# Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria and Tanzania:
A comparative, historical analysis

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Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International Studies) at the Stellenbosch University

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<u>Declaration</u>

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in the part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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Abstract

Civil-military relations play an important role in Africa as these relations strongly influence the processes of development and democratisation. This thesis examines civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania, as these two countries have experienced very different 'patterns of influence, control, and subordination between the armed forces and the wider social environment'. Most theories of civil-military relations have been formulated by Western scholars and this study investigates if these theories are applicable to Nigeria and Tanzania. As only two cases are under focus, this thesis does not aim to dismiss any of the theories or to develop new theory; rather, I suggest new aspects and factors that should be included when studying African civil-military relations. The theoretical framework includes theories by Huntington, Finer, and Janowitz, as well as theories by more recent scholars. After presenting the history of civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania, I analyse the theories' validity in the two cases by evaluating five hypotheses based on these theoretical frameworks. The thesis concludes that even though the prevailing theories contain factors that are very important in the two countries and in Africa in general, it is important to keep the specificity of African countries in mind when studying their civil-military relations. The domestic context and internal factors in both Nigeria and Tanzania are very significant. The importance of identity and the economic situation should especially receive more attention in theories addressing civil-military relations in Africa. There is a strong interrelationship between the various theories, and as a result a holistic approach including all factors, actors and aspects should be used when studying civil-military relations in Africa and elsewhere.

Samevatting

Burgerlike-militêre verhoudings speel 'n belangrike rol in Afrika as gevolg van die feit dat hierdie verhoudinge die prosesse van ontwikkeling en demokratisering sterk beïnvloed. Hierdie tesis ondersoek burgerlike-militêre verhoudings in Nigerië en Tanzanië, juis omdat hierdie twee lande twee verskillende 'patrone van invloed, beheer en ondergeskiktheid' ondergaan het. Die meerderheid van burgerlike-militêre teorieë is geformuleer deur Westerse geleerdes en hierdie studie ondersoek dus of hierdie teorieë werklik geskik is vir Nigerië en Tanzanië. Omdat daar slegs gefokus word op twee gevallestudies, is hierdie tesis se doelstelling nie om enige van hierdie teorieë af te maak nie of om 'n nuwe teorie te ontwikkel nie; maar ek stel eerder nuwe aspekte en faktore voor wat ingesluit behoort te word in die studie van burgerlike-militêre verhoudings in Afrika. Die teoretiese raamwerk sluit in teorieë deur Huntington, Finer en Janowitz, sowel as teorieë deur meer moderne en onlangse akademici. Eerstens sal die geskiedenis van burgerlik-militêre verhoudings in Nigerië en Tanzanië bespreek word, waarna ek die teorieë se geldigheid sal analiseer deur gebruik te maak van vyf hipoteses wat gebaseer is op hierdie teoretiese raamwerke. Hierdie tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat alhoewel die heersende teorieë faktore bevat wat baie belangrik is vir die twee lande en veral Afrika, is dit steeds belangrik om die spesifieke hoedanigheid van elke Afrika land in gedagte te hou wanneer hul burgerlike-militêre verhoudings gebestudeer word. Die plaaslike konteks en interne fokus in beide Nigerië en Tanzanië is betekenisvol. Die belangrikheid van identiteit en die ekonomiese situasie moet veral aandag geniet in teorieë betrekkende burgerlike-militêre verhoudings in Afrika. Daar is 'n sterk verwantskap tussen die verskeie teorieë, wat dus daartoe lei dat 'n holistiese benadering gebruik moet word wat alle faktore, akteurs en aspekte insluit om sodoende burgerlike-militêre verhoudings in Afrika en ook elders suksesvol te bestudeer.

<u>Acknowledgements</u>

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Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

The civil-military relations of Nigeria and Tanzania will be the main subject under analysis in this thesis. It will be a comparative historical analysis where the degree of civilian control over the military will be assessed. This First Chapter will explain the importance of the subject and the chosen case studies, as well as providing an outline of how the research will be conducted. The reasoning behind the choice of research design and methodology will also be provided.

Background and rationale

Post-colonial Africa has experienced many difficulties, and the continent is host to some of the world's most underdeveloped and unstable countries. Several factors led to this unfortunate situation, and civil-military relations are one important aspect. These relations are a central feature of any country, but are especially important in Africa due to specific circumstances. The sociopolitical history and the unstable environment have created a special context, which has affected all actors in civil-military relationships (Ngoma, 2006).

Most African states received their independence in 1960 or soon thereafter. The military became an important institution in these countries, and it has been argued that the military received more autonomy than necessary because of the Cold War (Naidoo, 2006). The notion that the military should be under civilian control was imported from Western countries. Local conditions were often not considered in implementing this principle, and civil-military relations have naturally developed differently in post-colonial Africa than in the Western world. The military is quite visible in African governance, and it is impossible to separate military, democracy and politics completely when studying independent Africa. The military as an institution has had a strong influence on the (lack of) democratisation of the continent. It is important to analyse civil-military relations in African countries and understand the degree to which the military has been controlled by the civilian authorities. Several studies (see for example Auma-Osolo, 1980; Decalo, 1989; Emizet, 2000; Naidoo, 2006; N'Diaye, 2002; and Omari, 2002) are already done on this issue, but the number of studies does not correspond to the importance of the topic. A broader and more complete understanding of these relations must be reached, and this research seeks to be a contribution to this understanding.

Nigeria and Tanzania

A comparative study on civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania was carried out in 1977 by J.Collins, where he tried to assess if there were any specific factors leading to military intervention or preventing such intervention. He argued that internal conditions in Nigeria deteriorated to such a degree that military intervention was unavoidable. The Tanzanian case proved completely opposite, as the conditions prevalent in Nigeria did not exist in Tanzania (Collins, 1977). This study will look at the same two cases, and both the similar and dissimilar conditions in both countries will be analysed. This is necessary in order to reach a full understanding of which particular factors make the actual difference.

Both Nigeria and Tanzania were British colonies, and both received their independence in the early 1960s (1960 and 1961 respectively). Even though they had the same colonial master, the experiences of the recruitment to the colonial armies were different in the two countries. During colonial times recruitment to the armies was often done on the basis of ethnicity. This was very important in Nigeria, where the military became highly skewed due to ethnic preferences by the British rulers. The consequences of this were also highly visible in the country's post-colonial history. Tanzania however is an exception to this rule. Ethnicity was not a factor in the recruitment of the colonial army, and ethnicity never played an important role in the country's political history (Omari, 2002:90-95).

Tanzania's transition to independence was peaceful, and the civilian authorities believed that as long as the military was kept outside of politics civilian supremacy would be guaranteed. This did not materialise however, as a mutiny happened in 1964 (Omari, 2002:90-95). The mutiny resulted in a redefinition of civil-military relations. Civilian control was resumed, and the Defence Forces became well integrated into the political system. As such the military was dependent on the government, which secured stability within the domestic sphere (Lupogo, 2001). In order to integrate the military into the national mainstream, it proved necessary to find a proper role for the military, and it increasingly became involved in the development projects of Tanzania. The Defence Forces of Tanzania became civilianised in order to be subordinated to the civilian regime (Pachter, 1982). After the mutiny in 1964 a single-party rule was installed, which lasted until 1992. For the last 15 years there has been a multiparty system in Tanzania, and the country is still consolidating its democracy (Baregu, 2004; Omari, 2002).

Nigeria is also struggling to consolidate its democracy, which has been in place since 1999. The country had a civilian Government during its first six years of independence, but in January 1966 a military regime was installed after a coup d'état. The military regime lasted until 1979 when civilian rule was restored, but this regime only survived four years. In 1983 the

regime was ousted through a bloodless coup, and the military came back into power. It was not until the then military leader died that democracy was re-installed, and since 1999 several reforms and laws have been implemented in order to consolidate the democratic system (ISS, 2002(a)).

Problem statement

This research will focus on civil-military relations and which control possibilities civilian authorities have over the armed forces. The main aim of the study is to understand how civil-military relations develop over time. I will analyse which factors influence these relations and how civilian authorities are able to control the state's armed forces. Civil-military relations are central when it comes to understanding the democratisation and the development of a state. How the civilian authorities (try to) control the military institutions is an important aspect to study in order to reach a fuller understanding of the present situation in Africa. The focus will especially be on Nigeria and Tanzania, however, implications for all of Africa will also be discussed. Nigeria has had a very prominent military which has participated actively in the governance of the state. The country's history has been unstable, and the military still has considerable influence. In Tanzania, on the other hand, the military institutions have been effectively controlled, and the country has a more stable history. These countries will provide good examples for studying civil-military relations in Africa, as their experiences have been contrasting and they have used different strategies in their civil-military relations. The histories of two countries can of course not be applied to all of Africa, but can nevertheless help us reach a more complete picture of the challenges the continent is facing.

The specific questions the research will answer are:

- *How have civil-military relations developed in Tanzania and Nigeria in the post-colonial period?*
- *Which factors have influenced the degree of civilian control of the military in both countries?*

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses will be investigated:

1. The lack of professionalism within the military has led to weak civilian control in Nigeria, whereas strong professionalism in Tanzania's military has led to good civilian control.

2. The military in Nigeria has not accepted civilian supremacy leading to weak control of the Armed Forces, whereas this acceptance has been in place in Tanzania leading to effective control.

3. No political measures to control the military have been implemented in Nigeria resulting in weak civilian control, whereas such measures have been implemented in Tanzania which in turn resulted in good civilian control.

4. Internal factors and actors, such as the economy, historical events, and political and military personalities, have played a negative role in civil-military relations in Nigeria, whereas their role in Tanzania has been positive.

5. External and international factors and actors, such as Cold War-rivalries, superpowers, the previous colonial power and international organisations, have negatively influenced civil-military relations in Nigeria, but have had a positive influence on these relations in Tanzania.

Objectives of study

The method used in this research will be the structured, focused comparison proposed by George and Bennett (2005). This approach calls for a list of focused questions that will be investigated in the cases under analysis. This is necessary in order to properly compare the cases. The questions will be closely connected to the hypotheses, as well as to the two main research questions. The first set of questions will be descriptive and are connected to the first research question. These will provide empirical information necessary to evaluate the hypotheses. The second set of questions will be more theoretical and the answers will be explanatory. These questions are closely linked to the second main research question.

The specific questions that will be asked in the study, for both Tanzania and Nigeria are the following:

1.0 How have civil-military relations developed in the post-colonial decades?

    1.1 What was the civil-military relationship at the time of independence?

    1.2 How has the civil-military relationship changed during the different phases which the country has gone through?

    1.3 What is the present civil-military situation?

    1.4 Which control mechanisms, if any, have the civilian authorities used?

2.0 Which factors have influenced the degree of civilian control of the military?

    2.1 Have there been attempts at professionalising the military and has it in case been successful?

2.2 Which measures did the civilian authorities use in order to achieve professionalism, and how did the military react to these measures?

2.3 What attitudes do the military institutions and their leaders have towards the civilian authorities?

2.4 How do the military institutions and their leaders regard their own role in society?

2.5 Have the civilian authorities imposed budget constraints on the military?

2.6 How have the military's missions and responsibilities been allocated?

2.7 Have directives concerning politico-military affairs been implemented?

2.8 Have other political measures than the three previous been undertaken?

2.9 What is the structure of the military institutions?

2.10 Have there been strong personalities with significant influence within the military?

2.11 Have there been strong personalities with significant influence within the civilian authorities?

2.12 How has the economic situation developed within the country?

2.13 Have significant events in the country led to a change in the civil-military relationship?

2.14 Has the colonial power kept any influence over its previous colony?

2.15 What has been the relationship to the countries in the region?

2.16 What has been the relationship to the international community?

2.17 Did the end of the Cold War change the relations to external actors?

Scope of study

Nigeria and Tanzania were both granted independence in the early 1960s, and it is in those years this study will start. The influence of the colonial power in post-colonial years will be analysed, but the countries' earlier history will only be discussed when relevant for understanding subsequent civil-military relations. The situation from independence until present will be discussed. In both cases the histories will be divided into phases giving a clear picture of how civil-military relations have developed under different circumstances within the countries. As discussed elsewhere, only two countries will be analysed. These are not perfect representations of all African countries, but they possess characteristics that are illustrative of common trends within African states in general.

Research design

I will use comparative historical analysis to answer my research questions. It will be a qualitative study, where textual data will be analysed. Bennett and Elman (2006) have argued that case studies are ideal for providing a holistic analysis at the same time as they allow for details in the study of historical events. Looking at the two cases of Nigeria and Tanzania, I will discuss the details of both cases at the same time as a more general assessment of their civil-military relations and an analysis of common characteristics will be provided. The two countries have several factors in common, but still have had very different experiences when it comes to civil-military relations. Civilian control of the military has been weak in Nigeria but very strong in Tanzania.

By analysing the similarities and differences, it will be possible to draw some conclusions on which of the factors actually plays the most important role for civil-military relations, and what factors and circumstances are necessary to establish civilian control over the military. This will be what Skocpol and Somers (1980) have defined as a contrasting type of comparative historical analysis, as clearly divergent cases with some common patterns are chosen. Through such an approach it is possible to show limitations of general theories, but it is not an aim to create new generalisations. The details within the specific cases are paramount and the interrelations between various spheres are important (Skocpol and Somers, 1980). Lijphart (1971) has highlighted the two main problems with the comparative method as being the high number of variables and the small number of cases under analysis. To ease these problems, he suggests that it is very important that the cases actually are comparable in that they have several common characteristics that can be treated as constants, but at the same time the cases have to vary in terms of the conditions one wants to put into a relationship. He argues that such comparable cases "offer particularly good opportunities for the application of the comparative method because they allow the establishment of relationships among a few variables while many other variables are controlled" (Lijphart, 1971:687).

A historical analysis is useful in this research in that it shows how civil-military relations have changed through decades. Which factors have been influential and how the circumstances impact the relations as well as how civil-military relations influence the circumstances will become clear. Through studying it over time, it is also possible to see if, and in case how, the authorities have tried to control the military and if this has been successful or not.

I will use the theoretical framework provided by Huntington, Janowitz, Finer and more recent scholars, and analyse to which extent these theories have applicability in these cases. In this sense my study will be what George and Bennett (2005) have described as a disciplined

configurative case study. I will use established theories to explain civil-military relations in the two countries and by doing this I will test if these theories are relevant in these specific contexts. As George and Bennett have explained, through using case studies, theory can be developed, but this is normally through an inductive process. This will not be the main aim of this research; rather, I will follow their suggestion of using case studies to test already existent theories. With this as basis I will be able to suggest new factors that have to be taken into consideration by these theories in order to provide a more complete understanding of civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania.

Methodology

The units of analysis in this research will be the actors in the civil-military relationships in Nigeria and Tanzania. I will analyse the governments, both civilian and military, in the two countries in the years since independence, as well as the military institutions. In order to analyse civil-military relations it is important to measure how much influence the two institutions have on each other. There is a general consensus in the literature and in previous research that civil-military relations must be studied in a continuum, it can not be studied in dichotomies such as civilian control/no civilian control or military influence/no military influence. As a result of this, and as is reflected in the hypotheses and questions, the measurements will be done at both the nominal as well as on the ordinal level allowing for the study to be put in a continuum. This of course makes the operationalisation complicated, however as this is a qualitative research with a historical approach, it allows for relatively open and dynamic operationalisation. For the various authorities under analysis I will look at to which extent they tried to control the military, which factors were influential and if they were successful. As is common in historical analyses, the data used in this research will be textual and mostly secondary literature. I will make use of previous research concerning civil-military relations, but will study it over a longer time-frame in addition to comparing two countries which will ensure new results.

When it concerns the testing of established theories, it is important to keep Lieberson's (1991) discussion of deterministic and probabilistic causal propositions in mind, which outlines how a factor influences an outcome. In the former case there is a clear relationship between the two, whereas in the latter case the factor is seen as only having limited influence on the outcome. In the real world the conditions present are normally very complex, and the difficulty of finding simple causal relations is obvious. An outcome might be a result of several factors, at the same time as different factors might operate in different directions creating an unexpected outcome. In several instances it is also impossible to know, and/or to measure all the factors that can

influence a specific outcome. Lieberson (1991:311) further argues that "in most social research situations it is unlikely that the requirements of a deterministic theory will be met. When these conditions are not met, the empirical consequences of deterministic and probabilistic theories are similar in the sense that both will have to accept deviations." As a result of this it is often impossible in social research to reject a major theory just because a small number of cases deviate from it. This corresponds to the previously mentioned arguments by both George and Bennett (2005) as well as Skocpol and Somers (1980) that case studies are important in order to test established theories and make suggestions on new variables that should be incorporated, but they are not as useful in order to disprove a theory or develop a new theory.

Limitations and delimitations

This study will focus on civil-military relations in Tanzania and Nigeria after both countries received their independence. It is only in this period it makes sense to study their civil-military relations, as the control and influence from abroad was too strong before this, and the countries could not independently develop such relations. The whole period will be looked at, but for each case certain periods and regime changes are important for the development of civil-military relations, and will receive more attention.

The main limitation of this research is what Lijphart (1971) has argued; there are very few cases, only two, and there are a high number of variables. However, I will follow his, and Skocpol and Somers' (1980) suggestions, and have chosen two cases that are comparable, in that they have both constant and contrasting variables. As a result of only analysing two cases I will not aim to create new theories or generalisations, but I will be able to show weaknesses by the general theories under focus. Even though these cases will be used to suggest implications for other African countries, it is important to keep Decalo's (1973) warning in mind; lessons learned from one situation can not necessarily be transferred to another case.

Structure of study

This first chapter has provided the background and rationale of the study as well as the reasoning behind the choice of research design and methodology. Chapter Two includes a review of the relevant literature on civil-military relations and outlines the theoretical framework that will be used in this study. There will be an assessment of theories concerning civil-military relations in general, but emphasis will especially be on Africa and Tanzania and Nigeria in particular. Definitions of important concepts will also be included. Chapter Three will focus on Nigeria, and the theories' applicability will be discussed. A historical overview of the country's civil-military

relations will be provided, before there will be a preliminary analysis of the main determinants of these relations. Chapter Four will have the same outline as Chapter Three, but now the case of Tanzania will be under focus. Chapter Five will compare the two cases, and there will be a more detailed analysis of what the main determinants have been for creating such radically different civil-military relationships in the two countries. Chapter Six will be the concluding chapter and it will sum up the findings from the previous sections. A discussion of how the results of the study correlate to the prevailing theories will be provided. Implications of the findings for the two countries as well as for Africa in general will also be included.

Conclusion

Civil-military relations in Africa have been very influential in shaping the modern continent. Nigeria and Tanzania, which underwent very different experiences in their post-colonial civil-military relations, have been chosen as case studies to provide a comparative historical analysis of the phenomenon. The development of these relations throughout the post-independence decades will be analysed, and an assessment will be made of which factors are important in determining civilian control of the military. Nigeria and Tanzania will be discussed separately, before drawing the results together to provide the comparative analysis. First, however, it will be necessary to give attention to the central literature on the topic, and the following chapter will provide a comprehensive literature review.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Introduction

Much has been written on both the theory and practice of civil-military relations, and it is important to assess where scholarship on the subject is today and how the debates have developed. This chapter will give an overview of the prevailing literature on the subject. It will start with the main theories concerning civil-military relations in general, before looking more closely at these theories' applicability in Africa. Definitions of the most central concepts will be provided, and some important problems and debates will be highlighted. The last part of this chapter will provide more details on the two cases under analysis.

Theories of civil-military relations

The theoretical framework used in this research will be divided in two parts. First there will be an analysis of what I will term 'the Old School', which consists of the theories by the three most central writers in the study of civil-military relations: Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz and Samuel E. Finer. Even though their main works on this subject are several decades old, their theories keep getting referred to in the most recent articles concerning civil-military relations. These theories will be evaluated in hypotheses one to three. The second theoretical framework I will use is one that is provided by more recent scholars in the field, who have emphasised other aspects, divided very roughly into internal and external factors influencing civil-military relations. The importance of such factors will be examined through hypotheses four and five.

Huntington (1957) argues that the best method of achieving civilian control of the military is by minimising military power. This can be done in two different ways. The first strategy is through subjective civilian control, where civilian power is increased to its fullest. The second approach is objective civilian control, where military professionalism is maximised. The first approach argues that the military should be civilianised, whereas the latter argues for a militarisation of the military. In this latter way the institution becomes a tool of the civilian authorities, and it is this strategy that according to Huntington is the best. What characterises professionalism is expertise, responsibility and corporateness within a specific field. This is an ideal type, but the closer to this ideal the officer corps gets, the stronger and more effective it becomes. Following from the expertise, the officer has a special responsibility toward society, and if he takes advantage of this expertise for his own gain, it would wreck society. Holding a military commission is a public profession, and only some members have the legal rights to carry out this profession (Huntington, 1957:83). One of the main mechanisms to obtain

professionalism is by completely respecting the military's independent sphere of action. Civilians should not interfere in military affairs, as this would undermine professionalism. As a result the military would get a weak political position, but at the same time would keep up its military strength. If the military receives autonomy, this would result in professionalism. Professionalism in turn would lead to neutral political values and the military would voluntarily accept civilian supremacy. This again would ensure civilian control (Feaver, 2003).

Finer (1962) also sees professionalism as important for civilian control over the military, but it is not sufficient. Finer argues that there must be firm acceptance by the military institutions of civilian supremacy, and this relates closely to the military's perception of its own, as well as the political institutions', role in society. Janowitz (1961) has argued that there are three major ways in which the civilian authorities can control the military: firstly, budget constraints can be used to lower the military's capacities; secondly, the way the armed forces' responsibilities and missions are allocated could be used as a control mechanism; and lastly, directives concerned with politico-military affairs could be implemented by the civilian authorities. Janowitz (1977) has later argued that the militaries in new nations are more politicised than armed forces in the Western world. This politicisation is supported by the process of education, recruitment and professional cohesion. The military personnel often identify themselves with national interests. The main problem in these countries however is the lack of mutual trust between the military and the politicians.

These theories have been interpreted in various ways and different aspects of them have been emphasised by more recent scholars. Baynham (1986) has looked at why the military intervenes in politics, and in his work he divides the mentioned scholars into two schools: the first is connected to Janowitz and emphasises the dynamics and inner characteristics of the armed forces; the second is associated with Huntington and Finer and concentrates on the socio-political environment. He further notices that there is a general consensus that both schools have to be taken into consideration; both internal and external characteristics are important in understanding civil-military relations, and none of them can be excluded in a complete analysis. Emizet (2000) has argued that a main differentiation between Janowitz and Huntington is that the former assumes that military rule should not necessarily be regarded as an opposite to the norm of civilian rule. Armed forces in the developing world often have other responsibilities and functions than militaries in the developed world. They could at times have functions that are normally seen as responsibilities of the government or could even obtain all executive and legislative power. As such Janowitz argues that military regimes could establish the same type of

civil-military relations as a civilian regime would do, if that is what is necessary to keep the highest political positions.

Baker (2007) does not see Huntington's and Janowitz' theories as all that different, and argues that professionalism is central in both. Janowitz' theory should be regarded as complementing Huntington's theory, as the former's approach is more sociological, whereas the latter's approach is political. The main division between the two is how they regard professional autonomy. Huntington argued that a clear division between the values of liberal civil society and the values of the armed forces is necessary. Janowitz on the other hand, argued that a professional soldier must also be politically aware and therefore share some of the values of the larger society (Baker, 2007).

These theories have not only been interpreted, but they have also been applied, rejected, challenged and/or changed by subsequent scholars. Welch (1976) for example, concludes his book on the subject by emphasising that there are two different strategies for developing nations to achieve civilian control over the armed forces. One of the approaches places the main focus on the civilian political institutions, arguing for their need of legitimacy. The other approach, which he maintains is most likely for developing states to follow, is a strategy emphasising the military institutions. Their values, recruitment, mission and boundaries are among other factors in focus, and the institutions' political strengths have to be assessed. Welch's assessment is supported by Decalo's (1989) empirical study of how different African regimes have tried to achieve control of the military. Out of the seven ways Decalo identifies as how the regimes have pursued control, four relate directly to the recruitment and construction of the military institutions, whereas only one is connected to the civilian authorities. Croissant (2004) discusses push- and pull-factors influencing military intervention. He argues that push-factors are the endogenous variables shaping the ability and disposition the armed forces have to intervene, whereas the pull-factors are extraneous variables that provide the context and structures, which could either be favourable or not for intervention. How these variables interact is central when it comes to achieving civilian control over the military.

Feaver (2003) is one of the most important current scholars, and he has introduced a new approach to the studies of civil-military relations; agency theory. This theory is based on the principal-agent theory often used within economics, and the two concepts of hierarchy and strategic interaction are the main aspects of this framework. He argues that this framework is applicable to civil-military relations, as there is strategic interaction between the civilian authorities and the armed forces and these interactions take place within a hierarchical context. The civilians are in this context the principals who make the decisions on how the military

should be monitored, whereas the armed forces are the agents that have to respond to these decisions. The agents could either work (follow the instructions) or shirk (reject/disobey the policies). Whether shirking is desirable or not depends on the risk of getting detected and punished. There are three assumptions or limitations connected to Feaver's (2003) model. First of all, it is assumed that the players are rational actors. Secondly, it is assumed that the actors recognise themselves as agents or principals, and thirdly, only two players are counted in, despite the knowledge that these are not unitary actors. Agency theory does not deal with the overarching aim of controlling the might of the military, but rather addresses how day-to-day control over the military can be obtained, through controlling policy outcomes that influences the military. The main goals of the civilian authorities are on the one hand to be protected from threats from the external realm, and on the other hand to keep their political control over the national armed forces (Baker, 2007).

The African context

What Huntington, Finer and Janowitz, as well as Welch, Decalo and Feaver, have in common is that they are all Western-based scholars. The question then naturally arises if their theories are applicable in Africa. Auma-Osolo (1980) has assessed this issue using Nigeria as a case, and has argued that Huntington's thesis does not fit in the African context. Finer's findings more accurately describe the Nigerian case, because Auma-Osolo's research makes clear that professionalisation of the military was not sufficient to keep it from intervening in politics. To prevent intervention the military also had to be satisfied with the civilian authorities in place. Emizet (2000) looks at Mobutu's military regime as a case, and contrasts Huntington's and Janowitz's views. He argues that the latter's emphasis on politicised military is better for understanding the situation in Congo rather than Huntington's idea of military professionalism. Emizet argues that Huntington's theory fits better in Western societies, but that his theory does not work that well in Africa. This is mainly because the military in Africa has not been subordinated in the way Huntington suggested, because most African states do not have a framework of working political institutions. Janowitz on the other hand saw politicisation of the military as more important than professionalism, and this is better for explaining the situation in the Congo.

N'Diaye (2002) on the other hand, is on the same side as Huntington, and argues that professionalisation of the military is necessary in order to prevent military intervention. He shows that this is valid in Africa as well in a study of the coup prevention strategies used by leaders in Kenya. He argues that these strategies have not been successful precisely because the

approaches have undermined military professionalism. He agrees with Janowitz on some points as well, and argues that Janowitz's notion of a 'democratic model' in civil-military relations must be applied by the emerging democracies on the African continent. Democratic, civilian control of the military is essential on a continent with so many diverse identities that can be manipulated so easily.

Feaver (2003) himself recognised that his agency theory was limited in that it was only applicable to mature democracies. Baker (2007) however has assessed whether Feaver's theory is applicable in the African context, and argues that it is. For many African countries mechanisms of monitoring and punishment, which are central in agency theory, can be difficult due to a lack of resources. However, civilian control could still be achieved with help from regional organisations and regional cooperation. If the principle of civilian supremacy is broken, regional punishments could include foreign intervention, diplomatic censure and sanctions. As such Baker argues against Feaver who claims that agency theory is only applicable when the military sees itself as an agent and recognises the civilians as its principal. It is further argued that the theory is very important for weak democracies, as it shows how monitoring and punishment mechanisms can be implemented in order to secure oversight possibilities immediately. This is contrasting to Huntington's theory, where the values would have to be changed. This is also possible, but would take a long time, and it is as such difficult to achieve for young democracies (Baker, 2007).

Omari (2002) has studied civil-military relations in Tanzania, and has argued that it is difficult to study African cases through Western lenses. He has also pointed to the problem that the prevailing civil-military relations in the West were imposed on Africa at independence, regardless of the different backgrounds in the different countries. Naidoo (2006) points to the specificity of Africa when it comes to studying the military. He argues that the Cold War played an important role in justifying African militaries to the citizenry, as an outbreak of war between the superpowers was possible, and military protection was needed. The military as a result enjoyed a level of autonomy that was disproportionate to their role in post-colonial African states. Saffu (1981) looks at the common characteristics of all Third World countries, and argues that these must be taken into account. Central to this is the recognition of their poverty and powerlessness. He argues that their marginal and peripheral status in the global political economy is important. A historical approach is useful to analyse how these countries have been incorporated into the current international system. Civilian control of the military is normally dependent on good democratic institutions, but Saffu points out that in order to establish well-functioning institutions in Third World countries, their dependence on others must be reduced.

Goldsworthy (1986), on the other hand, argues that these macro-level variables are not as important as micro-level variables. Subjective and personal factors determining civil-military relations are, according to him, more important than the objective and structural factors.

Even though Africa might be considered a special case when it comes to civil-military relations, different countries within and across continents still have huge differences between them and these relations differ from case to case. Decalo (1973) pointed to the problem that even though the ultimate goal might be to find theories valid for the whole continent, one should not assume that lessons learned from one African country's civil-military experiences could be easily transferred to another country. Related to this, Albright (1980) analysed the complexities in civil-military relations in different states, and argued that these relations range across a wide spectrum. Exactly where they are to be found on this spectrum depends on several different factors. If one does not take all factors into the analysis, the results can be highly skewed. In addition it has to be recognised that these relations are very complex when studied over time. In order to reach a full understanding of the development of civil-military relations in any country, all the different variables that have ever had any influence on the relationship must be identified and analysed.

In spite of the fact that the most important scholars in the field of civil-military relations are based in the Western world, their theories have had a strong impact on the study of civil-military relations in Africa. Applying these theories to cases they were not initially intended for has in some cases led to misconceptions and wrong assumptions, but in other cases they have proved to be valid also outside the Western world. In addition to the geographical distance, it is also important to remember when the theories were formulated. Huntington for example wrote his important work in 1957, when almost all African countries were still colonies. This complicates the application of these theories even more. However, these works are still very central and pertinent, and they will also provide the framework for this thesis. I will test which of the theories fits best in the cases of Nigeria and Tanzania, and/or which factors from the different theories are applicable, and which factors are missing. As such it will be possible to suggest aspects that are important in an African context, but that might be absent in the theories produced in the Western world. As shown, other scholars have already looked at these issues, but further studies on more cases over a longer time-period would provide new insight into these theories' applicability.

Definitions

There are several important concepts that will be recurring in this research, and as such they call for clear definitions. Civil-military relations will be understood in the same way Emizet (2000) has defined them, and which also seems to be prevailing in other major works; where the concept of *civil-military relations* "refers to patterns of influence, control, and subordination between the armed forces and the wider social environment" (Emizet, 2000:204). I will follow the conceptualisation of civilian control which is dominant in the literature. *Civilian control* entails that the political authorities make the decisions whereas the military implements them. In addition the military accepts that they are subordinate to the political authorities. *Parliamentary oversight* of the defence sector refers to holding the executive and the Ministry of Defence accountable and to oversee that a balance exists between the needs of society and the needs of the security sector in pursuing governmental objectives. It should include oversight of the personnel, the policies, the finances, the operations and the acquirement of equipment. Parliamentary oversight depends on a well-functioning committee within the parliament devoted to issues on defence and security, and there should be sufficient expertise on security issues within parliament (Born, 2002; Naidoo, 2006).

The *civil-military problematique* refers to the balancing of two vital factors: on the one hand it is important for the military to be strong enough to protect the civilians in case of war; they must be able to fight all threats confronting the country, and they must always be prepared for a worst-case scenario. On the other hand it must also protect the community from itself, meaning that if they have too much coercive power, which they need for external threats, they will also have the power to destroy the community they are set to protect (Feaver, 1999). A *military coup* (coup d'état) in this study refers to a situation where the military institution or a part thereof illegally overthrows the government. The governments in the two countries have throughout the years been changing much and have had different characteristics. However, for the sake of this study, a *government* will be conceptualised as the highest authority in the country making political decisions. On the opposite side is the *military institution*, which here will be understood as the official armed forces of the country. As a result all irregular armed forces (such as guerrilla groups, resistance armies etc) will not be included. The military in most cases include the army, the navy, and the air forces, and these three bodies will also in this study be included in the military forces. However, in both cases under analysis, the army has played the most important role.

Dichotomy versus continuum

Studies on military involvement in politics have often put the main emphasis on coups, and this has been done through a coup/no coup dichotomy. However, the nature of civilian control has increasingly received more focus, but as this is not an event, but rather a set of relationships, it is much more difficult to measure (Feaver, 1999; Welch, 1976). Decalo (1989) has argued that even if there is civilian control over the military, there might be military involvement in politics, and these relations should be seen as a continuum, rather than as either full civilian control or no civilian control. Bilveer (2000) agrees, and argues that even if it is in a developed or developing country, the military is always involved in some way or the other in politics. How strong this influence is varies from country to country, and depends among others on the threats the society is facing, how the military as an institution sees itself, and how well the civilian authorities are holding on to power. This was also recognised by Finer (1962) who argued that the degree to which the military intervenes in politics varies substantially: some overthrow the whole government; others change only parts of it. Nordlinger (1977) has argued that military leaders could be described as moderators, guardians or rulers, according to how strong their level of intervention is. If they are moderators they have veto power on political decisions, and their main aim is to secure the current situation. If they act as guardians, they have governmental control and their aim is either to secure the current situation and/or make small changes to this situation. The highest level is when the military officers are rulers and dominate the regime, and they aim to create political, and at times socioeconomic, changes.

Liebenow (1986) has also emphasised that civil-military relations should be analysed along a continuum. It should not be regarded as a dichotomy of either civilian control or military rule. At the one extreme of the continuum one finds what he terms civilian supremacy. This basically entails that there is civilian control over the military, and the civilian authorities make the decisions. The next step along the continuum is the watchdog model. This means that there is military intervention in the political sphere, but this is a very short and limited intervention, and it has a specific aim, for example installing the desired regime. Next is what Liebenow terms the balance wheel, where it also comes to military intervention, but here it is more extensive than in the watchdog model. The military has all authority when it comes to the use of force, but is not particularly involved in the running of politics. The direct rule model involves an even stronger presence of the military. The social transformation model also includes a strong military involvement, and in this model it is assumed that there is a clear break with the past. The last model is what is labelled the atavistic model, where the armed forces penetrate absolutely all

aspects of society. Liebenow's classification has been widely acknowledged, and Schraeder (2000) among others adopted these categories in his work on the topic.

The importance of studying civil-military relations along a continuum will also be emphasised in this research. It will not be an aim to establish whether there has been civilian control of the military or not in Nigeria and Tanzania; the purpose will rather be to analyse the degree to which there has been civilian control, and what factors influence where on the continuum civil-military relationships have been throughout the decades. An analysis will be made of which factors make these relations move in the one or the other direction along this scale. Liebenow's classification will also be used, and it will be assessed if it is possible to make such clear distinctions along the continuum, or whether the lines between these categories also get blurred.

Civilian supremacy and military intervention

Huntington (1957) argues that nations which are able to establish balanced civil-military relations have a great advantage in reaching security, whereas nations which do not manage this will squander their resources and run uncalculated risks. At the time of independence, it was broadly accepted across Africa that the civilian supremacy model was the most desirable model of civil-military relations. This was recognised by both the military as well as the civilians (Liebenow, 1986), yet many African countries have not been characterised by civilian supremacy in their civil-military relations. Civilian authorities have often not been respected, and the military have at times intervened strongly in the political sphere.

Liebenow (1986) has argued that civil-military relations in Africa are highly idiosyncratic, and the causes and conditions of military intervention as well as the structure of the armed forces are widely varied. However, he has outlined some factors that are important in explaining why the military intervenes. The first one relates to the party government, and if this is weak it increases the chances of military intervention. The African military forces have generally been weak, but the African political parties have been even weaker. The second factor is what Liebenow has termed 'societal perception of the role of force'. Not only did the political leaders overestimate their own power, but at the same time they underestimated how important force had been for the colonial powers to keep the country together. Because of this underestimation, they did not understand the role the military should, or could, play. The third factor he points to is the 'erosion of the colonial bargaining strategy'. This strategy had in pre-independence days been important in order to maintain stability, yet after independence this was ended, and even locals who had participated in politics earlier were now either not allowed to

participate or had to take on new roles. The fourth factor is 'the transitional military establishment'. During the colonial period the military was important in the modernisation process, but this was not realised by the political elites in the post-colonial days. The fifth factor is 'party leadership reliance on the military'. Even though the civilian authorities initially were negative towards the military, they became very dependent on this institution in order to secure their own rule. The last factor is 'signalling civilian vulnerability'. The authorities realised that the political situation they had themselves created was not positive, and the fact that they had brought the military so close into politics was not sustainable. This close relationship made military intervention even easier.

After a military intervention the armed forces do their best to persuade the public that their rule is better than the civilian regime's, however Schraeder (2000) argues that all their justifications are pure myths: the military is not more legitimate; its rule is not more efficient, it is not better able to maintain stability; the military is not a better unifying structure; and it is not able to promote development any better than civilian regimes. Military interventions have at times been positively welcomed in Africa; however this is not a rejection of the principle of civilian supremacy, but rather a rejection of the particular regime that got overthrown. The importance of civilian supremacy is still recognised, and this is also understood by the intervening armed forces. They normally pledge a return to civilian rule soon after their intervention. In order to achieve a transfer from a military to a civilian regime five factors are important. First, an actual effort must be made. Second, the issues the military tried to solve through its intervention must have been resolved. Third, there must be close cooperation between the armed forces and the prospective politicians. Fourth, the military must be able and ready to share power with other actors, and lastly, external support and funding must be directed towards the civilian and not the military regime (Liebenow, 1986).

Since time of independence it has been recognised that civilian supremacy over the military is desirable in Africa, as well as in the rest of the world. That it is desirable does not necessarily mean that it will materialise, and this has been proven over and over again in several African countries. In order to understand why civilian supremacy has not always been successful, this research will analyse how the political authorities have managed the political situation in Nigeria and Tanzania, and which factors in their rule have contributed to strong and/or weak control over the armed forces. In the cases where the military has intervened, or has tried to intervene, the aspects which contributed to this intervention will be discussed. As a result, it will be possible to identify which factors are important for overthrowing civilian rule, and it would be easier to predict and prevent military intervention.

Tanzania

Tanzania experienced a mutiny in January 1964, and as a result a single-party system that was to last until 1992 was implemented (Baregu, 2004). The new political system was more or less authoritarian, with a very strong party and leadership. The Defence Forces came under civilian rule, the forces were kept small, and they became closely integrated into the political system (Lupogo, 2001). The military that was established after the mutiny was from the very start political, and it became compulsory to be a member of the ruling party in order to serve in the military. Four requirements were especially highlighted to the new recruits; patriotism, obedience, bravery and loyalty (Luanda, 2006:17-20; Omari, 2002).

The mutiny of 1964 was regarded a huge humiliation to the nationalist country, and it became even worse as it was forced to invite British troops to disarm its own forces. These events led to a shift in civil-military relations. The Defence Forces would now be integrated within the national mainstream, and it became necessary to find a proper role for the military. The Defence Forces became increasingly involved in the development projects of Tanzania. This meant that the military should not only play a strict military role, rather, it should also be involved in the larger nation-building, and as such have certain political roles as well. The authorities believed that it was fine to sacrifice professionalism in order to ensure that the military remained supportive of the civilian regime. During the one-party system the Defence Forces were highly politicised. This eroded the professionalism of the military, and especially the important aspects of leadership and discipline suffered (Luanda, 2006; Mazrui, 1968; Pachter, 1982). At the same time as there was a bureaucratisation of the military there was also a militarisation of the bureaucracy; and these two processes were instrumental in harmonising civil-military relations in Tanzania (Omari, 2002:101-104).

Omari (2002) argues that the fact that policies were implemented in order to make the Defence Forces subservient to the civilian authorities should be understood as a response to the Tanzanian context at the time, and as such the new policies reflected strategic considerations. Regional circumstances were also important, as significant military events were taking place at the continent, and the 1971 coup in Uganda was especially influential. It is often believed that the civilian authorities successfully integrated the military into the political mainstream and as a result were able to avoid military coups. However, Tanzania suffered several problems in its civil-military relations. In 1969 a coup attempt was thwarted, and in 1972 the president of Zanzibar was assassinated. This latter event was regarded by some as settlement with an individual, whereas others regarded it as an attempted coup. In any case it proves that the loyalty of the military was not as strong as often believed. There was also an attempted, but failed, coup

in 1982, and in 1984 there were allegedly military plans to take over Zanzibar (Omari, 2002:94-98). The end of the Cold War and worldwide democratisation affected Tanzania, and in 1992 the one-party system was replaced by multiparty system. A new constitution was introduced, including a redefinition of the Defence Forces' role in society. Military personnel were no longer allowed to play a role in politics, but this did not always materialise in practice (Omari, 2002).

Mahanga (2006) has argued that a properly functioning parliament is able to efficiently oversee the government and the state in general. However, in Africa there is generally no close involvement of the parliament and its members in issues relating to peace and security. The parliament should play an important role as a monitor, but this role has often been deemphasised in many African countries. The Tanzanian Parliament is not well-functioning and this must be improved if it should be able to properly monitor the Defence Forces. How well any parliament is able to have an efficient oversight function depends strongly on the structural relationships between the government and the military. These relations are paramount in understanding the degree to which the parliament can control the military (Baregu, 2004:36-37).

According to Baregu (2004:40-41) the implementation of a multiparty system in Tanzania resulted in several problems concerning civilian oversight of the military. The executive today is much stronger than the Parliament, which results in an inability of the Parliament to achieve substantial oversight over the military. In addition there is a close relationship between the Tanzanian military and the executive branch. One of the most important problems is the lack of a clear opposition. If the opposition were stronger, they could more easily control the executive and the Parliament could have been more influential. This again could lead to better chances of controlling the military. The party committees should play an important role in oversight of the military, but this is not the case in Tanzania. The committees should have a consultative function; however, in practice strong limitations are imposed on both the Members of Parliament (MPs) as well as on members of the main party represented in the oversight committees. Baregu (2004:42) suggests three steps in order to improve the parliamentary oversight of the Defence Forces. First, the military should be professionalised, meaning that the military should be completely kept out of civilian positions. Secondly, the multiparty system has reduced the possibility to control the military. In order to avoid this problem, the powers of the Chief Whip should be reduced, but in the long run it would also call for acceptance of independent candidates and independence for candidates affiliated with a party. As such, opposition would be stronger and the Parliament would enhance its power vis-à-vis the executive. Thirdly, the opposition should be further strengthened. The environment should be changed in order to allow for important contributions from opposition parties and candidates.

Nigeria

Nigeria has often been under military rule since its independence in October 1960. Civilian regimes have only been in place in the periods of 1960-1966, 1979-1983 and from 1999 until present. The first two civilian regimes were toppled by military coups, followed by counter-coups, and Nigeria has as a result been regarded as one of Africa's most unstable countries. However, these coups can be regarded as a natural result of very bad civilian regimes (Ikome, 2007). Ejiogu (2007) has through his recent study shown how the recruitment pattern during colonial days favoured certain ethnic groups, and especially the North of the country. There is still today a distortion in the recruitment patterns in the Nigerian military, and it does as a result not reflect the broader society. Welch (1995) has argued that ethnicity will continue to play a significant role in both the Nigerian military as well as in the society in general. In addition to ethnicity, region and religion are also factors that could lead to domestic disturbances.

In 1995 Welch argued that the chances of restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria were unlikely, but if it happened, it was even more unlikely that the military leaders would give up their political influence. He claimed that the main obstacle to civilian rule was the lack of professionalism within the Armed Forces, ethnic tensions, and no clear picture of what a democratisation process would actually entail. Welch (1995) further argued that in developing countries facing economic problems, domestic unrest and complex social pluralism, it is almost certain that the Armed Forces will retain their influence and power. For both Nigeria as well as other developing countries it will therefore be important to reduce the direct influence of the military on the political situation, but removing it completely from the national political arena will probably not be possible and as such should not be a priority. The fight over prestige and wealth is high in Nigeria, and these are often achieved through having high political positions, mainly due to high levels of corruption.

Nigeria has played an active role in African affairs and has participated in several observation and peace-keeping missions across the continent. According to Welch (1995) however, the internal economic conditions are more important for civil-military relations than the international involvement. He points to the fact that the country is highly dependent on oil, and argues that this has some influence on its civil-military relations. Nigeria is very rich in petroleum resources which resulted in a huge increase in revenues in the 1970s. The Government spent increasing amounts of money and the general expectations for the country's future grew. This economic boom also led to a restructuring of the Armed Forces. The arsenal was modernised, an armoured division was established, intelligence units were better coordinated, and the number of personnel was reduced at the same time as the education of recruits improved

drastically. Military expenditures decreased by about two-thirds from 1979 to 1989. The Nigerian military is relatively small, but this is not reflected in its political influence (Welch, 1995).

Ukiwo (2003) has argued that even though Nigeria today has a democratic structure, it remains an unpopular and oppressive state. According to the transitional arrangements of 1993 the President and the National Assembly should have oversight functions of the Armed Forces, however, these arrangements were according to Welch (1995) never respected. The legislature has however grown more important of late. There are various bodies in the Parliament with the responsibility of overseeing the Armed Forces; however they are still building up their capacity to do a proper job. The Minister of Defence has the political control over the Armed Forces, whereas a Permanent Secretary for Defence has the administrative responsibility. The President is still the Commander-in-Chief of the military. Measures are taken in order to civilianise this structure (ISS, 2002(b)).

As becomes clear from these brief overviews of civil-military relations in Tanzania and Nigeria, the two countries have had very different experiences in this field, and they are currently developing along different paths. Tanzania has a longer tradition of democratic rule than Nigeria, but current studies point in the direction that the democratisation process in Tanzania is making civilian control of the military more complicated, whereas the democratisation process in Nigeria seems to be strengthening civilian control. These are current trends, and they will be analysed in order to see how the development has been over recent years, and how these patterns are likely to develop in the future. In order to analyse the present developments it will also be essential to have a proper analysis of civil-military relations in the whole post-independence era, and the changes in these relations will be closely discussed. Factors contributing to different paths will be highlighted, and reforms and measures influencing the relationships will be analysed.

Conclusion

This chapter has given an overview of the prevailing literature in the field of civil-military relations. The seminal theories of Huntington, Janowitz and Finer, as well as those of Welch, Decalo and Feaver, have been examined, and their applicability to the African context discussed. While these theories can often be tailored to fit that context, it has been shown that they also have flaws and deficiencies, often as a result of their age or their Western-centric views. In the study of civil-military relations, scholars have tended to view these relations as either a dichotomy or continuum. This chapter has demonstrated the inadequacies of the dichotomy and has shown the importance of viewing civil-military relations along the sliding scale of a

continuum. Liebenow and Schraeder have discussed which factors influence how, why and when the military intervenes in civilian rule, and what consequences this leads to. These questions will be of major concern in this research as well, and both Nigeria and Tanzania will be used for discussing these issues. Nigeria has had several military interventions and is as such a very good case, whereas Tanzania will provide insight into what prevents the military from intervening. These two cases will also provide the base for evaluating the theories prevalent on the subject, and the works of Omari, Baregu and Welch will especially be analysed.

Chapter Three: Nigeria

Introduction

Nigeria has experienced very problematic civil-military relations since its independence in October 1960, and this chapter will examine these relations. The first section will provide an overview of the Nigerian context, before civil-military relations are discussed in the following two main sections. Details of the development of these relations are provided in the second section of this chapter. It will be divided into historical epochs: the First Republic; the coups and Civil War of 1966-1975; the coup and transition to civilian rule through 1975-1979; the Second Republic; the coup and failed transition to civilian rule of 1984-1992; Abacha's rule through 1993-1998; and finally the consolidation of democracy from 1999 until today. The third main section of this chapter will analyse these relations and evaluate the theories' applicability in the Nigerian context. The outline will follow the hypotheses stated in Chapter One and this section will as such be divided into: professionalism, the role of the military, political measures, domestic environment, and external context.

The Nigerian context

Nigeria is a former British colony, which received its independence on 1 October 1960. The country is situated in West Africa and it is the most populous country in Africa, with a current population at approximately 150 million people. It is an ethnically diverse country, with a total of more than 250 ethnic groups (Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2002(b)); Economist, 2008(a)). However, three of these groups are dominant: the Yorubas in the Southwest; the Igbos in the Southeast; and the Hausa-Fulani in the North. The North is predominantly Muslim whereas the other two areas are mainly Christian and animist. This religious divide has exacerbated the ethnic divide (Abubakar, 2001:33; Badmus, 2005:57). When the country became independent, the First Republic was established along these ethno-regional lines. A federal system was created, and the country was divided in three regions with fairly autonomous governments. The federal Government emphasised national issues, including defence, foreign policy and international trade (Leith and Solomon, 2001).

This federal structure was however not positive for the country as a whole, as each region had minorities that struggled to achieve their rights. The Northern region was highly dominant within the Federation, as it covered almost three quarters of the country and had more than half of the population. In addition, there were big differences between the North and the South in terms of socio-economic development. The most important resource in Nigeria is oil which is

located in the South, whereas agriculture is the most important economic sector in the North. However, oil provides about 80 percent of the country's revenues, and as such the regions compete about the sharing of these revenues. The North has been trying to achieve dominant political influence in order to obtain access to the oil-resources, and the region has been successful in doing this, as it has been dominant within politics throughout most of the post-colonial history of Nigeria (Badmus, 2005; Leith and Solomon, 2001).

The military has played a very prominent role in Nigerian politics since the arrival of independence, and out of the thirteen different governments the country has experienced, eight of them have been military regimes. Four have been civilian, whereas one was appointed. Coups and assassinations have been predominant in the change of regimes, and elections have not played a very important role (Ejiogu, 2007). The post-colonial history has as such been fairly unstable, and even though the country possesses enormous material and human resources, the political and economic development has not been satisfactory. If these resources had been used effectively, the country could have been highly influential globally. Oil is definitely the most important sector, and through the 1970s' oil boom the country's wealth increased substantially. However, it did not promote democracy, instead corruption became an increasing problem (Economist, 2004; Leith and Solomon, 2001; Philips, 2005).

Oil continues to be the most important economic resource in Nigeria, and in spite of problems and conflict in the Niger Delta, it is expected that oil production will increase in 2008. Most of the growth will come as a result of increased offshore production. In addition there is also growth within other sectors, and this has led to calculations saying that the real GDP growth the current year will be at 7.4 percent (Economist, 2008(c)). It still remains to be seen if the country is better able to use these resources for development this time around. Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, and the elections in both that year as well as in 2003 were won by Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military ruler. The most recent elections were held on 21 April 2007, and two days later Umaru Yar'Adua was declared the winner. This was the first time since independence that political power was handed over from one civilian regime to another. However, all these three democratic elections have been regarded as flawed and unfair. On 26 February 2008 Nigerian judges declared that there would be no rerun of the 2007-election, and Yar'Adua's political power is now secured. There are today more than 30 political parties in the country, however, most of these do not have a clear ideology, rather ethnic and personal connections are still highly influential in Nigerian party politics. Ethnic and religious cleavages and high levels of poverty are dominant in the country today, and these factors combined could easily lead to sporadic violence and conflicts, which has been seen in the Niger Delta (Africa

Research Bulletin (ARB), 2007(a):16893-16895; ARB, 2007(b):17031-17035; ARB 2008(b):17419-17420; Economist, 2008(a); Economist, 2008(b)).

The main destabilising events this decade have been the continuing violence in the Niger Delta (ARB, 2006(b):16739-16742) and violent clashes following the implementation of Sharia law in certain states. The Zamfar State Government was the first to implement Sharia in January 2000, and eleven other Northern states have followed suit. As a result animosity between Christians and Muslims has increased. Christians are worried that Sharia will apply to non-Muslims; however, the regional governments have assured that it is only for Muslims. The Christians do not find these assurances convincing enough though, and thousands have been killed as a result (Economist, 2004; Ukiwo, 2003:124-125). Nigeria is still consolidating its democracy, and the new President faces many challenges. The country possesses resources that potentially could enable it to become highly developed and influential. However this requires good leadership and stable civil-military relations, which have not been present in its post-colonial era, as will be shown below.

Civil-military relations

Military take-overs have been normal in the post-colonial history of Nigeria, and they have sometimes been regarded positively immediately after the coup due to corruption and mismanagement by the civilian rulers, but it has normally not taken long until the public realised that military rule was no better than the previous civilian regime. However, it has sometimes been difficult to distinguish clearly between the two types of regimes, and before the recent democratisation, the public increasingly realised that neither military nor civilian regimes have been able to promote development for the country as a whole (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985:610; Ikome, 2007:27-29). When there have been military coups in Nigeria, it has normally been at times when social, economic and political unrest have been prominent in the country. As a result, the military has been able to easily intervene, especially because it has monopoly of the use of force. In addition, civil society has been very weak and divided. A special feature in Nigerian politics is that it is often those who most strongly complain about the military who welcome it the most when it intervenes in politics. This is mainly a result of frustration over Nigerian politicians (Ihonvbere, 1996; Ihonvbere, 1998).

The Armed Forces are not designed to play political roles, and political interventions have therefore led to negative consequences for the military. Olusegun Obasanjo, the retired General, was the first military leader who voluntarily withdrew from politics. He has later argued that as long as the military engages in politics, professionalism will not be achieved. Obasanjo

further argued that the military must be able to be on a high ground, both ethically and morally in order to unite the nation. Personal interests should be abandoned in order to create development for the nation as a whole (Ihonvbere, 1998:513). Another retired General, Salihu Ibrahim, has explained that whenever the Nigerian military was involved in politics, it

> threw overboard the bondage of esprit de corps and created divisions, particularly within the officer corps, with various allegiance and loyalty to the different groups so created. Then we went ahead to make a complete turnaround from our established traditions. We created such a situation whereby we were operating mini-armies within the larger Nigerian Army, to such a ridiculous extent that some commanders had the audacity to kit their troops without any recourse to existing regulations or the Army Headquarters (in Ihonvbere, 1998:508-509).

The Armed Forces of Nigeria have gone through immense changes since independence. In the early 1960s it was not a respected institution in the country; rather it was known for thugs, dropouts and other people not able to achieve success in other ways. The education requirements were very low for Nigerian soldiers. However, after the military coups in 1966 and after the Civil War in 1967-70 there have been many developments in the military. Training has increased considerably. During the war the number of people in the military was approximately 250,000, but it has subsequently been reduced significantly. Professionalism has been encouraged, and among others the military has its own university, war college and insurance scheme. This has been promoted in order to be more independent of civilians, and to not have to rely on them after every military coup (Ihonvbere, 1998). Peters (1997) has argued that the Armed Forces of Nigeria have developed in four specific stages. The first period extends from 1960 to 1966 and marks the formation of the post-independence military. The Civil War and the following years make up the second phase, where both the size and the influence of the military grew substantially. The third phase started in 1975 and lasted until 1984, and in this period both the military as well as the country as a whole went through significant transformations and new foundations were laid. The last phase began in 1984, and is, according to Peters, still going on. However, he created this classification in 1997, and it is possible that he would have argued for a new phase beginning at the turn to the current state of democracy. In the following the development of the Nigerian Armed Forces and the different regimes will be studied in more detail.

The First Republic

In order to analyse the development that started in 1960, it is important to have a brief understanding of the colonial power's influence before independence, and of the state of civil-military relations at the time of independence. Prior to independence the colonial administrators

had full control over the Armed Forces. One of the main criteria for being accepted into the military was loyalty to the British Empire. Britain recruited the military in the hinterland as it was believed that since their homelands were then so remote the recruits would be more detached from the population in the urban areas. As such they would be more efficient in dealing with anti-colonial protests in these areas, as they did not have a strong connection to the population there (Ejiogu, 2007:102-106). The military was trained to control internal conflicts; however, the Nigerian military also participated in foreign missions. During the Second World War it was involved in Eastern Africa and Asia, protecting British interests (Nigerian Army Education Corps and School (NAECS), 1992:73-96). Initially the military consisted of groups that were illiterate and had no education, however, when the military became involved in the Second World War new groups with higher education were recruited, as there was now a larger need for skilled personnel (Ejiogu, 2007:105; Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999:8-9). After returning from Asia in 1946 there was a huge demobilisation of the Nigerian military, and just what was enough for routine responsibilities and peace time tasks remained (NAECS, 1992:98).

In 1956 there were only 15 Nigerian officers out of a total of 250. There were 6,400 other ranks, of which only 336 were not Nigerians. On 1 April 1958 the Nigerian Government, instead of the London-based British Army Council, received control over the Nigerian military. This made it possible to 'Nigerianise' the Armed Forces and its Officer Corps. By 1 January 1960, 228 of the officers were British, whereas 50 were Nigerian. In 1966 the whole Officer Corps was Nigerian, and it had grown to 517 officers. Before independence the majority, 68 percent, of the officers was from the Igbo groups, whereas only 14 percent of the officers were of Northern origin. Before independence, the British rewarded the Hausa-Fulani with increasing political power, and they introduced a quota system where officers should represent all regions. The North should have 50 percent representation, whereas the East and the West should have 25 percent each. As such, the Hausa-Fulani constructed the military to their own advantage, and the Southerners' suspicions of the Northerners trying to guarantee their hegemony both within society and within the military were affirmed. At independence in October 1960 the military was fairly small (7,500 men) and it was weak due to lack off training, experience and equipment (Ejiogu, 2007; First, 1970; NAECS, 1992:107-113; Peters, 1997:77-81).

During the first independent years the Armed Forces mainly participated in ceremonial duties, routine training and parades. The military also assisted the police when there was need for it to maintain law and order. However, the military participated in the United Nations (UN) Congo Operation between November 1960 and June 1964. This peace-keeping mission was the most difficult operation undertaken by the UN until then. It was the first multinational operation

the Nigerian military was involved in and it became the first test for Nigeria's foreign policies. The country believed strongly in the importance of the UN and also found it important that Cold War-rivalries were not played out in Africa. In addition Nigeria opposed colonialism, and believed that African countries should and could solve their own problems. The contingent was at its biggest in March 1962 when it comprised 1,700 men. During the whole operation all the five Battalions of the military participated (Auma-Osolo, 1980; Ekoko, 1993:45-46; Ibrahim, 1993:71,87; NAECS, 1992:113-132). Throughout the early 1960s education became more important within the military, and at the end of 1965 forty-one percent of the high-ranking officers had been educated at the British Sandhurst Academy. Thirty-two percent were non-commissioned officers (NCOs), whereas only twenty-three percent had short-service training. Five percent had no military education, but came straight from grammar schools (Auma-Osolo, 1980:38).

The first years of democratic rule were characterised by rivalries among different regional fractions, who all wanted to achieve control over the central political power. In addition, these regional fractions could not agree how the country's resources and revenues should be divided between them. The politicians used coercion to keep themselves in power, and their legitimacy quickly deteriorated (Agbese and Kieh, 1992; First, 1970; Luckham, 1971). These years were characterised by disorder and chaos. Elections were held in 1965, but the results were highly disputed. At the end of the year there was widespread violence throughout the country, and the central Government was not able to restore order (Abegunrin, 2003:25-27). Throughout all of Nigeria in the early 1960s there was a very negative attitude towards politicians and their politics, and popular discontent was high. The politicians had used everything from elections and speeches to nepotism and bribery in order to stay in control. Military officers, as well as the population in general, became disillusioned with the political leaders (First, 1970; Luckham, 1971).

The military did not involve themselves in policy making in the early 1960s, at the same time as the civilian leaders hardly interfered in military matters. There were several factors within the civilian regime that made intervention possible and justifiable. First of all, as the military did not influence policy-making, they could more easily criticise these policies. In addition, the Armed Forces were forced to take political decisions due to the crisis the regime was going through. The quota system used for recruitment to the military was regarded as political interference in matters purely militarily, and especially Southern officers were critical of this. Lastly, the military was used for tasks related to internal security, but it regarded these

problems as a result of the Government's faults (Luckham, 1971:230-231). It was therefore not a big surprise that the military intervened in the political sphere, which will be discussed next.

1966-1975: Coups and Civil War

The First Republic was characterised by ethnic and political rivalries, and one political crisis followed the other until the structures collapsed completely. It was in an attempt to save Nigeria that the first military coup was carried through on 15 January 1966, and Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was overthrown. Major Patrick Nzeogwu was the leader of the January 1966 coup, and he justified it by stating that:

> Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten percent, those that keep the country divided so that they can remain in office as Ministers and VIPs of waste (...) the tribalists – the nepotists. Those who make us look big for nothing in the international circles. We seized power to stamp out tribalism, nepotism and regionalism (in Agwunobi, 1992:3).

Major Nzeogwu was from the Mid-West and from the Igbo ethnic group. He had been in the army since 1957 and he had training from Sandhurst. So did the Captains and Majors who were involved in this coup and they were among the elite in the officer corps. The junior officers who participated however only had lower education (Luckham, 1971:30; NAECS, 1992:136). This coup was successful in the North, but it failed in the Southern parts of the country. Because of the only partial success, Nzeogwu could not lead the whole country; instead the civilian regime gave the political power to Major-General Johnson T.A. Aguiyi-Ironsi, who had been Chief of Staff of the Army and who did not have any close connection to the coup plotters. Major Nzeogwu and other participants in the coup were arrested (Ihonvbere, 1991:604-605; McGowan, 2005:58; NAECS, 1992:136-139).

Close to all the participants were Igbo, seven out of eight Majors were from this ethnic group and of the other twenty-three participants only four were not Igbo. Looking at who were assassinated in the coup, it appears as if tribal and regional characteristics were central. As such, it is not surprising that many within the military as well as the population at large perceived this coup to be carried out by Igbos in order for them to dominate the other tribes in the country. However, this is not a reliable explanation when looking at the statements and justifications given by the coup-participants (Luckham, 1971:36-50). Ejiogu (2007:113) agrees, and has argued that by looking at how the involved people justified their coup, it shows that they did not aim at removing Hausa-Fulani domination. Rather, the central aim was to save the country from the dictatorship-like rule of the Hausa-Fulani regime. Major Ademoyega has later claimed that all the participants wanted to save the country from a political leadership that was not leading the

country anywhere (Ejiogu, 2007:115). First (1970) has also argued that the group acted because of political grievances and not along tribal lines. However, even if the coup was not Igbo-inspired, Igbo officers steadily became more dominant in the officer corps, and there was growing hostility among Northern officers and other ranks against the Igbo dominance. Officers from the North saw clearly how the Igbos' influence in the military grew at the higher levels, and even though the Northerners did not necessarily loose position, the changes at the higher levels were still regarded as threatening. Suspicion and mutual fear increased, and regional and ethnic animosity became stronger (First, 1970; Luckham, 1971).

Initially, the coup was more heartily welcomed than independence had been. One of the main reasons the military was able to and wanted to intervene was the weakness of the civilian regime between 1960 and 1966 and this justified its intervention. However, just as the civilian regime had lost legitimacy, so did the first military regime (First, 1970; Luckham, 1971). In May 1966 General Ironsi proposed the Unification Decree No. 34. This decree aimed at abolishing the federal structure of the country. It was strongly resisted in the North and the ethno-religious and regional tensions increased. Halfway through 1966 it became obvious that there was rising discontent within the Armed Forces, and one of the main reasons for this was that those who had participated in the January coup had not been held accountable according to military tradition (Badmus, 2005:58; NAECS, 1992:139-140). In addition, Ironsi committed several grave political mistakes, and his six months as national leader led to more tension, killings, destruction and uncertainty (Ihonvbere, 1991:605).

The Northerners were very sceptical of Ironsi's centralisation plans, and this combined with the increasing presence of Igbo in both civilian and military positions contributed to the fear that the Igbo would dominate the country. This is often regarded as the reason why the July-coup was launched and why Ironsi was killed (Badmus, 2005:58). The Kaduna 'Mafia' was strongly involved in this coup. Its power rests in the North, and it was worried that a unitary Government would remove its influence (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985:619). Igbos, particularly from the Mid-West and the East, were targeted, even though some Igbos from other regions was killed as well. Almost all the participants in this coup were from the North; however it is too big a simplification to state that the coup was only a conflict between the North and the Igbos. Organisational relationships should be taken into consideration, and it should also be remembered that neither of the groups had a cohesive structure (Luckham, 1971:51-79). Agwunobi (1992:5) has argued that the July-coup was a revenge coup and it did not really have to do with the characteristics of the government. He further argued that Decree 34 was only used as an excuse for the coup. Forsyth (2007:44-45) is of the opinion that "the July coup was wholly regional, introverted, revanchist

and separatist in origins and unnecessarily bloody in execution." Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon announced himself as the new Head of State on 1 August 1966 and he promised that civilian rule would be restored as soon as possible (McGowan, 2005:60).

Three days after the coup of July, Igbos in the military serving elsewhere than in the Eastern region were either arrested, dead or escaping back to the East. Many of those from the East who were able to flight later participated in the Biafran military. The Nigerian military had been a coherent unit and the last truly national institution in the country, but this now was shattered (First, 1970; Forsyth, 2007). The Biafran war lasted from 30 May 1967 until September 1969. It was the Federal side which declared the war, after Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegu Ojukwu, the Eastern region's military governor, declared Biafra as a separate republic. This declaration is often regarded as the climax of the ethnic primacy in the country. After an estimated one million people had died, the Federal side won the war. It managed to keep the country in one piece through the use of extensive force (Abegunrin, 2003; Auma-Osolo, 1980; ISS, 2002(a)).

The military Government decided in 1967, before the outbreak of the Civil War, that the Army should be reorganised. The Supreme Military Council would govern the military, and the chairman of this council would be the Commander-in-Chief and Head of the Federal Military Government. The military headquarters would be responsible for co-ordination. Each region of the country would have one area command, which would be led by an area commander (ARB, 1967(a):698-699). However, with the end of the war, a new reorganisation became necessary. One of the main consequences of the Civil War on the military was its enormous growth. In 1970, the army consisted of more than 250,000 men divided into the Lagos Garrison organisation, three Infantry Divisions, and much larger arms and services than before. However, the growth had to a large degree been unplanned, and as the increase had been very huge and rapid, proper training had not been provided for all the new recruits. With the end of the Civil War it therefore became important to redeploy and reorganise the military. The aim was a more efficient military that would be able to protect the country from external threats and preserve domestic stability. The Armed Forces' budget grew substantially during the Civil War and in the following years, and the public started questioning the need for spending so much money on the military. Many saw this as unproductive when looking holistically at the economic situation of the country (Adekson, 1981:6; ARB, 1970:1898-1898; NAECS, 1992:145).

On 12 December 1967 General Gowon argued that it could be that the Military Government would have to remain in power longer than initially assumed. It was first planned for a transition to civilian rule in 1969; however, the authorities now argued that it had to be

ensured that the country was ripe for such a transition before it would take place (ARB, 1967(b):932-934). Three years later, on 1 October 1970, Gowon stated that the Government was aiming at a return to civilian rule by 1976. However, he argued that it would be necessary that this would ensure stability and peace in the country, and as a result it was essential that the transition should not be rushed (ARB, 1970:1898-1899). In May 1973 Major-General Hassan Usman Katsina confirmed that there would be a transition to civilian rule in 1976. He argued that the Government would keep the promise given earlier, and it would do this in order to create a positive image of military rule (ARB, 1973(b):2857). On 1 October 1974 General Gowon argued that it had become clear that the country would not be ripe for civilian rule by the promised year of 1976. He and his military colleagues had assumed that the Nigerians would by then have been able to create an atmosphere of political stability; rather he now argued that "it is clear that those who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule have not learnt any lesson from our past experiences" (in ARB, 1974(a):3392). There were in general very negative reactions to General Gowon's announcement, and the extension of military rule was regarded as ruining the credibility of the regime (ARB, 1974(a):3392-3394).

1975-1979: Coup and transition to civilian rule

A new coup was launched on 29 July 1975 and it demonstrated the huge domestic weaknesses in Nigerian society: the deficiency of both stability and political legitimacy. General Gowon was overthrown and General Murtala Ramat Mohammed came into power. He was however assassinated the following year in a failed coup led by Major Buka Suka Dimka. Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo had been Chief of Staff and replaced Mohammed (Abegunrin, 2003:56; Badmus, 2005:58). The coup against Gowon in 1975 reflected a coherent view among the higher ranks within the military, and this view was also consistent with the view held by the lower ranks and the public in general; the Gowon regime had not handled events over the last years properly (Dent, 1975:353). Agwunobi (1992:6) has argued that the 1975 coup that overthrew Gowon was a result of personality clashes between him and Mohammed. It was however justified by Gowon's continued extension of military rule. Agwunobi has further argued that the failed coup against Mohammed had nothing to do with government; rather it was revenge by soldiers who continued to be loyal to Gowon.

On 1 October 1975 General Mohammed broadcasted a four-year programme with the ultimate goal of transition to civilian rule. The programme was positively welcomed, and this was the first time after the country's first coup that such a specific timing for return to civilian rule had been announced. The newspaper 'The New Nigerian' wrote that "the programme is

simplicity itself and will consequently be more readily understood by the public at large" (in ARB, 1975(a):3788). After the assassination of General Mohammed on the 13th of February 1976, General Obasanjo held a broadcast where he reiterated that the policies promoted by Mohammed would be continued (ARB, 1975(a):3787-3789; ARB, 1976(a):3932-3934).

As early as 1973 Brigadier I.D. Bisalla stated that reorganisation of the military would be important if it should be able to fulfil its new role. The areas of command should be readjusted, units should be merged and there would have to be a certain deployment in order to ensure efficiency (ARB, 1973(a):2761). However, it was not until after the 1975 coup that the military really started going through drastic changes. Restructuring and reorganisation was carried out and instead of only serving foreign policy interests, the Armed Forces should now also be a force promoting development and national unity (Peters, 1997:141-143). After the Civil War the number of soldiers had risen to 250,000, but at the end of 1978 this number had been reduced to 182,000 and during 1979 40,000 soldiers more would be demobilised (ARB, 1979(a):5200). The country was now forced to make reductions in the defence budget due to the overall economic situation. There was financial chaos and the Government had to reprioritise, and spending on the military was consequently reduced (Welch, 1995).

The Second Republic

On 1 October 1979 Nigeria inaugurated its first civilian Government after 13 years of military rule. Alhai Shehu Shagari became President and the former Head of State, General Obasanjo said he would leave the military after the successful takeover, and so would other members of his Government. This transition back to civilian rule was often credited to the personality of Obasanjo. He was regarded as a wise man and played a vital role in transforming the country. There were however still deep divisions within the country, and it was argued that for Nigeria to stay united and democratic, it would be essential that the new leaders be able to prevent tensions resulting from regional, ethnic and religious ties being used against the young democracy (ARB, 1979(b):5433-5436). Unfortunately the new regime did not achieve this; rather it became marred by corruption and bad leadership. The civilian regime became highly unpopular, and the economic situation in the country deteriorated. This was partly a result of a fall in global oil prices, but the leaders were not able to respond to these circumstances in a proper way. The regime lost its legitimacy, there were high levels of tension between the different ethnic groups, and corruption had now become endemic (Badmus, 2005:58-59; Ikome, 2007:27-29).

For the first time since the last civilian regime the military participated in foreign missions. The Armed Forces were involved in the international peace-keeping operation

organised by the UN in Lebanon from 1978 until 1983. The mission faced domestic criticism; however, the Government would not withdraw its promised support from any UN operation. Nigeria also assisted in a peace-keeping mission in Chad from late 1981 until mid-1982, an operation organised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Chad had been a troubled country in the region, but even though Nigeria had both strong historical and geographical links to the country, it initially played no significant role in the conflict. However, when the foreign presence in Chad increased, especially of France and Libya, Nigeria started changing its attitude. The military build-up in the neighbouring country was regarded as threatening to Nigeria's own security, and it decided to play a leading role in establishing peace in the country, and a large peace-keeping operation was set up. The military gained useful knowledge and experience from these missions, and it prepared the institution for similar services in other countries and regions. This was also the first time since the early 1960s that the military was involved in domestic security tasks when they assisted the police in putting down internal uprisings (James, 1993:137-138; Kupolati, 1993:153; NAECS, 1992:213-222; Olurin, 1993:115,127).

1984-1992: Coup and failed transition

President Shagari was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by Major-Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon on the last day of 1983. The four-year long civilian regime had brought the country into a social and economic crisis. In the broadcast legitimising the coup, Brigadier Sani Abacha stated: "Fellow countrymen and women, you are all living witnesses to the grave economic predicament and uncertainty which an inept and corrupt leadership has imposed on our beloved nation for the last four years" (in ARB, 1984:7110). The Nigerian media and the population at large were supportive of the take-over, basically because of the mismanagement of the Shagari Government (ARB, 1984:7109-7116; Badmus, 2005:59; McGowan, 2005:63). The total of economic, social and political factors in the domestic context contributed strongly to the coup (Ikome, 2007:27-29), and Agwunobi (1992:6) has argued that the coup that overthrew Shagari was probably one of the few coups that actually had legitimate motivations.

After the coup the military tried to sort out the economic problems the country was going through, and fighting corruption became a central concern. Major-General Buhari justified the military's take-over mainly by looking at economic factors. In his first broadcast on 1 January 1984 he argued that

> not only was there an inadequate response to the global recession caused by the worldwide oil glut (…) but measures designed to curb Nigeria's vulnerability to the vagaries of the oil market were applied in a half-hearted manner. (...) While corruption and indiscipline had been associated with our state of

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underdevelopment, these twin evils in our politics have attained unprecedented height over the past four years. The corrupt, inept, and insensitive leadership in the last four years had been the source of immorality and impropriety in our society, since what happens in any society is largely a reflection of the leadership of that society (in Peters, 1997:187).

However, despite these claims the regime became very repressive, and the economic situation did not improve. As a result of this it was overthrown on 27 August 1985 in a palace coup and Major-General Ibrahim Babangida became the new Head of State. His policies were welcomed, and the military regime promised that civilian rule would be restored (ARB, 1985:7754-7757; Badmus, 2005:59-60). The broadcasts given after this coup justified the action as a necessity because of the economic policies the previous regime had implemented, as these were widely regarded to be failures. However, power struggles within the regime seem to have played an important role, and Brigadier Dogonyaro claimed that there was a "lack of unity or purpose among the ruling body" (in ARB, 1985:7754).

Babangida was a Muslim from the North, but he was not perceived as having such strong ties to any region or ethnic group as many previous leaders had had, and he could more easily be regarded as a Nigerian rather than being looked upon as belonging to a particular grouping in society (MacDonald, 1988; McGowan, 2005:66). By the mid 1980s the Kaduna 'Mafia' had become a strong political actor and it had people placed throughout society and it had personnel and connections within the military. It has been argued that this institution had strong control over the military regime and it was also an important actor within the economy. The Kaduna 'Mafia' consists mainly of high-ranking officials and princes from the North, and its members have always promoted a regime where Northern Muslims play the most central roles (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985:619-621). The prominence of the Kaduna 'Mafia' might have been one of the reasons why a very bloody coup was attempted on 22 April 1990, as the participants were from the South and Middle regions. It was led by Major Gideon Orkar and Major Oka, and in a broadcast after this attempted coup, the plotters tried to justify it by stating that it was a "well conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the South with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique in this country" (in Ihonvbere, 1991:621). The coup was however unsuccessful and very many of the participants were arrested and many were executed (Ejiogu, 2007:122-123; Ihonvbere, 1991; McGowan, 2005:69).

The restructuring of the military that was started after the Civil War and intensified after 1975 continued throughout this period, especially the reduction of the forces. At the beginning of 1988 the military numbered about 95,000 men. This large reduction in size since the Civil War

had not hurt military strength. Rather, the Armed Forces had become much more effective, as they were better organised and managed, the training had improved and so had the equipment (ARB, 1988(a):8733-8734). This reorganisation continued after the 1990 coup attempt. The number of personnel was further reduced, and the aim was to increase the efficiency even more. Equipment was improved and professionalism encouraged (Peters, 1997:209-213).

In 1992 the Defence Minister was in control of the entire ministry, unlike in the First and Second Republics. As a leader he was supposed to attend to areas concerning military professionalism, including the military's role in foreign policy, organisational structure, doctrine, procurement decisions and budget, and he led in a way that promoted an adherence to military concerns by the whole military. The Defence Minister was responsible for making sure that the military adhered to principles of professionalism (Agwunobi, 1992:54). The military authorities argued that this increased professionalism would prevent military intervention. The Armed Forces had been reduced in size in order to better accommodate those still participating, and the Government hoped that the military would be more efficient, and that these measures would lead to an apolitical and professional force (NAECS, 1992:227).

1993-1998: Abacha's rule

Elections were held in June 1993 as promised, and these were regarded as fair and free, at least in a Nigerian context. However, the results were annulled as the military argued that there had been too many irregularities. It is however obvious that it did this to ensure its own continuation in power (Badmus, 2005:60). After the annulment of the elections, Babangida's regime became highly unpopular both at home and in other countries, and the challenges were the greatest ever since he came to power eight years earlier. Abegunrin (2003:140-146) has pointed out that most of the military regimes of Nigeria have not been openly criticised by foreign powers. However, during the Babangida regime, and especially after the election annulment, the international community increasingly grew hostile to the country. This international hostility should also be seen in connection with the end of the Cold War, as Nigeria then lost some of its strategic importance, and foreign criticism became possible. The justification for cancelling the results was stated as being in order to "preserve the honour and esteem of the judicial system" (in ARB, 1993(a):11041); however, many Nigerians never believed that Babangida would actually give up power. The promised transition to civilian rule was annulled (ARB, 1993(a):11040-11042). Civil society in Nigeria reacted strongly to the annulment of the election results, and a peaceful demonstration was held from 5 to 9 July 1993. This was the first time after the Civil War that civil society openly criticised the military and the protests were not influenced by religious,

ethnic, class, gender or regional lines. Unfortunately this demonstration led to even harsher reactions against pro-democracy activists, and security was tightened throughout the country. However, even though the movement was not successful it managed to put new opinions onto the political landscape, and the military could no longer completely ignore civil society (Ihonvbere, 1996:202-204).

Babangida faced increasing pressure from all sides, and after fellow military officers had convinced him of giving up power, he stepped down on 26 August 1993 and power was given to a civilian administration, but it was not an elected body. General Sani Abacha was one of the main actors forcing Babangida to give up power, and Abacha now himself continued as Defence Minister and he also became Vice-President. Chief Ernest Shonekan became the new Head of Government in the Interim National Government (ING) that was established (ARB, 1993(b):11104-11106; Ihonvbere, 1998). The ING however was perceived as having little legitimacy, it was not popular at home nor abroad, and there were pro-democracy demonstrations against it. The Armed Forces however supported the ING, and Brigadier-General Godwin Abbe stated that they were prepared for civilian rule and they would subject themselves to such a regime. However, when the Lagos High Court on 10 November ruled the ING illegal, Abacha saw this as an opportunity to seize power. On 17 November 1993 the ING was overthrown by Generals Oladipo Diya and Sani Abacha (ARB, 1993(c):11219-11221; Badmus, 2005:60; BBC, 1993; Ihonvbere, 1998:514-520). It was officially stated that Shonekan had voluntarily resigned, but in 2000 when he finally spoke in public about what happened this day, he claimed that he had been threatened with his life. There have been speculations and accusations that he returned the country to military rule out of free will, but this now goes against these insinuations (Ihonvbere, 1998:514-520; Nwabuko and Famakinwa, 2000).

Ihonvbere (1998:516) has argued that the background of the 1993 coup should be analysed at three different levels. The first that should be taken into account are the economic policies that the previous regimes had implemented, as these to a large degree had failed. The second was related to the cancelled June elections, Babangida's resignation as well as the ING's illegitimacy; factors that all strengthened the political gridlock in the country. The third level that has to be analysed is the personality of Abacha and the ambitions he had. He had previously had significant roles and power, and he now believed that it was about time that he received the ultimate form of power, naming himself not only Commander-in-Chief but also President of Nigeria (Ihonvbere, 1998:516).

At the end of 1994 it was recommended that a civilian regime should be installed by the beginning of 1996. The Committee discussing the issue had previously agreed that 1997 would

be the best year, but it now argued that the economic situation would deteriorate even further if the military was allowed to stay in power that long. However, in 1995 Abacha said that there would be a transition to democracy, but elections would not be held until 1998 (ARB, 1994:11677; ARB, 1995(a):11980-11982). The three-year long transition program was not well received in Nigeria, and many believed Abacha would stay in power even after the date proposed for a return to civilian rule. He indeed stayed in power until he unexpectedly died on 8 June 1998. Abacha was the Head of State of Nigeria that has faced strongest international opposition, and as well as Babangida, he managed to ruin the country's foreign relations. General Abdulsalami Abubakar was chosen to replace him, and he immediately promised a democratisation process (Abegunrin, 2003:140-159; ARB, 1995(b):12012-12013; Badmus, 2005:60; Economist, 2000).

One trend in Nigeria's foreign policy that became even more important after the end of the Cold War, and that continued throughout Abacha's regime, was participation in international peace-keeping operations. The country has participated in peace-keeping missions in for example Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Iraq, Rwanda, the DRC and Western Sahara since the end of the Cold War, but the two most important operations have been those in Liberia and Sierra Leone. At the end of 1989 civil war broke out in Liberia, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established a Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) on 7 August 1990. This peace-keeping force was led by Nigeria and entered Liberia and later Sierra Leone when the Liberian civil war spilled into this neighbouring country (Gershoni, 1997:55; Howe, 1996:151; ISS, 2002(b); Saliu, 2000:105-106).

Nigeria has been actively involved in peace-keeping missions around the world and the Nigerian Armed Forces have earned a reputation of being highly disciplined. Nigeria's soldiers and officers have throughout the years in peace-keeping efforts received medals and honours for their professional integrity, bravery, leadership and discipline. The confidence within the military grew substantially after the involvement in ECOMOG missions (Aimienmwona, 2000; Peters, 1997:218). In general, peace-keeping missions provide positive opportunities to nation-states, as their armed forces become exposed to practical interactions and administration. There are several military paybacks from participating in peace-keeping operations, including for example training in how to handle weapons and military tactics in real situations (Saliu, 2000:113-114). In the case of Nigeria it is also positive to keep the Armed Forces busy in foreign peace-keeping efforts in order to prevent them from intervening in politics once again (IRIN, 1999).

Participation in international multilateral security efforts marks one of the highest points in the military career of a Nigerian soldier. The Nigerian defence establishment has historically considered its involvement in international peacekeeping a tremendous asset both in terms of the experience it provides to its men, the logistical support acquired and as a tremendous boost to the national image in international politics (Lawrence Onoja in Saliu, 2000:113-114).

However, it is disputed how positive the Nigerian involvement in peace-keeping missions has been. The ECOMOG troops have been accused of being ineffective, having low morale and little discipline. The Nigerian troops were especially known for dealing drugs, looting and bothering the local citizens. They took advantage of the black market and were involved in theft from relief deliveries (Gershoni, 1997:66-67; Howe, 1996:169). ECOMOG was indeed labelled "Every Commodity Or Moveable Object Gone" (Gershoni, 1997:66-67). This was in large part due to the fact that the Nigerian soldiers were often underpaid and/or paid too late. Soldiers from other countries did at times privately complain that there was no prosecution of the Nigerians due to the dominance of the country within the ECOMOG (Gershoni, 1997:66-67; Howe, 1996:169).

1999-today: Consolidating democracy

General Abdulsalami Abubakar fulfilled his promises of a return to civilian rule. Democracy was finally restored, and on 29 May 1999 the former military leader Olusegun Obasanjo became President once again, this time as a civilian candidate through democratic elections. Hopes arose that democracy could finally be consolidated in a state that had been dominated by the military for most of its post-colonial history. However, as the country does not have a democratic tradition, but rather has been virtually torn apart by dictators and corruption, the challenges facing democratic civilian regimes are enormous (Abegunrin, 2003:159-164; Badmus, 2005:60-61; Economist, 2000). One phenomenon that is often pointed to is that of retired officers. Badmus (2005:61-62) has argued that it was during this transition to democracy that the climax of this phenomenon came, as this is when Obasanjo again received political power. He argued that this proves that retired military officers are becoming increasingly dominant in the running of the country, and they have the networks, wealth, positions and power needed (Badmus, 2005:61-62). Abubakar himself does not think it is negative that former military men want to get involved in politics after the return to democracy. However, most Nigerians disagree with him. Several of Obasanjo's advisers and ministers were former military or police officers. Both the ruling party and the opposition parties are strongly dominated by former personalities from the Armed Forces (PANOS, 2002). The presidential elections of 2003 reflected the dominance of retired officers, as the two major contenders were the former military Head of State, Obasanjo,

and General Muhammadu Buhari. There were also several retired officers within the National Assembly (Badmus, 2005:62-63).

One of the main problems in Nigerian society, and one that is further exacerbated by the retired officer phenomenon, is that of corruption. It could almost be described as an epidemic, due to its systemic character. Corruption became a serious problem in the 1970s, as the oil boom made it increasingly important to achieve political control to get access to and control over the economic resources, in order to ensure personal agendas (Omotola, 2006). The economic situation is going to continue influencing the politics in the country, and it will play a major part in determining if democracy will succeed. Seventy-one percent of the Nigerian population have less than a dollar a day to live on. The small elite within the country will probably try to get on the good side with the country's President and cut deals with him. The majority however receives nothing from the Government, despite the fact that it is relatively rich due to the oil resources (ARB, 2007(b):17031-17035). General Alexander Ogomudia has argued that reducing poverty is essential to ensure the furtherance of democracy. If people do not have what they need, they will more easily sell their votes at election times (BBC, 2002).

Upon becoming President, Obasanjo promised to establish stable civil-military relations and promote democracy. He started out by restructuring the military, and from May 1999 onwards he removed much personnel from the Armed Forces. Many corrupt officers had to go, and it was an important step in the direction of protecting the newly-established democracy in the country (Daily Trust, 2003(a)). Across Nigeria commanders in the military were supposed to supervise their officers in order to figure out if any of them were inclined towards politics. Lieutenant-General Theophilus Danjuma, the Minister of Defence, argued that by doing this, it would be possible to dismiss such officers and keep a professional and balanced military (BBC, 1999). In 2000, after fears had been raised about the prevailing unstable civil-military relations, President Obasanjo announced that "firstly, all soldiers are Nigerians and therefore have a stake in the polity. Secondly, I do not expect miracles to happen about the civil-military relationship that has been soured over a number of years" (in Omonobi, 2000). However, Vice Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi, a former Chief of Defence Staff, in 2001 stated that the military respected the civilian regime, and he argued that there had now developed a mutual relationship between the two sectors (The Post Express, 2001).

It has been argued by several politicians and military officers alike that the reduction in size of the military is very important. As shown, the size of the Armed Forces has been significantly reduced since it was at its height after the Civil War. At the beginning of 2000 the military consisted of about 80,000 men, and it was proposed that about 5,000 soldiers a year

should be demobilised. In 2002 Colonel Onwuamaegbu argued that in addition to further reductions in number, proper training for the remaining soldiers would be essential. Combined this would contribute to professionalism, which again would prevent military interventions in politics. In 2006 Nigeria had 78,500 active soldiers (ARB, 2006(a):16662; Ejime, 2000; ISS, 2002(a); PANOS, 2002). At the beginning of 2008 Andrew Azazi, the Chief of Defence Staff, announced that a plan for the reorganisation and allocation of responsibilities for the Armed Forces would soon be implemented (This Day, 2008).

General Ogomudia, the then Chief of Army Staff, in early August 2002 emphasised the importance of keeping the military outside politics. He recognised that democracy still needed to be consolidated in Nigeria and he argued that "politicians must be left to learn, make mistakes, correct themselves and in the process mature on the job" (in BBC, 2002). At the end of 2003 a programme aiming at improving civil-military relations, resource management and training, and promotion of democratic values was introduced by the Ministry of Defence (Daily Trust, 2003(b)). As a result of the domination of the military in politics throughout the post-colonial era, the civil population has a misunderstanding of what the proper role of the Armed Forces is. It is therefore also necessary to educate the civilians as well as re-professionalise the military (This Day, 2005). A seminar was organised in the latter half of 2006 discussing Nigerian civil-military relations. The participants agreed that it is essential that there is proper funding, training and capacity building in order to achieve stable civil-military relations. It was also believed that it would be important for the political leaders to give the Armed Forces specific missions, there should be an appropriate budget, and politicians should not interfere in purely military affairs (Daily Trust, 2006).

The return of democracy has not created a completely secure and safe environment in Nigeria. Rather, thousands have been killed as a result of religious and ethnic tensions after 1999, and during the elections in 2003 there were many assassinations, and three important politicians were killed in 2006 (ARB, 2006(c):16795-16796). The Niger Delta is particularly a troubled region. It is the centre of oil-production in Nigeria, and in recent years there have been several kidnappings there. The oil industry fears further attacks on their facilities, and the security companies that have been employed have not been able to properly provide protection. Thousands of military troops have been sent to the Delta. However, the military has had lots of problems with its equipment, and ill-discipline and corruption are widespread, and as such they have not been properly able to ensure stability in the region (ARB, 2006(b):16739-16742). The Navy is going through a reorganisation process, and the main aim is to be better able to tackle the problems in the Niger Delta. Both politicians and military officers have argued that it is

necessary with increased funding in order to ensure effectiveness within the military, and defence and national security should be prioritised (ARB, 2007(c):17319-17320). This was especially put on the agenda in October 2006 when ten military officers were killed in an aircraft crash. After this accident it became highlighted that both the military authorities, as well as the Government, were in part responsible for the tragedy, as they had not provided enough resources to the military. As a result much equipment, even such important equipment as aircraft, is not well maintained, and there have been several such accidents in recent years (ARB, 2006(c):16795-16796). In February 2008 however, the Government announced that it would purchase new hardware for the Armed Forces (ARB, 2008(a):17401-17402).

Despite the return to democracy and more stable civil-military relations, the military is still perceived as posing obstacles to Nigerian democracy. In November 2006 Dr Istiafanus Zabadi who works at the war college argued that Nigerian civil-military relations are dysfunctional. In combination with cultural, social and economic factors, this poses a threat to the consolidation of democracy. Even though the country had been returned to civilian rule seven years before, Dr Zabadi argued that there was still mutual suspicion and mistrust between the Armed Forces and the politicians. Dr Mohammad Zayyan Umar who works at the University of Sokoto argued that "the military has been a danger to the installation and consolidation of democratic institutions and process" (in Daily Trust, 2006). According to the Africa Research Bulletin (2007(a)), in spite of the official return to democracy, "Nigerian politics are still dominated by back-room dealings, political thuggery and ethno-religious and communal violence. Access to resources rather than policies based on consistency is often the more likely key to political success" (in ARB, 2007(a):16894).

Applicability of theories

Nigeria has experienced both civilian and military regimes, and all of them have had to deal with the problem of how to accommodate the military. The question of what ambitions the military has, and what they are capable of doing, has been a constant preoccupation (Arnold, 2005:399). The military has not only intervened against civilian authorities, but also against military regimes. As such, in the case of Nigeria, it is not fruitful to analyse only how the civilian regimes have tried to control the military, rather, the military authorities' attempts at managing the Armed Forces must also be examined. Remembering the definitions stated in Chapter Two, a government (whether civilian or military) in this study is understood as the highest authority making political decisions, whereas the military is conceptualised as the official armed forces of the country. As both Nigerian society and the military are influenced by strong regional,

religious and ethnic cleavages, conflicts between a military government and the armed forces are possible and at times likely. Ihonvbere (1998:515-516) has argued that the structural forces of the Nigerian coups

> must be located in the distorted and disarticulated political and social structure of Nigeria, which is a product of colonial domination and exploitation, as well as in the reproduction of contemporary neocolonial relations, the interplay of political forces, new contradictions, coalitions, conflicts and crises have been an important factor which makes coup-making a frequent activity in Nigeria. In addition, the alignment and realignment of forces in contemporary Nigeria have created an environment propitious for military takeovers. Thus, with a largely unproductive and dependent dominant class, corrupt political elites, a non-hegemonic state, a foreign-dominated economy, failed economic policies, massive alienation and disillusionment among non-bourgeois forces, and structural distortions which have contributed to the reproduction of dependence, underdevelopment and negative pressures, the intervention of the military must be seen as part of the ongoing class struggle for hegemony and control of the state and its resources in Nigeria.

The following will analyse which factors have contributed to the recurrent military interventions in Nigerian politics, and the Government's control or possibility of control over the Armed Forces will be discussed. As such, this section will provide an evaluation of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One, and the data provided in the previous section will be the basis for analysis.

Professionalism

Huntington strongly promotes military professionalism, characterised by expertise, corporateness and responsibility, as the most important factor in order to achieve civilian control over the military. As has been shown, the military lacked experience at the time of independence, and the education level was low. However, throughout the first half of the 1960s education was emphasised, and professionalism encouraged. This did not prevent military intervention in politics, as the first coup was launched in January 1966. The high-ranking officials who were involved in this coup were well educated, and should as such be regarded as professionals. During the Civil War the Armed Forces increased substantially, and many of the new soldiers had no education and training in general was lacking. At the end of the war the military was therefore not very professional anymore, as its expertise had deteriorated. Attempts to improve this were put through in the post-war years; however, the development in the area was slow. The next coup did materialise in 1975, and it was especially higher ranks who were involved, but they were also supported by lower ranks within the military.

The military was reorganised and restructured throughout the next couple of decades, training was of central concern and professionalism increased substantially. The size of the

Armed Forces was reduced, so that the remaining force could promote values central in the concept of professionalism, such as corporateness and expertise. The military was also involved in peace-keeping missions, especially after the end of the Cold War, which further enhanced the professional character of the Armed Forces. However, opposed to what was envisaged by this professionalism, the military did not disengage from politics, rather, the country experienced coups in both 1983 and 1993. After the return to democracy in 1999 emphasis was again put on making the Armed Forces professional, as this is still deemed highly necessary to keep them outside politics. There has been increased training of staff and a reduction in size of the military. So far there have not been any successful coups since 1999; however a plot was discovered in 2004 (McGowan, 2005:74). Even though civil-military relations have improved, these relations are still not entirely stable.

Professionalism was at its lowest point at the time of independence and immediately after the Civil War; however, at these points in time the Governments did not experience military interventions. Rather, both in 1966 and 1993, when the Armed Forces were much more professional, there were coups that had severe consequences for the country. As such, it can not be argued that professionalism has been central in order to control the Armed Forces of Nigeria. It may have contributed to disengagement, as seen in the late 1990s, which is hoped for in the current democracy; however, professionalism is not a sufficient factor on its own. Other aspects will be necessary to provide a continuing military disengagement, and these will be further discussed below.

Role of the military

Professionalism is important, but as Finer argued, it is not sufficient in order to establish and maintain civilian control over the military. He highlighted that the military's perception of its own role in society and its role in relation to the authorities were important in order to understand if the Armed Forces would intervene or not. There is a need for the military to respect civilian supremacy, but several factors must be in place before this materialises. The first time the military intervened in Nigerian politics was in 1966. They argued that they did this in order to save the country from collapse, and the public in general agreed that this was necessary. This has also been the justification in several of the other coups, and as such it becomes clear that the military often perceives itself as 'saviour of the nation', and this is most often the result of mismanagement by the Government in place.

General Gowon early announced that there would be a return to civilian rule; however, this was repeatedly postponed. He and his colleagues argued that they could not give power back

to the civilians before it was proved that they could ensure peace and stability. As such, the military through these years saw itself as the ultimate protector of the nation's unity. However, a coup was launched against Gowon, proving that it was not a coherent view within the Armed Forces that they were the only ones that could rule the country in a satisfactory way. A return to civilian rule was promised, and the promise was fulfilled. This makes it clear that parts of the military viewed the military as an instrument of the Government, and not as a Government itself.

Throughout the regimes of Babangida and Abacha the military (or its ruling section) regarded the civilians subordinate to themselves, and this had very negative consequences for the country as a whole. As shown however, the military was throughout these regimes strongly involved in peace-keeping efforts in other countries, and this influenced the Armed Forces' perception of themselves. They were officially recognised to be playing a central and very important military role and received international acclaim. This acclaim was based on their military merits, and not their governing capabilities. It could therefore be argued that the military increasingly recognised its own institution as separate from the ruling authorities, and realised that it was not its task to govern a country, but rather to participate in military operations. This could as such have influenced the fact that civilian rule was finally restored in 1999. It now remains to be seen which role the military will perceive that it is responsible to fulfil. In 2002 the Chief of Army Staff argued that it was very important that the military accepted that it takes time for democracy to become consolidated. The military had to understand that others were better suited for running the country, but the civilians had to be given time to learn properly how to do it. This indicates that the military increasingly is regarding itself as an important institution in the Nigerian society, but not as the institution that should govern the country.

How the military perceives its own role in society and its responsibilities towards the Government of the day is important in order to understand its actions. It has intervened several times in political affairs, and it has often justified this by arguing that it was saving the country from misrule. The military's perception of its own governing capabilities has been important in its engagement and disengagement. Finer is as such correct in emphasising these factors in addition to professionalism when explaining how the military should be controlled. In order to prevent military intervention, the military must have a correct overall understanding of how the whole society works, and it must recognise its own limited role within this society.

Political measures

Janowitz does not disagree with the former theories; however, he puts more emphasis on the implementation of political measures in order to prevent military intervention in politics.

Constraining the budget of the Armed Forces is, according to him, one way of controlling the military. The Nigerian military grew significantly during the Civil War and the institution required very large resources. However, the country did not have the economic capacity to sustain such a large military, but it was not until the overthrow of General Gowon in 1975 that budget constraints were properly enforced. The size of the military was also drastically reduced. In 1979 a civilian regime was installed, however, even though the military did not receive more funding throughout these years, the civilian regime was overthrown at the end of 1983. The military's budget has become more and more restricted due to the overall economic situation in the country, but this has not proved to be significant in determining whether there will be military intervention or not. This could of course also be related to the fact that these restraints have not necessarily been aiming to control the military; rather, they have been necessary measures in a country with economic problems. Financial means were also lacking in the peace-keeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and had negative consequences for both the operation as well as the local population. However, this did not affect civil-military relations in Nigeria. Since 1999 scholars as well as politicians have argued for an increase in military budgets instead of restraints, as it is necessary that the Armed Forces receive sufficient funding. However, a balanced budget is important; the military should have sufficient resources for fulfilling its missions to keep members satisfied with the Government, but it should not have so much resources that it is able to take on political tasks.

Another factor that Janowitz has pointed out as a means of controlling the Armed Forces is the allocation of responsibilities and missions. During the first years the responsibilities of the military were mainly related to routine functions, as well as supporting the police. There are a couple of interesting similarities when it comes to the allocation of missions during the First and Second Republics, and these can also be seen in the current state of civilian rule. The civilian authorities allocated responsibilities within the domestic security arena to the military, and in addition, it participated in international missions. The domestic issues could have negative repercussions, as these missions could have a political character, and these responsibilities should preferably be given to the police only. These tasks could as such make the military more political. The international operations on the other hand, should be regarded much more positively. These missions provided the Armed Forces with military tasks, they were kept outside domestic politics, and in addition they received valuable training and experience. As shown, this was also very important during the Liberia and Sierra Leone operations, and it was at the time argued that keeping the military busy outside the country would prevent them from intervening in domestic politics. The Armed Forces did however intervene in politics in 1993, at

the same time as they were strongly involved in Liberia. This did not influence the peace-keeping mission, and the military stayed in Liberia and Sierra Leone throughout the decade. There have been no successful military interventions in Nigerian politics since 1993, although there have been three reported plots (McGowan, 2005:72-74). As such international missions do not prevent better civil-military relations, but are also no guarantee for the improvement of these relations. The importance of specific missions was highlighted at the seminar arranged in 2006, as this is seen as essential in keeping the military within its own set limits, and in 2008 the Chief of Defence Staff announced that a plan for allocation of responsibilities would soon be implemented.

The last political measure Janowitz has emphasised is directives concerning civil-military relations. These have not been very important in the Nigerian context; it could only be referred to the Nigerian constitutions. There is only one article that directly addresses the question of military intervention, and it states that it is illegal to take control over the Government as long as it is not in agreement with the constitution. Besides from this there are no provisions in the current constitution on how to achieve and maintain civilian control over the Armed Forces (Adekson, 1981:31-33; Nigerian constitution, 1999). This, however, does not mean that this measure is not significant; rather the opposite could be true. Had there been more specific directives concerning how the military should be controlled, it might have been more difficult for the military to justify its interventions. However, this is difficult to prove, and it remains to be seen if a new constitution comes about, and how it in case deals with these issues and which consequences this will lead to.

Another political measure that has been important in the Nigerian context, but that Janowitz did not mention, is that of a quota system. This was implemented during the first years of the Federation, and dictated how the regions should be represented in the Armed Forces. The authorities at the time argued that this would make the military more representative of the country as a whole, and as such would make it easier to control the Armed Forces. However, in reality this was the North assuring its own dominance, both politically and militarily, and as such made the country more vulnerable to conflict and coups. Political measures have been influential on civil-military relations in Nigeria, but to varying degrees. How and why these measures are incorporated must be analysed, and they must be regarded in connection with the wider domestic situation.

<u>Domestic environment</u>

Several scholars have put emphasis on domestic factors when studying civil-military relations, and argue that these are the most significant aspects. As has become clear, ethnicity, religion and regionalism play a very important role in Nigerian society, and these factors have influenced the military strongly. These aspects have also been central in some of the military interventions, particularly in the coups of 1966. It has often been perceived, rightfully or not, that only one group has been in control of the country and this has then been used for justifying military intervention. These factors must be seen in connection to the federal structure of the country. This especially became evident during the very first military regime when Ironsi proposed centralisation, as this became one of the main reasons why he was overthrown. The Civil War (1967-1970) had a strong impact on the military and on the society as a whole, and this war was also strongly related to these domestic conditions.

Personalities have also been very important in the development of civil-military relations. An example is the role of Obasanjo in returning the country to civilian rule in 1979, whereas Abacha could be mentioned on the negative side, as he did not give up his authoritarian rule until he died in 1998. Most military leaders (as well as some of the civilian) have been able to take huge advantage of Nigeria's resources, and they have become able to dominate large parts of the country's economy. This state of affairs has to change if the Armed Forces are to acquire a neutral role in society. It is essential that being an officer should no longer be the easiest way to achieve wealth and influence. However, the retired officer phenomenon is still a domestic factor that must be taken into account, and it shows the difficulty of finding a proper role for the military and its ex-officers even today.

The economic situation in Nigeria has been highly influential on civil-military relations during its whole post-colonial history. The military has been able to use economic deterioration as an excuse to intervene, and at the same time it has taken advantage of its power for personal enrichment. There is today still a high level of underdevelopment, not only in economic terms, but also in political and social aspects. Another internal factor that can not be forgotten in the Nigerian context is the importance of oil. This resource has been the source of many conflicts and rivalries throughout the history and still today, as the current conflicts in the Niger Delta illustrate. However, the importance of oil is not solely a domestic aspect, it must be analysed in an international context as well.

External context

The external context has been central for many scholars analysing civil-military relations; however, it is often argued that both internal and external factors as well as their interrelationship must be included in a complete analysis. In the Nigerian context, oil is an important factor that illustrates this interrelationship. Oil is Nigeria's main export, and the global oil price is therefore very important for the Nigerian economy; however, this price is not determined by Nigeria alone. Rather, the international market decides this price, and as such, the external context has had strong repercussions on the domestic policies of the regimes. Okharedia (2004:68) has argued that oil is one of the main reasons why there has not been stronger foreign opposition against the military regimes in Nigeria. He has argued that even though the USA's (and other Western countries') policies officially endorse democracy, their policies towards Nigeria are focused on buying oil, and whether they do this from a democratically elected government or not has not been of major concern. As shown above, only two of the military regimes have been condemned by external powers, and this could be as a result of the need for Nigerian oil. The conflicts in the Niger Delta today could have repercussions on civil-military relations in the country, and these conflicts can not be seen isolated from the external context. Many foreign companies are involved in the region and strongly influence how the Nigerian politicians can deal with these problems. The economic aspects' influence on Nigerian civil-military relations has already been discussed, and it is clear that the economy is both determined by internal and external factors.

The importance of ethnicity, religion and regionalism in Nigeria is obvious, and these aspects are domestic. However, Britain's role as a colonial power must be taken into account. According to Jega (2000:15-16) during colonialism Britain exacerbated an 'us' versus 'them' tendency. Religion, regions and ethnic identities were highlighted, and different groups were pitted against each other. These identities were important when it came to the implementation of different policies, and as such, the British laid the foundation for the imbalances that were to dominate Nigerian society and the country's civil-military relations.

Since independence Nigeria has played an important role in foreign military assistance, and the country has participated in peace-keeping operations instigated by ECOWAS, the UN and the OAU. The military has received important training and experience through these operations, and it could as such be argued that this has promoted professionalism. However, these missions' influence on civil-military relations is ambivalent, as the military has both intervened in and disengaged from politics during peace-keeping missions. The operation in Lebanon illustrates this point, as it started in 1978 when there was a military regime, it continued

through the following civilian regime, and ended when there was still civilian rule (1983). This regime was however overthrown at the end of the year, but this was not regarded as having anything to do with the international involvement. The situation during the Liberian and Sierra Leone missions was similar, as the Liberian operation started while the military was in control, it continued after the military intervened again, and Nigeria was still involved in these neighbouring countries during the military's disengagement in the late 1990s. The strongest connection between international involvement and civil-military relations was probably that these missions required economic resources which the country did not possess. As such the domestic economic situation was negatively affected by these operations, which further put strains on the Armed Forces and the authorities in general. As a result the international missions could influence civil-military relations.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Nigeria has experienced a turbulent post-colonial history, and the country's civil-military relations have been very unstable. However, since 1999 the country has been democratic and civilian control over the military has improved. Obstacles are still present though, and the current regime is facing several challenges. The different theories outlined in Chapter Two propose various factors that should be taken into consideration when analysing civil-military relations and the validity of these theories has been evaluated above.

Huntington argued that professionalism was the one measure that would guarantee civilian control over the Armed Forces. However, the Nigerian experience has shown that this is not enough. The military has several times reached high levels of professionalism, but intervention has still occurred. Professionalism is necessary, but it is not the only measure that has to be fulfilled. Finer claimed that the military must accept civilian supremacy, and as such it is important to look at the military's perceptions of its own role in society and its relation to the authorities. This factor has been central in Nigeria, as the Armed Forces have justified their interventions through their perceived role. It is also important when looking at their disengagement, as this has been done on the basis that they have regarded themselves as subordinate to civilian authorities. Janowitz has claimed that the military could be controlled by implementing political measures such as allocation of responsibilities, directives concerning civil-military relations, and budget constraints. As argued, such measures have been influential in Nigeria; however, it has been difficult to evaluate their importance due to the fact that they often have not been implemented with the aim of actually controlling the Armed Forces. What appears to be most influential in this regard is the allocation of missions, and the importance of

keeping these strictly militarily has been shown. The internal characteristics of Nigeria have been highly influential on civil-military relations, and these relations can not be properly analysed without an understanding of the ethnic, religious, regionalist and economic factors of the country. In addition, personalities have played an important role in these relations. The domestic aspects, especially the economy, can not be separated from the external context however, and factors at the international level must as well be included. However, in the Nigerian situation this level has been less important than the domestic level, and as such theories emphasising these factors have far less, but still some, applicability on Nigerian civil-military relations.

There has been very limited control over the military in Nigeria since the advent of independence. In order to achieve a consolidation of democracy in the country, it is important that civil-military relations improve, and that the Armed Forces have limited influence in political affairs. Different measures must be implemented in order to achieve this, and it is important to look at what has worked and what has not, and why, in the recent decades. A proper understanding of this will make it easier to establish stable and positive civil-military relations in democratic Nigeria.

Chapter Four: Tanzania

Introduction

Tanzania's civil-military relations have been stable throughout its post-independence history, both during single-party and multiparty systems. This chapter will analyse these relations, and the general outline will be similar to the structure of the previous chapter on Nigeria. The Tanzanian context will first be provided, before the following sections look closer at civil-military relations. The second main section will provide details on the civil-military history of Tanzania, and will be divided into historical eras: from colonial times until the end of 1963; the 1964 mutiny and its consequences; the conflicts with Uganda from 1971 to 1979; the transition to democracy from 1980 until 1992; and finally the democratic period from 1992 until today. The third main section will examine the development of civil-military relations, and the theories' applicability in the Tanzanian case will be evaluated. This section will be divided into: professionalism, the role of the military, political measures, domestic environment, and external context.

Tanzanian context

Tanzania is situated in Eastern Africa and covers 960,000 square miles. The population is close to 40 million. Of these approximately 25 percent live in urban areas, whereas about 50 percent of the whole population live in poverty. Agriculture is the main economic sector, and 45 percent of Tanzanians are dependent on the land. Tanzania is host to more than 125 different tribes, of which the Sukuma are the largest comprising about 13 percent of the population. Following are the Makonde, the Chagga and the Haya with respectively 4.0, 3.7 and 3.5 percent of the total population. However, the ethnic diversity has not led to disunity as a homogenous culture has developed. Kiswahili, the national language, has been instrumental as a unifying force, and it has been illegal to conduct political discussions based on ethnicity or geographic locations. As a result inter-ethnic tensions have not been an important feature of the country's politics (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:73; Economist, 2007; Lupogo, 2001; Mallya, 2007:174; Tungaraza, 1998:305).

The United Republic of Tanzania contains the islands of Zanzibar (Ugunja and Pemba) and the Tanzania mainland (previously Tanganyika). These two entities became a union in 1964. Karume (2004:1) has argued that the unification came as a surprise, as the two entities were highly diverse in both backgrounds and milieus, and they had different economic, political and social structures. Tanganyika was ruled by Germany from 1885 to 1919, before the British

received control over the territory after the First World War. Tanganyika now came under the trusteeship system and became a League of Nations mandated territory. Zanzibar on the other hand was a colony under the Omanis until 1891 when Britain created a protectorate over it. The two entities still today have very different internal economic and political systems, and Zanzibar has its own judiciary, legislature and executive branches. The union has faced several obstacles, and it has been divisive, controversial and complex (Ahluwalia and Zegeya, 2001; Karume, 2004:1-5; Maundi, 2002; Rupiya et.al., 2006:2). In this chapter however, the problems of the union will not be analysed; rather Tanzania will be looked at as one entity.

Julius Nyerere was the leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and also a member of the Legislative Council, from which he resigned in 1957. He did this to protest against the slow pace towards independence, and the following year TANU called for strikes and boycotts of elections. The British leaders as a result called in the King's African Rifles (KAR) battalions from Kenya to prevent mass unrest. However, these forces were not sufficient, and Britain realised that they had to grant the territory independence. A timetable was subsequently agreed upon for the withdrawal of Britain (Parsons, 2003:42). The Republic of Tanganyika achieved independence on 9 December 1961 and Nyerere won the subsequent presidential elections and became Head of State and President of Tanganyika. The country was a de-facto one-party state from 1962, and a de-jure single-party state from 1965. In 1967 the single-party system was reiterated in the Arusha Declaration. 'Ujamaa' has been a central concept in Tanzania's socio-political history, and signifies self-reliance where the aim is to achieve a just and fair distribution of the domestic resources. Collective villages were established throughout the country. After the 1967 Arusha Declaration the state would own most means of services and production, and there was a huge effort at nationalisation. African socialism became the national ideology. Political power became more and more centralised, and the elite argued that it was necessary to have the state in the centre in order to achieve development (Ahluwalia and Zegeya, 2001; Baregu, 2004:33; Mallya, 2007:175-176; Parsons, 2003:68; Rupiya et.al., 2006:2).

TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar joined forces in 1977, and the joint party was named Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). As leader of this party, Nyerere was elected President for the fifth time in 1980. However, he announced that he would not run again in the next elections. The country experienced an economic decline in the 1980s and this was regarded as demonstrating the failure of his socialist policies. Nyerere still had much support within the country, however, he was disappointed that his policies had not led to more positive results and stepped down as President in 1985. Ali Hassan Mwinyi became President in October 1985. He started implementing economic reforms, and liberalisation was central on his agenda. In 1991 it

was declared that political leaders would be allowed to participate in business, and now they suddenly became involved in economic activities at the same time as the business elite got involved in politics. As a result, the two groups started cooperating more closely and did favours for each other so that they themselves received economic benefits (Arnold, 2005:693; Mallya, 2007:183-185).

Julius Nyerere kept his influence after he stepped down as President, and remained an important figure in Tanzanian politics until he died in October 1999. Nyerere was instrumental in the democratisation process, as he criticised his own ruling party in February 1990 and argued that the CCM party's power was not legitimate anymore. The following year he quit as chairperson of the party and argued that Tanzania would be better served by a multiparty system. In 1992 Tanzania started its transition towards multiparty democracy; local elections were held in 1993/94 and in 1995 the country held democratic elections at the national level. Benjamin Mkapa became the country's third President, and he continued Mwinyi's liberalisation policies. The political opposition was fairly strong at the implementation of democracy, but it did not take long until problems of disunity arose. The opposition did not have strong organisation skills and it also lacked a clear social foundation. However, despite these problems it was significant that an opposition at least was a realistic possibility (Ahluwalia and Zegeya, 2001; Economist, 2007; Mallya, 2007:179; Maundi, 2002). Mallya (2007:186) argued that people had expected that a multiparty system would lead to more inclusion, a more vigorous Parliament and better-debated policies, however, these effects have so far not come about.

The most recent national elections in Tanzania were held in 2005, and Jakaya Kikwete won the presidential elections. He became the fourth President of the Republic, and as the previous three, he represented the ruling CCM party. Mr Kikwete is perceived to have played a positive role in the country so far; the economy is growing, and the annual growth rate is estimated at about 7 percent (Economist, 2007). With only four different presidents representing the same party throughout the post-independence decades, Tanzania has experienced a stable history. The transition to independence, as well as the transition from one-party system to a multiparty rule, did not pose significant problems. As opposed to Nigeria, there have been no successful military coups in the country, and the Tanzanian situation has been very different from the experiences in Nigeria. Tanzanian civil-military relations will now be closer examined.

Civil-military relations

> The TPDF [Tanzania People's Defence Forces] is a defence force. Firstly, it is a force of the people of Tanzania – it is not a force of rulers of Tanzania. It is made up of Tanzanians themselves and is trained and

guided and executes its tasks for the benefit of Tanzanians – all Tanzanians and not a clique of Tanzanians. Secondly, it is a defence force, not an invading force. It is an institution for the defence of our borders and our freedom. It fights and defends Tanzania's policy of non-alignment and good-neighbourliness. It consists of a small group of well-trained Tanzanians who are instructors and leaders of defence and who collectively resolved to defend the dignity of their nation. This force has never been and never will be used as an institution to threaten our neighbours, but it will continue to be a significant pillar in the struggle for fighting for the rights and freedom of Africa and its people by collaborating with other bodies of freedom-fighters. Therefore, the TPDF, as well as being a defence force, is also a liberation force (Julius Nyerere's speech at the 20th anniversary of the TPDF, in BBC, 1984).

Baregu (2004:38) has argued that the Tanzanian case best fits into a civil-military model called the penetration model. In this model the military is subordinate to the authorities, but it is at the same time an integral part of this authority. The military has identical political interests and values as the civilian regime. Omari (2002) on the other hand has argued that the Tanzanian case does not fit into any model of civil-military relations; rather this case shows how situational factors must be included in order to understand the direction taken by civil-military relations. In the following, details on the development of Tanzanian civil-military relations will be provided, before analysing if, and in case how, these experiences fit in with the prevailing theories.

Colonial times - 1963

Tanganyika had been a German colony but was granted to the British Empire as a mandate under the League of Nations after the First World War and under the United Nations after the Second World War. Due to the international mandate, Britain had to ensure that the interests of the Tanganyika population were protected until they were ready to achieve independence. Two of the country's neighbours, Kenya and Uganda, were both British colonies, and the three countries' armed forces were incorporated into the East African colonial army controlled by Britain. This army was called the King's African Rifles (KAR) (Parsons, 2003:1,65). However, already before independence Tanganyika wanted an autonomous military, and the country did not want to be dependent on Kenya or Uganda. In 1957 Paul Bomani, who after independence became Minister of Finance, argued that Tanganyika was after all under the trusteeship system and he did not "see any reason why [Tanganyika] should have military amalgamation with colonies and protectorates. I think we should stand on our own" (in Mazrui, 1968:272).

During the colonial rule the KAR effectively provided security within the colonies. The rank-and-file soldiers did not pose political obstacles to the colonial rule and they normally adhered to orders. Between the First and Second World Wars the military units had a very tight budget, they did not have proper equipment, and they were in general very small. The War

Office in Britain had no respect for these military units and did not plan on using them outside the continent. This changed with the Second World War. It was now believed that the colonial militaries could be used to defend imperialistic interests, and the KAR underwent expansion, training and re-equipment. However, when the war came to an end almost all the troops were demobilised (Luanda, 1998:180-181; Parsons, 2003:31). Britain did not have any specific recruitment policy for its colonial army. In other colonies it was normal that recruitment was done in one area in order to put down uprisings in other areas. This was however not necessary in Tanzania, as the Germans had been the colonial masters before, and had both suppressed and 'pacified' Tanzania (Omari, 2002:92-93).

As independence came closer, Nyerere still believed that the soldiers, who were led by British officers, would be loyal to the state. When the Congolese army rebelled in 1960, Nyerere argued that "these things cannot happen here. First, we have a strong organisation, TANU (…) There is not the slightest chance that the forces of law and order in Tanganyika will mutiny" (in Pachter, 1982:597). Although Nyerere promoted an official policy of pan-Africanism, he continued to depend on British military personnel and aid after independence. This was a reflection of the fact that Tanganyika did not have enough resources to provide for an independent military. Another reason why Tanganyika continued to depend on Britain was the fact that it did not have any local officers that had enough qualifications to control the military (Parsons, 2003:67). Nyerere did not see it as a problem that only three of the commissioned officers at independence were Tanganyikans. The British officers and other ranks who were in the country at the time stayed in the military, and the organisation of the institution was basically kept as it had been during colonial times. Nyerere regarded professionalism to be the most important factor within the Defence Forces and he did not push Africanisation strongly. Two years after independence, only 35 officers were Tanganyikans, and half of these were warrant officers (Luanda, 1998:184; Pachter, 1982:597-598). The Tanganyikan officers however did not share Nyerere's view on Africanisation. The statement of Warrant Officer Gangisa, later to become Lieutentant-Colonel of the TPDF, describes the sentiment in the military well:

> I had been promoted to WOPC [Warrant Officer Platoon Commander] in 1957. When we achieved independence many of us hoped to become commissioned officers. But to our dismay independence brought no change at all: things remained the same. British officers told us bluntly that we were not good material for officer ranks because we lacked the necessary requirement (…) We became very bitter but what could we possibly do? Eventually, however, we could bear it no more and we began to agitate for promotion quite openly (in Parsons, 2003:69).

By the end of 1963 not much had changed since independence; the rank-and-file soldiers were still led by British officers, they wore the same uniforms as before, and both their terms of service and their pay stayed more or less the same (Parsons, 2003:68). The consequences of these conditions will be discussed next.

The 1964 mutiny

There was a revolution on Zanzibar on 12 January 1964, and five days later 300 Tanganyikan police officers were sent to the island. As a result the Tanganyikan Rifles were the only ones in the country who possessed modern weapons. They could not let the opportunity pass, and on 19 January 1964 the 'Army Night Freedom Fighters', a group consisting of African soldiers, met to organise a protest against the low pay they were receiving, the slow pace of promotion, and the continued dominance of British officers within the military. The next morning they broke into the magazines of the 1st Battalion and arrested the officers. Subsequently they set up roadblocks in Dar es Salaam and took control of central government buildings. The Minister of External Affairs and Defence, Mr Oscar Kabona, met them and assured the soldiers that he would consider their demands, upon which they returned to their barracks. However, looting and rioting continued, and the next morning the 2nd Battalion joined the protests. They locked up their officers, both British and African (Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), 1964(a):9; Mazrui, 1968:273; McGowan, 2005:237-238; Parsons, 2003:1,106-107).

It seemed as if Nyerere quickly achieved control over the situation, however the Government received information that the soldiers were in contact with trade unionists and the opposition, and unrest and indiscipline continued. Nyerere finally asked for British help to disarm the military. On 25 January 600 British marines stormed the barracks after the mutineers refused to surrender and the soldiers were then arrested. After successful disarmament and prosecution of the soldiers, Nigerian troops replaced the British (ARB, 1964(a):9; McGowan, 2005:237; Tordoff, 1967:163). Inviting the former colonial power in to restore peace and stability was however not done with an easy heart. Years later Nyerere still argued that he had been forced to invite British forces in, as he and his colleagues believed that if he did not ask them, they would invade anyhow. As Nyerere (in Parsons, 2003:126) explained

> although I had given that go-ahead with immense reluctance, I was glad I had. The British would have landed without my permission. It is possible a new mutiny would have been provoked as an excuse. Then I believe I would have lost my semblance of control. As it is, I did not have much: but at least I would 'play' I had invited them!

There is however no evidence that Britain planned any intervention (Parsons, 2003:126).

The leader of the coup is believed to have been Sergeant Francis Hingo Ilogi who had been in the military since 1958 and was well educated, whereas the other participants had less education but still believed that they deserved promotion due to their experience. There is no reason to believe that the soldiers wanted to seize power, they only wanted their demands fulfilled. Even though Nyerere admitted that some of the grievances were justified, the episode was treated as a mutiny. The Tanganyikan Rifles consisted only of two battalions, and as such basically all parts of the military had been involved in the mutiny. As a result Nyerere lost his faith in the military structures the country had inherited from its colonial masters and he also refused to forgive the fact that he had been forced to ask Britain for help. The end result was the disbanding of the two battalions and 345 soldiers were discharged. What remained were the officers and the support staff (Parsons, 2003:108,155; Tordoff, 1967:163).

The mutiny of 1964 was regarded a huge humiliation to the nationalist country, and it became even worse as they were forced to invite British troops to disarm their own army. In explaining his decision to other African leaders, Nyerere argued that

> It was not very much affected by their nationality, but the presence of troops from a country involved in the cold war had serious implications for non-alignment. The presence of British troops could be exploited too easily by those who wished to divide Africa. Naturally, our first instinct was to ask for the help of our partners in the East African Common Services Organisation. But in the meantime – following the Tanganyika mutiny – first Uganda and then Kenya experienced troubles with their own military forces (…) I therefore asked for the help of such troops as were immediately available (in ARB, 1964(b):21).

This justification also explains why Nigerian troops, and not British, were asked to fill the vacuum after the military had been disbanded (Tungaraza, 1998:291).

After the mutiny it was decided that the Ministry of External Affairs and Defence should no longer be in charge of the defence sector, rather the Second Vice-President's Office now received the main responsibility for security and defence. Until that time the Second Vice-President had been responsible for central establishments and regional administration, but in order for him to better concentrate on the new portfolio, these tasks were relocated to the President's Office. As a result, the mutiny indirectly led to a concentration of power (Tordoff, 1967:67).

The Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF) were established in September 1964, and Captain Mirisho S.H. Sarakikya became the Commander of the new institution. Nyerere had now realised that the Armed Forces should be integrated within the national mainstream, and it became necessary to find a proper role for the military. The military would no longer play a strict military role; rather, it should also play a role in nation-building, and as such have certain

political roles as well. Politically neutral soldiers were not necessarily the ideal. Programmes aimed at politicising, legitimising and indigenising the Defence Forces were implemented. Nyerere regarded political security as the most important aspect and if military professionalism had to be sacrificed he would do that. The military became closely connected to the ruling party and the Armed Forces were loyal to the political leaders. Four requirements were especially highlighted; patriotism, obedience, bravery and loyalty (ARB, 1964(a):9; ARB, 1964(c):26; Luanda, 2006; Pachter, 1982; Parsons, 2003:181-182).

President Nyerere changed his view on the military radically after the mutiny, and he no longer thought that professionalism was the most important factor. Rather, he came to believe that

> The military is a political tool. The issue really is whose politics. I am unable to imagine a situation where the army is apolitical. To say that [British] officers commanding Colonel Chacha and cohorts [native troops] did not represent a political ideology is a fallacy. To say that these officers were just mercenaries is absolutely not true. The [British] officers stood as a political watchdog. They stood for British imperialism. Ours is Jeshi la Wananchi – a people's army. The task of the army has changed. Its task is not to watch over natives wishing to cause trouble. It is a people's army whose task is to make sure that the people do not suffer another colonial disaster. Its task is to make sure that the people do not experience another colonial invasion. This is the Tanzania People's Defence Force. Its task is first and foremost to see to it that we do not suffer from another colonial invasion (in Luanda, 2006:16-17).

Recruitment to a new army was started, and only very few from the previous military were allowed back in, and only after accepting the norms laid out by the Party. The qualification needed to be a possible recruit to the military was membership in either TANU or Afro-Shirazi (Zanzibar) or their youth organisations. As such, the mutiny led to new criteria for being selected to the Defence Forces; physical fitness was no longer as significant, rather political loyalty and affiliation now became more important. After the dismissal of basically all the soldiers, the officers put through a huge recruiting process. One thousand soldiers were recruited in the first recruitment effort, and 700 more swiftly followed. From then on the party in concurrence with the military was responsible for the recruitment. Until 1969 the total number of national servicemen was around 3,300. Further increases were not possible due to economic problems (ARB, 1964(d):113; Luanda, 2006:17; Omari, 2002; Parsons, 2003:165-166; Tordoff, 1967:163-164; Tungaraza, 1998:291-293). Lupogo (2001) has argued that the mutiny had positive consequences as it allowed for a fresh start for the military, and reorganisation was carried out. The Government did not need the military to secure its own existence; rather the Defence Forces depended on the political leaders. It was a relatively authoritarian system with a very strong

party and leadership where the Defence Forces were small and controlled by civilians. The military defended the political system and the military was itself a part of this system.

Omari (2002:95-98) has pointed out that it is often believed that the civilian authorities successfully integrated the Defence Forces into the political mainstream and as a result were able to avoid military coups. However, Tanzania also suffered some problems in its civil-military relationship. Two MPs were arrested in July 1967 on allegation of subversive activities. One of them had tried to subvert a member of the military and he had asked for the military's assistance. However, the authorities were quickly informed about this. A statement was issued which said that the MPs are allowed to disapprove of the Government's actions and they are allowed to openly criticise; however, it is constitutionally illegal to use the military "for the purpose of changing the Government or its policies by unconstitutional means" (ARB, 1967(c):823-824). There were suggestions that political officials who opposed the Arusha Declaration were responsible, and that they wanted to overthrow the regime. In response to this Nyerere claimed that "anybody who believes in this talk of conspiracy can well believe that his parents are donkeys" (in ARB, 1967(d):843). A plot was discovered on 11 October 1969, and four military officers as well as an important party member and a former minister were arrested. In 1972 the President of Zanzibar was assassinated. This latter event was by some regarded as settlement with an individual, whereas others regarded it as an attempted coup. In any case it proves that the loyalty of the military was not as strong as often believed (McGowan, 2005:239; Omari, 2002:95-98).

A National Defence Bill was implemented in 1966 where it was stated that a Defence Forces Committee should be created, and this committee would be led by the minister responsible for defence. The committee should be instrumental in formulating and examining policies related to the Defence Forces. The Second Vice-President should chair this body, and in the committee's meeting he had the capacity as Minister of Defence. The committee was to be responsible for "the review and formulation of policy in all matters relating to the administration and supply of the Defence Forces" (Tordoff, 1967:83). On 4 October the same year the Parliament endorsed a White Paper proposing National Service for all school-leavers and university graduates. The training would be obligatory for some categories and it would be open to everyone between 18 and 35 years. There would be no educational or professional requirements (ARB, 1966(a):473; ARB, 1966(b):648). In addition to the National Service and the creation of a People's Militia, several committees of the CCM party were established throughout the country. The aim of these measures was to create mechanisms whereby the military was effectively monitored nationwide by non-government, civilian groups. In addition

military skills were now distributed amongst the civilian society as a whole (Williams, 1998). It is important to note that the newly established militia was directly controlled by the CCM party. Only the party could use the militia during war and the party could then let the TPDF have the leading command. The purpose was to not let the military have a monopoly of the use of force. The militia was trained by the TPDF, but it had its own command structure which was supposed to prevent militarism. The integration among people, party and military meant that it was not necessary to have a large standing army (Tungaraza, 1998:303).

The National Service was at its highpoint in the mid-1970s when it generated between six and ten thousand recruits every year. These recruits were part of a reserve army. It was emphasised that the TPDF was superior to the National Service in order to prevent friction that could have resulted from two parallel military institutions. There was a clear division of power and labour, and the National Service was responsible for making uniforms and producing food for the TPDF. The party was responsible to recruit people to the nation-wide militia, whereas the TPDF was responsible for training the recruits. An increasing number of the population was involved in the security and defence tasks in the country (Lupogo, 2001; Omari, 2002:98-99).

The Party Guidelines of 1971 proposed relationships between the Defence Forces, the Government and the CCM party that would integrate the military even further into the political mainstream. Civilian supremacy was assumed and the party and the Government should oversee the performance of the military. Professionalism was not the ideal; rather, the Defence Forces should be an integrated part of society (Omari, 2002:98-99). According to the Party Guidelines

> Tanzania's defence and security depend on Tanzanian's themselves. Had our party been forced to wage a liberation war, every party member would have been a soldier, and a soldier a party member. TANU's relations with the TPDF should be those of a people's party and a people's army. It is up to the party to ensure that the people's army is the army for both the liberation and the defence of the people. It is TANU's responsibility to ensure that the army's main task in peace time is to enable the people to safeguard their independence and their policy (in Omari, 2002:99).

In 1974 a new recruitment system for officers was introduced. Before school leavers had received officer training directly, however a new system distinguishing three groups of recruits was now implemented. The first group of candidates consisted of senior NCOs who could receive training courses for junior officers with the aim of promotion to lieutenant. The second group were university graduates or school leavers who after a period could get accepted into the officer cadet course and the third group were professionals who could get into this course directly. This system was implemented with the aim of reducing elitism in the military and the result was a highly diverse institution (Tungaraza, 1998:292-293).

1971-1979: Conflicts with Uganda

Idi Amin seized power in Uganda through a military coup in January 1971. The relationship between Tanzania and Uganda quickly deteriorated, and on 24 August 1971 fighting occurred between the militaries of the two countries. There were new border clashes in October and during a couple of days 22 civilians were killed and six soldiers wounded. On 24 October Uganda released a statement where it was argued that the Kagera River should be the natural frontier between the two countries. The following day The Tanzanian Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Mr Namfua, said that this would mean a 90 to 100 miles annexation of Tanzanian territory, and he argued that Tanzania's territorial sovereignty had to be protected. Negotiations between the two countries contributed to an easing of tensions and the situation improved. The border between the two countries had been closed since July 1971, but reopened at the end of the year. However, after the January-coup in Uganda and the new regime's accusations that Tanzania would invade Uganda, relations between the two countries had been strained. Even though it now came to an improvement, the underlying problems were still not solved (ARB, 1971(a):2192-2193; ARB, 1971(b):2253-2254; ARB, 1971(c):2279-2280).

The following year started off relatively peacefully, but on 18 September 1972 President Amin of Uganda said that the country had been attacked by Tanzanian troops (ARB, 1972(a):2597-2601). Tanzanian authorities did not reply directly to the allegations; however, the next few days were filled with heavy fighting between the two countries, including air bombardments. When Nyerere was asked what he thought Amin would do next; he replied that "it is difficult to know what a lunatic will do next. It is even more difficult to anticipate the outcome of a lunatic's action. He could grab a weapon and create real havoc. And in the case of Idi Amin the consequences could be disastrous" (in ARB, 1972(a):2599). After casualties and loss on both sides, the two countries agreed to start negotiations under a temporary truce on 21 September. Talks commenced on 4 October between the Foreign Minister of Tanzania, Mr John Malecela, and the Foreign Minister of Uganda, Mr Wanume Kibedi. The two sides issued a communiqué 6 October 1972 after completing the talks, and both emphasised good neighbourliness and African brotherhood (ARB, 1972(a):2597-2601; ARB, 1972(b):2625-2628). The bilateral relationship was improved, but it was not to last for many years.

In July 1974 Mr Edward Sokoine, Tanzania's Defence Minister, announced that the Defence Forces would be expanded. At the beginning of 1971 Tanzania possessed approximately 10,000 troops. Now the number of both men and weapons would increase, and naval and air forces would also be strengthened. At the same time Sokoine said that the People's Militia would have common training with the Defence Forces. In 1975 the Government announced that they

wanted the National Service to become a division of the TPDF as this would be positive for Tanzania's defence capacity. Mr Sokoine proclaimed that national servicemen during training would be full members of the Defence Forces and when the training was over they would constitute a reserve corps. There was a huge increase in the military budgets in the years 1975-1977; however, this budget growth was no economic reward to the military institutions. Rather, the party perceived external threats to be increasing, and there was as a result necessary to acquire both extra personnel and equipment (ARB, 1971(a); ARB, 1974(b):3306; ARB, 1975(b):3701; Pachter, 1982:607). In 1976 the Defence Forces of Tanzania included 13,000 soldiers in the army, 1,000 in the air force, 600 in the navy, and the citizens' militia had a total of 35,000. In addition there was one police marine unit. The country received most of its military backing from China. The following year the army troops increased to 17,000 (ARB, 1976(b):3696; ARB, 1977:4613). This significant expansion of Tanzania's defence capabilities can not be seen in isolation from the country's relationship to Uganda, and these defence policies would soon prove important and necessary.

The bilateral tensions between the two countries developed into a full-blown war at the end of 1978 and did not end until April 1979. After several border clashes, Uganda claimed that Tanzania had invaded its territory. In response they pushed their own frontier to the Kagera River on 1 November 1978, which meant an annexation of 710 square miles of their neighbour's territory (ARB, 1978(a):5052-5055). The next day Nyerere stated that Tanzania's only mission now was to retaliate against Amin. He said that "We have the ability and the intention to do so. Amin is a savage – he has killed many of our people" (in ARB, 1978(a):5053). The two sides had very diverse versions of what was happening on the ground, and in Tanzania there was growing concern about the people living the in the area where the fighting was at its height. During the last days of November Ugandan troops were driven out of the occupied territory. Uganda claimed that Tanzanian troops had entered its territory, but Tanzania rejected these allegations. The war zone at the border was closed to foreign reporters, and as a result it was difficult to achieve independent information about what was happening, and it was not possible to confirm or disprove the allegations and counter-allegations from the two sides. Tanzania constantly denied having any aims of overthrowing Amin, however, many observers were sceptical of this claim (ARB, 1978(a):5052-5055; ARB, 1978(b):5087-5088; ARB, 1979(c):5153-5157).

Fighting between the two countries erupted again on 20 January 1979, but the Tanzanian Government reiterated that it had no wish to occupy Ugandan land; it only wanted to protect itself. Fighting continued throughout the next few months, and the end of the war began on 10

April when the Tanzanian military began large-scale attacks on the Ugandan capital, Kampala. The next day the city was captured. Idi Amin fled the country, and the military dictator was finally defeated after more than eight years of misrule in his own country. Commenting on the defeat of Amin, the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 12 April congratulated the people of Uganda, and offered its support and expressed its solidarity with its neighbours. Uganda requested Tanzanian troops to remain in the country until stability was ensured, which Nyerere agreed to do. Nyerere argued that Tanzania's aim had been to punish Amin, but not to overthrow him; the Ugandans themselves had achieved that. The world and the world press in general welcomed the overthrow of Amin, but they were sceptical about the role Tanzania had played as it had broken the principles of international law, including the OAU charter and its principle of non-interference in other African states (ARB, 1979(d):5220-5228; BBC, 1979(a)).

Tanzanian troops stayed on in Uganda after the war to train local troops, following an agreement between the two countries, and these troops started their withdrawal from Uganda in March 1980. During and after the war against Amin, the CCM party argued that the People's Militia was the backbone of the country's defence system. The militia differed from the TPDF in that as long as the militia was not involved in militia activities, its members were occupied with their normal jobs. However, they were a very important reserve force, and played a very significant role during the war. Many unemployed people in Tanzania had joined the Defence Forces in fighting Amin, and after the war some of these continued in the TPDF, whereas most of them later became employed either by private firms, parastatals or the Government itself (BBC, 1979(b); BBC, 1980; Tungaraza, 1998:301-303).

The Tanzanian war against Uganda's Idi Amin is often regarded the highlight of the country's achievements. This war proved that Tanzania had mature leaders who were willing to defend the country against outside threats and that they were able to mobilise the Defence Forces very quickly. During the first few weeks of the war, the national army grew from 40,000 men to 100,000. The militia, the prison service, the national service and the police all participated, as they were officially a part of the Defence Forces. The military experienced a huge expansion and it was expected to be reduced after the end of the war. However, almost all the soldiers stayed in the forces, as demobilisation was regarded as contravening the appreciation the soldiers deserved. There was some criticism of this, as the economic situation was deteriorating as a consequence of the war, and these economic realities finally prevented further expansion, and several military units had to be dismantled (Lupogo, 2001).

At the TPDF's 20th anniversary, in September 1984, President Nyerere gave a speech where he stated that

Our force was compelled to fight a war outside Tanzania when our country was invaded by the oppressive troops of savage Idi Amin. We had to eliminate the oppressive troops and throw them outside our borders. Our Force, in collaboration with the people, achieved great success in that war. As a result of that war we discovered many things which we deserved to learn and we learned more about the structure of our force, tactics of war and the relationship between our economy and matters pertaining to the defence of our nation. I think, and I like to believe, that we learnt war tactics as a result of that war. Similarly, before and after that war we were forced into, our Force has been making its small contribution to strengthening the freedom of some of our neighbours. We gave permission to our Force to undertake this task following requests from the countries concerned (in BBC, 1984).

1980-1992: Transition to democracy

There was some instability in Tanzania's civil-military relations in the early 1980s, and it started off in 1981 when several officers were reported to have presented grievances about the current situation to the President. These officers were subsequently arrested (Pachter, 1982:606). In January 1983 a plot was discovered. About 30 people were involved, including military officers ranging from sergeant to lieutenant-colonels. The military reported this attempt to the Government, and was praised by the political leaders who argued that this proved the TPDF's strong commitment to the Government and the nation as a whole. In 1984 there were allegedly military plans to take over Zanzibar, but this failed as well (BBC, 1983; McGowan, 2005:240; Omari, 2002:95-98).

In Nyerere's speech to the military in 1984 he argued that

It is true we need a Defence Force, but what we need more is to have a small people's army who are steadfast and experienced (…) An army in a socialist country cannot be a group of people who like prestige, hoarding wealth for themselves, but it should be a group of officers and soldiers who have received very good training and who recognise the implications and importance of their social duty (…) Political education in the armed forces must be given similar or even greater priority than military training (…) This Force has a great treasure of technology and expertise and amongst yourselves there are people with various qualifications, such as engineers, doctors, instructors and so on, and I know that officers from the Force have received their training in excellent institutions which have credibility inside and outside our country. Fighters who are not officers are young people with a good academic ability who have been duly trained, and have an opportunity of furthering their education within and outside our Force (in BBC, 1984).

The military steadily played a stronger role in civilian areas. By 1982 military personnel filled about a third of the positions as regional party secretaries, and 15 percent of the 240 district party commissioners and secretaries. Party elections were held in 1987, and at this time the central committee had 15 percent military officers, and the regional secretaries had 24 percent military personnel (Omari, 2002:101). The military was under strict political control, and this came to a highpoint in 1987 when provincial forces (Mkoa wa Majeshi) were created within the

military. An Armed Forces Region was established in 1988 and operated from 1989 to 1992. Officially the CCM party was divided into 25 regions, but it now recognised 26, adding this new Armed Forces Region as an additional administrative unit. The TPDF, the prison services, the police and the security and defence institutions of Zanzibar all made up this region. The region further strengthened the military's role in Tanzanian politics (Luanda, 2006:13; Tungaraza, 1998:298).

The early 1980s saw economic problems, inflation was at 30 percent and there were not enough basic goods in the country. As a result Nyerere stepped down as President in 1985, but continued as chairman of the party. After the end of the Cold War, and with opposition and criticism from both international financial institutions and local politicians, the Government decided to appoint a commission that was to analyse which direction the political situation in the country should take. The commission was headed by Justice Francis Nyalali (Ahluwalia and Zegeya, 2001; Rupiya et.al., 2006:2-3). The commission issued its report at the end of 1991, and one of the most significant recommendations was that the close ties between the party and the military should be abolished. At this time the security and defence instruments were closely intertwined with the political structures, and it was difficult to distinguish the two institutions from each other. The military had strong influence on policies, decisions and resource allocation (Ahluwalia and Zegeya, 2001; Mmuya, 1995:40; Rupiya et.al., 2006:3), and Omari (2002:101) has argued that by 1992 "the Tanzanian administration looked like a civilian-military coalition."

1992-today: Multiparty system

The end of the Cold War and worldwide democratisation affected Tanzania, and in 1992 the one-party system was replaced by a multiparty system. The Political Parties Act of the same year had specific articles regarding civil-military relations, and it was now to be a clear division between the political and military spheres. There should not be party structures within the Defence Forces; military personnel should not be involved in party tasks and politicians should not be involved in military affairs; political parties should not have any influence on who becomes recruited to the military; and military personnel who at the time were involved in party politics had to choose whether they wanted to keep up this work, or if they rather wanted to be professional soldiers. However, in reality, this division has not become as clear as promoted in the act, and military personnel still have a strong position within the political sphere. In 2003 twenty percent of the commissioners at the district level had background from the Defence Forces, whereas this proportion at the regional level was 45 percent. Civil-military relations are much the same now as they were during the one-party system, but this might change if one of the

opposition parties comes to power, as the military should serve any government regardless of the party (Baregu, 2004:38-39; Luanda, 2006:13; Mmuya, 1995:47; Omari, 2002).

There are today about 16 registered parties in Tanzania. Soldiers are allowed to be members of any party, but they are not allowed to "actively demonstrate allegiance to that party (…) [or] to aspire to leadership posts in a political party" (Luanda, 2006:22). Even though there is today a multiparty system in Tanzania and it is opened up for political opposition, the ruling party throughout the post-colonial decades (TANU/CCM) is still the strongest party. As opposed to this party, almost all the opposition parties are new constructs, and it has not been easy to recruit members and popularising the parties' policies. In addition several of the new parties have had problems with their leadership. As a result the opposition is very weak, which ensures the continued dominance of the incumbent party and the difference from the earlier one-party system is not that significant (Maundi, 2002). It is also important to keep in mind that most of the opposition parties today could be regarded as splinter groups from the main party, as most of the opposition parties' members and leaders were members of the CCM before 1992 (Shayo, 2005:9). Multiparty elections were first held in October 1995, and CCM won the presidency as well as 78.1 percent of the seats in Parliament. Ten years later this picture repeated itself as the presidential candidate, Kikwete, won 80.28 percent of the vote, and the party secured 206 out of 232 seats. One of the other presidential contesters at this point said that the country could just as well return to a one-party system (Nyang'oro, 2006:2).

The Parliament's main task is to supervise how the Government is performing. There are 13 standing committees in the Tanzanina Parliament, and they investigate and analyse affairs within their jurisdiction before sending them to the National Assembly. There is one committee for defence and security issues (Baregu, 2004:37; Killian, 2004:193-194). During the one-party system it was fairly common to expel MPs who were critical and outspoken, however, this changed with the implementation of a multiparty system. It is now more normal to co-opt dissidents by promoting them to top posts. The reasoning behind this is to prevent members of the ruling party changing loyalties to one of the newly established opposition parties (Killian, 2004:194-195). In the multiparty setting, parliamentary debates are regarded as providing less critical analysis, and legislation is approved quicker. Now, as opposed to before, the MPs look at themselves as part of a party and not as individual members, and they are expected to follow the official party line in voting (Killian, 2004:197). A properly functioning Parliament is able to efficiently oversee the Government and the state in general. In Africa there is generally no close involvement of the Parliament and its members in issues relating to peace and security. Parliament should play an important role as a monitor, but the Tanzanian Parliament is

dysfunctional and this must be improved if it is able to properly monitor the Defence Forces (Mahanga, 2006).

Tanzania today has 27,000 active soldiers, 108,400 in total, and the country spends 0.4 percent of its budget on the military. President Kikwete promised the TPDF in 2006 that the Government would provide proper equipment so that the Defence Forces would always be able to protect the country, even though there were financial problems (ARB, 2006:16662; BBC, 2006). Ethnicity has not played an important role in Tanzania's history, but it is still a factor that should not be forgotten. Omari (2002:104) has argued that ethnicity is becoming increasingly important in the whole region, and Tanzania will probably not be able to escape this, which could influence the country's civil-military relations. Most of the opposition parties today follow ethnic lines. The Wakuria ethnic group is dominant in the military, but according to Tungaraza (1998:305) this has not led to resentment among other ethnic groups. However, there has been some private criticism by army officers about the Wakuria's dominant position, especially as people from this ethnic group have also received central positions in courts and in the central bank (ARB, 1988(b):9014).

Applicability of theories

When Tanzania received its independence, its political leaders decided to keep the military organisation more or less unchanged. However, the 1964 mutiny had vast consequences on the military institution and civil-military relations. The Defence Forces became strongly integrated into the wider society, and were kept under strong political control. This paid off for the civilian leaders, as repeated plots never developed into military coups. Politicians had military roles, and military personnel were involved in the political system, and whenever a plot was developing, someone in any of these structures would uncover and report it. Both civilians and military men have been involved in the various plots throughout Tanzania's history, which further proves that the two spheres were closely integrated. As has been shown, there was a very strong political control over the military before 1992, and the Defence Forces depended on the political authorities for their existence, not opposite as was the experience in many other countries. The 1992 Political Parties Act in theory redefined the country's civil-military relations, but as discussed above, in practise there have not been many changes. The civil-military relations of Tanzania have been radically different from those of Nigeria, and as such it is likely that the prevailing theories in the field will apply differently in this case. How, and if, these theories can be applied in the Tanzanian case will now be analysed.

Professionalism

Luanda (2006:20) has argued that the politicisation of the military that happened in Tanzania corroded the professionalism of the military, and especially its corporateness, discipline and leadership deteriorated. These characteristics should be the foundation of the military structure. As shown above, professionalism was regarded as very important by the political leadership until the mutiny of 1964. However, the mutiny had severe consequences on the country's civil-military relations. Professionalism was not completely dismissed, but it was no longer the central concept that would guide the military institution. One of the reasons for this might have been the fact that the leader of the mutiny was highly professional; he had extensive education and long experience in the Defence Forces. The other main participants had less education, but they also had long experience and were ready for promotion. It became clear that professionalism did not ensure stable civil-military relations. As a result the whole institution and its relations with the political leaders changed radically.

After 1964 political neutrality was no longer an ideal for the Defence Forces, rather the requirement for recruitment to the military was political, as allegiance to the TANU or Afro-Shirazi party had to be ensured before being considered for the military. Political security was the main goal, and this could only be ensured if the security and defence forces were political. However, this politicisation did not necessarily mean that all professional characteristics were overshadowed. Rather, expertise is central in military professionalism, and this was something the political authorities emphasised that the Tanzanian military should have. Training has always been very important in the military, and even though there were no educational or professional requirements to get into the National Service, which provided the military recruits, training in various fields was given to all the new soldiers. The fact that not only the TPDF possessed military skills contravened the professionalism of the forces, however, there was a clear division of power and labour, and the TPDF was responsible for the training of the People's Militia.

In spite of the fact that professional characteristics were present in the Tanzanian military, it is clear that professionalism was not the central factor in the institution, and professionalism was not regarded as being all that important for ensuring stable civil-military relations. The civilian authorities however achieved strong control over the Defence Forces, and this case therefore contradicts Huntington's argument about professionalism being the most important aspect for ensuring civilian supremacy over the military.

Role of the military

Theories on civil-military relations have often stated that the military must accept a subordinate role, and Finer has been one of the most important scholars arguing this. Tungaraza (1998:312) argued that the principle in itself is reasonable; however, he claims that the Tanzanian case proves that stable civil-military relations can also be achieved through integration. Integration has indeed been the main characteristic of the Tanzanian political authorities' attempt at achieving good relations with the Defence Forces, and as discussed above, this has been successful. There have been very strong connections between the military institution and the political system, and military personnel have had political positions at the same time as politicians have had positions within the Defence Forces.

This integration has had strong impact on the military's perception of its own role within society. As it has been an integral part of the wider community, it has been in the its own interest to maintain a good relationship with the authorities, at the same time as it has accepted that it is the civilians who are best able to govern the country. As long as the Defence Forces have had such a strong influence on the political situation anyhow, it has not been necessary to directly intervene in the civilian rule. The military has always known that its responsibility is to ensure the political security of the country, and it has fulfilled the tasks necessary to provide this security.

How the Government has shaped the military to accept its role within society, and how the Defence Forces have reacted to this, has ensured stable civil-military relations in Tanzania. Finer's theory about the importance of the military's perception of its own role is as such very important in the Tanzanian case. However, as stated above, this does not necessarily imply that the military believes that it is subordinate to the civilians; rather it has had a strong influence on them and their policies, and could as a result regard its own institution as complementary to the political institutions. The military's role in Tanzania has been a direct consequence of political measures put through by the authorities, which will be discussed next.

Political measures

Janowitz has argued that various political measures are important to ensure stable civil-military relations. One of the factors he emphasises is clear directives concerning these relations. This has been central in the Tanzanian case, and the integration discussed above was defined in the Arusha Declaration and in the country's constitution. The Party Guidelines of 1971 also stated that the military should be an integrated part of society; it should be a people's army. These directives were changed at the turn to multiparty system in 1992, and it was now emphasised that

the military should be independent of political parties. However, these recent directives have not been strictly followed, and civil-military relations have not changed significantly.

Another political measure Janowitz has emphasised, and one that in Tanzania's case has to be seen in connection to the previous measure, is the allocation of responsibilities. The main responsibility of the Defence Forces was to defend the country; at the beginning against colonial invasion, but later to protect the country from any external threats. However, the Tanzanian military also received political missions, and nation-building became a central task. What is special in the Tanzanian case is that in addition to the fact that the military received political missions, the civilians also received military tasks. It was regarded important that the military did not have monopoly of the use of force, and the civilian population was therefore trained in military skills. At the same time the Defence Forces received political training in order to ensure that they would support the political system, and not intervene directly in political rule. As shown above, this led to a situation where it was difficult to distinguish the military institution and its actors from the civilian authorities. This way of preventing military intervention has been discussed by N'Diaye (2002) in relation to the situation in Kenya, and the resemblance between the Kenyan case and Tanzania, and also Nigeria, will be further discussed in the following chapters.

Budget constraints could also be used to achieve control over the military, but this measure has not been significant in the Tanzanian case. The country has had economic problems, which have affected the military's budget. However this has not had an impact on the control over the institution. As seen, the military budget was increased in the 1970s, which was a consequence of external threats. This did not affect the civilian control over the military though, and this was also not the intention. The large-scale integration between the military, the people and the party meant that there was no need for a large standing army, and as such resources allocated to the military did not have to be as huge as in other countries with large armed forces. Recruitment policies were also important in Tanzania, and recruits came from all layers of society and the soldiers had very diverse backgrounds. As such the military reflected the society better, and elitism was prevented. This was of course closely related to the integration policy discussed above, and should also be seen in connection to the wider domestic environment.

Domestic environment

Nyerere's socialism was very dominant in the domestic situation and it was emphasised that the society should be egalitarian. This was reflected in the Defence Forces, and the military adjusted well to the domestic circumstances. Collective villages and nationalisation were important

elements of the country's ideology. However, these measures led to several economic problems. The economic situation did not have a strong impact on the military institution however, besides when it at times prevented expansion of the Defence Forces. The economic situation was one of the factors that influenced Nyerere's decision to step down, as it showed that his socialist policies were not successful. This again led to democratisation and a turn to multiparty system in Tanzania, which in theory affected the military and civil-military relations. The Defence Forces would no longer have political influence, and there should be a more significant separation between the military and the civilian politicians. As shown above however, there has not been a significant change in either the military institution nor in civil-military relations in the country.

One reason for this continuation of the conditions that were prevailing during the single-party system is the fact that the same party is still governing the country. Even though Tanzania in theory has a multiparty system, the characteristics of its political system are much the same as pre-1992. The opposition parties are weak, and have not been able to pose significant challenges to the CCM party. One of the main ways to control the military today should be parliamentary oversight; however, as has been shown above, the Tanzanian Parliament does not function well. So far the military has not posed any obstacles to the civilian authorities, but this is likely to be a result of the fact that they still have loyalties to the CCM party. However, if the opposition becomes stronger and the multiparty system develops into what the name implies, the military has to be controlled in other ways. If this happens, parliamentary oversight must be improved in order to ensure stable civil-military relations.

One domestic factor that is important in most African countries is the aspect of ethnicity. There are many ethnic groups in Tanzania as well, but this has not posed significant problems for the political actors or for the military institution. However, ethnicity is present, and it has been argued that it could come to play a stronger role in Tanzanian society as well. This might especially be important in the mainland's relations with Zanzibar, and even though this situation has not been discussed in this chapter, there are tensions between the two entities that could lead to security problems. Zanzibar was also important in the 1964 mutiny, but at that time the islands were not part of the Republic. It could as such be argued to have constituted a part of the international context, which will be discussed next.

<u>External context</u>

Like other countries Tanzania has not lived in a vacuum; rather, international factors have influenced the country. Britain controlled the territory until 1961 and after independence the military institution and its structure remained the same as before. As discussed above, this was

the main reason behind the 1964 mutiny, which had huge consequences for the country's civil-military relations. This led to a radical shift in the definition of these relations, and the political control over the military was changed substantially. It is in connection with the mutiny that Zanzibar must be mentioned as well, as the placement of Tanganyikan police officers on the islands after the revolution contributed to the Tanganyikan military's possibilities of carrying out a mutiny.

The conflicts with Uganda are probably the most significant aspect of the international context in regard to Tanzania's military. The problems started with the military coup in Uganda in 1971 and reached a highpoint with the 1978-79 war. During the 1970s there was a huge expansion of the Defence Forces, and the militia became even closer integrated into the military. The conflict is regarded a success for Tanzania and its military, and the Defence Forces gained very useful experiences from this conflict. Nyerere especially emphasised that the forces learnt war tactics. In addition the military successfully fulfilled one of its central tasks: defending Tanzania's territorial integrity. This war did not change the civil-military relations of Tanzania however, but it further strengthened the belief that the way these relations were conducted at that time was positive for the country. As a result, the military's involvement in the civilian sphere became even stronger in the 1980s.

Another international event that can not be disregarded in the Tanzanian context is the end of the Cold War. The changing international context was central in the democratisation process in Tanzania, and it was one of the factors that led to the implementation of a multiparty system. In addition, international actors argued that Tanzania should start a democratisation process, and democratic developments were taking place around the world at that time. In theory the turn to democracy and multiparty rule had implications for the country's civil-military relations. In practice however, these implications are still to materialise, but the international context must nonetheless be taken into account when studying Tanzania's civil-military relations.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Tanzania has experienced a very stable post-independence history. There have been no military take-overs, and plots have quickly been uncovered and dealt with in a professional way. The country has only had four presidents, all from the same party, and elections have been held regularly to confirm the power of the CCM party. Until 1992 there was however a one-party system in the country, but even after the implementation of a multiparty

system the same party has stayed in power. This party has very strong connections with the Defence Forces of the country.

Huntington's emphasis on professionalism has not proved to be valid in the Tanzanian case. The military had some professional characteristics, but the institution could not be defined as a professional institution. This has however not harmed civil-military relations. The perception the military has had about its own role in society has however been very significant, as their integration with the wider society has made them loyal to civilian authorities. This is closely connected to the political measures the civilian rulers have put through. It is important to notice that these measures have been successful in ensuring stable civil-military relations due to the fact that the measures also served the military's interests. Both the domestic environment and the external context have influenced civil-military relations in the country. The domestic environment has in theory changed since 1992, but it remains to be seen if these theoretical changes materialise, and how this in case will affect civil-military relations. Tanzania is no longer an authoritarian and socialist state. Democracy is consolidating, and its economic policies are liberal. Positive developments are currently ongoing, and the country could be optimistic about its future. In order to maintain the stability and the positive processes it will however be necessary to ensure continued stable civil-military relations, also if the domestic situation is to change.

Chapter Five: Comparison

Introduction

The two previous chapters have shown that civil-military relations and the authorities' control over the military institutions have been very different in Nigeria and Tanzania. Tanzania has experienced a more stable civil-military relationship than Nigeria, and the reasons for this difference must be analysed. This chapter will give a more detailed evaluation of the five hypotheses stated in Chapter One, and it will be divided in five main sections corresponding to these hypotheses. The research questions related to each theory will be studied first within the sections. Then the validity of the hypotheses will be discussed and evaluated.

Professionalism

The first hypothesis for analysis is based on Huntington's theory of professionalism. He has argued that the best way to achieve proper civilian control over the military is through acquiring professionalism within the armed forces. As Tanzania has experienced much more stable civil-military relations than Nigeria, the first hypothesis reads as follows: *The lack of professionalism within the military has led to weak civilian control in Nigeria, whereas strong professionalism in Tanzania's military has led to good civilian control.* To evaluate this hypothesis, two questions will be answered: 1) *Have there been attempts at professionalising the military and has it in case been successful?* 2) *Which measures did the civilian authorities use in order to achieve professionalism, and how did the military react to these measures?*

Comparison

In Nigeria there have been very clear attempts at professionalising the military, and this has been more or less successful. One of the most important measures the authorities have been using is education and training of the military. During the first years of independence there was a significant focus on this within the Armed Forces, and before the first coup of 1966 the majority of the officers were well educated. Major Nzeogwu, who was the leader behind the first coup, had long experience within the military and he had training from the British Sandhurst military academy as well. The other senior officers participating in this coup should also be regarded as professionals. After the end of the Civil War in 1975 training was further intensified, and throughout the next couple of decades professionalism was strongly encouraged, through reorganisation of the military institution. The size of the Armed Forces was reduced, but management and efficiency were improved, which was regarded as promoting professionalism.

From the early 1990s the Defence Minister received control of the Ministry of Defence, and he was responsible for all areas influencing military professionalism, as well as making sure that the Armed Forces remained loyal to the principles of professionalism. Since the implementation of civilian rule in 1999 professionalism has been promoted. Politicians and military personnel alike have argued that this is important in order to keep the military outside the political sphere. Military officers have argued that the number of soldiers should be reduced, at the same time that as training of the remaining men should be improved.

During the first few years of independence, professionalism was regarded as very important in Tanzania as well, and Nyerere believed that this was the most important aspect within the military. The Officer Corps was still dominated by the British officers who were well educated. These officers were however not involved in the 1964 mutiny, rather, their presence was one of the reasons behind the mutiny. The participants in the mutiny should be regarded as professionals, as their leader was well educated and had long experience within the Defence Forces and the other participants had long military experience as well. As a result of this mutiny, Nyerere radically changed his view on the importance of professionalism. Political security now became the overriding goal and Nyerere believed that military professionalism could be sacrificed if necessary. Professionalism deteriorated quickly, and the Defence Forces became closely connected to the ruling political party, and the military was no longer an apolitical institution. The integration of the military into the political mainstream and society in general continued throughout the following decades, and the turn in this relationship only came at the installation of a multiparty system in 1992. From this year on the Defence Forces were to be separated from the political institutions, and professionalism was promoted strongly for the first time since 1964.

Evaluation of professionalism's importance

The Nigerian military has, at least officially, mainly responded positively to the measures the authorities have put through to promote professionalism. This must of course be seen in the light of the fact that most of the regimes in Nigeria have been military regimes. Measures promoting professionalism that were used by both civilian and military regimes and that are still promoted after 1999 are the reduction of the size of the Armed Forces and increased training and capacity building among the forces. In Tanzania on the other hand, professionalism has not been an important goal, especially not between 1964 and 1992, when political security was the overriding aim in civil-military relations. Professionalism was not disregarded, but it was not seen as absolutely necessary in order to ensure civilian control over the Defence Forces. After 1992

however, the military officially were separated from the civilian authorities. One of the most important measures that were implemented to separate these institutions and to promote professionalism was the rule that military personnel had to decide if they wanted to be a professional soldier or not. If they wanted remain in the Defence Forces, they had to give up their involvement in party politics. However, as shown in Chapter Four, this measure has not proved to be very successful. Military personnel remain very influential in Tanzanian politics, even though this is better hidden than before. The Defence Forces, and especially their officers, can not be regarded as completely apolitical, and as such the professional character of the military institution is still today very dubious.

The hypothesis based on Huntington's theory of civil-military relations is therefore not valid. Throughout most of Nigeria's post-colonial history there have been high levels of professionalism within the Armed Forces. This professionalism has not been perfect and does not fit 100 percent with Huntington's concept of professionalism; however, the country has tried to promote and implement professional characteristics within the military institution. This has unfortunately not led to stable civil-military relations or strong civilian control. Rather, Nigeria has been dominated by military rulers since independence, and democracy and its civilian rulers are still facing huge obstacles today. However, only one plot has been discovered since 1999, and as such it could be argued that professionalism today is promoting more stable civil-military relations. Tanzania has had a very different experience of professionalism. Due to Huntington's theory it was hypothesised that the reason for Tanzania's good civilian control were high levels of professionalism within the Defence Forces. However, as shown, the military intervened when the military was at its early highpoint of professionalism in 1964. During the next three decades professionalism came in second place to political security, and professional characteristics were not promoted strongly in the military. However, during these decades the civilian authorities controlled the Defence Forces well, and the few plots that were planned were quickly uncovered and reported to the civilian authorities. Professionalism has officially been promoted since 1992, but it has not been very successful, and civil-military relations have not changed much through the last 16 years.

Against the hypothesis based on Huntington it could be argued that professionalism led to weak civilian control in Nigeria, whereas little professionalism led to good civilian control in Tanzania. However, this conclusion would be premature, and would only include a limited number of factors that influence civil-military relations. I would rather argue that professionalism was not sufficient to ensure civilian control over the Nigerian military, at the same time as civilian control of the Tanzanian Defence Forces was not prevented by the lack of

professionalism in this country's military. However, other aspects of civil-military relations must be included to understand why professionalism played out in these ways in these countries, and these aspects will be discussed below.

The role of the military

Finer agreed that professionalism was important, however, the military's perception of its own role in society also mattered. To achieve civilian control over the military, it was necessary that the military accept that the civilian authorities were supreme. Based on Finer's theory, the second hypothesis for analysis states that: *The military in Nigeria has not accepted civilian supremacy leading to weak control of the Armed Forces, whereas this acceptance has been in place in Tanzania leading to effective control.* The two questions that will be answered in order to evaluate this hypothesis are the following: 1) *What attitudes do the military institutions and their leaders have towards the civilian authorities?* 2) *How do the military institutions and their leaders regard their own role in society?*

<u>Comparison</u>

The Nigerian military has throughout the post-colonial history had an ambivalent attitude towards both the civilian and military regimes, and this attitude has normally been a reflection of the regimes' policies and legitimacy. One of the best ways of studying the military's perceptions of the various regimes is by looking at its justifications after military coups. Throughout the four decades of military interventions, the coup leaders and participants have justified their actions by pointing to the previous regime's mismanagement, corruption, and illegitimacy. As such, they have regarded their own role as saviours of a society that is going downhill. This has been the official explanation, but it is clear that it has not always been the main reason behind the coups. Rather, the Armed Forces and their officers have often been seeking power and wealth for themselves and their patrons. However, when the military has intervened, its attitude towards the authorities has been that the regime was not able to govern the country. This has been either a result of the authorities' mismanagement towards the whole society, or the military's belief that the authorities have been mismanaging the relations with the Armed Forces, meaning that the regime had not given the military sufficient resources and/or power to maintain a positive relationship. This is the situation the civilian authorities in Nigeria today have to take into account. As argued above, it is necessary that the Armed Forces receive enough resources to fulfil their missions in a proper way, at the same time as they should not receive too many resources so that they can take on political tasks. The biggest problem however is to limit the

Armed Forces' power, which has still not been done in a successful way in Nigeria. However, if this power becomes too limited, there is always the possibility that the military will intervene again.

The situation in Tanzania has been radically different. It was only before the mutiny of 1964 that the Tanzanian military had a negative attitude towards the civilian authorities, and this was a result of the regime's (mis)management of the Defence Forces. There was basically no Africanisation, the British officers dominated the military, and pay was perceived to be too low. These factors led to dissatisfaction with the civilian authorities, and a mutiny was seen as the proper response. At this time, the military perceived its own role in society as important, but did not see this to be recognised. The shift in Tanzanian society and in civil-military relations after the mutiny was drastic, and from then on the military's view of the civilian authorities changed substantially. The Defence Forces became closely integrated into the wider society, and their institution could not be clearly separated from the political institutions. As a result, the military's perception of both the civilian regime as well as of its own role in society changed. As there was no clear distinction between the two, its attitude towards the politicians (which also included its own personnel) became positive. When plots were discovered they were regarded a threat to both the politicians and the military, and were quickly reported and condemned. There has officially been a change in civil-military relations in Tanzania since 1992, but as discussed in Chapter Four, this change has not been practically implemented to any strong degree.

Applicability of Finer's approach

The recurring military interventions and problematic civil-military relations in Nigeria allude to a lack of respect and acceptance for the authorities in place, whether civilian or military. It is clear that the Armed Forces have believed that the authorities were mismanaging the country and the national institutions. As a result the military has regarded its own institution as the one that has to take the responsibility of ousting the regime and governing the country itself. However, this perception is slowly changing, and the Armed Forces are coming to regard their own institution as separate from the political institutions. In Tanzania on the other hand, there has not been any successful military take-overs since independence. There has been a very close integration between the military and the political actors and institutions, and as a result the Defence Forces have not opposed the civilian authorities to any significant degree. They have perceived their own role to be political, and they have been influential in political decisions and have received such an amount of resources and power that intervention has not been regarded necessary. A coup would be a threat to society as a whole, including both the military and the

civilian authorities. This situation has changed since 1992, and if the situation in practical terms becomes as envisaged by the official documents, it could lead to more instability in civil-military relations. This could be the result if political power is removed from key military personnel; their respect and acceptance of the civilian regime could diminish. The wider implications of this hypothetical situation will be further discussed in the next chapter.

The hypothesis based on Finer's theory appears to be valid; for most of the country's post-colonial history the military in Nigeria has not accepted civilian supremacy (or supremacy of the political authorities), and this has led to weak control of the Armed Forces. This is currently changing, and if civilian supremacy becomes accepted within the military, Nigeria could face a more stable future in terms of civil-military relations. In Tanzania since 1964 there has been an acceptance of civilian supremacy, and the Defence Forces have been effectively controlled. This could however also change if the multiparty system develops into being a practical reality. It is important to analyse why the Tanzanian military so far has accepted civilian supremacy, and if this in the long-term is positive for civil-military relations. This aspect must also be studied in the Nigerian case. In the final chapter it will be analysed more closely whether acceptance of civilian supremacy actually leads to more stable civil-military relations, and possible short- and the long-term consequences will be discussed. How the civilian authorities have or have not succeeded in achieving recognition of their supremacy when it comes to political leadership, must be analysed by looking at which political measures they have implemented. This will be discussed next.

Political measures

Janowitz has argued that in order to create and maintain stable civil-military relations and achieve civilian control over the military the most important aspect is to implement political measures. He has especially promoted the measures of budget constraints, allocation of missions and responsibilities, and politico-military directives. The hypothesis based on Janowitz' work states that: *No political measures to control the military have been implemented in Nigeria resulting in weak civilian control, whereas such measures have been implemented in Tanzania which in turn resulted in good civilian control.* The specific questions that will be looked at in order to evaluate this hypothesis are the following: 1) *Have the civilian authorities imposed budget constraints on the military?* 2) *How have the military's missions and responsibilities been allocated?* 3) *Have directives concerning politico-military affairs been implemented?* 4) *Have other political measures than the three previous been undertaken?*

Comparison

The Nigerian authorities have several times imposed budget constraints on the country's Armed Forces. During the Civil War both the size of the military and the amount of resources spent on it increased drastically, and in the 1970s the country had to reduce its budget. In combination with this resource reduction the number of military personnel also decreased. This was however not done in order to increase civilian control over the military; rather it was a consequence of the overall economic situation in the country. The domestic economic situation also influenced the peace-keeping missions in the 1990s, and the fact that economic restraints were imposed on the soldiers serving abroad had negative consequences. However, these consequences did not influence the country's civil-military relations. Since 1999 it has been emphasised by both military men and politicians that it is important to provide the necessary resources for the country's Armed Forces, so that they can perform the operations for which they are responsible. At the same time some have argued for further reduction of the number of military personnel, so that the resources can be used more efficiently on the remaining men in the Armed Forces. Tanzania has experienced economic problems as well and this has also influenced the resources allocated to the military. A result of this has at times, for example in the late 1960s, been that it has not been possible to increase the size of the military. However, as in the Nigerian case, the restraints on the Tanzanian defence budget have not been imposed with the aim of improving civilian control over the military, and this control has as a result not been affected by this measure.

The allocation of missions and responsibilities could, according to Janowitz, have important influence on a country's civil-military relations. During the first decade of independence the Nigerian military mainly participated in military tasks, which came to a highpoint during the Civil War. The Armed Forces participated in the peace-keeping mission in the Congo, and they were also involved in maintaining internal security. After the 1975 coup the military received additional responsibilities, including promoting national unity and development. Since the end of the Cold War the Nigerian Armed Forces have become more strongly involved in international peace-keeping missions, where the tasks were of a military nature. However, the military has several times been involved in operations that should rather be dealt with by the police. This is evident today in the Niger Delta where military troops have been deployed, but where ideally the security should be maintained by the police and security companies. As has been the case throughout the decades however, the police forces in Nigeria do not have sufficient capacity to deal with large-scale problems. The Tanzanian Defence Forces had strictly military responsibilities until 1964, but after the mutiny the allocation of tasks and

responsibilities changed. They kept their military duties; however, they now had to participate in nation-building and development as well. After 1992 the military again were assigned purely military tasks, and apolitical soldiers became the ideal.

As discussed in Chapter Three, there have hardly been any directives concerning politico-military affairs or civil-military relations in Nigeria. The various constitutions do not specifically mention how the political authorities should control the military. The Tanzanian experience has been very different in this regard. Shortly after the 1964 mutiny it was decided that the military should be closely integrated into the ruling party, and membership in TANU or the Afro-Shirazi party became a requirement for being recruited into the Defence Forces. This was included in the Arusha declaration, and the Constitution stated that it was illegal to use the Defence Forces in order to change the Government. New Party Guidelines were published in 1971, and these stated that the military should be even closer integrated into the political sphere. This changed in 1992 when the Political Parties Act was passed by Parliament. This law had specific articles addressing civil-military relations; the most important change was that the military must now be clearly separated from the political sphere. Military personnel are still allowed to be members of any party, but they are not allowed to reveal strong allegiance to a party or to aim at high positions within a party.

One political measure that has been implemented in both Nigeria and Tanzania relates to recruitment policies. Shortly before independence the Hausa-Fulani group from the North dominated the political sphere in Nigeria, and it implemented a quota system where soldiers from the North became overrepresented in the Armed Forces. This increased inter-ethnic and inter-regional tensions, and resulted in negative consequences for the country's civil-military relations that were to last for decades. In Nigeria, as in other British colonies, recruitment patterns reflected a need to put down uprisings in one area with soldiers from another area. However, Tanzania had been under the rule of Germany before the British, and the Germans had both 'pacified' and suppressed the Tanzanian population. As a result, this kind of recruitment was not needed in Tanzania, and the military became a more cohesive institution. This became even stronger emphasised in 1974 when a new system aiming at recruiting officers with various backgrounds was implemented, as the overall objectives were reducing elitism and creating a diverse institution. Another political measure that was introduced in Tanzania was the creation of a People's Militia. The militia received military training, and the TPDF did not have monopoly of the use of force.

<u>Evaluation of political measures' influence</u>

The militaries of both Nigeria and Tanzania have experienced budget restraints, but these political measures have not been implemented in order to achieve better control over the military, and they have therefore not resulted in a change in civil-military relations. When it comes to the allocation of missions and responsibilities, there are both similarities and differences between the two countries. The overriding aim of both militaries has been to protect the countries from foreign threats, and the tasks related to this aim have been purely military. The Nigerian Armed Forces protected the territorial integrity of the country during the Civil War, and the tasks performed were of strict military nature. The Nigerian military has also been strongly involved in international operations, where it had clear military responsibilities. The Tanzanian Defence Forces have also been involved in international operations, but to a lesser degree than their Nigerian counterpart. Tanzania has fought an inter-state war since independence, and the responsibilities were at this time strictly military. This conflict and its consequences will be further discussed below. The militaries of both countries have also received more political responsibilities, such as promoting development and national unity. However, the emphasis on such tasks, and other political missions, has been much stronger in Tanzania than in Nigeria. Directives related to civil-military relations are one political measure that has been implemented radically different in Nigeria and Tanzania. This measure has hardly been present in Nigeria, whereas Tanzania has seen several directives and laws regulating the relationship between the military and the civilian authorities. Recruitment policies have also influenced the two countries' civil-military relations differently. In Nigeria's case the recruitment patterns have been very problematic, whereas the results in Tanzania have been positive.

The hypothesis based on Janowitz' theory on political measures is only valid to a certain extent. Nigeria has experienced weak control over the military, but the country has implemented political measures that could have led to good control possibilities. Tanzania has as well implemented such measures, and it has achieved good control over its Defence Forces. However, the countries have emphasised various measures differently. Neither country has used budget constraints actively to control the military, but both have had clear allocation of responsibilities and missions. Nigeria and Tanzania have both participated in international operations, and both countries' militaries have participated in national political tasks. However, Nigeria has been more strongly involved in the former operations, whereas Tanzania's military has had a higher number of, as well as more thoroughgoing, political responsibilities. Tanzania has also adhered to several directives concerning politico-military affairs, whereas such directives barely have

existed in Nigeria. At first sight it seems as if political measures are important to some degree, and those promoted by Tanzania are the ones with the most positive effect on civil-military relations. This conclusion is however premature.

In an article from 2002 N'Diaye looked at the coup prevention strategies of Kenya, and some of these strategies have also been present in its neighbouring country, Tanzania. He has argued that these approaches have been successful in the short-term, however, in the long-term they might weaken civilian control. Two of the three strategies N'Diaye has highlighted in the Kenyan context are those of creating a paramilitary organisation that acts as a counterweight to the ordinary military forces and 'buying off' officers with material awards and as such ensuring their loyalty. These tactics have also been used in Tanzania, although in a slightly different way. A People's Militia was established in Tanzania, and even though it was not supposed to be a rival to the military, it ensured that the Defence Forces could not monopolise the use of force. Leading military men did not necessarily get much material awards, but they got political awards and received power and influence on political issues that kept them loyal to the civilian authorities. N'Diaye argued that the Kenyan strategies undermined professionalism, political neutrality, and autonomy. These measures led to short-term gains as they prevented immediate military coups; however, long-term institutionalisation of civilian control was sacrificed in these efforts. This could unfortunately also be the consequence in Tanzania. The country's history and patterns within its civil-military relations have been similar to those in Kenya, and as N'Diaye (2002:630-631) has pointed out: "the absence of a *successful* coup in a civilian ruled state should not lead to any other conclusion than its strategies have helped prevent coups thus far." If civil-military relations are successfully changed as envisaged by the 1992 Political Parties Act, Tanzania might avoid these consequences. Nigeria's experience is different from both Kenya and Tanzania, however, in Nigeria as well there have been payoffs to military officers, and corruption has as a result become endemic within the Armed Forces, as well as in the wider society.

N'Diaye's research and arguments have implications for the evaluation of the third hypothesis. Political measures implemented by both Nigeria and Tanzania have influenced the countries' civil-military relations in various ways. In Nigeria the allocation of missions and responsibilities has been the most important measure, and when the tasks are kept completely military, the civil-military relations have mostly been influenced positively. In Tanzania on the other hand there have been several directives concerning civil-military relations and these have also been reflected in the allocations of responsibilities. The Tanzanian Defence Forces have become highly political, and this has so far prevented military coups. However, that there has

been no military intervention does not mean that coups will not materialise in Tanzania's future. Implementation of political measures does as such not guarantee civilian control over the military. One must closely analyse which measures are implemented, how and why they are executed, if these strategies have short-term and/or long-term effects, and what the wider context is at the time of implementation. The contexts, both domestic and external, will be analysed next.

Domestic environment

In recent years several scholars have argued that the domestic context must be analysed and properly understood in order to reach a complete picture of why a country's civil-military relations have developed as they have. The hypothesis based on these scholars therefore reads: *Internal factors and actors, such as the economy, historical events, and political and military personalities, have played a negative role in civil-military relations in Nigeria, whereas their role in Tanzania has been positive*. To evaluate this hypothesis the following questions will be answered: 1) *What is the structure of the military institutions?* 2) *Have there been strong personalities with significant influence within the military?* 3) *Have there been strong personalities with significant influence within the civilian authorities?* 4) *How has the economic situation developed within the country?* 5) *Have significant events in the country led to a change in the civil-military relationship?*

Comparison

The structure of the military institution in each country, and strong personalities within this institution, must be taken into account when analysing the domestic situation in Nigeria and Tanzania. The Armed Forces in Nigeria have been strongly influenced by the inter-regional, inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions in the country. This was especially dominant during the first independence years, and as shown in Chapter Three several military coups and coup attempts have reflected these tensions. However, at times these factors have been perceived to be more dominant than they really were. Ethnic and other identities have not been predominant in the Tanzanian military. The Wakuria ethnic group is however dominant within the Defence Forces, but this has not been an important factor in shaping the institution or civil-military relations in the country. It is however disputed whether Tanzania in the future can escape the ethnicity-trap. A more important factor in the structure and organisation of the Defence Forces in Tanzania was the establishment of a People's Militia. This institution was a supplement to the military, and military skills were no longer the monopoly of the main military forces. It is impossible to escape the TANU/CCM party in the organisation of the Defence Forces, as these

institutions were closely integrated. By establishing committees throughout the country the military was effectively monitored by civilian groups.

As the military has played a much more influential role in Nigeria than in Tanzania, it is a logical consequence that there have also been more influential military personalities in Nigeria. There have been several military leaders with different levels of influence, and their policies have led to various impacts on civil-military relations. Obasanjo has been regarded positively as he voluntarily implemented a transition back to civilian rule after his own military regime. Babangida and Abacha are at the opposite end of the scale. Babangida was however positively welcomed, as he was perceived as being more independent in regard to the various identities in the country. However, he was supported by the Kaduna 'Mafia', and his refusal to recognise the election results of 1993 proved his incompetence as a neutral leader. Abacha came to power later that year through a coup, and his personality and ambitions must be included when analysing why this coup was launched. Nigeria has not had many strong civilian personalities, simply as a result of the fact that the minority of political leaders have been civilian. This lack of civilian personalities has also been reflected in the very weak influence of civil society. Tanzania's history on the other hand can not be told without including the important role of the civilian leader Julius Nyerere. He had huge influence and impact on Tanzania's politics during his rule and up until his death. His ruling party always had, and still has, strong personalities and great influence. Since 1992 a multiparty Parliament has been established in Tanzania, but due to weak personalities and parties within the opposition, this Parliament has not been functioning well. This again has led to negative consequences for the country's civil-military relations.

Both Nigeria and Tanzania have experienced economic problems. In Nigeria this has had severe effects on civil-military relations. The leaders of the country, both civilian and military, have taken advantage of the country's resources for their own personal benefits. Coups have often been justified by deteriorating economic situations, but the new leaders have seldom improved the situation. Corruption, both within the military and in the wider society, has become a serious problem. There is a huge gap between the rich and the poor, and about 70 percent of the population live in poverty and receive nothing from the Government. Development and helping people out of poverty will be necessary to ensure the continuation of the current democracy. Tanzania has also faced economic obstacles, and the number living in poverty is also high in this country. Nyerere imposed socialistic policies, but these failed in the long run and led to his retirement from politics. Economic problems also led to an opening up of the country to Western economic policies, and as a consequence of this, democratic policies were forced on the country and ultimately led to the installation of a democratic multiparty system in 1992.

All the military coups of Nigeria are events that have had a strong influence on the country's civil-military relations. However, one other event that is more special and stands more out is the Civil War. It led to a huge expansion of the Armed Forces and professionalism deteriorated. After the end of the war therefore, a reorganisation became necessary. The large forces required resources the country did not possess, and demobilisation and redeployment slowly came into place. This led to a smaller, but more efficient and professional military. Another factor that is still important in Nigeria today is the problematic situation in the Niger Delta. Due to the oil-production and the skewed distribution of resources extracted in the region, attacks on facilities and kidnappings have become a common phenomenon. Tanzania has not experienced such problematic internal conditions as Nigeria, and the mutiny of 1964 still stands out as the most significant domestic event influencing civil-military relations. The implementation of democracy and multiparty system in 1992 could also influence these relations, if the envisaged changes become practical reality.

Importance of domestic actors and factors

The domestic situation has proved to be important in both Nigeria and Tanzania and has influenced the countries' civil-military relations. However, different aspects have had different impacts in the two countries, and the various internal experiences can not be regarded as having just as much positive or negative influence on the authorities' control over the military. The structure and organisation of the Nigerian Armed Forces have not directly influenced civil-military relations. However, the fact that the military has reflected other tensions within the wider society has had negative consequences for the military institution. The (perceived) dominance of one ethnic group has at several times led to military unrest and coups. As a result of the military's strong role within Nigerian society, personalities central in the institution have also influenced civil-military relations. Babangida's and Abacha's regimes severely oppressed society and negatively influenced the military's reputation. Obasanjo on the other hand obtained a positive reputation as a military leader, and later also became the elected civilian President of Nigeria. Civilian personalities have however not played such a strong role in Nigerian history. In Tanzania on the other hand, there have not been strong military personalities, rather, civilian personalities have had more impact, and the role of Nyerere stands out as exceptional. He laid the basis for the country's control over the Defence Forces, and this basis is still present in today's Tanzania. The structure and organisation of the Tanzanian military has been important, but the most important factor is the integration of military and political institutions, as well as the People's Militia's supplementary role.

Both Nigeria and Tanzania have experienced economic problems throughout their post-colonial histories, and both countries still face economic problems today. Large parts of their populations live in poverty, and there are big gaps between the rich and the poor. These differences are however larger in Nigeria than in Tanzania, and the economic situation has also had more severe consequences in Nigeria. Deteriorating economic conditions have been used to legitimise most of the coups in this country. Corruption has also become and continues to be, a huge problem in Nigeria. This has negative repercussions for civil-military relations, as it pays to support the authorities of the day. Supporting the authorities in Tanzania has also paid off, however in a less materialistic and economic way than in Nigeria, as political power and influence have been the main rewards. Both countries have also experienced internal events that have influenced civil-military relations. In Nigeria the various military interventions have been important, however, the Civil War has also played a huge role in the country's ability to control the military. The most influential domestic event in Tanzania is still the mutiny of 1964, which as discussed had vast repercussions for the country's civil-military relations.

The hypothesis emphasising the internal situation is proved to be valid. Internal factors and actors, including the military's organisation and its personalities, the economic conditions, and historical events have negatively influenced Nigerian civil-military relations. All these factors have mutually influenced each other and in total they have created a negative environment for developing stable civil-military relations. This is in spite of the fact that there have been positive developments in Nigerian history, such as voluntary military disengagement and restructuring of the Armed Forces. The combination of these factors has throughout the post-colonial history predominantly affected Nigerian civil-military relations and the authorities' control possibilities in a negative direction. In Tanzania on the other hand, the combination of these internal characteristics has contributed to civilian control over the Defence Forces. As discussed above however, it is not guaranteed that these factors will continue to provide a stable environment for civil-military relations. Rather, the nature of the current Parliament and the obstacles it is facing in terms of controlling the military are results of the domestic political situation including the lack of strong civilian personalities and parties in Parliament.

External context

The external context and international influence have been emphasised by various scholars within the field of civil-military relations, and the factors and actors on the international level should according to these academics also be included in an analysis of civil-military relations. This leads to the last hypothesis stating that: *External and international factors and actors, such*

as Cold War-rivalries, superpowers, the previous colonial power and international organisations, have negatively influenced civil-military relations in Nigeria, but have had a positive influence on these relations in Tanzania. The following questions will be looked at: 1) *Has the colonial power kept any influence over its previous colony?* 2) *What has been the relationship to the countries in the region?* 3) *What has been the relationship to the international community?* 4) *Did the end of the Cold War change the relations to external actors?*

Comparison

Britain was the colonial power in both Nigeria and Tanzania, although Tanzania had trusteeship status. The most important consequence of Britain's rule in terms of the military was the recruitment patterns. This influenced civil-military relations at the time of independence in both countries; however, even though the ethnic division within the military remained in Nigeria, there was quick Africanisation of the military. In Tanzania on the other hand, Nyerere continued to depend on the British after independence, and the British officers remained in position. This was one of the reasons behind the 1964 mutiny, but Nyerere still depended on the British to disarm the Tanzanian military. This was a huge humiliation to the country and after this episode Africanisation was implemented in Tanzania as well. Regional factors must also be included when studying this event, as the revolution on Zanzibar shortly before created the opportunity for the mutiny. The regional situation has strongly influenced Tanzania's civil-military relations, and the tensions between Tanzania and neighbouring Uganda are the most important in this regard. The disagreements between the two countries had vast implications for the Defence Forces. After the disputes in the early 1970s there was a huge expansion and strengthening of the military. In addition the People's Militia was further trained and became more important. At the end of the 1970s Tanzania won the war against Uganda and Idi Amin was ousted. This has been regarded a success in Tanzania's history and especially for the Defence Forces including the People's Militia. The military experienced a huge expansion during the war, but there was no large-scale demobilisation immediately afterwards.

The regional situation has also been important in the Nigerian history; however, its experiences have been quite different from Tanzania's. Nigeria has not been involved in any inter-state war since independence; rather it has played an important role in regional peace-keeping missions under the auspices of ECOWAS and the OAU. The most significant missions have been those in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. Nigeria's own security is dependent on a stable region, and as such it is in the country's own interest to provide assistance to countries in the region. Nigeria has also participated in international missions in other parts of the world, and

has had a strong belief in the importance of the UN. Even though some of these missions have faced strong opposition within Nigeria, the authorities have refused to withdraw their support from UN-led operations. These missions have in general had a positive impact on the military, but the consequences for civil-military relations have not been that significant. International factors have also been important in Tanzania, and this was especially the case after the country's victory over Amin. Even though the international community was positive about Amin's ousting, it did not welcome Tanzania's breach of the OAU Charter and international law.

The external context did of course change with the end of the Cold War, and both countries were affected by this. In the Nigerian case this led to increased opposition and criticism toward the country's military rulers. Nigeria no longer possessed the same strategic importance, and criticism became possible. None of the military regimes during the Cold War were openly criticised by foreign powers, but this now came to an end. Tanzania also became more criticised by international actors after the end of the Cold War. Both its economic policies as well as the single-party political structure came under pressure, and this was one of the reasons that led to the appointment of the commission that recommended a multiparty system. Civil-military relations officially changed in 1992, and this was a direct consequence of the external context.

Evaluation of theories emphasising external actors and factors

The international situation has been important for both Nigeria and Tanzania; however this factor has had varying influence on the countries' civil-military relations. Britain of course had immense influence before the countries achieved independence, but after the time of independence Britain's role decreased quickly. During the early years of independence Britain however played a negative role on the countries' civil-military relations. Regional and international factors and actors have also been dominant in both countries, although in different ways. These conditions have been more critical in the Tanzanian case, as they have led to direct confrontations and inter-state war. Nigeria is the regional hegemon and has been a promoter of regional cooperation. The country has also participated in regional, as well as international, peace-keeping missions, and these missions have also positively affected the military institutions. However, as in the Tanzanian case after the conflict with Uganda, these operations have not had direct consequences on civil-military relations. It has been pointed out though, that keeping the Nigerian Armed Forces busy abroad, might prevent military interventions in the political sphere. The end of the Cold War influenced both Nigerian and Tanzanian civil-military relations positively, however, Tanzania adapted more quickly to the new circumstances.

The hypothesis looking at external and international factors and actors are only valid to a limited degree. These aspects have indeed influenced both countries, but they have not had a great impact on the countries' civil-military relations. Both countries have recognised and accepted the importance of regional and international organisations, and Nigeria has played an important role under these organisations' auspices when it comes to peace-keeping missions. During the Cold War, Nigeria's military regimes did not experience international criticism. Tanzania on the other hand faced foreign opposition after the overthrow of Idi Amin. However, this did not influence the country's civil-military relations, and the lack of criticism against Nigeria did of course also not have any influence on this country. After the end of the Cold War the international aspects have become more important and influential for both countries, and the new circumstances have had an impact on the countries' civil-military relations. However, this impact can not be seen separately from the domestic circumstances, and it is doubtful whether the external context could have such a strong influence had the domestic situation been different. External and international factors and actors have had limited influence on civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania, and it can not be argued that these aspects have led to a strong civilian control over the military in Tanzania or to a weak control over the Armed Forces in Nigeria.

Conclusion

The five hypotheses outlined in Chapter One have been evaluated in this chapter, and their applicability in the Nigerian and Tanzanian cases has been analysed. The first hypothesis emphasising the importance of professionalism proved to be invalid. Professionalism has been much stronger in Nigeria than in Tanzania, however, it is the latter country that has experienced the most stable civil-military relations. Professionalism could have positive consequences, but it is neither a sufficient aspect nor a necessary aspect in order to ensure control over the military. The second hypothesis looking at how the military perceives its own role in society and how it regards the political authorities is validated. In Nigeria the military has been very sceptical of civilian supremacy, and the acceptance of the various regimes was very low before 1999, but this seems to have improved to a certain degree since. In Tanzania there has been a clear acceptance of civilian supremacy, and this has contributed to good civilian control over the military institutions. Finer's theory is therefore applicable in the Nigerian and Tanzanian cases. The theories emphasising the domestic environment are also valid, as the internal factors and actors have contributed negatively on Nigeria's civil-military relations, whereas their contribution has been positive in Tanzania.

The third hypothesis looking at political measures and the fifth hypothesis evaluating the importance of the external context both have limited validity. Political measures have been implemented in both countries, but various methods have been used, and they have had different results. Political measures do not ensure stable civil-military relations, but they can contribute in a positive way. It is however more important to study which measures are executed and why, and if they have short- or long-term effects, instead of looking at if they simply are implemented or not. External and international factors and actors have influenced both Nigeria and Tanzania, however, they have had restricted effects on the countries' civil-military relations. There has been a change in this aspect since the end of the Cold War, and it is likely that the international environment will increase in influence on civil-military relations in the future.

It is important to recognise the mutual interrelationship between the various theories and hypotheses. The theory of professionalism could at first sight appear to be independent of the other theories; however, political measures will strongly influence whether professionalism comes about or not. Political measures could also determine how the military regards the political authorities and which role it perceives its own institution should be playing. The wider domestic situation influences, contributes to and limits the possible political measures, at the same time as the internal context must be seen in relation to the international situation. The implications of the theories' applicability and their interrelationship will be further discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

Introduction

The main aim of this study has been to reach a more complete understanding of how civil-military relations develop, and which factors have influenced these relations. To what degree the political authorities have managed to control the military, and what measures have been used to ensure this control have been analysed. The first section of this final chapter will sum up the main findings and discuss the wider relevance of the theories under study. The following section will look more closely at the present situation in Nigeria and Tanzania, and the main challenges facing both countries will be discussed. This will also shed light on the military's current influence and the likely future developments. The third main section will discuss the implications of the various theories and their applicability, for both Nigeria and Tanzania as well as for Africa in general.

Civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania

The two main research questions this study set out to answer were: 1*) How have civil-military relations developed in Tanzania and Nigeria in the post-colonial period?* 2) *Which factors have influenced the degree of civilian control of the military in both countries?* These two questions have been discussed in detail in the previous chapters, and even though both countries had been under the rule of Britain and achieved independence in the early 1960s, their post-independence histories are very different. Their experiences with civil-military relations have also been highly different; Nigeria soon entered a cycle of military interventions and disengagement from politics, whereas Tanzania experienced only one military mutiny and its civil-military relations remained relatively stable after this event.

Relevance of theories – 'the Old School'

The three scholars who are the most central in 'the Old School' are Huntington, Finer and Janowitz, who respectively have emphasised professionalism, civilian supremacy and the role of the military, and political measures. As has been shown in Chapters Three through Five, professionalism has not been very significant in determining civil-military relations in Nigeria or in Tanzania. This fits in with Auma-Osolo's 1980 study of Nigeria's experience with professionalism. He further argued that Finer's findings were more relevant, as the lack of satisfaction with the civilian authorities was one of the main reasons for military intervention. Even though his analysis was made 28 years ago, Auma-Osolo's conclusions are still valid

today. N'Diaye (2002), on the other hand, has in his work on Kenya argued for the importance of professionalism as a coup prevention strategy. His work has proved to be very important in this study as well. However, as Nigeria with the highest level of professionalism has had the highest number of military interventions, whereas Tanzania with a low level of professionalism has not experienced any successful coups, his argument is not proven by these two country cases. However, his work has implications for the future development of both states, as will be further alluded to below.

Emizet (2000) has compared the theories of Huntington and Janowitz and concludes that the main difference is the latter's assumption that military and civilian rule are not extreme opposites. Rather, Janowitz emphasises that military regimes at times could create and maintain similar civil-military relations as a civilian regime. In the Nigerian case at hand the various military regimes have established civil-military, or rather political-military, relations that to a certain extent are similar to those a civilian regime could establish. The military rulers have been the political authorities, and they have attempted to control the military institution as a whole. As such, this part of Janowitz' theory is valid in the present study. As discussed, his emphasis on political measures has proved to have important impact on civil-military relations, however, different measures have had different influence depending on the context. Of 'the Old School', Finer's work has been most important in the cases of Nigeria and Tanzania, Janowitz' theories have had varying influence, whereas professionalism so far has not led to the results Huntington envisaged. However, it is necessary to recognise the interrelationship between the various theories. A change of political measures could promote or prevent professionalism and it can alter the military's perception of its own role in society and of the legitimacy of the political authorities. Professionalism and acceptance of civilian supremacy, or the lack of one or both, could modify the political measures in place. 'The Old School' theories should therefore not be completely separated, and should also be seen in relation to the relevance of the theories emphasising internal and external factors and actors, as discussed below.

Relevance of theories – internal versus external influence

Scholars writing after the academics belonging to 'The Old School' have put a strong emphasis on either internal or external factors, actors, and aspects. Goldsworthy (1986) has argued that micro-level variables, for example personal factors and internal aspects are more important than for example structural factors such as the international system. Saffu (1981) however, has argued that macro-level variables have the greatest influence on civil-military relations and the structure of international society is therefore very relevant in the study of such relations. Naidoo (2006)

supports Saffu, as he argues that the Cold War and the role of the superpowers were influential on the African militaries, as these factors justified a high level of autonomy for the militaries. However, as has been discussed in previous chapters, Cold War rivalries influenced neither Tanzania nor Nigeria to any great degree in terms of the countries' civil-military relations. It was only the end of the Cold War that affected these relations, and the impact was sooner noticed in Tanzania than Nigeria.

Croissant (2004) has looked at push- and pull-factors, where the first are endogenous variables and the latter are exogenous variables, which could be found either on the domestic or the international level. The exogenous variables are those describing the structures and context whereas the endogenous variables are closely related to the military as an institution. Croissant's work on factors influencing military intervention could be applied in the present study as well. The endogenous variables shape the disposition and the ability the military has to intervene, and the Nigerian military has both had the capacity and the internal structure that could lead to military intervention. The exogenous variables, when applied to the domestic structures and contexts, have been important in both Nigeria and Tanzania. The domestic structures in Nigeria involving inter-regional, -religious, and -ethnic tensions, economic problems and corruption, have been favourable for intervention. In Tanzania however, the close integration between the military and the civilian authorities have made military intervention unlikely. Feaver's (2003) work on agency theory should be mentioned in this regard as it also emphasised internal structures and context. He has argued that the strategic interactions that take place between the political authorities and the military play out in a hierarchical context where the authorities are the principals and the military is the agent reacting to the decisions taken by the principal. However, there are limitations to Feaver's theory, and one of these is especially important in the Nigerian and Tanzanian cases and relates to the work of Finer. In Feaver's model it is assumed that the actors recognise themselves as either principal or agent. However, this is closely related to the military's perception of its own and the authorities' role and legitimacy. In Tanzania the military has recognised its own role as an agent, and as such they have followed the instructions from the civilian principals. In Nigeria on the other hand, this acceptance has been far from constant, and the military has had both the role of agent and of principal. Feaver's work therefore only has partial validity in these two countries.

Continuum of civil-military relations

As was emphasised in Chapter Two it is important to study civil-military relations along a continuum instead of in a clear-cut dichotomy. Decalo (1989) pointed out that there might be

military involvement in politics even if there is a civilian regime with civilian control over the military. Bilveer (2000) has also claimed that the military always has some influence in the political sphere, but how strong this involvement is depends on various factors. Liebenow (1986) agrees that civil-military relations should be studied on a continuous scale; however, he argues that there are different categories within this continuum. On the one end there is civilian supremacy, where he argues that the military has no influence on political issues. At the other end of the scale there is a category called the atavistic model, where the military has very high influence on the political sphere and has penetrated all layers of society. However, as has become clear throughout this study, it is very difficult to make categories along the continuum. If this is done, there has to be an acceptance that the boundaries are not very clear-cut, and the categories themselves should also have a continuum within them.

The cases of Nigeria and Tanzania illustrate the importance of studying civil-military relations along a continuum. Even though Tanzania has had a higher level of civilian control over the military than Nigeria, the various factors discussed in previous chapters have an impact on the degree of civilian control. It would be a misleading simplification to state that there is, and has since 1964 always been, civilian control over the Tanzanian Defence Forces, and that there has been no military involvement in the political sphere. Rather, the military in Tanzania has had a very large impact on the political situation, and the military's possibilities to influence politics have been the main factor preventing a military coup and the complete penetration of Tanzanian society. There has as such been civilian supremacy and civilian control over the military in Tanzania, but this has only been achieved by giving the military influence. The Nigerian experiences have also moved along a continuum, and even today when there is civilian supremacy in the country, the military is still influential in certain political aspects. As such, the arguments made by Decalo and Bilveer are valid in these cases; whereas Liebenow's work is more difficult to apply, and only has validity if it is recognised that the categories are blurred.

Current situation in Nigeria and Tanzania

Tanzania officially became a democracy in 1992 and Nigeria followed suit in 1999. It could easily be assumed that democracy would lead to civilian control over the military; however, this is not guaranteed. A civilian elected government would be in place, however, as argued above this does not mean that the military does not have any influence on politics. The control over the military could move along a continuum, and the possibility of military intervention could still be present. Both countries are currently going through democratisation processes and are trying to consolidate democracy, but they are developing along different paths.

<u>Present challenges</u>

Even though both Tanzania and Nigeria are now democratic states, both countries are currently experiencing many obstacles in their consolidation of democracy. Nigeria's civil-military relations have become more stable since the installation of democracy, however it has been argued that the military today is dysfunctional, and that this in combination with other factors could pose a threat to the consolidation of democracy. There continues to be mistrust and suspicion between the military and the political authorities. As the Africa Research Bulletin (2007(a):16894) has highlighted, political back-room dealings, thuggery and identity-related violence are still important aspects of Nigerian society. Violence is especially seen in the Niger Delta in relation to the oil-industry and in the North of the country due to implementation of Sharia law in certain states. Nigeria is facing many challenges, but the country has huge potential to become influential and developed as it has vast resources, especially of oil. It will however be necessary that these resources and the results of oil-production are evenly and rightfully distributed among all Nigerian citizens, regardless of regional, religious or ethnic affiliation. The military has been used to prevent domestic violence, especially in the Niger Delta. However, this has not been successful due to corruption, ill-discipline and problems with the equipment. Reorganisation is ongoing in an effort to increase the ability of dealing with these issues, but it remains to be seen if this obstacle can be overcome.

The situation in Tanzania is quite different, but this country is also experiencing obstacles with the consolidation of its democracy and the multiparty system. The main challenge in Tanzania is the political opposition. The opposition parties have problems with disunity, organisation skills, leadership and lack of a social foundation. Officially a multiparty system has been in place since 1992, but the CCM party is still the ruling party and Tanzania today has a party-dominant system. As shown, this situation has also resulted in a Parliament that is not able to properly oversee the military. It is necessary to strengthen the political opposition in order to achieve a better functioning Parliament which in turn could obtain proper parliamentary oversight over the Defence Forces. Both Nigeria and Tanzania are experiencing economic problems, and as General Ogomudia (BBC, 2002) pointed out, poverty could pose a threat to democracy. To strengthen the democratic tradition in both countries it will be necessary to promote further economic development, as well as ensure a more equal distribution of the available resources. The continuing influence of (ex-) military personnel is a problem that both Nigeria and Tanzania are facing in their civil-military relations, which will be discussed next.

Military's influence

Even though both countries under analysis have had democratic civilian regimes for years now, the military has not lost all its influence in the political sphere. The military institution as a whole does not play a significant role, however, personnel from the military institutions, whether still military active or not, have received important positions within society and government. These personalities still have military priorities and are able to promote military ideas and values within the political sphere. In Tanzania the Political Parties Act was implemented in 1992, and it stated that there should be a very clear division between military and political structures and issues. Politicians should not be involved in internal military concerns at the same time as military personnel should be kept outside of the affairs of political parties. According to this Act the soldiers or officers who at the time participated in party politics had to decide if they wanted to continue political work, or if they wanted to remain in the military. They could in theory not participate in both institutions. However, this has not materialised in the way the Act predicted. A large number of political commissioners throughout the country have background from the Defence Forces, and military personnel largely remain loyal to the ruling party due to their own (indirect) influence on this party's policies. In Nigeria there is a similar situation which has been termed the retired officer phenomenon. As Badmus (2005) pointed out, the retired military officers in Nigeria still have the power and positions, the wealth and the networks needed to maintain their former dominant roles in running the country. Since 1999 former military personnel have been very influential in both the opposition parties as well as in the ruling party. Advisers and ministers as well as presidential candidates have had military background.

Tanzania's civil-military relations have not changed much since the end of the single-party state in practical terms, even though in theory it should have been transformed. Civil-military relations in Nigeria have changed more substantially, however these relations now resemble Tanzanian civil-military relations. Today civilian supremacy is accepted in both countries, but one of the reasons behind this acceptance is the military's continuing influence on political issues. As such, it is able to shape political outcomes in a way that will suite the military institution. As N'Diaye (2002) has argued, the integration of the military into the political sphere, and rewards to the institution are strategies used to prevent military coups. Even though these strategies have positive short-term effects, their long-term consequences seem to be more questionable in terms of satisfactory democratic results. Since democratisation in both countries there have been no direct military interventions. As a result of the strong military influence on the civilian authorities and their policies, there has been no need to intervene as the military's requests are responded to. In Nigeria there are no clear directives addressing civil-military

relations, but this might change if a new constitution comes into place. In Tanzania on the other hand, there are very clear directives, however in practicality these directives are not adhered to. It is quite likely that a new constitution will materialise in Nigeria, and if the opposition becomes stronger in Tanzania, it is also likely that the theoretical changes concerning civil-military relations will materialise in practical terms. Such developments could lead to more unstable civil-military relations in the short-term, as the military will be dissatisfied with their decreased influence. However, in the long-term this would be beneficial in achieving stable civil-military relations, as civilian supremacy would be ensured to a greater degree.

Liebenow (1986) has also looked at the factor of close integration of military and political actors, and has argued that civilian authorities many times have become dependent on the armed forces in order to protect their own rule. In relation to this Liebenow has also claimed that the authorities often realised that this close integration of the military into the political sphere was not sustainable, and that it made military intervention even easier. The political power the military received came at the expense of the political authorities' power, and as such further weakened the civilian regime. For Tanzania and Nigeria it will be important to strengthen the power of the civilian authorities at the same time as the military's political influence and power is diminished. However, in order to ensure and maintain positive civil-military relations, it will be necessary that this transformation will not be rushed, as this could lead to high dissatisfaction within the military. It must however be done in order to achieve complete civilian supremacy, as this is the best way of preventing military intervention. There might be short-term instability, but in the long-term the end result would be positive for the countries' civil-military relations.

Implications

Throughout this study it has become clear that the theories under analysis have varying applicability in the two cases of Nigeria and Tanzania. It is however impossible to dismiss any of the theories. Professionalism is the most obvious aspect that has not had the consequences as envisaged by Huntington, however, this does not mean that the theory is invalid in all countries. As was made clear in Chapter One, a couple of case studies could have importance in testing established theories. Such studies could also imply new factors and variables that should be included in various theories. However, such a small number of cases are not sufficient to disprove a prevailing theory or to develop new theory. New aspects to incorporate could be suggested though.

Implications for Nigeria and Tanzania

The theories analysed in this study have mainly been developed by Western scholars. It could therefore easily be assumed that civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania would not fit completely into these theories. However, a majority of the factors suggested by these Western academics are important in these two cases as well. As shown, Huntington's theory has not been valid in these situations, whereas Finer's concept of civilian supremacy and the military's role in society have been very important in both Nigeria and Tanzania. Various political measures have been implemented in both countries, with varying outcomes. Janowitz' theory has had stronger and more positive results in Tanzania; however, whether these effects prove to be lasting and positive in the long-term remains to be seen. The domestic situation and the internal factors have had a significant impact on civil-military relations in both countries, whereas the international context has proved to be less important.

One significant aspect that has not been emphasised enough by the theories analysed, is the importance of identity. Nigeria and its civil-military relations have been strongly influenced by ethnic, religious and regional affiliation and these factors have led to great instability within civil-military relations, as well as in society as a whole. Recruitment patterns often reflected these divisions within the country, and as such this factor should be better incorporated in the study of civil-military relations, at least in Africa. This factor has so far not been influential in the Tanzanian case, but it has been suggested that this could change. Ethnicity is an important factor in the East-African region (last seen after the recent Kenyan elections), and it is disputed whether Tanzania can escape the problem of identity politics. Opposition parties in Tanzania today mostly reflect ethnic divisions, and within the military institution the Wakuria ethnic group is dominant. This has not led to any significant problems, but there has been criticism when this group also receives other important positions within society. This is another consequence of the close integration between the Government and the military, and could pose problems in the future if it is not properly dealt with.

Another factor that has proved to be very important in Nigeria is the economic conditions. This aspect has often been used to legitimise military interventions, at the same time as it has led to widespread corruption. The economy of Nigeria is closely related to the country's oil-industry, as this is the main export product. As has been shown, the importance of oil has resulted in little international criticism of the military regimes. At the same time, oil has led to very difficult problems in present Nigeria, as kidnappings and insecurity in general have become central features of the Niger Delta. The military's work in the region has been unsuccessful, and could further influence the country's civil-military relations. As discussed, certain aspects of the

prevailing theories have not influenced Tanzania' nor Nigeria's civil-military relations. Internal factors and actors have been emphasised by some theorists, however, identity, recruitment and the economic situation should receive much more attention than they have so far. These factors have been more important in Nigeria than in Tanzania; however, especially the identity-aspect could prove to increase its significance in Tanzania in the future. These and other factors are important in the wider African context as well.

Implications for Africa

Nigeria and Tanzania are not perfect representations of all African countries. There are vast differences within the African continent; however, some similarities are still present. Even though experiences and knowledge of one country can not directly be implemented on another, certain aspects can allude to other countries' civil-military relations. Most African countries have been under colonial rule, and have only been independent since the 1960s (some even shorter). This creates a clear cleavage with the Western world, which has had a significantly different history than Africa. Many African countries are political constructs, and the borders drawn by colonial rulers are not true reflections of African society as a whole. These Western imposed boundaries often do not represent traditional African limits, and as a result various ethnic and religious groups have been forced to live in one country and are supposed to be one nation. Conflicts throughout the African countries since independence have proved that this was not as easy as believed by the colonial rulers.

Professionalism has not been important in the cases in this study; however, this does not mean that professionalism has no validity in other countries. Rather, professionalism could contribute strongly to more stable civil-military relations. Even though professionalism did not prevent military coups in Nigeria, it could not be argued that the coups were results of professionalism. At the same time, the lack of professionalism in Tanzania was not the factor that ensured civilian supremacy. Professionalism can not be studied as an aspect in isolation; it must be seen in connection to all the other factors influencing civil-military relations. It is also important to recognise that professionalism exists along a continuum; the professionalism in Nigeria was not perfect, and in Tanzania there were professional characteristics within the Defence Forces, but the institution as a whole was not professional in the way envisaged by Huntington. Emizet (2000) has argued that this theory is applicable in Western countries, but that the African context is too different for Huntington's work to be applied on the continent. In this connection it must also be remembered that Huntington's contribution came before most African countries were independent. The subordination he foresees has not been possible in Africa as

most of the continent's states do not have political institutions that work in the way he assumes, as Huntington's assumptions are based on Western countries' experiences.

Finer's emphasis on civilian supremacy and the role of the military has been valid in both Nigeria and Tanzania, and it appears to be factors that would be important in other African countries as well. If the military institutions are dissatisfied with the authorities' policies, it is likely that they will intervene. In the extreme cases this would lead to a military coup, whereas in some situations other less dramatic measures of increasing the military's influence could be implemented. The abilities of political intervention of course also depend on the military's resources, knowledge and leadership. This again is closely related to the political measures implemented by the political authorities as well as the wider domestic context. One political measure that has influenced both Tanzania and Nigeria is the allocation of responsibilities. The military's work in both developed and developing countries reflect national interests, and the main goal is to protect the state against external threats. However, as Janowitz (1977) has pointed out, military personnel in the developing world more closely identify themselves with national interests. National interests in Western and African countries have similarities, however, the promotion of development and national unity are more pressing issues in new, underdeveloped states. The military therefore receives more responsibilities in this regard and as a result it has more political tasks than the militaries in Western states.

The domestic situation is highly different in African countries compared to the Western world. Most developed countries have long histories of independence and nation-building, and are now consolidated nation-states. In Africa on the other hand, independence is fairly recent, and the colonial legacy still influences the domestic sphere. National development and national unity do not have a long tradition in most African countries, and there is a lack of experience within these fields, as they were not emphasised by the colonial powers. After colonial times the power and influence of the colonial powers decreased, and international factors have not had such a strong impact on civil-military relations. However, in this respect there are huge differences between the African countries. There have been several wars on the continent, and most of these can not be studied without including Cold War rivalries and the influence of the superpowers. However, even though this international influence had vast consequences for several countries, such as Angola and the DRC, it is difficult to analyse the international context's significance for civil-military relations. The international situation rather provided the framework and structures within which civil-military relations developed, but the domestic contexts and the political and military developments were the aspects that directly contributed to the state of civil-military relations.

Conclusion

The civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania have been analysed in detail in this study. Five hypotheses based on different theories have been tested, and their applicability in the two cases and in Africa as a whole has been discussed. It has not been an aim of this study to dismiss any of the theories or to develop any new theory. However, it has become clear that these Western theories can not simply be applied to African cases. Some of the factors proposed by various scholars have proved to be highly important in the developing world. However, the particular histories and internal structures in African countries must be kept in mind, as these are highly different from Western experiences and conditions. The domestic contexts and internal factors and actors have had strong influence on civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania, and this is likely to be valid in other African countries as well. The importance of identity and economy in many developing countries can not be forgotten, and these factors should receive even more attention than they do today. The most important finding in this study is however the interrelationship between the various theories. Even though scholars emphasise different aspects in studying civil-military relations, it is clear that none of these aspects can be completely dismissed. They all play a part in shaping civil-military relations, and none of them should be studied in isolation.

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