

2017

Climate models, scenarios, and projections

Katharine Hayhoe
Texas Tech University

James Edmonds
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Robert Kopp
Rutgers University, robert.kopp@rutgers.edu

Allegra LeGrande
NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies

Benjamin Sanderson
National Center for Atmospheric Research, bsande@ucar.edu

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usdeptcommercepub>

Hayhoe, Katharine; Edmonds, James; Kopp, Robert; LeGrande, Allegra; Sanderson, Benjamin; Wehner, Michael; and Wuebbles, Donald, "Climate models, scenarios, and projections" (2017). *Publications, Agencies and Staff of the U.S. Department of Commerce*. 589.
<https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usdeptcommercepub/589>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Department of Commerce at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications, Agencies and Staff of the U.S. Department of Commerce by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Authors

Katharine Hayhoe, James Edmonds, Robert Kopp, Allegra LeGrande, Benjamin Sanderson, Michael Wehner, and Donald Wuebbles

Climate models, scenarios, and projections

Katharine Hayhoe, Texas Tech University

James Edmonds, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Robert Kopp, Rutgers University

Allegra LeGrande, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies

Benjamin Sanderson, National Center for Atmospheric Research

Michael Wehner, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Donald Wuebbles, National Science Foundation

Citation: In: *Climate Science Special Report: A Sustained Assessment Activity of the U.S. Global Change Research Program* [Wuebbles, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock (eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA (2017), pp. 186-227.

Comments: U.S. Government work

Abstract

1. If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing concentrations would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of warming over this century relative to the last few decades (*high confidence* in continued warming, *medium confidence* in amount of warming).
2. Over the next two decades, global temperature increase is projected to be between 0.5°F and 1.3°F (0.3°–0.7°C) (*medium confidence*). This range is primarily due to uncertainties in natural sources of variability that affect short-term trends. In some regions, this means that the trend may not be distinguishable from natural variability (*high confidence*).
3. Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of climate change depends primarily on cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols and the sensitivity of the climate system to those emissions (*high confidence*). Projected changes range from 4.7°–8.6°F (2.6°–4.8°C) under the higher RCP8.5 scenario to 0.5°–1.3°F (0.3°–1.7°C) under the lower RCP2.6 scenario, for 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 (*medium confidence*).
4. Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and sea level were significantly higher than today (*high confidence*). Continued growth in CO₂ emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens of millions of years (*medium confidence*). The present-day emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year suggests that there is no climate analog for this century any time in at least the last 50 million years (*medium confidence*).
5. The observed increase in global carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been consistent with higher scenarios (*very high confidence*). In 2014 and 2015, emission growth rates slowed as economic growth has become less carbon-intensive (*medium confidence*). Even if this trend continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would meet the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels (*high confidence*).
6. Combining output from global climate models and dynamical and statistical downscaling models using advanced averaging, weighting, and pattern scaling approaches can result in more relevant and robust future projections. For some regions, sectors, and impacts, these techniques are increasing the ability of the scientific community to provide guidance on the use of climate projections for quantifying regional-scale changes and impacts (*medium to high confidence*).

4. Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections

KEY FINDINGS

1. If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing concentrations would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of warming over this century relative to the last few decades (*high confidence* in continued warming, *medium confidence* in amount of warming).
2. Over the next two decades, global temperature increase is projected to be between 0.5°F and 1.3°F (0.3°–0.7°C) (*medium confidence*). This range is primarily due to uncertainties in natural sources of variability that affect short-term trends. In some regions, this means that the trend may not be distinguishable from natural variability (*high confidence*).
3. Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of climate change depends primarily on cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols and the sensitivity of the climate system to those emissions (*high confidence*). Projected changes range from 4.7°–8.6°F (2.6°–4.8°C) under the higher RCP8.5 scenario to 0.5°–1.3°F (0.3°–1.7°C) under the lower RCP2.6 scenario, for 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 (*medium confidence*).
4. Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and sea level were significantly higher than today (*high confidence*). Continued growth in CO₂ emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens of millions of years (*medium confidence*). The present-day emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year suggests that there is no climate analog for this century any time in at least the last 50 million years (*medium confidence*).
5. The observed increase in global carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been consistent with higher scenarios (*very high confidence*). In 2014 and 2015, emission growth rates slowed as economic growth has become less carbon-intensive (*medium confidence*). Even if this trend continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would meet the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels (*high confidence*).
6. Combining output from global climate models and dynamical and statistical downscaling models using advanced averaging, weighting, and pattern scaling approaches can result in more relevant and robust future projections. For some regions, sectors, and impacts, these techniques are increasing the ability of the scientific community to provide guidance on the use of climate projections for quantifying regional-scale changes and impacts (*medium to high confidence*).

1 **4.1. The Human Role in Future Climate**

2 The Earth's climate, past and future, is not static; it changes in response to both natural and
3 anthropogenic drivers (see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change). Human emissions of
4 carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), and other greenhouse gases now overwhelm the influence
5 of natural drivers on the external forcing of the Earth's climate (see Ch. 3: Detection and
6 Attribution). Climate change (see Ch. 1: Our Globally Changing Climate) and ocean
7 acidification (see Ch. 13: Ocean Changes) are already occurring due to the buildup of
8 atmospheric CO₂ from human emissions in the industrial era (Hartmann et al. 2013; Rhein et al.
9 2013).

10 Even if existing concentrations could be immediately stabilized, temperature would continue to
11 increase by an estimated 1.1°F (0.6°C) over this century, relative to 1980–1999 (Collins et al.
12 2013). This is because of the long timescale over which some climate feedbacks act (Ch. 2:
13 Physical Drivers of Climate Change). Over the next few decades, concentrations are projected to
14 increase and the resulting global temperature increase is projected to range from 0.5°F to 1.3°F
15 (0.3°C to 0.7°C). This range depends on natural variability, on emissions of short-lived species
16 such as CH₄ and black carbon that contribute to warming, and on emissions of sulfur dioxide
17 (SO₂) and other aerosols that have a net cooling effect (Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate
18 Change). The role of emission reductions of non-CO₂ gases and aerosols in achieving various
19 global temperature targets is discussed in Chapter 14: Mitigation.

20 Over the past 15–20 years, the growth rate in carbon emissions from human activities has
21 increased from 1.5 to 2 parts per million (ppm) per year due to increasing carbon emissions from
22 human activities that track the rate projected under higher scenarios, in large part to growing
23 contributions from developing economies (Tans and Keeling 2017; Raupach et al. 2007; Le
24 Quéré et al. 2009). One possible analog for the rapid pace of change occurring today is the
25 relatively abrupt warming of 9°–14°F (5°–8°C) that occurred during the Paleocene-Eocene
26 Thermal Maximum (PETM), approximately 55–56 million years ago (Bowen et al. 2015;
27 Kirtland Turner et al. 2014; Penman et al. 2014; Crowley et al. 1990). However, emissions today
28 are nearly 10 GtC per year. During the PETM, the rate of maximum sustained carbon release was
29 less than 1.1 GtC per year, with significant differences in both background conditions and
30 forcing relative to today. This suggests that there is no precise past analog any time in the last 66
31 million years for the conditions occurring today (Zeebe et al. 2016; Crowley et al. 1990).

32 Since 2014, growth rates of global carbon emissions have declined, a trend cautiously attributed
33 to declining coal use in China, despite large uncertainties in emissions reporting (Jackson et al.
34 2016; Korsbakken et al. 2016). Economic growth is becoming less carbon-intensive, as both
35 developed and emerging economies begin to phase out coal and transition to natural gas and
36 renewable, non-carbon energy (IEA 2016; Green and Stern 2016).

1 Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of future climate change will be primarily a
2 function of future carbon emissions and the response of the climate system to those emissions.
3 This chapter describes the scenarios that provide the basis for the range of future projections
4 presented in this report: from those consistent with continued increases in greenhouse gas
5 emissions, to others that can only be achieved by various levels of emission reductions (see Ch.
6 14: Mitigation). This chapter also describes the models used to quantify projected changes at the
7 global to regional scale and how it is possible to estimate the range in potential climate change—
8 as determined by climate sensitivity, which is the response of global temperature to a natural or
9 anthropogenic forcing (see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change)—that would result from
10 a given scenario (Collins et al. 2013).

11 **4.2. Future Scenarios**

12 Climate projections are typically presented for a range of plausible pathways, scenarios, or
13 targets that capture the relationships between human choices, emissions, concentrations, and
14 temperature change. Some scenarios are consistent with continued dependence on fossil fuels,
15 while others can only be achieved by deliberate actions to reduce emissions. The resulting range
16 reflects the uncertainty inherent in quantifying human activities (including technological change)
17 and their influence on climate.

18 The first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment Report (IPCC FAR) in 1990
19 discussed three types of scenarios: equilibrium scenarios, in which CO₂ concentration is fixed;
20 transient scenarios, in which CO₂ concentration increased by a fixed percentage each year over
21 the duration of the scenario; and four brand-new Scientific Assessment (SA90) emission
22 scenarios based on World Bank population projections (Bretherton et al. 1990). Today, that
23 original portfolio has expanded to encompass a wide variety of time-dependent or transient
24 scenarios that project how population, energy sources, technology, emissions, atmospheric
25 concentrations, radiative forcing, and/or global temperature change over time.

26 Other scenarios are simply expressed in terms of an end-goal or target, such as capping
27 cumulative carbon emissions at a specific level or stabilizing global temperature at or below a
28 certain threshold. The 2015 Paris Agreement, for example, includes an aim of “holding the
29 increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and
30 pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”
31 (UNFCCC 2015). To stabilize climate, however, it is not enough to halt the growth in annual
32 carbon emissions. It is projected that global net carbon emissions will eventually need to reach
33 zero (Collins et al. 2013) and negative emissions may be needed for a greater than 50% chance
34 of limiting warming below 3.6°F (2°C) (Smith et al. 2016; see also Ch. 14: Mitigation for a
35 discussion of negative emissions scenarios).

36 And finally some scenarios, like the “commitment” scenario in Key Finding 1 and the fixed-CO₂
37 equilibrium scenarios described above, continue to explore hypothetical questions such as, “what

1 would the world look like, long-term, if humans were able to stabilize atmospheric CO₂
2 concentration at a given level?” This section describes the different types of scenarios used
3 today, and their relevance to assessing impacts and informing policy targets.

4 **4.2.1. Emission Scenarios, Representative Concentration Pathways, and** 5 **Shared Socioeconomic Pathways**

6 The standard sets of time-dependent scenarios used by the climate modeling community as input
7 to global climate model simulations provide the basis for the majority of the future projections
8 presented in IPCC assessment reports and U.S. National Climate Assessments (NCA).

9 Developed by the integrated assessment modeling community, these sets of standard scenarios
10 have become more comprehensive with each new generation, as the original SA90 scenarios
11 (IPCC 1990) were replaced by the IS92 emission scenarios of the 1990s (Leggett et al. 1992),
12 which were in turn succeeded by the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios in 2000 (SRES,
13 Nakicenovic et al. 2000) and by the Representative Concentration Pathways in 2010 (RCPs,
14 Moss et al. 2010).

15 SA90, IS92, and SRES are all emission-based scenarios. They begin with a set of storylines that
16 were based on population projections initially. By SRES, they had become much more complex,
17 laying out a consistent picture of demographics, international trade, flow of information and
18 technology, and other social, technological, and economic characteristics of future worlds. These
19 assumptions are then fed through socioeconomic and Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) to
20 derive emissions. For SRES, the use of various IAMs resulted in multiple emissions scenarios
21 corresponding to each storyline; however, one scenario for each storyline was selected as the
22 representative “marker” scenario to be used as input to global models to calculate the resulting
23 atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing, and climate change for the higher A1fi (fossil-
24 intensive), mid-high A2, mid-low B2, and lower B1 storylines. IS92-based projections were used
25 in the IPCC Second and Third Assessment Reports (SAR and TAR; Kattenberg et al. 1996;
26 Cubasch et al. 2001) and the first NCA (NAO 2001). Projections based on SRES scenarios were
27 used in the second and third NCAs (Karl et al. 2009; Melillo et al. 2014) as well as the IPCC
28 TAR and Fourth Assessment Reports (AR4; Cubasch et al. 2001; Meehl et al. 2007).

29 The most recent set of time-dependent scenarios, RCPs, builds on these two decades of scenario
30 development. However, RCPs differ from previous sets of standard scenarios in at least four
31 important ways. First, RCPs are not emissions scenarios; they are radiative forcing scenarios.
32 Each scenario is tied to one value: the change in radiative forcing at the tropopause by 2100
33 relative to preindustrial levels. The four RCPs are numbered according to the change in radiative
34 forcing by 2100: +2.6, +4.5, +6.0 and +8.5 watts per square meter (W/m²) (van Vuuren et al.
35 2011; Thomson et al. 2011; Masui et al. 2011; Riahi et al. 2011).

36 The second difference is that, starting from these radiative forcing values, IAMs are used to work
37 backwards to derive a range of emissions trajectories and corresponding policies and

1 technological strategies for each RCP that would achieve the same ultimate impact on radiative
2 forcing. From the multiple emissions pathways that could lead to the same 2100 radiative forcing
3 value, an associated pathway of annual carbon dioxide and other anthropogenic emissions of
4 greenhouse gases, aerosols, air pollutants, and other short-lived species has been selected for
5 each RCP to use as input to future climate model simulations (e.g., Meinshausen et al. 2011;
6 Cubasch et al. 2013). In addition, RCPs provide climate modelers with gridded trajectories of
7 land use and land cover.

8 A third difference between the RCPs and previous scenarios is that while none of the SRES
9 scenarios included a scenario with explicit policies and measures to limit climate forcing, all of
10 the three lower RCP scenarios (2.6, 4.5, and 6.0) are climate-policy scenarios. At the higher end
11 of the range, the RCP8.5 scenario corresponds to a future where carbon and methane emissions
12 continue to rise as a result of fossil fuel use, albeit with significant declines in emission growth
13 rates over the second half of the century (Figure 4.1), significant reduction in aerosols, and
14 modest improvements in energy intensity and technology (Riahi et al. 2011). Atmospheric
15 carbon dioxide levels for RCP8.5 are similar to those of the SRES A1fi scenario: they rise from
16 current-day levels of 400 up to 936 parts per million (ppm). CO₂-equivalent levels (including
17 emissions of other non-CO₂ greenhouse gases, aerosols, and other substances that affect climate)
18 reach more than 1200 ppm by 2100, and global temperature is projected to increase by 5.4°–
19 9.9°F (3°–5.5°C) by 2100 relative to the 1986–2005 average. RCP8.5 reflects the upper range of
20 the open literature on emissions, but is not intended to serve as an upper limit on possible
21 emissions nor as a business-as-usual or reference scenario for the other three scenarios.

22 Under the lower RCP4.5 and RCP2.6 scenarios (van Vuuren et al. 2011; Thomson et al. 2011),
23 atmospheric CO₂ levels remain below 550 and 450 ppm by 2100, respectively. Emissions of
24 other substances are also lower; by 2100, CO₂-equivalent concentrations that include all
25 emissions from human activities reach 580 ppm under RCP4.5 and 425 ppm under RCP2.6.
26 RCP4.5 is similar to SRES B1, but the RCP2.6 scenario is much lower than any SRES scenario
27 because it includes the option of using policies to achieve net negative carbon dioxide emissions
28 before the end of the century, while SRES scenarios do not. RCP-based projections were used in
29 the most recent IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5; Collins et al. 2013) and the third NCA
30 (Melillo et al. 2014) and will be used in the upcoming fourth NCA as well.

31 Within the RCP family, individual scenarios have not been assigned a formal likelihood. Higher-
32 numbered scenarios correspond to higher emissions and a larger and more rapid global
33 temperature change (Figure 4.1); the range of values covered by the scenarios was chosen to
34 reflect the then-current range in the open literature. Since the choice of scenario constrains the
35 magnitudes of future changes, most assessments (including this one; see Ch. 6: Temperature
36 Change) quantify future change and corresponding impacts under a range of future scenarios that
37 reflect the uncertainty in the consequences of human choices over the coming century.

1 Fourth, a broad range of socioeconomic scenarios were developed independently from the RCPs
2 and a subset of these constrained, using emissions limitations policies consistent with their
3 underlying storylines, to create five Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) with climate
4 forcing that matches the RCP values. This pairing of SSPs and RCPs is designed to meet the
5 needs of the impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability (IAV) communities, enabling them to couple
6 alternative socioeconomic scenarios with the climate scenarios developed using RCPs to explore
7 the socioeconomic challenges to climate mitigation and adaptation (O'Neill et al. 2014). The five
8 SSPs consist of SSP1 (“Sustainability”; low challenges to mitigation and adaptation), SSP2
9 (“Middle of the Road”; middle challenges to mitigation and adaptation), SSP3 (“Regional
10 Rivalry”; high challenges to mitigation and adaptation), SSP4 (“Inequality”; low challenges to
11 mitigation, high challenges to adaptation), and SSP5 (“Fossil-fueled Development”; high
12 challenges to mitigation, low challenges to adaptation). Each scenario has an underlying SSP
13 narrative, as well as consistent assumptions regarding demographics, urbanization, economic
14 growth, and technology development. Only SSP5 produces a reference scenario that is consistent
15 with RCP8.5; climate forcing in the other SSPs’ reference scenarios that don’t include climate
16 policy remains below 8.5 W/m^2 . In addition, the nature of SSP3 makes it impossible for that
17 scenario to produce a climate forcing as low as 2.6 W/m^2 . While new research is under way to
18 explore scenarios that limit climate forcing to 2.0 W/m^2 , neither the RCPs nor the SSPs have
19 produced scenarios in that range.

20 **[INSERT FIGURE 4.1 HERE]**

21 **4.2.2. Alternative Scenarios**

22 The emissions and radiative forcing scenarios described above include a component of time: how
23 much will climate change, and by when? Ultimately, however, the magnitude of human-induced
24 climate change depends less on the year-to-year emissions than it does on the net amount of
25 carbon, or cumulative carbon, emitted into the atmosphere. The lower the atmospheric
26 concentrations of CO_2 , the greater the chance that eventual global temperature change will not
27 reach the high-end temperature projections, or possibly remain below 3.6°F (2°C) relative to
28 preindustrial levels, consistent with the long-term temperature goal included in the Paris
29 Agreement.

30 Cumulative carbon targets offer an alternative approach to expressing a goal designed to limit
31 global temperature to a certain level. As discussed in Chapter 14: Mitigation, it is possible to
32 quantify the expected amount of carbon that can be emitted globally in order to meet a specific
33 global warming target such as 3.6°F (2°C) or even 2.7°F (1.5°C)—although if current carbon
34 emission rates of just under 10 GtC per year were to continue, the lower target would be reached
35 in a matter of years. The higher target would be reached in a matter of decades (see Ch. 14:
36 Mitigation).

1 Under RCP4.5, global temperature change is more likely than not to exceed 3.6°F (2°C) (IIASA
2 2016; Collins et al. 2013), whereas under RCP2.6 it is likely to remain below 3.6°F (2°C)
3 (Sanderson et al. 2016a; Collins et al. 2013). While new research is under way to explore
4 scenarios consistent with limiting climate forcing to 2.0 W/m², a level consistent with limiting
5 global mean surface temperature change to 2.7°F (1.5°C), neither the RCPs nor the SSPs have
6 produced scenarios that allow for such a small amount of temperature change (Sanderson et al.
7 2016a; see also Ch. 14: Mitigation).

8 **[INSERT FIGURE 4.2 HERE]**

9 Future projections are most commonly summarized for a given future scenario (for example,
10 RCP8.5 or 4.5) over a range of future climatological time periods (for example, temperature
11 change in 2040–2079 or 2070–2099 relative to 1980–2009). While this approach has the
12 advantage of developing projections for a specific time horizon, uncertainty in future projections
13 is relatively high, incorporating both the uncertainty due to multiple scenarios as well as
14 uncertainty regarding the response of the climate system to human emissions. These
15 uncertainties increase the further out in time the projections go. Using these same transient,
16 scenario-based simulations, however, it is possible to analyze the projected changes for a given
17 global mean temperature (GMT) threshold by extracting a time slice (typically 20 years)
18 centered around the point in time at which that change is reached (Fig. 4.2).

19 Derived GMT scenarios offer a way for the public and policymakers to understand the impacts
20 for any given temperature threshold, as many physical changes and impacts have been shown to
21 scale with global mean surface temperature (GMT), including shifts in average precipitation,
22 extreme heat, runoff, drought risk, wildfire, temperature-related crop yield changes, and even
23 risk of coral bleaching (e.g., NRC 2011; Collins et al. 2013; Frieler et al. 2013; Swain and
24 Hayhoe 2015). They also allow scientists to highlight the effect of global mean temperature on
25 projected regional change by de-emphasizing the uncertainty due to both climate sensitivity and
26 future scenarios (Herger et al. 2015; Swain and Hayhoe 2015). This approach is less useful for
27 those impacts that vary based on rate of change, such as species migrations, or where equilibrium
28 changes are very different from transient effects, such as sea level rise.

29 Pattern scaling techniques (Mitchell 2003) are based on a similar assumption to GMT scenarios,
30 namely that large-scale patterns of regional change will scale with global temperature change.
31 These techniques can be used to quantify regional projections for scenarios that are not readily
32 available in preexisting databases of global climate model simulations, including changes in both
33 mean and extremes (e.g., Fix et al. 2016). A comprehensive assessment both confirms and
34 constrains the validity of applying pattern scaling to quantify climate response to a range of
35 projected future changes (Tebaldi and Arblaster 2014). For temperature-based climate targets,
36 these pattern scaling frames or GMT scenarios offer the basis for more consistent comparisons
37 across studies examining regional change or potential risks and impacts.

1 **4.2.3. Analogs from the Paleoclimate Record**

2 Most CMIP5 simulations project transient changes in climate through 2100; a few simulations
3 extend to 2200, 2300, or beyond. However, as discussed in Chapter 2: Physical Drivers of
4 Climate Change, the long-term impact of human activities on the carbon cycle and Earth's
5 climate over the next few decades and for the remainder of this century can only be assessed by
6 considering changes that occur over multiple centuries and even millennia (NRC 2011).

7 In the past, there have been several examples of “hothouse” climates where carbon dioxide
8 concentrations and/or global mean temperatures were similar to preindustrial, current, or
9 plausible future levels. These periods are sometimes referenced as analogs, albeit imperfect and
10 incomplete, of future climate (e.g., Crowley 1990).

11 The last interglacial period, approximately 125,000 years ago, is known as the Eemian. During
12 that time, CO₂ concentration was similar to preindustrial, around 280 ppm (Schneider et al.
13 2013). Global mean temperature was approximately 1.8°–3.6°F (1°–2°C) higher than
14 preindustrial levels (Lunt et al. 2012; Otto-Bleisner et al. 2013), although the poles were
15 significantly warmer (NEEM 2013; Jouzel et al. 2007) and sea level was 6 to 9 meters (20 to 30
16 feet) higher than today (Fig. 4.3; Kopp et al. 2009). During the Pliocene, approximately 3 million
17 years ago, long-term CO₂ concentration was similar to today's, around 400 ppm (Seki et al.
18 2010)—although this level was sustained over long periods of time, whereas today CO₂
19 concentration is increasing rapidly. At that time, global mean temperature was approximately
20 3.6°–6.3°F (2°–3.5°C) above preindustrial, and sea level was somewhere between 66 ± 33 feet
21 (20 ± 10 meters) higher than today (Haywood et al. 2013; Dutton et al. 2015; Miller et al. 2012).

22 Under the RCP8.5 scenario, CO₂ concentrations are projected to reach 936 ppm by 2100. During
23 the Eocene, 35 to 55 million years ago, CO₂ levels were between 680 and 1260 ppm, or
24 somewhere between two and a half to four and a half times above preindustrial levels (Jagniecki
25 et al. 2015). If Eocene conditions are used as an analog, this suggests that if the CO₂
26 concentrations projected to occur under the RCP8.5 scenario by 2100 were sustained over long
27 periods of time, global temperatures would be approximately 9°–14°F (5°–8°C) above
28 preindustrial levels (Royer 2014). During the Eocene, there were no permanent land-based ice
29 sheets; Antarctic glaciation did not begin until approximately 34 million years ago (Pagani et al.
30 2011). Calibrating sea level rise models against past climate suggests that, under the RCP8.5
31 scenario, Antarctica could contribute 3 feet (1 meter) of sea level rise by 2100 and 50 feet (15
32 meters) by 2500 (DeConto and Pollard 2016). If atmospheric CO₂ were sustained at levels
33 approximately two to three times above preindustrial for tens of thousands of years, it is
34 estimated that Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets could melt entirely (Gasson et al. 2014),
35 resulting in approximately 215 feet (65 meters) of sea level rise (Vaughn et al. 2013).

36

1 **4.3. Modeling Tools**

2 Using transient scenarios such as SRES and RCP as input, global climate models (GCMs)
3 produce trajectories of future climate change, including global and regional changes in
4 temperature, precipitation, and other physical characteristics of the climate system (Collins et al.
5 2013; Kirtman et al. 2013; see also Ch. 6: Temperature Change and Ch. 7: Precipitation Change).
6 The resolution of global models has increased significantly since IPCC FAR (IPCC 1990).
7 However, even the latest experimental high-resolution simulations at 25–50 km (15–30 miles)
8 per gridbox, are unable to simulate all of the important fine-scale processes occurring at regional
9 to local scales. Instead, downscaling methods are often used to correct systematic biases, or
10 offsets relative to observations, in global projections and translate them into the higher-resolution
11 information typically required for impact assessments.

12 Dynamical downscaling with regional climate models (RCMs) directly simulates the response of
13 regional climate processes to global change, while empirical statistical downscaling models
14 (ESDMs) tend to be more flexible and computationally efficient. Comparing the ability of
15 dynamical and statistical methods to reproduce observed climate shows that the relative
16 performance of the two approaches depends on the assessment criteria (Vattinada Ayar et al.
17 2016). Although dynamical and statistical methods can be combined into a hybrid framework,
18 many assessments still tend to rely on one or the other type of downscaling, where the choice is
19 based on the needs of the assessment. The projections shown in this report, for example, are
20 either based on the original GCM simulations or on simulations that have been statistically
21 downscaled using the LOcalized Constructed Analogs method (LOCA; Pierce et al. 2014). This
22 section describes the global climate models used today, briefly summarizes their development
23 over the past few decades, and explains the general characteristics and relative strengths and
24 weaknesses of the dynamical and statistical downscaling.

25 **4.3.1. Global Climate Models**

26 Global climate models (GCMs) are mathematical frameworks that were originally built on
27 fundamental equations of physics. They account for the conservation of energy, mass, and
28 momentum and how these are exchanged among different components of the climate system.
29 Using these fundamental relationships, GCMs are able to simulate many important aspects of
30 Earth's climate: large-scale patterns of temperature and precipitation, general characteristics of
31 storm tracks and extratropical cyclones, and observed changes in global mean temperature and
32 ocean heat content as a result of human emissions (Flato et al. 2013).

33 The complexity of climate models has grown over time, as they incorporate additional
34 components of the Earth's climate system (Figure 4.3). For example, GCMs were previously
35 referred to as “general circulation models” when they included only the physics needed to
36 simulate the general circulation of the atmosphere. Today, global climate models simulate many
37 more aspects of the climate system: atmospheric chemistry and aerosols, land surface

1 interactions including soil and vegetation, land and sea ice, and increasingly even an interactive
2 carbon cycle and/or biogeochemistry. Models that include this last component are also referred
3 to as Earth system models (ESMs).

4 **[INSERT FIGURE 4.3 HERE]**

5 In addition to expanding the number of processes in the models and improving the treatment of
6 existing processes, the total number of GCMs and the average horizontal spatial resolution of the
7 models has increased over time, as computers become more powerful, and with each successive
8 version of the World Climate Research Programme's (WCRP's) Coupled Model
9 Intercomparison Project (CMIP). CMIP5 provides output from over 50 GCMs with spatial
10 resolutions ranging from about 50 to 300 km (30 to 200 miles) per horizontal size and variable
11 vertical resolution on the order of hundreds of meters in the troposphere or lower atmosphere.

12 It is often assumed that higher-resolution, more complex, and more up-to-date models will
13 perform better and/or produce more robust projections than previous-generation models.
14 However, a large body of research comparing CMIP3 and CMIP5 simulations concludes that,
15 although the spatial resolution of CMIP5 has improved relative to CMIP3, the overall
16 improvement in performance is relatively minor. For certain variables, regions, and seasons,
17 there is some improvement; for others, there is little difference or even sometimes degradation in
18 performance, as greater complexity does not necessarily imply improved performance (Knutti
19 and Sedlacek 2012; Kumar et al. 2014; Sheffield et al. 2013, 2014). CMIP5 simulations do show
20 modest improvement in model ability to simulate ENSO (Bellenger et al. 2014), some aspects of
21 cloud characteristics (Lauer and Hamilton 2012), and the rate of Arctic sea ice loss (Wang and
22 Overland 2012), as well as greater consensus regarding projected drying in the southwestern
23 United States and Mexico (Sheffield et al. 2014),

24 Projected changes in hurricane rainfall rates and the reduction in tropical storm frequency are
25 similar, but CMIP5-based projections of increases in the frequency of the strongest hurricanes
26 are generally smaller than CMIP3-based projections (Knutson et al. 2013). On the other hand,
27 many studies find little to no significant difference in large-scale patterns of changes in both
28 mean and extreme temperature and precipitation from CMIP3 to CMIP5 (Kharin et al. 2013;
29 Knutti and Sedlacek 2013; Sheffield et al. 2014; Sun et al. 2015). Also, CMIP3 simulations are
30 driven by SRES scenarios, while CMIP5 simulations are driven by RCP scenarios. Although
31 some scenarios have comparable CO₂ concentration pathways (Figure 4.1), differences in non-
32 CO₂ species and aerosols could be responsible for some of the differences between the
33 simulations (Sheffield et al. 2014). In NCA3, projections were based on simulations from both
34 CMIP3 and CMIP5. In this report, future projections are based on CMIP5 alone.

35 GCMs are constantly being expanded to include more physics, chemistry, and, increasingly, even
36 the biology and biogeochemistry at work in the climate system (Figure 4.3). Interactions within
37 and between the various components of the climate system result in positive and negative

1 feedbacks that can act to enhance or dampen the effect of human emissions on the climate
2 system. The extent to which models explicitly resolve or incorporate these processes determines
3 their climate sensitivity, or response to external forcing (see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate
4 Change, Section 2.5 on climate sensitivity, and Ch. 15: Potential Surprises on the importance of
5 processes not included in present-day GCMs). These models build on previous generations and
6 therefore many models are not independent from each other. Many share both ideas and model
7 components or code, complicating the interpretation of multimodel ensembles that often are
8 assumed to be independent (Knutti et al. 2013; Sanderson et al. 2015). Consideration of the
9 independence of different models is one of the key pieces of information going into the
10 weighting approach used in this report (see Appendix B: Weighting Strategy).

11 **4.3.2. Regional Climate Models**

12 Dynamical downscaling models are often referred to as regional climate models (RCMs), since
13 they include many of the same physical processes that make up a global climate model, but
14 simulate these processes at higher spatial resolution over smaller regions, such as the western or
15 eastern United States (Figure 4.4; Kotamarthi et al. 2016). Most RCM simulations use GCM
16 fields from pre-computed global simulations as boundary conditions. This approach allows
17 RCMs to draw from a broad set of GCM simulations, such as CMIP5, but does not allow for
18 possible two-way feedbacks and interactions between the regional to global scales. Dynamical
19 downscaling can also be conducted interactively through nesting a higher-resolution regional
20 grid or model into a global model during a simulation. Both approaches directly simulate the
21 dynamics of the regional climate system, but only the second allows for two-way interactions
22 between regional and global change.

23 RCMs are computationally intensive, providing a broad range of output variables that resolve
24 regional climate features important for assessing climate impacts. The size of individual grid
25 cells can be as fine as 1 to 2 km (0.6 to 1.2 miles) per gridbox in some studies, but more
26 commonly range from about 10 to 50 km (6 to 30 miles). At smaller spatial scales, and for
27 specific variables and areas with complex terrain, such as coastlines or mountains, regional
28 climate models have been shown to add value (Feser et al. 2011). As model resolution increases,
29 RCMs are also able to explicitly resolve some processes that are parameterized in global models.
30 For example, some models with spatial scales below 4 km (2.5 miles) are able to dispense with
31 the parameterization of convective precipitation, a significant source of error and uncertainty in
32 coarser models (Prein et al. 2015). RCMs can also incorporate changes in land use, land cover, or
33 hydrology into local climate at spatial scales relevant to planning and decision-making at the
34 regional level.

35 Despite the differences in resolution, RCMs are still subject to many of the same types of
36 uncertainty as GCMs. Even the highest-resolution RCM cannot explicitly model physical
37 processes that occur at even smaller scales than the model is able to resolve; instead,
38 parameterizations are required. Similarly, RCMs might not include a process or an interaction

1 that is not yet well understood, even if it is able to be resolved at the spatial scale of the model.
2 One additional source of uncertainty unique to RCMs arises from the fact that at their boundaries
3 RCMs require output from GCMs to provide large-scale circulation such as winds, temperature,
4 and moisture; the degree to which the driving GCM correctly captures large-scale circulation and
5 climate will affect the performance of the RCM (Wang et al. 2004). RCMs can be evaluated by
6 directly comparing their output to observations; although this process can be challenging and
7 time-consuming, it is often necessary to quantify the appropriate level of confidence that can be
8 placed in their output (Kotamarthi et al. 2016).

9 Studies have also highlighted the importance of large ensemble simulations when quantifying
10 regional change (Xie et al. 2015). However, due to their computational demand, extensive
11 ensembles of RCM-based projections are rare. The largest ensemble of RCM simulations for
12 North America is hosted by the North American Regional Climate Change Assessment Program
13 (NARCCAP). NARCCAP simulations are useful for examining patterns of change over North
14 America and providing a broad suite of surface and upper-air variables to characterize future
15 impacts. Since this ensemble is based on four simulations from four CMIP3 GCMs for a single
16 mid-high SRES scenario, these runs do not encompass the full range of uncertainty in future
17 projections due to human activities, natural variability, and climate sensitivity.

18 **[INSERT FIGURE 4.4 HERE]**

19 **4.3.3. Empirical Statistical Downscaling Models**

20 Empirical statistical downscaling models (ESDMs) combine GCM output with historical
21 observations to translate large-scale predictors or patterns into high-resolution projections at the
22 scale of observations. The observations used in an ESDM can range from individual weather
23 stations to gridded datasets. As output, they can generate a range of products, from large grids to
24 analyses optimized for a specific location, variable, or decision-context.

25 Statistical techniques are varied, from the simple difference or delta approaches used in the first
26 NCA (subtracting historical simulated values from future values, and adding the resulting delta
27 to historical observations; NAST 2001) to the parametric quantile mapping approach used in
28 NCA2 and 3 (Stoner et al. 2012; Karl et al. 2009; Melillo et al. 2014). Even more complex
29 clustering and advanced mathematical modeling techniques can rival dynamical downscaling in
30 their demand for computational resources (e.g. Vrac et al. 2007).

31 Statistical models are generally flexible and less computationally demanding than RCMs. A
32 number of databases using a variety of methods, including LOCA, provide statistically
33 downscaled projections for a continuous period from 1960 to 2100 using a large ensemble of
34 global models and a range of higher and lower future scenarios to capture uncertainty due to
35 human activities. ESDMs are also effective at removing biases in historical simulated values,
36 leading to a good match between the average (multidecadal) statistics of observed and

1 statistically downscaled climate at the spatial scale and over the historical period of the
2 observational data used to train the statistical model. Unless methods can simultaneously
3 downscale multiple variables, however, statistical downscaling carries the risk of altering some
4 of the physical interdependences between variables. ESDMs are also limited in that they require
5 observational data as input; the longer and more complete the record, the greater the confidence
6 that the ESDM is being trained on a representative sample of climatic conditions for that
7 location. Application of ESDMs to remote locations with sparse temporal and/or spatial records
8 is challenging, though in many cases reanalysis (Brands et al. 2012) or even monthly satellite
9 data (Thrasher et al. 2013) can be used in lieu of in situ observations. Lack of data availability
10 can also limit the use of ESDMs in applications that require more variables than temperature and
11 precipitation. Finally, statistical models are based on the key assumption that the relationship
12 between large-scale weather systems and local climate or the spatial pattern of surface climate
13 will remain stationary over the time horizon of the projections. This assumption may not hold if
14 climate change alters local feedback processes that affect these relationships.

15 ESDMs can be evaluated in three different ways, each of which provides useful insight into
16 model performance (Kotamarthi et al. 2016). First, the model's goodness-of-fit can be quantified
17 by comparing downscaled simulations for the historical period with the identical observations
18 used to train the model. Second, the generalizability of the model can be determined by
19 comparing downscaled historical simulations with observations from a different time period than
20 was used to train the model; this is often accomplished via cross-validation. Third and most
21 importantly, the stationarity of the model can be evaluated through a "perfect model" experiment
22 using coarse-resolution GCM simulations to generate future projections, then comparing these
23 with high-resolution GCM simulations for the same future time period. Initial analyses using the
24 perfect model approach have demonstrated that the assumption of stationarity can vary
25 significantly by ESDM method, by quantile, and by the time scale (daily or monthly) of the
26 GCM input (Dixon et al. 2016).

27 ESDMs are best suited for analyses that require a broad range of future projections of standard,
28 near-surface variables such as temperature and precipitation, at the scale of observations that
29 may already be used for planning purposes. If the study needs to evaluate the full range of
30 projected changes provided by multiple models and scenarios, then statistical downscaling may
31 be more appropriate than dynamical downscaling. However, even within statistical downscaling,
32 selecting an appropriate method for any given study depends on the questions being asked (see
33 Kotamarthi et al. 2016 for further discussion on selection of appropriate downscaling methods).
34 This report uses projections generated by the LOcalized Constructed Analogs approach (LOCA;
35 Pierce et al. 2014) that spatially matches model-simulated days, past and future, to analogs from
36 observations.

37

1 **4.3.4. Averaging, Weighting, and Selection of Global Models**

2 The results of individual climate model simulations using the same inputs can differ from each
3 other over shorter time scales ranging from several years to several decades (Deser et al.
4 2012a,b). These differences are the result of normal, natural variability, as well as the various
5 ways models characterize various small-scale processes. Although decadal predictability is an
6 active research area (Deser et al. 2014), the timing of specific natural variations is largely
7 unpredictable beyond several seasons. For this reason, multimodel simulations are generally
8 averaged to remove the effects of randomly occurring natural variations from long-term trends
9 and make it easier to discern the impact of external drivers, both human and natural, on the
10 Earth's climate. Multimodel averaging is typically the last stage in any analysis, used to prepare
11 figures showing projected changes in quantities such as annual or seasonal temperature or
12 precipitation (see Ch. 6: Temperature Change and Ch. 7: Precipitation Change). While the effect
13 of averaging on the systematic errors depends on the extent to which models have similar errors
14 or offsetting errors, there is growing recognition of the value of large ensembles of climate
15 model simulations in addressing uncertainty in both natural variability and scientific modeling
16 (e.g., Deser et al. 2012a).

17 Previous assessments have used a simple average to calculate the multimodel ensemble. This
18 approach implicitly assumes each climate model is independent from the others and of equal
19 ability. Neither of these assumptions, however, are completely valid. Some models share many
20 components with other models in the CMIP5 archive, whereas others have been developed
21 largely in isolation (Knutti et al. 2013; Sanderson et al. 2015). Also, some models are more
22 successful than others at replicating observed climate and trends over the past century, at
23 simulating the large-scale dynamical features responsible for creating or affecting the average
24 climate conditions over a certain region, such as the Arctic or the Caribbean (e.g., M. Wang et al.
25 2007; C. Wang et al. 2014; Ryu and Hayhoe 2014), or at simulating past climates with very
26 different states than present day (Braconnot et al. 2012). Evaluation of the success of a specific
27 model often depends on the variable or metric being considered in the analysis, with some
28 models performing better than others for certain regions or variables. However, all future
29 simulations agree that both global and regional temperatures will increase over this century in
30 response to increasing emissions of greenhouse gases from human activities.

31 Can more sophisticated weighting or model selection schemes improve the quality of future
32 projections? In the past, model weights were often based on historical performance; yet
33 performance varies by region and variable, and may not equate to improved future projections
34 (Knutti and Sedlacek 2013). For example, ranking GCMs based on their average biases in
35 temperature gives a very different result than when the same models are ranked based on their
36 ability to simulate observed temperature trends (Jun et al. 2008; Giorgi and Coppola 2010). If
37 GCMs are weighted in a way that does not accurately capture the true uncertainty in regional
38 change, the result can be less robust than an equally-weighted mean (Weigel et al. 2010).

1 Although the intent of weighting models is to increase the robustness of the projections, by
2 giving lesser weight to outliers a weighting scheme may increase the risk of underestimating the
3 range of uncertainty, a tendency that has already been noted in multi-model ensembles (see Ch.
4 15: Potential Surprises).

5 Despite these challenges, for the first time in an official U.S. Global Change Research Program
6 report, this assessment uses model weighting to refine future climate change projections (Knutti
7 et al. 2017; see also Appendix B: Weighting Strategy). The weighting approach is unique: it
8 takes into account the interdependence of individual climate models as well as their relative
9 abilities in simulating North American climate. Understanding of model history, together with
10 the fingerprints of particular model biases, has been used to identify model pairs that are not
11 independent. In this report, model independence and selected global and North American model
12 quality metrics are considered in order to determine the weighting parameters (Knutti et al.
13 2017). Evaluation of this approach shows improved performance of the weighted ensemble over
14 the Arctic, a region where model-based trends often differ from observations, but little change in
15 global-scale temperature response and in other regions where modeled and observed trends are
16 similar, although there are small regional differences in the statistical significance of projected
17 changes. The choice of metric used to evaluate models has very little effect on the independence
18 weighting, and some moderate influence on the skill weighting if only a small number of
19 variables are used to assess model quality. Because a large number of variables are combined to
20 produce a comprehensive “skill metric,” the metric is not highly sensitive to any single variable.
21 All multimodel figures in this report use the approach described in Appendix B: Weighting
22 Strategy.

23 **4.4. Uncertainty in Future Projections**

24 The timing and magnitude of projected future climate change is uncertain due to the ambiguity
25 introduced by human choices (as discussed in Section 4.2), natural variability, and scientific
26 uncertainty (Hawkins and Sutton 2009, 2011; Deser et al. 2012a), which includes uncertainty in
27 both scientific modeling and climate sensitivity (see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change).
28 Confidence in projections of specific aspects of future climate change increases if formal
29 detection and attribution analyses (Ch. 3: Detection and Attribution) indicate that an observed
30 change has been influenced by human activities, and the projection is consistent with attribution.
31 However, in many cases, especially at the regional scales considered in this assessment, a
32 human-forced response may not yet have emerged from the noise of natural climate variability
33 but may be expected to in the future (e.g., Hawkins and Sutton 2009, 2010). In such cases,
34 confidence in such “projections without attribution” may still be significant under higher
35 scenarios, if the relevant physical mechanisms of change are well understood.

36 Scientific uncertainty encompasses multiple factors. The first is parametric uncertainty—the
37 ability of GCMs to simulate processes that occur on spatial or temporal scales smaller than they
38 can resolve. The second is structural uncertainty—whether GCMs include and accurately

1 represent all the important physical processes occurring on scales they can resolve. Structural
2 uncertainty can arise because a process is not yet recognized—such as “tipping points” or
3 mechanisms of abrupt change—or because it is known but is not yet understood well enough to
4 be modeled accurately—such as dynamical mechanisms that are important to melting ice sheets
5 (see Ch. 15: Potential Surprises). The third is climate sensitivity—a measure of the response of
6 the planet to increasing levels of CO₂, which is formally defined in Chapter 2: Physical Drivers
7 of Climate Change as the equilibrium temperature change resulting from a doubling of CO₂
8 levels in the atmosphere relative to preindustrial levels. Various lines of evidence constrain the
9 likely value of climate sensitivity to between 2.7°F and 8.1°F (1.5°C and 4.5°C; IPCC 2013b;
10 see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change for further discussion).

11 Which of these sources of uncertainty—human, natural, and scientific—is most important
12 depends on the time frame and the variable considered. As future scenarios diverge (Figure 4.1),
13 so too do projected changes in global and regional temperature (Hawkins and Sutton 2009).
14 Uncertainty in the magnitude and sign of projected changes in precipitation and other aspects of
15 climate is even greater. The processes that lead to precipitation happen at scales smaller than
16 what can be resolved by even high-resolution models, requiring significant parameterization.
17 Precipitation also depends on many large-scale aspects of climate, including atmospheric
18 circulation, storm tracks, and moisture convergence. Due to the greater level of complexity
19 associated with modeling precipitation, scientific uncertainty tends to dominate in precipitation
20 projections throughout the entire century, affecting both the magnitude and sometimes
21 (depending on location) the sign of the projected change in precipitation (Hawkins and Sutton
22 2011).

23 Over the next few decades, the greater part of the range or uncertainty in projected global and
24 regional change will be the result of a combination of natural variability (mostly related to
25 uncertainty in specifying the initial conditions of the state of the ocean; Deser et al. 2012b) and
26 scientific limitations in our ability to model and understand the Earth’s climate system (Figure
27 4.5). Differences in future scenarios, shown in orange in Figure 4.5, represent the difference
28 between scenarios, or human activity. Over the short term, this uncertainty is relatively small. As
29 time progresses, however, differences in various possible future pathways become larger and the
30 delayed ocean response to these differences begins to be realized. By about 2030, the human
31 source of uncertainty becomes increasingly important in determining the magnitude and patterns
32 of future global warming. Even though natural variability will continue to occur, most of the
33 difference between present and future climates will be determined by choices that society makes
34 today and over the next few decades. The further out in time we look, the greater the influence of
35 these human choices are on the magnitude of future warming.

36 **[INSERT FIGURE 4.5 HERE]**

37

1 TRACEABLE ACCOUNTS

2 Key Finding 1

3 If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing concentrations
4 would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of warming over this century
5 relative to the last few decades (*high confidence* in continued warming, *medium confidence* in
6 amount of warming).

7 Description of evidence base

8 The basic physics underlying the impact of human emissions on global climate, and the role of
9 climate sensitivity in moderating the impact of those emissions on global temperature, has been
10 documented since the 1800s in a series of peer-reviewed journal articles that is summarized in a
11 collection titled, “The Warming Papers: The Scientific Foundation for the Climate Change
12 Forecast” (Archer and Pierrehumbert 2011).

13 The estimate of committed warming at constant atmospheric concentrations is based on IPCC
14 AR5 WG1, Chapter 12, section 12.5.2, page 1103 (Collins et al. 2013) which is in turn derived
15 from AR4 WG1, Chapter 10, section 10.7.1, page 822 (Meehl et al. 2007).

16 Major uncertainties

17 The uncertainty in projected change under a commitment scenario is low and primarily the result
18 of uncertainty in climate sensitivity. This key finding describes a hypothetical scenario that
19 assumes all human-caused emissions cease and the Earth system responds only to what is already
20 in the atmosphere.

21 Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 22 nature of evidence and level of agreement

23 The statement has *high confidence* in the sign of future change and *medium confidence* in the
24 amount of warming, based on the estimate of committed warming at constant atmospheric
25 concentrations from Collins et al. (2013) based on Meehl et al. (2007) for a hypothetical scenario
26 where concentrations in the atmosphere were fixed at a known level.

27 Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information

28 The key finding is based on the basic physical principles of radiative transfer that have been well
29 established for decades to centuries; the amount of estimated warming for this hypothetical
30 scenario is derived from Collins et al. (2013) which is in turn based on Meehl et al. (2007) using
31 CMIP3 models.

32

1 **Key Finding 2**

2 Over the next two decades, global temperature increase is projected to be between 0.5°F and
3 1.3°F (0.3°–0.7°C) (*medium confidence*). This range is primarily due to uncertainties in natural
4 sources of variability that affect short-term trends. In some regions, this means that the trend may
5 not be distinguishable from natural variability (*high confidence*).

6 **Description of evidence base**

7 The estimate of projected near-term warming under continued emissions of carbon dioxide and
8 other greenhouse gases and aerosols was obtained directly from IPCC AR5 WG1 (Kirtman et al.
9 2013).

10 The statement regarding the sources of uncertainty in near-term projections and regional
11 uncertainty is based on Hawkins and Sutton (2009, 2011) and Deser et al. (2012a,b).

12 **Major uncertainties**

13 As stated in the key finding, natural variability is the primary uncertainty in quantifying the
14 amount of global temperature change over the next two decades.

15 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 16 nature of evidence and level of agreement**

17 The first statement regarding projected warming over the next two decades has *medium*
18 *confidence* in the amount of warming due to the uncertainties described in the key finding. The
19 second statement has *high confidence*, as the literature strongly supports the statement that
20 natural variability is the primary source of uncertainty over time scales of years to decades
21 (Deser et al. 2012a,b, 2014).

22 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

23 The estimated warming presented in this KF is based on calculations reported by Kirtman et al.
24 (2013). The key finding that natural variability is the most important uncertainty over the near-
25 term is based on multiple peer reviewed publications.

26

27 **Key Finding 3**

28 Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of climate change depends primarily on cumulative
29 emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols and the sensitivity of the climate system to those
30 emissions (*high confidence*). Projected changes range from 4.7°–8.6°F (2.6°–4.8°C) under the
31 higher RCP8.5 scenario to 0.5°–1.3°F (0.3°–1.7°C) under the lower RCP2.6 scenario, for 2081–
32 2100 relative to 1986–2005 (*medium confidence*).

1 **Description of evidence base**

2 The estimate of projected long-term warming under continued emissions of carbon dioxide and
3 other greenhouse gases and aerosols under the RCP scenarios was obtained directly from IPCC
4 AR5 WG1 (Collins et al. 2013).

5 All credible climate models assessed in Chapter 9 of the IPCC WG1 AR5 (IPCC 2013a) from the
6 simplest to the most complex respond with elevated global mean temperature, the simplest
7 indicator of climate change, when atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases increase. It
8 follows then that an emissions pathway that tracks or exceeds RCP8.5 would lead to larger
9 amounts of climate change.

10 The statement regarding the sources of uncertainty in long-term projections is based on Hawkins
11 and Sutton (2009, 2011).

12 **Major uncertainties**

13 As stated in the key finding, the magnitude of climate change over the long term is uncertain due
14 to human emissions of greenhouse gases and climate sensitivity.

15 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 16 nature of evidence and level of agreement**

17 The first statement regarding additional warming and its dependence on human emissions and
18 climate sensitivity has *high confidence*, as understanding of the radiative properties of
19 greenhouse gases and the existence of both positive and negative feedbacks in the climate system
20 is basic physics, dating to the 19th century. The second has *medium confidence* in the specific
21 magnitude of warming, due to the uncertainties described in the key finding.

22 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

23 The estimated warming presented in this key finding is based on calculations reported by Collins
24 et al. (2013). The key finding that human emissions and climate sensitivity are the most
25 important sources of uncertainty over the long-term is based on both basic physics regarding the
26 radiative properties of greenhouse gases, as well as a large body of peer reviewed publications.

27

28 **Key Finding 4**

29 Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a level
30 that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and sea level were
31 significantly higher than today (*high confidence*). Continued growth in CO₂ emissions over this
32 century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens of
33 millions of years (*medium confidence*). The present-day emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year

1 suggests that there is no climate analog for this century any time in at least the last 50 million
2 years (*medium confidence*).

3 **Description of evidence base**

4 The key finding is based on a large body of research including Crowley (1990), Schneider et al.
5 (2013), Lunt et al. (2012), Otto-Bleisner et al. (2013), NEEM (2013), Jouzel et al. (2007), Dutton
6 et al. (2015), Seki et al. (2010), Haywood et al. (2013), Miller et al. (2012), Royer (2014),
7 Bowen et al. (2015), Kirtland Turner et al. (2014), Penman et al. (2014), Zeebe et al. (2016), and
8 summarized in NRC (2011) and Masson-Delmotte et al. (2013).

9 **Major uncertainties**

10 The largest uncertainty is the measurement of past sea level, given the contributions of not only
11 changes in land ice mass, but also in solid earth, mantle, isostatic adjustments, etc. that occur on
12 timescales of millions of years. This uncertainty increases the further back in time we go;
13 however, the signal (and forcing) size is also much greater. There are also associated
14 uncertainties in precise quantification of past global mean temperature and carbon dioxide levels.
15 There is uncertainty in the age models used to determine rates of change and coincidence of
16 response at shorter, sub-millennial timescales.

17 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of** 18 **nature of evidence and level of agreement**

19 *High confidence* in the likelihood statement that past global mean temperature and sea level rise
20 were higher with similar or higher CO₂ concentrations is based on Masson-Delmotte et al. (2013)
21 in IPCC AR5. *Medium confidence* that no precise analog exists in 66 million years is based on
22 Zeebe et al. (2016) as well as the larger body of literature summarized in Masson-Delmotte et al.
23 (2013).

24 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

25 The key finding is based on a vast body of literature that summarizes the results of observations,
26 paleoclimate analyses, and paleoclimate modeling over the past 50 years and more.

27

28 **Key Finding 5**

29 The observed increase in global carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been consistent
30 with higher scenarios (*very high confidence*). In 2014 and 2015, emission growth rates slowed as
31 economic growth has become less carbon-intensive (*medium confidence*). Even if this trend
32 continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would meet the long-term temperature goal of the

1 Paris Agreement of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 3.6°F
2 (2°C) above preindustrial levels (*high confidence*).

3 **Description of Evidence Base**

4 Observed emissions for 2014 and 2015 and estimated emissions for 2016 suggest a decrease in
5 the growth rate and possibly even emissions of carbon; this shift is attributed primarily to
6 decreased coal use in China although with significant uncertainty as noted in the references in
7 the text. This statement is based on Tans and Keeling 2017; Raupach et al. 2007; Le Quéré et al.
8 2009; Jackson et al. 2016; Korsbakken et al. 2016 and personal communication with Le Quéré
9 (2017).

10 The statement that the growth rate of carbon dioxide increased over the past 15–20 years is based
11 on the data available here: <https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gr.html>

12 The evidence that actual emission rates track or exceed the RCP8.5 scenario are as follows. The
13 actual emission of CO₂ from fossil fuel consumption and concrete manufacture over the period
14 2005–2014 is 90.11 Pg (Le Quéré et al. 2015). The RCP8.5 emissions over the same period
15 assuming linear trends between years 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2020 in the specification is 99.24
16 Pg.

17 Actual emissions:

18 <http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/> and Le Quéré et al. (2015)

19 RCP8.5 emissions

20 <http://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at:8787/RcpDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=compare>

21 The numbers for fossil fuel and industrial emissions (RCP) compared to fossil fuel and cement
22 emissions (observed) in units of GtC are

	RCP8.5	Actual	difference
2005	7.97	8.23	0.26
2006	8.16	8.53	0.36
2007	8.35	8.78	0.42
2008	8.54	8.96	0.42
2009	8.74	8.87	0.14
2010	8.93	9.21	0.28
2011	9.19	9.54	0.36
2012	9.45	9.69	0.24

2013	9.71	9.82	0.11
2014	9.97	9.89	-0.08
2015	10.23	9.90	-0.34
total	99.24	101.41	2.18

1

2 **Major Uncertainties**

3 None

4 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of** 5 **nature of evidence and level of agreement**

6 *Very high confidence* in increasing emissions over the last 20 years and *high confidence* in the
7 fact that recent emission trends will not be sufficient to avoid 2°C. *Medium confidence* in recent
8 findings that the growth rate is slowing. Climate change scales with the amount of anthropogenic
9 greenhouse gas in the atmosphere. If emissions exceed RCP8.5, the likely range of changes
10 temperatures and climate variables will be larger than projected.

11 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

12 The key finding is based on basic physics relating emissions to concentrations, radiative forcing,
13 and resulting change in global mean temperature, as well as on IEA data on national emissions as
14 reported in the peer-reviewed literature.

15

16 **Key Finding 6**

17 Combining output from global climate models and dynamical and statistical downscaling models
18 using advanced averaging, weighting, and pattern scaling approaches can result in more relevant
19 and robust future projections. For some regions, sectors, and impacts, these techniques are
20 increasing the ability of the scientific community to provide guidance on the use of climate
21 projections for quantifying regional-scale changes and impacts (*medium to high confidence*).

22 **Description of evidence base**

23 The contribution of weighting and pattern scaling to improving the robustness of multimodel
24 ensemble projections is described and quantified by a large body of literature as summarized in
25 the text, including Sanderson et al. (2015) and Knutti et al. (2017). The state of the art of
26 dynamical and statistical downscaling and the scientific community's ability to provide guidance

1 regarding the application of climate projections to regional impact assessments is summarized in
2 Kotamarthi et al. (2016) and supported by Feser et al. (2011) and Prein et al. (2015).

3 **Major uncertainties**

4 Regional climate models are subject to the same structural and parametric uncertainties as global
5 models, as well as the uncertainty due to incorporating boundary conditions. The primary source
6 of error in application of empirical statistical downscaling methods is inappropriate application,
7 followed by stationarity.

8 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of** 9 **nature of evidence and level of agreement**

10 Advanced weighting techniques have significantly improved over previous Bayesian approaches;
11 confidence in their ability to improve the robustness of multimodel ensembles, while currently
12 rated as *medium*, is likely to grow in coming years. Downscaling has evolved significantly over
13 the last decade and is now broadly viewed as a robust source for high-resolution climate
14 projections that can be used as input to regional impact assessments.


15 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

16 Scientific understanding of climate projections, downscaling, multimodel ensembles, and
17 weighting has evolved significantly over the last decades to the extent that appropriate methods
18 are now broadly viewed as robust sources for climate projections that can be used as input to
19 regional impact assessments.

20

1 FIGURES

Emissions, Concentrations, and Temperature Projections




2

1 **Figure 4.1:** The climate projections used in this report are based on the 2010 Representative
2 Concentration Pathways (RCP, right). They are largely consistent with scenarios used in
3 previous assessments, the 2000 Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES, left). This figure
4 compares SRES and RCP annual carbon emissions (GtC, first row), annual methane emissions
5 (MtCH₄, second row), nitrous oxide emissions (MtN₂O, third row), carbon dioxide concentration
6 in the atmosphere (ppm, fourth row), global mean temperature change relative to 1900–1960 that
7 would result from the central estimate (lines) and the likely range (shaded areas) of climate
8 sensitivity as calculated by an energy balance model (°F, fifth row), and global mean temperature
9 change relative to 1900–1960 as simulated by CMIP3 models for the SRES scenarios and
10 CMIP5 models for the RCP scenarios (°F, sixth row). Note that global mean temperature from
11 SRES A1fi simulations are only available from four global climate models, hence the much
12 smaller range. (Data from IIASA, CMIP3, and CMIP5).

13

14

FINAL DRAFT




1

2 **Figure 4.2:** Global mean surface temperature anomalies (°F) relative to 1976–2005 for four RCP
3 scenarios, 2.6 (green), 4.5 (yellow), 6.0 (orange), and 8.5 (red). Each line represents an
4 individual simulation from the CMIP5 archive. Every RCP-based simulation with annual or
5 monthly temperature outputs available was used here. The values shown here were calculated in
6 0.5°C increments; since not every simulation reaches the next 0.5°C increment before end of
7 century, many lines terminate before 2100. (Figure source: adapted from Swain and Hayhoe
8 2015).

9

1


A Climate Modeling Timeline
(When Various Components Became Commonly Used)



2

3 **Figure 4.3:** As climate modeling has evolved over the last 120 years, increasing amounts of
 4 physical science have been incorporated into the models. This figure shows when various
 5 components of the climate system became regularly included in global climate model
 6 simulations.


7



1

2 **Figure 4.4:** CMIP5 global climate models typically operate at coarser horizontal spatial scales
 3 on the order of 50 to 300 km (30 to 200 miles), while regional climate models have much finer
 4 resolutions, on the order of 10 to 50 km (6 to 30 miles). This figure compares annual average
 5 precipitation (in millimeters) for the historical period 1979–2008 using (a) a resolution of 250
 6 km or 150 miles with (b) a resolution of 25 km or 15 miles to illustrate the importance of spatial
 7 scale in resolving key topographical features, particularly along the coasts and in mountainous
 8 areas. In this case, both simulations are by the GFDL HIRAM model, an experimental high-
 9 resolution model. (Figure source: adapted from Dixon et al. 2016).

10



1

2 **Figure 4.5:** The fraction of total variance in decadal mean surface air temperature predictions
 3 explained by the three components of total uncertainty is shown for the lower 48 states (similar
 4 results are seen for Hawai'i and Alaska, not shown). Orange regions represent human or scenario
 5 uncertainty, blue regions represent model uncertainty, and green regions represent the internal
 6 variability component. As the size of the region is reduced, the relative importance of internal
 7 variability increases. In interpreting this figure, it is important to remember that it shows the
 8 fractional sources of uncertainty. Total uncertainty increases as time progresses. (Figure source:
 9 adapted from Hawkins and Sutton 2009).

10

1 **REFERENCES**

- 2 Archer, D. and R. Pierrehumbert, eds., 2011: *The Warming Papers: The Scientific Foundation*
3 *for the Climate Change Forecast*. Wiley-Blackwell: Oxford, UK, 432 pp.
- 4 Bellenger, H., E. Guilyardi, J. Leloup, M. Lengaigne, and J. Vialard, 2014: ENSO representation
5 in climate models: From CMIP3 to CMIP5. *Climate Dynamics*, **42**, 1999-2018.
6 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-013-1783-z>
- 7 Bowen, G.J., B.J. Maibauer, M.J. Kraus, U. Rohl, T. Westerhold, A. Steimke, P.D. Gingerich,
8 S.L. Wing, and W.C. Clyde, 2015: Two massive, rapid releases of carbon during the onset of
9 the Palaeocene-Eocene thermal maximum. *Nature Geoscience*, **8**, 44-47.
10 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ngeo2316>
- 11 Braconnot, P., S.P. Harrison, M. Kageyama, P.J. Bartlein, V. Masson-Delmotte, A. Abe-Ouchi,
12 B. Otto-Bliesner, and Y. Zhao, 2012: Evaluation of climate models using palaeoclimatic data.
13 *Nature Climate Change*, **2**, 417-424. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1456>
- 14 Brands, S., J.M. Gutiérrez, S. Herrera, and A.S. Cofiño, 2012: On the use of reanalysis data for
15 downscaling. *Journal of Climate*, **25**, 2517-2526. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/jcli-d-11-00251.1>
- 16 Bretherton, F., K. Bryan, J. Woods, J. Hansen, M. Hoffert, X. Jiang, S. Manabe, G. Meehl, S.
17 Raper, D. Rind, M. Schlesinger, R. Stouffer, T. Volk, and T. Wigley, 1990: Time-dependent
18 greenhouse-gas-induced climate change. *Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment*
19 *Report prepared for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group I*
20 Houghton, J.T., G.J. Jenkins, and J.J. Ephraums, Eds. Cambridge University Press,
21 Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 173-193.
- 22 Collins, M., R. Knutti, J. Arblaster, J.-L. Dufresne, T. Fichefet, P. Friedlingstein, X. Gao, W.J.
23 Gutowski, T. Johns, G. Krinner, M. Shongwe, C. Tebaldi, A.J. Weaver, and M. Wehner,
24 2013: Long-term climate change: Projections, commitments and irreversibility. *Climate*
25 *Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth*
26 *Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Stocker, T.F., D. Qin,
27 G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex, and P.M.
28 Midgley, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,
29 USA, 1029–1136. <http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/>
- 30 Crowley, T.J., 1990: Are there any satisfactory geologic analogs for a future greenhouse
31 warming? *Journal of Climate*, **3**, 1282-1292. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/1520-](http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/1520-0442(1990)003<1282:atasga>2.0.co;2)
32 [0442\(1990\)003<1282:atasga>2.0.co;2](http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/1520-0442(1990)003<1282:atasga>2.0.co;2)
- 33 Cubasch, U., G. Meehl, G. Boer, R. Stouffer, M. Dix, A. Noda, C. Senior, S. Raper, and K. Yap,
34 2001: Projections of future climate change. *Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis.*
35 *Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental*

- 1 *Panel on Climate Change*. Houghton, J.T., Y. Ding, D.J. Griggs, M. Noquer, P.J. van der
2 Linden, X. Dai, K. Maskell, and C.A. Johnson, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
3 United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 525-582.
4 <https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg1/pdf/TAR-09.PDF>
- 5 Cubasch, U., D. Wuebbles, D. Chen, M.C. Facchini, D. Frame, N. Mahowald, and J.-G. Winther,
6 2013: Introduction. *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of*
7 *Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate*
8 *Change*. Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels,
9 Y. Xia, V. Bex, and P.M. Midgley, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
10 Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 119–158. [http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-](http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/)
11 [report/](http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/)
- 12 DeConto, R.M. and D. Pollard, 2016: Contribution of Antarctica to past and future sea-level rise.
13 *Nature*, **531**, 591-597. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature17145>
- 14 Deser, C., R. Knutti, S. Solomon, and A.S. Phillips, 2012b: Communication of the role of natural
15 variability in future North American climate. *Nature Climate Change*, **2**, 775-779.
16 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1562>
- 17 Deser, C., A. Phillips, V. Bourdette, and H. Teng, 2012a: Uncertainty in climate change
18 projections: The role of internal variability. *Climate Dynamics*, **38**, 527-546.
19 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-010-0977-x>
- 20 Deser, C., A.S. Phillips, M.A. Alexander, and B.V. Smoliak, 2014: Projecting North American
21 climate over the next 50 years: Uncertainty due to internal variability. *Journal of Climate*, **27**,
22 2271-2296. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-13-00451.1>
- 23 Dixon, K.W., J.R. Lanzante, M.J. Nath, K. Hayhoe, A. Stoner, A. Radhakrishnan, V. Balaji, and
24 C.F. Gaitán, 2016: Evaluating the stationarity assumption in statistically downscaled climate
25 projections: Is past performance an indicator of future results? *Climatic Change*, **135**, 395-
26 408. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-016-1598-0>
- 27 Dutton, A., A.E. Carlson, A.J. Long, G.A. Milne, P.U. Clark, R. DeConto, B.P. Horton, S.
28 Rahmstorf, and M.E. Raymo, 2015: Sea-level rise due to polar ice-sheet mass loss during past
29 warm periods. *Science*, **349**. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa4019>
- 30 Feser, F., B. Rockel, H.v. Storch, J. Winterfeldt, and M. Zahn, 2011: Regional climate models
31 add value to global model data: A review and selected examples. *Bulletin of the American*
32 *Meteorological Society*, **92**, 1181-1192. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/2011BAMS3061.1>
- 33 Fix, M.J., D. Cooley, S.R. Sain, and C. Tebaldi, 2016: A comparison of U.S. precipitation
34 extremes under RCP8.5 and RCP4.5 with an application of pattern scaling. *Climatic Change*,
35 **First online**, 1-13. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-016-1656-7>

- 1 Frieler, K., M. Meinshausen, A. Golly, M. Mengel, K. Lebek, S.D. Donner, and O. Hoegh-
2 Guldberg, 2013: Limiting global warming to 2°C is unlikely to save most coral reefs. *Nature*
3 *Climate Change*, **3**, 165-170. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1674>
- 4 Gasson, E., D.J. Lunt, R. DeConto, A. Goldner, M. Heinemann, M. Huber, A.N. LeGrande, D.
5 Pollard, N. Sahoo, M. Siddall, A. Winguth, and P.J. Valdes, 2014: Uncertainties in the
6 modelled CO₂ threshold for Antarctic glaciation. *Climate of the Past*, **10**, 451-466.
7 <http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/cp-10-451-2014>
- 8 Giorgi, F. and E. Coppola, 2010: Does the model regional bias affect the projected regional
9 climate change? An analysis of global model projections. *Climatic Change*, **100**, 787-795.
10 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9864-z>
- 11 Green, F. and N. Stern, 2016: China's changing economy: Implications for its carbon dioxide
12 emissions. *Climate Policy*, **17**, 423-442. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1156515>
- 13 Hartmann, D.L., A.M.G. Klein Tank, M. Rusticucci, L.V. Alexander, S. Brönnimann, Y.
14 Charabi, F.J. Dentener, E.J. Dlugokencky, D.R. Easterling, A. Kaplan, B.J. Soden, P.W.
15 Thorne, M. Wild, and P.M. Zhai, 2013: Observations: Atmosphere and surface. *Climate*
16 *Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth*
17 *Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Stocker, T.F., D. Qin,
18 G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex, and P.M.
19 Midgley, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,
20 USA, 159–254. <http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/>
- 21 Hawkins, E. and R. Sutton, 2009: The potential to narrow uncertainty in regional climate
22 predictions. *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*, **90**, 1095-1107.
23 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/2009BAMS2607.1>
- 24 Hawkins, E. and R. Sutton, 2011: The potential to narrow uncertainty in projections of regional
25 precipitation change. *Climate Dynamics*, **37**, 407-418. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-010-](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-010-0810-6)
26 [0810-6](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-010-0810-6)
- 27 Haywood, A.M., D.J. Hill, A.M. Dolan, B.L. Otto-Bliesner, F. Bragg, W.L. Chan, M.A.
28 Chandler, C. Contoux, H.J. Dowsett, A. Jost, Y. Kamae, G. Lohmann, D.J. Lunt, A. Abe-
29 Ouchi, S.J. Pickering, G. Ramstein, N.A. Rosenbloom, U. Salzmann, L. Sohl, C. Stepanek, H.
30 Ueda, Q. Yan, and Z. Zhang, 2013: Large-scale features of Pliocene climate: Results from the
31 Pliocene Model Intercomparison Project. *Climate of the Past*, **9**, 191-209.
32 <http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/cp-9-191-2013>
- 33 Herger, N., B.M. Sanderson, and R. Knutti, 2015: Improved pattern scaling approaches for the
34 use in climate impact studies. *Geophysical Research Letters*, **42**, 3486-3494.
35 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/2015GL063569>

- 1 IEA, 2016: Decoupling of global emissions and economic growth confirmed. International
2 Energy Agency, March 16.
3 [https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2016/march/decoupling-of-global-](https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2016/march/decoupling-of-global-emissions-and-economic-growth-confirmed.html)
4 [emissions-and-economic-growth-confirmed.html](https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2016/march/decoupling-of-global-emissions-and-economic-growth-confirmed.html)
- 5 IIASA, 2016: RCP Database. Version 2.0.5. International Institute for Applied Systems
6 Analysis. <https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/RcpDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=compare>
- 7 IPCC, 1990: *Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment*. Houghton, J.T., G.J. Jenkins, and
8 J.J. Ephraums, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New
9 York, NY, USA, 212 pp.
- 10 IPCC, 2013: *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group*
11 *I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*.
12 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, 1535 pp.
13 <http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/>
- 14 IPCC, 2013: Summary for policymakers. *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.*
15 *Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental*
16 *Panel on Climate Change*. Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J.
17 Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex, and P.M. Midgley, Eds. Cambridge University Press,
18 Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1–30.
19 <http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/>
- 20 Jackson, R.B., J.G. Canadell, C. Le Quere, R.M. Andrew, J.I. Korsbakken, G.P. Peters, and N.
21 Nakicenovic, 2016: Reaching peak emissions. *Nature Climate Change*, **6**, 7-10.
22 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2892>
- 23 Jagniecki, E.A., T.K. Lowenstein, D.M. Jenkins, and R.V. Demicco, 2015: Eocene atmospheric
24 CO₂ from the nahcolite proxy. *Geology*, **43**, 1075-1078. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1130/g36886.1>
- 25 Jouzel, J., V. Masson-Delmotte, O. Cattani, G. Dreyfus, S. Falourd, G. Hoffmann, B. Minster, J.
26 Nouet, J.M. Barnola, J. Chappellaz, H. Fischer, J.C. Gallet, S. Johnsen, M. Leuenberger, L.
27 Loulergue, D. Luethi, H. Oerter, F. Parrenin, G. Raisbeck, D. Raynaud, A. Schilt, J.
28 Schwander, E. Selmo, R. Souchez, R. Spahni, B. Stauffer, J.P. Steffensen, B. Stenni, T.F.
29 Stocker, J.L. Tison, M. Werner, and E.W. Wolff, 2007: Orbital and millennial Antarctic
30 climate variability over the past 800,000 years. *Science*, **317**, 793-796.
31 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1141038>
- 32 Jun, M., R. Knutti, and D.W. Nychka, 2008: Local eigenvalue analysis of CMIP3 climate model
33 errors. *Tellus A*, **60**, 992-1000. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0870.2008.00356.x>

- 1 Karl, T.R., J.T. Melillo, and T.C. Peterson, eds., 2009: *Global Climate Change Impacts in the*
2 *United States*. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, 189 pp.
3 <http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf>
- 4 Kattenberg, A., F. Giorgi, H. Grassl, G. Meehl, J. Mitchell, R. Stouffer, T. Tokioka, A. Weaver,
5 and T. Wigley, 1996: Climate models - projections of future climate. *Climate Change 1995:*
6 *The Science of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment*
7 *Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Houghton, J.T., L.G. Meira Filho,
8 B.A. Callander, N. Harris, A. Kattenberg, and K. Maskell, Eds. Cambridge University Press,
9 Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 285-358.
10 https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sar/wg_I/ipcc_sar_wg_I_full_report.pdf
- 11 Kharin, V.V., F.W. Zwiers, X. Zhang, and M. Wehner, 2013: Changes in temperature and
12 precipitation extremes in the CMIP5 ensemble. *Climatic Change*, **119**, 345-357.
13 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0705-8>
- 14 Kirtland Turner, S., P.F. Sexton, C.D. Charles, and R.D. Norris, 2014: Persistence of carbon
15 release events through the peak of early Eocene global warmth. *Nature Geoscience*, **7**, 748-
16 751. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ngeo2240>
- 17 Kirtman, B., S.B. Power, J.A. Adedoyin, G.J. Boer, R. Bojariu, I. Camilloni, F.J. Doblas-Reyes,
18 A.M. Fiore, M. Kimoto, G.A. Meehl, M. Prather, A. Sarr, C. Schär, R. Sutton, G.J.
19 van Oldenborgh, G. Vecchi, and H.J. Wang, 2013: Near-term climate change: Projections and
20 predictability. *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working*
21 *Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*.
22 Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia,
23 V. Bex, and P.M. Midgley, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York,
24 NY, USA, 953–1028. <http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/>
- 25 Knutson, T.R., J.J. Sirutis, G.A. Vecchi, S. Garner, M. Zhao, H.-S. Kim, M. Bender, R.E.
26 Tuleya, I.M. Held, and G. Villarini, 2013: Dynamical downscaling projections of twenty-first-
27 century Atlantic hurricane activity: CMIP3 and CMIP5 model-based scenarios. *Journal of*
28 *Climate*, **27**, 6591-6617. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/jcli-d-12-00539.1>
- 29 Knutti, R., D. Masson, and A. Gettelman, 2013: Climate model genealogy: Generation CMIP5
30 and how we got there. *Geophysical Research Letters*, **40**, 1194-1199.
31 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/grl.50256>
- 32 Knutti, R. and J. Sedlacek, 2013: Robustness and uncertainties in the new CMIP5 climate model
33 projections. *Nature Climate Change*, **3**, 369-373. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1716>

- 1 Knutti, R., J. Sedláček, B.M. Sanderson, R. Lorenz, E.M. Fischer, and V. Eyring, 2017: A
2 climate model projection weighting scheme accounting for performance and interdependence.
3 *Geophysical Research Letters*, **44**, 1909-1918. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/2016GL072012>
- 4 Kopp, R.E., F.J. Simons, J.X. Mitrovica, A.C. Maloof, and M. Oppenheimer, 2009: Probabilistic
5 assessment of sea level during the last interglacial stage. *Nature*, **462**, 863-867.
6 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature08686>
- 7 Korsbakken, J.I., G.P. Peters, and R.M. Andrew, 2016: Uncertainties around reductions in
8 China's coal use and CO2 emissions. *Nature Climate Change*, **6**, 687-690.
9 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2963>
- 10 Kotamarthi, R., L. Mearns, K. Hayhoe, C. Castro, and D. Wuebbles, 2016: Use of Climate
11 Information for Decision-Making and Impact Research. U.S. Department of Defense,
12 Strategic Environment Research and Development Program Report, 55 pp.
13 <http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1986.0085>
- 14 Kumar, D., E. Kodra, and A.R. Ganguly, 2014: Regional and seasonal intercomparison of
15 CMIP3 and CMIP5 climate model ensembles for temperature and precipitation. *Climate*
16 *Dynamics*, **43**, 2491-2518. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-014-2070-3>
- 17 Lauer, A. and K. Hamilton, 2013: Simulating clouds with global climate models: A comparison
18 of CMIP5 results with CMIP3 and satellite data. *Journal of Climate*, **26**, 3823-3845.
19 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/jcli-d-12-00451.1>
- 20 Le Quéré, C., R. Moriarty, R.M. Andrew, J.G. Canadell, S. Sitch, J.I. Korsbakken, P.
21 Friedlingstein, G.P. Peters, R.J. Andres, T.A. Boden, R.A. Houghton, J.I. House, R.F.
22 Keeling, P. Tans, A. Arneeth, D.C.E. Bakker, L. Barbero, L. Bopp, J. Chang, F. Chevallier,
23 L.P. Chini, P. Ciais, M. Fader, R.A. Feely, T. Gkritzalis, I. Harris, J. Hauck, T. Ilyina, A.K.
24 Jain, E. Kato, V. Kitidis, K. Klein Goldewijk, C. Koven, P. Landschützer, S.K. Lauvset, N.
25 Lefèvre, A. Lenton, I.D. Lima, N. Metzl, F. Millero, D.R. Munro, A. Murata, J.E.M.S. Nabel,
26 S. Nakaoka, Y. Nojiri, K. O'Brien, A. Olsen, T. Ono, F.F. Pérez, B. Pfeil, D. Pierrot, B.
27 Poulter, G. Rehder, C. Rödenbeck, S. Saito, U. Schuster, J. Schwinger, R. Séférian, T.
28 Steinhoff, B.D. Stocker, A.J. Sutton, T. Takahashi, B. Tilbrook, I.T. van der Laan-Luijckx,
29 G.R. van der Werf, S. van Heuven, D. Vandemark, N. Viovy, A. Wiltshire, S. Zaehle, and N.
30 Zeng, 2015: Global carbon budget 2015. *Earth System Science Data*, **7**, 349-396.
31 <http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/essd-7-349-2015>
- 32 Le Quéré, C., M.R. Raupach, J.G. Canadell, G. Marland, L. Bopp, P. Ciais, T.J. Conway, S.C.
33 Doney, R.A. Feely, P. Foster, P. Friedlingstein, K. Gurney, R.A. Houghton, J.I. House, C.
34 Huntingford, P.E. Levy, M.R. Lomas, J. Majkut, N. Metzl, J.P. Ometto, G.P. Peters, I.C.
35 Prentice, J.T. Randerson, S.W. Running, J.L. Sarmiento, U. Schuster, S. Sitch, T. Takahashi,

- 1 N. Viovy, G.R. van der Werf, and F.I. Woodward, 2009: Trends in the sources and sinks of
2 carbon dioxide. *Nature Geoscience*, **2**, 831-836. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ngeo689>
- 3 Leggett, J., W.J. Pepper, R.J. Swart, J. Edmonds, L.G.M. Filho, I. Mintzer, M.X. Wang, and J.
4 Watson, 1992: Emissions scenarios for the IPCC: An update. *Climate Change 1992: The*
5 *Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment*. Houghton, J.T., B.A. Callander, and
6 S.K. Varney, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, New York, NY,
7 USA, and Victoria, Australia, 73-95.
8 [https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_Suppl_Report_1992_](https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_Suppl_Report_1992_wg_I/ipcc_wg_I_1992_suppl_report_section_a3.pdf)
9 [wg_I/ipcc_wg_I_1992_suppl_report_section_a3.pdf](https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_Suppl_Report_1992_wg_I/ipcc_wg_I_1992_suppl_report_section_a3.pdf)
- 10 Lunt, D.J., T. Dunkley Jones, M. Heinemann, M. Huber, A. LeGrande, A. Winguth, C. Loptson,
11 J. Marotzke, C.D. Roberts, J. Tindall, P. Valdes, and C. Winguth, 2012: A model–data
12 comparison for a multi-model ensemble of early Eocene atmosphere–ocean simulations:
13 EoMIP. *Climate of the Past*, **8**, 1717-1736. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/cp-8-1717-2012>
- 14 Masson-Delmotte, V., M. Schulz, A. Abe-Ouchi, J. Beer, A. Ganopolski, J.F. González Rouco,
15 E. Jansen, K. Lambeck, J. Luterbacher, T. Naish, T. Osborn, B. Otto-Bliesner, T. Quinn, R.
16 Ramesh, M. Rojas, X. Shao, and A. Timmermann, 2013: Information from paleoclimate
17 archives. *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group*
18 *I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Stocker,
19 T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex,
20 and P.M. Midgley, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New
21 York, NY, USA, 383–464. <http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/>
- 22 Masui, T., K. Matsumoto, Y. Hijioka, T. Kinoshita, T. Nozawa, S. Ishiwatari, E. Kato, P.R.
23 Shukla, Y. Yamagata, and M. Kainuma, 2011: An emission pathway for stabilization at
24 6 Wm^{-2} radiative forcing. *Climatic Change*, **109**, 59. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0150-5)
25 [0150-5](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0150-5)
- 26 Meehl, G.A., T.F. Stocker, W.D. Collins, P. Friedlingstein, A.T. Gaye, J.M. Gregory, A. Kitoh,
27 R. Knutti, J.M. Murphy, A. Noda, S.C.B. Raper, I.G. Watterson, A.J. Weaver, and Z.-C.
28 Zhao, 2007: Ch. 10: Global climate projections. *Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science*
29 *basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the*
30 *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M.
31 Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H.L. Miller, Eds. Cambridge University Press,
32 Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, 747-845. [http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-](http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter10.pdf)
33 [report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter10.pdf](http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter10.pdf)
- 34 Meinshausen, M., S.J. Smith, K. Calvin, J.S. Daniel, M.L.T. Kainuma, J.-F. Lamarque, K.
35 Matsumoto, S.A. Montzka, S.C.B. Raper, K. Riahi, A. Thomson, G.J.M. Velders, and D.P.P.
36 van Vuuren, 2011: The RCP greenhouse gas concentrations and their extensions from 1765 to
37 2300. *Climatic Change*, **109**, 213-241. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0156-z>

- 1 Melillo, J.M., T.C. Richmond, and G.W. Yohe, eds., 2014: *Climate Change Impacts in the*
2 *United States: The Third National Climate Assessment*. U.S. Global Change Research
3 Program: Washington, D.C., 841 pp. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7930/J0Z31WJ2>
- 4 Miller, K.G., J.D. Wright, J.V. Browning, A. Kulpecz, M. Kominz, T.R. Naish, B.S. Cramer, Y.
5 Rosenthal, W.R. Peltier, and S. Sosdian, 2012: High tide of the warm Pliocene: Implications
6 of global sea level for Antarctic deglaciation. *Geology*, **40**, 407-410.
7 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1130/g32869.1>
- 8 Mitchell, T.D., 2003: Pattern scaling: An examination of the accuracy of the technique for
9 describing future climates. *Climatic Change*, **60**, 217-242.
10 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1026035305597>
- 11 Moss, R.H., J.A. Edmonds, K.A. Hibbard, M.R. Manning, S.K. Rose, D.P. van Vuuren, T.R.
12 Carter, S. Emori, M. Kainuma, T. Kram, G.A. Meehl, J.F.B. Mitchell, N. Nakicenovic, K.
13 Riahi, S.J. Smith, R.J. Stouffer, A.M. Thomson, J.P. Weyant, and T.J. Wilbanks, 2010: The
14 next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment. *Nature*, **463**, 747-
15 756. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature08823>
- 16 Nakicenovic, N., J. Alcamo, G. Davis, B.d. Vries, J. Fenhann, S. Gaffin, K. Gregory, A. Grüber,
17 T.Y. Jung, T. Kram, E.L.L. Rovere, L. Michaelis, S. Mori, T. Morita, W. Pepper, H. Pitcher,
18 L. Price, K. Riahi, A. Roehrl, H.-H. Rogner, A. Sankovski, M. Schlesinger, P. Shukla, S.
19 Smith, R. Swart, S.v. Rooijen, N. Victor, and Z. Dadi, 2000: IPCC Special Report on
20 Emissions Scenarios. Nakicenovic, N. and R. Swart (Eds.). Cambridge University Press.
21 <http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=0>
- 22 NAST, 2001: Climate Change Impacts on the United States: The Potential Consequences of
23 Climate Variability and Change, Report for the US Global Change Research Program. U.S.
24 Global Climate Research Program, National Assessment Synthesis Team, Cambridge, UK.
25 620 pp. [http://www.globalchange.gov/browse/reports/climate-change-impacts-united-states-](http://www.globalchange.gov/browse/reports/climate-change-impacts-united-states-potential-consequences-climate-variability-and-3)
26 [potential-consequences-climate-variability-and-3](http://www.globalchange.gov/browse/reports/climate-change-impacts-united-states-potential-consequences-climate-variability-and-3)
- 27 NEEM, 2013: Eemian interglacial reconstructed from a Greenland folded ice core. *Nature*, **493**,
28 489-494. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature11789>
- 29 NRC, 2011: *Climate Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over*
30 *Decades to Millennia*. National Research Council. The National Academies Press,
31 Washington, D.C., 298 pp. <http://dx.doi.org/10.17226/12877>
- 32 O'Neill, B.C., E. Kriegler, K. Riahi, K.L. Ebi, S. Hallegatte, T.R. Carter, R. Mathur, and D.P.
33 van Vuuren, 2014: A new scenario framework for climate change research: The concept of
34 shared socioeconomic pathways. *Climatic Change*, **122**, 387-400.
35 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0905-2>

- 1 Otto-Bliesner, B.L., N. Rosenbloom, E.J. Stone, N.P. McKay, D.J. Lunt, E.C. Brady, and J.T.
2 Overpeck, 2013: How warm was the last interglacial? New model–data comparisons.
3 *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering*
4 *Sciences*, **371**. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2013.0097>
- 5 Pagani, M., M. Huber, Z. Liu, S.M. Bohaty, J. Henderiks, W. Sijp, S. Krishnan, and R.M.
6 DeConto, 2011: The role of carbon dioxide during the onset of Antarctic glaciation. *Science*,
7 **334**, 1261-1264. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1203909>
- 8 Penman, D.E., B. Hönisch, R.E. Zeebe, E. Thomas, and J.C. Zachos, 2014: Rapid and sustained
9 surface ocean acidification during the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum.
10 *Paleoceanography*, **29**, 357-369. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/2014PA002621>
- 11 Pierce, D.W., D.R. Cayan, and B.L. Thrasher, 2014: Statistical downscaling using Localized
12 Constructed Analogs (LOCA). *Journal of Hydrometeorology*, **15**, 2558-2585.
13 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/jhm-d-14-0082.1>
- 14 Prein, A.F., W. Langhans, G. Fosser, A. Ferrone, N. Ban, K. Goergen, M. Keller, M. Tölle, O.
15 Gutjahr, F. Feser, E. Brisson, S. Kollet, J. Schmidli, N.P.M. van Lipzig, and R. Leung, 2015:
16 A review on regional convection-permitting climate modeling: Demonstrations, prospects,
17 and challenges. *Reviews of Geophysics*, **53**, 323-361.
18 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/2014RG000475>
- 19 Raupach, M.R., G. Marland, P. Ciais, C. Le Quéré, J.G. Canadell, G. Klepper, and C.B. Field,
20 2007: Global and regional drivers of accelerating CO₂ emissions. *Proceedings of the National*
21 *Academy of Sciences*, **104**, 10288-10293. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0700609104>
- 22 Rhein, M., S.R. Rintoul, S. Aoki, E. Campos, D. Chambers, R.A. Feely, S. Gulev, G.C. Johnson,
23 S.A. Josey, A. Kostianoy, C. Mauritzen, D. Roemmich, L.D. Talley, and F. Wang, 2013:
24 Observations: Ocean. *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of*
25 *Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate*
26 *Change*. Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels,
27 Y. Xia, V. Bex, and P.M. Midgley, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
28 Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 255–316. [http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-](http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/)
29 [report/](http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/)
- 30 Riahi, K., S. Rao, V. Krey, C. Cho, V. Chirkov, G. Fischer, G. Kindermann, N. Nakicenovic, and
31 P. Rafaj, 2011: RCP 8.5—A scenario of comparatively high greenhouse gas emissions.
32 *Climatic Change*, **109**, 33-57. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0149-y>
- 33 Royer, D.L., 2014: 6.11 - Atmospheric CO₂ and O₂ during the Phanerozoic: Tools, patterns, and
34 impacts. *Treatise on Geochemistry (Second Edition)*. Holland, H.D. and K.K. Turekian, Eds.

- 1 Elsevier, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 251-267. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-095975-7.01311-5>
- 2
- 3 Ryu, J.-H. and K. Hayhoe, 2013: Understanding the sources of Caribbean precipitation biases in
4 CMIP3 and CMIP5 simulations. *Climate Dynamics*, **42**, 3233-3252.
5 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-013-1801-1>
- 6 Sanderson, B.M., R. Knutti, and P. Caldwell, 2015: A representative democracy to reduce
7 interdependency in a multimodel ensemble. *Journal of Climate*, **28**, 5171-5194.
8 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-14-00362.1>
- 9 Sanderson, B.M., B.C. O'Neill, and C. Tebaldi, 2016a: What would it take to achieve the Paris
10 temperature targets? *Geophysical Research Letters*, **43**, 7133-7142.
11 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/2016GL069563>
- 12 Sanderson, B.M., M. Wehner, and R. Knutti, 2016b: Skill and independence weighting for multi-
13 model assessment. *Geoscientific Model Development Discussions*, **In Review**.
14 <http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/gmd-2016-285>
- 15 Schneider, R., J. Schmitt, P. Köhler, F. Joos, and H. Fischer, 2013: A reconstruction of
16 atmospheric carbon dioxide and its stable carbon isotopic composition from the penultimate
17 glacial maximum to the last glacial inception. *Clim. Past*, **9**, 2507-2523.
18 <http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/cp-9-2507-2013>
- 19 Seki, O., G.L. Foster, D.N. Schmidt, A. Mackensen, K. Kawamura, and R.D. Pancost, 2010:
20 Alkenone and boron-based Pliocene pCO₂ records. *Earth and Planetary Science Letters*, **292**,
21 201-211. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epsl.2010.01.037>
- 22 Sheffield, J., A. Barrett, D. Barrie, S.J. Camargo, E.K.M. Chang, B. Colle, D.N. Fernando, R. Fu,
23 K.L. Geil, Q. Hu, X. Jiang, N. Johnson, K.B. Karnauskas, S.T. Kim, J. Kinter, S. Kumar, B.
24 Langenbrunner, K. Lombardo, L.N. Long, E. Maloney, A. Mariotti, J.E. Meyerson, K.C. Mo,
25 J.D. Neelin, S. Nigam, Z. Pan, T. Ren, A. Ruiz-Barradas, R. Seager, Y.L. Serra, A. Seth, D.-
26 Z. Sun, J.M. Thibeault, J.C. Stroeve, C. Wang, S.-P. Xie, Z. Yang, L. Yin, J.-Y. Yu, T. Zhang,
27 and M. Zhao, 2014: Regional Climate Processes and Projections for North America:
28 CMIP3/CMIP5 Differences, Attribution and Outstanding Issues. NOAA Climate Program
29 Office, Silver Spring, MD. 47 pp. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7289/V5DB7ZRC>
- 30 Sheffield, J., A.P. Barrett, B. Colle, D.N. Fernando, R. Fu, K.L. Geil, Q. Hu, J. Kinter, S. Kumar,
31 B. Langenbrunner, K. Lombardo, L.N. Long, E. Maloney, A. Mariotti, J.E. Meyerson, K.C.
32 Mo, J.D. Neelin, S. Nigam, Z. Pan, T. Ren, A. Ruiz-Barradas, Y.L. Serra, A. Seth, J.M.
33 Thibeault, J.C. Stroeve, Z. Yang, and L. Yin, 2013: North American climate in CMIP5
34 experiments. Part I: Evaluation of historical simulations of continental and regional
35 climatology. *Journal of Climate*, **26**, 9209-9245. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/jcli-d-12-00592.1>

- 1 Smith, P., S.J. Davis, F. Creutzig, S. Fuss, J. Minx, B. Gabrielle, E. Kato, R.B. Jackson, A.
2 Cowie, E. Kriegler, D.P. van Vuuren, J. Rogelj, P. Ciais, J. Milne, J.G. Canadell, D.
3 McCollum, G. Peters, R. Andrew, V. Krey, G. Shrestha, P. Friedlingstein, T. Gasser, A.
4 Grubler, W.K. Heidug, M. Jonas, C.D. Jones, F. Kraxner, E. Littleton, J. Lowe, J.R. Moreira,
5 N. Nakicenovic, M. Obersteiner, A. Patwardhan, M. Rogner, E. Rubin, A. Sharifi, A.
6 Torvanger, Y. Yamagata, J. Edmonds, and C. Yongsung, 2015: Biophysical and economic
7 limits to negative CO₂ emissions. *Nature Climate Change*, **6**, 42-50.
8 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2870>
- 9 Stoner, A.M.K., K. Hayhoe, X. Yang, and D.J. Wuebbles, 2012: An asynchronous regional
10 regression model for statistical downscaling of daily climate variables. *International Journal*
11 *of Climatology*, **33**, 2473-2494. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/joc.3603>
- 12 Sun, L., K.E. Kunkel, L.E. Stevens, A. Buddenberg, J.G. Dobson, and D.R. Easterling, 2015:
13 Regional Surface Climate Conditions in CMIP3 and CMIP5 for the United States:
14 Differences, Similarities, and Implications for the U.S. National Climate Assessment.
15 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Environmental Satellite, Data,
16 and Information Service, 111 pp. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7289/V5RB72KG>
- 17 Swain, S. and K. Hayhoe, 2015: CMIP5 projected changes in spring and summer drought and
18 wet conditions over North America. *Climate Dynamics*, **44**, 2737-2750.
19 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-014-2255-9>
- 20 Tans, P. and R. Keeling, 2017: Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide. Annual Mean Growth
21 Rate of CO₂ at Mauna Loa. NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory.
22 <https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gr.html>
- 23 Tebaldi, C. and J.M. Arblaster, 2014: Pattern scaling: Its strengths and limitations, and an update
24 on the latest model simulations. *Climatic Change*, **122**, 459-471.
25 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-1032-9>
- 26 Thomson, A.M., K.V. Calvin, S.J. Smith, G.P. Kyle, A. Volke, P. Patel, S. Delgado-Arias, B.
27 Bond-Lamberty, M.A. Wise, and L.E. Clarke, 2011: RCP4.5: A pathway for stabilization of
28 radiative forcing by 2100. *Climatic Change*, **109**, 77-94. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0151-4)
29 [011-0151-4](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0151-4)
- 30 Thrasher, B., J. Xiong, W. Wang, F. Melton, A. Michaelis, and R. Nemani, 2013: Downscaled
31 climate projections suitable for resource management. *Eos, Transactions, American*
32 *Geophysical Union*, **94**, 321-323. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/2013EO370002>
- 33 UNFCCC, 2015: Paris Agreement. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
34 [Bonn, Germany]. 25 pp.

- 1 http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf
2
- 3 Vaithinada Ayar, P., M. Vrac, S. Bastin, J. Carreau, M. Déqué, and C. Gallardo, 2016:
4 Intercomparison of statistical and dynamical downscaling models under the EURO- and
5 MED-CORDEX initiative framework: Present climate evaluations. *Climate Dynamics*, **46**,
6 1301-1329. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-015-2647-5>
- 7 van Vuuren, D.P., S. Deetman, M.G.J. den Elzen, A. Hof, M. Isaac, K. Klein Goldewijk, T.
8 Kram, A. Mendoza Beltran, E. Stehfest, and J. van Vliet, 2011: RCP2.6: Exploring the
9 possibility to keep global mean temperature increase below 2°C. *Climatic Change*, **109**, 95-
10 116. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0152-3>
- 11 Vaughan, D.G., J.C. Comiso, I. Allison, J. Carrasco, G. Kaser, R. Kwok, P. Mote, T. Murray, F.
12 Paul, J. Ren, E. Rignot, O. Solomina, K. Steffen, and T. Zhang, 2013: Observations:
13 Cryosphere. *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working*
14 *Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*.
15 Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia,
16 V. Bex, and P.M. Midgley, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom
17 and New York, NY, USA, 317–382. <http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/>
- 18 Vrac, M., M. Stein, and K. Hayhoe, 2007: Statistical downscaling of precipitation through
19 nonhomogeneous stochastic weather typing. *Climate Research*, **34**, 169-184.
20 <http://dx.doi.org/10.3354/cr00696>
- 21 Walsh, J., D. Wuebbles, K. Hayhoe, J. Kossin, K. Kunkel, G. Stephens, P. Thorne, R. Vose, M.
22 Wehner, J. Willis, D. Anderson, S. Doney, R. Feely, P. Hennon, V. Kharin, T. Knutson, F.
23 Landerer, T. Lenton, J. Kennedy, and R. Somerville, 2014: Ch. 2: Our changing climate.
24 *Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment*.
25 Melillo, J.M., T.C. Richmond, and G.W. Yohe, Eds. U.S. Global Change Research Program,
26 Washington, D.C., 19-67. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7930/J0KW5CXT>
- 27 Wang, C., L. Zhang, S.-K. Lee, L. Wu, and C.R. Mechoso, 2014: A global perspective on
28 CMIP5 climate model biases. *Nature Climate Change*, **4**, 201-205.
29 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2118>
- 30 Wang, M. and J.E. Overland, 2012: A sea ice free summer Arctic within 30 years: An update
31 from CMIP5 models. *Geophysical Research Letters*, **39**, L18501.
32 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1029/2012GL052868>
- 33 Wang, M., J.E. Overland, V. Kattsov, J.E. Walsh, X. Zhang, and T. Pavlova, 2007: Intrinsic
34 versus forced variation in coupled climate model simulations over the Arctic during the
35 twentieth century. *Journal of Climate*, **20**, 1093-1107. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JCLI4043.1>

- 1 Wang, Y., L.R. Leung, J.L. McGregor, D.-K. Lee, W.-C. Wang, Y. Ding, and F. Kimura, 2004:
2 Regional climate modeling: Progress, challenges, and prospects. *Journal of the*
3 *Meteorological Society of Japan. Ser. II*, **82**, 1599-1628.
4 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2151/jmsj.82.1599>
- 5 Weigel, A.P., R. Knutti, M.A. Liniger, and C. Appenzeller, 2010: Risks of model weighting in
6 multimodel climate projections. *Journal of Climate*, **23**, 4175-4191.
7 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/2010jcli3594.1>
- 8 Xie, S.-P., C. Deser, G.A. Vecchi, M. Collins, T.L. Delworth, A. Hall, E. Hawkins, N.C.
9 Johnson, C. Cassou, A. Giannini, and M. Watanabe, 2015: Towards predictive understanding
10 of regional climate change. *Nature Climate Change*, **5**, 921-930.
11 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2689>
- 12 Zeebe, R.E., A. Ridgwell, and J.C. Zachos, 2016: Anthropogenic carbon release rate
13 unprecedented during the past 66 million years. *Nature Geoscience*, **9**, 325-329.
14 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ngeo2681>