

CAPACITY BUILDING LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF TRANSITIONAL SETTLEMENT AND SHELTER

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ABSTRACT. This paper examines 23 recent case studies of post-disaster settlement and shelter across Africa, Asia, and Latin America to provide examples of implementing transitional settlement and shelter as a process and how to build more capacity for such programmes. The case studies are examined by using a four-part framework: (i) Safety, security, and livelihoods; (ii) the question “Transition to what?” in order to understand better how to connect post-disaster programmes to permanent communities and housing; (iii) fairness and equity; and (iv) connecting relief and development, which also explores root causes of vulnerability. The main lessons identify six specific activities that should be highlighted for capacity building in transitional settlement and shelter: site selection, good governance, participatory and consultative processes, land ownership, logistics, and monitoring and evaluation.

KEYWORDS: Capacity building; Process approach; Transitional settlement and shelter

1. INTRODUCTION TO TRANSITIONAL SETTLEMENT AND SHELTER

The most effective post-disaster actions tend to have local bases (e.g. Lewis, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004), so that external, namely international, interventions would be used only when the situation overwhelms first local and then national capacity. Due to inadequate pre-disaster preparation and mitigation, local and national capacities tend to be overwhelmed far more frequently than should occur.

As one example, post-disaster settlement and shelter has strong potential for local capacity building, but also has a long history of requiring external interventions for most steps. Most post-disaster reconstruction for settlements and shelters is completed by people affected by those disasters and needing the settlement and shelter, emphasising the importance of local response. Private remittances frequently support such work, but even so, disaster-affected localities do not always have the capacity-in terms of experience, skills, person-

nel, material, and equipment-to deal with all aspects of post-disaster infrastructure development and management for settlement and shelter. Therefore, external organisations use a variety of methods from providing technical assistance and workers on the ground to developing and following guidelines and standards (e.g. Corsellis and Vitale, 2005; Cuny, 1983; Shelter Centre, 2008; Shelterproject 2003; Sphere, 2004; UN-HABITAT, 2005; UNISDR, 2005; UNOCHA. 2004).

To support post-disaster settlement and shelter, especially to support the people who need it and who are doing most of the work, strong potential exists for continued, local capacity building. Post-disaster shelter covers infrastructure and non-infrastructure elements and is directly linked to post-disaster settlement through planning and through connections to other infrastructure development and maintenance, including, for instance, public health, energy supply, water, and waste management.

The meaning of combining infrastructure and non-infrastructure elements for shelter and settlements can be traced back to Turner's (1972, p. 148) 'housing as a verb', implying that housing is not just the physical structure built, but is also an ongoing action during which people feel comfortable and secure in and around the physical structure. For post-disaster situations, Davis (1978, p. 33) commented that 'shelter must be considered as a process, not as an object'. That is, in supplying post-disaster shelter, it is not just about providing a structure, but it also relates to continual and overlapping tasks which fulfil specific needs encompassing livelihoods, communities, and the wider environment. From Kennedy et al. (2008), those specific needs are:

- (i) Physical and psychological health including protection from the elements and a feeling of home and community.
- (ii) Privacy and dignity for families and for the community.
- (iii) Physical and psychological security.
- (iv) Livelihood support.

Through Shelterproject (2003) and Corsellis and Vitale (2005), the process of meeting these needs is termed 'transitional settlement and shelter' which emphasises the transition from emergency needs immediately after a disaster to the longer-term rebuilding of disaster-affected communities. One post-disaster settlement and shelter challenge tends to be retaining external interest and support after emergency needs have been met. That support is needed, for both disaster-affected people and for those assisting, in order to fully understand and implement the infrastructure and non-infrastructure elements of transitional settlement and shelter (e.g. Ashmore et al., 2003; Babister and Kelman, 2002; Barakat, 2003; Cuny, 1983; Quarantelli, 1995).

Settlement and shelter are usually socially and environmentally contextual. As a result 'it is not necessarily feasible to design settlements and shelters as an off-the-shelf package' (Kennedy et al., 2008, p. 26). Different people and different cultures have different expectations regarding, for example, infrastructure layout and appearance. One consequence is that flexibility should be a component of the design, meaning that occupants can adjust their own shelter to meet their own needs, supporting acceptability and ownership of the transitional settlement and shelter (e.g. Ashmore et al., 2003).

The principle of transitional settlement and shelter as a process is not straightforward to implement in practice, so capacity is currently being built through initiatives such as the development and evaluation of minimum standards (Sphere, 2004), field guidelines (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005), and accountability procedures (e.g. Resster, 1978; Saunders, 2004). This paper examines recent case studies of transitional settlement and shelter in order to provide examples of implementing transitional settlement and shelter as a process and how to build more capacity for such programmes.

The original research value of this work is presenting, consolidating, and describing

good and bad practices in new case studies for transitional settlement and shelter programmes. That leads directly to assisting and providing ways forward for capacity building for post-disaster infrastructure development and management, specifically for settlements and shelter. This link between research and capacity building supports other, similar calls in the disaster literature.

Two examples are (i) “useable science” (Glantz, 1997), referring to research findings targeted to help societal or individual well-being, and (ii) “people’s science” (Wisner et al., 1977), in that all people understand significant aspects about their environment and about adjusting to extremes in order to deal with disasters, but external influences can distort this understanding and the adjustment processes. Other authors call for research to support capacity building by emphasising local or traditional knowledge for disaster risk reduction (e.g. Gaillard, 2007; Mercer et al., 2007) which should also be applied to transitional settlement and shelter. This paper heeds those calls and contributes to demonstrating how the research process can be used to build capacity, local and non-local, for transitional settlement and shelter programmes.

The new case studies presented are analysed through a framework of four transitional settlement and shelter topics identified by Kennedy et al. (2008) based on Clinton’s (2006) ten “Build Back Better” propositions for reconstruction after the 26 December 2004 tsunami. The “Build Back Better” principles have been critiqued, especially regarding the choice of the word “better” which is easily misinterpreted and which was perhaps selected more for alliteration than for usefulness. Yet, to some degree, these principles consolidate previous disaster relief experience and they do match reasonably well with the 14 principles for post-disaster settlement and shelter in UNDR0 (1982), as revised from Davis (1978). Thus, they provide a useful starting point spanning much of the history of transitional settlement

and shelter, as exemplified by Kennedy et al.’s (2008) framework of:

- “Safety, security, and livelihoods”, covering the four previously mentioned needs that transitional settlement and shelter should fulfil.
- “Transition to what?” in order to better understand the meaning and implications of the term “transitional settlement and shelter”.
- “Fairness and equity”, which are often promoted as being fundamental guiding aspects for post-disaster work (e.g. Sphere, 2004).
- “Connecting relief and development”, which also explores root causes of vulnerability (see Lewis, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004).

2. CASE SELECTION AND DISCUSSION

Finding and selecting case studies for which the research process can be used to build capacity necessarily restricts the possibilities. Any field work conducted must be done in an ethical fashion (e.g. see Kelman, 2005 for ethics of disaster research) which, for instance, means that, during humanitarian emergencies, those in need must be assisted. That does not preclude simultaneous research, especially research for capacity building (e.g. Ashmore et al., 2003; Kennedy et al., 2008), but it could mean that available data are more focused on the contexts of each instance, rather than rigidly adhering to a highly-structured approach defined prior to field work. The reality of being on the ground and of supporting useable and useful science means that not every case study can or does produce every form of data, leading to necessarily adaptable and qualitative analysis approaches.

The case studies used for this paper (Table 1) were selected to present a cross-section and variety of new material, hence previously unpublished case studies were preferred.

Table 1. Case studies of the transitional settlement and shelter process

#	Location	Start Year	Situation	Length of Programme	Transitional Settlement and Shelter Programme	People Assisted
1	Afghanistan	2002	Conflict, returnees	Still ongoing	Distribution of shelter construction materials for self-build shelters along with cash grants and technical support.	1,200,000 million beneficiaries to date with an average family size of 6, covering approximately 25% of the returning population.
2	Democratic Republic of Congo, Goma	2002	Volcano	10 months	Distribution of materials for self-build shelters with technical support.	Initially 3,000 families, but later increased to 5,000. Part of a joint intervention targeting 12,625 families out of the 15,000 affected.
3	Eritrea	1998	Conflict, displaced	10 years	Camp upgrades through distribution of tents, tarpaulins, fuel efficient stoves, and other non-food items.	The target population varied over time, but at least 22,873 tents and 34,018 plastic tarpaulins were distributed.
4	Honduras	1998	Hurricane	4 months	Transitional shelter construction.	3,000 families covering approximately 15,000 people.
5	India, Gujarat	2001	Earthquake	10 months	Distribution of non-food items and self-build transitional shelters along with technical support.	Over 23,000 families.
6	Indonesia, Aceh	2004	Earthquake and tsunami	42 months	Distribution of emergency non-food item, advocacy for land rights, and support for housing.	1,564 houses, covering the creation of 28 villages in 7 regions, all with house ownership land title certificates.
7	Indonesia, Jogjakarta	2006	Earthquake	10 months	Community built and self-built transitional shelters, cash grants for materials, and skills exchanges through volunteers living in communities.	12,250 shelters built.
8	Indonesia, Jogjakarta	2006	Earthquake	2 months	Distribution of non-food items, mainly plastic sheeting, to support an emergency shelter enhancement programme. A public outreach and information programme was included.	75,000 families received plastic sheeting and 26,500 families had emergency shelter enhancement.
9	Kenya, Dadaab	2007	Flooding	1 year	Self-build new shelters for refugees, community-based efforts, and disaster risk reduction.	500 households in Ifo camp.

(Continued)

#	Location	Start Year	Situation	Length of Programme	Transitional Settlement and Shelter Programme	People Assisted
<i>(Continued)</i>						
10	Kenya	2008	Election violence	2 months	Distribution of transitional shelter kits coupled with technical support in building but full construction for vulnerable households.	481 transitional shelters kits were provided as a pilot project. 226 were erected by the organisation and 255 were self-built.
11	Liberia	2007	Conflict, displaced	6 months	Community mobilisation and distribution of materials for self-build shelters. Cash payments were given for materials and labour along with technical support for design improvements.	500 individual shelters benefitting 1,328 people. Post-completion, a total of 1,782 people were living in the houses as family members and lodgers moved in.
12	Mozambique	2007	Cyclone	5 months	Distribution of shelter construction material packages and training on improved building techniques.	2,219 vulnerable households covering 11,095 people who had remained on their own land.
13	Pakistan	2005	Earthquake	3 months	Transitional shelters, including self-built and cash-for-work, tools, and technical support.	1,125 families with shelter and additional distribution of corrugated iron to 657 families.
14	Pakistan	2005	Earthquake	4.5 months	Distribution of household non-food items, such as corrugated iron and tool kits, to assist in building transitional shelters.	15,900 families were provided with corrugated iron sheets and basic tools to build transitional shelters. Around 11,000 families received quilts and household items.
15	Peru	2007	Earthquake	24 days	Community mobilisation and provision of a flexible package of shelter construction materials, mainly self-build with a training manual distributed.	726 families.
16	Peru	2007	Earthquake	3 months	Rubble removal and transitional shelter construction, including self-build.	706 families covering 3500 people.
17	Peru	2007	Earthquake	5 months	Transitional shelter construction in which the shelter components were pre-fabricated by contractors and then homeowners assembled the shelters.	Targeted to help 1,900 families in five communities. On project completion, an additional 120 shelters were requested by the government to help house those left landless by the earthquake.

(Continued)

#	Location	Start Year	Situation	Length of Programme	Transitional Settlement and Shelter Programme	People Assisted
<i>(Continued)</i>						
18	Russia, Ingushetia	1999	Conflict, displaced	2 years	Cash grants to assist host families to shelter displaced people in private households.	15,000 host families during the winter of 2000-2001 and 11,000 host families during the winter of 2001-2002.
19	Rwanda	2008	Conflict, Returnees	14 months	Community mobilisation and establishment of beneficiary associations to provide technical guidance and materials distribution.	469 households.
20	Somalia	2007	Conflict, displaced	3 months	Support to local authorities in sourcing private land for resettlement, for internally displaced people as well as for urban poor. Land tenure was secured, an extendable one-room shelter was provided, and services were provided for family plots.	140 families, 112 which were internally displaced and 28 which were urban poor being resettled.
21	Sri Lanka	2007	Conflict, returnees	3 months	Transitional shelter construction.	213 displaced families.
22	Sri Lanka	2004	Tsunami	9 months	Transitional shelter construction.	1,500 families were initially targeted, which was then reduced to 1,000 families. The final total assisted was approximately 850 families.
23	Sudan, Darfur	2004	Conflict, displaced	3 months	Distribution of shelter materials and non-food items along with use of a multi-agency common logistics system.	The initial target population was 1,000,000 people (covering 167,000 families), which was later increased to 1,400,000 people. (The numbers are relatively high here because they were compiled as a full logistics supply operation implemented by multiple organisations.)

(The numbers of people assisted refer to only a single organisation's programme for each case study, not to the total numbers of those in need or those supported for an entire emergency, apart from case study #23 where other figures were not available.)

Whilst some of the case studies appear in the literature from a transitional settlement and shelter perspective, such as Sri Lanka (e.g. Ruwanpura, 2009) and Aceh (e.g. Kennedy et al., 2008) following the 26 December 2004 earthquake and tsunami, few elements from the specific programmes mentioned here have been published. In contrast, where new information or different programmes were not available, such as Mozambique after the 2000 cyclones and floods (Gall, 2004) or for earthquakes in 1999 in Turkey and Colombia (Johnson et al., 2006), then that case study is not considered here.

The case study information presented here was obtained from staff involved in the programme implementation or from their field reports, as long as their consent was given, which further restricted the choice of case studies. In many of the case studies, the programme staff were one or more of this paper's authors. Otherwise, they were generally personal contacts of this paper's authors.

For confidentiality, specific staff, specific agencies, and specific documents cannot be identified unless the material is publicly available, in which case the full reference is given. Avoiding public criticism of specific individuals

and organisations, and respecting confidentiality, permits open learning and improvement from mistakes without fear of recrimination. That is an important approach for continuing to build capacity to deal with post-disaster situations.

The focus of this paper's work was also on case studies that occurred during the past decade, taken as starting from Hurricane Mitch in Central America and hence going through to October 2008. The reason is that the past decade of case studies had the opportunity to learn from previous decades of transitional settlement and shelter, such as those in Table 2. As well, the more recent case studies tended to have the most documentation available, usually in the form of field reports, along with the easiest access to staff who were involved.

Geographically, the case studies were aimed towards places with already existing severe development problems in order to support some level of comparability in terms of the transitional settlement and shelter situation overlaying longer-term development concerns. As such, all cases are from Africa, Asia (including Ingushetia), and Latin America. Examples of North American and European case studies that are not included are, respectively,

Table 2. Examples of pre-1998 case studies of transitional settlement and shelter

Location	Start Year	Reason for Programme	Length of Programme	Transitional Settlement and Shelter Programme
Azerbaijan	1997	Conflict	8 years	Upgrade of collective centres.
Bangladesh	1975	Conflict, displaced	36 months	Cyclone-resistant shelters in camps.
Guatemala	1976	Earthquake	13 months	Material distribution and training.
India, Andhra Pradesh	1977	Cyclone	10 months	Material distribution and training.
Nicaragua	1973	Earthquake	2 months	Shelters in community-grouped camp.
Sudan	1985	Famine	12 months	Planned camps.
Thailand	1979	Conflict, displaced	14 years	Camp construction and development of a manual of standards.
Tonga	1982	Cyclone	30 months	Shelter guidelines and shelter-related quick response programmes.
India, West Bengal	1971	Conflict, displaced	4 months	Material distribution and training.

Hurricane Katrina in the USA in 2005 (Nigg et al., 2006 and see Quarantelli, 1995 for other American examples) and Macedonia in 2000-2001 following the Kosovo conflict (Babister and Kelman, 2002).

In summary, the criteria for selecting case studies were:

- The research process must contribute to capacity building.
- A cross-section and variety of case studies must be presented.
- New case studies must be presented, thereby favouring previously unpublished case studies.
- First-hand field information was sought, with the consent of the staff involved and without breaking confidentiality.
- Case studies that occurred during the past decade were sought.
- Case studies focused on locations with already existing severe development problems were sought.

These criteria, as discussed above, led to a total of 23 case studies of programmes, covering 19 disaster situations across 16 countries. The type of support examined in the case studies was not necessarily the same as the support given by other organisations responding to the same emergency and rarely represents the implementation of a universal settlement and shelter strategy for the case study.

This set of case studies is thus illustrative rather than being comprehensive or representing a random sample, thereby giving a deliberately broad-brush approach in order to extract patterns of capacity-related lessons, such as Davis (1987) does for shelter in an urban development context. This work complements and extends the single case study approach of much previous literature on transitional settlement and shelter (e.g. Gall, 2004; Kennedy et al., 2008; Oliver-Smith, 1990; Ruwanpura, 2009).

The illustrative approach to case studies is further necessary because organisations in-

involved in transitional settlement and shelter tend not to keep systematic information on their programmes. As a result, institutional memory from this work is retained mainly in the memories of individuals who frequently move jobs amongst organisations. In using Kennedy et al.'s (2008) framework (see section 1) and in drawing on wider literature to apply to transitional settlement and shelter, a more coherent and comparative approach embedded in wider contexts can be used to support improved institutional memory.

3. SAFETY, SECURITY, AND LIVELIHOODS

The combined topic of safety, security, and livelihoods summarises the needs that the process approach adopts for transitional settlement and shelter. Examples of direct links amongst these topics are (i) psychological well-being and dignity being partly founded on having self-supporting livelihoods, rather than relying on hand-outs; (ii) being able to generate income and collect day-to-day resources (e.g. water and firewood) without fear of robbery or physical or sexual assault; and (iii) feeling secure and being protected from the elements, permitting a focus on pursuing livelihoods.

In case study 10, local knowledge was used for the technology and skills needed to construct transitional shelters. Since the local capacity exists, this approach promoted local livelihoods by creating jobs, demonstrating what locals could offer, and encouraging pursuit of those careers. Additionally, the local involvement meant that the shelters were similar to what the beneficiaries were used to, so they readily accepted the results, bolstering their psychological well-being.

Case studies 7, 8, 9, 15, and 21 also kept funds and livelihoods local by focusing on local materials for the transitional shelters. Volunteers living in the communities where the programme was being implemented proved

successful for promoting local livelihoods and security in case study 7, because the process of building the transitional shelters involved skills exchange and building local capacity for settlement and shelter work. For case study 8, locally made woven bamboo wall sheets were used, rather than tendering for external materials and products. Community volunteers were trained as trainers and then worked with their communities on the construction, from buying materials to building the shelters.

Case study 9 trained a small group of beneficiaries, including women and the elderly, as trainers and supervisors for construction and brick making. That generated skills and livelihoods for the beneficiaries, reduced costs by using local labour, and instilled a sense of pride and ownership in self-built shelters, enhancing the feeling of well-being and acceptance of the shelters.

The cash grants provided for case study 18 supported the local economy while the transparency and monitoring implemented for the cash grants ensured that the system was not abused, as far as could be ascertained. These approaches reduced the danger of the displaced people being evicted by their host families, because the host families were compensated well and were monitored, as far as feasible, to see how the displaced people were being treated. Consequently, despite the tense security situation in the area due to the conflict, the security of the displaced people and their host families was not compromised. Similarly, case study 16's cash-for-work scheme for rubble removal and building transitional shelters injected cash into the economy and assisted livelihoods recovery while increasing safety through timely and monitored disposal of the rubble.

Another example combining livelihoods, safety, and security was case study 22 for which the transitional settlement and shelter construction included apprenticeships for tsunami-affected youth. They were trained in carpentry and electrician skills, giving them

an introduction to possible livelihoods, a say in the transitional process, tasks to occupy their time, and an appreciation for safety issues regarding construction and electricity.

A contrast regarding security was evident between case studies 2 and 15. In case study 2, the plastic walls led some beneficiaries to criticise their low level of privacy and security. Thieves could easily cut through the plastic while, at night, lamps in the shelters cast shadows on the plastic so that others could see what was being done inside. The beneficiaries of case study 15, though, highlighted the privacy and anti-theft advantages of the solid materials that were used for their transitional shelters.

These examples demonstrate two lessons for capacity. First, the capacity exists within transitional settlement and shelter programmes to address safety, security, and livelihoods through the transitional settlement and shelter process. Given the successes identified, failures could potentially be avoided. Second, across a range of locations and situations, the transitional settlement and shelter process can be used to build the capacity of the beneficiaries for safety, security, and livelihoods topics which supports long-term community building.

4. TRANSITION TO WHAT?

The term "transitional" is used to emphasise the need for a transition from meeting immediate emergency needs, where action directly saves individual lives, through to the completion of rebuilding permanent communities and houses. The latter can take years. Leaving people in emergency shelters cannot fulfil the settlement and shelter needs for that length of time, hence the transitional phase is helpful for meeting needs in the absence of permanent communities and housing. In many instances, rapid implementation of transitional settlement and shelter, or policies that do not fully factor in the process approach, ne-

glect to consider beyond the transitional phase in order to connect transitional work with the longer-term view.

Case studies 7, 13, 22, and 23 especially demonstrated the drawbacks of failing to consider the “Transition to what?” question. In case study 7, some transitional shelters were still being built when construction of permanent structures started, leading to resentment and lack of clarity regarding the order in which beneficiaries would be sheltered and then housed. For the other three case studies, the transitional role was simply forgotten, leading to difficulties for the beneficiaries.

In case study 13, many transitional shelters had to be torn down before permanent houses could be built, because the houses were built on the same plots as the shelters and there was no room for the two side-by-side. In case study 23, only plastic sheeting and a few other basic non-food items were distributed, leaving the beneficiaries without any form of a frame or other support items needed to ensure a complete transitional approach fulfilling transitional settlement and shelter needs. Case study 22 did not consider the link to permanent housing, leaving the transitional settlement and shelter process somewhat directionless and the beneficiaries with limited opportunity to build their own capacity for recovery. Confusion was augmented by logistics challenges restricting materials delivery and a changing exclusion zone for construction, which also conflicted with pre-tsunami coastal settlement patterns.

Other case studies demonstrated that capacity in transitional settlement and shelter programmes exists to fully implement the link to permanent communities and housing. For case studies 5 and 16, many of the materials distributed for self-build of transitional shelters could be re-used for other purposes. For example, in case study 5, many roofs were initially grass thatched. Later, the grass was needed to feed livestock and was replaced by

locally made clay tiles. Conversely, in case study 3, authorities did not wish the camps to become permanent and so restricted the use of durable shelter materials. Rather than having re-useable materials to effect a smooth transition to permanent housing, further funds were used to replace poor-quality temporary shelters with more shelters of the same poor quality.

The main lesson is that transitional settlement and shelter programmes should always have the capacity to consider the “Transition to what?” question and, in consultation with the beneficiaries, consider what will come after the transitional settlement and shelter. That is not necessarily straightforward given pressures to focus on construction and given logistics or political challenges that can preclude the opportunity to consider the permanent result while supporting the transitional period. Capacity could be further built outside transitional settlement and shelter programmes to try to demonstrate to others the need to have a permanent aim in mind during the transitional period. In fact, considering water, sanitation, hygiene, and health, field workers suggest that capacity is already far higher than for transitional settlement and shelter, so it might be a case of building on those successes to boost capacity in transitional settlement and shelter, without losing the existing capacity in the other areas.

5. FAIRNESS AND EQUITY

Numerous fairness and equity challenges and solutions emerged from the case studies. Ensuring that representative voices from amongst the beneficiaries were heard during decision-making and implementation proved to be challenging on occasion. In case study 9, minorities were not fully accounted for, with disabled people being highlighted as a group not entirely included in the transitional settlement and shelter process.

In contrast, the programme in case study 12 was set up specifically to assist those who are most vulnerable, covering child-headed households, widows, and those who were chronically ill or disabled. Yet three months after material distribution, 15% of the beneficiaries had not been able to use the materials for rebuilding due to a lack of assistance for doing so. Part of this situation was attributed to poor support regarding land ownership. The organisations adopted the ethos that shelter means a house, without considering the process approach, thereby neglecting the vulnerability of renters, squatters, and other landless people who could not build because they had no land rights. Fairness and equity were not implemented on the basis of differential ownership of and access to land on which to build.

Difficulties arose in case study 20 when clan-based loyalties overlapped with responsibilities of municipal workers along with contrasts between customs, religious law, and non-religious law. For case study 1, gender-sensitive participation was identified as requiring improvement; the landless were not fully assisted by the programme; and different organisations provided different transitional shelters, leading some beneficiaries to destroy their cheaper shelters due to the inequalities, in the hope of receiving better assistance.

The fairness and equity issues led to ethical dilemmas regarding the distribution of available transitional settlement and shelter capacity, specifically whether to implement high quality programmes for fewer people or poorer quality programmes that supported more people. The 2005 Pakistan earthquake illustrates the contrast. Technical support, significant amounts of material, and cash-for-work were implemented in case study 13, supporting 0.2% of the affected population. Meanwhile, case study 14 covered 2.3% of the affected population, but delivered only basic non-food items, corrugated iron, and tool kits.

Case studies 7, 12, and 18 raised concerns about fairness and equity in the governance

of the transitional settlement and shelter programmes. Cash grants were provided as part of case study 7, but no possibility existed for continuing the programme. Accountability and transparency for the grants' final tranche were therefore much less than for the earlier tranches, because no incentive existed to spend the time to report back and because penalty clauses for failing to report back were not included in the cash-grant contract. Case study 18 experienced fraud when individuals manipulated documents to make themselves eligible for support. Appropriate monitoring uncovered at least some of the fraud before payments were made. Case study 12 prevented much fraud through close collaboration with the local government and coordination with the national government.

These three case studies show that transitional settlement and shelter programmes need governance capacity to deal with accountability, transparency, and fraud prevention in order to support fairness and equity. When that capacity is available or generated and then used, close monitoring of programmes can assist in reducing corruption.

Fair and equitable consultation with beneficiaries is an important component of such capacity, with a wide range of techniques available (e.g. Chambers, 2002; Wilcox, 1994). Examples of specific methods are making maps accessible to local populations (Haynes et al., 2007), using three-dimensional models for planning (Maceda et al., 2009), and combining indigenous and scientific knowledge bases (Mercer et al., 2008). Lawther (2009) describes one example of community involvement in post-disaster reconstruction.

As indicated by the difficulties noted above in ensuring that that representative voices from amongst the beneficiaries, communities cannot necessarily be considered as coherent entities, so capacity is needed to carefully monitor fairness and equity within communities, not just across communities. In fact, communities rarely display the ideal character-

istics of a community such as coherence and cooperation (Brint, 2001; Cannon, 2007), so a general community-based consultation process should not be assumed to reflect the views of everyone living in a location. Instead, capacity should be built and made available to actively seek out the views of all groups within each community to ensure an adequately fair and equitable consultation process.

For example, case study 11 positively took a house-by-house approach to select beneficiaries. That provided direct contact to establish the transitional settlement and shelter needs and whether or not the programme could fulfil those needs. Yet once the beneficiaries were selected, and following a rapid consultation regarding needs, the same items (including basic carpentry tools, shovels, nails, and metal strapping) and the same shelters were provided to all beneficiaries without accounting for special individual or locational needs. Lack of human and organisational capacity was the main factor leading to this limitation.

This example illustrates the “equity dilemma” for post-disaster needs assessment: does “equity” mean that everyone is treated equally or that everyone receives support according to their needs, necessarily assessed subjectively? Which is fairer? A trade-off between fairness and equity sometimes exists.

Case study 17 illustrates a combination of fairness and equity. Communities were chosen on the basis that no other organisations were working there on transitional settlement and shelter—the premise that all communities should have assistance (equity). Within communities, beneficiaries were prioritised on the basis of assessed vulnerabilities and needs (fairness). Similarly, in case study 8, each village in the programme (equity) received sufficient tarpaulins to ensure that the sick, disabled, young, and elderly within their village (fairness) were adequately sheltered.

For case study 11, beneficiaries were selected in collaboration with community represent-

atives and that process appeared to be representative, augmenting community cooperation. Open meetings with local authorities enhanced that cooperation, leading to understanding and agreement regarding what the programme did and did not cover. Continued feedback from the beneficiaries and others in the community, coupled with an open decision-making process and close monitoring, achieved quality control and countered corruption. That was boosted by paying for materials and labour only after the beneficiary had moved in, to ensure that work was completed on time and with appropriate quality.

The need to re-do some of the technical work, along with improved technical supervision as one recommendation, notes that case study 11 was not entirely successful. Additionally, the involvement of some community-based organisations was ended due to corruption and lack of community involvement in those organisations. Yet recognising the drawbacks of these organisations, and acting on the observations, promoted fairness and equity by reducing corruption.

These cases studies demonstrate two linked lessons for capacity regarding fairness and equity. First, using and enhancing capacity to address fairness and equity can support transitional settlement and shelter programmes. Second, the converse works too: building and using capacity for the transitional settlement and shelter process can support fairness and equity in the community.

6. CONNECTING RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT

Relief and development can be connected through the transitional settlement and shelter process (Bosher, 2008; Lewis, 1999; UN-HABITAT, 2005; Wisner et al., 2004). This topic notes the importance of not only considering the long-term vulnerability which led to the need for transitional settlement and shelter,

but also encompassing longer-term processes to try to avert that need from recurring. Action on development that is sensitive to disaster risk reduction in order to identify and redress vulnerabilities is incorporated. That assists in reducing or avoiding the need for post-disaster external assistance, focuses on local capacity for response and reconstruction, and possibly covers community-driven peacemaking and conflict prevention where relevant. Two aspects are highlighted from the case studies: (i) implementing disaster risk reduction, rather than just disaster response and reconstruction, as part of the transitional settlement and shelter and (ii) connecting development concerns, especially across different development interests, with transitional settlement and shelter.

Results for longer-term disaster risk reduction were mixed from the case studies. Case study 14 did not include seismic resistant construction training due to a lack of staff. While such material is available, such as in book form (e.g. Coburn et al., 1995) or online (e.g. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7354_WHETutorialAdobeEnglish.pdf), the capacity does not always exist to access it and to translate it into local languages and for local contexts. If potential users are not aware of the material, find it too complex, do not understand its language or concepts, or are inexperienced in aspects that cannot be fully covered in these documents – such as budgeting, training staff, contextualising, and accountability – then these documents will not be useful. Instead, capacity would be needed to support the use of that already existing material within each context.

Case study 9 occurred in refugee camps near Dadaab, set up in 1991 for Somalis fleeing conflict in their country. The transitional settlement and shelter due to floods was needed for people already in transitional settlement and shelter due to conflict, because the latter had not fully factored in flood risk reduction. The programme for case study 9 did consider floods by creating a transitional settlement on

higher ground, seemingly out of the floodplain. Yet this site was farther from the market and lacked trees, reducing natural shade. These tradeoffs can only be resolved by consulting with the beneficiaries to determine their preferences and priorities.

Similarly, the timber used in some shelters in case study 19 was not treated or protected, so it was quickly attacked by termites. That problem could have been anticipated by consulting with the beneficiaries who, as returnees, knew the area. Similarly, beneficiaries in case study 7 suffered from the use of non-treated bamboo, which deteriorates after two years, rather than the programme having used treated bamboo that can last up to 25 years.

A question could be raised regarding the need for long lasting materials in these case studies. Since the settlements and shelters are transitional, could short-term approaches be adopted? The answer is preferably to avoid as much short-termism as possible because transitional settlement and shelter often form the direct basis for the future settlements and shelters. Even where that is not case, then the materials used for the transitional phase are frequently useful for later activities and can form contributions to the reconstruction of livelihoods. Short-changing those who need the settlements and shelters in the transitional phase tends to poorly connect relief and development.

Case study 19 demonstrates this situation. It displays good links between relief and development by including a locally designed rainwater catchment system and, to reduce deforestation, a fuel-efficient stove made from local materials. Shared services – a community centre, a day care system for children, and boreholes for clean water – were incorporated as part of the transitional settlement and shelter process, services that would be expected to last beyond the transitional phase.

Deforestation was also reduced in case study 3 by providing fuel-efficient stoves as

part of the transitional settlement and shelter process. Case study 16 integrated the transitional shelters with water and sanitation programmes. Case study 22 integrated the transitional settlement and shelter process with rainwater harvesting, roof insulation, basic electrical wiring, and either latrines or else materials and advice for constructing latrines.

Case study 10 inadvertently used construction teams of mixed ethnicity which supported the peace-building process amongst rival groups, showing how the transitional settlement and shelter process can be directly linked to peace-making. In contrast, such links to peace were not seen in the post-tsunami case studies of 6 and 22. That is not necessarily bad, because forcing post-disaster actions to be integrated with peace can often cause long-term harm, as illustrated by the continual failures of 'disaster diplomacy' which examines how disasters and disaster risk reduction do and do not assist in conflict reduction (e.g. Kelman, 2006).

Case study 4 integrated relief and development by seeking sites that would not be prone to a recurrence of flooding and landslides; however, water, electricity, and sanitation were not properly considered within the transitional settlement and shelter process. The shelters did have nets on the windows and doors, providing ventilation and protection from insects.

The diversity of successes and failures in connecting relief and development demonstrates the need for more capacity for this topic. The knowledge exists (e.g. Lewis, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004) and is frequently used. Yet sometimes limits on awareness, or on field resources and trained personnel, can prevent relief and development being properly connected through the transitional settlement and shelter process. The challenge works both ways. People working with transitional settlement and shelter need the capacity to connect with other aspects of post-disaster work and with longer-term development processes. Simul-

taneously, people working on various topics, both post-disaster and in terms of longer-term development, need the capacity to work with those implementing transitional settlement and shelter. The result should be fruitful cooperation across topical interests and organisations, rather than competition for resources and priorities.

7. CAPACITY AND CAPACITY BUILDING

The four previous sections examined examples of good and bad practice, indicating aspects of existing capacity and how capacity could be improved. Capacity is relevant to all parties involved, including but not limited to beneficiaries; local, regional, and national authorities; and organisations from local groups to international organisations. What is the most effective way of improving and maintaining capacity for transitional settlement and shelter programmes? How can the four-topic framework be used, and its limitations overcome, to ensure practical steps forward in capacity building, based on the evidence from and discussion of the case studies?

Education, training, awareness raising, and related activities are certainly needed and important elements. They are frequently mentioned and solid initiatives to support them are continuing; for instance, field guides such as Davis and Lambert (2002) and websites such as <http://www.sheltertraining.org>. The four-category framework used above from Kennedy et al. (2008) is a useful approach for focusing education-related work, but sometimes more specific activities or actions could be identified for understanding how to move forward with capacity building initiatives. That is a potential limitation of using more generalised frameworks for this sort of analysis. Conversely, Kennedy et al. (2008) provide a starting point that should be taken further to meet specific objectives, which in this case relate to using the research process for capacity building.

Examples from the case studies are provided here to suggest six specific activities that should be highlighted for capacity building, given the material analysed from the case studies through the four-topic framework:

- Site selection.
- Good governance.
- Participatory and consultative processes.
- Land ownership.
- Logistics.
- Monitoring and evaluation.

Site selection for transitional settlement and shelter poses a significant challenge because (i) to do so properly takes time, yet little can proceed without this task being completed and (ii) available sites tend to be those with major problems because the best sites are, understandably, already occupied. Proper and timely site selection is therefore an important skill for those involved in transitional settlement and shelter (e.g. Corsellis, 2001) and capacity can be built for that task. That capacity in action was shown for case study 10 where site selection was completed carefully and included consultation, thereby playing an important role in the ultimate success of the programme.

For good governance, UNDP (1997) suggests the principles of participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, and equity. These principles have been implemented for disaster risk reduction (UNISDR, 2005) and all appeared throughout the case studies in the discussion above, with a particular emphasis on “Connecting relief and development”. Capacity building could use UNDP’s (1997) good governance principles and/or HAP International’s (2008) humanitarian accountability and quality management approach for implementing and managing transitional settlement and shelter programmes. They would be used not just as principles, but also as measures to be implemented on the ground, as illustrated, for example, by case study 18’s transparency and the difficulties encountered

in case study 20 from overlapping rules of law—while also noting how legislation can help and inhibit post-disaster reconstruction (e.g. Rotimi et al., 2009). The principle of effectiveness could encompass field coordination, which worked well in case study 23, in that funding was centralised to avoid programme duplication. Field coordination did not work as well in case study 1, where some shelters were not built in coordination with organisations providing other services, leading the shelters to be unusable.

Using participatory and consultative processes, but not relying solely on them, was discussed under “Fairness and equity”. The key point is that capacity can be built to effect community-based processes and to factor in other considerations, in a transparent manner, for making the final decisions. From the experience of the case studies, as detailed above, incorporating this action into the transitional settlement and shelter process enhances the likelihood of success of a programme, even when intensive pressures exist to start building immediately.

Participatory and consultative processes mesh with site selection in cases when permanent resettlement is considered. After the 2007 Peru earthquake (case studies 15, 16, 1nd 17), permanent construction of communities elsewhere was proposed for some locations. That was soundly opposed, with the population instead requesting support for earthquake-resistant construction at the same locations. This situation mirrored the opposition to resettlement elsewhere after the 1970 earthquake in Peru (Oliver-Smith, 1986).

Yet sometimes permanent resettlement elsewhere is essential for achieving “Safety, security, and livelihoods”. Examples are due to conflict-related boundary changes or unexploded ordnance (case study 3) or due to original land being covered by landslides or floods and still being unstable or at high risk. Whilst forced resettlement should not be un-

dertaken, circumstances might dictate that participatory and consultative processes must deal with the challenge of site selection for resettlement rather than for reconstruction (see also Corsellis and Vitale, 2005; Deng, 1998; UNHCR, 2007). With care, the “Transition to what?” question can be answered with “permanent resettlement elsewhere”.

Also contributing to answering the “Transition to what?” question, land ownership must be addressed for transitional settlement and shelter programmes in order to ensure an effective transition to permanent communities and housing (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005). Capacity is needed for a general understanding of rights (e.g. Leckie, 1995; part of “Safety, security, and livelihoods” and for “Fairness and equity”) and for applying the generalities to specific contexts. The case studies illustrate the contrast of approaches. In case studies 15, 16, and 17, shelters tended to be built for people who could provide proof of ownership of the land on which the shelter was being built. Conversely, for case study 6, land with title deeds was negotiated for entire villages before construction began.

Across many case studies, logistics was raised as a topic where capacity was needed. In case study 17, basic raw materials (rough timber, tongue and groove wall sheeting, and corrugated, cement panels) were delivered straight to the building sites, reducing logistics requirements because warehousing and transport tend to be easier for raw material stacks than for manufactured or assembled components.

Transitional shelters for case study 6, however, experienced severe delays because the tsunami had washed out roads and bridges along with difficulties in negotiating material supply and delivering bulk quantities which the national industries were not used to. These logistics problems were not factored into the planning at first, leading to raised expectations amongst the beneficiaries followed by frustra-

tion due to lack of delivery. Capacity is needed for handling the logistics of transitional settlement and shelter along with the assessment of logistics before plans are finalised. That often encompasses training to improve communication between shelter programme officials and logisticians and will support “Connecting relief and development”.

Finally, a frequent issue for which more capacity is needed is monitoring and evaluation of case studies, especially for tackling corruption and inefficiency (part of “Fairness and equity”). Indicators, criteria, and evidence for failure and success are lacking, rather than providing feedback to improve future situations. Continued initiatives seek to redress this concern (e.g. UNOCHA, 2004; Shelter Centre, 2008), plus Corsellis and Vitale (2005) provide templates specifically for monitoring and evaluation during the transitional settlement and shelter process, thereby continuing to ask “Transition to what?”. Effective monitoring and evaluation also entails continued education of those involved in transitional settlement and shelter—including local contractors, governments at all levels, and international organisation staff—to recognise the importance of monitoring and evaluation, to be aware of the available material on this topic, and to know how to apply the available material and techniques.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Through continued compilation and analysis of case studies, incorporating historical material, efforts to improve capacity and to apply lessons learned can yield more successes for transitional settlement and shelter. That includes the point raised earlier about the lack of systematic institutional memory retained by organisations involved in transitional settlement and shelter. This paper might provide a useful starting template by which case studies can be recorded and analysed to ensure that

capacity to deal with transitional settlement and shelter is not lost from lack of systematic monitoring, evaluation, and record keeping for these programmes.

By building and maintaining such capacity for post-disaster infrastructure and maintenance, the transitional settlement and shelter process should produce permanent communities and housing that have significantly reduced vulnerabilities. That is a necessary, even if not sufficient, component for stopping disasters from occurring in the first place and for bypassing the need for the transition.

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SANTRAUKA

PER DEŠIMT METŲ IŠMOKTOS POTENCIALO DIDINIMO PAMOKOS APRŪPINANT LAIKINOSIOMIS GYVENAMOSIOMIS VIETOMIS IR SUTEIKIANT PRIEGLAUDĄ

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Šiame darbe analizuojami 23 neseniai atliktų nelaimės ištiktų žmonių apgyvendinimo ir prieglaudų jiems suteikimo Afrikoje, Azijoje ir Lotynų Amerikoje tyrimų rezultatai, pateikiami efektyvaus aprūpinimo laikinosiomis gyvenamosiomis vietomis ir prieglaudomis programų įgyvendinimo pavyzdžiai, patariama, kaip didinti šių programų potencialą. Tyrimų rezultatai nagrinėjami remiantis keturių dalių struktūra: 1) saugumas, apsauga ir pragyvenimo šaltinis; 2) klausimas „Jei laikinas, tai kas po to?“, siekis ištikus nelaimei vykdomas apgyvendinimo programas susieti su pastoviomis bendruomenėmis ir nuolatiniu būstu; 3) teisingumas ir lygybė; 4) paramos ir plėtros sąsaja, pagrindinės pažeidžiamumo priežastys. Išskiriamos šešios konkrečios veiklos rūšys, kurias reikėtų akcentuoti didinant aprūpinimo laikinosiomis gyvenamosiomis vietomis ir prieglaudų suteikimo potencialą: vietos parinkimas, geras valdymas, dalyvavimo ir konsultavimo procesai, žemės nuosavybė, logistika, stebėjimas bei vertinimas.