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CHANGING AMERICA: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON WELFARE ATTITUDES AND WELFARE REFORM

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By

Jason Eugene Kehrberg

Lexington, Kentucky

Director: Dr. Mark Peffley, Professor of Political Science

Lexington, Kentucky

2013

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

CHANGING AMERICA: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON WELFARE ATTITUDES AND WELFARE REFORM

The purpose of my dissertation is to further our understanding of why some states restricted immigrant access to welfare in the 1990s while other states granted immigrants access to social programs. With the passage of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), many states diverged from equal access to welfare programs, such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), for immigrants arriving after 1996. Very little scholarly work examines the variance in immigrants' access to welfare programs. Current research studying welfare attitudes and policy has largely failed to investigate whether and how the influx of immigrants over the last three to four decades has decreased public support for welfare programs and resulted in policies that both decrease benefit levels and restrict access to programs based on citizenship. This is a serious shortcoming because immigration since the 1970s represents the largest population shift since the early 20th century, a change that has increased the size of the underclass and transformed the cultural and racial makeup of the United States. Accordingly, in my dissertation, I will examine how changes to the American political environment, immigration levels and the increasing number of immigration media stories, trigger authoritarian attitudes that in turn form a breeding ground supporting restrictive welfare programs. The results from the individual-level analysis provide strong evidence that authoritarians prefer less welfare spending, fewer immigrants, and a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare programs. In addition, authoritarians view immigrants as a threat due to their perceived failure to socially conform to American society. Building on these individual-level results, I find that states with large authoritarian populations are more likely to adopt restrictive welfare policies.

Jason E. Kehrberg
March 30, 2013

Keywords: Authoritarianism, Welfare Reform, Immigration, Predisposing Factors, Situational Triggers

CHANGING AMERICA: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON WELFARE ATTITUDES AND WELFARE REFORM

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February 26, 2013

To my family, Ana and Alexander, with all my love

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have contributed in numerous ways to this project, and for that I am thankful. I owe a tremendous debt to Mark Peffley. I am grateful for Mark's advice, guidance, and patience with me at every stage of my graduate training, even at odd hours of the night. His consistent guidance and encouragement was crucial in the successful completion of this project. In addition, Richard Fording provided helpful comments on the conference papers based on my dissertation chapters. I wish to thank my Dissertation Committee, Dr. Emily Beaulieu, Dr. Thomas Janoski, and Dr. Richard W. Waterman, for their advice and help with this project. I am also indebted to colleagues who provided feedback, advice, support, and data. Kirk Randazzo, Justin Wedeking, Irfan Nooruddin, Adam Butz, Richard Anrold, Mark Stambush, and Ken Moffet provided advice that influenced this project. David Leal, Elizabeth Rigby, and Gary Segura provided helpful comments on chapters that I presented at conferences. Rodney Hero and Robert Preuhs shared their state-level data. Justin Phillips and Jeffrey Lax provided statistical help with MRP.

I am extremely grateful to my family. I am thankful for their continued support and encouragement from my parents, Robert and Ella, my sister, Tina, and my in-laws, Bruce and Beth. Finally, I wish to thank my family: Ana and Alex. Ana has been with me for every step of my graduate career and her sacrifices made my academic career a possibility.

Jason E. Kehrberg
March 14, 2013

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

"The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants; the public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers." William Jefferson Clinton in the State of the Union (1995)

INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 fundamentally changed the United States welfare system. PRWORA ended welfare as an entitlement program by replacing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). TANF created work requirements, imposed time limits on assistance programs, restricted eligibility requirements, and increased the role of the states in policy formation (e.g., Fellowes and Row 2004; Soss et. al. 2001; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).

Welfare reformers also included several provisions to prevent immigrants from receiving assistance. Congress included policy changes in PRWORA that impacted immigrants' right to access welfare programs at the federal and state-levels. At the federal level, immigrants arriving after 1996 were restricted from accessing several social programs, including TANF (welfare), as well as food stamps, Medicare, Supplemental Security Income, and government healthcare programs. For example, the federal

government adopted a 5-year moratorium on TANF benefits[1] to immigrants arriving after 1996. Policy makers argued that such restrictions were necessary to decrease immigrant dependence on government benefits, end the so-called "magnet" effect of attracting undesirable immigrants to the United States, and encourage the naturalization of immigrants (see Borjas and Hilton [1996] for a justification of such arguments). Ultimately, advocates of such reforms argued that the policy would "promote immigrant self-sufficiency" and increase the "quality" of admitted immigrants (Fix, Capps, and Kaushal 2009)[2].

Like with many of the other components of PRWORA, the policy option to deny immigrants access to social spending programs was also included in the devolution of powers to the states (Hero and Preuhs 2007). The devolution of powers provided states with the policy flexibility to include or exclude immigrants from state-originated funds. Very few studies examine why some states deny immigrants access to welfare programs and why other states grant access. Most studies of state-level welfare policy examine dimensions of policy related to cash benefit levels (e.g., McGuire and Merriman 2006), work requirements (e.g., Soss et. al. 2001; Fellowes and Rowe 2004), or sanctions for non-compliance (e.g., Soss et. al. 2001; Fording et. al. 2007). Additional forms of policy stringency are often understudied by researchers, such as the initial eligibility to government programs. All state welfare programs are means-tested, meaning that program eligibility is fundamentally based on income levels, but some states also attach

[1] The time length of the ban varied from one social program to the next. For example, Medicaid had a 7-year federal ban, instead of the 5-year ban used for TANF benefits.

[2] The scholarly evidence is inconsistent on whether immigrants actually create a drain on social programs and are attracted to states with more generous welfare benefits. See Capps, Fix, and Henderson (2009), Van Hook and Bean (2009), and Zavodny (1999) for evidence against the magnet hypothesis and immigrant drain on social programs for evidence supporting such arguments see Borjas (1995; 1999) and Borjas and Trejo (1991).

citizenship requirements to welfare boundaries, thus statutorily denying immigrants access to public assistance (Fix, Capps, and Kaushal 2009; Graefe et. al. 2008; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Tichenor 2002).

The granting of these policy options to the states represents a critical change in American politics for several reasons. First, devolution is the transfer of political powers from the federal government to state and local governments. Devolution in welfare policymaking means that states and localities are responsible for crafting decentralized policies. The result of devolution is substantial variation in state-level welfare policies (Soss et. al. 2001; Fording and Kim 2010) including immigrant access to these programs (Hero and Preuhs 2007). Second, PRWORA granted states some authority over immigration. In 1875, the Supreme Court ruled in Henderson v. the Mayor of New York that immigration control and policies are a federal power and subject to Congressional regulation. PRWORA represents the beginning of a trend in the increasing role of states in the policy intersection of immigration and U.S. domestic policies (Filindra and Kovacs 2011). The increasing role of the states is changing the two legal "worlds" that immigrants face. Traditionally, immigration policy has been described as "hard on the outside and soft on the inside" (Bosniak 2006). The hard outer shell describes U.S. border control and immigration policy. The soft inside refers to U.S. domestic policy and legal norms that used to treat immigrants with a high degree of social citizenship by providing access to social programs and legal protections. Policy reforms, at the state and federal levels, have "harden" the soft middle by decreasing immigrant rights and access to social programs (Boehme 2011). PRWORA represents an important and early case in the study of how domestic policies have been shaped to discourage immigration.

This dissertation seeks to explain why states vary in their policy responses in granting and restricting immigrant eligibility to social welfare programs. Why are some states more generous and offer redistributive benefits to immigrants while other states adopt more stringent welfare boundaries that exclude immigrants? I believe that public opinion represents one key explanation to this research question. Public opinion shapes a state's willingness to incorporate immigrants into welfare programs. To study the relationship between public opinion and immigrant access to welfare, my dissertation examines both individual-level support for welfare, welfare chauvinism (desire to limit immigrant access to welfare), and state-level policy reforms. My analysis of welfare support finds that authoritarianism is a driving force behind anti-immigrant welfare chauvinism. Authoritarianism is a general orientation built around a personality cluster including conformity, obedience, and aggression to outsiders (Altemeyer 1988). As a result, authoritarians are more likely to show intolerance to ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities (Adorno et. al. 1950; Stenner 2005). In regards to policy, authoritarians prefer programs that enforce social norms by decreasing perceived threats from such outgroups as immigrants and aggressive and restrictive policies that punishing non-conforming minorities (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009. I build on this individual level finding by predicting that states with higher levels of authoritarianism are more likely to adopt restrictive policies denying immigrant inclusion to social programs.

It is important to understand the climate of opinion and the determinants of state welfare policies for several reasons. First, the construction of imagined communities creates group boundaries (Anderson 1983), justifying the exclusions of outgroups. For immigrants and Latinos, group boundaries help to “rationalize and justify governmental

practices and policies that stigmatize and punish certain categories of immigrants and their children" (Chavez 2008, p. 42). Second, numerous studies find that, in general, public policy responds to public opinion (e.g., Erickson et. al. 1993; Lax and Phillips 2009a; 2009b; Stimson 2004), and more specifically, state welfare policies are influenced by mass political ideology and racial attitudes (e.g., Johnson 2001; 2003). Third, the generosity of social spending programs influences inequality within society by having a profound and positive economic impact on disadvantaged groups (e.g., Brady 2009; Fix and Passell 1999; 2002; Moller et al. 2003). In summary, we need a better understanding of how the climate of opinion shapes inclusive and exclusive state-level policies.

THE PLAN FOR THE DISSERTATION

My dissertation traces welfare chauvinism from mass political attitudes to policy reforms in 1996. I start with a basic theory of predisposing factors (racial stereotypes, authoritarianism, economic self-interest, and political identifications) and situational triggers (immigration levels and mass communication) and end by showing that states with higher levels of authoritarianism were more likely to restrict immigration access to welfare programs. The dissertation will consist of six chapters. Below I provide a brief description of each of the remaining chapters.

In Chapter 2, I present a theoretical argument for why immigration trends and media coverage trigger predisposing factors that decrease public support for welfare programs. Drawing from literature on group-identity, political behavior, and immigration, I theorize that media effects about immigration and immigration patterns are likely to trigger core predisposing factors (e.g., authoritarianism, economic self-interest, Latino racial

stereotypes, or political identifications) that shape welfare preferences. One such media effect is the Latino Threat Narrative (Chavez 2008). The Latino Threat Narrative is the media's portrayal of immigrants as being a culturally different threat to the U.S. society. Once triggered, predisposing factors influence welfare attitudes by decreasing the willingness of individuals to support welfare and grant immigrants access to welfare programs, resulting in conservative policy preferences.

In Chapter 3, I examine two situational triggers, immigration levels and mass communication, in greater detail. I show that the rate of both triggers has increased since the 1960s. As the Latino immigration population increased, the United States shifted from a dual ethnic society dominated by the black-white paradigm to a multi-ethnic society. As a result, U.S. society became more diversified due to the increasing Latino population. In addition, I show an increased rate in the number of media stories on immigration. I also re-analyze Chavez's (2001) data on magazine covers to show how the media primarily uses negative images of immigrants. In the end, Chapter 3 helps to explain why the public became increasingly concerned about immigration in the 1990s.

In Chapter 4, I examine individual level support for welfare policies based on the theory presented in Chapter 2. I discuss four predisposing factors that can be triggered by immigration and media effects: authoritarianism, political identifications, economic self-interest, and racial stereotypes. I test several hypotheses regarding the relationship between each of these predisposing factors and policy preferences for welfare and immigration. I find that authoritarianism is a strong predictor of individual preferences for welfare spending, immigration levels, and welfare chauvinism, the restricting of immigrant access to welfare programs. Based on these initial results, I conduct further

studies into the relationship between policy preferences and racial stereotypes regarding Latinos and authoritarianism. I find that racial stereotypes are a moderating influence on authoritarianism by increasing the likelihood that non-authoritarians will hold similar policy preferences as authoritarians.

In Chapter 5, I use the findings in Chapter 4 to predict which political attitudes, authoritarianism, influenced welfare reforms. To test my argument, I conduct a comparative study of immigrant access to social spending programs across all fifty states. Using a recently developed statistical method, multi-level regression with poststratification (MRP), I estimate macro measures of public opinion for each state. I find that states with higher levels of authoritarianism were much more likely to restrict immigrant access to social spending programs. Additionally, I test the robustness of this finding by controlling for political institutions, demographics, geographic location, and economics.

Finally in Chapter 6, I conclude the dissertation by summarizing my findings and discussing the implications of my results. I discuss how my study offers important insights into American politics from public opinion formation to public policy outcomes. Further, I briefly talk about the unanswered questions from my research and how future research can expand on my dissertation.

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CHAPTER TWO
The Complexity of Immigration Politics:
A Theory of How Immigration Influences Public Opinion

"… no nation in history has gone through a demographic change of this magnitude in so short a time, and remained the same nation… uncontrolled immigration threatens to deconstruct the nation we grew up in…" Patrick J. Buchanan, OPPONENT OF IMMIGRATION, in *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization* (2002).

INTRODUCTION

Immigration is a political issue that sits at the intersection of both domestic and foreign affairs. The impact of immigration reaches beyond border control and policy reform of immigration by also influencing domestic policies. The connection between immigration and domestic politics, particularly social spending policies, is described as the "new politics of immigration" by Calavita (1996, p. 284-286), who argues that in addition to wanting to limit immigration flows, opponents of immigration also complain that immigrants should be denied the benefits of social services. What is unclear in the scholarly literature is when, why, and how mass preferences for restricting immigration help to fuel policy reforms, such as PRWORA.

An individual's desire to restrict immigrant access to social programs can be motivated by several considerations, from, "balanced-budget conservatism" (Calavita 1996) to cultural threat (Huntington 2004). The evidence on the economic and social

impact of immigrants is mixed[3]. In the end, the important factor may not be the actual impact of immigration but the *perceived* negative consequences of immigration among the general public. It is understandable to expect negative messages about immigration from the media and political elites to shape public opinion, resulting in strong preferences for limiting immigrant access to domestic programs like welfare.

In this chapter, I present a theory to explain why some states placed many more limitations on immigrants' access to welfare than other states in 1996. My focus is on the linkage between public opinion and public policy in the states. I start with a discussion of how immigration patterns and political rhetoric about immigration trigger predisposing factors and end with how these attitudes are related to state welfare reform. At the individual-level, I theorize that people hold various predisposing factors, like authoritarianism, economic self-interest, political identifications, and racial stereotypes, that can be "triggered" or activated by an influx of immigrants in the state and negative news coverage. Once certain predisposing factors are triggered, individuals become less willing to support immigrants' access to welfare programs. At the state-level, mass attitudes influences social policymaking. Public policies imperfectly mirror the preferences of citizens (e.g., Burstein 1998; Manza and Cook 2002; Brooks and Manza 2007; Lax and Phillips 2011). Scholars find policy responsiveness between elected officials and mass opinions that forms an opinion-policy linkage through representative democracy (Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Burstein 2003). The opinion-policy linkage is strongest when the masses are concerned about

[3] For evidence on the negative economic impact of immigration, see Borjas (1994; 1998); for evidence on its positive impact, see Bean and Stevens (2005). For arguments on the negative social consequences of immigration, see Huntington (2004); and for contrary evidence refuting such arguments, see Alba and Nee (2005).

policy outcomes of relevant issues, the majority supports a particular policy outcome, and "the attitudes in question must reflect some non-zero degree of salience among the public" (Brooks and Manza 2007, p. 28).

(Figure 2.1 about here)

My theoretical argument is depicted in Figure 2.1, which captures the relationships between individual predisposing factors, policy preferences, situational triggers, and macro policy outcomes. At the individual level, socio-demographic characteristics (gender, education, and age) influence various relevant predisposing factors (e.g., authoritarianism, political identifications, racial stereotypes, and economic self-interest) that people then use to form policy preferences (e.g., Brooks and Manza 2007; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Feldman 2003; Goren 2001; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). The activation of particular predisposing factors will vary depending on the situational triggers in the environment (e.g., Feldman 2003; Sniderman et. al. 2004; Stenner 2005). As indicated in the diagram, external situational triggers thus “activate” specific predisposing factors. Once activated, individuals use these predisposing factors as considerations when forming policy preferences. Next, the aggregation of citizens’ attitudes influences policy outcomes by forming a constituency to support elite policy preferences (e.g., Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Lax and Phillips 2009b, 2011; Manza and Cook 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). I expect mass attitudes

to help explain the variation across the states in welfare policy reforms concerning immigration access.

THE ROLE OF TRIGGERS AND PREDISPOSING FACTORS

Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy are shaped by two types of factors: internal predisposing factors and external situational triggers (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Predisposing factors are preexisting considerations that individuals draw upon to form more specific attitudes (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Each of us holds numerous predisposing factors. For example, a single individual holds multiple predisposing factors that are associated with their social class, racial identifications, political ideology, and gender with the importance of each predisposing factors varying across time and issues. Exactly which of these different predisposing factors end up being used to form opinion statements varies depending on the situational triggers present in the environment and the individual characteristics that interact with those triggers.

People are cognitive misers with a very limited amount of working memory (Fiske and Taylor 1991). In addition, the average citizen has little incentive to survey the news or engage in deep or deliberative thought about most political issues of the day (Downs 1957). Consequently, most citizens on most issues process political information in a rapid and superficial way by relying on a variety of cognitive heuristics or short cuts to quickly and efficiently process information and form their political opinions (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). For example, individuals are only able to access limited amounts of

information when forming their political attitudes. Rather than exhaustively searching for all relevant information about a complex political issue, they rely on salient, long-term predisposing factors like social stereotypes, prejudices and various identifications to form their political attitudes (Peffley and Hurwitz 1992). This strategy allows individuals to quickly and efficiently form opinions on complex political issues on which they lack specific information, like immigration (Citrin and Sides 2007) and welfare policies (Gilens 1999). For example, when Americans' think about a wide variety of issues, they consider their stereotypes and prejudices toward various groups—i.e., the policy's primary intended beneficiary (or target). As Nelson and Kinder (1996, p. 1055-56) argued "Public opinion on matters of government policy is group-centric: shaped in powerful ways by the attitudes citizens possess toward the social groups they see as the principal beneficiaries (or victims) of the policy. Racial stereotypes, political identifications, and authoritarianism are easy predisposing factors for individuals to evaluate policies and form their policy preferences (e.g., Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997; Wong 2010). For example, previous research shows that racial stereotypes influence a wide variety of policy preferences from welfare (Gilens 1999) to the death penalty (Peffley and Hurwitz 2007).

The simplicity of predisposing factors and situational triggers raises a concern. Immigration is a complex issue that can be framed in various ways by elites—i.e., politicians and the press. Framing is defined as "the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue" (Chong and Druckman 2007, p. 104). Thus, elites can trigger opposition by framing the issue of immigration in a way that emphasizes xenophobic, economic, and cultural fears that help

activate particular types of predisposing factors. Immigrants have routinely been described as posing a variety of threats to Americans--cultural threats to social cohesion and national identity such as the perceived failure of immigrants to learn English and adopt American norms and customs (e.g., Buchanan 2002; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Huntington 2004; Kinder and Kam 2009; Schildkraut 2011), economic threats to jobs and government resources (e.g., Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Kunovich 2004; Lubbers et. al. 2002; Quillian 1995), and as criminals (e.g., Arnold 2010)[4]. Associating immigrants with social threats, economic competition, and crime creates a framing effect. Each of these immigration frames can potentially trigger predisposing factors. The frames must be stored in memory to be recalled when forming political attitudes (Chong and Druckman 2007a). When a frame triggers a pre-existing and often used predisposing factor, individuals are more likely to use that predisposing factor to interpret and react to the issue. The simple exposure to elite frames, media and political messages, can result in the connection between predisposing factors and political issues that in the end form the basis for policy preferences. If the frames are negative, such as those associated with immigrants, the activation of various predisposing factors can lead individuals to support restrictive and discriminatory policies.

In addition, elite messages can also shape stereotypes of immigrants through persuasion, defined as mass communication that changes an individual's evaluation component of their attitude on an issue (see the discussion in the next section on the components of an attitude) (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Nelson and Oxley 1999). Elite frames of non-assimilating immigrants who take American jobs while draining

[4] Additionally, these frames are not mutually exclusive and individuals can use multiple considerations when forming an opinion statement (Zaller 1992).

government programs can change Americans' views of immigrants (Chavez 2001; 2008). Persuasion effects are more likely to be successful when the message appeals to the motivations or predisposing factors of the individual (Fabrigar and Petty 1999) and individuals lacking meaningful social contact, particularly friendship (Ellison, Shin, and Leal 2011). Many White Americans do not have much contact with immigrants and Latinos, particularly older Whites in the baby boom generation who grew up in an era when the percentage of foreign born was lower than it's been in many years (see Martin and Midgley 2003; Leal and Trejo 2010 for changes in immigration patterns that can influence social contact), and are likely more susceptible to negative elite portrayals of Latino immigrants in the news. In the end, the result is the same. Negative images become associated with immigrants and the issue of immigration and then images become easily activated by individuals holding certain predisposing factors, such as authoritarianism.

Situational Triggers: Influence on Attitudes

We do not encounter stimuli as blank slates, but instead we hold prior predisposing factors that influence our attitudes. Individuals possess multiple predisposing factors that can be triggered by a stimulus.

Following Chong and Druckman's (2007a, p. 105) conceptualization, attitudes are the "weighted sum of a series of evaluative beliefs about that object." Specifically, Attitude = $\sum v_i * w_i$, where the first part is the evaluation of the attitude object, v_i, and the second is the salience or weight of the consideration w_i. Given this concept of attitudes, there are two possible mechanisms to change an individual's overall attitude (Eagly and

Chaiken 1993). First, one can change their evaluative components (v_i) or change their salience components (w_i).

The weighted sum of all evaluations[5], or equivalently, considerations, defined as "any reason that might induce an individual to decide a political issue one way or the other" (Zaller 1992, p. 42), determines the overall summary evaluation of the attitude object (Chong and Druckman 2007a, Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). For example, an individual's attitude towards immigration is the weighted sum of both positive and negative considerations about immigrants. A hypothetical individual may view immigrants as positively adding to the multi-cultural American melting pot. This positive cultural view is the first consideration. The same individual may also view immigrants as having a negative economic impact, either personally, because immigrants are seen to compete with the individual (and her family) for jobs, or sociotropically, because low-skilled immigrants are seen as a drain on society's resources (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Even though this individual holds both positive and negative considerations about immigrants, s/he does not necessarily have a neutral overall evaluation (attitude) toward immigrants because economic considerations may be weighted (w_i) much more heavily than cultural ones, or vice versa. Because elite framing and other situational triggers influence the *weight* of people's considerations, they can have a crucial impact on people's overall evaluations of political issues—i.e., their policy preferences or attitudes (Nelson and Oxley 1999).

This conceptualization of attitudes also fits well with Zaller's (1992) memory-based theory of the survey response, the "Receive-Accept-Sample" (RAS) model, which helps

[5] It is important to note that I use the terms considerations and evaluations interchangeable throughout this manuscript.

to explain elite opinion leadership. The RAS model includes four axioms: reception, resistance, accessibility, and response. The first axiom concerns the reception of information. The second axiom is the resistance axiom. Individuals who receive messages inconsistent with their predisposing factors are able to resist these messages if they have the necessary knowledge. The accessibility and response axioms are closely related to framing effects. The accessibility axiom addresses the probability of a consideration coming to mind when forming political attitudes: recently received and frequently used considerations have a greater probability of being accessed and therefore influencing attitude formation. The fourth axiom, the response axiom, states that "individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations *that are immediately salient or accessible to them*." In other words, people do not search their memories for all relevant information or considerations when forming attitudes. Rather, survey responses and attitude formation are disproportionately influenced by the few accessible considerations of the top of people's heads.

Predisposing factors are conceptually distinct from considerations or evaluations of the attitude object. Predisposing factors, such as authoritarianism and racial stereotypes, are more long-term and general orientations, whereas evaluations are more specific to the attitude object. Situational triggers influence attitudes in two ways. First, situational triggers activate predisposing factors like authoritarianism. Second, situational triggers can also directly influence the formation and weight of evaluations. I am unable to test the specific links between situational triggers, predisposing factors, and evaluations due to the use of observational survey data. Previous research used experimental data to test the relationship to test the direct link between predisposing factors and situational triggers

(see Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Stenner 2005). An experimental design allows the researcher to control exposure to the situational trigger, but regardless of the pathway, I can examine the correlation between predisposing factors and political attitudes in relation to one situational trigger: levels of immigration.

In the end, situational triggers can alter people's attitudes by either changing their evaluative components (v_i) or changing their salience components (w_i). In this manner, situational triggers act as a shock that alters an individual's overall evaluation of an issue. The degree of this shock varies depending on the situational trigger and the individual accepting or resisting the frame (see the discussion on framing below for more on resistance).

Situational Triggers

Two situational triggers stand out as likely suspects for activating predisposing factors during the time period under study: levels of immigration and news coverage of immigration. The important factor is the public perception of immigration and how the public interprets the increasing immigrant population and news coverage. In his book, *The Death of the West*, conservative commentator, Pat Buchanan (2002), described the recent influx of illegal immigrants from Central, Latin, and South America as one of the greatest changes in the history of the United States. Over the last four decades, from 1970 to present, the rate of immigration increased and, even more importantly, shifted from developed European countries to developing Asian and Hispanic countries, which Buchanan viewed as a serious threat to American society. I argue that the way these changes in immigration patterns were interpreted by many elites served to trigger particular individual predisposing factors (economic self-interest, political identifications,

authoritarianism, and racial stereotypes) that shaped attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and welfare. In Chapter 3, I provide more historical detail about various situational triggers, but for now I focus on a more general argument.

Several theories of social conflict—i.e., ethnic competition theory, realistic conflict theory, and group-threat theory suggest that the relative size of the immigrant population is likely to influence public opinion (e.g., Gijsberts, Hagendoorn, and Scheepers 2004; Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002). These theories share a common element. As the proportional size of the immigrant population increases so should the level of perceived threat to the native population. In the end, each of these theories predict that threat to natives results in hostility in areas with large immigrant populations due to competition between the two groups.

Different group threat theories point to different types of threat posed by immigrants and postulate different consequences of group threat. For example, different scholars argue that group threat serves to increase political competition (Glaser 1994), and economic competition (Quillian 1995; 1996), or prejudice (Taylor 1998) against the outgroup, while others emphasize the resulting social cohesion among the ingroup (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Putnam 2007). Each group threat theory is based on an interaction between threat and individuals' predisposing factors resulting in hostile attitudes. For example, Lincoln Quillian (1995) wrote that group threat "is a function of two factors: the numerical size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group, and economic circumstances."

In the end, group threat theories predict that as the proportion of immigrants increases, the threat to natives' political power, economic structure, and/or society should

also increase resulting in prejudice or at least more negative attitudes among natives. The evidence to support group threat theories is mixed from one study to the next. The research finds that increasing immigrant populations can result in more hostile attitudes, less hostile attitudes, or simply null findings (Hopkins 2010). The nature of immigration may not directly create a group threat effect. Immigrants live and work in segmented communities and work sectors which can make economic and social threat much less noticeable for large portions of the public. In the end, group threat theories assume that individuals are aware of objective demographic changes around them and connect the demographic changes to their political attitudes.

A second trigger is the influence of the news media on public opinion. Media messages may not be a necessary condition to alter individual policy preferences, but media messages can be a sufficient condition. In contrast to the "limited effects" position, which concluded that the impact of news messages on public opinion was limited to reinforcement of prior attitudes rather than persuasion (i.e., changing attitudes), in an important paper, Zaller (1996) makes the forceful argument that persuasion is one of the primary influence of the news media on public opinion. Zaller (1996, p. 18) argued that "mass communication is a powerful instrument for shaping the attitudes of the citizens who are exposed to it, and it exercises this power on an essentially continuous basis." He finds much more evidence for persuasion in his study that takes advantage of better measures of reception and better variance in the content and volume of mass communication. Focusing on the second condition, persuasion occurs when the media changes overall volume and "directional thrust." These conditions increase the likelihood that an individual is exposed, recessives, and accepts the content of the news story. For

example, the increasing number of immigration stories in the early 1990s that portrayed immigrants as a drain of government programs should persuade the mass public to decrease the number of immigrants. As we will see in Chapter 3, immigration news stories fits the pattern that Zaller predicts can create "massive" influences on individual attitudes.

Contemporary research on media effects also identifies three second-order influences of news messages on public opinion: framing, priming, and agenda setting. The three media effects shape public opinion by influencing how individuals "develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue" (Chong and Druckman 2007a).

Starting with framing effects, Chong and Druckman's (2007a) theory of competitive framing is perhaps the most current and developed theory of how (media and other) frames influence people's attitudes. Their work (Chong and Druckman 2007a; 2007b; 2010), mentioned briefly above, led to two significant developments in the way scholars think about framing. First, they examined how the influence of frames is tempered in the presence of competing frames. For example, some elites praise the United States as a land of freedom and opportunity to all hardworking immigrants, while other elites frame immigrant labor as economic competition for Americans.

Second, they argued that under certain conditions the effects of framing and priming are similar. Research indicates that priming may not increase accessibility, as the concept is defined by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), but instead operates through the same common processes as framing (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Druckman, Kuklinski, and Sigelman 2009; Miller and Krosnick 2000). As such, priming and framing may use the

same mental process and "the two terms can be used interchangeably" (Chong and Druckman 2007a, p. 115). Overall, frames can influence how individuals think about political issues. The emphasis on certain aspects results in individuals focusing on those aspects of an issue when forming opinion statements (Druckman 2001; 2004). For example, Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) conducted an experiment changing the frame of an immigration media story. When the frame included either negative consequences of immigration or a Latino immigrant, individuals became more supportive of restrictive immigration policies because the frame changed the weight of the issue and the considerations by increasing the importance of immigration as a political issue and the ability of people to access the negative frame when forming political attitudes.

As emerging research on framing in political science has demonstrated, a frame is likely to influence individuals if the fame is repeated, triggers a predisposing factor, or is salient (Chong and Druckman 2007a). First, frames are more likely to influence people's attitudes when they are repeatedly exposed to a frame, thus making the issue more salient to the individual (Chong and Druckman 2010). Repeated exposure increases the individual's ability to access the images and information associated with the frame, which Chong and Druckman call the loudness hypothesis. The result is a higher probability of individuals using the frame to form policy preferences. Using survey data, Branton and Dunaway (2009) found that increased newspaper exposure to negative immigration stories is associated with less support for immigration.

Second, when a frame appeals to a pre-existing predisposing factor, the individual is less likely to resist the frame. In this situation, the media frame is increasing the probability of accessing an existing predisposing factor. For example, frames about

immigrants failing to socially conform should be of greater concern and less resisted among authoritarians, due to their concern about social conformity, than non-authoritarians. In my example, the frame and the predisposing factor point in the same direction. Authoritarians are by nature concerned about social conformity and, as a result, are less likely to resist frames showing perceived threats to society. Individuals are likely to resist a media frame when they do not trust the source (Druckman 2001) or when media frames conflict with their predisposing factors (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Peffley and Hurwitz 2007). Going back to my example, authoritarians will resist frames showing immigrant assimilation. Third, frames related to issues perceived by the public as being important are more likely to influence individuals. Contextual factors can influence both the salience of the issue and the accessibility of the frame by motivating the individual to pay attention to the frame (Chong and Druckman 2007a). Branton and Dunaway (2009) found that counties in California that are closer to the border and with larger immigrant populations have more newspaper stories about immigrants and, on average, these stories are more negative.

Agenda setting is defined as the impact of the frequency of news coverage on the public's evaluation of the importance of problems or issues facing the country (Iyengar and McGrady 2007). Agenda setting is directly related to the salience (view of how important) of the issue among the general public. Political issues that the media determines to be important receive additional attention. Agenda setting results in an increasing proportion of the public that views an issue as being important.

Another media effect is priming. Instead of changing the individual's attitude on an issue, priming alters the perceived importance of the issue and the criteria people use to

evaluate policy-makers (Miller and Krosnick 2000). Political priming helps describe the process by which agenda setting influences people's attitudes. As the term was used by Iyengar et. al. (1984) and many political scientists, priming was cast narrowly as the process by which a ballast of political information can influence the weight of criteria that people use to evaluate politicians. An example is the news coverage of the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan administration, where increasing negative stories about the scandal resulted in a large decrease in President Reagan's popularity (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). Individual evaluations of politicians can change as media stories provide new information and the weight and importance of political issues shifts due to media exposure (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Thus, "the standards citizens use to judge a president may be substantially determined by which stories newscasts choose to cover and, consequently, which considerations are made generally accessible" (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

In conclusion, media effects and mass communication should have a large impact on immigration attitudes. Rates of mass communication should influence when and where people believe immigration to be important and alter (persuasion) people's attitudes on immigration. Framing and priming shape the considerations that people use when forming policy attitudes and their views of policy-makers. The ability to create mass communication that relates to predisposing factors only increases the influence of the media on individuals and their resulting attitudes. Unfortunately, I do not have detailed data on the influence of triggers, except for immigration and news story trends. As a result, I will not be testing theories of media effects but inferring influences of the news media and political rhetoric from the differential weights of antecedents of immigration

attitudes –i.e., predisposing factors. Most importantly, the theories of media effects helps guide my hypotheses and interpretation of my findings.

In this section, I provided a theoretical argument for how context can influence public opinion. In sum, situational triggers (immigration levels and media effects) trigger predisposing factors (authoritarianism, racial stereotypes, economic self-interest, and political identifications) that in turn shape policy preferences (support for welfare). My argument occurs at the individual-level but I believe that macro public opinion creates a feedback loop that influences public policy. In the following section, I provide more details about the opinion-policy linkage that is tested in Chapter 5.

PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY

Thus far I have discussed, an individual-level theory of situational triggers and predisposing factors that shape public policy preferences. I focused on how situational triggers, mass communication and immigration patterns, can trigger predisposing factors that act as considerations when forming policy preferences. I predict that the triggered predisposing factors will result in lower levels of support for welfare. In this section, I discuss how mass political attitudes can influence public policy.

Earlier in this chapter in the discussion on media effects, I presented what must be considered a top-down view of mass communication influencing individual attitudes, which is an elite-driven model of political change. At the same time, I presented a bottom-up view of immigration trends where increasing immigration levels results in greater public concern that is then communicated to policy-makers. On the surface, an opinion-policy linkage appears to be a bottom up or mass-driven model of change. In

reality, the causal arrow runs in both directions. The masses do constrain elite behavior, under certain conditions (Brooks and Manza 2007). Elites do send cues (situational triggers) that influence public opinion. In return, a complex feedback loop constrains the policy options available to elites.

The relationship between the public and policy is a fundamental and necessary component of liberal democratic theory. Liberal democratic theory requires at least weak policy responsiveness to public mood. Citizens identify, support, and elect elites with similar views to their own and the elites in return adopt policies that mirror their supporters' preferences (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1989). Perfect policy responsiveness results in the tyranny of the majority, an undesirable outcome based on the characteristics of the public. In general, the public is intolerant (e.g., Gibson 1988; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Sullivan et. al. 1993), lacks political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991, 1993, 1996), and has low levels of political interest (Treadway 1985). Each of these characteristics can prevent the development and application of a democratic society. On the other hand, the failure to respond to the masses results in the questioning the legitimacy of democracy. In the end, the opinion-policy linkage is a delicate balance between responding to and ignoring public opinion or maintaining legitimacy while avoiding tyranny of the majority.

Research supports a causal relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes (e.g., Brooks 2006; Brooks and Manza 2007; Burstein 1981, 1982; Erickson et. al. 1989; Erickson et. al. 2002; Johnson, Brace, and Arceneaux 2005; Lax and Phillips 2009a, 2009b, 2011; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Stimson 2004). First, the issue needs to be *salient* to the general public. Second, the public needs to be *aware* of and

concerned with the policy outcomes. Third, the message from the public to the elites should emphasis one policy option over another. If these three conditions exist, the public's message is clear and strong. A clear message limits the options available to elites resulting in public policy that mirrors public opinion. Or as Brustein (1981, p. 295) argued, policy reflects the preferences of the public when "what the public want in those instances where the public cares enough about an issue to make its wishes known."

While a number of scholars accept the idea of policy responsiveness, there is less consensus on which opinions matter. The majority of this research examines an opinion-policy linkage focusing on political ideology. Unfortunately, political ideology may not tell us much about specific issues (Converse 1964; Lax and Phillips 2009b). The weakness of the opinion-policy response using ideology is that immigration, as a political issue, cuts across the traditional ideological spectrum (Tichenor 2002).

More recent research has focused on the relationship between specific policy opinions and policy outcomes (Lax and Phillips 2009a; 2009b; 2011; Johnson et. al. 2005). For example, Johnson, Brace, and Arceneaux (2005) examine how environmental policy preferences responded to changes in pollution emissions. Johnson et. al. found that increases in pollution levels were associated with preferences for tougher environmental laws and increased environmental spending. Lax and Phillips recently examined over thirty different state policy areas finding a strong relationship between policy and policy specific attitudes in most areas (2011). The relationship between immigrant attitudes and immigration policy was the weakest opinion-policy relationship in their study.

There are at least two problems with using policy attitudes in a study of policy responsiveness. First, individual policy attitudes vary over time at a greater rate than government policy. Second, the use of policy attitudes ignores the possibility of an underlying predisposing factor that connects one policy preference to another or what some scholars call "core values" (Goren 2001; Peffley and Hurwitz 1987), "embedded preferences" (Brooks and Manza 2007), "worldview" (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), or "predispositions" (Stenner 2005).

This can be problematic for the study of welfare and immigration policies. Korpi wrote that "it can be argued that major welfare-state institutions are organized by reference to the social relations and contexts in which individuals are situated" (2003, p. 598). Brooks and Manza's theory groups sources of welfare preferences into demographics, social identities, and institutional environments (2007). A very similar theoretical design applies to immigration. Immigration attitudes and immigration policy reforms are shaped by demographics, identities, and coalitional formations (see Sniderman et. al. 2004 at the individual attitudes level and Tichenor 2002 regarding immigration policy in the United States).

In Chapter 5, I apply this theory of policy preferences to welfare reforms regarding immigration access. I expect to find a strong relationship between mass attitudes and policy outcomes as state governments, being closer to the people, are better able to adopt policy to the preferences of their residents. Further, I expect that predisposing factors will be a strong predictor of immigrant accessibility than specific policy preferences. The issue of immigrants receiving welfare benefits combines two policy areas, immigration and welfare, and the common link between the two policies are predisposing factors.

CONCLUSION

I have covered significant and complex ground about two central topics in political research: political attitudes and the opinion-policy relationship. The goal of this chapter was to present a general theory that can be used to explain why some states adopted restrictive policies limiting immigrant access to welfare programs and other states granted access to immigrants. Fundamentally, the public's willingness to grant immigrant access to welfare programs is the deciding factor on which states adopted generous policies and which states passed exclusionary policies.

Beginning with public opinion, I have argued for a simple theory of predisposing factors and situational triggers. A theory of predisposing factors and triggers stresses the interaction of individuals and environmental triggers, such as media effects and immigration demographics. Every individual interacts with the world around them, which they view through "rose colored" lenses of the predisposing factors triggered by the surrounding environment. I test this basic theory at the individual-level in Chapter 4.

The result of the increased awareness and concern about immigration can create a constituency for specific policy outcomes under the right conditions. Conditions or political barriers can strengthen or weaken the representation of mass attitudes. As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, the convergence of negative attitudes and political conditions result in the adoption of restrictive policies limiting immigrant access to state welfare funding.

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

Figure 2.1A The Relationship between Situational Triggers and Predisposing Factors.



Figure 2.1B The Relationship between Public Opinion and State Policy Outcomes.
Note: The relationships shown in this figure are not the only possible relationships between the variables. To avoid an overly complex figure, I have omitted the arrows for a direct relationship between several variables. Variables that appear in the earlier stages of the funnel of casualty can influence any variable or relationship that appears in later stages.

CHAPTER THREE

Situational Triggers: The Changing Immigration Politics

"In the 1960s powerful movements began to challenge the salience, the substance, and the desirability of this concept of America." Samuel P. Huntington in *Who are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (2004).

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) into law to restructure the welfare system. PRWORA created federal restrictions limiting immigrant access to welfare programs. At the state level, PRWORA granted states the power to adopt their own restrictive gate-keeping policies. As a result, the degree to which immigrants are provided access to welfare programs varies from one state to another.

In the previous chapter, I presented a theory focusing on public opinion as an influence on the policy-making process resulting in different state policies restricting immigrant access to welfare. I theorized that political attitudes are shaped by predisposing factors and situational triggers. I briefly mentioned four possible predisposing factors (authoritarianism, political identifications, economic self-interest, and racial stereotypes) that are potentially activated by two situational triggers (mass communication and immigration levels). In Chapter 4, I provide more details about the particular predisposing factors that are likely to influence immigration and welfare policy attitudes. In this chapter, I present a brief historical narrative describing the changing

patterns of news coverage on immigration and immigration levels. This historical narrative helps explain why restrictive immigration policies were adopted in the 1990s, which states were likely to limit immigrant access to social programs and how immigration is tied to worldview evolution

In summary, I argued that political attitudes are shaped by situational triggers, specifically mass communication and immigration levels. As the masses receive elite cues, they sort themselves into constituencies supporting specific policy reforms (Levendusky 2009). Mass support for policy reforms creates a feedback loop that constrains elite policy making (Jacobson 2006; Lassiter 2006; Lee 2002; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). I believe that the changes in U.S. demographics and the American political culture have influenced the public's willingness to provide welfare benefits to immigrants.

In order to understand which predisposing factors structure and shape immigration and welfare attitudes, I need to examine how American politics changed over time from the 1960s to the present. I argue, along with Hetherington and Weiler (2009), that authoritarian attitudes are central elements in shaping a worldview that organizes a wide range of policy preferences, including immigration. I begin this chapter with a discussion of Hetherington and Weiler's theory of worldview evolution (2009) and how it relates to Levendusky's concept of mass sorting (2009). Contemporary America is polarized around cultural issues including race (Carmines and Stimson 1989), the role of government (Baer 2000), and new political issues that became central to national politics, such as crime (Black and Black 2002), gay rights (Lax and Phillips 2009a), and *immigration* (Calavita 1996). Many scholars trace the contemporary political

environment back to changes that began in the 1960s resulting in a restructuring of American politics (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Levendusky 2009). This chapter provides a limited narrative, since it is impossible to address the change in each political issue over nearly a half of a century. I limit my discussion beyond the basic concepts of the worldview evolution and two situational triggers: news coverage on immigration and immigration levels. My description of worldview evolution emphasizes the role of immigration issues to help set the stage for the empirical analysis at the individual-level and state-level in Chapters 4 and 5. This historical narrative discusses how immigration became incorporated into the changing American political environment. In the 1960s, immigration was not a polarized political issue, but it eventually became part of a broader constellation of issues, along with crime and gay rights, that still polarizes the electorate. I do not mean to imply by the discussion below that immigration is the only important issue, but wish to maintain the focus on the subject at hand.

WORLDVIEW EVOLUTION: A CHANGING POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

In this section, I discuss how the political culture of the United States has evolved since the 1960s to ultimately show how immigration and other issues became bundled together and shaped, in part, by authoritarianism and a sorting along party lines. I begin this section by discussing the theory of issue evolution, an explanation for how the American political culture has changed since the 1960s, and how issue evolution relates to partisan sorting. I then present a more recent theory, worldview evolution, that builds

on issue evolution and sorting. Finally, I explain how worldview evolution helps set the stage for immigration to emerge as a major political issue in the 1990s.

Over four decades ago, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Immigration Act of 1965. The act marked a change in Johnson's position on immigration. While in Congress, President Johnson had a voting record favoring restrictive immigration policies, but as President, he supported progressive immigration policies. Thirty-one years later, another Democratic President, Bill Clinton, also changed his position on immigration, but in the opposite direction from supporting progressive immigration policies to signing restrictive policies into law (Teichenor 2002). Unlike 1965, the immigration debate in 1996 was not about restricting or expanding the flow of legal immigrants. Instead, the debate focused on the flow of illegal immigration and the domestic impact of legal immigrants, mostly from Latin America, and more specifically, Mexico. For example, the Republicans' Contract for America in 1994 called for denying immigrants; access to Medicaid, Food Stamps, and other welfare programs[6]. Another important difference in the Johnson and Clinton presidencies is that Johnson signed many Great Society programs like welfare into law, while Clinton signed legislation to "end welfare as we know it."

Many scholars argue that the different postures of the Johnson and Clinton presidencies on the immigration and welfare policies stemmed from the evolution of those issues in the political environment from 1960 to the present (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Carter 1996; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Levendusky 2009). Issue evolution is the process by which party positions on a powerful issue like racial politics

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[6] Immigrants arriving after 1996 are denied access to federally funded benefits for their first five years of permanent residence in the United States. States are able to determine their own policies for their part of welfare funding. There are some exceptions to the ban including children, refugees, and the handicap.

can change and influence the reshaping of party coalitions, a process that is illustrated in Figure 3.1 (Carmines and Stimson 1981; 1986; 1989). The process of issue evolution starts with political elites sending cues to the mass public, such as messages through the media, about their activities and positions on political issues. A critical component of this first step is elites changing their position on a salient issue. One reason party officer holders change their position on an issue is that they are pressured by party activists to not only change their position, but also to adopt a clear and distinct position. Carmines and Stimson (1986) analyze data from 1945 to 1980 to show that the Republican Party started out as the more racially liberal party in the 1950s but the 1970s ended as the more racially conservative party. As the parties changed their position on the issue, party elites in Congress and the White House sent clear signals about the parties' changing positions. The second step in issue evolution is called clarification, which occurs when individuals change their "cognitive perceptions of the parties with respect to the new issue dimension" (Carmines and Stimson 1986, p. 903). In the next step, labeled "Affect Toward Parties" in the figure, people who care about the political issue develop affection and disaffection for the parties and the political issue shapes people's attitudes on other, related issues. For example, the issue of race reshaped American attitudes across a range of issues including welfare (Gilens 1999), crime (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010), and immigration (Voss, Kehrberg, and Butz 2013). In the final stage, Americans sort themselves between Republicans and Democrats based on their affection and disaffection with the political parties (detailed further below).

(Figure 3.1 about here)

Once the political elites have adopted competing positions on issues, the mass public is, to a degree, “redistributed” in the two parties through a “sorting effect” (Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Levendusky 2009). Hetherington and Weiler (2009, p. 17) conceptualize sorting as individuals “aligning their preferences with their respective parties” or bringing their partisanship more into line with their issue preferences. Levendusky (2009, p. 3) provides a more specific definition of partisan sorting as the “alignment of partisanship and ideology” where ideology is either represented as identifying oneself as liberal or conservative or as a series of preferences on different issues. In the end, sorting is the process by which individuals realign their views of the parties and various issues.

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) build on the concepts of sorting and issue evolution with their idea of worldview evolution. Worldview is defined as “a set of connected beliefs animated by some fundamental, underlying value orientation that is itself connected to a visceral sense of right and wrong” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, p. 3). Conceptually, a worldview is a constellation of political attitudes driven by a more general predisposing factor or “value orientation” that structures and shapes attitudes across a range of issues, such as immigration and welfare. Hetherington and Weiler describe the idea as "a cluster of issues tethered to an underlying disposition [that] animates a distinct way of understanding political reality and of shaping political behavior" (2009, p. 64). The key difference between worldview evolution and issue evolution is the concept of a broad predisposing factor being used by individuals to sort their ideological and issue positions (worldview evolution) rather than a single issue reshaping the political environment (issue evolution).

The process of worldview evolution and partisan sorting was well underway when immigration became a major national political issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the following sections, I describe the evolution of immigration as a national political issue and how it became part of a constellation of new issues – i.e., race, crime, and foreign affairs - that now polarize elites as well as the mass public in the U.S.

IMMIGRATION POLICY, THE IMMIGRATION POPULATION, AND FEDERALISM

Dramatic changes in the rate of immigration and the cultural makeup of the immigration population can influence immigration attitudes and policy preferences related to immigration (Hopkins 2010; 2011). The United States has undergone a dramatic change both in the rate of immigration and in the country of origin of immigrants over the last fifty to sixty years. To see how the rate of immigration has changed, Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of foreign-born individuals (immigrants) in the United States from 1850[7] through 2006. The percentage of immigrants increased from about 10% to over 14% between 1850 and 1925. Policy reforms restricted the flow of immigrants entering the United States after 1925. As a result, the overall percentage of immigrants steadily decreased to a historic low in 1970. The Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 opened the Golden Doors allowing for a large increase in the flow of immigrants. From 1970 to 2006, the percentage of immigrants in the U.S. population almost tripled from 4.7% to 12.5%.

(Figure 3.2 about here)

[7] 1850 is the first year that the U.S. Census tracked immigration.

To understand the changes in immigration demographics one needs a basic understanding of the historical evolution of immigration policy and the division of power over immigration policy between the federal government and state governments. Before the American Revolution, immigration policy was established by each colony. Even during this time period, some colonies were concerned about immigration. For example, immigrants to Pennsylvania were required to take an oath of allegiance to the colony. From the American Revolution to the late 1800s, federal policy focused on naturalization and legally defining the rights of citizenship. At the same time, states began to adopt restrictions on immigrants by adopting anti-immigrant domestic policies, such as charging taxes to immigrate.

In the 1870s, the federal government became a central player in immigration policy, as displayed in Figure 3.2. First, Congress restricted immigration from China and the United States negotiated similar immigrant restrictions with Japan. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first instance of racism or ethnocentrism in immigration policy[8]. By 1917, a literacy test was adopted that virtually prevented all Asians from immigrating[9]. Second, the Mayor of New York was charging a tax on immigrants arriving by ship. In 1876, the Supreme Court ruled this local-level policy was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court declared immigration a type of foreign commerce. As a result, immigration policies became the dominion of the federal government, particularly the U.S. Congress.

[8] The Immigration Act of 1875 barred prostitutes and criminals from immigrating to the United States.
[9] The separate immigration policy for Chinese was finally lifted in 1943 due to our World War II alliance with China. The Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907 restricted Japanese immigration until the 1960s.

The pattern of exclusion based on ethnicity and race became the norm for immigration policy accumulating with the passage of the National Quota Law of 1921. The two National Quota Laws, 1921 and 1929, and the National Origins Act of 1924 restricted immigration based on census data. The National Quota Law of 1921 limited immigration to 3% of the number of foreign-born individuals living in the United States by country. By using the 1910 census, Congress was attempting to limit immigration from Ireland, southern Europe, and Eastern Europe and increase immigration from northern Europe. In 1924, Congress decided to further restrict the quotas to 2% of the persons of nationality in the 1890 census. Finally in 1929, the quotas were changed to the 1920 U.S. census.

Between 1929 and 1965 the national origin quotas formed the foundation of U.S. immigration policy. The national origin quota system severely limited the flow of immigrants into the United States[10]. The census data in Figure 3.2 shows a decrease in the immigrant population between 1910 and 1970. The pattern changes after 1970, the proportion of immigrants in the United States suddenly starts to grow due to immigration reform in 1965.

The Hart-Celler Act of 1965 ended the use of national origin quotas that favored immigration from Europe. Opposition to the national quotas was based on the system being racist and inconsistent with civil rights (Tichenor 2002). Vice President Hubert Humphrey directly linked immigration to racism when he said "We have removed all elements of second-class citizenship from our laws by the Civil Rights Act. We want to bring our immigration law into line with the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." As a

[10] Immigration levels had already begun to decline by 1921 due to World War I and the anti-German backlash in the United States.

result, the Hart-Celler Act removed restrictions preventing immigration from developing countries. Without these policy restrictions, the flow of immigrants increased from developing countries due to demand for cheaper labor.

After 1965, immigration legislation continued to define U.S. refugee policy (1975, 1977, and 1980), increased the annual immigration limit (1978, 1990) and provided amnesty for illegal immigrants (1986) (Tichenor 2002). The majority of the immigration policies passed between 1965 and the early 1990s are considered liberal policies, those that expand immigration or the rights of immigrants. In the 1990s, political rhetoric began to shift with immigrants viewed as a threat to domestic social programs. One of these policy changes was PRWORA.

The Hart-Celler Act created an immigration policy based on family reunification and a seven-category system. The act allowed for 120,000 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere and 170,000 visas from the Eastern Hemisphere with no country being allotted more than 20,000 visas. As seen in Table 3.1, the 290,000 visas were divided across a seven category system. In addition to the set number of visas, the Hart-Celler Act established unrestricted amount of visas for the spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens.

(Table 3.1 about here)

The new U.S. immigration policy, combined with Western Europe shifting from an exporter of immigrants to an importer, resulted in a change in U.S. immigration patterns. The first change is the actual rate of immigration. In 1960, immigrants made up 5.4% of the U.S. population. The percentage of immigrants continued to decline over the decade

to 4.7% by 1970. By 1980, the percentage of foreign-born individuals climbed to 6.2%. From 1980 to 2004 the proportion of immigrants increased to 12.0%.

Additionally, the racial and ethnic composition of the immigrants changed to include more people of color. From the earliest immigration records to the 1960s, European immigrants were the vast majority of newcomers to the United States. By 1980, European immigrants accounted for less than 20 percent of the legal admissions. Overall, the number of European immigrants decreased from roughly 1.3 million between 1951 and 1960 to about 800,000 between 1971 and 1980 (*INS Statistical Yearbook* 2000). On the other hand, third world immigrants increased from 800,000 in the 1950s to over 1.8 million in the 1970s. As Figure 3.3 shows, the American racial divide changed dramatically over the last fifty years. The graph, on the left side of the figure, shows the change in the proportion of Blacks, Latinos, and immigrants. The solid line represents the proportion of the American population made up of Blacks based on the U.S. Census (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000) and the Population Survey (2004). The line is relatively flat as the Black proportion of the U.S. population increased by 1.7%. The more dramatic changes involve the Latino[11] and immigrant populations[12]. The proportion of Latinos and immigrant populations almost tripled in size to 12.5% by 2000. Further, Latinos are now the largest minority in the United States and the legal immigration population is the same size as the Black population.

(Figure 3.3 about here)

[11] The proportion of Latino in the United States starts with the 1970 U.S. Census since the 1960 census lacked a Latino option as an ethnic or racial category in the survey.

[12] The Latino and immigrant lines are not exactly parallel but there is a significant overlap between the two groups since the categories are not mutually exclusive and many immigrants over this time frame are Latino.

Due to the zero sum nature of population proportions, a rise in one or more groups must correspond with a decline in another group. In the case of the United States, the White majority declined as shown in the second graph. In nearly a half a century, the White proportion of the U.S. population declined from nearly 90% to roughly 65% between 1960 and 2000. If the trend continues, the White population is likely to decline below 50% by 2042. Table 3.2 shows the changes for the White population. In 48 of the 50 states, the proportion of Whites decreased between 1960 and 2004. The proportion of the White population increased slightly in South Carolina and Mississippi. In both states the increasing proportion of the White population is a result of the decreasing percentage of the Black population and the lower than average growth in the Latino and immigrant populations. The pattern is mixed for the Black population, as seen in Table 3.3. The overall pattern is a shift from the southern states to the other regions of the country. Blacks have mostly migrated to the upper Midwest and East Coast states.

(Table 3.2 about here)

(Table 3.3 about here)

At the state-level, the distribution of racial groups varies across space and time. First, once immigrants gain entry into the United States, they are free to move to any state. Second, internal migration patterns result in unequal distribution of racial groups. Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the composition of racial groups for 1960 and 2004,

as well as, the change in racial groups between these two time points. Table 3.4 shows the demographic changes for Latinos at the state-level between 1970 and 2004[13]. Every state experienced an increase in the Latino population between 1970 and 2004. The Latino population is concentrated in several states, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, California, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, and New Mexico, which contain 80% of the Latinos in 2000 (Pew 2005). On the other hand, the immigration demographic patterns, in Table 3.5, are not as clear as those for Latinos. The immigrant population increased in the majority of states. In sum, immigrants and Latinos represent the largest change in the American population in the last half century.

(Table 3.4 about here)

(Table 3.5 about here)

The change in immigration patterns from European and Canadian immigrants to Hispanic and Asian immigrants creates a tangled web in understanding the impact of immigration on American politics. Previous waves of immigrants resulted in cultural conflicts between Italian, Irish, Polish, and other European immigrants with Americans. Previous immigration waves have been romanticized in popular culture. Many Americans mistakenly believe that modern immigrants desire to keep their cultural identities and native languages in a way that past immigrants did not (Chavez 2001; 2008). In reality, current immigrants and natives hold similar views of what it means to be American (Schildkraut 2011). In addition, immigrants value learning English

[13] The U.S. Census began collecting data on Latinos in 1970.

(Dowling, Ellison, and Leal 2012) and American customs (Schildkraut 2011). And just like the immigrants of the 1800s, current immigrants wish to become American while also holding some of their cultural practices.

Changing immigration levels, by themselves, are neither necessary nor sufficient for creating perceptions of threat that alter individual political attitudes. Immigrants live in segregated areas, work in segmented markets, and many are unable to vote due to lacking citizenship. These factors limit the political and economic threat of immigrants and reduce interactions with natives. Daniel Hopkins (2011) developed the politicized place hypothesis to group conflict. The politicized place hypothesis uses both demographic changes and framing effects to explain anti-immigrant sentiment. Hopkins predicts that individuals will view immigrants as a threat if they are in areas with a sudden inflow of immigrants and negative news coverage that portrays immigrants as economically and culturally threatening. For example, media stories discussing crimes committed by illegal immigrants can result in additional support for "tougher" enforcement of immigration laws.

SITUATIONAL TRIGGERS: CONTEMPORARY MEDIA IMAGES OF IMMIGRANTS

In Chapter 2, I discussed how media images can act as situational triggers that shape political attitudes. I build on that argument in this chapter by presenting evidence that the news coverage of immigrants has increased in frequency since the 1960s. In addition to the increasing frequency of news stories, the frames of the stories have become increasingly negative by portraying immigrants as a threat to American citizens. This

pattern of the prevalence of negative images is similar to Gilens' (1999) content analysis showing that negative news stories on welfare (e.g., welfare queens) were far more likely to be illustrated with images of Blacks, whereas more positive or hopeful stories on poverty were more likely to be illustrated with Whites.

In 1996 magazine cover of the *Atlantic Monthly* shows an image of the Statue of Liberty rewriting her book and the title of the article is "The Price of Immigration: Can we still afford to be a nation of immigrants?" A few years earlier, the same magazine describes immigration as a "tidal flow of refugees" that will result in "wars... fought over scarce resources." According to Chavez, these images are representative of other magazine covers on immigration, including the *National Review*, *Time*, *U.S. News & World Report*, the *Nation*, the *Progressive*, and *Newsweek* (Chavez 2001). Magazine covers have a significant influence on public perceptions about political issues. People are more likely to recall images than words and more likely to recall images even if the person does not read the news story (Gilens 1999).

The media commonly use a negative frame in stories about immigration, emphasizing the cultural and economic threat of immigrants (Chavez 2001). The negative frame found in political rhetoric and media images creates a socially threatening and symbolic image of Latinos and immigrants called the Latino Threat Narrative (Chavez 2008). Chavez's 2001 study examines magazine covers from 1965 to 1999 for ten different national magazines. The results suggest that immigration is being framed as an "invasion" of poor Latinos that threatens American society. The Latino Threat Narrative appeared on 64.5% of the studied magazine covers. Only 10.5% of the covers are considered neutral and 25% of the covers are affirmative or positive images of

immigrants. Additionally, the negative trend of magazine covers with immigration images is increasing, as is the number of covers using negative frames of immigrants. Chavez's analysis of magazine covers spans 1965 to 1999. The earliest cover is a *U.S. News and World Report* on July 22, 1974 (Chavez 2001, p. 16). Not a single magazine in Chavez's study had a cover on immigration from 1965 to 1974. Over the next twenty-four years, seventy-six magazine covers were published with images on immigration, as seen in Figure 3.5. The number of covers per decade is pretty consistent with twenty covers during the 1970s and twenty-eight covers in both the 1980s and 1990s. During the 1970s, 50% of the covers have positive images and slightly less than 50% have negative images of immigrants. By the 1990s, the proportion of positive covers decreases to 14.3% but the proportion of negative or alarmist covers increases to 71.4%.

(Figure 3.4 about here)

(Figure 3.5 about here)

Magazine covers are only one form of the popular media that may be more oriented to attentive or educated publics than other news outlets. A more popular news source is the evening news on the major networks. Data on the evening news are archived at Vanderbilt University. Using a simple keyword search for immigration provides each instance of a news story on immigration starting in the late 1960s through

2008. In Figure 3.6, I graph the number of news stories about immigration by year[14]. The number of immigration stories clearly increases since the 1960s.

(Figure 3.6 about here)

To simplify the distribution of Figure 3.6, I report the mean number of television news stories on immigration for each year in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in Figure 3.7, which shows that the average number of news stories per year increases for each decade. Across the three decades, I find an almost 200% increase in the number of news stories on immigration. A smaller increase in the average number of news stories on immigration occurs between the 1980s and the 1990s. Finally, a significant and dramatic surge in stories occurs in the 2000s. The average number of immigration stories per year almost triples in the 2000s and is 700% greater than the number in the 1970s. Unfortunately, my data on television news stories featuring immigration can only show the overall volume of stories and how the volume changes over time. I do not have data about the tone of television coverage.

(Figure 3.7 about here)

In conclusion, the number of news stories and magazine covers focusing on immigration increased over the last few decades. Following theories of agenda setting,

[14] I limit the analysis of television news stories to the "loudness" hypothesis or the number of stories over time due to the amount of time that would be required to watch, analyze, and code each news story's media frame. I assume that the media frame for television news stories show immigrants as a threat to U.S. society, criminals, and made up of individuals from a different ethnic and racial background. This assumption is based the pattern found in regards to magazine covers on this issue (Chavez 2001).

increased coverage of immigration likely led to the public viewing immigration as a more important political issue. Unfortunately, it is difficult to directly test the influence of media coverage of immigration and public attitudes about immigration over time. For example, Gallup rarely included an immigration survey question until after the issue gained national attention in the late 1990s. Before 1999, Gallup surveys included questions about immigration in five surveys: 1965, 1977, 1986, 1993, and 1995. The Gallup data is not a complete loss; in 1965 one-third of respondents wanted to decrease immigration levels. By 1995, the year before welfare reform and the year after Contract with America, nearly 65% of Americans wanted to decrease immigration levels. More recent research provides additional support for the influence of agenda setting on immigration attitudes. Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano (2010) compare newspaper coverage and public opinion data for border and nonborder states in 2006. They find greater newspaper coverage is significantly related to the percentage of the mass public that views immigration as an "important issue" regardless of geographic location.

Research on immigration and the Latino Threat Narrative both find a pattern similar to Gilens' research on welfare news stories and images of Blacks. The end result is that immigrants are viewed as undeserving recipients of welfare, similar to Blacks. Both Blacks and immigrants are believed to have violated American social norms. In the case of Blacks, public perceptions are that "most welfare recipients are taking advantage of the system and would rather sit home and collect benefits than work" (Gilens 1999, p. 5). Gilens' (1999) research shows that these perceptions are paralleled in stereotypes of Blacks as being lazy. In the early 1990s, the public also viewed Latinos as being lazy. The correlation between 1992 Black and Latino work-ethic stereotypes is .494 ($p<.05$).

Some political elites viewed immigrants as being lazy and the U.S. welfare system as a magnet that attracted lazy immigrants (Haskins 2009). Public perceptions about immigrants are not limited to their work ethic. Other negative stereotypes of immigrants include the view that immigrants have yet to pay into the welfare system, illegal immigrants are falsely believed not to pay taxes, and immigrants send money to their native country (Chavez 2010; Crepaz 2008; Haskins 2009). On the surface, one can argue that these perceptions result in immigrants being perceived by natives as an economic threat. As I show in Chapter 4, the driving force to limit immigrant access to welfare is authoritarianism due to a lack of social conformity by immigrants.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I built on a dynamic theory of situational triggers and predisposing factors by providing a historical narrative about how immigration politics changed over the last fifty years. The increasing size of the immigrant population and media stories with negative frames create cues from both political elites and the environment. These political cues are in turn influenced by existing predisposing factors that from a worldview linking immigration to other political issues, such as welfare.

The combination of the findings on immigration patterns and media stories with worldview evolution help explain when we should see immigration as a polarizing issue. Immigration was not one of the issues that candidates in the 1960s used to clarify their political positions from one and another. But as the immigrant population grew, we find Democrats and Republicans taking competing positions on the issue and connecting the issue to domestic policies. In addition, the issue vertically cuts across the political

landscape as the state governments adopt restrictive immigration policies, a domain that has been restricted to the federal government since 1875.

In Chapter 4, I discuss four predisposing factors: authoritarianism, racial stereotypes, economic self-interest, and political identifications. I build on this chapter by investigating a relationship between situational triggers and the four predisposing factors to explain the relationship between attitudes toward welfare and immigration at the individual-level. In Chapter 5, I use the findings from Chapters 3 and 4 to predict which states will limit immigrant access to welfare through an opinion-policy linkage.



Figure 3.1. The Pathway of Issue Evolution.
Source: Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1986. "On the Structure and Sequence of Issue Evolution." *The American Political Science Review* 80(3): 901-920.



Figure 3.2. Significant Immigration Policy and Immigration Levels.
Source: Percentage of Foreign Born (U.S. Census Bureau). Immigration acts (Tichenor, Daneil J. 2002. *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press).



Figure 3.3. Population Change among Immigrants, Blacks, Whites, and Latinos from 1960-2004.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau



Figure 3.4. Distribution of Magazine Covers on Immigration by Type and Decade.
Source: Chavez, Leo R. 2001. *Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation*. Berkley: University of California Press.



Figure 3.5. Number of Immigration Magazine Covers by Year, 1965-1999.
Source: Chavez, Leo R. 2001. *Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation*. Berkley: University of California Press.



Figure 3.6. Number of National News Stories on Immigration by Year, 1965-2008.
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive



Figure 3.7. Mean Number of News Stories on Immigration.
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive

Table 3.1. The Preferential Categories of the Immigration Act of 1965.

Preference	Description	Number Allotted (%)
Exempt	Spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens	No Limit
First	Unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens	58,000 (20%)
Second	Spouses and unmarried children of permanent aliens	58,000 (20%)
Third	Professionals	29,000 (10%)
Fourth	Married children of U.S. citizens	29,000 (10%)
Fifth	Adult brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens	69,600 (24%)
Sixth	Skilled and unskilled labor needed for labor shortages	29,000 (10%)
Seventh	Refugees	17,400 (6%)

Source: Tichenor, Daneil J. 2002. *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 216.

Table 3.2. The Change in White Populations between 1960-2004 at the State Level.

State	1960 White Population (%)	2004 White Population (%)	White Population Change (%)	State	1960 White Population (%)	2004 White Population (%)	White Population Change (%)
AL	69.9	69.5	-0.4	MT	96.4	89.1	-7.3
AK	77.2	66.9	-10.3	NE	97.4	85.7	-11.7
AZ	89.8	61.1	-28.7	NV	92.3	61.2	-31.1
AR	78.1	77.2	-0.9	NH	99.6	94.3	-5.3
CA	92.0	44.5	-47.5	NJ	91.3	63.8	-27.5
CO	97.0	72.5	-24.5	NM	92.1	43.5	-48.6
CT	95.6	75.9	-19.7	NY	91.1	61.1	-30.0
DE	86.1	70.2	-15.9	NC	74.6	68.6	-6.0
FL	82.1	62.8	-19.3	ND	98.0	91.1	-6.9
GA	71.4	60.2	-11.2	OH	91.8	83.3	-8.5
HI	32.0	23.3	-8.7	OK	90.5	72.9	-17.6
ID	98.5	87.2	-11.3	OR	97.9	82.0	-15.9
IL	89.4	66.2	-23.2	PA	92.4	82.9	-9.5
IN	94.1	84.6	-9.5	RI	97.6	80.5	-17.1
IA	99.0	91.7	-7.3	SC	65.1	65.6	0.5
KS	95.4	81.9	-13.5	SD	96.0	87.1	-8.9
KY	92.8	88.7	-4.1	TN	83.5	78.1	-5.4
LA	67.9	61.8	-6.1	TX	87.4	49.8	-37.6
ME	99.4	96.1	-3.3	UT	98.1	83.8	-14.3
MD	83.0	59.8	-23.2	VT	99.8	96.0	-3.8
MA	97.6	80.8	-16.8	VA	79.2	68.7	-10.5
MI	90.6	78.1	-12.5	WA	96.4	77.5	-18.9
MN	98.8	86.7	-12.1	WV	95.1	94.4	-0.7
MS	57.7	60.0	2.3	WI	97.6	86.2	-11.4
MO	90.8	83.1	-7.7	WY	97.8	88.6	-9.2

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Table 3.3. The Change in Black Populations between 1960-2004 at the State Level.

State	1960 Black Population (%)	2004 Black Population (%)	Black Population Change (%)	State	1960 Black Population (%)	2004 Black Population (%)	Black Population Change (%)
AL	30.0	26.0	-4.0	MT	0.2	0.3	0.1
AK	3.0	3.4	0.4	NE	2.1	3.6	1.5
AZ	3.3	3.0	-0.3	NV	4.7	6.9	2.2
AR	21.8	15.3	-6.5	NH	0.3	0.8	0.5
CA	5.6	6.2	0.6	NJ	8.5	13.1	4.6
CO	2.3	4.0	1.7	NM	1.8	2.3	0.5
CT	4.2	9.3	5.1	NY	8.4	15.8	7.4
DE	13.6	19.8	6.2	NC	24.5	21.2	-3.3
FL	17.8	15.1	-2.7	ND	0.1	0.6	0.5
GA	28.5	28.7	0.2	OH	8.1	11.7	3.6
HI	0.8	1.7	0.9	OK	6.6	7.1	0.5
ID	0.2	0.3	0.1	OR	1.0	1.7	0.7
IL	10.3	14.7	4.4	PA	7.5	10.0	2.5
IN	5.8	8.1	2.3	RI	2.1	5.5	3.4
IA	0.9	2.2	1.3	SC	34.8	28.9	-5.9
KS	4.2	5.1	0.9	SD	0.2	0.8	0.6
KY	7.1	6.8	-0.3	TN	16.5	16.3	-0.2
LA	31.9	32.5	0.6	TX	12.4	11.0	-1.4
ME	0.3	0.6	0.3	UT	0.5	0.8	0.3
MD	16.7	28.5	11.8	VT	0.1	0.5	0.4
MA	2.2	6.0	3.8	VA	20.6	19.3	-1.3
MI	9.2	14.0	4.8	WA	1.7	3.3	1.6
MN	0.7	4.1	3.4	WV	4.8	3.1	-1.7
MS	42.0	37.2	-4.8	WI	1.9	5.7	3.8
MO	9.0	11.2	2.2	WY	0.7	0.8	0.1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Table 3.4. The Change in Hispanic Populations between 1970-2004 at the State Level.

State	1970 Hispanic Population (%)	2004 Hispanic Population (%)	Hispanic Population Change (%)	State	1970 Hispanic Population (%)	2004 Hispanic Population (%)	Hispanic Population Change (%)
AL	09	2.0	1.91	MT	1.1	2.2	1.1
AK	2.1	4.8	2.7	NE	1.4	7.0	5.6
AZ	17.3	28.1	10.8	NV	5.6	22.9	17.3
AR	.05	4.4	4.35	NH	0.4	2.1	1.7
CA	13.7	34.9	21.2	NJ	4.3	15.0	10.7
CO	11.6	19.2	7.6	NM	37.4	43.4	6.0
CT	2.4	10.6	8.2	NY	8.0	16.1	8.1
DE	1.1	5.9	4.8	NC	0.4	6.1	5.7
FL	6.6	19.1	12.5	ND	0.3	1.1	0.8
GA	.06	6.7	6.64	OH	0.9	2.2	1.3
HI	3.0	7.9	4.9	OK	1.4	6.4	5.0
ID	2.6	8.9	6.3	OR	1.7	9.6	7.9
IL	3.3	14.0	10.7	PA	0.9	3.7	2.8
IN	1.3	4.4	3.1	RI	0.7	10.5	9.8
IA	0.6	3.7	3.1	SC	0.4	3.0	2.6
KS	2.1	6.1	4.0	SD	0.4	1.7	1.3
KY	0.3	1.9	1.6	TN	0.4	2.9	2.5
LA	1.9	2.7	0.8	TX	17.7	34.9	17.2
ME	0.4	0.9	0.5	UT	4.1	10.6	6.5
MD	1.4	5.4	4.0	VT	0.6	0.9	0.3
MA	1.1	7.7	6.6	VA	1.0	5.8	4.8
MI	1.4	3.6	2.2	WA	2.1	8.5	6.4
MN	0.6	3.5	2.9	WV	0.4	0.6	0.2
MS	0.4	1.5	1.1	WI	0.9	4.4	3.5
MO	0.9	2.6	1.7	WY	5.6	6.7	1.1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Table 3.5. The Change in Immigrant Populations between 1970 -2004 at the State Level.

State	1960 Immigrant Population (%)	2004 Immigrant Population (%)	Immigrant Population Change (%)	State	1960 Immigrant Population (%)	2004 Immigrant Population (%)	Immigrant Population Change (%)
AL	0.5	2.5	1.91	MT	4.5	1.6	-2.9
AK	3.6	6.1	2.7	NE	2.9	4.9	2.0
AZ	5.4	14.4	10.8	NV	4.6	18.0	13.4
AR	0.4	3.6	4.35	NH	7.4	4.9	-2.5
CA	8.5	26.8	21.2	NJ	10.1	18.8	8.7
CO	3.4	9.7	7.6	NM	2.3	9.2	6.9
CT	10.9	11.6	8.2	NY	13.6	21.0	7.4
DE	3.3	7.6	4.8	NC	0.5	6.5	6.0
FL	5.5	17.9	12.5	ND	4.7	2.5	-2.2
GA	0.6	8.4	6.64	OH	4.1	3.5	-0.6
HI	10.9	18.5	4.9	OK	0.9	4.4	3.5
ID	2.3	5.9	6.3	OR	4.0	9.2	5.2
IL	6.8	13.3	10.7	PA	5.3	4.7	-0.6
IN	2.0	3.9	3.1	RI	10.0	12.3	2.3
IA	2.0	3.1	3.1	SC	0.5	3.9	3.4
KS	1.5	4.8	4.0	SD	2.7	1.7	-1.0
KY	0.6	2.4	1.6	TN	0.4	3.8	3.4
LA	0.9	2.9	0.8	TX	3.1	15.1	12.0
ME	6.2	3.0	0.5	UT	3.6	7.0	3.4
MD	3.0	11.0	4.0	VT	6.0	3.9	-2.1
MA	11.2	13.7	6.6	VA	1.2	9.5	8.3
MI	6.8	6.1	2.2	WA	6.3	11.3	5.0
MN	4.2	6.1	2.9	WV	1.3	0.8	-0.5
MS	0.4	1.3	1.1	WI	4.3	4.1	-0.2
MO	1.8	3.2	1.7	WY	2.9	3.0	0.1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

CHAPTER FOUR

Triggering Predisposing Factors: How Immigration Undermines Support for Welfare

"In the first place we should insist that if the immigrant who comes here in good faith becomes an American and assimilates himself to us... We have room for but one language here, and that is the English language...and we have room for but one sole loyalty and that is a loyalty to the American people." Theodore Roosevelt in a letter to the American Defense League (1919)

INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 dramatically altered the U.S. welfare system. PRWORA eliminated federal entitlements to cash benefits, increased work requirements, increased devolution of policymaking authority to the states (e.g., Fellowes and Row 2004; Soss et. al. 2001), and increased restrictions on immigrants' access to welfare programs (Graefe et. al. 2008; Hero and Preuhs 2007). These historic changes to welfare policy make it important to understand the climate of opinion and the determinants of welfare attitudes that existed in the 1990s, prior to passage of PRWORA. Understanding public opinion is important since other studies have demonstrated that public opinion is an important predictor of the type of welfare policies adopted nationally (e.g., Brooks and Manza 2007; Crepaz 2008).

In Chapter 2, I proposed a theoretical framework of how forces related to immigration operate as situational triggers that interact with predisposing factors to shape

opposition to welfare as shown in the bold part of Figure 4.1. In Chapter 3, I examine the historical development of the relevant situational triggers -- patterns of immigration and its portrayal in the news. But which predisposing factors are associated with support for welfare and immigrants' access to it?

(Figure 4.1 about here)

To answer this question, I examine individual attitudes in this chapter. I begin with a discussion of four predisposing factors: economic self-interest (social class), political identifications (partisanship and ideology), racial and ethnic stereotypes, and authoritarianism. I discuss how each factor connects to preferences on policy attitudes for immigration levels and indirectly influences welfare preferences (i.e., spending preferences and support for immediate immigrant access to welfare). The connection between predisposing factors, immigration, and welfare spending preferences is not an easy matter to sort out. The statistical evidence indicates that one of the four factors, authoritarianism consistently predicts policy preferences regarding welfare and immigration policy and the intersection between the two (i.e., immigrants' access to welfare).

FOUR PREDISPOSING FACTORS

Immigration patterns and news coverage act as situational triggers by activating predisposing factors that decrease support for welfare. The Latino Threat Narrative is the media image of immigrants as an illegal invasion of culturally different individuals who

are unwilling to conform to American social norms and are "stealing" American jobs (Chavez 2008). The Latino Threat Narrative contains multiple frames that can trigger all four factors: economic self-interest, political identifications, authoritarianism, and racial stereotypes. I hypothesize that patterns of immigration activate different predisposing factors, which in turn decrease support for welfare. Below I discuss the theoretical justification for expecting each of the predisposing factors to influence policy preferences toward welfare and immigration policies.

Self-Interest

Campbell and his co-authors described Americans as having a "primitive self-interest" or self-interest without ideological pretensions (1960). The economic self-interest thesis assumes that individuals seek to increase their economic resources and hold many policy preferences that are congruent with their material self-interest (Feldman 1982). Individuals are more likely to support public policies when they perceive themselves as directly benefitting from the policy. Less affluent individuals, for example, are expected to be more supportive of social spending programs because they benefit from them materially. By contrast, middle and upper class individuals pay the costs of these programs without seeing much direct benefit themselves, and are thus expected to oppose welfare programs.

Research provides only mixed support for the economic self-interest thesis in the area of welfare policy and other policy domains (Feldman 1982; Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; other domains includes Citrin and Green 1990; Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen 1980; Sears and Funk 1990). Kinder and Sanders (1996) find a significant but weak relationship between economic self-interest and support for a range of racial policy

preferences among Blacks and Whites, including fair employment, school desegregation, federal spending, government effort, preferential hiring, and college admission quotas. Measures of economic self-interest, such as income, occupation, education, homeownership, and the number of children are only weak predictors of policy preferences. On the other hand, Gilens (1999, p. 52-53) finds a statistically significant relationship between an individual's income and support for welfare: as income increases the likelihood of supporting additional welfare spending decreases. However, he finds that stereotypes of Blacks and other factors are much more important in explaining opposition to welfare policy.

Shifting the focus from welfare preferences to immigration policy preferences, economic self-interest, for the most part, seems to be a secondary explanation to symbolic considerations - i.e., the other three predisposing factors (e.g., Citrin et. al. 1997; Kehrberg 2007; McLaren 2003; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Voss, Kehrberg, and Butz 2013). Several scholars find a relationship between economic self-interest and immigration preferences (e.g., Fetzer 2000; Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Wilson 2001). The *fiscal burden hypothesis* predicts that the middle and upper classes will oppose more liberal immigration and generous welfare policies because they pay more of the costs of social spending for immigrants' access to social programs without themselves qualifying to receive benefits (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). On the other hand, the *labor market hypothesis* predicts a positive relationship between income and immigration policy preferences due to job market competition (Mayda 2006; Quillian 2005; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Low

skilled labor and the lower class compete with immigrants for jobs and, as a result, hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants, whereas highly skilled labor and members of the upper class have more positive attitudes toward immigrants because they are less likely to compete with them for jobs.

In conclusion, I expect a significant but weak relationship between economic self-interest, measured as income (see discussion in research design section for justification of this measure), and welfare preferences, welfare chauvinism (opposition to immigrants' access to welfare), and immigration levels. I do not expect the relationship to be in the same direction for each dependent variable, however. Based on research by Gilens (1999), I predict that as income increases, support for generous welfare programs decreases ($Hypothesis_1$). In addition, based on the fiscal burden hypothesis, income should be negatively related to support for immediate immigrant access to welfare programs (H_2). In other words, individuals with higher incomes are expected to oppose access to welfare programs. When it comes to support for increasing immigration levels, however, the labor market hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between income and preferences for increasing immigration levels (H_3).

Political Identifications

For some scholars, policy preferences are not based so much on negative racial attitudes, self-interest, or authoritarianism, but on political identifications (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Political identifications are general orientations, such as party identification and liberal-conservative identification (often referred to as "ideology," which is something of a misnomer), that orient citizens to groups they like and dislike and serve as heuristics for

interpreting ambiguous political information and inferring one's policy positions (Conover and Feldman 1981). For example, Sniderman and Piazza (1993, 45) wrote that "contemporary American society is divided by ideological outlook, with liberals differing systematically from conservatives." Political identifications have a symbolic and affective component that serve as a form of group consciousness that can be triggered by political issues (Levitin and Miller 1979; Conover and Feldman 1981). As such, political identifications act "as a basis for social differentiation" (Conover and Feldman 1981, p. 622).

I focus on two types of political identification that have wide currency in American politics: partisanship and ideology, which research suggests play a similar role in guiding issue preferences, with one important difference: ideological identifications tend to be less widespread than partisan identifications (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Conover and Feldman 1981; Fiorina 1977; Gerber and Green 1998; Levendusky 2009). Partisanship has received more attention in the literature. Scholars have conceptualized the influence of political identifications on policy attitudes in several different ways. The original conceptualization of partisanship in *The American Voter* viewed partisanship as a loyalty developed early in life that was stable throughout adulthood and was largely impervious to new contrary information (i.e., Campbell et al 1960; summarized by Fiorina 1981). In contrast to this view, Fiorina (1981, p. 84) viewed partisanship as a running tally that is constantly updated with new information and "retrospective evaluations of party promises and performance." Gerber and Green (1998) have expanded on Fiorina's notion of a running tally where partisans follow the principles of Bayesian learning in updating their priors based on new information.

Bartels (2002) takes exception to the view of partisanship as a running tally updated through Bayesian learning, and he marshals a variety of survey evidence to show that partisans often distort information to preserve their prior identifications and commitments. More recent experimental evidence amplifies Bartels' position, finding that partisans often act as motivated reasoners whose judgments are influenced by selective perceptions and disconfirmation biases (Taber and Lodge 2006).

Regardless of the exact process that partisans follow in processing political information, nearly everyone agrees that one of the most common and useful functions of partisanship is that it serves as a heuristic, an information shortcut, that allows individuals "to make reasonable decisions with minimal cognitive effort in all aspects of their lives" (Lau and Redlawsk 2001, p. 952). Individuals can use partisanship and ideology of elites as a form of cue-taking. In addition, partisans rely heavily on cues from party elites when interpreting information (Berinsky 2007, Zaller 1992). For my purposes, partisan and ideological identifications are important predictors of many policy preferences because individuals use political identifications to determine which cues are accepted from elites that in turn influence individual policy preferences. And for this reason, divisions between party elites on various issues are often reflected in similar divisions in the same issues among the parties in the electorate.

Thus, the association between political identities and policy attitudes often depends on the clarity of partisan cues and whether the parties and candidates have taken distinct positions on the issue (see the discussion on issue evolution and clarification in Chapter 3). As an economic issue, the parties' positions on welfare policy have been distinct since the New Deal era. Welfare has been described as one of the most divisive political

issues in American politics (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Conservatives and Republicans have traditionally supported cutting or eliminating welfare programs, while liberals and Democrats have fought to preserve them (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).

On the other hand, the issue of immigration has historically been a crosscutting political issue (Freeman 1995; Tichenor 2002), meaning that support and opposition to immigration could often be found on both sides of the left-right divide. Until recently, support for liberal and conservative immigration policies could not be easily predicted by the ideology or party membership of elites. Traditionally, classic exclusionists opposed immigration reform while free-market and big business Republicans provide support. On the other side, Democrats with strong labor unions opposed immigration reforms,while those in more cosmopolitan (multi-cultural liberal) legislative districts support liberal and progressive reforms (Tichenor 2002).

The combination of the two issues, welfare and immigration, can create the necessary cues from partisan elites for the masses to use political identifications when forming attitudes about immigrants and domestic programs. In the 1990s, the political rhetoric shifted from border control to immigration's influence on domestic programs (Calavita 1996; Faist 1994). This rhetoric quickly became partisan. For example, in 1996, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich summarized the Republican position by saying, "Come to America for opportunity. Do not come to America to live off the law-abiding American taxpayer."

In summary, I expect a significant and consistent relationship between political identifications (partisanship and political ideology) and policy preferences that involve

welfare programs (welfare preferences and welfare chauvinism). I predict that, in 1992, conservatives and Republicans will support less spending for welfare programs (H_4-H_5) and a longer waiting period before immigrants are permitted access to benefits from welfare programs (H_6-H_7). I expect a much weaker relationship between political identifications and immigration levels due to the cross-cutting nature of immigration as a political issue early in the 1990s (i.e. before the promotion of an anti-immigrant ballot initiative in California by Governor Pete Wilson in 1994). Democratic and Republican office holders did not yet fully distinguished their positions on the issue of immigration until the 2008 presidential campaign. I predict that political identifications will not significantly predict respondents' preferred level of immigration in 1992 (H_8-H_9).

Racial Stereotypes

Before discussing racial stereotypes and authoritarianism, it is important to briefly discuss the "racialization" and "ethnicization" of contemporary immigration[15], since opposition to immigration often reflects animosity, prejudice, stereotypes and perceived threats of various types from particular immigrant groups. Such fears and animosities are likely influenced more by elite rhetoric and news coverage than experience, since many people do not have direct contact with the group in question. As indicated earlier, the Latino Threat Narrative frames news about Latino immigrants in a way that suggests they are unwilling to integrate into the national community (Chavez 2008). As previously mentioned, the racial and ethnic identity of immigrants has changed from White

[15] I use the term racialization as a synonym for ethnicity. Despite Latinos being an ethnic group and not a race, much of the scholarly literature and survey questions treat Latinos the same as racial minorities, such as Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans (for examples see Lu and Nicholson-Crotty 2010 or Hero and Preuhs 2007). For example the 2000 General Social Survey includes a question saying "Besides whites, what was the largest racial group in your high school [or the last high school you attended] – Blacks/ African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, or American Indians?" (Ellison, Shin, and Leal 2011).

immigrants from developed countries to Latino and Asian immigrants arriving from developing countries. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that forty percent of the U.S. Latino population are immigrants. The overlap between the Latino and immigrant populations influences public perceptions. Survey data by Opinion Research Corporation for CNN Opinion Research (2009) asked a representative sample of Americans if "you saw a Latino man or woman who you did not know. Would you be most likely to assume that they were born in this country, that they immigrated to this country legally, or that they were an illegal immigrant?" Nearly one-half of the respondents answered that they would assume the unknown Latino was an immigrant[16], a clear exaggeration of reality, while only thirty-eight percent assumed the individual was a U.S. citizen. The results of the CNN study provide evidence for the hypothesis that immigration is racialized in the minds of many Americans who assume the prototypical Latino is an immigrant, not a U.S. citizen.

A second survey provides further support for the idea that immigration is shifting from a race-neutral policy to a "racialized" policy. Gallup (2008) asked respondents if they preferred the size of the immigrant population from particular regions of the world to increase, decrease, or stay the same. The results of these survey questions are interesting, since 48% of the respondents believed there are too many immigrants from Latin American countries but only 31% felt the same about immigrants from Asian countries (Gallup 2008). Thus, many Americans associate immigration with Latinos, and public perceptions about Latinos influence immigration policy preferences.

Several studies clearly show that an important source of opposition to welfare among Whites is their negative views of Blacks, whom many Whites view as lazy and

[16] 30% answered legal immigrant and 19% answered illegal immigrant.

mistakenly see as the primary beneficiaries of welfare programs (e.g., Gilens 1996; 1998; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997b). Gilens' (1998) study demonstrates that Whites' negative stereotypes of African Americans are strongly linked to Whites' opposition to welfare. He uses two sets of analyses to determine the sources of welfare opposition. One set of analyses uses a correlational approach to estimate the direct and indirect effects of the sources of opposition to welfare spending among Whites. He finds that White opposition to welfare is driven substantially by Whites' beliefs that Blacks are lazy, even after controlling for a host of other factors, including the belief that the poor are lazy. Stereotypes towards Blacks and the poor are confounded since Blacks (and other ethnic minorities) are disproportionately represented among the poor and unemployed.

To compliment the correlational approach, Gilens also uses an experimental design to separate the confounding nature of poverty and race from each other. The welfare mother experiment frames a story about a welfare mother whose race is randomly manipulated. Respondents who are asked about the Black welfare mother register greater opposition to welfare policy in a subsequent portion of the survey. The results indicate that attitudes toward Blacks impact individual perceptions of and support for welfare policies. Specifically, the studies suggest that when many Whites think about welfare, they think about *Black* welfare mothers.

Further, immigration has developed into an important news story and political elites have argued that immigrants are net benefactors of welfare programs (Tichenor 2002). For example, the November cover of *Atlantic Monthly* had the headline “The Price of Immigration” (Chavez 2001, p. 199). In California, Governor Wilson supported and

campaigned for Proposition 187, a ballot initiative that would eliminate the social rights of illegal immigrants from receiving government benefits from 200 state programs. These images may have a similar influence on welfare attitudes as Black stereotypes (Gilens 1995; 1998; 1999). For example, the majority of magazine covers either picturing immigrants as a threat to the American society or as culturally different from Americans show Latinos (Chavez 2001; 2008). Many magazine covers highlighted Mexican immigrants as the "enemy within," an invading force, or a nation within the nation. As such, I expect individuals who view Latinos as being lazy, relative to the work-ethic stereotypes of Whites (see my discussion below for more details of this measure), are more likely to prefer lower welfare spending levels (H_{10}), lower immigration levels (H_{11}), and a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare programs (H_{12}).

Authoritarianism

The Latino Threat Narrative also increases perceptions of threat from foreigners who challenge the existing social and political order, which are likely to trigger authoritarianism, an orientation long associated with ethnocentrism and hostility toward a variety of outgroups (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009). Authoritarianism is a general orientation "concerned with the appropriate balance between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity, on the other hand" (Stenner 2005; p. 14). A core component of authoritarianism is social conformity (Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005), defined as "a desire for an orderly and structured world" (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992, p. 400). A need for social order among authoritarians leads to a black-and-white view of the world that distinguishes sharply

between ingroups and outgroups (Altemeyer 1981; 1996; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Katz 1960; Stenner 2005; Walker 2009). As a result, authoritarians are much more likely than non-authoritarians to express prejudice toward a range of outgroups that are perceived to challenge the existing social and political order. Authoritarians are much more likely to perceive threats from such outgroups and to prefer policies designed to minimize such threats, including an aggressive military posture in world affairs and restrictions on the immigration of groups perceived to be racially or culturally different from "true" Americans (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009). Authoritarians are more likely than non-authoritarians to view immigrants as an alien out-group. Immigrants are commonly portrayed as being "unwilling or incapable of integrating, of becoming part of the national community" (Chavez 2008, p. 2) resulting in "the failure of Mexican-Americans over several generations to increase their identification with American values" (Huntington 2004, p. 242)[17].

Exaggerated perceptions of the differences between ingroups and outgroups fuel authoritarians' jaundiced view of outgroups and a preference for largely punitive policies that restrict the social, economic and political rights of out-groups. Authoritarians support the aggressive and "harsh application of rules" (Adorno et. al. 1950) with a preference for policies that either punish or eliminate threats to conformity (Stenner 2005). There is a long tradition of research in the social sciences finding that authoritarians are not only prejudiced toward outgroups but are politically intolerant toward them as well, meaning

[17] The concern over the failure of immigrants to assimilate American values may not accurately reflect reality (Schildkraut 2011).

that they support limiting their civil liberties (e.g., Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005)[18]. As such, I hypothesize that immigrant groups that are branded as alien outgroups will be targeted by authoritarians for a series of harsh and punitive measures. In addition to supporting restrictive immigration policies and policing the borders, authoritarians are likely to oppose welfare as a means to prevent undeserving outgroups, such as immigrants as well as Blacks and other minorities, from receiving support. Despite the fact that welfare programs are designed to be ethnically and racially neutral, welfare programs become a mechanism for enhancing social solidarity by "defining structures of social and political inclusion and exclusion" (Lieberman 2003, p. 30). As a result, authoritarians have a preference for welfare policies "to become more aggressive in enforcing social order, defining behavioral expectations, and demanding self-discipline from the poor" (Soss, Fording and Schram 2011, p. 63). In this way, support for welfare is predicted by group identities with support for limiting access to out-group members (Kinder and Kam 2009; Theiss-Morse 2009) by adopting restrictive policies (Stenner 2005).

Based on the foregoing discussion, I hypothesize that, compared to non-authoritarians (i.e., those who score on the lower half of the authoritarianism scale described below), authoritarians are more likely to prefer lower welfare spending (H_{13}), more restrictive immigration policies (H_{14}) and a longer waiting period before immigrants are deemed eligible for welfare benefits (H_{15}).

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

[18] Recent research has studied the relationship between authoritarianism and a wider range of issues including immigration (Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and support for the war on terror (Hetherington and Suhay 2011).

In the analysis, I examine whether non-Latino Whites' attitudes toward welfare and immigration are a function of predisposing factors and situational triggers. I limit the analysis to non-Latino Whites because, unfortunately, the American National Election Study (ANES) survey studies rarely oversamples Blacks and Latinos in order to have representative samples of these two groups.

Dependent Measures

I use questions from the 1992 ANES to measure welfare spending preferences, welfare chauvinism, and immigration preferences[19]. The 1992 ANES has two important advantages over other surveys. First, the 1992 ANES includes a question that directly asks respondents about immigrant access to welfare, my measure of welfare chauvinism. This question is rarely included in surveys and the 1992 ANES is the only survey that I am aware of that includes this welfare chauvinism question and the necessary items to measure authoritarianism, an important independent variable of interest. Second, the 1992 ANES comes before the 1996 welfare reforms, allowing me to study public opinion that influenced which reforms were adopted.

Policy preferences are the dependent variables in the analysis. Each of the dependent variables are coded from more conservative to more liberal preferences. To measure support for welfare, I use a general question asking individuals about their preferred welfare spending levels used by Gilens and others. Respondents are asked "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the

[19] Please see Appendix A for further discussion about variable selection, exact question and response wording, and details about variable coding for all dependent and independent variables.

right amount. First (welfare) . . . are we spending too much (coded as -1), too little (coded as 1), or about the right amount (coded as 0) on (welfare)?" I use a similarly designed question to measure immigration attitudes. Respondents are asked "Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little (coded as .5), increased a lot (coded as 1), decreased a little (-.5), decreased a lot (-1), or left the same as it is now (0)?" This survey question is a standard one for measuring attitudes towards immigration policy (see Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Lu and Nicholson-Crotty 2010; Voss, Kehrberg, Butz 2013). Finally, the 1992 ANES includes a question that captures individuals' attitudes on welfare chauvinism by directly asking about preferences for immigrants' access to welfare with the following question: "Do you think that immigrants who come to the U.S. should be eligible as soon as they come here for government services such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, Welfare (coded 1), or should they have to be here a year or more? (coded 0)." A more ideal question would allow more differentiation in responses and allow individuals to select a longer waiting period, such as five years, or even a permanent ban on benefits for immigrants. Nevertheless, although the variation in responses to the question is undoubtedly truncated, individuals with more restrictive preferences for immigrants' access to welfare should map onto the two responses, since a waiting period is closer to restrictive preferences than no waiting period.

Independent Measures

As indicated earlier, economic self-interest should guide both immigration attitudes (Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Kunovich 2004; Sniderman et al. 2004; Lahav 2004a; 2004b) and welfare policy preferences (Gilens 1999). To measure economic self-

interest, I follow Gilens and others by using a simple measure of yearly household income in constant dollars. The ANES question asks respondents to indicate the "letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 1991 before taxes." I code the responses into nine categories ranging from less than $5,000 yearly (coded as 0) to more than $105,000 yearly (coded as 1).

I measure authoritarianism with an additive index of four questions on childhood values (e.g., Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). Each childhood values question asks respondents to choose between two desirable values for children, such as being independent or respectful of elders (the authoritarian value option). The wording of the stem of the battery is, "Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have." The four sets of childhood value options are "being independent or respectful of elders," "self-reliance or obedience," "curiosity or good manners," and "being considerate or being well behaved." The wording of the battery is designed to minimize social desirability bias and tap respondents' value priorities for order, conformity, and obedience to authority (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). The authoritarian values in this battery are "respect for elders," "obedience," "good manners," and "being well behaved." Each question is coded as 0 for non-authoritarian values, .5 for the small percentage of respondents who volunteer that both values are equally important, and 1 for authoritarian values (Chronbach's alpha=.674). To recode the additive scale to range

from a low of 0 to a high of 1 (indicating high authoritarianism), I added responses to the four questions together and divided by four.

This measure has several advantages over traditional measures of authoritarianism, such as the F-Scale (Adorno et. al. 1950) and the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) measure (Altemeyer 1981). As Feldman (2003) points out, previous measures of authoritarianism, such as Altemeyer's (1988) RWA index, included questions that asked about prejudice, intolerance, and conservatism, which made predicting prejudice and the like from authoritarianism tautological. By contrast, the child values measure is clearly distinct from the attitudes it is designed to predict (Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Suhay 2011)[20].

To measure party partisanship, I use a 7-point Party ID scale developed by the ANES based on multiple questions starting with an individual's general partisanship to how strongly or weakly they consider their partisanship. The partisanship scale ranges from "strong Democrat" (coded as 0) to "strong Republican" (coded as 1). In addition, individuals were given the option of picking "No preference" or "Other party." I decided to code these respondents (n=5) as Independents (coded as .5) since independents are usually described by the mass media as individuals who are registered as neither Democrats nor Republicans but are registered as independents or members of third political parties. Political ideology is assessed on a seven-point scale asking respondents to self-place themselves on the ideological spectrum. Respondents are asked, "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to

[20] For a more detailed examination of the construct validity of the child-rearing measure and how it relates to other measures of authoritarianism see Hetherington and Weiler (2009, p. 51-58).

extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?” The seven-point scale for political ideology ranges from extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservatives (1).

Due to the racialization of immigration policy, racial stereotypes of Latinos are likely to influence immigration policy preferences. Respondents are told, “Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are “rich." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are "poor." A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.” Afterwards, the respondents are given a series of questions about different groups. For work-ethic stereotypes, the respondents are asked, “The second set of characteristics asks if people in the group tend to be hard-working or if they tend to be lazy.” The respondents rate a series of social groups one at a time. The work-ethic stereotype questions are commonly used in the scholarly literature when conducting research on welfare (see Gilens 1999). The advantage of using the work-ethic stereotypes is that these stereotypes should be influenced by negative media stories about welfare recipients, especially those that include a racial image or frame, that distinguish between deserving and undeserving recipients of government aid. In the early 1990s, some political elites, including Governor Pete Wilson of California, argued that the generous American welfare system was attracting lazy and undesirable immigrants that take advantage of our

government programs. I believe that the work-ethic stereotype question captures these attitudes.

To construct my measure of Latino stereotypes, I code individual assessments for the work ethic of “Whites” and “Hispanics”[21] on a 7-point scale ranging from hardworking (0) to lazy (1). Previous scholars have suggested that respondents use different rating systems (e.g., Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989). For example, one respondent may view all groups as being hardworking and a second respondent may view all groups as being lazy. To make sure that the Latino stereotype measure taps beliefs about Latinos and not a misanthropic view of everyone, scholars recommend subtracting ratings of the target group from ratings of the respondent’s own racial group. The Latino stereotype gap (e.g., Fording, Soss, and Schram 2011), therefore, subtracts Whites’ ratings of the work ethic of “Whites” from their ratings of “Hispanics”. The work ethic measure captures non-Latino Whites’ views of Latinos’ work ethic in relative terms to their perceptions of their own racial group's work ethic[22]. The Latino stereotype gap ranges from -1 to 1, with positive values indicating a belief that Latinos are more hard working than Whites, and negative values indicate the view that Whites are more hardworking than Latinos. In the 1992 survey, 13.32% of Whites rated Whites as more hardworking (-1 on the Latino stereotype gap) while 10.03% rate Latinos as more hard working (1), with 36.25% seeing no difference (0).

Control Variables

[21] For the sake of consistency, I use the term "Latino" throughout the text of this manuscript. The American National Election Study uses the term Hispanic in the actual survey questions. The terms are interchangeable and I do not believe that the use of either term biases the results.

[22] Positive values indicate individuals believe that Latinos are more hard working than whites and negative values indicate that they view whites as being more hardworking than Latinos. Kinder and Mendelberg (1995), Peffley and Hurwitz (2010), and Piston (2010) use a similar coding scheme to estimate racial stereotypes about Blacks relative to Whites.

As Figure 4.1 indicates, individual demographics influence predispositions and policy preferences. Based on previous research, I include several demographic characteristics as control variables: education, female, and age. I include these demographic characteristics since each might shape individual policy preferences. Based on prior research, I expect older individuals, measured in years, to prefer less welfare spending (H_{16}) (Gilens 1999), fewer immigrants (H_{17}) (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kehrberg 2007), and a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare benefits (H_{18}).

More educated individuals should support increasing immigration levels and immediate immigrant access to welfare programs. Education can influence a range of factors, from income to democratic attitudes. Recent research on immigration attitudes found that individuals with higher levels of formal education hold more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). In addition, Gilens found education to be negatively correlated to welfare spending preferences, but the relationship was insignificant (1999, p. 90). To measure education, I use a question asking respondents "What is the highest degree that you have earned?" I coded the responses into a 4-point scale to match the coding developed by Lax and Phillips (2009a; 2009b) used in Chapter 5. The first category includes individuals who did not complete a high school degree (coded as 0). Respondents who have completed a high school degree are coded as .333. Individuals who are attending college or completed a two-year degree are combined into a single category (coded as .667). For the final category, I combine individuals who have completed a bachelor's degree or an advanced degree into a single category (coded as 1). I expect that higher educated individuals are more likely to support increased welfare

spending (H_{19}), increased immigration levels (H_{20}), and immediate access to welfare for immigrants (H_{21}).

Finally, research has found that women (coded as 1) prefer more social services (e.g., Hutchings et. al. 2004) but the research has mixed findings for immigration attitudes with gender gaps in both directions and at other times insignificant results (Beaulieu and Kehrberg 2008). In sum, I expect that females are more likely to prefer increased welfare spending (H_{22}), increased immigrations levels (H_{23}) and less likely to support welfare chauvinism ($H_{24)}$, but I am less certain about a prediction for gender differences on immigration policy and welfare chauvinism. Nevertheless, I include gender in the analysis to eliminate spurious effects that confound the effects of the theoretical variables.

IMMIGRATION, WELFARE, AND PREDISPOING FACTORS: AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

In Chapter 2, I presented a theory explaining why some states restrict immigrant eligibility to welfare programs and other states grant access to immigrants. I argued that the key difference between states is public opinion. To be more precise, I constructed a theory of predisposing factors at the individual level that are triggered by levels of immigration and news coverage that decrease support for generous and inclusive welfare programs, see Figure 4.2. At the state level, I predict that states with larger concentrations of individuals holding specific predisposing factors are more likely to restrict immigrants' access to welfare. In order to test my theory, I follow a three step process that follows the figure presented in Chapter 2. Each step of the analysis builds on

the previous one by using the results to develop expectations for the next step. The first step is to examine the individual level component of my theory in the first portion of the analysis in this chapter. I use this analysis to identify the most important predisposing factors-- authoritarianism and the Latino stereotype gap--that consistently predict the three policy preferences. The second step, also considered in this chapter, will be to include state-level contextual factors in a multilevel analysis of individual-level policy preferences to examine how one trigger, state immigration levels, both activates and shapes predisposing factors. Based on the findings in this chapter, I turn to the third and final step in the analysis in the next chapter (Chapter 5). Based on the individual-level findings that authoritarians prefer less welfare spending, fewer immigrants, and more supportive of a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare, I predict that states with larger populations holding authoritarian attitudes are more likely to limit immigrant access to social spending programs.

I summarize the predicted relationships between the four predisposing factors and the three policy preferences in Table 4.1, with reference to specific hypotheses. Because two of the dependent variables (welfare spending preferences and immigration policy preferences) range from -1 to 1 with three to five categories, I use ordered logistic regression for my analysis. The third policy preference, welfare chauvinism, has three categories ranging between 0 and 1, so I also use ordered logistic regression.

(Table 4.1 about here)

Welfare Spending Preferences

The results from regressing each of the three policy preferences (i.e., welfare spending preferences, immigration policy preferences, and welfare chauvinism) on the four predisposing factors and the control variables (i.e., education, gender, and age) are presented in Table 4.2. The first column for each policy preference provides the estimates for the model including only the control variables. The second column adds the four predisposing factors (authoritarianism, racial stereotypes, self-interest, and political identifications). The far left column of coefficients presents the results from regressing welfare spending preferences on the control variables. Both female and education have a significant direct impact on welfare spending preferences, as more highly educated individuals and males are less likely to support increasing welfare spending, consistent with H_{19} and H_{22}. The coefficient for age is small and far from being significant.

(Table 4.2 about here)

The effect of the control variables should be indirect and mediated by the inclusion of the predisposing factors. In the second column of table 4.2, I report estimates for the equations including the predisposing factors. The effects of demographic factors are clearly muted once the predisposing factors are included. Each of the predisposing factors is significantly related to welfare spending preferences. As predicted, the more traditional determinants of welfare spending preferences – i.e., identifying oneself as conservative and Republican, having higher income, and viewing Latino as less hard-working than Whites- are associated with support for reducing welfare spending. As indicated by the coefficient in the first row of the table, a less traditional determinant of

welfare preferences, authoritarianism, is also associated with a preference for reducing welfare spending. Thus, the results provide support for hypothesis H_{13}.

Immigration Policy Preferences

Shifting to the two middle columns in Table 4.2, I present the ordered logit estimates predicting preferred levels of immigration. Focusing first on the impact of the control variables, as an individual's education increases, so does support for increasing immigration levels. The education coefficient becomes smaller once the predisposing factors are included, but does not lose significance. As Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) have shown, the impact of education on immigration preferences is mediated by self-interest, social tolerance, and democratic attitudes.

Three of the predisposing factors are significant predictors of immigration policy preferences. The coefficients for authoritarianism, ideology, income, and Latino stereotypes are each negatively associated with immigration preferences, as authoritarianism, income, ideology, or Latino stereotypes increase preferences for fewer immigrants also increase. The results are consistent with several of the individual hypothesis in that authoritarians (H_{14}) and individuals who hold negative Latino stereotypes (H_{11}) prefer restricting levels of immigration. An unexpected finding is the significant coefficient for ideology; conservatives are more likely to prefer fewer immigrants than liberals. Although smaller than the impact of ideology for welfare preferences, this results is nevertheless unexpected because I hypothesized an insignificant relationship between ideology and immigration policy preferences due to the lack of divergent positions among ideological elites on the immigration issue in 1992 (H_8). In addition, the labor market hypothesis (H_2) and the fiscal burden hypothesis

setup competing predictions for the relationship between income and immigration preferences. The labor market hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient and the fiscal burden hypothesis predicts a negative relationship. The results in Table 4.2 finds that income is negatively related to immigration levels, that more affluent individuals are more likely than the less affluent to support lower immigration levels. This finding is inconsistent with the labor market hypothesis (H_2), which predicted that the lower class prefers restricting immigration levels to decrease job competition, but supportive of the fiscal burden hypothesis, that more affluent individuals prefer fewer immigrants that can drain social services that the upper class support through taxes (Mayda 2006; Quillian 2005; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

In comparison, partisanship has no discernible impact on immigration preferences, as predicted (H_9). This suggests that party elites had yet to clarify their distinct positions on immigration levels, either increasing or decreasing the population size, but conservatives were already supporting a decrease in immigration levels creating a possible "breeding ground" of support for Republican elites to draw upon.

Welfare Chauvinism

In the final two columns, the dependent variable, welfare chauvinism, indicates whether individuals would rather see immigrants receive immediate access to welfare programs or a one year waiting period before immigrants receive access. Judging from the first column of coefficients where only demographic factors are considered, education and age are significant predictors of welfare chauvinism, while being female is not. Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to support giving immigrants'

immediate access to welfare. On the other hand, older individuals are more supportive of a one year waiting period before allowing immigrants access to welfare benefits.

The estimates for the impact of the predisposing factors on welfare chauvinism are presented in the final column of Table 4.2. Partisan and ideological identification both fall short of statistical significance: knowing one's political identifications provides no real insight into whether they support welfare chauvinism or not. The lack of distinct positions and partisan cues (i.e., clarification) doubtless helps explain the lack of findings here. I expect that over time, as party elites began to diverge more on issues related to immigration, political identifications become more important predictors of these issue preferences. For example McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle (2012) find that ideology significantly predicts immigration attitudes using data from 2006 and 2008.

Three of the predisposing factors — authoritarianism, income (economic self-interest), and the Latino stereotype gap are significantly related to welfare chauvinism. Authoritarians are more likely to prefer a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare programs than non-authoritarians, consistent with (H_{15}). In support of the fiscal burden hypothesis, individuals with higher levels of income are, on average, more supportive of an immigrant waiting period (H_2). Finally, individuals who view Latinos as less hardworking than Whites prefer to restrict immigrants' access to welfare programs by supporting a waiting period before they become eligible (H_{12}).

Overview of Individual-Level Findings

Examining the statistical models for each individual policy preference provides important insights, but a comparison of the coefficients for the predisposing factors across models makes the comparisons easier. Thus, I report the coefficients for only the

predisposing factors in Table 4.3. Looking at the patterns in Table 4.3, several predisposing factors are not consistently significant predictors of all three policy preferences. First, given the traditional economic split between the parties and liberals and conservatives, it is no surprise that both ideology and partisanship are important predictors of welfare spending. But the impact of ideology shrinks considerably for immigration policy, and partisanship becomes insignificant, while neither identification is important for welfare chauvinism, all suggesting that the parties and ideological elites had not yet diverged enough to provide clear cues to the electorate on immigration issues by 1992. An alternative explanation for the non-findings is that ideology and partisanship are too closely related to separate the effects of both predictors in the equations, thus increasing standard errors and making it difficult to find a significant effect for either variable. The correlation between the ideology and partisanship is substantial ($r = .39$, $p<.05$), but not too high to estimate separate coefficients reliably[23]. Rather, the political variables simply fall short in explaining immigration attitudes, especially welfare chauvinism.

(Table 4.3 about here)

Individuals with higher levels of income (our measure of economic self-interest) are less likely to support increasing welfare spending and providing immigrants immediate access to welfare, but surprisingly, are more favorable to reducing immigration levels.

[23] I also estimated the models with an additive index of partisanship and ideology; the new combined measure of political identifications was not significant either. I also estimated the models separately for ideology and party identification, the results are identical in terms of coefficient direction and significance as the models that include both measures.

This is contrary to the labor market hypothesis (H_2), which predicts that as income levels rise, individuals are less opposed to increasing immigration levels because the affluent do not compete with immigrants for jobs and government aid. Exactly why income has this effect is a matter of speculation. One possibility is the framing of immigration in the early 1990s as a drain on government resources. Some political elites, such as Newt Gingrich, portrayed immigrants as flocking to the United States to "live off" government programs instead of being hardworking and contributing to society. One of the goals of the welfare reforms of 1996, studied in Chapter 5, was to end the "magnet effect" of attracting undesirable immigrants and increase the flow of hardworking immigrants. As such, the observed coefficient for income is more consistent with the fiscal burden hypothesis, which assumes that individuals with higher incomes oppose generous welfare policies to immigrants because they pay more of the costs of such programs (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). Individuals concerned about the fiscal burden of immigrants would be more likely to prefer decreasing that burden by lowering immigration levels. Thus, across the three policies, affluent individuals appear to opposing programs (welfare and immigration) that they view as conflicting with their narrow economic self-interest.

The three consistent predictors across all three policy areas are authoritarianism, income, and the Latino stereotype gap. Authoritarians, the affluent, and individuals holding negative Latino stereotypes are more likely to prefer lower levels of welfare spending and immigration levels and less immigrant access to welfare. To gain a better understanding of the impact of these predisposing factors, I compare the effect sizes of authoritarianism, income, and Latino stereotypes by graphing predicted probabilities for

each policy. I simulate the predicted probability of an individual supporting a decrease in welfare spending (value -1), a lot smaller immigrant population (value -1), and a waiting period before immigrants can receive welfare benefits (value 0) by independently shifting each independent variable from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean while holding other independent variables constant[24].

As is evident in Figure 4.2, the three predisposing factors are powerful predictors of policy preferences. I have included descriptive statistics for each variable discussed in Figure 4.2 to allow for comparisons of the simulations to a baseline. Racial stereotypes are the strongest predictor of immigration preferences and welfare chauvinism. Individuals holding negative Latino stereotypes are seven percent more likely to prefer a decrease in welfare spending than individuals who view Latinos as being hard-working relative to their views of Whites' work-ethic. Authoritarians, on the other hand, are five percent more likely to prefer decreased welfare spending than non-authoritarians. In regards to immigration and immigrant welfare access, the racial stereotype gap is the strongest predictor of both variables. Whites that view Latinos as being lazy are almost ten percent (immigration attitudes) and six percent (immigrant welfare access) more likely to prefer restrictive policies than those that view Latinos as being hard working. Income is a powerful predictor of welfare attitudes, as income is shifted from the lower class to upper class, individuals are twelve percent more likely to prefer decreasing welfare spending. The same simulation for immigration preferences (immigration levels and welfare chauvinism) provides smaller predicted probabilities for income with results of four percent for welfare chauvinism and four percent for immigration levels.

[24] All continuous variables were set at their mean value while dichotomous variables, such as female, were set to the value 0 (i.e., male).

Authoritarianism has a smaller substantive impact compared to the Latino stereotype gap, with an increase in the probability of preferring restrictive policies by five percent for immigration to six percent for immigration welfare access in comparison to non-authoritarians. The primary reason for the lower predicted probabilities for authoritarianism is the difference in policy preferences among non-authoritarians (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Hetherington and Weiler (2009) have found that policy preferences vary more among non-authoritarians than authoritarians. For example, 72.8% of non-authoritarians support welfare chauvinism, while 85.25% of authoritarians prefer the same policy. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argued that perceptions of threat, including immigration, alter non-authoritarian policy preferences making them similar to authoritarians in which policies non-authoritarians support.

(Figure 4.2 about here)

Further Exploring Authoritarianism

In the previous section, I showed that authoritarianism is related to three policy preferences with authoritarians preferring less welfare spending, fewer immigrants, and a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare programs. Authoritarianism is a non-traditional predictor of these policy preferences, in the sense that the scholarly literature rarely studies the relationship between authoritarianism, attitudes on immigration, and welfare preferences. Starting with immigration, Hetherington and Weiler (2009, p. 166-171) also find that authoritarians prefer fewer immigrants. Authoritarianism has to this point received less attention as a predictor of welfare preferences. The closest research on authoritarianism and welfare was conducted by

Hurwitz and Peffley, who focused on social conformity (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997a). As discussed earlier, social conformity is a key component, along with submission and aggression, of the personality cluster that forms authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1996). As matter of fact, Hurwitz and Peffley's measure of social conformity includes "three 3-point childhood value priorities" (1999, p. 237). These childhood value priorities are included in the child-rearing measure of authoritarianism that I am using in this dissertation. They find that social conformity significantly predicts a wide range of policy attitudes including welfare, affirmative action, and foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992) and that social conformity is related to racial stereotypes, particularly work-ethic stereotypes (Peffley and Hurwitz 1997a). Finally, I am unaware of any studies that directly test for a relationship between authoritarianism and welfare chauvinism. The majority of the research on welfare chauvinism, as an attitude, focuses on European politics (e.g., Banting 2000; Crepaz 2008; Faist 1994). In the American context, some studies examine immigration and mass support for welfare, but do not include authoritarianism as a predictor, such as the fiscal burden hypothesis discussed earlier in this chapter. Peffley and Hurwitz conduct a more direct test of welfare chauvinism using the 1991 Race and Politics Survey (1997a). They use survey questions asking whether *new immigrants from Europe* who want to work versus those who are in trouble should be able to access welfare programs. White respondents are significantly less likely to support welfare access to new European immigrants who are in trouble (65.6%) than to new European immigrants who want to work (81.9%) (Peffley and Hurwitz 1997a, p. 74). Below, I turn my attention to expanding our understanding of how authoritarianism influences policy preferences by

showing how authoritarians hold different feelings towards specific out-groups in American society and how racial stereotypes mediate and moderate the relationship between authoritarianism and policy preferences.

According to scholars who study authoritarianism, the connection between authoritarianism as a predisposing factor and political attitudes is that authoritarians desire social conformity and view certain outgroups as threats to the established order (e.g., Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). For example, immigrants that primarily speak Spanish are viewed as failing to assimilate and as a threat to the social norm of speaking English (Schildkraut 2005; 2011). As such, I argued that underlying this relationship between authoritarianism and policy preferences is that authoritarians dislike immigrants due to their perceived failure to conform to society. My measure of authoritarianism does not ask about any specific ethnic group. In the next step, I provide evidence that authoritarians hold more negative feelings toward immigrants and illegal immigrants[25] while comparing these feelings to other important ethnic and social groups. The goal is to show that authoritarians are concerned about immigrants and their feelings are significantly lower than non-authoritarians. Each feeling thermometer measures how "favorable" the individual feels about a particular group or person[26] on a continuous scale ranging from 0 (extremely unfavorable) to 100 (extremely favorable)[27].

[25] So far, I have used a measure of immigration policy preferences. The measure relates directly to policy preferences, not individual feelings towards immigrants. It is likely, but not always, that individuals that hold negative feelings towards immigrants also prefer fewer immigrants. In the following analysis, I shift to a more direct measure of feelings towards immigrants.

[26] The order of the feeling thermometer questions randomly varied for each respondent to neutralize question order effects.

[27] Feeling thermometers are not without problems. Research indicates that individuals have different reference points resulting in inter-personal incompability (Brady 1985; Green 1988; Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989). Despite the problem of inter-personal incompability, feeling thermometers tend to meet face

The first two columns of Table 4.4 are OLS regression models with immigration and illegal immigration feeling thermometers as the dependent variable. In both models, authoritarianism is a significant predictor of feelings towards legal and illegal immigrants: authoritarians are more likely to rate immigrants and illegal immigrants harshly than non-authoritarians. These results provide support that authoritarians are concerned about immigration and are more likely to view immigrants as an outgroup.

(Table 4.4 about here)

In addition to the feeling thermometers on immigration and illegal immigration, the ANES also includes questions that are related to the lower class and other racial groups. I use feelings toward the poor and welfare recipients as measures of attitudes on the lower class. In addition, I include feeling thermometers asking about feelings towards Whites and Blacks to compare racial attitudes. Starting, with the questions on welfare recipients and the poor, a comparison of the two questions, the middle columns in Table 4.4, shows a conflicting pattern. Starting with people on welfare, non-authoritarians have slightly more positive feelings than authoritarians, but the difference is marginal and insignificant. On the other hand, when asked about poor people, the pattern is the reverse and significant. Authoritarians hold more positive views of the poor than non-authoritarians.

In terms of racial attitudes, authoritarians essentially hold the same attitudes as non-authoritarians towards Blacks. The results concerning Blacks are surprising due to the

validty and operate as a rank-order preference system. As such one can use feeling thermometers in relative terms but not as exact interval level differences across individuals or groups.

negative association between Blacks and welfare created by the media (Gilens 1999). These negative images do not seem to "trigger" an authoritarian response based on these feeling thermometer results. As expected, White authoritarians do hold more positive feelings toward members of their racial in-group.

I predicted that authoritarians would hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants than non-authoritarians. The evidence supports my proposition, authoritarians are significantly more likely to hold negative feelings. Authoritarians hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants. In sum, authoritarians differ from non-authoritarians in their perception of the threat posed by immigrants (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), but only marginally differ in their attitudes toward welfare recipients and the poor. The lack of a significant difference between authoritarians and non-authoritarians may be due to authoritarians not viewing these two groups as a social threat. The perceived threat posed by immigrants results in authoritarians viewing them as being undeserving recipients while other groups, such as the poor, are deserving recipients resulting in different policy preferences regarding immigrant accessibility to welfare programs.

Authoritarianism is not a necessary or sufficient condition for negative racial stereotypes, but it is also well established that authoritarians are more likely to be prejudiced and hold negative stereotypes of outgroups (e.g., Adorno et. al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981; 1996; Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; Stenner 2005). Racial stereotypes and authoritarianism are both predisposing factors and yet they are not independent of each other. Perceptions of Latinos failing to adopt the Puritan work-ethic can be viewed as a

failure to adopt American social norms or essentially a failure to conform to society. As such, racial stereotypes can be placed between authoritarianism and policy preferences, meaning that the Latino stereotype gap can possibly mediate or moderate the effect of authoritarianism on individual preferences for welfare spending, immigration levels, and welfare chauvinism. Based on the work of Baron and Kenny (1986), I graph the mediated and moderated relationships in Figure 4.3. In the top half of the figure, I show how the relationship between authoritarianism and policy preferences can be mediated by an indirect relationship through racial stereotypes. At the basic core, a mediated relationship is when a third variable (Latino stereotype gap) decreases the relationship between the dependent variable (policy preferences) and an independent variable (authoritarianism) since the third variable (Latino stereotype gap) is a result of the independent variable (authoritarianism).

(Figure 4.3 about here)

To test for a mediated effect, I calculate a series of statistical models in Table 4.5 (the first four columns), estimate predicted probabilities, and compare the probabilities to estimates from Table 4.2. In the first column, I regress racial stereotypes on authoritarianism and the other independent and control variables that I use throughout this chapter. This column is a test for the arrow linking authoritarianism to the Latino stereotype gap in Figure 4.3a. The coefficient for authoritarianism is positive and significant. Authoritarians are more likely to view that Latinos as being lazy relative to their work-ethic stereotypes of Whites. The next step in testing for a mediated relationship is to estimate models for each policy preference (welfare spending,

immigration levels, and welfare chauvinism) that includes authoritarianism but excludes Latino stereotype gap. These models establish a baseline and the direct relationship between authoritarianism and the policy preferences. The second, third, and fourth columns present the results for each policy preference. In all three models, authoritarianism is negatively related to each preference, as expected. Authoritarians prefer lower welfare spending, fewer immigrants, and at least a one-year waiting period before immigrants can receive welfare benefits. We can compare the authoritarianism coefficients from the three models that excludes the Latino stereotype gap to models from Table 4.2 that includes the Latino stereotype gap. The inclusion of the Latino stereotype gap does not significantly mediate the relationship between authoritarianism and the dependent variables.

(Table 4.5 about here)

To better visualize the similarity in the models from Tables 4.2 and 4.4, I graph the first difference for authoritarianism in Figure 4.4. The black columns are the predicted probabilities for a change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for the models excluding the Latino stereotype gap. The gray columns represent the same change, while holding all other variables constant, for the models from Table 4.2 that include Latino stereotype gap. The inclusion of the Latino stereotype gap does decrease the substantive effects of authoritarianism but the decrease is small and minor. These results support recent findings that authoritarianism is weakly related to a measure of ethnocentrism that is based on similar racial stereotype questions that I am using to calculate the Latino stereotype gap (Kinder and Kam 2009).

(Figure 4.4 about here)

On the other hand, racial stereotypes could moderate the relationship between authoritarianism and welfare chauvinism. A moderator effect is a variable that influences the "direction and/or the strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable" (Baron and Kenny 1986, p. 1774). Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest the use of interaction terms to test moderator effects, see Figure 4.3B. In this scenario, I interact authoritarianism with the Latino stereotype gap and graph predicted probabilities to better analyze the interaction. Recent research has found that authoritarianism interacts with threat to provide unusual results. Several scholars argue that authoritarians change their attitudes in the presence of a normative threat (e.g., Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Other scholars find that perceived threat of out-group members interacts with authoritarianism to decreases the gap in policy preferences between authoritarians and non-authoritarians by shaping the attitudes of non-authoritarians (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Perceived threat results in non-authoritarians adopting similar attitudes as authoritarians. In addition, authoritarians' attitudes do not vary (or vary less depending on the subject matter) as threat increases. In this possible scenario, authoritarians' preferences should remain the same regardless of their perceptions of Latino work-ethic and non-authoritarians' preferences should be influenced by racial stereotypes.

In the last three columns of Table 4.5, I include an interaction term between authoritarianism and the Latino stereotype gap in a model for each dependent variable. The interaction term is significant and positive in the models for welfare spending and

immigration levels. For welfare chauvinism, the interaction term is not significant. In order to better analyze the interactive effects, I graph the predicted probabilities as recommended by recent research (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Berry, Demeritt, and Esarey 2010). In each graph in Figure 4.5, I display the predicted probability of an individual supporting less welfare spending, much fewer immigrants, and a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare by adjusting the Latino stereotype gap, authoritarianism, and the interaction together, while holding all other variables constant. Basically, for each value on the authoritarianism measure (0 to 1 with a 10-point scale) I calculate the predicted probability for someone who believes Latinos are hardworking and Whites are lazy (-1 on the Latino stereotype gap), who believes Latinos are slightly more hardworking than Whites (-.5), neutral (0), who believes Whites are slightly more hardworking than Latinos (.5), and who believe Whites are hardworking and Latinos are lazy (1). An overall pattern emerges across all three graphs in Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7, the Latino stereotype gap has a larger influence on non-authoritarians' attitudes than authoritarians' attitudes. In Figure 4.5, authoritarians (authoritarianism=1) prefer lower welfare spending at essentially the same rate regardless of viewing Latinos as being hardworking (predicted probability= 50.4%) or as being lazy (49.7%) as evident by the slope of the line being flat. The results for non-authoritarians (authoritarianism=0) is a very different story. Non-authoritarians shift from being less supportive of cutting welfare spending to being more supportive of cutting welfare spending as their work-ethic stereotypes of Latinos (relative to Whites) change from hardworking to lazy. For example, a non-authoritarian who believes that Latinos are hardworking and Whites are lazy is roughly 18.1% likely to support cutting welfare spending. On the other hand, a

non-authoritarian who views Latinos as being lazy and Whites as being hardworking is 71.2% likely to hold the same policy preference, a shift of 53.1 points between the two non-authoritarians.

(Figure 4.5 about here)

(Figure 4.6 about here)

(Figure 4.7 about here)

Shifting our focus to immigration preferences in Figure 4.6, we find a similar pattern as welfare spending. The Latino stereotype gap has a larger influence on non-authoritarian attitudes than authoritarian preferences for fewer immigrants. Authoritarians shift from 17.4% to 34.8% in their probability of wanting fewer immigrants as the stereotype gap shifts from net positive Latino work-ethic stereotypes to net negative Latino work-ethic stereotypes. So unlike welfare spending preferences, the Latino stereotype gap does have a larger influence on authoritarians' preference for fewer immigrants. When I compare the same change in stereotype attitudes for non-authoritarians, I find a much larger shift in attitudes. Non-authoritarians who view Latinos as being hardworking and Whites as being lazy are 2.5% likely to prefer fewer immigrants. Changing the Latino stereotype gap to Latinos being lazy and Whites being hardworking increases the probability of supporting a decrease in immigration to 61.7%, a much larger change than with authoritarians.

The final graph, Figure 4.7 displays the predicted probabilities for the dependent variable measuring welfare chauvinism. The pattern in Figure 4.7 is similar in some regards to Figures 4.5 and 4.6, but has some unique characteristics to itself. The similarities are that authoritarians' preferences for an immigrant waiting period for welfare increases at slightly a lower rate than non-authoritarians' preferences. Authoritarians start with a probability of supporting a waiting period at roughly 57.8% and the probability increases to 90.3% as I shift the Latino stereotype gap. In comparison, the predicted probability for non-authoritarians changes from 26.5% to 87.9%. The difference in Figure 4.7 is that individuals who view Latinos as being lazy and Whites as being hardworking do not significantly vary in their probability of supporting welfare chauvinism regardless of being either an authoritarian or non-authoritarian. This finding can be seen as each line merges on the right side of the graph. On the left side, I find that the lines are spaced further apart, indicating a greater difference in the predicted probabilities between authoritarians and non-authoritarians.

In this section, I set out to further explore the relationship between authoritarianism and policy preferences. I found that authoritarians hold significantly more negative feelings towards immigrants and illegal immigrants. Their feelings towards the poor are significantly more positive than non-authoritarians. In addition, authoritarians and non-authoritarians do not hold significantly different feelings towards welfare recipients. These findings support the argument that authoritarians do view immigrants, both legal and illegal, as an out-group from their view of American society. Further, I found that the relationship between authoritarianism and policy preferences is moderated by racial stereotypes. Racial stereotypes have a larger impact on non-authoritarians' preferences

than authoritarians' preferences. In the next section, I estimate multi-level models to see if immigration can "trigger" authoritarian responses in states with larger immigrant populations.

Adding Context to the Analysis

Thus far, I have examined the influence of four predisposing factors (economic self-interest, political identifications, racial stereotypes, and authoritarianism) on three policy preferences (welfare spending preferences, immigration policy preferences, and welfare chauvinism). After examining a series of statistical models, I found that Latino racial stereotypes and income, traditional predictors from the scholarly literature, and authoritarianism, a non-traditional predictor, have a substantial impact on all three policy preferences. Unfortunately, the statistical models estimated so far, fail to test for the hypothesized relationship between immigration levels at the state level (a situational trigger) and individual predisposing factors. As discussed in Chapter 2, a component of the theory presented in this dissertation is that individuals are influenced by their surrounding environment, particularly one’s social context, which may influence by immigration levels on predisposing factors and policy preferences. In Chapter 3, I provided more details about situational triggers, including immigration levels, and how these situational triggers have changed since the 1960s. Based on the discussion in previous chapters, I expect the influence of immigrant social context (measured as the percentage of foreign-born at the state level) to influence Latino racial stereotypes and trigger authoritarian responses. The next step in this chapter is to conduct a more direct test of this hypothesis using multilevel data consisting of the 1992 ANES survey data and state-level measures of the percentage of foreign-born.

As is usually the case for a representative national survey like the ANES, the use of cluster sampling based on census tracts samples individuals from the more populous states. In 1992, although the national sample included 1800 non-Latino White respondents, they were drawn entirely from 33 of the more populous states. Because two of the states (Louisiana and Nebraska) had fewer than 20 respondents, they were dropped from the analysis, leaving 31 states for the multi-level analysis. The number of respondents per each of the 31 states, ranging from a low of 25 for Wyoming to a high of 161 for California, is listed in Table 4.6.

(Table 4.6 about here)

I created a multi-level dataset by merging the survey data with state-level data for individuals living in these 31 states. The state-level measure is the percentage of foreign-born individuals living in the state taken from the 1990 U.S. census. The variable ranges from .9% in West Virginia to 21.7% in California, with a mean of 5.5% and a standard deviation of 5%.

Because the multi-level data are "nested," I rely on multi-level modeling estimation as given by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). The primary advantage of estimating a multi-level model in this case is to avoid biased (i.e., inflated) estimates of macro-level variables when the multi-level structure of the data is ignored. More specifically, the multi-level models estimated below provide more conservative estimates of the percentage of the impact of foreign born population in an individual's state on his or her support for welfare spending, immigration levels and welfare chauvinism, and the net of the individual-level predictors (authoritarianism, stereotype gap, ideology, partisanship,

income, gender, age, and education). In addition, the multi-level model is able to estimate cross-level interactions between state-level context and individual-level factors. I use Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Model (HLM) estimation with random effects, which allows the intercepts and slopes of some of the individual-level predictors to vary across the states. Since all three of my dependent policy variables of interest are ordinal-level measures, I estimate ordinal logit models.

The multilevel results for the three policy preferences appear in Table 4.7. The estimated effects of the individual level predictors for the multilevel models match, in terms of significance and coefficient direction, the pattern found in the earlier individual level results (in Table 4.2). The percentage of foreign-born living in the individuals' state is not a significant predictor for any of the three dependent variables. But this must be considered a preliminary test of the hypothesized effect of immigration levels in a state, since the multilevel models estimated in Table 4.7 assess only the direct impact of immigration context on policy preferences.

(Table 4.7 about here)

In my theory, situational triggers, such as immigration levels, are hypothesized to trigger predisposing factors that influence policy preferences. To estimate the moderating influence of immigration levels on two predisposing factors (authoritarianism and racial stereotypes), I include cross-level interactions between immigration levels and each of the predisposing factors in Table 4.8. Contrary to expectations, the cross-level interaction term is not significant in five of the six models. In fact, in the majority of the models, the coefficients for the interaction terms are close to zero. I suspect that these

negative findings are likely due to several factors. First, it may be that the survey data for the multi-level analysis simply do not include sufficient respondents per all 50 states and thus introduce noise and bias, and, as a result, decreases the accuracy and reliability of my estimates. Unfortunately, these are the only survey data collected prior to the 1996 welfare reform act that include appropriate measures of authoritarianism and welfare chauvinism. Second, state percentages of the foreign born may not be the best measures of situational triggers. Individuals tend to overestimate the population size of immigrants (Citrin and Sides 2007) in part because they lack contact with immigrants living in segregated communities and working in segmented labor sectors (Hopkins 2010). Media stories may be a better measure of situational triggers, but estimates of the number and framing of immigration news stories do not exist at the state-level.

(Table 4.8 about here)

Even though I cannot directly include a measure of media stories in my statistical models, it possible that regional proxies can partially capture different regional focuses on the importance of the immigration media story. For example, Branton and Dunaway (2009) found that areas closer to the U.S.-Mexico border receive a greater number and more negative newspaper coverage on immigration. Hopkins (2010) predicted that regions with higher concentration of immigrants and more media stories will hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants. He called this the Politicized Places Hypothesis. The states along the U.S.-Mexico border fit the overall premise of his hypothesis. These areas have large concentrations of immigrants and the immigration issue has been covered the media in these states longer than at the national level. A second possible

region is the American south. The majority of the American south lacked large number of immigrants, Texas and Florida are two exceptions. Despite this lack of a large immigrant population, politicians have long stressed authoritarian issues in the south (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). The focus of politicians using the media to focus on issues of social conformity may make the south a politicized place ripe for an anti-immigrant response. In order to test for these two possibilities, I include a dummy variable for each regional grouping in a multi-level statistical model presented in Table 4.9.

(Table 4.9 about here)

The results are mixed. Starting with the first three columns, the dummy variable for the south is never significant. On average, being in the south does not generate a stronger preference for less welfare spending, fewer immigrants, or a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare programs. One possible conclusion is that immigration levels were extremely low in most southern states in the early 1990s and immigration maybe a necessary condition for the Politicized Place Hypothesis. In the final three columns, I include a dummy variable for states having a border with Mexico and the state of Florida. Florida may not have a border with Mexico but the state experiences many of the same problems with immigration from the Caribbean Sea. The dummy variable for a border state is not statistically significant in predicting individual attitudes toward welfare chauvinism, but the variable is significant in predicting attitudes towards welfare spending and immigration levels. Individuals in these states are more likely to prefer restrictive immigration policies and less generous welfare programs. The border state

variable is probably tapping into the politicized nature of immigration in these states. States along the U.S.-Mexico border were among the first to pass English-only laws and the first to attempt banning immigrant access to government programs since the late 1800s

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I set out to determine which predisposing factors acted as a worldview connecting immigration context to support for welfare. The combination of theory and initial findings eliminated partisanship and ideology as possible predisposing factors for this connection, leaving Latino racial stereotypes, self-interest, and authoritarianism as two likely predisposing factors. It is possible that the stereotype gap is being influenced by racial context but in the opposite direction with attitudes becoming more positive towards Latinos in states with large Latino populations (Fox 2004), but further research, beyond the scope of this dissertation, is required. In addition, different racial stereotypes, such as trust, maybe better measures of negative attitudes towards Latinos. Further, I explored the relationship between authoritarianism and policy preferences finding a moderating relationship between authoritarianism and racial stereotypes. Racial stereotypes have a smaller impact on authoritarians than non-authoritarians. This indicates that authoritarians hold restrictive policy preferences regardless of the racial stereotypes they hold, but non-authoritarians that hold negative racial stereotypes are more likely to prefer restrictive policies.

In the end, immigration appears to be triggering an authoritarian response. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that authoritarians view immigrants as a threat to

social order and my evidence supports their conclusion. Additionally, I find that authoritarians prefer to decrease welfare spending and want a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare. Authoritarianism is a previously unexplored predictor of welfare attitudes and a rarely explored consideration of immigration attitudes. Perceptions of failing to conform to social norms drives authoritarians and some non-authoritarians, those holding negative racial stereotypes of Latinos, to support barriers against entry into the welfare system. This finding provides an extra dimension to the complexity of welfare attitudes. Previous research finds that individuals are willing to grant welfare access and benefits to members of the ingroup (Theiss-Morse 2009). My findings suggest that perceptions of conformity is one of the dividing lines between ingroup and outgroup membership for many Americans. This finding fits with the previous research on welfare attitudes that distinguish between perceptions of deserving and undeserving welfare recipients. In my study, welfare access is a tool or reward for those deserving recipients, individuals that are perceived to have adopted American social norms.

In the following chapter, I build on these results to see if social spending policies adopted by states are influenced by authoritarianism through an opinion-policy relationship. Authoritarians prefer strong and punitive policies in response to perceived threats to social order. Authoritarians should support additional limitations and restrictions on welfare access.

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

Figure 4.1. Policy Preferences as a Function of Situational Triggers and Predisposing Factors.
Note: The relationships shown in this figure are not the only possible relationships between the variables. To avoid an overly complex figure, I have omitted the arrows for a possible relationship between the predisposing factors themselves. Variables that appear in the earlier stages can influence any variable or relationship that appears in later stages.



Figure 4.2. Substantive Impact of Select Predictors on Welfare Spending, Immigration, and Immigrant Welfare Access Policy Preferences.

Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for believing that welfare spending should be decreased, immigration should be decreased, and support for a 1 year waiting period before immigrants can access welfare, based on Table 4.2. The probabilities are estimated by shifting each independent variable from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding other independent variables constant. The values in the parentheses are the mean and standard deviations for each variable.

Source: 1992 ANES.



Figure 4.3A. Model for the Mediating Influence of the Latino Stereotype Gap on the Relationship between Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences.



Figure 4.3B. Model for the Moderating Influence of the Latino Stereotype Gap on the Relationship between Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences.
Note: The diagrams are based on the models presented in Baron and Kenny (1986).



Figure 4.4. The Mediated Impact of Stereotype Gap on the Relationship between Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences.

Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for believing that welfare spending should be decreased, immigration should be decreased, and support for a 1 year waiting period before immigrants can access welfare, based on Table 4.2 (with stereotype gap) and Table 4.5 (without stereotype gap). The probabilities are estimated by shifting each independent variable from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding other independent variables constant.
Source: 1992 ANES.



Figure 4.5. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Less Welfare Spending at Various Levels of Stereotype Gap.
Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for believing that welfare spending should be decreased based on interaction models in Table 4.5. The probabilities are estimated by shifting authoritarianism, racial stereotype gap, and the interaction one unit at a time while holding other independent variables constant.
Source: 1992 ANES.



Figure 4.6. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Lower Immigration Levels at Various Levels of Stereotype Gap.

Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for believing that immigration should be decreased based on interaction models in Table 4.5. The probabilities are estimated by shifting authoritarianism, racial stereotype gap, and the interaction one unit at a time while holding other independent variables constant.
Source: 1992 ANES.



Figure 4.7. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Welfare Chauvinism Levels at Various Levels of Stereotype Gap.
Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for supporting a 1 year waiting period before immigrants can access welfare (welfare chauvinism) based on interaction models in Table 4.5. The probabilities are estimated by shifting authoritarianism, racial stereotype gap, and the interaction one unit at a time while holding other independent variables constant.
Source: 1992 ANES.

Table 4.1. Predicted Relationships between Predisposing Factors, Control Variables, and Policy Preferences.

	Increase Welfare Spending	Increase Immigration Levels	Immediate Welfare Access for Immigrants
Authoritarianism	Decreases Support (H_{13})	Decreases Support (H_{14})	Decreases Support (H_{15})
Ideology	Decreases Support (H_4)	Neutral (H_8)	Decreases Support (H_6)
Party ID	Decreases Support (H_5)	Neutral (H_9)	Decreases Support (H_7)
Income	Decreases Support (H_1)	Increases Support (H_2)	Decreases Support (H_3)
Latino Stereotype Gap	Decreases Support (H_{10})	Decreases Support (H_{11})	Decreases Support (H_{12})
Age	Decreases Support (H_{16})	Decreases Support (H_{17})	Decreases Support (H_{18})
Education	Increases Support (H_{19})	Increases Support (H_{20})	Increases Support (H_{21})
Female	Increases Support (H_{22})	Increases Support (H_{23})	Increases Support (H_{24})

Note: Authoritarianism ranges from low authoritarianism (0) to high authoritarianism (1). Ideology ranges from extreme liberals (0) to conservatives (1). Income ranges from 0 to $5,000 (0) to $105,000 or more (1). Party identification ranges from Democrats (-1) to Republicans (1). Latino Stereotype Gap ranges from Latinos as less hardworking than Whites (-1) to more hardworking than Whites (1).

Table 4.2. Predicting Policy Preferences from Demographic Variables and Predisposing Factors.

	Welfare Spending		Immigration Levels		Welfare Chauvinism	
	Demographic Variables	Predisposing Factors	Demographic Variables	Predisposing Factors	Demographic Variables	Predisposing Factors
Authoritarianism		-.367*		-.585**		-.780***
		(.177)		(.178)		(.231)
Political Ideology		-1.973***		-.577*		.170
		(.274)		(.257)		(.349)
Party ID		-.642**		-.153		-.358
		(.151)		(.148)		(.229)
Income		-.999***		-.503*		-.614*
		(.220)		(.207)		(.293)
Stereotype Gap		-.600**		-1.357***		-.835**
(Latino)		(.207)		(.220)		(.271)
Education	-.374**	-.235	.908***	.814**	.652***	.763**
	(.135)	(.155)	(.135)	(.152)	(.157)	(.226)
Age	.001	.001	.005*	.006*	-.001	-.005
	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)
Female	.305**	.158	.042	-.016	-.017	-.066
	(.089)	(.092)	(.087)	(.088)	(.101)	(.129)
Chi^2	21.69	192.42	46.22	114.81	18.84	57.60
Prob> Chi^2	.001	.001	.001	.001	(.001)	(.001)
Pseudo R^2	.006	.057	.010	.030	.007	.037
N	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880

Note: Entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Higher values on the above variables indicate greater support for increasing welfare spending, increasing immigration levels, and supporting immediate welfare access for immigrants (welfare chauvinism). Authoritarianism ranges from low authoritarianism (0) to high authoritarianism (1). Ideology ranges from extreme liberals (0) to conservatives (1). Income ranges from 0 to $5,000 (0) to $105,000 or more (1). Party identification ranges from Democrats (-1) to Republicans (1). Latino Stereotype Gap ranges from Latinos as less hardworking than Whites (-1) to more hardworking than Whites (1).
Source: 1992 ANES

Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables, Authoritarianism, and Latino Stereotype Gap.

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Welfare Spending Preferences	-.311	.693	-1	1
Welfare Chauvinism	.193	.395	0	1
Immigration Policy Preferences	-.285	.463	-1	1
Authoritarianism	.551	.280	0	1
Latino Stereotype Gap	.127	.233	-1	1
Income	.513	.240	0	1

Source: 1992 ANES

Table 4.4. Predicting Authoritarian Feelings toward Racial Groups, Immigrants, and the Lower Class.

	Immigration	Illegal Immigration	Welfare Recipients	Poor People	Whites	Blacks
Authoritarianism	-.052**	-.063**	-.029	.038*	.075***	.016
	(.017)	(.019)	(.017)	(.016)	(.017)	(.016)
Stereotype Gap	-.046*	-.174***	-.081***	.053**	.153***	-.051*
(Latino)	(.021)	(.022)	(.020)	(.018)	(.019)	(.020)
Political Ideology	-.021	-.038	-.058*	-.012	.031	-.041
	(.025)	(.027)	(.023)	(.021)	(.023)	(.023)
Party ID	-.006	-.038*	-.069***	-.052***	-.013	.002
	(.015)	(.016)	(.014)	(.013)	(.014)	(.014)
Income	.011	-.020	-.059**	-.047**	-.052**	-.024
	(.019)	(.022)	(.019)	(.018)	(.019)	(.018)
Education	.085***	.033*	.007	-.029*	-.011	.030*
	(.015)	(.016)	(.015)	(.014)	(.015)	(.014)
Age	.001	.001	.001***	.001*	.001***	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Female	-.003	.024*	.006	.018*	.028**	.036*
	(.009)	(.010)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
Constant	.538***	.405***	.562***	.674***	.587***	.585***
	(.023)	(.026)	(.023)	(.021)	(.023)	(.023)
R^2	.049	.072	.064	.055	.098	.172
N	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Higher values on the above variables indicate more positive feelings. Authoritarianism ranges from low authoritarianism (0) to high authoritarianism (1). Ideology ranges from extreme liberals (0) to conservatives (1). Income ranges from 0 to $5,000 (0) to $105,000 or more (1). Party identification ranges from Democrats (-1) to Republicans (1). Latino Stereotype Gap ranges from Latinos as less hardworking than Whites (-1) to more hardworking than Whites (1).
Source: 1992 ANES

Table 4.5. Testing for a Mediated and Moderated Relationship between Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences.

	Stereotype Gap	Welfare Spending	Immigration Levels	Welfare Chauvinism	Welfare Spending	Immigration Levels	Welfare Chauvinism
Authoritarianism	.110***	-.427*	-.727***	-.994***	-.539**	-.830***	-.911***
	(.020)	(.176)	(.178)	(.204)	(.199)	(.207)	(.224)
Stereotype Gap					-1.497**	-2.556***	-1.884**
(Latino)					(.490)	(.535)	(.599)
Interaction					1.508*	1.983*	-.686
					(.764)	(.808)	(.909)
Political Ideology	-.017	-1.965***	-.527*	.304	-1.964***	-.559*	.295
	(.032)	(.275)	(.257)	(.280)	(.275)	(.257)	(.281)
Party ID	.038	-.658***	-.215	-.350*	-.640***	-.146	-.303
	(.020)	(.151)	(.146)	(.177)	(.151)	(.148)	(.180)
Income	.026	-1.012***	-.519*	-.535*	-1.009***	-.510*	-.512*
	(.024)	(.220)	(.206)	(.231)	(.219)	(.209)	(.230)
Education	-.073***	-.193	.883***	-.577**	-.259	-.780***	.488**
	(.019)	(.154)	(.154)	(.171)	(.156)	(.153)	(.173)
Age	-.001	.001	.006*	-.001	.001	.005*	-.001
	(.001)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Female	.021	.148	-.043	-.087	.167	-.008	-.053
	(.011)	(.092)	(.088)	(.103)	(.092)	(.088)	(.103)
Chi^2		182.43	83.52	49.78	192.69	121.44	81.16
Prob> Chi^2		.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001
Pseudo R^2	.038	.055	.020	.018	.058	.032	.030
N	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880

Note: Entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Higher values on the above variables indicate greater support for increasing welfare spending, increasing immigration levels, and supporting immediate welfare access for immigrants (welfare chauvinism). Authoritarianism ranges from low authoritarianism (0) to high authoritarianism (1). Ideology ranges from extreme liberals (0) to conservatives (1). Income ranges from 0 to $5,000 (0) to $105,000 or more (1). Party identification ranges from Democrats (-1) to Republicans (1). Latino Stereotype Gap ranges from Latinos as less hardworking than Whites (-1) to more hardworking than Whites (1). Interaction is authoritarianism * Latino stereotype gap.
Source: 1992 ANES

Table 4.6. Sample Size for 31 States included in the Multi-Level Analysis.

State	Sample Size	State	Sample Size
Alabama	27	Missouri	39
Arizona	51	New Hampshire	31
Arkansas	25	New Jersey	54
California	161	New York	136
Colorado	25	North Carolina	21
Connecticut	29	Ohio	69
Florida	60	Oregon	40
Georgia	74	Pennsylvania	66
Illinois	59	Tennessee	79
Indiana	86	Texas	87
Iowa	31	Virginia	93
Kansas	56	Washington	38
Maryland	41	West Virginia	38
Massachusetts	64	Wisconsin	47
Michigan	123	Wyoming	25
Minnesota	77		

Note: The 31 states included in the multi-level models in Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. A minimum of 20 respondents per state.
Source: 1992 ANES

Table 4.7. The Relationship between Immigration Levels and Policy Preferences.

	Welfare Spending	Immigration Levels	Welfare Chauvinism
Contextual Factors			
Immigration Pop.	-.001	-.001	.003
	(.012)	(.012)	(.011)
Individual-level Factors			
Authoritarianism	-.339⁺	-.597**	-.885**
	(.182)	(.179)	(.205)
Ideology	-2.004**	-.610*	.249
	(.261)	(.250)	(.286)
Party ID	-.678**	-.147	-.302⁺
	(.155)	(.151)	(.177)
Income	-1.057***	-.465*	-.516*
	(.214)	(.209)	(.239)
Stereotype Gap	-.551**	-1.353**	-1.427**
(Latino)	(.202)	(.196)	(.251)
Education	-.221	.859**	.496⁺
	(.159)	(.155)	(.179)
Age	.001	.005⁺	-.001
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Female	.162⁺	-.012	-.057
	(.093)	(.091)	(.105)
Chi^2	56.243	57.846	40.317
Prob>Chi^2	.002	.001	.079
Variance Component	.063	.061	.032
Micro N	31	31	31
Macro N	1852	1852	1852

Note: Standard errors in the parentheses. $^{+}$p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01. All models were estimated using HLM 6.02. States with 20 or more respondents were included in the analysis.
Missing States: Alaska, D.C., Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.
Source: 1992 ANES.

Table 4.8. The Moderating Relationship of Immigration Levels on Policy Preferences through Predisposing Factors.

	Authoritarianism Interactions			Stereotype Gap Interactions		
	Welfare Spending	Imm. Levels	Welfare Chauvinism	Welfare Spending	Imm. Levels	Welfare Chauvinism
Predisposing Factor x Immigration Pop.	-.043 (.028)	.002 (.027)	-.002 (.031)	-.006 (.032)	.016 (.031)	.069^{+} (.039)
Contextual Factors						
Immigration Pop.	-.001 (.013)	-.010 (.012)	.003 (.011)	.001 (.012)	-.009 (.012)	.007 (.011)
Individual-level Factors						
Authoritarianism	-.277 (.186)	-.600** (.183)	-.882** (.210)	-.339^{+} (.183)	-.594** (.179)	-.878** (.205)
Ideology	-2.001** (.261)	-.610* (.250)	.248 (.286)	-2.004** (.261)	-.611* (.250)	.247 (.286)
Party ID	-.665** (.156)	-.148 (.152)	-.302^{+} (.178)	-.677** (.155)	-.150 (.151)	-.311^{+} (.178)
Income	-1.068** (.214)	-.464* (.209)	-.517* (.237)	-1.059** (.214)	-.461* (.209)	-.510* (.239)
Stereotype Gap (Latino)	-.553** (.202)	-1.352** (.196)	-1.427** (.251)	-.543** (.208)	-1.377** (.202)	-1.565** (.265)
Education	-.218 (.159)	.860** (.155)	.496** (.179)	-.221 (.159)	.861** (.155)	.499** (.179)
Age	.001 (.003)	.005^{+} (.003)	-.001 (.003)	.001 (.003)	.005^{+} (.003)	-.001 (.003)
Female	.163^{+} (.093)	-.012 (.091)	-.056 (.105)	.162^{+} (.093)	-.012 (.091)	-.058 (.105)
Chi^2	57.685	57.783	40.383	56.327	57.347	39.077
$Prob>Chi^2$	.001	.001	.078	.002	.002	.100
Variance	.066	.061	.032	.063	.060	.029
Micro N	31	31	31	31	31	31
Macro N	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852

Note: Standard errors in the parentheses. $^{+}p<.10$; $*p<.05$; $**p<.01$. All models were estimated using HLM 6.02. States with 20 or more respondents were included in the analysis.
Missing States: Alaska, D.C., Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.
Source: 1992 ANES.

Table 4.9. The Moderating Relationship of Immigration Levels on Policy Preferences through Predisposing Factors.

	Welfare Spending	Imm. Levels	Welfare Chauvinism	Welfare Spending	Imm. Levels	Welfare Chauvinism
Contextual Factors						
South	-.090	-.060	.096			
	(.140)	(.140)	(.130)			
Border State				-.302^{+}	-.353*	.108
				(.167)	(.167)	(.160)
Individual-level Factors						
Authoritarianism	-.333^{+}	-.587***	-.896***	-.347^{+}	-.599**	-.873***
	(.183)	(.179)	(.205)	(.182)	(.179)	(.205)
Ideology	-1.995***	-.597*	.230	-2.012***	-.605*	.440
	(.261)	(.250)	(.286)	(.260)	(.250)	(.294)
Party ID	-.683***	-.152	-.295^{+}	-.662***	-.137	-.237
	(.074)	(.151)	(.177)	(.155)	(.151)	(.179)
Income	-1.063***	-.478	-.501*	-1.045***	-.468*	-.436^{+}
	(.214)	(.209)	(.239)	(.213)	(.208)	(.239)
Stereotype Gap	-.556**	-1.352***	-1.425***	-.573**	-1.369***	-1.418***
(Latino)	(.202)	(.196)	(.250)	(.260)	(.196)	(.252)
Education	-.222	.853***	.499**	-.210	.864***	.509**
	(.159)	(.155)	(.178)	(.159)	(.155)	(.179)
Age	.001	.005^{+}	-.001	.001	.005^{+}	-.001
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Female	.162^{+}	-.013	-.056	.166^{+}	.010	-.070
	(.093)	(.091)	(.105)	(.093)	(.091)	(.106)
Chi^2	55.810	62.413	39.332	48.470	49.766	38.035
$Prob>Chi^2$	.002	.001	.095	.013	.010	.122
Variance	.061	.066	.027	.043	.048	.024
Micro N	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852
Macro N	31	31	31	31	31	31

Note: Standard errors in the parentheses. $^{+}p<.10$; $*p<.05$; $**p<.01$. All models were estimated using HLM 6.02. States with 20 or more respondents were included in the analysis.
Missing States: Alaska, D.C., Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.
Source: 1992 ANES.

CHAPTER FIVE

Immigration and Welfare Reform in the States: The Mediating Role of Public Opinion

"Why should we take the bread out of the mouths of our own children and give it to strangers?" President John Adams on immigration in a letter to Secretary of State John Marshall on August 14, 1800.

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, I examined the influence of several predisposing factors (economic self-interest, political identifications, authoritarianism, and racial stereotypes) on preferences for three policies: welfare spending, immigration levels, and welfare chauvinism (a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare). I delved deeper into the relationship between authoritarianism, immigration, and welfare by examining authoritarian versus non-authoritarian feelings (i.e., thermometer ratings) toward several social groups. Although authoritarians do not rate people on welfare more negatively than non-authoritarians and tend to hold significantly more *positive* attitudes toward the poor in general, these groups lack the degree of social threat that authoritarians are hypothesized to perceive from immigrants. But what are the political ramifications of this relationship between immigration, authoritarianism, and welfare? Does public opinion influence the legislative process and shape public policy? One possible implication of my findings is that state governments may adopt more restrictive

government policies towards immigrants in states with larger proportions of individuals who are authoritarian, have more negative stereotypes of Latinos, and are conservative.

I begin this chapter with a discussion of the policies that are most relevant to investigating the relationship between public opinion and policy-making in the states: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), which partially shifted domestic policy on immigration from the federal government to the state governments, at least in terms of welfare policy. I then turn to the literature on the opinion-policy linkage to expand the theory present in Chapter 2. In order to test my theory of an opinion-policy relationship, I detail my use of a new statistical method, multi-level regression with poststratification (MRP). Finally, I present an empirical analysis that provides evidence that public mood shapes government policy reforms. I find that state policies are predicted by noneconomic considerations concerning group identities resulting in the desire for welfare chauvinism, limiting immigrant access to welfare programs. The statistical evidence indicates that states with a larger proportion of the population holding authoritarian and other attitudes are more likely to restrict immigrant access to welfare.

PRWORA eliminated federal entitlements to cash benefits, instituted rigid work requirements, and most importantly for our purposes decentralized policymaking authority downward to states and localities (e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001). While all states follow a standard workfare framework that requires employment in conditional exchange for benefits, "devolution" in welfare policymaking means that states and localities are responsible for crafting decentralized welfare policies, resulting in substantial variation in state-level welfare policies (Fording and Kim 2010; Soss et al.

2001). Most existing studies of state-level welfare policy adoptions examine dimensions of welfare policy related to cash benefit levels (e.g., McGuire and Merriman 2006), work requirements (e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001), or sanction for non-compliance (e.g., Fording et. al. 2007; Soss et al. 2001). Additional forms of policy stringency include initial eligibility or access to government programs. Determining welfare eligibility is a crucial gate-keeping step in receiving government assistance, and states vary in terms of selecting who qualifies for benefits. Some states attach citizenship requirements to welfare boundaries statutorily denying undocumented immigrants access to public assistance (Fix, Capps, and Kaushal 2009; Graefe et al. 2008; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Tichenor 2002).

Besides granting states with the limited ability to shape their own welfare policies, PRWORA represents a critical policy in the evolution of state powers in the realm of immigration. For the first time in over 100 years, states hold the power to adopt individual immigration policies. Traditionally, federal and state governments divided policy in the realm of immigration between *immigration policy*, under federal control, and *immigrants policy*, under state control (Fix and Passel 1994). In the basic and most rigid delineation of policy between federal and state roles, the federal government controls entry into the United States (immigration policy) and state governments control the integration of immigrants into U.S. society (immigrants policy). This distinction between federal and state policies is a result of multiple Supreme Court rulings starting in the late 1800s, such as Henderson v. Mayor of New York, Chae Chan Ping v. United States and Hines v. Davidowitz. In addition, states were further limited in their ability to pass immigrants policy by the "equal protections standard" providing the federal

government, particularly Congress, with the power to establish the treatment of immigrants within the United States. Using the "equal protections standard," state laws regarding immigrants were subject to the Equal Protection Clause, thus limiting states to "treat immigrants as people, that is persons protected by the Constitution" (Varsanyi 2010, p. 8). The federal government controlled entrance to the United States and the rights, liberties, and privileges of immigrants. As a result, states were limited to very few policy options, such as English-only laws, in the realm of immigration until the 1990s.

In 1996, the ability of state governments to shape policies toward immigrants and immigration policy changed dramatically with the passage of three laws. First, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) gave authority to local and state law enforcement agencies to arrest immigrant felons who had been previously deported. Second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) allowed for state and local law enforcement agencies to apply for training in enforcing federal immigration laws. Third, the passage of PRWORA reshaped the American welfare system. On the national level, PRWORA limited using federal funds to provide welfare benefits to future immigrants. At the same time, PRWORA granted states the authority to include or exclude immigrants from state-funded social programs. With the passage of AEDPA, IIRIRA, and PRWORA, the door has opened for states to expand their role in immigration policy. In 2005, state representatives introduced 300 bills on immigration, 45 of which passed (NCSL 2005). By 2010, state legislation increased to 1,400 bills, of which 208 were enacted (NCSL 2010). PRWORA represents a watershed moment in immigration policy and requires further study of the political environment that shaped state policies.

In this chapter, I focus on one of the three acts passed in 1996: PRWORA. The study of PRWORA offers several important advantages over the study of AEDPA and IIRIRA. PRWORA is a point in time when states decided between inclusionary and exclusionary polices (welfare chauvinism). The law enforcement powers given under AEDPA do not require local and state governments to form policy to use these new powers. Some cities, the so called "sanctuary cities," did pass ordinances directing local law enforcement not to work with the federal government on illegal immigration, but these cases are few and far between (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). Under the IIRIRA, state and local governments could request training to enforce federal immigration law (called 287(g) agreements). Between 1996 and 2001, the number of requests for this training was zero (Creek and Yoder 2012; Varsanyi 2008). After, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the number of agencies requesting training increased to 12 states by 2009. The 287(g) adopters are states that have decided to receive training to enforce federal immigration law to "crackdown" on immigrants, an anti-immigrant decision. The decision not to request a 287(g) agreement is not the same as making a pro-immigrant decision. Further, the 287(g) agreements are spread out over time, allowing for additional contextual factors to influence this particular decision. Almost all the states made decisions regarding immigrant access to welfare at the same time, in 1996, and the states had to decide between pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant policy decisions. As such, I decided to focus on PRWORA but I do believe that my general findings, that authoritarianism influences welfare chauvinism, can equally apply to other immigrant policies.

WELFARE REFORM, ELITE RESPONSIVENESS AND PUBLIC OPINION

In 1994, the Republican Party introduced the Contract for America. A component of the Contract for America called for denying immigrants access to Medicaid, Food Stamps, and other welfare programs. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich summarized the Republican position by saying, "Come to America for opportunity. Do not come to America to live off the law-abiding American taxpayer." This quote is an example of the political rhetoric portraying immigrants as failing to socially conform to the American norm of a strong work-ethic. Later, this sentiment was included in The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), welfare reform legislation that required at least a five-year waiting period before newly arrived immigrants could receive federal aid from welfare programs. The original restrictions included programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (replacement for welfare), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Food Stamps[28]. PRWORA included exceptions to the five year waiting period for refugees, asylum seekers, military veterans, the disabled, victims of domestic violence, and immigrants employed for at least four calendar quarters. The federal restrictions on immigrant access to welfare programs have changed since the passage of PRWORA. In legislation passed in 1997, 1998, and 2002, Congress changed several restrictions on immigrant accessibility to social programs by allowing disabled immigrants access to Food Stamps, lowering the waiting period for Food Stamps from seven-years to five-years, and decreasing restrictions on accessibility for immigrant children who do not meet the five-year residency requirement. None of

[28] Besides TANF, most programs had a seven-year waiting period.

these changes dramatically changed state policies on immigrant access to welfare programs.

PRWORA allowed for the creation of state-funded programs with each state determining its own eligibility requirements for legal immigrants. As seen in Figure 5.1, immigrant accessibility to social spending programs varies across states. Darkly shaded states allow immigrant access to specific government programs based on data collected by Tumlin, Zimmerman, and Ost (1999). Non-shaded states either are undecided states or do not allow immigrant access[29]. I excluded Alaska and Hawaii from the maps due to image stretching allowing for a better visual representation. Alaska restricted immigrant access to TANF during the federal ban, to food stamps, to Medicaid, and to SSI but provided TANF benefits to immigrants after a five-year waiting period. Hawaii provided TANF aid to immigrants during and after the federal waiting period but restricted access to food stamps, Medicaid, and SSI.

Starting with TANF, states considered granting immigrants program access during the five-year federal ban and after the federal ban. The top two maps in Figure 5.1 show the states that provide immigrant access to TANF. Nineteen states granted immigrants access to TANF during the five-year federal ban and thirty-seven allowed for access after the federal ban. Of these nineteen states that grant immediate access to welfare programs, only Utah and Georgia limit TANF access to immigrants after the federal five-year waiting period.

(Figure 5.1 about here)

[29] I have missing data for TANF aid after the federal waiting period for Indiana, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Virginia. I have complete data for all other social spending programs.

The second row of maps shows the states that grant immigrants access to state funded Food Stamps and Medicaid programs. Fewer states allow immigrants access to these programs than TANF. Seventeen states provide Food Stamps to the immigrant population. The final map displays the fifteen states that provide Medicaid benefits during the federal waiting period. In the end, the maps leave us asking why did some states restrict immigrant *access* to social programs under PRWORA and others did not?

Unfortunately, the answers are far and few between. The differences in social program eligibility requirements for immigrants across the American states remains largely unstudied, despite the important role that immigration has played in reshaping the American political landscape (Graefe et al. 2008; Filindra 2013; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Tichenor 2002). The lack of scholarly attention on this area is probably due to the historical dominance of the federal government in the area of immigration policy. The few studies on immigration state policies provide a solid foundation for this dissertation chapter to build on (Graefe et al. 2008; Filindra 2013; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Tichenor 2002)[30]. At the core of each of these studies is the concept of willingness or public opinion (see Creek and Yoder 2012; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010 as examples of how public opinion influences more recent immigration policies). States that are willing to provide benefits to immigrants grant them access to social programs.

[30] It should be noted that Tichenor's (2002) research does not focus entirely on the changes to social spending programs due to PRWORA. Instead, his research examines how elite coalitions change and shift throughout U.S. history in order to explain when and what type of immigration reform will be passed by legislatures.

Graefe et al. (2008) examine fourteen different theoretical relationships to explain why states restricted and granted immigrant access to social spending programs. They include variables measuring teenaged childbearing behavior, racial demographics, economic factors, and voter turnout. Their findings can be divided into the "means" to provide benefits to immigrants and the "willingness" to do so. The evidence primarily supports one side of the division, mainly that states that are "willing." Willingness is measured as having a more liberal ideology and wealthier population.

Filindra (2013) uses demographic data (percentage of blacks and percentage of immigrants per state) as proxies for public opinion. She finds that larger immigrant populations do not result in restrictive welfare programs at the state-level. Instead, states with larger black populations are more likely to restrict immigrant access to welfare. Butz and Kehrberg (2012) argue that states with larger black populations are historically more likely to have racial resentment that decreases levels of social trust that minorities will properly use welfare benefits.

Hero and Preuhs (2007) test how political ideology and racial/ ethnic diversity influence immigrant accessibility to welfare programs. Ideology builds on the previous state level research on welfare policies and attitudes (e.g., Berry et al. 1998; Brace et al. 2002; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). Theoretically, conservative states prefer to restrain immigrant access and provide lower benefits levels. Conservatives are in opposition to welfare due to their desire for a smaller government. As a result, conservative states are less "willing" to provide benefits. Second, the authors examine

the influence of racial context. [31] According to Hero and Preuhs, as the proportion of minorities increases, support for benefit levels and access to welfare among the masses should decrease as the minority population increases (Fellowes and Row 2004; Giles and Evans 1986).

In addition, Hero and Preuhs hypothesize how ideological and racial context can lead to lower welfare benefits, which they term, the erosion hypothesis. First, the argument predicts that welfare access is based on state political ideology. Red states are more likely to restrict welfare access to immigrants and blue states will grant access to welfare programs. Once the question of access is determined, policy-makers most set the level of generosity of welfare programs. Under the erosion hypothesis, benefit levels are influenced by racial context. Immigrants are viewed similar to blacks, in that the immigrant population is perceived to be net benefactors of these programs. In addition, immigrants are believed to be attracted to states with more generous welfare programs, this is called the welfare magnet hypothesis (e.g., Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2003; Borjas 1999; Kaushal 2005). As the immigrant population increases, benefit levels should decrease due to the increased demand on welfare programs.

To test the erosion hypothesis, Hero and Preuhs construct two continuous dependent variables. Their first dependent variable, immigrant welfare scale (IWS), measures immigrant access to welfare programs (see the methods section of this chapter for more details about the IWS). The second dependent variable measures the level of benefits, maximum cash benefits for a family of three. They regress these two measures of state

[31] Hero and Preuhs (2007) use these terms racial, social, and ethnic diversity interchangeably throughout their article. I will refer to this theory simply as racial context or racial demographics for the purposes of this literature review.

welfare policy on three state-level independent variables[32] of interest political ideology, percentage of foreign-born, and percentage of Latinos in the state's population.

The results from Hero and Preuhs' empirical analysis are mixed. First, their empirical results find that conservative states are less likely to grant immigrants access to welfare programs. Second, Hero and Preuhs (2007) note that previous state level research finds a negative *association* between the size of an immigrant population in a state and the state's welfare benefit levels (e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001). Oddly enough, however, the authors find that larger immigrant populations in the states are *not* related to welfare policy *changes* designed to restrict immigrant access to welfare benefits.

In regard to Hero and Preuhs' second dependent variable, the amount of cash benefits available under TANF, they find an interactive relationship between the percentage of foreign born in each state and the immigration welfare scale (their first dependent variable). The authors argue that the significance of the interaction variable, that states who grant immigrant access to welfare also provide lower benefits, is evidence supporting the erosion argument.

Hero and Preuhs follow a long, confusing research tradition of immigration research, where scholars use very similar demographic measures as proxies for very different theoretical concepts. For example, Quillian (1995), Scheepers et al. (2002), Gijpserts et al. (2004) and Kunivich (2004) each treat the foreign-born population as a conceptual

[32] Control variables include the percentage of Democrats in each state legislature, level of party competition, multicultural predisposition, urbanization, percentage of state population with a high school degree, unemployment rate, caseload size of welfare programs, the average immigration welfare scale value of neighboring states, if the state shares a border with Mexico, and if the state has major sea port. Of these variables, only education and caseload are significantly related to the immigration welfare scale and cash benefit levels.

measure of economic group threat[33]. Other scholars treat foreign-born population as a measure of cultural conflict between immigrants and the native population (e.g., Golder 2003). Other scholars use immigration population percentages as measures of the likelihood of social contact with immigrants that could result in more positive attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., Fox 2004, Graefe et al. 2008; McLaren 2003). Further, other scholars use immigrant demographics, either the proportion of legal or illegal immigrants, as a proxy for public opinion (e.g., Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Filindra 2013). The basic concept is that states with larger immigrant populations are more likely to have macro or mass attitudes that are less supportive of welfare programs (Filindra 2013) or more negative immigrant attitudes (Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011).

One likely explanation for this inconsistency between correlational and over-time evidence is that the relationship between immigration and welfare policies in the states is much more complex than prior research has suggested. It seems likely, for example, that the relationship between immigration and state welfare policies is not invariant over time or across different state characteristics; rather, the relationship between racial context and welfare policy is likely to be *indirect*, filtered or mediated through various political factors, specifically public opinion, state government actors, and institutions.

Larger immigrant populations are not necessarily related to welfare inclusion of immigrants due to public opinion, or "willingness." Public opinion moderates the impact of immigration patterns on policy-making. In some states, an influx of immigrants fuels

[33] Foreign born population is also used as part of the economic component, specifically as a measure of realistic competition, of the ethnic competition theory. Economic competition theory is very similar to group threat theory in that both theories expect group competition to increase as the foreign born population increases (e.g., Blalock 1967; Key 1949; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002).

public opposition to welfare, such as in Arizona, but in other states the public reacts differently, such as in California. The point is that state demographic patterns do not lead inexorably to policy outcomes. There are a number of intermediary steps that condition the relationship. Representative democratic theories assume communication between citizens and elites concerning policy preferences (e.g., Gibson 1988; Goren 2001). Elites respond to the masses under certain conditions (Brooks and Manza 2007). First, the masses must be concerned about the policy options. The population needs to be aware of the different possible policy outcomes, concerned about the different outcomes, and communicate their preferred outcome to policy-makers. Second, the mass public needs to care about the political issue, meaning that the issue needs to be salient (Brooks and Manza 2007). Immigration, and its relationship to welfare reform, was a highly salient issue in 1996 (Chavez 2001; Hopkins 2010; Tichenor 2002). The third condition for elite response is that the signal from the mass public should be consistent (Brooks and Manza 2007). Clear and strong messages from citizens constrain the acceptable policy options available to elites.

It is my contention that the size of the immigrant population did not directly influence policy makers during the formulation of welfare policies regarding immigrant access and benefit levels. Rather, I argue that the policies adopted by each state are based on mass public opinion. As political issues and concerns change among the masses, the mobilized public shares their concerns with their elected representatives. Representatives are expected to adopt policies to meet these concerns in order to keep and maybe gain electoral support (Bartels 1988). Legislators are elected officials who formulate policy decisions with their constituents in mind. Elites must take into

consideration various demographic and environmental conditions in order to get reelected. Politicians concerned with electoral survival should vote with the median voter position on an issue and those that violate this strategy do suffer at the polls by receiving a lower percentage of the votes (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002). As politicians adopt policy, the public updates their attitudes and provides electoral support in the future.

Politicians do not always respond to public opinion, especially in the areas of immigration[34] (Freeman 1995; Lahav 2004a, 2004b). Some even argue that pro-immigration policies are not responsive to mass attitudes, but instead are the result of elite business interests that capture the political system (Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011). Failure to respond to mass attitudes results in questioning the quality of democracy but perfect matching between public attitudes and policy creates the fear of "tyranny of the majority."

In this chapter, I add to our knowledge of welfare reform and immigrant accessibility to social spending programs by building on the individual and multi-level findings on public opinion from Chapter 4. The previous findings from Chapter 4 indicate that authoritarianism is an important mediating variable between immigration patterns, support for welfare spending preferences, and immigrant access to welfare programs. I find in this chapter, that a macro measure of authoritarianism is a strong predictor of immigrant accessibility to social spending programs at the state level.

[34] It is important to note that previous research examined if politicians responded to public opinion on immigration in regards to immigration policy with mixed results. As such, these studies focus on a direct relationship between mass attitudes and a policy within the same realm. Due to federalism, state governments are limited in their ability to influence immigration policy but can consider attitudes regarding immigration in other policy areas that affect immigrants, such as welfare.

OPINION-POLICY LINKAGE

As discussed in Chapter 4, how an individual responds to political stimuli is partially dependent on predisposing factors that influence individual interpretation of distinct objects (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Sniderman et al. 2004). Predisposing factors are situated at an early stage in the funnel of causality, allowing predisposing factors to influence policy preferences, as seen in Figure 5.2. One of these predisposing factors is authoritarianism (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009).

(Figure 5.2 about here)

The diagram displays the aggregation of attitudes across individuals that in turn influence public policy outcomes through what is called an opinion-policy linkage, defined as the responsiveness of political elites to mass attitudes. At first glance, the political behavior research would predict a weak relationship in the responsiveness of elites to public attitudes. The American public is characterized as having low levels of political knowledge (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1989), weak ideological constraints (e.g., Converse 1964), weak attitudes (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960), inconsistent attitudes (Zaller and Feldman 1992), and at times seemly random attitudes (e.g., Converse 1964). These results provide skepticism of the masses' ability to influence their political representatives or, more importantly, reasons for elites to consider mass attitudes.

These studies on the negative characteristics of the masses are accurate, but are *individual*-level results. The formation of constituencies is at the *macro*-level and an

aggregate outcome. Individual level attitudes predict which constituency a person belongs, but politicians respond to macro, group, or aggregate attitudes (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). In general, several studies find an opinion-policy link at the federal and state level (e.g., Erikson et al. 2002; Stimson et al. 1994, 1995; Stimson 1999). Stimson, Erikson, and MacKuen find that congressional legislation reflect changes in the "public mood" of the nation. As mass mood shifts, legislative policy changes in the same ideological direction. At the state level, states with a liberal mass ideology are more likely to have liberal policies and conversely for conservative states (e.g., Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993).

Most of the previously mentioned studies use estimates of political identification or ideology to measure mass political attitudes to from what Lax and Phillips call the ideology-policy correlation (2012, p. 148). Some scholars argue that other policy attitudes are too unstable and random to form an opinion-policy link. Recent political research has found a link between policy attitudes and policy outcomes in several areas (Lax and Phillips 2011). Focusing on welfare policies, studies find that public opinion is an important factor in the adoption of Medicare (Jacobs 1993), Social Security (Quirk and Hinchliffe 1998), and state-level differences in AFDC programs (Fording 1997). In the area of equal employment legislation, racial attitudes are an important predictor from the 1940s to the 1970s (Burstein 1998). In conclusion, an opinion-policy link is supported by studies at both the federal and state levels, including welfare policies.

Immigrants are inherently in a weak position to influence policy outcomes. Individuals that participate in the political system have at their disposal a powerful tool, their votes. Immigrants are less likely to vote, due to the requirements of naturalization.

The end result is unequal political participation and "unequal participation spells unequal influence" (Lijphart 1997, p. 1). The unequal influence goes beyond just simply voting, voters are more likely to communicate with politicians (Miller and Stokes 1963; Verba and Nie 1972). In the end, "political activity is the means by which citizens make their needs and preferences known to governing elites and induce them to be responsive" (Verba 2003, p. 663). Or as Key (1949, p. 527) concluded, "the blunt truth is that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens [and non-citizens] that do not vote."

Based on the findings from Chapter 4, the opinion part of the opinion-policy link should be authoritarianism. As a predisposing factor, authoritarianism is characterized as the need for conformity, aggression, and a submission to established authorities (e.g., Altemeyer 1996; Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005)[35]. Authoritarians need for conformity results in a worldview that divides individuals into distinct in and out-groups. In addition, authoritarians prefer strong opposition towards out-groups that pose a threat to social conformity (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Huddy et al. 2005; Perrin 2005). Authoritarians see strong black and white differences between groups and membership requires "assimilation of principles" (Adorno et al. 1950). In the end, a strong relationship exists between the need and desire for social cohesion and the perceived threat posed by those with different group identities (Kruglanski et al. 2006).

[35] The concept of authoritarianism is historically debated within political science (see Stenner 2005 for a discussion of the criticism of past research). The source of authoritarianism is beyond the scope of this study as I examine a policy outcome that is the result of authoritarian preferences. Further, I focus on the first component of authoritarianism, the need for social order, as the theoretical cause for policy preferences since the question of a need for leadership is not a likely motivation for social spending preferences.

An alternative explanation to the opinion-policy linkage is that voters simply elect individuals who would similar attitudes, core believes, and personalities as themselves. In essence, representation may act within the gyroscopic model. I have several theoretical reasons to doubt that the gyroscopic model for an opinion-policy linkage with authoritarianism. At the individual-level authoritarians tend to be lower educated and more likely to be blue-collar occupations (Stenner 2005). Political elites tend to be the opposite, more highly educated and more likely to have a white-collar background. In addition, political elites tend to have more positive views of immigrants (Lahav 2004a; 2004b) and be more political tolerant (Sullivan et al. 1993). On the other hand, authoritarians tend to be less politically tolerant and hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants. The world does hold exceptions to this pattern, such as, radical right parties in Western Europe and several American politicians with Tom Tancredo being an example. But overall I believe that authoritarianism works through a delegate model of representation.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

In order to test the above theory, I need to construct estimates of public opinion at the state level. Unfortunately, I am unaware of a survey that contains the proper questions with representative samples from each state. The survey questions are a necessary component for this study. The ANES contains the necessary questions but lacks a representative sample from each state. The lack of a representative samples at the state level creates a concern about biases in the data (Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993). For example, Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2006) noted in their study of voting results that a

national random sample from a CBS/ *New York Times* survey included twelve individuals from Vermont. In 1988, 80% of the surveyed individuals supported George H.W. Bush, but President Bush won Vermont with 51% of the vote. Small samples are more error prone than large samples, a well-known concept in the study of public opinion.

There are two potential solutions to this problem. The most common method of measuring public opinion on the state-level involves gathering and combining multiple national polls, a method called disaggregation that was developed by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993). Erikson, Wright, and McIver combined surveys from over 25 years to estimate political ideology, a common survey question, on the state-level. The larger sample sizes are used to estimate macro level attitudes for each state. The disaggregation solution contains both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of disaggregation include simplicity and being considered the "paradigm" method in the study of state politics. Unfortunately, disaggregation contains a significant disadvantage for this study. The disadvantage is that disaggregation requires the combination of multiple surveys. I am limited to the 1992 ANES. For example, the commonly used child-rearing measure of authoritarianism was first included in the ANES in 1992 and does not appear in each ANES since. As a result, the number of states with large samples in the ANES is limited and may introduce biases in the analysis. Combining different questions across surveys and time with disaggregation can introduce reliability and validity issues with the measure (Brace, Sims-Butler, Arceneaux, and Johnson 2002).

A different possibility is Bayesian multi-level modeling with poststratification (MRP). MRP is a method that estimates state-level public attitudes using national surveys using two stages (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2010; Lax and Phillips 2009a;

2009b; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006). The basic concept is to take a single national survey of roughly 1500 individuals and use these respondents to generate state-level estimates. MRP involves two steps: a multi-level model and poststratification. In the first stage, MRP estimates a multi-level model for individual responses with a combination of demographic and geographic variables as predictors. Individuals are nested within states, regions, and demographic groups. In addition, the state-level effects are modeled based on region and aggregate demographics. These demographic and geographic variables result in 4,704 total possible combinations in the data for the baseline MRP model used by Lax and Phillips (2009b). As a result, MRP is able to use respondents regardless of location to create public opinion estimates for all states, even those with few to no respondents. This allows MRP to overcome the small state-level sample sizes found in national surveys. The second stage of MRP is poststratification. In this stage, the MRP estimates for the demographic and geographic combinations from the multi-level model are weighted using by the actual percentages for each combination in the state populations using Census data. The additional step of poststratification corrects for oversampling or under sampling of categories (Voss, Gelman, and King 1995). Poststratification weights the simulated data based on the demographics of each state by matching census data to estimated attitudes of the categories (race, gender, age, education, and the interaction between race and gender). In the end, MRP estimates the percentage of individuals that holds a specific attitude for each state.

$$\Pr(y_i = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\beta^0 + \alpha_{j[i]}^{race,gender} + \alpha_{k[i]}^{age} + \alpha_{l[i]}^{edu} + \alpha_{s[i]}^{state})$$

$$\alpha_s^{state} \sim N(\alpha_{m[s]}^{region} + \beta^{relig} \cdot relig_s, \sigma^2_{state})$$

The advantages include the ability to estimate public opinion for states with small samples and MRP outperforms disaggregation on sample sizes smaller than 14,000 respondents (Lax and Phillips 2009a). First, poststratification allows for public opinion estimates for states that lack respondents in the survey. The proportion of demographic combinations is known for each state from census data. Since, MRP estimates public opinion for each demographic combination, the estimated public opinions for each combination are weighted based on the proportion of combinations for each state. As a result, MRP allows for public opinion estimates of all fifty states. Second, MRP is highly accurate. Lax and Phillips (2009a) in a variety of tests find that MRP estimates have higher correlations with smaller standard errors to state polls and larger combined national polls (n>11,000) than the raw scores for each state and estimates using disaggregation.

The primary disadvantage of MRP is that estimates of public opinion are restricted to data with two response categories, support and against. The model predicts the percentage of ones in a data set. The public opinion variable of interest needs to be dichotomous. My public opinion variables are ordinal with multiple categories. As a result, I recode the public opinion measures into dichotomous variables; see Appendix B for the exact changes to each variable. The recoding of the variables is not a dramatic change for immigration preferences and welfare spending preferences due to the limited

number of categories for each variable. For example, the survey question for welfare has three categories (decrease welfare spending, keep welfare spending the same, and increase welfare spending). As I discuss below, I estimate support in each state for decreasing welfare spending (coded as 1) and the other two categories are combined (coded as 0). The measures of authoritarianism and Hispanic racial stereotypes are more problematic, as discussed in the next section. In the end, I do not believe that my coding decisions to overcome this disadvantage of MRP is problematic based on the similarity between statistical results using different MRP estimates that vary the coding of 1s and 0s for authoritarianism. As I present in Appendix C, the MRP estimates maintain statistical significance and direction of the coefficient. .

Public Opinion Variables

As I discussed in Chapter 4, I measure authoritarianism by constructing an index composed of several questions about desirable personality traits of children designed to measure the respondent's values between authoritarianism and individualism[36]. At the individual level, this measure of authoritarianism is an ordinal measure with multiple values ranging between 0 and 1. Previous scholars, Hetherington and Weiler (2009), treat this range as 0 being non-authoritarian, 1 being authoritarian, and .5 as neutral between these two extremes. The values between 0 and .5 indicate a varying degree of being non-authoritarian from more to lesser, while the values between .5 and 1 are

[36] An individual's child-rearing values tap their fundamental view of the world and human relations (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). The child-rearing values contain several advantages over traditional measures of authoritarianism, such as the F-Scale (Adorno et al. 1950) and the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) measure (Altemeyer 1981). Previous measures included questions that directly ask about prejudice, intolerance, and conservatism (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005) making the measures indistinguishable from these other political concepts. The child-rearing measure is neutral in these areas but yet correlates strongly with the RWA (Feldman 2003).

varying degrees of being less to more authoritarian. Since MRP requires public opinion measures to be dichotomous, I coded all values .625 or higher as being authoritarian (1s) and all values .5 or less as being non-authoritarian (0s). As mentioned earlier, I re-estimated the models from this chapter with varying coding for the authoritarianism measure. I include those results in Appendix C.

As shown in Table 5.1, low values indicate non-authoritarian states (the lowest value is 33.6% - Washington). Higher values indicate more authoritarian states (the highest value is 65.9% - Alabama). The mean value is 52.0% (closest state is Idaho with a value of 51.7%). I hypothesize that as the level of authoritarianism in a state increases the state is more likely to restrict immigrant access to welfare programs (Hypothesis_1).

(Table 5.1 about here)

My results from Chapter 4 show that authoritarianism is not the only possible political attitude related to welfare preferences. The scholarly literature identifies several policy-relevant attitudes, including racial attitudes and policy-specific attitudes, which elites may respond. Several survey studies clearly show that an important source of opposition to welfare among Whites is their negative views of minorities, whom many Whites mistakenly view as lazy and also mistakenly see as the primary beneficiaries of welfare programs (e.g., Fox 2004; Gilens 1996; 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Peffley et al. 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1998). Consistent with past studies, I use a measure of stereotypes concerning the Latino work ethic. On the individual-level, the measure is a 7 point scale ranging from hardworking to lazy. Again, MRP requires variables to be on

dichotomous scale. As such, I code individuals above the neutral point (.5) as considering Latinos to be lazy (1s) and individuals at and below the neutral point as viewing Latinos as being hardworking (0s). Afterwards, I estimate the proportion of the state population that views Latinos as being lazy. Based on this measure, the state with the lowest percentage of their state population with negative Latino stereotypes is Utah at 11.6%. The highest value for this measure is 29.8% (New Hampshire). The mean value is 22.5% (Virginia is the closest state to the mean at 22.4%). I predict that states with more negative views of Latino work-ethic are more likely to restrict immigrant access to welfare programs (H_2).

Political identifications, ideology and political partisanship, can have strong influences on individual policy preferences (e.g., Feldman and Huddy 2005; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993) and policy outcomes at the macro level (e.g., Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). The literature has a well established finding that states with a more liberal (Democratic) population are more likely to adopt liberal (Democratic) policies and the pattern is the same for conservative (Republican) states and conservative (Republican) policies. Unlike my other state-level measures of public opinion, I do not use MRP to estimate ideology and partisanship. The scholarly literature developed well established and useful measures for political identifications at the state-level. To measure ideology, I use MRP to estimate the percentage of conservatives in each state. To construct this measure I recode the 1992 ANES 7-point scale into a 2-point scale. I combine individuals who indicate they are "very conservative" with those who are "conservative" into a single category (coded as 1s). All other response options and

missing data are coded as 0s. Afterwards, I generate state-level estimates with the same MRP used for authoritarianism and Latino work-ethic stereotypes. The measures range from the least conservative states, being Massachusetts at 13.88, to more conservative states, the most conservative being Utah at 42.5. The mean value is 22.56 and Ohio is the closest to the average value at 22.75. I present the values for each state in Table 5.2. I predict that more conservative states are less likely to grant immigrants access to welfare programs (H_3).

(Table 5.2 about here)

Also in Table 5.2, I present my measure of state-level partisanship. I estimate the percent of Republicans in a state using MRP. The MRP estimates are based on a 1992 ANES survey question asking individuals to self-identify if they are Republicans, Democrats, or Independents. I coded Republicans as 1s and all other options, including missing data, as 0s. I use the standard MRP model for these estimates as I used for the previous state-level public opinion measures. This variable has a mean value of 26.61%, the closest state to this value is Georgia at 26.49%. The variable ranges from the lowest state, Massachusetts at 13.13%, to the highest state, Kansas at 53.78%. I hypothesize that as the percentage of Republicans in a state increases so does the likelihood that the state will restrict access to welfare programs by immigrants (H_4).

Several measures of ideology and partisanship are standard in the literature, but my MRP measures have several advantages. First, my MRP estimates are direct measures of individual self-placement on the ideological spectrum. On the other hand, citizen

ideology uses elite ideology due to being a weighted measure of the ideological score for the district incumbent's ideology and the electoral challenger's ideology by their electoral share (Berry et al. 1997, p. 331). The challenger's ideology is assumed to be the average ideology of all incumbents in the state from the challenger's political party. Second, my MRP estimates are based on a single point in time from one survey. Erickson, Wright, and McIver's ideology measure is constructed using disaggregation of multiple surveys over a long period of time (1993). The same authors also use disaggregation, with the same benefits and handicaps, to estimate partisanship in each state. Disaggregation across time and surveys can introduce issues of validity and reliability (Brace et al. 2002). Barbara Norrander's measures of political ideology and partisanship use disaggregation but she increases validity and reliability by only combining the three ANES Senate surveys from 1988, 1990, and 1992 (2001). Her estimates are further away from the 1996 welfare reforms than my MRP estimates. In Table 5.3, I show that my measures of state-level ideology and partisanship are highly correlated with these existing measures.

(Table 5.3 about here)

In addition, I provide the correlations between the MRP measures of state-level attitudes to show that these estimates are not just a product of the MRP process. As seen in Table 5.4, the majority of the MRP estimates are not highly correlated with each other. For example, authoritarianism and Hispanic Stereotypes are correlated at .151 (p-value<.05). The measure of the percent of conservatives in the state, a measure of ideology, is more strongly correlated with each of the other measures.

(Table 5.4 about here)

Dependent Variables

The main dependent variable is the immigration welfare scale (IWS) developed and provided by Rodney Hero and Robert Preuhs (2007). The components of the scale tap immigrant access to a wide variety of social spending programs, including state-funded TANF during the federal five-year ban for immigrants; access to TANF state funding after the federal five-year ban; general assistance programs; food stamps; state level programs similar to Supplemental Security Income; access to Medicaid during the federal five-year ban; undocumented immigrant access to nonemergency healthcare; and prenatal care. The data is coded as 1 for granting immigrants' access and 0 for denying immigrants' access for each social program. Hero and Pruehs (2007) use principal component factor analysis to generate an overall score of how inclusive each state's social programs are for immigrants. The IWS ranges from -1.11 to 1.67 with positive and higher values being more inclusive states and negative and lower numbers being more restrictive states. The average value is -.02 with a standard deviation of .91. The Eigen value for the first factor is 2.56 and the value for the second factor is .67. In addition, the Cronbach's Alpha is .75 indicating a high level of interitem reliability (Hero and Pruehs 2007, p. 502). Further, Hero and Pruehs also compare the IWS to other measures of immigrant access to welfare programs. The IWS correlates with the Urban Institute's measure of the immigrant welfare safety net (Pearson's r = .85), Tumlin, Zimmerman, and Ost's (1999) index of immigrant welfare provisions (Pearson's r = .83), and an

additive index of the nine social programs used to estimate the IWS (Pearson's r = .98). In the end, the IWS is a reliable measure of immigrant inclusiveness to state welfare programs.

The IWS measures a single dimension of welfare programs, access by immigrants. To expand my analysis, I include a measure of generosity of welfare programs, the maximum amount of cash benefits available to a family of three. The addition of this second dependent variable, allows me to study if authoritarianism influences more than just barriers to access but actual benefit levels as well. I use the 1999 maximum cash benefit levels for a family of three. This measure was adjusted for cost of living in each state to create a standardized measure that is not dependent on local living conditions (Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2000).

IMMIGRATION, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND WELFARE CHAUVINISM

Previous research indicates that politicians are likely to respond to macro attitudes (Erickson et al. 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). To see if the immigration accessibility fits the opinion-policy linkage, I start by examining the bivariate relationships between authoritarianism and the IWS in Figure 5.3. A clear linear and negative relationship exists between IWS and authoritarianism with a correlation of -.584 ($p.<.001$). States with higher levels of authoritarianism are more likely to adopt welfare chauvinistic policies that limit immigrant access to social programs. The variance in this scatterplot further supports the elite response theory of Brooks and Manza (2007). States below the .4 value for authoritarianism have a positive value on the IWS, such as California, Hawaii, and Colorado. States with high levels of authoritarianism, such as

Mississippi, North Carolina, and Alabama, are in the lower right hand corner and provide a low level of social benefits to immigrants. The one exception is Nebraska. Nebraska has a high level of authoritarianism but also adopted inclusionary welfare policies for immigrants.

(Figure 5.3 about here)

States in the mid range of values for authoritarianism are highly mixed between restrictive and inclusionary policies. For example, Maryland and Idaho both have similar levels of authoritarianism but Maryland adopted inclusionary programs and Idaho adopted exclusionary polices. Theoretically, the signal from the mass public to elites is mixed between preferences for granting and denying immigrant access. As authoritarianism becomes more consistent and one-sided, the policies adopted by the states match the authoritarian or non-authoritarian policy preferences. States with strong non-authoritarian preferences granted immigrant access to social spending programs while those with strong authoritarian preferences prevented immigrant access to these programs. The figure provides strong bivariate evidence for an opinion-policy link between authoritarianism and policies regarding immigrant accessibility to welfare programs. In conclusion, a higher need for conformity (Altemeyer 1996; Stenner 2005) seems to result in the exclusion of individuals that threaten that order, such as immigrants (Hetherington and Weiler 2009).

It is possible that the relationship between the proportion of authoritarians in the state and immigrant accessibility is due to a spurious relationship. To examine this possibility,

I conduct regression models that include each of the public opinion measures. I use OLS regression models since IWS and cash benefit levels are continuous dependent variables. The dependent variable in the first model (see Model 5.5A) is the immigration welfare scale. The second dependent variable (see Model 5.5B) is the maximum cash benefit level[37] available to families in each state. The results are presented in Table 5.5. Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska is excluded from Model 5.5B due to missing data for the dependent variable, the maximum amount of cash benefits for a family of three provided by TANF in 1999.

(Table 5.5 about here)

The results for Model 5.5A with the IWS provide two interesting findings. The coefficient for authoritarianism is in the predicted direction and significant, supporting H_1. Welfare can be viewed as a system of inclusion into the American society (Lieberman 2003), the exclusion of people that lack cultural similarities would appeal to authoritarians. The coefficient is negative, as the proportion of authoritarians increases, the state is more likely to adopt restrict immigrant access to welfare programs. This relationship is the same as the bivarrate scatterplot but authoritarianism continues to be a strong predictor of restrictive welfare policies for immigrants, even in a multivariate model that includes other measures of public opinion. In Figure 5.4, I show the effect size of authoritarianism on the Immigration Welfare Scale by graphing the adjusted means (marginal effects of authoritarianism while holding all other variables constant) from the minimum value, 30.9, to the maximum value, 65.9, for authoritarianism. The IWS ranges

[37] The maximum adjusted cash benefit level for a family of three

from a maximum value of 1.667 (Washington) to a minimum value of -1.106 (Alabama) with more positive scores indicating greater immigrant access to welfare programs. The graph in Figure 5.4 shows a strong relationship between authoritarianism and immigrant access to welfare. As authoritarianism shifts from its minimum to maximum value, the likelihood of adopting restrictive welfare programs also rangers from almost the maximum and minimum values of the IWS. Further, once authoritarian attitudes are held by roughly fifty percent of a state's population, immigrants are most likely denied access to welfare programs on average.

(Figure 5.4 about here)

The other measures of predisposing factors and policy preferences are not significant predictors of either welfare chauvinism or liberal immigrant access to welfare programs. Racial stereotypes, partisanship (% of Republicans in the state population), and percentage of conservatives (measure of ideology) in a state are not significantly related to IWS. The measure of ideology lacking significance is important due to the central position that state-level ideology has played in the scholarly literature.

Model 5.5B reports the results of a regression of TANF cash benefits on each of the measures of public opinion. Public opinion is a weaker predictor of cash benefit levels than the IWS. None of the public opinion measures are significant predictors of cash benefit levels. The effect size for authoritarianism is virtually flat with large confidence intervals, see Figure 5.5. The implications are that the mass public may have viewed immigration accessibility not as a general welfare issue. Instead, immigration

accessibility to welfare is associated to immigration in general. Media images portray immigrants as an out-group taking advantage of the social safety net. Further, one can expect that immigrant accessibility is a more salient issue than the actual benefit levels. This factors are more likely to trigger a response from authoritarians to influence determining accessibility but less likely for them to lobby elites for lower benefits. As Brooks and Manza (2007) indicate, issue salience is an important factor for policy-responsiveness. With a lower level of issue salience regarding benefit levels, political elites are given more "space" to adopt policies.

(Figure 5.5 about here)

Alternative Explanations and Robustness of Authoritarianism

The proportion of authoritarians in each state is certainly not the only factor that can influence public policy or mediate the relationship between authoritarians and the immigration welfare scale. To test for alternative explanations and robustness, I include a series of control variables to measure political factors, social factors, economics, and state characteristics. After controlling for several rival explanations, the proportion of authoritarians in each state continues to be significantly correlated with immigrant access to social welfare programs. There is one exception to this pattern, once I include the level of education in the state (proportion of state population with at least a high school diploma) and the percent of democrats in a state, the measure of authoritarianism is no longer significant. Below I discuss this finding in more detail.

Besides ideology and partisanship, other political factors influence policy outcomes at the state level. Democratic legislatures are known to be more generous and inclusive in their welfare policy reforms. As such, I include the percentage of legislative seats held by the Democratic Party. Unfortunately, Nebraska has a non-partisan legislative body, and thus, I do not know the party identification of each state representative. As a result, I have to exclude Nebraska from the political model. The results presented in Table 5.6, Model 6A reflect controls for a series of political variables. The political variables can influence the willingness of states to adopt inclusive welfare policies for immigrants. Of the political variables, percent conservative becomes a significant predictor once I introduce a control for the percent of Democrats in a state legislature. But none of the political variables are significant predictors of the IWS. More importantly, the relationship between authoritarianism and the immigration welfare scale persists, even after adding other political variables.

(Table 5.6 about here)

The size of minority populations can influence individual attitudes (e.g., Blalock 1967; Hopkins 2010; Key 1949; Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002) and welfare policies (e.g., Hero 1998; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Johnson 2003; Fording 2003; Wright 1976). As I theorize, the presence of immigrants can present a situational trigger that shapes public opinion (Sniderman et al. 2004) and possibly the policy-response relationship. The majority of the research on welfare policies and minority populations focus on the Black-White paradigm providing strong evidence that states

with a larger Black population are more likely to provide lower benefit levels (Hero 1998; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Johnson 2003; Fording 2003; Wright 1976), stronger sanctions (Soss et al. 2003), stricter time limits (Soss et al. 2003), and second-order devolution (Soss et al. 2008).

On the other hand, the findings are weaker for Latino and immigrant minority populations[38]. Soss, Schram, Vartanian and O'Brien (2003) find that Latino populations predict stricter time limits and family caps but failed to predict the strength of sanctions and stricter work requirements. Other research finds a similar relationship in that Latino racial context is a poor predictor of second-order devolution (Soss et al. 2008). I included the proportion of each state's population that is foreign born and Blacks to the basic model. I do not include a measure for the Latino racial context since the percentage of Latinos in a state is highly correlated with the percentage of immigrants ($r=.758$, $p<.05$).

In addition to racial and ethnic demographics, educational demographics can be an important factor. Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to be politically tolerant (e.g., Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003) and have positive attitudes towards immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Education lowers the perceived cultural threat posed by immigrants. I add the percentage of state population over 25 with at least a high school diploma.

None of the minority population variables are significantly related to the IWS, as presented in Model 6B. At this point, the education variable is also not a significant

[38] It is difficult to separate ethnicity, Hispanic identity, from nationality, immigrant status, due to significant overlap, as the U.S. Census estimates that roughly 40% of Hispanics are immigrants. Further, recent survey data also finds that 49% of Americans assume that any Hispanic they encounter is either a legal or illegal immigrant (CNN 2009).

predictor of the IWS. Further, the inclusion of these additional independent variables fails to alter the relationships between authoritarianism and the IW Scale[39].

In Model 6C, I included additional variables to capture other characteristics of each state. I include a measure of the state's geographic location to Mexico. The flow of illegal immigration from Mexico into border states increases the media attention and importance of the immigration issue. Additionally, the economic situation of the state can influence the generosity of the legislature to fund social spending programs by providing a means to increase funding and the economy influences the demand on these programs by the general public (Graefe et al. 2008; Plotnick and Winters 1985; Tweedie 1994). Yet, as can be seen in Model 6C, the inclusion of state gross domestic product, unemployment rates, and sharing a border with Mexico has very little impact on immigrant accessibility and no impact on the relationship between authoritarianism and the IWS.

In the final column, Model 6D, I include all the control variables together. For the first time, I find that the coefficient for authoritarianism is no longer significant. The impact on the effect of authoritarianism can be seen in Figure 5.6. The slope of the line decreases and more importantly the confidence intervals increase at both ends of the graph. The reason for this change in the authoritarianism coefficient is due to the addition of both the percent of conservatives and the percent of high school educated individuals in the state. On one hand, the percent of conservatives is positively correlated with authoritarianism ($r=.516$, $p<.05$). And on the other hand, the measure of education is negatively correlated with authoritarianism ($r=-.612$, $p<.001$). Conceptually,

[39] I also tested for the possibility of an interaction effect between the percentage of foreign born and authoritarianism and found no significant differences.

authoritarians are different from conservatives (see Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Conservatives support the status quo and authoritarians are willing to support dramatic changes to policy in order to support their view of social conformity. Unfortunately, Americans are presented with an ideological spectrum that contains a single left-right dimension instead of a spectrum with multiple dimensions. As a result, many Americans confuse the conservatism and authoritarianism as the same concept, which shows when they answer the survey questions that I use to construct my MRP estimates.

(Figure 5.6 about here)

Theoretically, the influence of education decreases the number of authoritarians and as such, states with a more educated public also have a less authoritarian public. At the individual level, research has show that education decreases the level authoritarianism (Stenner 2005). Theoretically, more educated individuals hold many attitudes and values that decrease individual concern for social conformity. As mentioned earlier, educated individuals tend to be more politically tolerant (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), socially tolerant (Weldon 2006), and less likely to view immigrants as a cultural threat (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Overall, a more tolerant individual is also more likely to hold positive attitudes towards immigrants (Kehrberg 2007). As such, these individuals do not view immigrants as a social threat and are likely to support inclusive welfare policies for immigrants.

Using the same approach, I estimate models for TANF cash benefit levels controlling for political variables, state demographics, and state characteristics. The models in Table 5.7, show a pattern of null findings. Authoritarianism is never a significant predictor of TANF cash benefit levels. Based on these findings, authoritarianism as a macro-level variable is a strong predictor of barriers to entry into the welfare system but not a predictor of the generosity of the programs. Of the additional variables I added to the statistical models, only the percentage of conservatives and the percentage of Blacks in a state are significant predictors of TANF cash benefit levels. Both variables are negatively correlated to TANF cash benefit levels, as such, more conservative states and states with larger Black populations are less likely to provide generous TANF programs.

(Table 5.7 about here)

CONCLUSION

The 1996 welfare reforms resulted in a host of significant changes in state welfare policies. State politics on immigration are one of the most understudied areas of political science. This study contributes to our understanding of state level immigration policies by focusing on welfare reforms that create inclusionary or exclusionary programs for immigrants. The decision to grant immigrants access to welfare programs can be divided into the “means” and the “willingness” to do so. My evidence finds a strong pattern that willingness of state populations predicts immigrant inclusion. Willingness is measured using multiple estimates of public opinion, therefore indicating an opinion-policy linkage with policy responsiveness by political elites to macro attitudes.

The macro attitudes associated with social spending policies regarding immigrant access are not predicted by the typical willingness explanatory variables found in the literature—i.e. welfare spending preferences and racial stereotypes. Conventional wisdom suggests that individuals who prefer a smaller welfare state should oppose allowing immigrants access to public assistance. Instead, the strongest and most robust predictor of immigrant access is level of authoritarianism in a state. In what I believe to be the first state-level analysis of authoritarianism and policy outcomes, I find the statistical evidence paralleling my findings at the individual-level in Chapter 4. At the state-level, the macro level estimate for authoritarianism is positively correlated with the macro estimate for immigration attitudes. Authoritarians are very concerned about immigrants, who are by definition cultural, social, and political outsiders in the United States. The authoritarian worldview pictures outsiders as a threat to the social order (Hetherington and Weiler 2009).

Previous research provides support that authoritarianism can influence individual attitudes and policy preferences (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and that the crucial position of authoritarianism as a predisposing factor and core value can result individuals responding to political cues and eventually a partisan sort (Hetherington and Weiler 2009) resulting in political polarization (McCarty et al. 2006). As a result of the partisan sort, authoritarians are becoming more concentrated within the Republican and as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) have shown, the cleavage in authoritarian attitudes continues to divide the public and create policy dilemmas for policy makers, especially those in the Republican Party. As my research finds, authoritarianism contributes to policy dilemmas as authoritarians make their policy

preferences known. Policy makers face policy dilemmas since authoritarianism view the world in “black and white” or “right and wrong” terms that decrease the likelihood of compromise on issues that are perceived threats to the American society and probably contribute to the increasing negative and polarized rhetoric currently being witnessed in U.S. politics.

In addition to creating political polarization across party lines, authoritarianism can create tension within the Republican Party. The Republican Party has been described as a big tent that contains multiple and competing ideologies. But as Ronald Reagan correctly predicted, "Within our tent, there will be many arguments and divisions over approach and method and even those we choose to implement our philosophy." As authoritarians sorted themselves in to the Republican Party, the party has become further divided between authoritarians and Libertarians. And as a result, the Republican Party is currently seeing increased internal fighting and failing to follow the advice of Ronald Reagan who also said, "It is not your duty, responsibility of privilege to tear down, or attempt to destroy, others in the tent."

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

Figure 5.1. Immigrant Accessibility to Social Welfare Programs in the U.S. States.
Notes: Darkly shaded states allow immigrants access to those individual welfare programs. Non-shaded states do not allow immigrants access to that particular welfare program.



Figure 5.2. The Relationship between Public Opinion and State Policy Outcomes.
Note: The relationships shown in this figure are not the only possible relationships between the variables. To avoid an overly complex figure, I have omitted the arrows for a possible relationship between the predisposing factors themselves. Variables that appear in the earlier stages can influence any variable or relationship that appears in later stages.



Figure 5.3. The Relationship between Authoritarianism and the IWS.
Note: Authoritarianism is a MRP estimate of the proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes. Higher values indicate larger authoritarian populations. Higher values for the Immigration Welfare Scale indicate states that allow immigrants greater access to welfare programs. Negative values on the Immigration Welfare Scale are states that overall deny immigrants access to welfare programs.



Figure 5.4. **The Effect of Authoritarianism on IWS.**
Note: Estimates of adjusted means based on Model 5.5A. Authoritarianism is a MRP estimate of the proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes. Higher values indicate larger authoritarian populations. Higher values for the Immigration Welfare Scale indicate states that allow immigrants greater access to welfare programs. Negative values on the Immigration Welfare Scale are states that overall deny immigrants access to welfare programs. All other variables are held constant.



Figure 5.5. **The Effect of Authoritarianism on TANF Cash Benefit Levels.**
Note: Estimates of adjusted means based on Model 5.5B. Authoritarianism is a MRP estimate of the proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes. Higher values indicate larger authoritarian populations. Higher values for the Maximum TANF Cash Benefit levels indicate states that provide more generous cash benefits to a family of three. All other variables are held constant.



Figure 5.6. **The Effect of Authoritarianism on Immigrant's Access to Welfare Programs while controlling for Education and Ideology.**
Note: Estimates of adjusted means based on Model 5.6D. Authoritarianism is a MRP estimate of the proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes. Higher values for the Immigration Welfare Scale indicate states that allow immigrants greater access to welfare programs. Negative values on the Immigration Welfare Scale are states that overall deny immigrants access to welfare programs. All other variables are held constant.

Table 5.1. MRP Estimates for the Level of Authoritarianism and Negative Hispanic Work-Ethic Stereotypes per State.

State	Authoritarianism	Hispanic Stereotypes	State	Authoritarianism	Hispanic Stereotypes
AL	65.9	19.0	MT	46.0	21.2
AK	48.1	21.3	NE	62.2	27.9
AZ	42.5	17.4	NV	42.8	19.8
AR	57.6	16.2	NH	47.2	29.8
CA	38.3	18.7	NJ	47.2	26.0
CO	37.8	19.6	NM	43.0	16.9
CT	46.7	27.7	NY	48.6	24.2
DE	51.7	24.4	NC	58.8	20.3
FL	56.3	23.6	ND	61.9	28.7
GA	61.6	21.2	OH	54.9	25.7
HI	35.4	18.3	OK	63.0	19.6
ID	51.7	18.3	OR	36.0	18.0
IL	50.1	21.8	PA	53.4	29.7
IN	61.6	24.6	RI	44.0	27.1
IA	52.4	23.1	SC	62.6	20.5
KS	61.2	25.5	SD	60.0	26.5
KY	62.0	20.7	TN	59.0	20.0
LA	62.5	24.6	TX	63.7	20.3
ME	47.5	28.5	UT	50.0	11.6
MD	49.5	19.6	VT	41.6	27.0
MA	37.8	29.5	VA	54.4	22.4
MI	51.6	25.3	WA	33.6	17.0
MN	47.1	22.8	WV	62.9	24.5
MS	64.9	18.0	WI	50.5	28.4
MO	56.1	21.9	WY	53.3	21.4
Mean	52.0	22.5			
SD	9.0	4.1			

Note: MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes and negative Hispanic work-ethic stereotypes. Higher numbers indicate larger authoritarian populations and larger populations with negative Hispanic work-ethic stereotypes.

Table 5.2. MRP Estimates for the Level of Conservatism and Self-Identified Republicans per State.

State	% Conservative	% Republican	State	% Conservative	% Republican
AL	31.1	19.57	MT	25.68	39.84
AK	26.37	41.34	NE	27.92	38.95
AZ	22.29	37.7	NV	20.48	29.34
AR	27.05	18.27	NH	18.44	22.61
CA	17.91	30.84	NJ	18.78	18.8
CO	19.81	28.14	NM	20.31	24.4
CT	16.68	17.58	NY	15.42	24.32
DE	16.89	21.79	NC	24.64	20.7
FL	21.25	24.29	ND	25.81	42.62
GA	25.43	26.49	OH	19.4	22.75
HI	18.5	26.44	OK	32.45	25.15
ID	32.92	39.09	OR	19.97	30.21
IL	16.8	26.13	PA	18.03	19.44
IN	25.01	34.0	RI	15.13	18.72
IA	21.01	25.44	SC	25.14	20.36
KS	26.87	53.78	SD	25.44	37.83
KY	28.13	23.73	TN	25.77	15.26
LA	22.73	20.84	TX	24.89	21.22
ME	17.89	22.89	UT	42.05	28.47
MD	15.91	20.53	VT	15.81	19.86
MA	13.88	13.13	VA	20.93	25.35
MI	20.99	25.07	WA	19.1	26.39
MN	19.15	24.21	WV	21.84	23.36
MS	26.98	16.85	WI	19.18	34.13
MO	22.95	18.78	WY	30.67	43.63
Mean	22.56	26.61			
SD	5.51	8.53			

Note: MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives or identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values of both variables indicate larger populations that identify themselves as conservatives or identifying themselves as being Republicans.

Table 5.3. Correlation between MRP Estimates for Political Identifications and Traditional Measures at the State-Level.

	MRP % Conservative	MRP % Republican
Citizen Ideology	-.754	
EWM Ideology	-.787	
Norrander Ideology	.590	
EWM Partisanship		.580
Norrander Partisanship		.446

Note: MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives or identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values of both variables indicate larger populations that identify themselves as conservatives or identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher value of Citizen Ideology and EWM Ideology indicate more liberal states. Higher values of Norrander Ideology indicate more conservative states. Higher values of EWM Partisanship and Norrander Partisanship indicate states with larger Republican populations.

Table 5.4. Relationship between MRP Estimates of Predisposing Factors at the State-Level.

	Authoritarianism	Hispanic Stereotypes	% Republican
Hispanic Stereotypes	.151		
% Republican	-.023	-.011	
% Conservative	.516	-.480	.374

Note: MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives, authoritarians, holding negative work-ethic stereotypes of Hispanics, and identifying themselves as being Republicans. All correlations are Pearson's R.

Table 5.5. Responsiveness of Immigration Welfare Accessibility and TANF Cash Benefits to Public Opinion.

	IWS Model 5.5A	Cash Benefits Model 5.5B
Constant	2.389**	1297.955***
	(1.074)	(459.373)
Authoritarianism	-.061***	-1.282
	(.018)	(7.184)
Racial Stereotypes	.069	-7.273
	(.045)	(15.892)
% Conservative	-.011	-15.720
	(.037)	(13.645)
% Republican	-.020	.197
	(.014)	(5.206)
Adj. R^2	.466	.008
N	50	47

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state. Independent variables are MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives, authoritarians, holding negative work-ethic stereotypes of Hispanics, and identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values indicate a greater proportion of the state population holding these attitudes.

Missing State Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska in Model 5.2B.

Table 5.6. The Influence of Controlling for Other Factors on the Relationship between Authoritarianism and the Immigration Welfare Scale.

	IWS Model 6A	IWS Model 6B	IWS Model 6C	IWS Model 6D
Constant	4.325***	-.984	3.633***	-4.910*
	(.948)	(2.725)	(.765)	(2.674)
Authoritarianism	-.045***	-.046**	-.062***	-.018
	(.012)	(.018)	(.010)	(.017)
% Conservative	-.060**			-.045**
	(.024)			(.017)
% Republican	-.019			-.027
	(.017)			(.017)
% Democratic Legislature	-.003			.012
	(.007)			(.008)
% Foreign Born		.024		-.040
		(.028)		(.048)
% Black Population		.016		-.006
		(.010)		(.011)
% High School Diploma		.041		.086***
		(.024)		(.026)
Border State - Mexico			-.776***	-.345
			(.200)	(.279)
State Unemployment			-.136	.067
			(.101)	(.093)
State GDP			.002***	.002**
			(.001)	(.001)
Adj. R^2	.502	.320	.412	.582
N	49	50	50	49

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Independent variables are MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives, authoritarians, holding negative work-ethic stereotypes of Hispanics, and identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values indicate a greater proportion of the state population holding these attitudes.
Missing States: Nebraska (Models 3A and 3D).

Table 5.7. The Influence of Controlling for Other Factors on the Relationship between Authoritarianism and TANF Cash Benefits.

	Cash Benefits Model 7A	Cash Benefits Model 7B	Cash Benefits Model 7C	Cash Benefits Model 7D
Constant	1442.746*** (475.824)	1786.133 (1425.096)	976.49** (408.516)	1420.893 (1528.17)
Authoritarianism	-1.652 (6.073)	-5.169 (10.484)	-5.709 (5.699)	5.636 (13.870)
% Conservative	-12.977 (8.107)			-17.018* (9.400)
% Republican	-5.186 (5.993)			-10.180 (7.146)
% Democratic Legislature	-4.115 (4.326)			-5.277 (5.109)
% Foreign Born		6.251 (19.026)		-1.620 (39.249)
% Black Population		-7.682 (5.404)		-10.889* (5.643)
% High School Diploma		-9.732 (13.060)		-2.176 (12.943)
Border State - Mexico			53.306 (195.974)	79.682 (282.400)
State Unemployment			4.155 (53.715)	43.278 (59.063)
State GDP			.119 (.287)	.093 (.469)
Adj. R^2	.011	.007	.039	.039
N	47	47	47	47

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state. Independent variables are MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives, authoritarians, holding negative work-ethic stereotypes of Hispanics, and identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values indicate a greater proportion of the state population holding these attitudes.
Missing States: Nebraska, Alaska, and Hawaii.

CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion and Implications

"We don't mind taking care of people, let's just take care of our own people. I don't want to take care of Mexico's people that are here illegally." Renee Unterman, Georgia State Senator on the passage of a state anti-immigration law (2011)

INTRODUCTION

Public support of welfare and welfare policy are among the most widely studied political phenomenon in American politics. Despite the increasing amount of research on welfare attitudes and welfare policy, there is still a need for further study. I advance our knowledge of welfare attitudes and policy reform by developing a theory connecting predisposing factors, authoritarianism, to reforms that limit immigrant access to welfare programs. As a result, this dissertation presents a unique study for several reasons. First, my dissertation is one of the few studies that examine how public opinion influences welfare reforms by using the individual level findings to predict state level policy reforms. Second, I employ newer statistical models allowing me to examine relationships across levels of analysis. In Chapter 4, I use multi-level modeling to assess the relationship between contextual factors, demographics, and individual attitudes. In Chapter 5, I apply multi-level modeling with poststratification (MRP) to estimate macro level attitudes. The estimates of macro level attitudes are included in a regression model to predict inclusionary welfare policies for immigrants at the state level. The use of MRP allowed me to build on previous research by Hero and Preuhs (2007). My study moves

beyond state characteristics to test for an opinion-policy relationship in greater detail by including measures of predisposing factors in a state-level model of policy reforms. In the end, these unique statistical tools would be unimportant and useless without interesting results that I discuss in the following section.

Results and Implications

I separate the predictors of welfare reforms into the "means" to provide benefits and "willingness" to grant access to benefits. The main finding is demonstrating the significant impact of authoritarianism on welfare attitudes and welfare policy reform. Authoritarianism undermines the willingness to provide inclusionary welfare benefits to immigrants by increasing support for welfare chauvinism. In general, I hypothesize that immigration levels trigger a predisposing factors (economic self-interest, racial stereotypes, political identifications, or authoritarianism). I find a strong pattern that authoritarianism is an important predisposing factor that influences policy. I build on previous research that finds a strong gap between authoritarians and non-authoritarians regarding preferences on immigration policy (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009). Neither of these previous studies connected the authoritarian gap on immigration to welfare preferences. But other studies find a strong relationship between conformity, a component of authoritarianism, and welfare preferences (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997). In summary, immigrants are a key out-group for authoritarians, a group that is perceived as being illegal, Latino, poor, culturally different, and unwilling to adopt American norms and customs. Essentially, immigrants are viewed as a non-conforming group who desire a new social order.

The first implication of my dissertation is that changes in the patterns of immigration does influence political attitudes and policy preferences by triggering authoritarianism. The authoritarian personality cluster revolves around three components: *authority* (submission), *conformity* (conventionalism), and *aggression* (Altemeyer 1996). The Latino Threat Narrative creates an image of immigrates violating authority and conformity and, as a result, authoritarians' aggressively prefer policies to punish immigrants, such as limiting access to welfare.

Building on the first implication, I find that states with higher levels of authoritarianism are more likely to restrict access to welfare programs (welfare chauvinism). To be more precise, the states with this population characteristic denied immigrant access to welfare programs as indicated by those states with a higher concentration of authoritarians are more likely to have policy congruence. The relationship between authoritarianism and welfare chauvinism is extremely robust even with the inclusion of racial demographics, state characteristics, economic factors, political representation, and political institutions. I suspect that authoritarianism shapes policy preferences towards immigration beyond welfare chauvinism. In a recent study, Lax and Phillips (2013) examined 39 state policies finding that the lowest level of congruence between state policies and public opinion is in the area of immigration. They focused on four different immigration policies: bilingual education, drivers' licenses for illegal immigrants, children of illegal immigrants attending public universities, and the creation of legal status databases for employment verification (e-verify programs). Based on my results, I believe these four policy are closely related to authoritarianism, a factor that Lax and Phillips did not include in their statistical models.

While, my findings contribute directly to the research on predisposing factors and situational triggers (Sniderman *et al.* 2004) and the opinion-policy relationship (*e.g.* Brooks and Manza 2007; Erickson *et al.* 2002; Lax and Phillips 2009a, 2009b; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004), my results are also consistent with research in other areas. For example, research finds that authoritarians are on average less tolerant of others (*e.g.* Stenner 2005). Additional studies show that intolerant individuals have more negative attitudes towards immigrants (Kehrberg 2007; Weldon 2007). While my study did not examine measures of tolerance directly, I can argue that the underlying dynamic of my research on welfare attitudes and the research on tolerance are similar. First, immigration is portrayed in the Latino Threat Narrative as an external invasion of the United States. Second, it does not require a great leap for an individual to hold negative group-centric attitudes that are used as considerations for the formation of multiple and different political attitudes.

Future Research

This dissertation is the first step in a series of projects studying the relationship between immigration, authoritarianism, and public policy. As I wrote this dissertation, I realized that far more work is needed to be done on immigration and authoritarianism, as well as, immigration and public policy. I am planning two papers that build directly on the findings in my dissertation. The first is based on the individual level findings in Chapter 4 and the second on the state level policy findings in Chapter 5. Additionally, the work ethic racial stereotype findings require further research. In less than two decades, non-Latino whites have gone from viewing Latinos' work ethic as being lazy, similar to Blacks, to seeing Latinos as being hardworking, similar to Whites. The change

in these attitudes should be studied and how these attitudes vary across states due to immigration patterns (Fox 2004; Fording, Soss, and Schram 2011).

Also at the individual level, experimental research can provide additional insights into how media images trigger authoritarianism. Forthcoming work by Wright and Citrin (2011) varied media images of the immigrant protests finding significant differences in attitudes towards the protests. Their experimental component was the presence of an American flag or not in the image. Images that contain the American flag generated more positive responses. Unfortunately, the authors do not include a measure of authoritarianism, particularly conformity, and do not include images of non-immigrant protests. Additionally, experimental research can explore the possibility that media frames of assimilating immigrants decrease the authoritarian response to immigrants.

Research on the opinion-policy relationship can be divided into two different categories based on the modeling of representation. The research design of this dissertation examined individual level attitudes and used the results from that chapter to predict welfare policy reform where the dependent variable is the adopted policy. On the other hand, the opinion-policy relationship can also be modeled with the representative roll call votes as the dependent variable. In order to test for a relationship between authoritarianism and roll call votes, I will probably have to shift the study to the United States Senate. Also, I could add an additional level of poststratification to the MRP model that allows for the estimation of public opinion of groups, such as Democrats and Republicans in each state (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2011).

As I mentioned earlier, my dissertation focuses on welfare attitudes and welfare policies, but states are also adopting other policies regarding immigration. Legislation in

other policy areas include restrictions on drivers' licenses, bilingual education, declaring English the official language, restrictions on government programs for children of illegal immigrants, and creating state-level penalties for illegal immigration (Hopkins 2010). Authoritarianism is a likely predictor of these additional policies and the overall level of immigration legislation in each state. Using data from The National Conference of State Legislatures, I can examine each piece of legislation and track changes in immigration related policies across time, while using the ANES data and MRP to measure authoritarianism in 2000, 2004, and 2008.

APPENDIX A

Coding for Individual Level Variables

Racial Stereotypes: “Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are “rich." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are "poor." A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.”

“The second set of characteristics asks if people in the group tend to be hard-working or if they tend to be lazy.”

Hispanic and White Work Ethic:

1. Hardworking (recoded as 0)
2. (recoded as .167)
3. (recoded as .333)
4. (recoded as .5)
5. (recoded as .667)
6. (recoded as .833)
7. Lazy (recoded as 1)

Missing data (recoded as .5)

The racial stereotype gap is calculated by the subtracting White work ethic from Hispanic work ethic.

Variable names:

1992 ANES: Hispanic - v926224 White - v926221

Welfare Attitudes: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?"

Too little (recoded as 1)
About right (recoded as 0)
Too much (recoded as -1)
Missing data (recoded as 0)

Variable names:

1992 ANES: v926242

Immigration Attitudes: "Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?"

Increased a lot (coded as 1)
Increased a little (coded as .5)
Same as now (coded as 0)
Decreased a little (coded as -.5)
Decreased a lot (coded as -1)
Missing data (coded as 0)

Variable names:

1992 ANES: v926235

Welfare Chauvinism: "Do you think that immigrants who come to the U.S. should be eligible as soon as they come here for government services such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, Welfare, or should they have to be here a year or more?"

Eligible Immediately (recoded as 1)
Wait a year (recoded as 0)
Missing data (coded as .5)

Variable names:

1992 ANES: v926242

Authoritarianism: "Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have."

1. "independence" (recoded as 0) v. "respect for elders" (recoded as 1), both (recoded as .5)
2. "self-reliance" (recoded as 0) v. "obedience" (recoded as 1), both (recoded as .5)
3. "curiosity" (recoded as 0) v. "good manners" (recoded as 1), both (recoded as .5)
4. "being considerate" (recoded as 0) v. "being well behaved" (recoded as 1), (recoded as .5)

The four components are added together and divided by four, therefore, the final variable ranges between 0 and 1. Missing data is coded as .5.

Variable names:

1992 ANES: 1. v926019 2. v926020 3. v926021 4. v926022

Ideology: "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative."

"Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?"

Extremely Liberal (recoded as 0)
Liberal (recoded as .167)
Slightly Liberal (recoded as .333)
Moderate (recoded as .5)
Slightly Conservative (recoded as .667)
Conservative (recoded as .833)
Extremely Conservative (recoded as 1)
Missing data (recoded as .5)

Variable names: I use a 7-point Party ID scale developed by the ANES based on multiple questions starting with an individual's general partisanship to how strongly or weakly they consider their partisanship.

Strong Democrat (recoded as 0)
Weak Democrat (recoded as .167)
Independent - Democrat (recoded as .333)
Independent - Independent (recoded as .5)
Independent - Republican (recoded as .667)
Weak Republican (recoded as .833)
Strong Republican (recoded as 1)
Other - Minor Party (recoded as .5)
Apolitical (recoded as .5)
Missing Data (recoded as .5)

1992 ANES: v923509

Party ID:

Variable names: v923634

Education: "What is the highest degree that you have earned?"

8 grades or less (recoded as 0)

9-11 grades, no further schooling (recoded as 0)
High school diploma, or equivalency test (recoded as .333)
More than 12 years of schooling, no higher degree (recoded as .667)
Junior or community college level degrees (recoded as .667)
BA level degrees; 17+ years, no advanced degree (recoded as 1)
Advanced degree, including LLB (recoded as 1)
Missing data (recoded as .5)

Variable names:

1992 ANES: v923908

Age: "This variable was built by subtracting the month and year of R's birth from month and year of interview. For short form cross section (4 in V3011) and those cases who refused to give us their date of birth, we either transferred here their age from the Household Listing in the Cover Sheet (cross-section), or we updated their age from 1990 (panel)."

Variable names:

1992 ANES: v923903

Gender:

Male (recoded as 0)
Female (recoded as 1)

Survey years and variable names:

1992 ANES: v924201

Income: Please look at this page and tell me the letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 1991 before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. (IF UNCERTAIN: What would be your best guess?)

Income is broken into 8 categories:

0 = 0 to $4,999
.125 = $5,000 to $9,999
.25 = $10,000 to $14,999
.375 = $15,000 to $24,999
.5 = $25,000 to $34,999
.625 = $35,000 to $49,999

.75 = $50,000 to $74,999
.875 = $75,000 to $104,999
1 = $105,000 plus
Missing data (recoded as .5)

Variable names:

1992 ANES: v924104

Race/ ethnicity: Used to limit the sample to non-Hispanic White respondents only. The coding varied between surveys due to the 1992 ANES not including Hispanic as a racial category.

1992 ANES required two questions, the first asking about race and the second asking about ethnicity.

"Respondent's race is:"

White (recoded as 1)
Black (recoded as 2)
American Indian (recoded as .)
Asian or Pacific Islander (recoded as .)

"Are you of Spanish or Hispanic origin or descent?"

Yes (recoded as 1)
No (recoded as 0)

Respondents answering yes to the Spanish origin or descent (ethnicity) question are dropped from the dataset, and then Blacks are dropped from the dataset using the race question.

Variable names:

1992 ANES: race - v924202   ethnicity - v924122

*Feeling Thermometers: "*I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person and I'd like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward that person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the

person. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one."

For the multivariate models, I divided all feeling thermometers by 100 resulting in a 0 to 1 scale. I coded all missing data as .5.

Variable names:

1992 ANES: Illegal Immigration - v925331 People on Welfare - v925318 Poor People - v925320 Whites - v925333 Blacks - v925323 Immigrants - v925336

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 4 Analysis

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Welfare	-.311	.693	-1	1
Welfare Chauvinism	.233	.383	0	1
Immigration Attitudes	-.285	.463	-1	1
Authoritarianism	.551	.280	0	1
Hispanic Work Ethic	.488	.199	0	1
White Work Ethic	.338	.189	0	1
Stereotype Gap	.127	.233	-.667	1
Ideology	.544	.205	0	1
Party ID	.497	.334	0	1
Income	.513	.240	0	1
White Feeling Th.	.690	.188	0	1
Black Feeling Th.	.600	.173	0	1
Immigration Feeling	.567	.185	0	1
Illegal Imm. Feeling	.351	.209	0	1
Welfare Feeling Th.	.491	.181	0	1
Poor Feeling Th.	.666	.172	0	1
Age	47.037	17.859	18	91
Education	.529	.343	0	1
Female	.520	.500	0	1

Source: 1992 ANES

APPENDIX B

Public Opinion Measures (pre-MRP estimation)

Racial Stereotypes: “Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are “rich." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are "poor." A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.”

“The second set of characteristics asks if people in the group tend to be hard-working or if they tend to be lazy.”

Source: 1992 ANES

Hispanic Work Ethic:

Coded as 0 for those that answered with positive characteristics, 1 for those that answered with negative characteristics.

Welfare Attitudes: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?"

Too little (recoded as 1)
About right (recoded as 0)
Too much (recoded as 0)

Source: 1992 ANES

Immigration Attitudes: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?”

Increased a lot (coded as 1)
Increased a little (coded as 1)
Same as now (coded as 0)
Decreased a little (coded as 0)
Decreased a lot (coded as 0)

Source: 1992 ANES

Authoritarianism:

"Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have."

"independence" (coded as 0) v. "respect for elders" (coded as 1)
"self-reliance" (coded as 0) v. "obedience" (coded as 1)
"curiosity" (coded as 0) v. "good manners" (coded as 1)
"being considerate" (coded as 0) v. "being well behaved" (coded as 1)

Source: 1992 ANES

Demographic Coding for MRP:

Racial Categories: White, Black, and Hispanic
Gender Categories: Male and Female
Age Categories: 18-29, 30-44, 45-64, and 65+
Educational Categories: Less than High School, High School graduate, some college, College graduate.

Source: 1992 ANES

Regional Classifications for MRP:

Northeastern, southern, western, mid-west, and D.C.

Source: 1992 ANES

State Level Measures

Immigration Welfare Scale: Combination, by factor analysis, of eight different state policies, see Table D1. Source: Tumlin, Karen, Wendy Zimmerman, and Jason Ost. 1999. *State Snapshots of Public Benefits for Immigrants: Occasional Paper Number 24, Supplemental Report*. Washington, DC: the Urban Institute. (For state-funded prenatal care) Fox News Online. 2004. "Arkansas Debate Focuses on Pregnant Illegals." http://www.foxnews.com/story/02933119144,00.html.

(Table B1 about here)

Political Ideology (1): Higher scores indicate more liberal states. Source: Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson. 1998. "Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 327-348.

Political Ideology (2): Updated scores based on Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993), higher values indicate more liberal states. Source: Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1993. *Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Party ID: Percent of state population identifying themselves as Republicans. Source: Aggregated CBS News/New York Times national polls [electronic file] collected by Gerald C. Wright, John P. McIver and Robert S. Erikson (http://php.indiana.edu/~wright1/cbs7603_pct.zip).

Immigrant %: Percentage of foreign born residents of the state population. Source: Tumlin, Karen, Wendy Zimmerman, and Jason Ost. 1999. *State Snapshots of Public Benefits for Immigrants: Occasional Paper Number 24, Supplemental Report*. Washington, DC: the Urban Institute.

Latino %: Percentage of Latinos of the state population. Source: U.S. Census, Current Population Reports.

Black %: Percentage of Blacks of the state population. Source: U.S. Census, Current Population Reports.

% Legislature Democratic: Percent of state legislature held by Democrats. Source: Klarner, Carl. 2003. "Measurement of Partisan Balance of State Government." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 3(3): 309-319.

Party Competition: Higher numbers indicate more even proportion of legislative seats across political parties. Calculated as 50-|50-%|. Source: Hero, Rodney E. and Robert R. Preuhs. 2007. "Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 498-517. Based on data provided by Klarner (2003).

Urbanization: Proportion of state population living in an urban area. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Education: Proportion of state population over 25 years old with at least a high school degree. Source: State Politics and Policy Data Archive: http://www.unl.edu/SPPQ/datasets.html.

State Unemployment: Percent of population that is unemployed. Source: State Politics and Policy Data Archive: http://www.unl.edu/SPPQ/datasets.html.

Mexico Border State: If the state shares a border with Mexico. Source: Hero, Rodney E. and Robert R. Preuhs. 2007. "Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 498-517.

Port: If the state has a major coastal port. Source: Source: Hero, Rodney E. and Robert R. Preuhs. 2007. "Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 498-517.

TANF Cash Benefit Level. Maximum adjusted cash benefit level for a family of three. Source: Source: Hero, Rodney E. and Robert R. Preuhs. 2007. "Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 498-517.

Table B1. Immigration Welfare Scale Components

Item	Coding
State-funded TANF during federal five-year ban.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.
State-funded TANF after federal five-year ban.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.
Immigrant access to state general assistance.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.
Immigrant access to state-funded food stamps.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.
Immigrant access to substitute program from SSI.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.
State-funded Medicaid funding during federal five-year ban.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.
Undocumented immigrant access to nonemergency Medicaid funding.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.
Immigrant access to state healthcare programs.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.
Immigrant access to state-funded prenatal care.	1 if allows, 0 otherwise.

Note: The primary source for the majority of the components is Tumlin *et al.* (1999) except for the prenatal care component (Fox News Online 2004).
Source: Hero and Preuhs (2007).

Table B2. Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 5 Analysis

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Racial Stereotypes	22.320	4.290	11.6	29.8
Authoritarianism	52.016	8.963	30.9	65.9
Immigration Attitudes	53.851	4.750	32.1	62.1
Welfare Preferences	50.441	7.478	19.2	65.6
State GDP	150.19	175.792	14.6	958.5
Political Ideology (1)	49.271	14.788	22.841	86.478
Political Ideology (2)	-14.3	7.515	-28	-.2
Party ID	31.379	6.940	9.6	45
Party Competition	-10.982	9.504	-34	.910
% Democratic Legislature	51.431	15.323	15	84.24
% Foreign Born	3.760	3.745	0	19
% Latino Population	6.705	8.439	.562	40.312
% Black Population	10.167	9.578	.363	36.425
State Education	76.286	5.631	64.3	86.6
Border State - Mexico			0	1
Port State			0	1
Urbanization	67.25	21.213	23.5	100
State Unemployment	4.338	1.021	2.5	6.6
TANF Cash Benefits	719.59	292.179	202.092	1421.79

APPENDIX C

In Chapter 5, I use multi-level regression with poststartification (MRP) to generate state level estimates of public opinion, including authoritarianism. The theory and results of this dissertation present authoritarianism as a key and important independent variable in explaining welfare attitudes, welfare policy, immigration attitudes, and individual response to immigration. But, the findings of an opinion-policy linkage that connects authoritarianism to state level welfare policies regarding immigrant access maybe a result of my coding of the authoritarianism measure in order to generate the MRP estimates.

As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, MRP uses demographic data and national level surveys to estimate micro level public opinion measures for each state. Unfortunately, MRP generates public opinion measures for one category, as a result, the variable must be coded as being dichotomous. To fulfill this requirement, I coded authoritarianism as non-authoritarian, individuals with .5 or less on the ordinal authoritarian measure, and authoritarian, individuals who scored .625 or greater on the ordinal measure. The result is a dichotomous measure of the original ordinal measure of authoritarianism, but does my choice of the coding for the dichotomous measure create a false negative result in Chapter 5?

In order to test for a possible false negative result, I alter the dichotomous coding for the MRP authoritarianism estimates and rerun the Chapter 5 models for each new MRP estimate. I narrowed the distribution of individuals that are coded as being authoritarian by increasing the critical threshold from .625 to .75 to .875 to 1 and generate estimates that I title author75, author875, and author1. Each new estimate is smaller than the estimates used in Chapter 5, since each estimate is based on a smaller proportion of the survey sample.

Besides changes in just the overall pattern between the authoritarianism estimates and welfare policy, the results can also vary based on theory. A decrease in the estimates maybe correlated with a small proportion of individuals supporting limited immigrant access to welfare programs. One of Brooks and Manza's (2007) conditions for an opinion-policy linkage is a sizeable proportion of the population providing a clear and one sided message with strong policy preferences. As the proportion decreases, so can the incentives for political elites to respond to this specific measure of public opinion. On the other hand, the literature claims that authoritarians have strong preferences and more likely to be vocal about those preferences. A small minority, with strong preferences and a willingness to share those policy preferences with elites, can influence legislation even when the majority holds a different policy preference. An example of this situation was the failure of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 to reach cloture in the U.S. Senate. Overall, the majority of Americans supported the

individual level components of the act, but several Members of Congress claimed that they were contacted overwhelmingly by individuals opposed to the act. This is evidence for the possibility that individuals who hold anti-immigrant preferences have stronger opinions than those who hold pro-immigrant preferences, and as a result, more likely to make their policy preferences known and use those attitudes on immigration to influence political elites.

The statistical results provide strong support for the pattern presented in Chapter 5. Starting with the basic model results, as seen in Table E1, authoritarianism is a significant predictor with a negative correlation regardless of the critical threshold used in the data coding. For the most part, the coefficient size is similar across the models, except for the most restrictive coding for authoritarianism, Author1 Model. In this model, the coefficient size is significantly larger, but still predicts that states with strong authoritarian preferences are more likely to restrict immigrant access to welfare.

(Table C1 about here)

In addition to the baseline model, I also conduct a series of robustness checks by including political variables, demographic variables, and measures capturing state characteristics. Table E2 presents the models that include control variables for political ideology, party competition, proportion of the Democratic party in the state legislatures, and the level of professionalization in the legislature. The inclusion of these political control variables result in a decrease in the coefficient size for the varying measures of authoritarianism, but in each model authoritarianism continues to be significant and negatively correlated with granting immigrant access to state welfare programs.

(Table C2 about here)

The next table, Table E3, includes the demographic control variables from Model 3B in Table 5.3from Chapter 5. Again, the inclusion of additional control variables does not alter the relationship between authoritarianism and immigrant accessibility to welfare programs. The relationship continues to be significant and negatively correlated. One interesting change, that should be explored in additional research on a future date, is that the percentage of foreign born becomes significant as the authoritarianism measure becomes more exclusive.

(Table C3 about here)

The final table, Table E4, includes several state demographic variables that influence immigration and immigration attitudes, including economic factors. With these results, the pattern begins to change as author875 and author1 coefficients are in the same direction as the Chapter 5 results, but the variables are no longer significant predictors. In conclusion, the pattern that as the level of authoritarianism increases the likelihood of

the state adopting restrictive policies regarding immigrant access to welfare programs increases is very strong, but not perfect, regardless of the critical threshold used to separate authoritarians from non-authoritarians to generate MRP estimates. Despite the imperfection, the models in this appendix increase the confidence in the results presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

Table C1. Relationship between Immigration Welfare Access and Varying the Measure of Authoritarianism in the Baseline Model from Chapter 5

	Author625	Author75	Autho875	Author1
Constant	3.995**	3.366*	4.763**	5.856***
	(1.837)	(1.889)	(1.858)	(1.928)
Authoritarianism	-.059***	-.060***	-.060**	-.088***
	(.012)	(.014)	(.016)	(.023)
Racial Stereotypes	.066**	.082**	.020	.002
	(.032)	(.031)	(.033)	(.036)
Welfare Attitudes	-.019	-.031	-.010	-.021
	(.022)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)
Immigration Attitudes	-.024	-.018	-.057	-.054
	(.038)	(.039)	(.039)	(.040)
% Republican	-.005	.003	-.005	-.010
	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)
R^2	.507	.510	.466	.469
N	48	48	48	50

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state.
Missing States: Alaska, Hawaii

Table C2. Relationship between Immigration Welfare Access and Varying the Measure of Authoritarianism with Political Control Variables

	Author625	Author75	Author875	Author1
Constant	3.211	3.033	3.724	4.236
	(2.341)	(2.322)	(2.426)	(2.644)
Authoritarianism	-.045**	-.047**	-.042*	-.063*
	(.017)	(.018)	(.024)	(.036)
Racial Stereotypes	.020	.032	-.019	-.030
	(.034)	(.035)	(.031)	(.031)
Welfare Attitudes	-.016	-.025	-.009	-.013
	(.023)	(.024)	(.024)	(.025)
Immigration Attitudes	-.034	-.028	-.059	-.058
	(.042)	(.043)	(.044)	(.048)
Political Ideology	.023**	.021*	.026*	.024*
	(.011)	(.011)	(.032)	(.012)
% Republican	.006	.008	.004	.003
	(.031)	(.031)	(.032)	(.031)
Party Competition	-.001	.001	-.001	.001
	(.011)	(.012)	(.012)	(.012)
% Democratic	-.001	.001	-.003	.001
Legislature	(.010)	(.011)	(.011)	(.013)
R^2	.621	.621	.588	.584
N	47	47	47	47

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state.
Missing States: Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska.

Table C3. Relationship between Immigration Welfare Access and Varying the Measure of Authoritarianism with Demographic Control Variables

	Author625	Author75	Author875	Author1
Constant	1.730	1.448	2.500	2.888
	(2.891)	(2.915)	(3.044)	(3.149)
Authoritarianism	-.045**	-.044**	-.040	-.068
	(.018)	(.019)	(.027)	(.041)
Racial Stereotypes	.041	.055	.003	-.008
	(.041)	(.044)	(.039)	(.040)
Welfare Attitudes	-.014	-.025	-.011	-.013
	(.028)	(.027)	(.027)	(.028)
Immigration Attitudes	-.014	-.010	-.040	-.035
	(.044)	(.046)	(.049)	(.052)
Political Ideology	.018	.014	.017	.017
	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)
% Republican	.008	.010	.007	.003
	(.022)	(.022)	(.023)	(.022)
% Foreign Born	.034	.050	.059	.055
	(.033)	(.035)	(.041)	(.042)
% Latino Population	-.011	-.013	-.021	-.018
	(.012)	(.012)	(.014)	(.014)
% Black Population	-.001	-.003	-.006	.002
	(.017)	(.016)	(.017)	(.020)
R^2	.550	.549	.525	.525
N	48	48	48	48

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state.
Missing States: Alaska and Hawaii.

Table C4. Relationship between Immigration Welfare Access and Varying the Measure of Authoritarianism with State Characteristics Variables

	Author625	Author75	Author875	Author1
Constant	-5.120	-5.643	-7.614	-9.032
	(4.062)	(4.226)	(4.561)	(5.769)
Authoritarianism	-.016	-.013	.005	.022
	(.023)	(.026)	(.032)	(.056)
Racial Stereotypes	.021	.025	.016	.024
	(.034)	(.040)	(.036)	(.046)
Welfare Attitudes	-.015	.007	-.013	-.012
	(.020)	(.047)	(.021)	(.022)
Immigration Attitudes	.008	.007	-.002	-.003
	(.046)	(.047)	(.049)	(.050)
Political Ideology	.020	.019	.023*	.025*
	(.012)	(.013)	(.012)	(.013)
% Republican	-.011	-.011	-.014	-.014
	(.028)	(.029)	(.028)	(.026)
% High School Ed.	.059**	.063*	.082**	.092**
	(.029)	(.032)	(.033)	(.040)
Border State - Mexico	-.208	-.167	-.107	-.059
	(.261)	(.251)	(.403)	(.409)
Port State	-.028	-.052	-.084	-.110
	(.280)	(.275)	(.274)	(.299)
Urbanization	.007	.007	.007	.007
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
State Unemployment	.031	.044	.078	.099
	(.122)	(.118)	(.129)	(.144)
State GDP	.001	.001	.001	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
R^2	.626	.624	.622	.623
N	48	48	48	48

Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state.
Missing States: Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska.

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