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Capital maintenance and investment: Complements or substitutes?*

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May, 2001

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the theoretical properties of demand for capital maintenance services. To this end, we consider two investment problems incorporating maintenance services and we analyze their steady state equilibria. At first, we show that if no variable capital utilization rate is allowed, investment and maintenance expenditures have the same qualitative properties, and so cannot be regarded as gross substitutes. If a variable rate of capital utilization is allowed, the occurrence of substitution Vs complementarity features and the comparative statics properties depend on the sensitivity of the postulated capital depreciation function with respect to both the rate of capital utilization and the maintenance expenditures ratio. We prove that the case where the *elasticity* with respect to maintenance expenditures is lower, gives much better shaped demand functions and fits definitely better the recent real business cycles studies.

Keywords: Investment theory, Demand for maintenance services, Capacity utilization, Substitution Vs complementarity.

Journal of Economic Literature: E22, E32, O40, C63.

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1 Introduction

It is widely admitted that the assumption according to which the capital depreciation rate is exogenous and constant is to a large extent wrong and misleading. Typically, capital depreciation is varying over time depending for example on the pace of economic activity. There is a common view arguing that in good times, capital depreciation should be higher than in recessions because capital goods are likely to be more intensively used in the former case, inducing a higher deterioration. This endogenous view of depreciation, often referred to as the *depreciation in use* hypothesis, has been put forward by Epstein and Denny (1980) and Bischoff and Kokkelenberg (1987). A higher level of economic activity implies a higher rate of capital utilization, which accelerates the depreciation of capital. Real business cycles models incorporating depreciation in use have been also built up and simulated in order to assess the cyclical implications of this hypothesis. Among other, the seminal contributions of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) and Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996). While this approach is certainly worthwhile as compared with the traditional framework based on constant capital depreciation rate, it does not seem to be completely satisfactory for several reasons. The main argument against the depreciation in use assumption outlines the residual role assigned to capital depreciation: It is quite mechanically computed from the rate of capital utilization optimal paths once the optimal investment plan of the representative firms characterized. Since the rate of capital utilization is pro-cyclical, depreciation should be so in such frameworks.

This view of capital depreciation is far from convincing from different points of view. First at all, depreciation is not merely physical, it is also an economic phenomenon and economic agents are perfectly aware of this while setting their investment plans. An obvious aspect of economic depreciation relies on technological progress and the induced *obsolescence* effect. The recent boom of information technologies makes clear the importance of the latter depreciation concept: The computers are typically scrapped and driven out the firms after a few years, often not more than three years! It is clear that the depreciation concept that applies here is not physical but exclusively economic. The vintage capital models built in the sixties were principally devoted to capture this aspect. In these models, the production functions are Leontief, and thanks to this linearity assumption, some simple and well-defined obsolescence rules can be derived: A machine is scrapped once its operation cost (usually the labor cost) does no longer cover its (expected) quasi-rents (see the seminal paper by Solow *et al.*, 1966). Capital depreciation is mainly driven by obsolescence and scrapping is a control variable. This is clearly an improvement with respect to the depreciation in use based

frameworks which typically treat depreciation residually. In addition to that, vintage capital models with Leontief technologies are shown to give rise to richer investment dynamics in comparison with the propagation mechanisms at work in standard business cycles models (see Benhabib and Rustichini, 1991, and Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro, 1997). Abstracting away from the Leontief assumption, a major drawback of this approach to capital depreciation is that it deliberately focuses on economic depreciation (and more precisely on obsolescence), in contrast to the depreciation in use frameworks which focus on physical depreciation. For an exhaustive treatment of capital depreciation, a synthesis of the two approaches sounds as highly desirable.

This appealing task has been first undertaken by Feldstein and Rothschild (1974) and Nickell (1975). In particular, Nickell's contribution puts together a Leontief production function subject to exogenous technological progress, inducing the traditional obsolescence scheme, and a relatively complete story for output and input decays. The latter is introduced through a *maintenance cost* function. However, as scrapping rules are only implicitly determined, no capital depreciation function is really characterized. More importantly, it turns out that the obsolescence effect is dominant in this kind of vintage models, so that the maintenance cost function plays a secondary role in the investment and depreciation decisions.

We claim in this paper that maintenance costs should be central in the specification of the theory of investment, and we discuss some related modeling issues. In particular, we will argue that a satisfactory treatment of capital depreciation should not only involve endogenous variables, but also some decision variables. While the common wisdom would call for a more complete appraisal of capital maintenance decisions, most models of business cycles and aggregate economic activity ignored this issue.¹ The lack of surveys assessing the importance of maintenance and repair costs was usually invoked to justify that omission. As pointed out McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) in a very recent exploratory study, it is not possible to measure the size of maintenance and repair expenditures in the aggregate in many countries, including the United States. An economy-wide survey is however available for Canada. Based on this survey, McGrattan and Schmitz find that the maintenance and repair expenditures averaged about 6% of the Canadian GDP over the period 1961 – 1993. Over the same period, these expenditures averaged about 50% of spending on new equipment. According to these authors, the survey thus suggests that the activities of maintenance and investment are to some extent substitutes for each other.

¹However, some few papers stressing the role of capital maintenance in the business cycles have very recently come out, see Licandro and Puch (2000) and Collard and Kollintzas (2000).

This paper is primarily devoted to investigate under which conditions a demand for maintenance services exist and checks some desired properties in some simple investment problems. In particular, we will provide a detailed analysis of the substitutability between investment and maintenance services. Under which conditions and to which extent the latter services may be substitutes for investment? This theoretical issue has been raised but not deeply tackled in McGrattan and Schmitz's paper though these authors provide some illuminating specifications of the investment problem in the presence of maintenance services. However since their contribution is mainly intended to point at the role of maintenance in the real economies, they have adopted the most elementary theoretical set-up to illustrate in the simplest way some observed empirical regularities. Our paper provides the needed analysis of demand for maintenance services in some typical firms' investment problems. In our view, the investment problem should be appraised within a general framework, including at least the three following ingredients: installation costs, maintenance costs and the possibility to choose the rate of capital utilization. Accordingly capital depreciation rate is optimally chosen together with the rate of capacity utilization and purchases of maintenance and repair services. In such a case, the analysis of the representative firm problem is shown to be much more complicated from the theoretical point of view with respect to McGrattan and Schmitz's contribution. Since it is also more realistic as for example the rate of capital utilization is hardly ever equal to unity according to the RBC literature (see Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman, 1988) and to the engineering literature (see Rust, 1987), we do think that our model can yield some interesting lessons on investment behaviour.

We consider a putty-putty production function with perfect malleability of capital as in the traditional neoclassical model. By doing so, we rule out obsolescence as a source of capital depreciation. However, since we allow for maintenance services to control for depreciation, the rate of depreciation is indeed chosen by the firms along with the other relevant variables. Hence though capital depreciation does not rely on obsolescence, it is to a large extent economic. In contrast to the depreciation in use based models, depreciation is no longer residual, and as opposed to the traditional vintage capital models, we are able to derive an explicit capital depreciation function in which the maintenance expenditures play a fundamental and apparent role. An alternative but related specification of the problem may be obtained by assuming a maintenance cost function depending on variable depreciation and utilization rates as in Escribá and Ruiz-Tamarit (1996).

In order to be as general as possible, we only bring out analytical results and we focus on the characterization of the stationary equilibria. So we do not include any short-run dynamics numerical simulation. Indeed, given the

type of investment models treated along this paper, such experiments do not add nothing to our analytical developments, especially because the obtained short-run dynamics lack persistence (except for the capital stock, due to the installation costs), and so they only differ slightly from the long-run dynamics depicted in this paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the properties of a basic model with maintenance services. Particular attention will be paid to the existence of a demand for those services. In Section 3, we allow for an additional decision variable, the rate of capital utilization. Once the investment problem specified, we derive and interpret the associated optimality conditions. We identify some new conditions under which the demand for maintenance services exists and checks some precise properties in the steady state. We carefully analyze for each model studied here the issue of substitutability Vs complementarity between maintenance and investment, and the issue of procyclical Vs countercyclical behavior of the main variables. Section 4 sums up the obtained results.

2 The basic problem of the firm with maintenance services

Let us consider the case of a firm producing a good Y_t in any period t with a neoclassical technology $z_t F(K_{t-1}, L_t)$, where z_t is the level of neutral technological progress and $F(\cdot)$ is homogenous of degree one in its arguments, being K_{t-1} the stock of capital available at the beginning of period t and L_t the labor force at work during this period. For given prices, the firm has to choose its gross investment level I_t , the amount of maintenance and repair services M_t , in addition to labor. If investment involves a convex installation cost, $\Phi(I_t)$, $\Phi(0) = 0$, $\Phi'(x) > 0$ for all $x > 0$, and $\Phi'' > 0$, the cash-flow of the firm for any period t takes the form:

$$\pi_t = p_t z_t F(K_{t-1}, L_t) - w_t L_t - q_t M_t - p_t^k I_t - p_t \Phi(I_t),$$

where p_t , w_t , q_t and p_t^k are respectively the price of the produced good, the wage paid to the employees, the unit price of maintenance services and the price of a new unit of capital. Note that the installation costs, which depend only on gross investment and not on capital stock, are evaluated at the price of the produced good because they are accounted as output losses rather than capital losses. From an analytical point of view, the assumption according to which the installation costs depend only on the investment level is fundamental in that it breaks down the homogeneity of our optimization problems. This is necessary to obtain a well defined steady state equilibrium values for the investment and maintenance levels and to derive the needed

comparative statics. The introduction of the capital stock into the adjustment cost function under the usual linear homogeneity assumption does not allow for so, eg. the long-run investment level is not determined in such a case but the ratio investment over capital is.² As usual, the adjustment costs are introduced so as to get a well-defined long-run investment function (see Takayama, 1994, commenting on Hayashi's seminal contribution, 1982). This is in sharp contrast to McGrattan and Schmitz (1999), whose model has no determinate steady state value for investment. We assume that the stock of capital evolves over time according to the following law of motion:

$$K_t = I_t + (1 - \delta(m_t)) K_{t-1}, \quad (1)$$

where $m_t = \frac{M_t}{K_{t-1}}$. $\delta(\cdot)$ is the depreciation function which depends on, say, the maintenance ratio m_t . By choosing m_t , the firm determines at the same time the depreciation rate of its capital stock. Actually the representative firm cannot go below a minimal value corresponding roughly to natural depreciation, mainly aging. Call this natural depreciation rate $\bar{\delta}$. Whatever is the (finite) amount of purchased maintenance services, for a given capital stock, the natural depreciation rate cannot be approached. The latter case is only obtained if the maintenance services (and the maintenance ratio since the capital stock is fixed) tends to infinity. Here are the properties the depreciation function should check in our set-up³:

- (i) $\delta(x) > 0$, $\delta'(x) < 0$ and $\delta''(x) > 0$, $\forall x \geq 0$.
- (ii) $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \delta(x) = \bar{\delta}$.

Let us turn now to define our investment problem and to derive the corresponding optimality conditions.

2.1 The optimality conditions

To ease our exposition, we shall assume that the interest rate of the economy is constant, equal to r . We can state our optimal investment problem as follows.

Definition 1 *A representative firm chooses the plan $(I_t, M_t, K_t, L_t)_{t \geq 1}$ so as to maximize the discounted stream of cash-flows $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{\pi_t}{(1+r)^{t-1}}$ subject to the accumulation law (??) and the usual positivity constraints, given the sequences of prices $(p_t, w_t, q_t, p_t^k)_{t \geq 1}$ and the initial level of capital K_0 .*

²In such case, the main results of this paper are reproduced on the ratios.

³We extend the previous analysis of McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) by introducing the notion of natural depreciation and the corresponding condition (ii) hereafter.

Note that by construction of the rate of maintenance, optimizing with respect to the level M_t is the same as optimizing with respect to the ratio m_t . This will appear clearly in the first-order conditions below. To simplify even more the algebra, we also normalize $p_t = 1, \forall t$. Denoting by μ_t the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (??), the first-order optimality conditions for an interior solution to exist are:

$$p_t^k + \Phi'(I_t) = \mu_t, \quad (2)$$

$$z_t F_L(K_{t-1}, L_t) = w_t, \quad (3)$$

$$q_t = -\delta'(m_t) \mu_t, \quad (4)$$

$$z_{t+1} F_K(K_t, L_{t+1}) = (1+r) \mu_t - \mu_{t+1} [1 - \delta(m_{t+1}) + m_{t+1} \delta'(m_{t+1})], \quad (5)$$

with the transversality condition: $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} (1+r)^{-t} \mu_t K_{t+1} = 0$.⁴ As usual, the Lagrange multiplier μ_t can be interpreted as the shadow price (or value) of one unit of installed capital. Equation (??) gives the optimal investment rule, the marginal cost of investing should be equal to the shadow price of capital. Note that investment demand is undetermined in the absence of installation costs. The equation (??) is the usual optimality condition with respect to labor demand. The next two equations are the most interesting part of the story. The first-order condition (??) is the optimality condition with respect to the maintenance services variable (either in percentage of operated capital m_t or in level M_t): An additional unit of maintenance services costs q_t and allows to reduce capital depreciation by $\delta'(m_t)$. At the (interior) optimum, the latter benefit evaluated at the shadow price of capital should be equal to its cost. Equation (??) may be advantageously rewritten as:

$$z_{t+1} F_K(K_t, L_{t+1}) = r \mu_t - (\mu_{t+1} - \mu_t) + \mu_{t+1} [\delta(m_{t+1}) - m_{t+1} \delta'(m_{t+1})].$$

It represents the usual condition equating the marginal productivity of capital and the user cost of capital (the right hand side of the equation). Typically this user cost includes the interest (opportunity) cost, minus the (potential) gain in the value of capital from t to $t+1$, plus the expected capital depreciation cost at $t+1$. As maintenance services are considered here, the latter cost includes a new term, namely $-m_{t+1} \delta'(m_{t+1})$: An increase in the capital

⁴In the rest of the paper, we will omit this condition as we only deal with steady state equilibria along which it is trivially checked.

stock by one unit implies a marginal increase in the maintenance cost (since the maintenance ratio will decrease for a fixed maintenance effort). This is a big change with respect to the traditional accounting frameworks as far as the amount of purchases of maintenance services is not negligible, which turns out to be the case as reported in the introduction section. Finally, the last optimality condition corresponds to capital accumulation as given in equation (??).

It is worth pointing out that in contrast to McGrattan and Schmitz (1999), the maintenance effort cannot be derived independently of the investment decision. Indeed as no installation costs are considered in the latter work, the optimality conditions (??) takes the following form:

$$q_t = -\delta'(m_t) p_t^k.$$

This allows to depict immediately the desired substitution features between capital accumulation and maintenance services. We do not have such an obvious case here since our model displays a well-defined investment rule, which is related as it should be with the maintenance decision. It is therefore impossible to derive so easily the properties stated in McGrattan and Schmitz's contribution, it is not even sure that they unconditionally hold. The next sub-section is devoted to explore this issue in the steady state case so as to bring out some preliminary analytical results regarding the characteristics of the demand functions for maintenance services and investment goods.

2.2 The demand for capital goods and maintenance services in the steady state

The steady state system is given by

$$I = \delta(m) K, \tag{6}$$

$$p^k + \Phi'(I) = \mu, \tag{7}$$

$$z F_L(K, L) = w, \tag{8}$$

$$q = -\delta'(m) \mu, \tag{9}$$

$$z F_K(K, L) = \mu [r + \delta(m) - m \delta'(m)]. \quad (10)$$

The following proposition states that the existence of a strictly positive demand for maintenance services is only ensured for a sufficiently small price q .

Proposition 1 *There exists a unique strictly positive solution for the steady state value of the maintenance ratio if and only if*

$$q < \frac{-\delta'(0)}{r + \delta(0)} q^0(w, z),$$

where $q^0(w, z)$ is a well-defined differentiable function, decreasing with respect to w and increasing with respect to z .

Proof: Let us sketch the proof briefly. From (??), we can compute the capital to labor ratio in terms of w and z , say $\frac{K}{L} = \psi_1(w, z)$, where $\psi_1(\cdot)$ is an increasing (Resp. decreasing) function of w (Resp. of z) as the production function is neoclassical (in particular, $F_{KK} < 0$, $F_{LL} < 0$ and $F_{KL} > 0$). Then using (??), equation (??) can be expressed in terms of the sole endogenous variable m :

$$z F_K[\psi_1(w, z), 1] = q \frac{m \delta'(m) - r - \delta(m)}{\delta'(m)},$$

which can be written as follows:

$$\Psi(m) = q^0(w, z), \quad (11)$$

where $\Psi(m) = q \frac{m \delta'(m) - r - \delta(m)}{\delta'(m)}$ and $q^0(w, z) = z F_K[\psi_1(w, z), 1]$. One can easily check that $q^0(\cdot)$ satisfies the properties stated in Proposition 1. Since $\Psi'(m) = q \frac{\delta(m)+r}{(\delta'(m))^2} \delta''(m) > 0$, as function $\delta(\cdot)$ is assumed to be strictly convex, it follows that $\Psi(m)$ is strictly increasing. Now by property (ii) of the depreciation function, we know that $\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \delta(m) = \bar{\delta} > 0$, which implies $\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \delta'(m) = 0$, and finally $\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \Psi(m) = \infty$. Hence, there exists a unique strictly positive solution for equation (??) if and only if $\Psi(0) < q^0(w, z)$. The latter proposition can be rewritten exactly as in Proposition 1 in terms of the price q . \square .

If the price of the maintenance services is above the threshold defined in the proposition, the demand for this type of services is zero.⁵ It is worth

⁵This could be more rigorously demonstrated by taking into account the positivity constraints of the problem with the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. Since the required work is trivial but cumbersome, we choose to not include it in this text.

pointing out that the upper-bound $\frac{-\delta'(0)}{r+\delta(0)} q^0(w, z)$ is decreasing with respect to the wage rate w and the interest rate r , increasing with respect to the level of technological progress z but it does not depend at all on the price of capital goods, p^k . The range of q values consistent with the existence of a strictly positive demand for maintenance services shrinks in the case where the labor and the financial costs rise while it is enlarged in case of positive supply shocks through technological improvements. It does not depend on p^k but so does the long-run maintenance ratio m .

Proposition 2 *Assume $q < \frac{-\delta'(0)}{r+\delta(0)} q^0(w, z)$. Then, there exists a strictly positive maintenance ratio $m(q, w, r, z)$ which: (i) is decreasing with respect to q , w , r , and increasing with respect to z , and (ii) $\lim_{q \rightarrow 0} m(q, \cdot) = \infty$. Moreover, the depreciation rate $\delta(q, w, r, z)$ is an increasing function with respect to q , w , r , and decreasing with respect to z .*

The proof is trivial in that it comes directly from the analytical properties of functions $\Psi(m)$, $q^0(w, z)$ and $\delta(m)$ as mentioned above.

On the other hand, since $M = m K$, a complete description of the demand for maintenance services M requires the analysis of the demand for capital goods. To do so, given the long-run relations (??), (??) and (??), we need to characterize how does the shadow price μ behave in terms of the exogenous variables. By (??) and Proposition 2, this is trivial except for the price q . By differentiating (??) with respect to q and after some simple algebra, one can see that the sign of $\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial q}$ is the sign of $q \delta''(m(q, \cdot)) m'(q, \cdot) - \delta'(m(q, \cdot))$. By differentiating equation (??) with respect to q , we get:

$$\frac{q \delta''(m(q, \cdot)) m'(q, \cdot)}{\delta'(m(q, \cdot))} = \frac{-q^0(w, z)}{q} \frac{\delta'(m(q, \cdot))}{r + \delta(m(q, \cdot))}.$$

But the ratio $\frac{\delta'(m(q, \cdot))}{r + \delta(m(q, \cdot))}$ can be recomputed from the same equation (??) as a function of $q^0(w, z)$. Indeed,

$$\frac{\delta'(m(q, \cdot))}{r + \delta(m(q, \cdot))} = \frac{q}{m(q, \cdot) q - q^0(w, z)},$$

which implies that

$$\frac{q \delta''(m(q, \cdot)) m'(q, \cdot)}{\delta'(m(q, \cdot))} = \frac{q^0(w, z)}{q^0(w, z) - m(q, \cdot) q} > 1.$$

As m is decreasing in q and given the properties of the depreciation function, the previous inequality implies that μ is a decreasing function of q

since $q \delta''(m(q, \cdot)) - m'(q, \cdot) - \delta'(m(q, \cdot)) < 0$. The lower is the price of a unit of maintenance services the higher is the shadow value of capital. It is now possible to derive all the properties of equilibrium demand functions for investment and maintenance goods.

Proposition 3 *Denote by \bar{p} the limit value of μ when q tends to $\frac{-\delta'(0)}{r+\delta(0)} q^0(w, z)$. Then, for any values of p^k , q , w , r and z such that $q < \frac{-\delta'(0)}{r+\delta(0)} q^0(w, z)$ and $p^k < \bar{p}$, the demand for new capital goods $I(p^k, q, w, r, z)$ and for maintenance services $M(p^k, q, w, r, z)$ are uniquely determined in R_+ . Moreover, these two functions behave exactly the same with respect to any of the considered exogenous variables: they increase with z and decrease when the prices p^k , q , w and r rise. In addition to that, $\lim_{q \rightarrow 0} M(q, \cdot) = \infty$, $\lim_{q \rightarrow 0} I(q, \cdot) = \bar{I} = (\Phi')^{-1} \left[\frac{q^0(w, z)}{r+\delta} - p^k \right]$, and $\lim_{q \rightarrow 0} K(q, \cdot) = \frac{\bar{I}}{\delta}$.*

Proof: Since μ is a decreasing function of q , so is I by (??) as the installation cost function $\Phi(\cdot)$ is assumed strictly convex. Note that the positivity of I is not ensured for any values of the exogenous variables. To get rid of this, we set the sufficient condition $p^k < \bar{p}$. It is sufficient over the range of q values for which a strictly positive value of demand for maintenance services exists, since the shadow value of capital μ is a decreasing function of q . On the other hand, using (??), (??) and Proposition 2, one can check very easily that I increases with z and decreases when the prices p^k , q , w and r rise.

Let us turn now to demand for maintenance services in level, $M = m K$. For any exogenous variable, say x , since $K = \frac{I}{\delta(m)}$, the sign of $\frac{\partial K}{\partial x}$ is the sign of $\frac{\partial I(x)}{\partial x} \delta(m(x)) - I(x) \delta'(m(x)) \frac{\partial m(x)}{\partial x}$. By Proposition 2 and given the comparative statics properties of function I mentioned just above, we know that I and m behave the same with respect to q , w , r and z . Since $\delta'(\cdot) < 0$, it follows that K has the same behaviour as I and m with respect to these latter four variables. Since $M = m K$, M should have the same comparative statics as I , K and m , for the four considered exogenous variables. In the case of p^k , things are simpler since m is independent of this variable. As expected, it can be checked that both K and M are decreasing functions of p^k .

To establish the limit properties, observe that since $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \delta(x) = \bar{\delta}$, we should have $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} x \delta'(x) = 0$.⁶ Now rewrite (??) as follows

$$\frac{-q}{\delta'(m(q))} = \frac{q^0(w, z)}{r + \delta(m(q)) - m(q) \delta'(m(q))} = \mu(q).$$

⁶Indeed, if $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} x \delta'(x) = \lambda < 0$, we have that $\delta'(x)$ is equivalent to $\frac{\lambda}{x}$ for sufficiently big x . By integration, we get $\delta(x)$ equivalent to a function of the form $-\lambda \ln(x) + k$, k a constant, for x big enough, which contradicts $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \delta(x) = \bar{\delta}$. The same type of argument can be used to rule out the case $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} x \delta'(x) = -\infty$.

When q tends to zero, $m(q)$ tends to infinity by Proposition 2. Hence $\lim_{q \rightarrow 0} \mu(q) = \frac{q^0(w,z)}{r+\delta}$. This implies the limit values stated in the proposition. \square

From the detailed theoretical analysis above, it follows that the maintenance ratio $m(\cdot)$ and the depreciation rate $\delta(\cdot)$ move in opposite directions when a supply shock hits the economy. The first one evolves “pro-cyclically” increasing with z while the second one behaves “counter-cyclically” decreasing when z rises. Moreover, from Proposition 3 we know that the demand for new capital goods $I(p^k, q, w, r, z)$ and the demand for maintenance services $M(p^k, q, w, r, z)$ have the same qualitative comparative statics. An increase in the price of maintenance services q leads the firms to lower their demand for both investment goods and maintenance services. We get exactly the same conclusion when the unit price of new capital goods p^k rises. On the other hand, supply shocks have qualitatively the same consequences on the demand functions: Both evolve “pro-cyclically”. So, instead of finding that maintenance services are to a given extent a substitute for investment expenditures, we have found that investment and maintenance are gross complements. The rationale behind this result is quite simple. Consider the case of an increase in the price of maintenance. This has a direct effect on the desired capital stock, which goes down. Now the firm has two active controls to reach such a new desired level of capital: gross investment and variable depreciation. The firm decides to adjust the capital stock by reducing investment and increasing the depreciation rate through lower maintenance expenditures.

Does this mean that there are no substitution effects by any kind of measure? Let us interpret investment and maintenance decisions as inputs in the production of capital goods according to the technology given by the accumulation motion (??). Along an isoquant, thus for a given stock of capital, one obtains by differentiation of (??):

$$0 = dI - K \cdot \delta'(m) \cdot \frac{1}{K} \cdot dM,$$

which yields:

$$\frac{dI}{dM} = \delta'(m) < 0.$$

It trivially follows that any variation of the relative price of investment with respect to maintenance does generate substitution effects. In this sense, I and M are net substitutes. Therefore, having in mind some specific quantitative criteria as in McGrattan and Schmitz (1999), one may well find out the necessary elements to conclude for substitution effects (taken in some well defined sense).

In any case, since the literature is not so rich in contributions explicitly incorporating demand for maintenance services, it is definitely worthwhile to study to which extent the previous results are robust to a further enrichment of the basic model. That is what we do hereafter by allowing for a variable rate of capital utilization. As for the previous model, we start with the derivation of the optimality conditions.

3 The general model with maintenance services and under-utilization of capital

In this section, we include a further ingredient of capital depreciation, the utilization rate of capital. In short, we add the depreciation-in-use story to the basic model seen above. The depreciation function depends now on two arguments, the maintenance ratio m_t and the rate the utilization of capital, u_t , that is $\delta_t = \delta(m_t, u_t)$, $m_t \geq 0$, $0 \leq u_t \leq 1$. For any fixed t , we hypothesize the following:

$$(H_1) \delta_t \geq \bar{\delta}, \forall u_t \forall m_t; \delta(\cdot, 0) = \bar{\delta} \text{ and } \lim_{m_t \rightarrow \infty} \delta(m_t, \cdot) = \bar{\delta}.$$

$$(H_2) \delta_1(m_t, u_t) < 0, \forall m_t \forall u_t \neq 0, \text{ and } \delta_2(m_t, u_t) > 0, \forall m_t \forall u_t \neq 0.$$

$$(H_3) \delta_{11}(m_t, u_t) > 0, \forall m_t \forall u_t \neq 0, \text{ and } \delta_{22}(m_t, u_t) > 0, \forall m_t \forall u_t \neq 0.$$

$\delta_i(\cdot)$ and $\delta_{ii}(\cdot)$, $i = 1, 2$ denote respectively the first order and second order partial derivative of function $\delta(\cdot)$ with respect to its i -th argument. With respect to maintenance, the depreciation function behaves exactly the same as in the basic model. On the other hand, the latter function should be increasing and convex with respect to the capital utilization rate as in the depreciation-in-use set-ups. Indeed, both the depreciation-in-use model and the basic maintenance model seen in Section 2 can be recovered as limit cases of our general model: The first one is obtained as the maintenance ratio tends to zero, and the second emerges as the rate of capital utilization goes to one. Finally note that we do not impose strict inequalities for the first and second order derivatives at $u_t = 0$, since this unnecessary requirement will disable the use of a large class of simple and useful parameterizations as it will be clearer later on.

3.1 The optimality conditions

The production function of the representative firm is now $z_t F(u_t K_{t-1}, L_t)$ as usual in the depreciation-in-use related frameworks. Except this change and

the new depreciation function, the same concepts are involved with respect to the basic model. The expression for the firm's cash-flow, π_t , is unchanged once the new production function reported, and the capital accumulation law is now

$$K_t = I_t + (1 - \delta(m_t, u_t)) K_{t-1}, \quad (12)$$

For a fixed interest rate r , the problem of the firm is defined as follows

Definition 2 *A representative firm chooses the plan $(I_t, M_t, u_t, K_t, L_t)_{t \geq 1}$ so as to maximize the discounted stream of cash-flows $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{\pi_t}{(1+r)^{t-1}}$ subject to the accumulation law (??), the restriction $0 \leq u_t \leq 1$, and the usual positivity constraints, given the sequences of prices $(w_t, q_t, p_t^k)_{t \geq 1}$ and the initial level of capital K_0 .*

As before denote by μ_t the Lagrange multiplier on the new capital accumulation constraint (??). The first-order necessary condition with respect to investment is unchanged with respect to the basic model, it is given by equation (??). The remaining first-order conditions are:

$$z_t F_L(u_t K_{t-1}, L_t) = w_t, \quad (13)$$

$$q_t = -\delta_1(m_t, u_t) \mu_t, \quad (14)$$

$$z_t F_1(u_t K_{t-1}, L_t) = \delta_2(m_t, u_t) \mu_t, \quad (15)$$

$$z_{t+1} u_{t+1} F_1(u_{t+1} K_t, L_{t+1}) = \quad (16)$$

$$= r \mu_t - (\mu_{t+1} - \mu_t) + \mu_{t+1} [\delta(m_{t+1}, u_{t+1}) - m_{t+1} \delta_1(m_{t+1}, u_{t+1})].$$

With respect to the basic model, we have a new optimality condition, (??). It is the typical equation we can find in the standard depreciation-in-use setting: At the (interior) optimum, the return to a marginal increment in the rate of capital utilization should be equal to the marginal cost of this increment measured by its opportunity cost. That is, the shadow price of the higher depreciated capital which arises from a higher utilization rate that increases the depreciation rate. The remaining first-order conditions are just extensions of those obtained for the basic model taking into account the variable rate of capital utilization.

In this general model, the firm has an additional control variable, the rate of capital utilization. As before, the firm can spend on maintenance services to control directly for capital depreciation. A less direct control of capital depreciation is allowed now through the choice of the rate of utilization. *A priori*, there is no obvious optimal combination of the two instruments. Our model can be used to conduct a first exploration into this markedly interesting question. Indeed, by combining equation (??) and (??) in order to eliminate the shadow value μ_t , one gets:

$$z_t F_1(u_t K_{t-1}, L_t) = -q_t \frac{\delta_2(m_t, u_t)}{\delta_1(m_t, u_t)},$$

Now, given the first-order condition (??) and the neoclassical properties hypothesized for the production function, the marginal return $z_t F_1(u_t K_{t-1}, L_t)$ is exactly equal to the function $q^0(w_t, z_t)$ introduced in Proposition 1. This yields:

$$\frac{q_t}{q^0(w_t, z_t)} = \frac{-\delta_1(m_t, u_t)}{\delta_2(m_t, u_t)}, \quad (17)$$

The following proposition gives a fundamental result as for the optimal combination of the instruments u_t and m_t .

Proposition 4 *Assume that the firm is facing a shock that does not alter neither the value of q_t nor $q^0(w_t, z_t)$, but which changes the optimal maintenance and capital utilization decisions.⁷ If the second-order cross-derivative $\delta_{12}(m_t, u_t) > 0$, then at the optimum, a subsequent increase (Resp. decrease) in the rate of capital utilization should be associated with a decrease (Resp. increase) in maintenance expenditures.*

Indeed, simply by totally differentiating equation (??), one can find that:

$$\frac{du_t}{dm_t} = -\frac{q_t \delta_{12}(m_t, u_t) + q^0(w_t, z_t) \delta_{11}(m_t, u_t)}{q_t \delta_{22}(m_t, u_t) + q^0(w_t, z_t) \delta_{12}(m_t, u_t)},$$

which by assumption (H_3) implies $\frac{du_t}{dm_t} < 0$ as long as $\delta_{12}(m_t, u_t) > 0$. The obtained property sounds absolutely counter-intuitive and as such it is undesirable. Indeed it is hard to support an optimal combination of instruments controlling for capital depreciation such that if one tends to worsen capital depreciation, the other does too. That is why we impose the further assumption:

$$(H_4) \delta_{12}(m_t, u_t) \leq 0, \forall m_t \forall u_t.$$

⁷Trivially, this is the case of a change in the interest rate r among other possibilities.

Then, the higher the utilization rate (and depreciation) the higher the marginal contribution of maintenance to capital stock by means of a lower depreciation rate. Note that assumption (H_4) does not ensure $\frac{du_t}{dm_t} \geq 0$. Note also that equation (??) does not allow for an explicit characterization of the optimal combination of the instruments u_t and m_t . Solving the general model would consequently require a big deal of implicit and cumbersome calculations. In order to come out with simple and useful lessons as to the parameterizations to be adopted in such frameworks, we set hereafter the following specifications: (i) the production function is Cobb-Douglas with α as the capital share, (ii) the installation cost function is purely quadratic as usual: $\Phi(x) = \frac{b}{2} x^2$, $b > 0$, and (iii) the depreciation function is given by:

$$\delta(m_t, u_t) = a u_t^{1+\epsilon} (1 + m_t)^{-\eta} + \bar{\delta},$$

with a , ϵ and η three positive real numbers. $\bar{\delta}$ is the so-called natural depreciation rate as before. Though none of the parameters ϵ and η is an elasticity number in the mathematical sense of the term, they do measure the sensitivity of capital depreciation to changes in the rate of capital utilization and maintenance services respectively. We shall refer to them as elasticity parameters to fix the ideas. The considered depreciation function checks all the assumptions (H_1) to (H_4) . Moreover, equation (17) simplifies into:

$$u_t = \frac{1 + \epsilon}{\eta} \frac{q_t}{q^0(w_t, z_t)} (1 + m_t). \quad (18)$$

Consequently, in this case we get $\frac{du_t}{dm_t} \geq 0$ which is the right property as pointed out before from the point of view of the general model. Unsurprisingly, our specification of the depreciation function yields an optimal combination between u_t and m_t which is linear in both arguments. In addition, this will simplify notably the steady state equilibrium analysis below.

3.2 The steady state equilibrium

The steady state values (I, K, μ, u, m) are given by the following system

$$I = \delta(m, u) K, \quad (19)$$

$$p^k + b I = \mu, \quad (20)$$

$$u = \frac{1 + \epsilon}{\eta} \frac{q}{q^0(w, z)} (1 + m). \quad (21)$$

$$q = -\delta_1(m, u) \mu, \quad (22)$$

$$u q^0(w, z) = \mu [r + \delta(m, u) - m \delta_1(m, u)]. \quad (23)$$

Equation (??) is the stationarized form of equation (??). As such, it incorporates the information regarding optimal demand for labor through the term $q^0(w, z)$ as explained above. To derive the conditions under which well shaped demand functions exist, we proceed as for the basic maintenance model. We first focus on the existence of positive values for the long-run maintenance expenditures variables. Using the parameterization adopted for the depreciation function, and eliminating the variables μ and u from equation (??) thanks to the relations (??) and (??) respectively, one gets the following equation involving only the long-run maintenance ratio:

$$\frac{1 + \epsilon}{\eta} = \tau(m),$$

with:

$$\tau(m) = \frac{1}{a \eta} \left[\frac{r + \bar{\delta}}{(q v^0(w, z))^{1+\epsilon}} (1 + m)^{\eta - \epsilon - 1} + a \left(1 + \eta \frac{m}{1 + m} \right) \right],$$

where $v^0(w, z) = \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta q^0(w, z)}$. These two relationships also imply: $\epsilon > \eta \frac{m}{1+m}$, a basic equilibrium property we are going to use repeatedly in our calculations and proofs. The next two propositions depict the existence conditions and comparative statics properties of the long-run maintenance ratio depending on the sensitivity parameters of the postulated depreciation function.

Proposition 5 *If $\eta > \epsilon$, a stationary solution for the maintenance ratio m exists and is unique for a sufficiently high unit price q . Moreover, in such a case, an increase in q shifts upward the demand for maintenance services. Indeed the long run maintenance ratio $m(q, w, r, z)$ is an increasing function of q and w , and it decreases when r or z goes upward. If $\eta = \epsilon$, there is no solution for the maintenance ratio in the long run.*

Proof: When $\eta > \epsilon$, two cases are possible.

(i) *The case $\eta \geq 1 + \epsilon$:* In such a case, function $\tau(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing from $\tau(0) = \frac{1}{\eta} \left[1 + \frac{r + \bar{\delta}}{a (q v^0(w, z))^{1+\epsilon}} \right]$ to infinity. Hence there exists a unique positive solution m if and only if $\tau(0) < \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta}$, which implies that the price q should be sufficiently high for a positive long-run maintenance ratio value

to arise. When q tends to zero and all the other prices are fixed, m tends to be negative. Note also that an increase in q shifts function $\tau(\cdot)$ to the right. Since this function is increasing, this means that a rise in the unit cost of maintenance tends to increase the equilibrium maintenance ratio. The remaining comparative statics with respect to w , r and z are trivial.

(ii) *The case $\epsilon < \eta < 1 + \epsilon$:* Note that

$$a \eta (1 + m)^2 \tau'(m) = (\eta - \epsilon - 1) \frac{r + \bar{\delta}}{(qv^0(w, z))^{1+\epsilon}} (1 + m)^{\eta-\epsilon} + a \eta. \quad (24)$$

So, as long as $\eta < 1 + \epsilon$, there exists a unique strictly positive \bar{m} such that $\tau'(\bar{m}) = 0$. When $\eta > \epsilon$, $\tau(\cdot)$ increases from $\tau(0)$ to $\tau(\bar{m})$, and then decreases (asymptotically) to $\bar{\tau} = 1 + \frac{1}{\eta}$ when m tends to infinity. Note that $\bar{\tau} > \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta}$ in our case. Hence the equation $\tau(m) = \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta}$ has at most one solution. Indeed, if $\tau(0) \geq \bar{\tau}$, there is no positive solution. Otherwise, there is at most one solution. There exists a unique strictly positive solution if and only if $\tau(0) < \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta} < \bar{\tau}$. Moreover the solution value for m will be located in the range of values where $\tau(\cdot)$ is increasing. We come back indeed to the case (i).

When $\eta = \epsilon$, from (??) we know that function $\tau(\cdot)$ is either strictly decreasing or strictly decreasing.⁸ More importantly we have: $\frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta} = \bar{\tau}$. It follows that the equation $\tau(m) = \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta}$ has no solution at a finite distance. \square

Proposition 6 *Assume $\eta < \epsilon$. Then a unique solution for the maintenance ratio m exists and is unique for a sufficiently low unit price q . Moreover, in such a case, an increase in q pushes downward the demand for maintenance services. Indeed, the long-run maintenance ratio $m(q, w, r, z)$ is decreasing in its two first arguments and increasing with respect to the two last ones.*

Proof: The proof uses the same line of arguments as for the previous proposition. If $\eta < \epsilon$, function $\tau(\cdot)$ is now decreasing from $\tau(0)$ to $\tau(\bar{m})$ and then increasing to $\bar{\tau} = 1 + \frac{1}{\eta}$ when m tends to infinity. In this case, and in contrast to the case (ii) of the previous proof, we have $\bar{\tau} < \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta}$. If $\tau(0) \leq \bar{\tau}$, there is no positive solution. If not, there is at most one solution. There exists a unique strictly positive solution if and only if $\tau(0) > \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta} > \bar{\tau}$, which implies an upper bound for the unit price q above which a strictly positive maintenance ratio cannot arise in the long-run. Moreover the solution value for m will be located within the range of values when $\tau(\cdot)$ is decreasing. In

⁸This is true except for the special case $\frac{r+\bar{\delta}}{(qv^0(w, z))^{1+\epsilon}} = a \eta$, but we abstract from this too particular case.

that case, a rising price q will move function $\tau(\cdot)$ to the left and decrease the equilibrium value of the maintenance ratio. The rest of the proof is a trivial comparative statics exercise. \square

Hence, according to Proposition 5, when the depreciation function shows a greater sensitivity with respect to the maintenance ratio than with respect to the utilization rate, both the existence conditions and the comparative statics for the equilibrium maintenance ratio are almost the opposite to those obtained for the basic model as analyzed in section 2. The exception is the interest rate. In the basic model, a rise in the interest rate increases the user cost of capital, which causes the decline of the desired stock of capital. The representative firm responds by cutting investment and maintenance services as well. In other words, the firm does not attempt at reducing the negative effect of the increasing interest cost on capital accumulation by increasing slightly maintenance services. That is the cost of the latter increment exceeds its **indirect** output contribution, at least at equilibrium. In the general case, the firm may additionally use the rate of capital utilization to reduce the interest cost effect on capital accumulation and thus on the production level. In contrast to the maintenance ratio, the capital utilization rate has a **direct** effect on output, in addition to its indirect one through the depreciation rate and the capital stock. By Proposition 4, we know that the maintenance ratio and the rate of capital utilization move in the same direction at equilibrium if the interest rate is altered. In such a case, the representative firm may well increase its maintenance effort as it is coupled with a rise in the utilization rate, which has a direct positive effect on output. This is exactly what happens if the sensitivity of the depreciation function with respect to the utilization rate is bigger, according to Proposition 6. If the sensitivity of the latter function with respect to the maintenance ratio is bigger, the results are reversed according to Proposition 5.

The incorporation of a variable rate of capital utilization therefore enriches and complicates a lot the analysis. As we have just seen, the general model involves much more sophisticated mechanisms, which require a much finer discussion. This will be even clearer in the study of the quantitative and qualitative substitution and complementarity features of the model hereafter.

3.3 Substitution Vs complementarity features in the long-run

A first step towards the analysis of the substitution and complementarity properties of the model is to derive the characteristics of the optimal rate of capital utilization. Let us do it briefly hereafter.

The behaviour of the equilibrium rate of capital utilization

It is not hard to see that in the spirit of our Assumption (H_4), the long run rate of capital utilization has the same qualitative behaviour as the equilibrium maintenance ratio. At first, note that by (??), we have:

$$u = \frac{1 + \epsilon}{\eta} \frac{q}{q^0(w, z)} (1 + m).$$

When $\eta > \epsilon$ things are trivial, given the properties of the equilibrium maintenance ratio stated in Proposition 5. Function $u(q, w, r, z)$ behaves exactly as $m(q, w, r, z)$, increasing with q and w , but decreasing when r or z rises.

Things are much more complicated in the case $\eta < \epsilon$. To give an idea about this, we provide the complete proof of the comparative statics exercise with respect to q . At first note that the equation $\tau(m) = \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta}$ implies that:

$$\frac{r + \bar{\delta}}{(qv^0(w, z))^{1+\epsilon}} (1 + m)^{\eta - \epsilon - 1} = a \left(\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1 + m} \right), \quad (25)$$

which allows us to rewrite the derivative $\tau'(m)$ as:

$$\tau'(m) = \frac{1}{1 + m} \left[(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m + 1} \right) + \frac{1}{1 + m} \right].$$

By totally differentiating the equation $\tau(m) = \frac{1+\epsilon}{\eta}$ with respect to m and q (all the other exogenous variables kept constant), one gets:

$$\frac{\partial m}{\partial q} = \frac{\frac{1+\epsilon}{q} \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right)}{\frac{1}{1+m} \left[(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m} \right]},$$

which implies that the (negative) elasticity of $1 + m$ with respect to q , say ξ_{mq} , is equal to:

$$\xi_{mq} = \frac{(1 + \epsilon) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right)}{(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m}}.$$

Now, see that since $(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m} < 0$, as $\xi_{mq} < 0$ when $\eta < \epsilon$, its absolute value is lower than the one of $(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right)$. This implies that the absolute value of ξ_{mq} is greater than $\frac{1+\epsilon}{1+\epsilon-\eta} > 1$, or equivalently that $\xi_{mq} < -1$.

Recall now the fundamental equation (??). An increase in q have a direct positive effect on u through the multiplicative term q , and a negative effect

through the term $1 + m$. However, the negative effect dominates the positive one as we have just proved that the elasticity of $1 + m$ with respect to q is greater than 1 in absolute value. Thus, $u(q, \cdot)$ is a decreasing function of q . Using exactly the same kind of computations, we can prove that $u(\cdot, w, z)$ is also decreasing in w and increasing in z ⁹. The result for the interest rate r derives from our discussion about Assumption (H_4), the results in Proposition 6 and the definition of u . So $u(\cdot, r)$ is an increasing function with respect to r .

Consequently, for any of the two cases: $\eta > \epsilon$ and $\eta < \epsilon$, the utilization rate u behaves exactly as the maintenance ratio m in the long run. As expected, an increase in u to meet any price or technological opportunity should be accompanied by a rise in m in order to offset the increasing depreciation associated with such an expansive policy¹⁰.

The behaviour of the long-run depreciation rate

Among the remaining questions we have those related with the behaviour of depreciation and gross investment in the long run. Concerning the first variable, it is given by: $\delta(m, u) = a u^{1+\epsilon} (1+m)^{-\eta} + \bar{\delta} = a (qv^0(w, z))^{1+\epsilon} (1+m)^{1+\epsilon-\eta} + \bar{\delta}$, the second equality being trivially derived thanks to equation (??). Now, using the relation (??), we have that:

$$(qv^0(w, z))^{1+\epsilon} (1+m)^{1+\epsilon-\eta} = \frac{r + \bar{\delta}}{a (\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m})},$$

which allows to rewrite the long-run depreciation function in a much more tractable form:

$$\delta(m, u) = \delta_0(m) = \bar{\delta} + \frac{r + \bar{\delta}}{\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m}}. \quad (26)$$

Thus, the depreciation rate is an increasing function of m at the long run equilibrium, which in turn implies that the depreciation rate behaves exactly the same as the maintenance ratio and the rate of capital utilization in the long-run when either z or q moves.¹¹ This result is in sharp contrast with the one obtained for the basic maintenance model seen in Section 2, where

⁹To prove very simply the results with respect to z and w , the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function is most helpful.

¹⁰This offsetting movement, however, is incomplete as we will see below in studying the comparative statics for the depreciation rate.

¹¹One can trivially check that this is not the case when the interest rate moves. Indeed, it is easy to prove that the equilibrium depreciation rate rises with r when $\eta > 1 + \epsilon$, while the maintenance ratio goes down by Proposition 5.

the depreciation rate and the maintenance ratio move exactly in opposite directions. In our re-interpretation of the McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) model, the maintenance ratio behaves pro-cyclically and the depreciation rate counter-cyclically. In that model it is assumed full capacity utilization. In our enlarged model with the utilization rate regarded as a decision variable, a better technological environment (for example through an increase in z) tends either to increase or to decrease the maintenance ratio depending on the position of η with respect to ϵ . If $\eta > \epsilon$ (Resp. If $\eta < \epsilon$), m and u decrease (increase), and so does depreciation. Hence the capital depreciation rate, the utilization rate and the maintenance ratio are all together pro-cyclical when $\eta < \epsilon$, and counter-cyclical in the alternative case.¹²

The behaviour of equilibrium investment

What about investment behaviour? We know that by (??): $p^k + b I = \mu$, which represents the standard investment function from the q-Tobin investment theory under quadratic adjustment costs. Hence as for the basic model, the investment demand depends on the behaviour of the shadow price μ . From (??), this one is given by: $\mu = -\frac{q}{\delta_1(m,u)}$. Using (??) to eliminate variable u , we get:

$$\mu = \frac{1}{a\eta (v^0(w,z))^{1+\epsilon}} \frac{(1+m)^{\eta-\epsilon}}{q^\epsilon}.$$

By (??), we have:

$$\frac{(1+m)^{\eta-\epsilon}}{q^\epsilon (v^0(w,z))^{1+\epsilon}} = \frac{a}{r+\delta} q(1+m)\left(\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m}\right).$$

Thus,

$$\mu = \frac{q}{r+\delta} (1+m) \left[\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right].$$

To illustrate our analysis of potential substitution effects, we study in details the case of changes in the price q . Moreover, given the ambiguous role played

¹²Simple short-run dynamic simulations can be used to show that effectively capital depreciation is truly pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical depending on the position of η with respect to ϵ , as predicted just above. As mentioned in the introduction section, we do not include these experiments in the text since they don't add nothing to the analytical developments of this paper, especially because the obtained short-run dynamics lack persistence (except for the capital stock, due to the installation costs), and so they only differ slightly from the long-run dynamics depicted in this paper.

by the interest rate along the previous subsections we also study the reaction of μ to changes in r . By differentiation of the previous equation, we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial q} = \frac{1+m}{r+\bar{\delta}} \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right) \left[1 + \frac{(1+\epsilon) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - 1 \right)}{(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m}} \right]$$

$$\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial r} = \frac{q}{r+\bar{\delta}} \left[\frac{\left(\frac{\epsilon-\eta}{\eta} \right)}{\left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right) (1+\epsilon-\eta) - \frac{1}{1+m}} \frac{(1+m)^{\eta-\epsilon}}{a\eta [q v^0(w, z)]^{1+\epsilon}} \right]$$

$$- \frac{q}{r+\bar{\delta}} \left[\left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right) \frac{1+m}{r+\bar{\delta}} \right].$$

By (??), we know that $\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} > 0$ at equilibrium. The sign of the remaining terms depends *a priori* on the position of η with respect to ϵ . However, the next proposition proves that the response in μ to changes in both q and r is indeed independent of the parameter positions.

Proposition 7 *Assume that the prices and technological parameters are such that a long-run equilibrium exist. Then, whatever is the position of ϵ with respect to η , $\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial q} \leq 0$ at equilibrium, with strict inequality if the long run maintenance ratio is strictly positive. Moreover, $\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial r} < 0$ for any position of ϵ with respect to η .*

Proof: In the case $\eta < \epsilon$, $\xi_{mq} < 0$, which implies that $(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m} < 0$ at equilibrium. Denote by $\theta(x)$ the function defined on R_+ such that $\theta(x) = (1 + \epsilon - \eta) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{x}{x+1} \right) - \frac{1}{1+x}$. Note that $\theta'(x) = \frac{\eta-\epsilon}{(1+x)^2} < 0$. Thus the maximal value reached by this function is $\theta(0) = (1 + \epsilon - \eta) \frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - 1$, which is exactly equal to $(1 + \epsilon) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - 1 \right)$. It follows that $(1 + \epsilon) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - 1 \right) \geq (1 + \epsilon - \eta) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) - \frac{1}{1+m}$, with strict inequality if $m > 0$. This implies that $\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial q} \leq 0$.

The proof for the case $\eta > \epsilon$ is symmetric. In effect, denote by $\theta_1(x)$ the function defined on R_+ such that $\theta_1(x) = (\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{x}{x+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+x}$. Since $\theta_1'(x) = \frac{\epsilon-\eta}{(1+x)^2} < 0$, $\theta_1(x)$ is bounded from above by $\theta_1(0)$, which is equal after rearranging terms to $(1 + \epsilon) \left(1 - \frac{\epsilon}{\eta} \right)$. This implies $\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial q} \leq 0$.

The proof of the last part is trivial given that equation (??) allows for the simplification:

$$\frac{\partial \mu}{\partial r} = \left[\frac{1}{1 + \eta \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right)} - 1 \right] \frac{q}{r + \bar{\delta}} \frac{(1+m)^{\eta-\epsilon}}{a\eta [q v^0(w, z)]^{1+\epsilon}},$$

and the sign of this derivative is determined by the sign of the first term, which is always negative. \square

On the basis of the previous proposition, we conclude that the shadow price of capital is a decreasing function of q , and r . Using the same type of computations, one can easily show that μ is decreasing with respect to w but increasing with z , whatever is the position of η with respect to ϵ . Now recall that the long-run investment level is given by: $I = \frac{1}{b} (\mu - p^k)$. Therefore, as far as $\mu > p^k$ at equilibrium for investment to be positive, the demand for new capital goods $I(p^k, q, w, r, z)$ decreases when the prices p^k , q , w and r go up, and increases with z . These properties, which do not depend on the parameters' positions, reproduce the standard results for investment coming from Tobin's q theory. They are also consistent with the properties of the investment function analyzed in section 2.

Observe that the condition $\mu > p^k$ at equilibrium is equivalent to

$$\frac{(r + \bar{\delta})p^k}{q} < m \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - 1 \right) + \frac{\epsilon}{\eta},$$

since $\mu = \frac{q}{r + \bar{\delta}} (1+m) \left[\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right]$. For a fixed maintenance ratio, the condition above sets an upper bound for the ratio $\frac{(r + \bar{\delta})p^k}{q}$ for the long-run investment to be positive, which is an expected outcome. Note that when $\eta > \epsilon$, the prices q , p^k and r should satisfy the necessary condition $\frac{(r + \bar{\delta})p^k}{q} < \frac{\epsilon}{\eta}$, which implies $\frac{(r + \bar{\delta})p^k}{q} < 1$. Although this condition should not necessarily hold in the alternative case $\eta < \epsilon$, we will impose it here after since we are primarily interested in comparing the two classes of parameterizations of the model for the same environment.

$$(H_5) \quad \frac{(r + \bar{\delta})p^k}{q} < 1$$

Clearly, since r and $\bar{\delta}$ are typically very small, the assumption (H_5) does cover by far all the admissible parameterizations in practice.

Let us come back now to the substitutability issue. Note that when $\eta < \epsilon$, the three control variables m , u and I move in the same direction.¹³ A rise in q will not only discourage maintenance expenditures (as captured by the

¹³As for the depreciation rate comparative statics exercise above, this is true except when the interest rate is the "shocked" exogenous variable.

maintenance ratio) and the high use of productive capacity but also gross investment. However, an improvement in technology (ie. a rise in z) will stimulate maintenance expenditures, capital utilization and investment. On the contrary, when $\eta > \epsilon$ the investment variable work in opposite direction with respect to the maintenance ratio and the rate of capital utilization. This result does not necessarily mean that for this class of parameterizations, gross investment and the aggregate level of maintenance expenditures are substitute to each other. To be able to treat this issue, we need more information on the capital stock comparative statics.

The behaviour of the long-run capital stock

Since by construction, the demand for maintenance services is given by $M = m K$, we have to primarily investigate the properties of the long-run equilibrium demand for capital. For this exercise to be analytically tractable, we assume that $\bar{\delta} = 0$.¹⁴ Even with this simplification, a substantial amount of computations is needed to conclude. To unburden the presentation, from now on we will only present the comparative statics results with respect to the prices q and p^k . However, this exercise is sufficient to develop the issue concerning the gross relation between investment and maintenance.

We first investigate the behaviour of the equilibrium capital stock under the parameterizations $\eta > \epsilon$. In this case we have an immediate answer. Since $K = \frac{I}{\delta_0(m)}$, the capital stock $K(p^k, q)$ decreases when either p^k or q increases. It is obvious for the first and very easy to show for the second. Indeed, m rises with q by Proposition 5, and as function $\delta_0(m)$ is increasing, it follows that the depreciation rate will go up. At the same time, we know from Proposition 7, that μ and I fall down when q rises. Hence, in such a situation, the depreciation of capital worsens and the investment goes down, so the capital stock must also decrease.

Things are definitely much more complicated when $\eta < \epsilon$. In this case, as q rises investment is depressed, but so is also maintenance as measured by the ratio m and the depreciation rate. Thus, the argument above cannot be reproduced here. Nevertheless, the same argument still applies here for the p^k determinant of capital stock.

Given that $K = \frac{I}{\delta_0(m)} = \frac{\mu - p^k}{b \delta_0(m)}$, and as $\mu = \frac{q}{r \eta} (1 + m) \left[\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m} \right]$, we can write K as follows using the expression for $\delta_0(m)$:

¹⁴Note that $\bar{\delta}$ appears in an additive way in the expression of the long-run depreciation $\delta_0(m)$. The reader can check that this term is responsible for fourth order non-symmetric polynomial expressions to appear in the computations required to derive the properties of long-run demand for capital. Also note that by continuity, our results hold for sufficiently small values of the natural rate of depreciation, as the latter are supposed to be.

$$K = \frac{q}{\eta b r^2} (1+m) \left[\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m} \right]^2 - \frac{p^k}{br} \left[\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m} \right]. \quad (27)$$

Differentiation of the latter expression with respect to q yields

$$K'(q) = \frac{\partial K}{\partial q} + \frac{\partial K}{\partial m} \frac{\partial m}{\partial q}.$$

After some tedious but very simple algebraic operations, one can write the term $\frac{\partial K}{\partial m}$ into the following compact form:

$$\frac{\partial K}{\partial m} = \frac{q}{\eta b r^2} (\epsilon - \eta)^2 \left[1 + \frac{\eta^2}{(\epsilon - \eta)^2 (1+m)^2} \left(\frac{rp^k}{q} - 1 \right) \right]. \quad (28)$$

It is now possible to state a proposition describing the behaviour of the equilibrium capital stock with respect to q .

Proposition 8 *Assume $\frac{rp^k}{q} < 1$. If $\epsilon > \eta$ there exists a unique strictly positive number \bar{m} so that $K'(q) > 0$, **if and only if** the equilibrium value for the maintenance ratio m checks $0 < m < \bar{m}$.*

Proof: Recall that:

$$\frac{\partial m}{\partial q} = \frac{\frac{1+\epsilon}{q} \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right)}{\frac{1}{1+m} \left[(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m} \right]}.$$

If we substitute this expression and (??) together with the analytical partial derivative $\frac{\partial K}{\partial q}$ into $K'(q) = \frac{\partial K}{\partial q} + \frac{\partial K}{\partial m} \frac{\partial m}{\partial q}$, we get after rearranging terms:

$$\begin{aligned} b r^2 \left((\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m} \right) K'(q) = \\ (1+m) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right) \Omega(m), \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} \Omega(m) = \left(\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m} \right) \left((\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m} \right) + \\ + \frac{(1+\epsilon)(\epsilon - \eta)^2}{\eta} \left(1 + \left(\frac{\eta^2}{(\epsilon - \eta)^2 (1+m)^2} \right) \left(\frac{rp^k}{q} - 1 \right) \right). \end{aligned}$$

Note that

$$(1+m)^2 \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial m} = 2 \left(\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m} \right) (1 + \epsilon - \eta) - (\epsilon - \eta) + 2 \frac{(1+\epsilon)\eta}{1+m} \left(1 - \frac{rp^k}{q} \right).$$

For $m > 0$, $(1+m)^2 \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial m} > 2(\epsilon - \eta) (1 + \epsilon - \eta) - (\epsilon - \eta) + 2 \frac{(1+\epsilon)\eta}{1+m} \left(1 - \frac{rp^k}{q} \right) > (\epsilon - \eta) (2 + \epsilon - \eta) + 2 \frac{(1+\epsilon)\eta}{1+m} \left(1 - \frac{rp^k}{q} \right) > 0$, since $\frac{rp^k}{q} < 1$ by assumption. Hence $\frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial m} > 0$ for any positive m . On the other hand, one can check that $\Omega(0) = (1+\epsilon) \left(\eta \frac{rp^k}{q} - \epsilon \right) < 0$, since $\frac{rp^k}{q} < 1$, and that $\Omega(m)$ tends to $(\epsilon - \eta)^2$ when m tends to infinity.

Hence, there exists a unique strictly positive number \bar{m} so that $\Omega(m) \leq 0$ when $0 \leq m \leq \bar{m}$, and $\Omega(m) > 0$ if $m > \bar{m}$. Since $(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} \right) + \frac{1}{1+m} < 0$ and $\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{m+1} > 0$ for any $m \geq 0$ when $\epsilon > \eta$, $K'(q)$ as given in equation (??) checks all the properties stated in the proposition. \square

The proposition depicts clearly the response of K to a change in q . In contrast to the case $\eta > \epsilon$, it depends on the magnitude of the equilibrium maintenance ratio for given prices. This is at least true for the case $\frac{rp^k}{q} < 1$, which corresponds to assumption (H_5) with $\bar{\delta} = 0$. If we accept, following Schmitz and McGrattan (1999), that the share of maintenance services in GDP does not exceed 10% in average, our Proposition 8 suggests that K is an increasing function of q , in contrast to the case $\eta > \epsilon$.¹⁵ That is, the reduction in the depreciation rate following a rise in q is sufficiently large to compensate for the negative effect on K coming from a depressed investment.

The behaviour of the long-run demand for maintenance services

Our final study concerns the equilibrium demand for maintenance services $M = m K$. Note that whatever is the position of η with respect to ϵ , the effect of an increase in q on M is ambiguous, in contrast to a rise in p^k which always lowers M . As shown in the previous sub-sections, m and K move in opposite directions when q rises. We will prove that M behaves exactly as m , which amounts to say that the registered changes in K are not enough important to offset those in the maintenance ratio. By definition of the maintenance level, we have: $M'(q) = m(q) K'(q) + m'(q) K(q)$. Using some equations obtained above, notably (??) and (??), we can express $M'(q)$

¹⁵Indeed, in our numerical experiments, \bar{m} is found to be much greater than 1. Especially in the case where ϵ is very close to η , \bar{m} tends to infinity. This is an expected results since \bar{m} is such that $\Omega(\bar{m}) = 0$ and $\Omega(\cdot)$ is a strictly increasing function from $\Omega(0) < 0$ to $(\epsilon - \eta)^2$. When ϵ is not that close to η , \bar{m} is also found to be greater by 1. For example if $r = 4\%$, $\epsilon = 1$ and $\eta = 0.5$, \bar{m} is always greater than 3.5 for a ratio $\frac{rp^k}{q}$ going from 0.25 to 4.

in terms of m and q . After some heavy algebraic operations, one obtains:

$$br^2 \frac{(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left[\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right] + \frac{1}{1+m}}{(1+m) \left[\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right]} M'(q) = G(m), \quad (30)$$

with

$$G(m) = m \Omega(m) + (1 + \epsilon) \left(\frac{1+m}{\eta} \left[\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m} \right]^2 - \frac{rp^k}{q} \left[\epsilon - \eta \frac{m}{1+m} \right] \right),$$

and $\Omega(m)$ defined in the proof of Proposition 8. Rather than trying to find the sign of $M'(q)$ for any value of m , which is quite analytically unfeasible given the very complex expressions of $G(m)$ and $\Omega(m)$, we will focus on small maintenance ratio values, which is the interesting case from an empirical point of view.

Let us study the behaviour of function $G(m)$ in the neighborhood of zero. After some simple algebra, it turns out that

$$G(0) = (1 + \epsilon) \frac{\epsilon}{\eta} \left(\epsilon - \eta \frac{rp^k}{q} \right).$$

Under assumption (H_5) , $\frac{rp^k}{q} < 1$, so if $\epsilon > \eta$, $G(0) > 0$. If $\epsilon < \eta$, recall from the discussion around assumption (H_5) that the positivity of investment (and of the capital stock in the long-run) requires $\frac{rp^k}{q} < \frac{\epsilon}{\eta} < 1$ when $\eta > \epsilon$. The first inequality implies that $G(0) > 0$ in this case. So $G(0) > 0$ independently of the position of ϵ with respect to η . By continuity of function $G(\cdot)$, we can infer that this function is strictly positive in the neighborhood of $m = 0$.

Now coming back to equation (??), one can easily conclude that the derivative $M'(q)$ has the opposite sign of $(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left[\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right] + \frac{1}{1+m}$ since $\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m}$ is always positive at equilibrium (and especially for small m values). Indeed, when $\epsilon > \eta$, $(\eta - \epsilon - 1) \left[\frac{\epsilon}{\eta} - \frac{m}{1+m} \right] + \frac{1}{1+m}$ is negative in the neighborhood of $m = 0$,¹⁶ which implies that $M'(q)$ should be negative in this neighborhood by equation (??, since $G(\cdot)$ is strictly positive in the same region. We get just the contrary in the case $\eta > \epsilon$. Hence, if the equilibrium maintenance ratio is small enough, the maintenance level behaves exactly as the maintenance ratio.¹⁷

¹⁶This property holds indeed at any equilibrium value for the maintenance ratio when $\epsilon > \eta$, which makes our local analysis even more relevant.

¹⁷The numerical simulation exercises conducted to check the outcomes of our local theoretical analysis confirm totally this claim.

From the previous theoretical analysis, it follows that the demand for maintenance services $M(p^k, q, \cdot)$ and the demand for new capital goods $I(p^k, q, \cdot)$ should show the same comparative statics under the parameterization $\eta < \epsilon$, provided the maintenance ratio is sufficiently small, which is the interesting case from the empirical point of view. An increase in the price of maintenance services q leads the firms to lower their demand for both investment goods and maintenance services. We get exactly the same conclusion when the unit price of new capital goods p^k rises. Thus, instead of finding that maintenance services is a substitute for investment expenditures, we have found that investment and maintenance behave as gross complements as in section 2.

However, the results are different under the alternative parameterization $\eta > \epsilon$. In this case, when p^k rises firms lower their demand for both investment goods and maintenance services and, in this sense, investment and maintenance behave as gross complements. At the same time, an increase in q leads the firms to lower their demand for investment but to increase the demand for maintenance services. In this sense, investment and maintenance behave as gross substitutes. Nevertheless, the parametric case $\eta > \epsilon$ does not meet one of the most fundamental requirements in the theory of demand, namely a decreasing demand for maintenance services with respect to the price of those services.

4 Summing up

This paper provides a detailed analysis of two simple investment problems in the presence of capital maintenance services. We use the simplest modeling strategy, adjustment costs and variable depreciation rate, to get well-defined long-run equilibrium values for investment and maintenance services levels. Some interesting lessons can be brought out. At first, from the theoretical point of view it is not obvious at all that maintenance services could be a substitute for investment (in any sense). Even the elementary model with full utilization of capital does not deliver a simple outcome in this respect. Second, it appears that maintenance services and investment are rather gross complements in general. The unique case where investment and capital maintenance services are shown to be gross substitutes (ie. when the sensitivity of the depreciation function with respect to the maintenance ratio is greater than the sensitivity of the latter with respect to the rate of capacity utilization) yields a non-admissible demand for maintenance services, namely an increasing demand with respect to the price of maintenance. Third, the introduction of a variable rate of capacity utilization into the model with maintenance services tremendously complicates the analysis. It is far from

being an easy extension with simple additional mechanisms. As an example, we have shown how the comparative statics with respect to a fundamental variable in investment theory, namely the interest rate, are altered when a variable rate of capital utilization is added. Macroeconomists and analysts of business cycles should take care of these aspects in the interpretation of investment, capacity utilization and maintenance services paths in real economies.

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