as "a historic gesture of goodwill"¹⁴ (Hussein Onn, himself, was invited to Brunei for the wedding of the Sultan's sister in July 1979). The initial Malaysian "wooing" of Brunei

reached its climax when the Sultan traveled to Malaysia in July 1980 for the installation of the new Yang Dipertuan Agung, his "Polo diplomacy" partner, the Sultan of Pahang. During this visit, the first in 17 years by a Brunei ruler, the Sultan had four days of discussion with Malaysian officials that established a satisfactory basis for a pattern of social, economic, and political exchanges that in the space of a few short months made Malaysia an important partner of Brunei, not an adversary.

With respect to inter-Borneo relations, a significant event was the visit to Bandar Seri Bagawan in March 1981 by the Sarawak Chief Minister Tan Sri Abdul Rahman Yakub. It was described as memorable, opening "a new chapter in the history of the two states."¹⁵ It occurred just before Yakub stepped down as Chief Minister, but he was accompanied on the visit by his designated successor, Datuk Amar Taib Muhammad, formerly Federal Territory Minister in the central government. The Yakub visit marked the end of an era of official hostility between Brunei and Sarawak that began in 1970, when Yakub, the newly named Chief Minister, scornfully rejected the Limbang claim, after which Brunei cut off Sarawak's overland connection to the district.

The Malaysian ring was closed with an exchange of visits between Sabah's Chief Minister, Datuk Harris Salleh, and the Brunei Sultan. Datuk Harris attended the thirty-fifth birthday celebration for the Sultan in August 1981. This visit was reciprocated by the first official visit of a Brunei Sultan to a Malaysian state the next month. More informal relations with Sabah's Chief Minister exist in the form of business enterprises in which both the Brunei royal family and the Sabah leader have interests. The symbol of Borneo reconciliation may be seen in the "Friendship Road," which will be, when completed, the first road through Brunei, linking Sarawak and Sabah. The road is, according to Sabah's Datuk Harris, an example of East Malaysia and Brunei assisting each other, "in the spirit of ASEAN."¹⁶

A series of Malaysia-Brunei technical and administrative exchanges through 1981 and into 1982 laid the base for the March 1982 visit to Brunei of Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam. The two states finalized agreements on cooperation in a number of fields. Musa told his Brunei hosts of Malaysia's "keenness to see Brunei joining the community of nations, particularly ASEAN, as well as the Islamic Conference Organization."¹⁷ Malaysia will give facilities for the administrative training of Brunei officials and hold open more places in Malaysian tertiary education institutions for Bruneian students. Defense cooperation seems to be envisaged as well. Brunei's acting Menteri Besar Pehin Haji Abdul Aziz and his team spent ten days in Kuala Lumpur in January 1982 to discuss, among other items, Malaysian

assistance in training Brunei forces. Already a RBMR goodwill visit has been made to Sarawak, and joint naval exercises in the South China Sea are scheduled.

The developing network of Malaysia-Brunei modern economic, political, and social ties is based on a foundation of shared cultural, linguistic, and religious values. With such underpinnings, Malaysia bids well to replace Singapore as Brunei's unofficial mentor in ASEAN. The Singapore relationship has been very important. It gave Brunei a regional window that, next to London, provided access to the world. Singapore is an important site for the training of Brunei civilian and military personnel, and is Brunei's trade entrepot. A substantial part of Brunei's surplus wealth is invested in and through Singapore. There is also the security link. A Singapore Armed Forces infantry or artillery battalion is regularly rotated through Brunei for jungle training in Temburong District. The public record does not show whether the Singapore battalion has a defense function for Brunei, but it is instructive that plans for the third RBMR infantry battalion call for it to be based in Temburong. It is problematical whether Singapore Armed Forces will be able to operate in the future in Brunei given Malaysian (and perhaps Indonesian) reservations.

Both Singapore and Malaysia have been involved in tutoring Brunei in ASEAN and world affairs. The 1981 Singapore U.N. delegation had a Bruneian attached to it while Malaysia's delegation to the 1981 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting included a Bruneian. Singapore conducted a special seminar on the workings of ASEAN for Brunei in September 1981, and the Brunei Agency in Singapore is the basis for future diplomatic representation. Malaysia and Brunei have exchanged Representative Offices having diplomatic status, and Brunei has a rice-purchasing mission in Bangkok. In April 1981, the Thai Deputy Foreign Minister made the first high-level official Thai visit to Bandar Seri Begawan. "As far as Thailand is concerned," he said, "we will be happy if Brunei joins ASEAN and takes part in its activities after it becomes independent."¹⁸ Current planning suggests that in addition to London, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore, diplomatic missions will be opened in Japan and the United States. As in all other areas of administrative services, foreign affairs staffing will be a problem with senior officials doing double or triple duty. This is an area in which recruitment of expatriates is no solution.

A possible first legal step towards ASEAN membership for an independent Brunei would appear to be accession to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia adopted by the ASEAN states at the Bali Summit. The treaty provides for the pacific settlement of disputes among

the contracting parties and is open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia.¹⁹ Theoretically, a Southeast Asian state could become a party to the treaty without becoming a member of ASEAN—indeed, this provision was designed with Vietnam in mind. It is doubtful, however, that ASEAN membership would be granted to a non-signatory state. Brunei's accession to the treaty would bring it within an emerging legal regime in Southeast Asia in which the signatories have pledged that they "shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party" (Article 10). Such a regime would certainly provide a normative framework responsive to Brunei's security concerns while the political dynamic of ASEAN "concord" and "solidarity" gives policy substance to peaceful relations among ASEAN states. In one sense it could be said that Brunei's emergence as a fully independent member of ASEAN in 1984 will be one of the fruits of the ASEAN political community whose charter was laid down at the Bali Summit.

The progress made in integrating Brunei into the regional system does not mean that all problems are solved. Stumbling blocks still remain in the bilateral Malaysia-Brunei relationship, but these have not been allowed to interfere with the development of the rapprochement. The question of the Limbang claim immediately comes to mind, since this has not been abandoned by Brunei. The existence of the claim in itself should not be disruptive so long as neither party wishes to make an issue of it. But there is some feeling on the Malaysian side that the termination of the Limbang claim would have felicitous consequences in relation to the protracted dispute with the Philippines over sovereignty in Sabah. A second potential area of dispute between Brunei and Malaysia lies in the demarcation of their respective continental shelves. Malaysia's map of its continental shelf, gazetted in December 1979, ignores Brunei's shelf proclaimed in 1954. The Malaysian claim treats the shelf as uninterrupted from Sabah to Sarawak—i.e., as though Brunei did not exist. The question of the boundaries has been raised by Brunei through London, but Malaysia has indicated that this is an issue for independent Brunei. There is no evidence that the issue of the Limbang claim and Malaysian maritime jurisdiction have been connected. A possible future problem of jurisdiction would occur if Brunei followed all of the other ASEAN states by adopting the 320-kilometer (200-mile) Exclusive Economic Zone adjacent to its territorial sea. Brunei then would overlap with the other disputants in the South China Sea area.

Brunei's independence and ASEAN membership will undoubtedly have consequences for its internal politics. The state is an absolute monarchy with

power tightly held by the royal family. In many respects Brunei's government is more like that of a Persian Gulf than a Southeast Asian state. The state of emergency continues. The Legislative Council is nominated. Internal security has high police priority. Although the Sultan has become much more visible in the past two years as a reigning, modernizing monarch, it remains to be seen whether the kinds of political pressures for popular access to power, represented, for example, by the PRB, can be indefinitely resisted. There are two thousand or more Bruneians studying abroad. The non-royals are the great majority among them, and a rising political consciousness will be carried back to Brunei. Almost in anticipation of challenge, a new Internal Security Act has been promulgated that provides for preventive detention for two years renewable at the pleasure of the Sultan and not subject to appeal to any court.

Brunei's ASEAN membership will have certain consequences for the Association itself. In the first place, it will solidify the Malay-Indonesian cultural heart of ASEAN. Second, it will change Singapore's status as ASEAN's "mini-state." ASEAN's procedural pattern of site rotation of important committees may have to be altered given expected staffing problems in Brunei. Many of the administrative and technical aspects of ASEAN participation by Brunei will be solved on an ad hoc basis. This may be another argument in favor of ASEAN's structural flexibility.

Brunei is becoming independent in a Southeast Asia that continues to be an area of local- and great-power conflict. The process of integrating Brunei into ASEAN is taking place simultaneously with the ASEAN-Indochina confrontation. It is at this level of extra-ASEAN interaction that the security aspects of Brunei's membership in the Association have a regional dimension. A vulnerable Brunei will to some extent be insulated from the currents of competition through its absorption into the established pattern of ASEAN orientations, and its potential for becoming a venue for new conflict will be reduced. There are of course new risks for Brunei, but these seem more manageable for a Brunei in ASEAN than a Brunei trying to go it alone.

Notes

1. The Bangkok Declaration simply states "that the Association is open to participation of all states in the South East Asian region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles, and purposes."
2. The full text of Prince Mohammed's speech is given in *Pelita Brunei*, June 24, 1981.
3. State of Brunei, *Annual Report 1970*, p. 400.
4. *Kajian Pertama Banchi Perumahan dan Penduduk Brunei 1981*. The provisional results of the census may be subject to some minor upward adjustments following computer

processing, but the total is not expected to go beyond 193,000. The great gap between the estimated population figure and the actual figure is partially explained by the interpolation between 1974 and 1976 of figures for thousands of temporary immigrant construction workers that were never adjusted out of the base for extrapolation. Previous census data and yearly estimates are presented in the *Brunei Statistical Yearbook 1977/1978* (Statistics Section, Economic Planning Unit, State Secretariat, Brunei, 1980).

5. The treaty and notes are printed as CMND/7496 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1979).
6. T. M. Burley, "Brunei: ASEAN's Reluctant Independent," *Insight*, (December 1981), p. 38.
7. To July 1, 1981, the oil production figure is 1,644,801,930 barrels, with oil reserves estimated at 1,630,000,000 barrels (*Oil and Gas Journal*, December 28, 1981, p. 56). Also the statement by BSP's technical director that if the "scope for additions to recoverable reserves," i.e., speculative estimates, are added to established reserves, the total is not far short of the total quantity so far produced (*Petroleum di Brunei*, 2, 1981, p. 4).
8. All trade statistics are derived from Brunei's *Statistics of External Trade*, prepared annually by the Statistics Section, Economic Planning Unit, Brunei State Secretariat.
9. For an analysis of Malaysian policy towards Brunei to 1976, see Michael Leifer, "Decolonization and International Status: The Experience of Brunei," *International Affairs* (London), 54:2 (April 1978), pp. 240-252.
10. Text of the Agreement is given in Brunei Enactment No. 1 of 1972 (*Brunei Gazette*, 1972).
11. For a critical analysis of the role of the Gurkhas, see Hamzah Ahmad, "Oil and Security in Brunei," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 2:2 (September 1980), pp. 182-191.
12. Gen. Ali Moertopo as reported by Jakarta Radio, May 24, 1978.
13. *Borneo Bulletin*, April 18, 1981.
14. *Ibid.*, December 10, 1979.
15. *Ibid.*, March 28, 1981.
16. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1981.
17. *New Straits Times*, March 20, 1982.
18. *Straits Times*, March 19, 1981.
19. See the discussion of the treaty in Purification Valera-Quisumbing, "Can ASEAN Forge a Viable Legal Regime for Regional Cooperation?," *Philippines Law Journal*, 56:2 (June 1981), pp. 209-224.