

# Conon and Rhodes: The Troubled Aftermath of Synoecism

*H. D. Westlake*

RHODES was a late developer. It was not until the beginning of the Hellenistic age that the Rhodians extracted the full benefit of the environmental advantages with which their island was richly endowed and transformed it from a backwater<sup>1</sup> into one of the most prosperous and powerful states in the Greek world.<sup>2</sup> The turning point was undoubtedly the synoecism of the three hitherto independent cities, which was implemented soon after the revolt from Athens in 412, and the foundation of the new capital, Rhodes, on a well chosen site at the northern extremity of the island. For many years, however, progress towards stability and power was slow. The Spartans must have given their blessing to the two new projects and have supported the oligarchical régime which evidently assumed control after the revolt, but their interest in the island was largely confined to its value to them as a naval base. Soon after the revolt a rising against Sparta, presumably by Rhodians faithful to Athens, was threatened (Diod. 13.38.5), and although it was suppressed (13.45.1), rivalry between opposing factions doubtless continued. Lindus had had a democratic government not long before the synoecism,<sup>3</sup> though not necessarily Ialysus or Camirus, and, as will be shown below, democratic feeling was strong in the first decade of the fourth century.

Another factor retarding rapid progress was that in the closing years of the Peloponnesian war Rhodes contributed ships to the Peloponnesian fleet,<sup>4</sup> and the establishment and maintenance of this squadron doubtless diverted effort and resources which might have been devoted to the needs of the new state.<sup>5</sup> The scheme for the

<sup>1</sup> J. M. Cook, *JHS* 81 (1961) 66.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo 14.2.5–10 (652ff) presents a glowing account of Rhodes in his own day.

<sup>3</sup> As is attested by two inscriptions of which S. Accame, *Clara Rhodos* 9 (1938) 211–12 and 221, gives the texts (also Hiller at *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 110 n.4 for the second).

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 13.70.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.3. The monument erected by the Spartans at Delphi to commemorate the victory at Aegospotami included statues of two Rhodian naval commanders (Paus. 10.9.9).

<sup>5</sup> References to Rhodes in this period are almost exclusively concerned with naval operations, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.15 and 17.

development of the capital city was extremely ambitious. Unfortunately evidence from which its progress might have been traced is negligible, but the site is, by Greek standards, enormous, and the construction of public and private buildings must have continued for many years. How the population was recruited is also unknown. Diodorus in a brief note from his chronological source (13.75.1) states that the inhabitants of Ialysus, Lindus, and Camirus migrated to the new city, but if he means that these sites were abandoned, he is entirely mistaken, since all three cities, though no longer enjoying sovereign status, survived for centuries. Movements of population, even when voluntary, tended to create unrest, and there may well have been friction between the three cities arising from competing claims by each of them to direct the development of the new state. The unification of the island did not at once produce for its inhabitants any substantial benefits.<sup>6</sup>

No evidence has survived which throws any light on the fortunes of the new Rhodian state for some eight years after the end of the Peloponnesian war. Rhodes is then mentioned only as a base from which the Spartan fleet operated in the southeastern Aegean.<sup>7</sup> The Great King had been persuaded that the best way of countering the Spartan offensive on the mainland of Asia Minor was to finance the creation of a powerful fleet, which was to be under the command of Conon. One hundred ships were to be fitted out in Cyprus, and before they were all completed Conon sailed with forty of them to Cilicia.<sup>8</sup> The Spartans were evidently determined to scotch this naval threat before it became too formidable, and one hundred and twenty ships under their *nauarchos* sailed from Rhodes to Caria and proceeded to blockade Conon and his fleet at Caunus. When, however, after some four or five months,<sup>9</sup> Artaphernes and Pharnabazus arrived to the rescue, presumably by land, with powerful forces, the Spartans had to abandon their blockade and sailed back to Rhodes (Diod. 14.79.4–5). Conon then received a reinforcement, doubtless

<sup>6</sup> Cf. M. Moggi, *I Sinecismi interstatali greci I* (Pisa 1976) 222.

<sup>7</sup> Diod. 14.79.4. The importance of Rhodes as a Spartan headquarters at this time is illustrated by an obscure reference to the trial there of Ctesias before some Spartan envoys when he was acting as a diplomatic agent for the Great King (Ctesias *FGrHist* 688F30).

<sup>8</sup> Diod. 14.39, Just. 6.1.7–9. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328F144 dates these developments to the archonship of Suniades (397/6), but unfortunately only a few words of the fragment are decipherable.

<sup>9</sup> C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca 1979) 188. Many scholars have pointed out that Isocrates 4.142 is guilty of a characteristic exaggeration in stating that the blockade lasted three years, cf. E. Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika* (Halle 1909) 69.

from Cyprus, so that his fleet was increased to eighty ships with which he moved to Loryma, a harbour-town on the mainland nearest to Rhodes.<sup>10</sup> Thereupon the Rhodians, after expelling (*ἐκβαλόντες*) the Peloponnesian force, revolted from Sparta and received Conon with his whole force into their city (Diod. 14.79.6).

It is not in the least surprising that there was some enthusiasm at Rhodes, at least among the populace, for an association with Persia and for a breach with the Spartans, who had alienated their allies by imposing oppressive régimes, as Isocrates affirms.<sup>11</sup> The new Rhodian state was not yet strong enough to establish its independence from external intervention by major powers, but any reluctance felt for submission to the Great King must have been tempered by the knowledge that his fleet was under the command of the Athenian Conon. There are, however, two very puzzling features in the account of the Rhodian revolt from Sparta as recorded by Diodorus. The first is military. Diodorus certainly appears to be convinced that Conon and his fleet did not play an active part in the expulsion of the Peloponnesians but remained at Loryma until after the enemy had withdrawn from Rhodes.<sup>12</sup> How then did the Rhodians, whose military resources must have been relatively modest, succeed in expelling the Peloponnesian fleet of one hundred and twenty ships, which doubtless carried the normal complement of marines and controlled the harbour of the new city?

This difficulty has long been appreciated by modern scholars, who have offered various explanations. A recent suggestion is that Conon by means of a feint towards the west enticed the Peloponnesians to sail out of the harbour, which the Rhodians, acting in collaboration with him, proceeded to close.<sup>13</sup> This ingenious idea, though it renders unnecessary the conclusion of others that Diodorus is wholly mistaken in crediting the Rhodians with the expulsion of the Peloponnesian fleet, has no evidence to support it and is incompatible with his clear implication that Conon remained at Loryma. It is also unlikely that Conon would have run the risk of being forced to fight a naval battle against a much superior force,<sup>14</sup> and the Peloponnesians

<sup>10</sup> Diodorus here refers merely to 'the Chersonese', but from 14.83.4 it is clear that Conon made his base at Loryma, which P. M. Fraser and G. E. Bean, *The Rhodian Peraea and Islands* (Oxford 1954) 59–61, locate at Bozuk, *cf.* Diod. 5.60.1.

<sup>11</sup> 4.142, *διὰ τὴν χαλεπότητα τῶν πολιτειῶν.*

<sup>12</sup> As is pointed out by I. A. F. Bruce, *CQ* n.s. 11 (1961) 166. Conon was doubtless unwilling to engage the Peloponnesian fleet, which at this stage heavily outnumbered his own, especially as he could expect before long to receive further reinforcements.

<sup>13</sup> R. M. Berthold, *Historia* 29 (1980) 35–36.

<sup>14</sup> *Cf. supra* n.12.

were certainly capable of returning and regaining control of Rhodes if Conon eluded them. Other scholars have suggested that the Spartans withdrew most, if not all, of their fleet, on their own initiative, and that it was not, as Diodorus states, expelled by the Rhodians. If an explanation on these lines is to be regarded as at all credible, some very compelling motive must be found to account for the Spartan decision to abandon a base which had for more than a decade proved extremely valuable and would now very probably pass into the hands of Conon acting on behalf of the Great King. Beloch suggests that Agesilaus ordered most of the Peloponnesian fleet to sail to the Hellespont to assist him in his operations against Pharnabazus in Phrygia.<sup>15</sup> It is, however, difficult to understand what advantage Agesilaus can have expected to derive from naval support, especially as Pharnabazus does not appear to have had many, if indeed any, ships at his disposal in that area. De Sanctis maintains that the Spartans withdrew their fleet from Rhodes early in 396 to safeguard the disembarkation of Agesilaus and his expeditionary force in Asia.<sup>16</sup> This explanation is somewhat more convincing, but again the value of naval support is questionable: the creation of a Persian fleet under Conon was proceeding slowly, and it can hardly have been already in a position to threaten the transportation of Agesilaus and his forces across the Aegean to Ephesus. The sources give no indication that he felt in any danger while at sea. Any additional security that a naval escort might have provided could scarcely compensate for the loss of the Rhodian base, if it could otherwise have been retained.

It does indeed seem necessary, as Beloch and De Sanctis maintain, to reject the statement of Diodorus that the Rhodians expelled the Peloponnesian fleet,<sup>17</sup> but a more promising approach to the problem is to consider Spartan reactions to the reports reaching Greece of Persian plans to assemble a powerful fleet for service in the Aegean. A Syracusan merchant brought news to Sparta from Phoenicia, in the autumn of 397 or the spring of 396, that a fleet of three hundred ships was being mobilized there for a purpose which was not publicly known (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1). At the same time the Spartans must have been aware that another fleet of one hundred ships was nearing

<sup>15</sup> *Griechische Geschichte* III.1 (Berlin/Leipzig 1922) 42 n.2.

<sup>16</sup> *AttiTor* 66 (1931) 165. His view is accepted by G. Barbieri, *Conone* (Rome 1955) 117.

<sup>17</sup> Diodorus may perhaps have misunderstood a sentence in his source in which the subject was the Peloponnesian fleet and the verb some part of *ἐκπίπτειν*, and have assumed that, as so often but not invariably, the verb was serving as the passive of *ἐκβάλλειν*.

completion in Cyprus to serve under Conon.<sup>18</sup> When, as has been noted above, their attempt to stifle this development by blockading Conon at Caunus had proved ineffective, the vulnerability of their Rhodian base must have become increasingly clear. Their efforts to obtain assistance from Egypt produced naval equipment and corn, which in fact arrived after their withdrawal, but no ships or troops were sent (Diod. 14.79.4, 7). If their admiral were to be defeated in Rhodian waters by a much superior Persian fleet, he might find himself in serious difficulties, especially as many Rhodians were evidently disaffected and no other Spartan base was near at hand. The Spartans had committed themselves to an ambitious offensive on land conducted by Agesilaus and may well have decided to adopt, at least for the present, a defensive strategy at sea by withdrawing their fleet to Ephesus, where it could be protected from attack. If the crusade led by Agesilaus proved successful, naval action might prove unnecessary and Rhodes be recovered without much difficulty. The Spartan government was doubtless conscious that forces financially maintained by the Great King seldom remained operationally effective for long periods, because he so often allowed their pay to fall into arrears.<sup>19</sup> The arrival of ten Cilician and eighty Phoenician ships to reinforce Conon before the end of 396 (*Hell.Oxy.* 9.2, Diod. 14.79.8), thereby increasing his fleet to one hundred and seventy, would appear to have endorsed the decision of the Spartans in having earlier withdrawn from Rhodes, though the Phoenician contingent was not so strong as had been anticipated.

The second of the two problems arising from the surviving record of events at Rhodes in 396/5 is political and will now be considered. It had been in consequence of an invitation ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων that in 412 the Peloponnesian fleet under Astyochus had sailed to Rhodes, which promptly revolted from Athens (Thuc. 8.44.1–2). Modern scholars have with good reason suggested that a leading instigator of the revolt was Dorieus,<sup>20</sup> the famous athlete and mem-

<sup>18</sup> The opinion attributed to Lysander that “the Greeks would be much superior at sea” (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2) is incompatible with the evidence of the reports reaching Sparta and was doubtless expressed by him when urging the acceptance of his plan for the expedition led by Agesilaus. His motives were personal: according to Xenophon, he sought thereby to reinstate his decarchies in Greek cities.

<sup>19</sup> *Hell.Oxy.* 19.2 Bartoletti. In fact, Conon had soon for this reason to deal with a serious mutiny (*Hell.Oxy.* 19–20), and when the battle of Cnidus was fought in 394 the Persian fleet had somehow dwindled to “more than ninety,” if Diodorus (14.83.4) is to be believed, though at least some Phoenician ships still remained (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.11).

<sup>20</sup> H. Swoboda, *RE* 5 (1905) 1561 s.v. “Dorieus 4”; Andrewes in A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* V (Oxford 1981) 91.

ber of the aristocratic Diagorid family from Ialysus. He was not at Rhodes at the time because he had been banished by the Athenians but had recently joined the Peloponnesian fleet with a contingent from Thurii.<sup>21</sup> In 395 the Diagorids and their supporters were ousted from control of Rhodes by a revolutionary coup, and their victorious opponents established a democracy (*Hell.Oxy.* 15.2–3). From this evidence it may be deduced with some confidence that in the intervening period from 412 to 395 oligarchy predominated and that after the synoecism an oligarchical government centred upon the new capital and headed by the Diagorids controlled the whole island. In 396, when the revolt from Sparta took place and Conon with his Persian fleet was admitted, apparently without opposition, this oligarchical government was certainly still in office. It is true that, according to a fragment of Androtion (*FGrHist* 324F46), the Rhodian *demos* was persuaded by Conon to revolt from Sparta and to come to terms with Persia instead. If, however, this statement means that Rhodes was governed by a democracy at the time of the revolt, it is demonstrably false. The Oxyrhynchus historian makes abundantly clear in his detailed account that the Diagorid faction still retained its power at Rhodes when the forces of Conon were already well established there (15.2–3), probably at least a year after the revolt.

There has been widespread agreement among scholars that the Diagorids welcomed the opportunity to transfer their allegiance from Sparta to Persia.<sup>22</sup> This conclusion might appear to be corroborated by the Spartan decision to execute Dorieus, who was in the Peloponnese at the time.<sup>23</sup> It is, however, highly questionable. The Diagorids had benefited handsomely during the last decade and a half from their ties with the Spartans, whose support had not only rendered possible the revolt from Athens and the subsequent synoecism but was also almost certainly responsible for the acquisition and maintenance of the authoritative position which the family had long enjoyed. It is difficult to imagine what positive advantages the Diagorids can have hoped to gain by deciding to abandon Sparta and to admit a Persian fleet commanded by an Athenian with Athenian subordinates. A spontaneous *volte face* on their part is most improbable. A more acceptable conclu-

<sup>21</sup> Thuc. 8.35.1. Later he was sent to Rhodes to deal with a threat of revolt against Sparta (see *supra* 333).

<sup>22</sup> Meyer (*supra* n.9) 73, who comments that they adopted this policy "ohne zu bedenken, dass sie dadurch ihrer eigenen Existenz die Axt an die Wurzel legten"; Bruce (*supra* n.12) 167; Berthold (*supra* n.13) 36; P. Funke in *Festschrift F. Vittinghoff* (KölnHistAbh 28 [1980]) 61–62.

<sup>23</sup> His execution will be discussed *infra* 342f.

sion, based on what is known of the circumstances at the time and especially of the democratic rising in the following year, is that their decision was a *pis aller*; that it was forced upon them by a most dangerous situation and was reluctantly adopted by them as the only course whereby they could prevent the immediate fall of their own oligarchical government, which might cost some of them their lives. There have been many occasions in history when a ruling faction has committed itself to a policy of which it disapproved in order to remain in office. For example, Achaean oligarchs came to terms with Epaminondas whereby they retained their authority, although, as the sequel shows, their sympathies lay with Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.42–43).

The Diagorids were doubtless aware that Sparta had become increasingly unpopular with the Rhodian *demos*, and they probably foresaw the withdrawal of the Peloponnesian fleet some time before it sailed, whether or not they were officially informed. From the fragment of Androtion cited above it may be inferred with some confidence, despite inaccuracies on other points,<sup>24</sup> that Conon, while still at Caunus, established contact initially with democratic elements at Rhodes with the intention of further stimulating their known hostility to Sparta. These circumstances must have alarmed the Diagorids. The only salutary course of action whereby they might hope to retain their authority would appear to have been to adopt the doubtless distasteful expedient of negotiating an agreement with Conon before the Peloponnesian fleet withdrew. While he was still at Caunus, he could be expected to give them an assurance, in return for an undertaking on their part to grant him unopposed access to their city, that he would not support any attempt to overthrow their régime.<sup>25</sup> That they concluded an agreement on terms such as these is a hypothesis and cannot be proved. It does, however, receive considerable support from the account by the Oxyrhynchus historian of the democratic revolution in the following year, since it offers an explanation of the extremely puzzling part played by Conon, a prominent feature which will now be examined.

The beginning of this account is missing in the papyrus, and its loss contributes to the obscurity of the episode. The extant portion

<sup>24</sup> In addition to the mistake noted above Androtion is also in error in stating that Rhodes joined "the alliance of the Great King and the Athenians." Athens was not in league with Persia, and Conon was serving as an admiral of the King, not of his own city, though he received surreptitious aid from some Athenians (*Hell. Oxy.* 6.1, 7.1). Funke (*supra* n.22) 63 rightly maintains that Athens was not involved at this stage.

<sup>25</sup> At this time the imminent withdrawal of the Peloponnesians was doubtless widely believed to be only temporary. If they had been victorious at Cnidus, they would almost certainly have regained control of the island.

(15.1–3) may be summarized as follows, emphasis being laid upon the rôle of Conon. He gave orders for a daily review of his troops at the harbour, ostensibly to prevent a relaxation of discipline but really to encourage the democratic conspirators.<sup>26</sup> He then left for Caunus with twenty ships, wishing to be absent when members of the ruling faction were assassinated and leaving two subordinates to deputize for him and “take charge of the situation.” On the next day these officers stationed under arms at the harbour some of the troops attending the regular review and others at a short distance from the agora. The conspirators assembled in the agora armed with daggers and killed the Diagorids and eleven others. They then called together the Rhodian populace to the *ecclesia*, and when Conon arrived back from Caunus, they abrogated the existing constitution and established a democracy. They also banished a few citizens.

This passage makes abundantly clear that, if Conon was not actually an instigator of the coup, he was determined that it should succeed. Yet, if the Diagorids had willingly abandoned their ties with Sparta and had recently welcomed him with his Persian fleet, why was he now so eager to remove them, and with the least possible delay? He must have had a good reason for distrusting them, presumably fearing that, if he were absent, they might turn against him and encourage the return of the Peloponnesian fleet, which remained a real possibility until it was defeated at Cnidus.<sup>27</sup> He could not afford to procrastinate, because the Persians were failing to supply him with pay for his men. If his forces were to remain effective, he must soon leave Rhodes to appeal for funds to his Persian paymasters, and his absence would be protracted if, as seemed likely, he had to travel to the Persian court. His determination to bring about the prompt elimination of the Diagorids is endorsed by the precautionary measure, which in fact proved to be unnecessary, of having detachments of his

<sup>26</sup> In 15.1 the reading *παρασκευάζειν προθύμους* supported by Bartoletti is preferable to *παρασκευάσας ἡσύχους* supported by Bruce (*supra* n.12) 169–70; Conon “wishing to make the Rhodians (*sc.* the conspirators) eager to . . .” rather than “after putting the Rhodians (*sc.* the populace) at their ease.” Conspirators about to risk their lives would inevitably be nervous and need encouragement. That the Oxyrhynchus historian refers to them merely as “the Rhodians” is characteristic of his somewhat clumsy style. It is a serious objection to the reading favoured by Bruce that it represents Conon as “wishing to embark there and then (*τηνικαῦτα*) on his tasks,” when he is in fact on the point of absenting himself from the scene of action. The emphatic *τηνικαῦτα* renders the phrase far more appropriate to the conspirators than to Conon. In his *Historical Commentary on the ‘Hellenica Oxyrhynchia’* (Cambridge 1967) 97–98, Bruce prints a speculative restoration of the text which he later abandoned: it is not at all convincing.

<sup>27</sup> See *supra* n.25. Berthold (*supra* n.13) 37 rightly maintains that his principal aim was to keep Rhodes out of Spartan hands.

troops stationed at strategic points while the democratic conspirators were assembling. The orders issued to his subordinates whom he left in command of these troops when he sailed for Caunus are not precisely defined. It is, however, very probable that they had his authority to resort, if the need arose, to armed intervention to ensure that the Diagorids did not survive.<sup>28</sup>

The narrative of the Oxyrhynchus historian stresses the determination of Conon not only to ensure the success of the democratic coup but also to avoid incurring any suspicion of personal responsibility for it. Conon undoubtedly felt that he might be accused of bad faith in even sanctioning the overthrow of the Diagorids. The Oxyrhynchus historian, whose presentation of Conon is consistently favourable, does not explicitly mention this charge but is too honest to suppress the facts upon which it might justifiably be based. Conon could be thought to be guilty at least of ingratitude towards the Diagorids<sup>29</sup> if, as most scholars believe, they had in the previous year deliberately turned against Sparta and welcomed his arrival. If, on the other hand, as has been suggested above, he had guaranteed their continuance in office in return for being admitted to Rhodes without opposition, he had a far more cogent reason for concealing his part in the plot against them, since he was in that case indisputably guilty of violating an undertaking probably given under oath.

A noteworthy feature of the episode is that of the oligarchical leaders only the Diagorids and eleven others were killed by the conspirators and a small number banished by the assembly (*Hell. Oxy.* 15.2–3). Outbreaks in inter-factional violence in Greek cities seldom claimed so few victims. There may well have been reasons, of which the extant evidence gives no hint, for this unwonted restraint, but Conon, who evidently had considerable influence with the conspirators and had returned to Rhodes before the assembly gave its verdict on the surviving oligarchs, may well have been responsible. He is

<sup>28</sup> Bruce (*supra* n.12) 169–70 suggests that their instructions were to secure that, if the coup failed, as many as possible of the conspirators escaped. Relations would, however, have become irreconcilably hostile between the Diagorids and Conon if they had remained in office and his troops were known to have protected conspirators who had tried to assassinate them. Funke (*supra* n.22) 64 believes that Conon could have denied complicity in the plot if it had been unsuccessful. He would, however, have had to explain why he had stationed his troops at strategic points, and it is difficult to understand why he took this action at all if they were under orders to remain passive whatever the outcome might be.

<sup>29</sup> *Cf.* Bruce (*supra* n.26) 99. Hamilton (*supra* n.9) 227 suggests, not altogether convincingly, that Conon wished to appear innocent of complicity in the plot because other states might be deterred from joining him by fears of being exposed thereby to revolutionary outbreaks.

likely to have urged restraint, feeling that a massacre of the oligarchs, who had apparently trusted him, would damage his reputation and be thought to confirm the suspicion that he had betrayed them.

Conon conformed to the pattern of military and political leaders in his day who were essentially practical<sup>30</sup> and did not hesitate to adopt Machiavellian methods in pursuit of their aims. The unscrupulousness ascribed to him in the above reconstruction of his relations with the Rhodians is fully in accord with the record of his actions on other occasions. As a mercenary leader he was in command of heterogeneous forces only too likely to become undisciplined, especially if they were inadequately paid. Shortly after the episode discussed above he had to deal with a mutiny by Cypriots at Caunus, of which the Oxyrhynchus historian gives a detailed account (20). It is clear that in suppressing this mutiny and seizing its leader he acted unscrupulously, perhaps even treacherously.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, it is necessary to consider the execution of Dorieus by the Spartans, mentioned above, which is known from a fragment of Androtion (*FGrHist* 324F46). This fragment is quoted by Pausanias in a passage outlining the political and military career of this famous Diagorid (6.7.4–6). According to Androtion, Dorieus was not at Rhodes when the revolt from Sparta took place but was absent on a visit to the Peloponnese; he was arrested by some Spartans and taken to Sparta where he was convicted, apparently of damaging Spartan interests (*ἀδικεῖν*), and put to death. Modern scholars have inferred from this fragment that he must have been in favour of transferring the allegiance of Rhodes from Sparta to Persia and that the purpose of his visit to the Peloponnese, like the mission of Timocrates, also a Rhodian, was to foster support for the cause of Persia and to stir up hostility against Sparta.<sup>32</sup> This conclusion is not at all cogent.<sup>33</sup> All the evidence on the earlier stages of his career shows him to have been a loyal and courageous partisan of Sparta, and while nothing is known of his activities since 407, it is even less likely that he consented to

<sup>30</sup> Meyer (*supra* n.9) 74.

<sup>31</sup> The Oxyrhynchus historian, who seeks to acquit him of sharp practice and praises his achievement (20.6), is undoubtedly somewhat prejudiced in his favour, as has already been noted, and tends elsewhere to be impressed by subterfuge, even if involving an element of deception (*cf.* 17.1; 18.1–4 on Androcleidas and Ismenias).

<sup>32</sup> Meyer (*supra* n.9) 73–74; Barbieri (*supra* n.16) 117–19; Funke (*supra* n.22) 61.

<sup>33</sup> F. Jacoby *ad loc.* n.6 (p.140), who even suggests that the story of his execution may perhaps be “an invention of an anti-Spartan publicist,” is inclined to reject any possibility that he lent his services to Persia. R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 369, is also sceptical.

act as a Persian agent<sup>34</sup> than that his family chose willingly to welcome the Persian fleet commanded by Conon.

Other factors point in the same direction. Pausanias, after his verbatim quotation from Androtion, adds a sentence comparing the treatment of Dorieus by the Spartans with that of Thrasyllus and the other generals in command at Arginusae by the Athenians.<sup>35</sup> This comment, by equating Dorieus with the Athenian generals, suggests that he was, ostensibly at least, serving the cause of Sparta, just as they were serving that of Athens. Pausanias also refers to the charge of over-hastiness brought against the Athenians in their treatment of the generals, implying that the Spartans had been too hasty in condemning Dorieus, who might otherwise have been acquitted. Similarly, in the fragment of Androtion Dorieus is stated to have been arrested (*συλληφθέντα*) by the Spartans. Normally this verb, in prose at least, denoted the detention of a person over whom jurisdiction is claimed,<sup>36</sup> rather than of an acknowledged enemy.<sup>37</sup>

Why Dorieus was in the Peloponnese when he was arrested can only be guessed. His visit could have been made for personal reasons, but he may well have been sent, because of his long-standing association with the Spartans, to convince them that by their withdrawal from Rhodes they had left the Diagorid faction with no alternative to the reluctant conclusion of an agreement with Conon, and to urge them to return while an oligarchy favouring their cause remained in power. The Spartans, who seldom showed any gratitude, or even understanding, in their relations with other Greeks, tended, especially in this period, to charge with high treason anyone whom they suspected of disloyalty towards themselves.<sup>38</sup> They may well have refused to believe that he and his family still favoured Sparta and have found in him a scapegoat for their setback in having to abandon a valuable base.

The events of 396/5 show that the synoecism of Rhodes, though initiated more than a decade earlier, had not yet afforded any pro-

<sup>34</sup> He had been the leader of violent protests in 411 when the Persian subsidy, from which the crews of the Peloponnesian fleet, including the Thurian contingent under his command, received their pay, was deliberately allowed by Tissaphernes to fall into arrears (Thuc. 8.84.2).

<sup>35</sup> 6.7.7. This comparison is perhaps made independently by Pausanias and not derived from Androtion, cf. Jacoby *ad loc.* (pp.155–56).

<sup>36</sup> This sense is common in Thucydides and in the orators; for example, Lys. 12.7, 26, 30, 32, 34.

<sup>37</sup> The translation by Frazer 'arrested' (LCL) is to be preferred to 'captured' by G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 355.

<sup>38</sup> Jacoby *ad loc.* n.6 (p.139).

tection against interference and exploitation by major powers combined with violent conflicts between rival factions. This evil was one from which Greek states even with abnormally large citizen-bodies and plenty of natural resources were seldom immune. A few years later a comparable situation arose from which the Rhodians suffered even more severely.<sup>39</sup>

ST JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE  
*October, 1983*

<sup>39</sup> See my paper "Rival Traditions on a Rhodian Stasis," *MusHelv* 40 (1983) 239–50.

It was not until this paper had been completed that a substantial and valuable note by E. Ruschenbusch, *Hermes* 110 (1982) 495–98, which covers some of the same ground, came to my notice. His chief concern is to challenge the conclusion of Funke (*supra* n.22) that the overthrow of the Diagorids was caused by internal dissensions and not by external pressure. On this point his arguments are, in my opinion, convincing. In addition, I agree with him against Funke and others that the Diagorids did not of their own free will adopt a policy of collaboration with Persia and that Conon was prepared, if necessary, to use his troops to ensure the success of the democratic coup. Ruschenbusch does not, however, deal with some important questions: (a) why the Spartans withdrew from Rhodes when they were far too powerful to have been expelled by the Rhodians and their fleet was still much superior to that of the Persians; (b) why Conon did not establish a democratic régime soon after he reached Rhodes; (c) why the Spartans executed Dorieus.