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Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises

Frederick H. Hartmann

Glenn H. Snyder

Paul Diesing

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of information on recent and current policy, with logic, flair, and literacy. He has a good eye for the absurdities and infelicities of official justifications for policies that do not stand close scrutiny. And he points clearly to the most worrisome aspect of present developments in this area. In the "first nuclear age," as he calls it, only the United States and the Soviet Union were seriously engaged in quasi-nuclear antagonism. But as of the early 1970s, a "second nuclear age" has opened, in which the number of nuclear weapons and nuclear capable states is increasing rapidly. Clearly, the nuclear threat to world security is not going to become easier to manage in the near future.

In *The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb*, Cave Brown and MacDonald have unfortunately given in to the temptation to publish a "non-book." They have published almost 600 pages of selections from the 35-volume official history of the Manhattan Engineering District. More than one-fifth of their book is an incomplete version of the Smyth report discussed above. Cave Brown's introduction to the volume is inappropriately titled, unfocused, and erroneous. The documents are presented without explanations of significance, selection criteria, annotation, or indications of abridgment. There is no index. In many instances the editors chose to publish the summary chapters of long sections in the official histories, so that the coverage of topics is extensive in breadth, abbreviated in depth. In sum, Cave Brown and MacDonald have succeeded in being the first to "edit" and "publish" this material, and perhaps that is distinction enough.

It remains an open question just what difference the bomb has made to politics, civilization, humankind. This riddle needs to be asked and answers attempted, whether doomsday is near or far, even though any clear solution seems likely to be elusive for some time to come.

THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College

Snyder, Glenn H., and Diesing, Paul. *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. 578pp.

In this lengthy book Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing have made a carefully argued and clearly written contribution to the growing contemporary literature on the anatomy of crises. As they acknowledge in the preface, the Naval War College Center for Advanced Research was able to provide the support needed for completion of the work.

The book, while clear and well-organized, is not easy to read because the material itself is very complex. There are only seven chapters, some of them 100 pages long. Sequentially, these chapters cover, after a short introduction, formal models of bargaining, crisis bargaining strategies and tactics, information processing, decisionmaking, crises and international systems, and—finally—summary and synthesis. Interspersed are 61 "figures" and 15 tables.

It is too difficult to attempt to summarize the argument in the limited space of a review. The progression of the book can, however, be indicated. Chapter II shows that bargaining models vary greatly in their "usefulness for understanding crisis bargaining." The most useful model they found to be the 2 x 2 game (and its 3 x 3 extension), at least with certain adaptations to "incorporate various cognitive processes—search, information processing, building up and revising subjective estimates of the bargaining situation, constructing and revising strategies." Accordingly, after a less formal analysis of the bargaining process in crises (Chapter III), Chapters IV and V analyze that reformulated model. Chapter VI examines the effects caused by variations in the nature of the international system (i.e., variations in number of actors, etc.). Chapter VII is a summary and synthesis.

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The book, because it has two authors, adopts a special device to clarify divergences in their views. Each author wrote several of the chapters and then amended them to take account of his colleague's critique. Where important differences persisted, footnotes expound the point. See p. 407 for an illustration, author Snyder dissenting. (I agree strongly with Snyder.)

What the book attempts to do it does well, and the material is certainly important. But what it does not do is important, too. As it looks at crises as categories occurring in a system, it suffers (as does Schelling's work, which they frequently cite) from being essentially devoid of cultural context. Their approach is perfectly valid and has value; I only point out that generalizing about actors, structures, and systems can usefully be taken only so far. Then its results have to be cross-tabulated against a look at the specific cultural context in which diverse actors approach decisionmaking. It is not only important to look at crises comparing changes in the system but at crises comparing who was involved (and considering the stage of their always changing self-views of their proper role in world affairs). Snyder and Diesing do not, of course, attempt this second task.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Naval War College

Steinberg, Eleanor B., and Yager, Joseph A., with Brannon, Gerard M. *New Means of Financing International Needs*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978. 256pp.

The United Nations is already experiencing what seems to be a chronic shortage of funds for maintenance of peacekeeping forces and for assistance to developing nations. In coming years there is likely to be a growing shortage of funds to pay for such new international services as controls over pollution of the environment. The answer to the

dilemma of growing demand for international services, and a relatively fixed supply of financial means, is sought by Eleanor B. Steinberg and Joseph A. Yager in new means of finance, and not in economies in services.

The authors believe that the existing means of raising money for international purposes—voluntary contributions by national governments to the United Nations and its associated agencies, or funds borrowed in capital markets by the World Bank and other international financial institutions—will not be adequate in future. Accordingly they study other possible sources of finance, including taxes on international trade, on oil, on raw materials, on international investment income and, most interestingly, on pollution of the marine environment. They also explore the possibility of raising funds from the proceeds of exploiting resources in or under international waters, in particular manganese nodules on the ocean bed. No possibility is excluded simply because its adoption seems unlikely for the time being, but clearly, unless nation states are to abandon both part of their sovereign rights and their propensity to disagree with each other, the scope for international taxation is limited, perhaps more limited than the authors appear to realize. Again, there are serious fiscal problems when taxes are collected in different currencies, some of them inconvertible, and some with highly variable exchange rates. Certainly the political and economic complexities of international taxation made this reader wonder whether the existing system of voluntary contributions and of borrowing by international agencies is not the best possible solution in an imperfect world.

Be that as it may, nautical interest will center on the authors' ideas for taxes on polluters of the marine environment. Such taxation would raise revenue only incidentally, the main purpose being to give polluters an