

Continuidade na renovação? Ten years of multiparty politics in Mozambique: roots, evolution and stabilisation of the Frelimo–Renamo party system

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ABSTRACT

Post-conflict elections in Mozambique, held in 1994, 1999 and 2004, established a formally competitive and pluralistic system. This paper examines the country's emerging two-party system as an essential feature affecting prospects for democratic deepening and consolidation. The condition for political parties to actually help the establishment of democratic politics is their development as durable, socially rooted, country-wide effective and legitimate organisations. The paper contends that the current party system has indeed been a major instrument for political expression and for the channelling and peaceful management of conflicts. It shows how both Frelimo and Renamo – and the competition between them – have deep-seated historical origins and well-established regional roots. Yet, a number of aspects concerning the Mozambican party system negatively affect the deepening of democratic politics: the legitimacy of the party system is weakened by post-conflict polarisation and uncertain mutual recognition; the ethno-regional entrenchment of the two main parties bestows a communal connotation on electoral competition; and most importantly, the party system remains unbalanced and unevenly institutionalised, with Frelimo's disciplined and fundamentally institutionalised organisation opposed by a strongly personalistic and weakly organised Renamo, which struggles to operate within state institutions and to accommodate internal differences.

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INTRODUCTION

Political parties are unique instruments for the non-violent transfer of democratic political power. Their function is all the more relevant in transitions from civil war to peaceful politics, since a party system can be the key channel through which formerly violent contestants for power are allowed a role in a new, non-violent political game. But the possibility of establishing and developing a regular, stable and legitimate practice of democratic politics – beyond the formal adoption of multiparty elections – hinges on the *specific* features that the political parties and their system of interactions develop. Political parties, for example, may develop organisational arrangements and effective rules that constrain the behaviour of individual politicians; or alternatively, they may remain labels that are entirely manipulated by individual personalities or small cliques for purposes of personal power. In the same way, parties may maintain weak connections to and wobbly support from their own social bases, or they may be made accountable through stable links with society and its intermediary bodies. They may be perceived as the illegitimate occupants of positions of power or, on the other hand, gain popular confidence and recognition by adversaries as functionally legitimate organisations.

While the classic criteria adopted by political scientists for the analysis and assessment of party systems – i.e. the number of parties and the ideological distance that separates them (see Sartori 1976) – remain most useful tools, the study of multiparty reforms in African politics, which traditionally feature highly personalised politics, must primarily focus on the extent to which emerging party systems are institutionalised. Party system institutionalisation can be conceived as a four-dimensional process based on: ‘*stability in interparty competition*, the existence of parties that have fairly *stable roots in society*, acceptance of parties and elections as the *legitimate* institutions that determine who governs, and *party organisations* with reasonably stable rules and structures’ (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 1, emphasis added).¹ The more political parties develop as durable, socially rooted, country-wide effective and legitimate organisations, the more they contribute to the consolidation of democratic politics.

An ‘institutionalised party system’ is thus one where ‘there is stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave. Change, while not completely precluded, is limited’ (Mainwaring 1998: 68). Of course, extreme levels of institutionalisation may produce negative effects, notably a paralysis of political competition and a lack of accountability or political change. Yet comparative evidence supports the idea that an institutionalised party system is an important factor for democratic consolidation, as it tends to promote political legitimacy, electoral and horizontal

accountability, and effective governance.² An institutionalised party system reduces the space for populist appeals and candidates, keeps the personalisation of political power under check, helps restrain neo-patrimonial practices, and potentially limits the marginalisation of parliament. The latter phenomena, by contrast, normally thrive in *inchoate party systems*, the empirical opposite of institutionalised party systems. Here, electoral volatility and uncertainty, in conjunction with the weak social linkages and the poor authority and organisation of political parties, are often the terrain for the persistence of low-quality and non-consolidating democracies and for the development or retention of semi-authoritarian delegative practices. Thus, 'the institutionalisation of a party system is important if for no other reason than what its opposite – an inchoate party system – implies for how democracies function' (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 21; cf. Mainwaring 1998: 79).

The 1992 General Peace Agreement, signed in Rome by President Joaquim Chissano and guerrilla leader Afonso Dhlakama, marked the beginning of a pacted and fundamentally successful process of democratic change in Mozambique. The country's first pluralist elections, held in 1994, established a formally competitive system, which opened the political arena to the guerrillas of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo). Democratic reform was instrumental in the pacification of the country, and while Mozambique remains among the poorest countries in the world, with peace and stability restored all over the territory came dividends in the form of resumed economic activities and impressive rates of growth.

The three rounds of competitive elections held so far have confirmed the former single party in power, as Tables 1 & 2 show. Both in 1994 and 1999, Chissano, the un-elected president since 1986, was endorsed by the electorate with an absolute majority. In the parallel legislative contests, Frelimo obtained a plurality of the vote which was turned into a majority of seats in the *Assembleia da República*. The December 2004 elections, which marked the tenth anniversary of the introduction of multipartyism, gave the ruling party an even stronger mandate. To better understand the meaning of this latest contest, it is worth having a closer look at the data.

Over ten years, national elections in Mozambique have been characterised by a significant and consistent decline in the number of people who took part in them. A sharp drop was particularly evident in 2004, as turnout went down to 3.3 m, from 4.9 m in 1999 and 5.4 m in 1994. The extent to which the record low turnout was due to the heavy rains that hit parts of the country during voting days or to the disaffection of voters is unclear. One consequence of the fact that electoral turnouts fell is that the

TABLE I
Presidential elections in Mozambique, 1994–2004

	1994			1999			2004		
	Candidate	Votes	%	Candidate	Votes	%	Candidate	Votes	%
Frelimo	J. Chissano	2,633,740	53.3	J. Chissano	2,338,333	52.3	A. Guebuza	2,004,226	63.6
Renamo (-UE)	A. Dhlakama	1,666,965	33.7	A. Dhlakama	2,113,655	47.7	A. Dhlakama	998,059	31.7
PADEMO	W. Ripua	141,905	2.9	–	–	–	–	–	
UNAMO	C. Reis	120,708	2.4	–	–	–	–	–	
MONAMO/FAP	M. Dias	115,442	2.3	–	–	–	–	–	
PACODE	C. Momboya	58,848	1.2	–	–	–	–	–	
PIMO	Y. Sibindi	51,070	1.0	–	–	Y. Sibindi	28,656	0.9	
FUMO/PCD	D. Arouca	37,767	0.8	–	–	–	–	–	
SOL	C. Nhamitambo	32,036	0.6	–	–	–	–	–	
PPPM	P. Kamati	24,208	0.5	–	–	–	–	–	
(Independent)	C. Jeque	34,588	0.7	–	–	–	–	–	
(Independent)	M. Machele	24,238	0.5	–	–	–	–	–	
PDD	–	–	–	–	–	R. Domingos	85,815	2.7	
FMBG	–	–	–	–	–	C. Reis	27,412	0.9	
<i>Registered voters</i>		6,148,842			7,099,105		9,142,151		
<i>Valid votes</i>		4,941,515			4,471,988		3,144,168		
<i>Turnout (total votes)</i>		5,402,940	88.0		4,934,352	69.5	3,329,117	36.4*	

absolute number of votes received by each major party gradually declined. The notable exception to this trend was Dhlakama's vote in 1999: with only two presidential aspirants, in that year Dhlakama was able to intercept a huge part of the non-Renamo opposition vote (in fact, he obtained half a million votes more than his party did in the legislative election). The former rebel group, however, lost support over the subsequent five years, which was 'not surprising given that Renamo has been beset by squabbling and internecine conflict' (Pereira *et al.* 2003: 21). In 2002, an Afrobarometer survey found a huge difference between the proportion of Mozambicans who trusted Frelimo (61%) and the popular confidence opposition parties could count on (22%) (*ibid.*: 18–21). This favourable political climate helped the ruling party sweep the 2003 local elections, held in the country's 33 urban municipalities, by winning 29 assembly majorities and 28 mayors. The following year, as Tables 1 & 2 illustrate, national elections gave Frelimo and its presidential candidate, Armando Guebuza, twice the vote obtained by Renamo and Dhlakama: Guebuza's strong mandate was accompanied by the ruling party's almost two-thirds majority of seats in parliament. In practice, while the former single party was able to get the bulk of its supporters to vote, the opposition was hit very hard by the low turnout, probably because many of its voters felt increasingly disillusioned.

Thus, over a decade, Renamo collected three consecutive defeats. Yet a key outcome of the first election, later borne out by the 1999 and even by the 2004 results, was a quite impressive electoral performance by the guerrillas-turned-into-party. Compare it, for instance, with the failed attempt by the former rebels of the Revolutionary United Front – admittedly orphans of their jailed leader Foday Sankoh – to transform into a political party in Sierra Leone. In the 2002 post-conflict legislative election, they obtained only 1.7% of the vote and failed to win any seats (IRIN 20.5.2002). In spite of an appalling record of violence inflicted upon Mozambicans, by contrast, Renamo immediately positioned itself as an unchallenged and challenging second force under the new constitutional framework, something which could not have been taken for granted prior to the 1994 election.

The end of the civil war in Mozambique thus saw the emergence of two-party competitive politics. The inclusion of Renamo in the new party system was a major success which granted significant legitimacy to the new democratic dispensation and helped improve the rule of law. But the country's political system, which is still characterised by an ambiguous relationship between ruling party and state apparatus, a heavy centralisation of power, increasingly rampant corruption, and the feeble

TABLE 2
Parliamentary elections in Mozambique, 1994–2004

	1994			1999			2004		
	Votes	%	Seats (%)	Votes	%	Seats (%)	Votes	%	Seats (%)
Frelimo	2,115,793	44.3	129 (51.6)	2,005,713	48.5	133 (53.2)	1,889,054	62.0	160 (64.0)
Renamo (-UE)	1,803,506	37.8	112 (44.8)	1,603,811	38.8	117 (46.8)	905,289	29.7	90 (36.0)
UD	245,793	5.1	9 (3.6)	61,122	1.5	—	10,310	0.3	—
AP	93,031	1.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SOL	79,622	1.7	—	83,440	2.0	—	13,915	0.5	—
FUMO/PCD	66,527	1.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PCN	60,635	1.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PIMO	58,590	1.2	—	29,456	0.7	—	17,960	0.6	—
PACODE	52,446	1.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PPPM	50,793	1.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PRD	48,030	1.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PADEMO	36,689	0.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
UNAMO	34,809	0.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PT	26,961	0.6	—	111,139	2.7	—	14,242	0.5	—
PALMO	—	—	—	101,970	2.5	—	9,263	0.3	—
UMO	—	—	—	64,117	1.5	—	—	—	—
PADELIMO	—	—	—	33,247	0.8	—	3,720	0.1	—
PANAOC	—	—	—	24,527	0.6	—	—	—	—
PPLM	—	—	—	11,628	0.3	—	—	—	—
PASOMO	—	—	—	2,153	0.0	—	15,740	0.5	—
PDD	—	—	—	—	—	—	60,758	2.0	—
PAZS	—	—	—	—	—	—	20,686	0.9	—
PARENA	—	—	—	—	—	—	18,220	0.6	—

PE-MT	–	–	–	–	–	–	12,985	0.4	–
FMBG	–	–	–	–	–	–	11,059	0.4	–
PVM	–	–	–	–	–	–	9,950	0.3	–
PAREDE	–	–	–	–	–	–	9,026	0.3	–
USAMO	–	–	–	–	–	–	8,661	0.3	–
FAO	–	–	–	–	–	–	7,591	0.2	–
CDU	–	–	–	–	–	–	1,252	0.0	–
PPD	–	–	–	–	–	–	448	0.0	–
<i>Registered voters</i>	6,148,842			7,099,105			9,142,151		
<i>Valid votes</i>	4,773,225			4,132,323			3,040,129		
<i>Turnout (total votes)</i>	5,404,199	87.9		4,833,761	68.1		3,321,926	36.3*	

Sources (Tables 1 and 2):

Data compiled by the author, largely based on various issues of Hanlon's *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*.

Notes (Tables 1 and 2):

In 1999 and 2004, Renamo ran with a coalition of minor parties known as União Eleitoral.

* The official number of registered voters was 9.1 million, but the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin* estimated the actual number of live potential voters at 7.6 million, which would imply an actual turnout at 43.6% (*Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, Election email special no.33, 3 January 2005).

Legend (both table 1 and 2):

AP (Aliança Patriótica), CDU (Congresso dos Democráticos Unidos), FAO (Frente Ampla de Oposição), FMBG (Frente para a Mudança e Boa Governação), Frelimo (Partido Frelimo), FUMO/PCD (Frente Unida de Moçambique-Partido de Convergência Democrática), PACODE (Partido do Congresso Democrático), PADELIMO (Partido Democrático Liberal de Moçambique), PADEMO (Partido Democrático de Moçambique), PALMO (Partido Liberal Democrático de Moçambique), PANAOC (Partido Nacional dos Operários e Camponeses), PAREDE (Partido para a Reconciliação Democrática), PARENA (Partido da Reconciliação Nacional), PASOMO (Partido de Ampliação Social de Moçambique), PAZS (Partido da Liberdade e Solidariedade), PCN (Partido da Convenção Nacional), PDD (Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento), PE-MT (Partido Ecologista-Movimento da Terra), PIMO (Partido Independente de Moçambique), PPD (Partido Popular Democrático), PPLM (Partido de Progresso Liberal de Moçambique), PPPM (Partido do Progresso do Povo de Moçambique), PRD (Partido Renovador Democrático), PT (Partido Trabalhista), PVM (Partido Verde de Moçambique), Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Renamo-União Eleitoral), SOL (Partido Social-Liberal e Democrático), UD (União Democrática), UMO (União Moçambicana da Oposição), UNAMO (União Nacional de Moçambique), USAMO (União para a Salvação de Moçambique).

independence of the legislative, media and judicial systems, can be at best described as an *electoral* democracy, i.e. a state that made significant changes by adopting and partly implementing fundamentally competitive elections, but still has a long way to go before it might be labelled *liberal* democracy (cf. Diamond 1999: 7ff.). This paper focuses on Mozambique's emerging two-party system as an essential feature affecting the country's prospects for democratic deepening and consolidation. The Mozambican party system is analysed in terms of its social and historical rootedness, its electoral stability, the organisation of its component parts, and its overall legitimacy. An additional section elaborates on the dynamics of inter-party relations. Finally, conclusions are drawn with regard to the effects of the current party system on the broader democratisation process.

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL BASES OF
FRELIMO AND RENAMO

The deep social and historical rootedness of Mozambique's new party system is apparent from the fact that the main political cleavage – and thus electoral competition – is heavily shaped by past patterns of conflict. Both main political parties emerged out of armed experiences whose dramatic and long-lasting divisions still profoundly affect the Mozambican society.

Established in Dar-es-Salaam in 1962, the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) was forged by the anti-colonial war fought against the Portuguese between 1964 and 1974. Backed by Zambia and Algeria, the liberation front mostly operated in the north of the country, launching its operations from rear bases in Tanzanian territory. Yet, because Frelimo's top leadership has invariably come from the south – the movement was 'essentially a coalition of cadres from the extreme south and a guerrilla mass in the extreme north' (Cahen 1998: 10) – southern dominance inevitably came to be resented, even before the new regime was established.

The adoption, in 1977, of structural and ideological measures that transformed the liberation movement into a Marxist-Leninist party had long-lasting implications. The Leninist notion of a vanguard single party, with restricted membership and party primacy over the state, implied a decision to do away with (and repress) opposition political organisations. Centrally planned and collectivist socio-economic and agricultural policies also had key political consequences. The systematic privilege accorded to the urban and industrial sectors – directly or indirectly subsidised by the state – and the combination of neglect and forced 'modernisation' for

rural communities, heavily contributed to widespread social disillusionment and bitterness. Many of the measures undertaken to achieve a revolutionary transformation of the Mozambican society, such as the forced resettlements envisaged by collective villagisation programmes or the ideological attacks on traditional institutions, deepened a sense of distance and antagonism between Frelimo and those broad sections of the population that were officially or practically identified as obstacles to development. Geographically, this antagonism became most evident in the provinces of the central and centre-north regions – Sofala, Manica, Zambezia, Tete and Nampula – which progressively turned into a fertile ground for anti-Frelimo sentiments.

In a similar environment, a conflict sparked by foreign powers met less than fierce resistance among local populations and gradually acquired some domestic support. In large areas of central Mozambique, Renamo's guerrillas were able to operate most successfully and establish links with local communities. The brutalities and the atrocities suffered by many during the civil conflict – largely, if not exclusively, committed at the hands of the rebels – have for some time drawn attention away from the underlying and growing resentment of parts of Mozambican society towards the Frelimo regime. The largely coercive recruitment of Renamo members has tended to hide a degree of tacit support that the movement enjoyed, if not for its vicious actions, at least for its effective opposition to the ruling group in Maputo. In particular, Dhlakama's movement became an outspoken defender of traditional rules and leadership, of religious beliefs and of (especially non-southern) rural communities – in other words, a protector of all those who had been penalised or marginalised under Frelimo's rule: 'the creation of a state hostile to African society ... gave rise to the hope and in some cases to the reality of withdrawing from the modern state thanks to the protection of the guerrillas' (Cahen 1998: 10–11). Thus, while it has long been acknowledged that the insurgency was initiated by Southern Rhodesia and later supported by South Africa, Renamo rapidly turned into a 'Mozambican phenomenon' (Vines 1996: 1).³

Thus, the dynamics of the civil war combined with the regime's attempts at transforming society and promoted the formation of two rival socio-political coalitions that were ripe for expression when a pluralist election was called. By the time electoral politics was introduced in the early 1990s, however, the starting conditions for Frelimo and Renamo were immensely different. Having governed for twenty years, Frelimo's leadership and cadres were tested and experienced in national government, policy- and law-making, administration of state structures, political

organisation and mobilisation, and diplomatic relations. This well-oiled former single party organisation faced the competition of newly created opposition parties, as occurred in several of the multiparty regimes that emerged in Africa during the 1990s. Renamo's guerrillas, in particular, were only hurriedly reorganised from a clandestine military movement into a national political party in the run up to the election and now faced a very peculiar challenge (Manning 1998: 188):

In other [African] countries ... the holding of elections forced parties which were mostly urban, elite-based and without much of a grassroots presence or constituency to go out and mobilize 'the rural masses' ... For Renamo, the problem is a different one ... Because of its character as a guerrilla army, Renamo has roots in large portions of the national territory. It has representatives at local levels in much of the country ... Thus, it is not an intellectual, urban-based party trying to put down roots in the countryside, but a military organisation with weakly developed administrative and political wings having to downplay its military character and strengthen its political and administrative side, largely by recruiting in the cities.

When multiparty politics was introduced in Mozambique, the political structures of the former rebels were still fragile, the internal procedures of the new party hardly effective, its presence on the ground rather unorganised, its policies in all evidence poorly articulated, and its personnel totally inexperienced in modern politics and administration.

TWO-PARTY ELECTORAL COMPETITION

The relative stability displayed by party competition in Mozambique's three elections allows some tentative inferences regarding the future development of the country's party system: a clear pattern of two-party competition has emerged that seems likely to be confirmed by further elections.

The 1992 General Peace Agreement was an elitist agreement between the top leaderships of Frelimo and Renamo. Not only were the unarmed political oppositions marginalised, but the country began moving towards its first multiparty election despite the fact that a majority of Mozambicans, when consulted by the government, expressed themselves against the abandonment of the single party regime (Manning 1997: 91; Hall & Young 1997: 210; see Harrison 1996 on the elitist character of the transition). The extent of actual popular support for the signatories of the accord was yet to be proven. This was notably the case for Dhlakama's rebel movement: on the eve of the 1994 election, it was not uncommon for analysts to point out that 'Renamo's prospects are ... bleak given its

TABLE 3

Legislative, presidential and parliamentary presidential electoral volatility for the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections in Mozambique and for 30 other African countries

	<i>Mozambique (%)</i>	<i>African average (%)</i>
Parliamentary volatility	13.5	28.4
Presidential volatility	15.0	29.6
Parliamentary-presidential volatility (average)	10.7	24.9

Source: Mozambique: author's calculations; other African countries: Kuenzi & Lambricht 2001: 449, 452.

Note: If one assumes that the Renamo–União Eleitoral 1999 vote must be compared to the 1994 vote of Renamo plus that of UE parties that were running on their own, and if similar adjustments are made for other minor instances of inter-party alliances, slightly different figures are obtained for parliamentary volatility (13.8%) and presidential volatility (11.5%).

infamous reputation for brutality during the civil war' (Simpson 1993: 336). Yet the former rebels surprised most observers by winning an average 36% of the vote in the country's first presidential and parliamentary multiparty elections.

Pedersen's index of electoral volatility allows us to quantify the stability of inter-party competition in Mozambique and to compare it with other experiences.⁴ The index measures the net percentage of votes that, from one election to the next, shift from one party to another. In other words, the lower the volatility, the more stable is the number of votes that parties receive over time and, as a consequence, the more stable the structure of the party system as a whole. Between 1994, 1999 and 2004, legislative volatility in Mozambique averaged a moderate 13.5%, roughly half of an African mean as high as 28.4% (Table 3). Over the same period, electoral volatility in the country's presidential contests, at 15%, was higher than its legislative volatility, but it still measured half the African average (29.6%). The preponderance and stability of Frelimo–Renamo competition in Mozambique is also evident across types of elections, i.e. when measuring the discrepancy between the votes obtained by a party in a given parliamentary election and those that the same party obtains in a corresponding presidential election. Parliamentary presidential volatility in Mozambique measured 14.3% in 1994, 12.7% in 1999 and 5.2% in 2004, averaging 10.7% against an African mean of 24.9%. These figures imply that turning an erratic game of bullets into a seemingly regularised count of ballots did not change who the main contestants for power are: at the beginning of the new century as in the late 1970s, political rule in Mozambique is still the result of a Frelimo-versus-Renamo confrontation.

Electoral competition in Mozambique also reflects the conflictual legacy of the regional divides that the country developed during its anti-colonial struggle and the subsequent civil war. The regional polarisation of Mozambican society is exposed by the results of the first three multiparty elections. Table 4 shows the number of seats obtained by the two main parties in each electoral constituency (i.e. the country's ten provinces, plus Maputo city) for the 1994, 1999 and 2004 legislative elections. The proportional representation electoral system, with multi-member constituencies, means that the share of seats obtained in a given province by a given party is a proxy for the latter's share of the provincial vote. During the first three electoral rounds, the geographical distribution of the seats won by the two major parties remained relatively stable. Only three of 11 constituencies changed hands from one election to another, namely Niassa, Nampula and Tete. By contrast, unchallenged support for Frelimo is most evident in the south of the country and in Cabo Delgado, while Renamo, despite the comprehensive defeat it suffered in 2004, still won by large margins in its heartland areas of Sofala and Zambezia.

BUILDING SOUND PARTY ORGANISATIONS?

The organisational development of individual parties is a third necessary component of any process of systemic institutionalisation. Yet, while the establishment of a sound organisation on the part of one of the parties in the system may prompt organisational responses from the others, such responses do not always take place, and organisational imbalances may persist within the same party system (cf. Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 6ff.), as appears to be the case in Mozambique.

In spite of the substantial decline in the support that Frelimo enjoys among Mozambicans – compared to the broad legitimacy it enjoyed in the 1960s and 1970s for its role in leading the anti-colonial struggle – the party remains the country's dominant organisation under the new political dispensation: one of a number of African parties that managed not only to survive the transition from one-partyism to pluralist competition, but also to remain in power.

Frelimo maintains an effective organisation that was built over two decades of monopolistic rule and that is now proving its efficacy in a multiparty context. In fact, its organisational set up has remained largely unchanged, at both national and local levels. The uninterrupted control of the state apparatus mitigated the changes that the party underwent. A formal separation of state and party structures was introduced in 1990–91, and this has reduced the direct relevance of party branches and the power

TABLE 4

Number of parliamentary seats won by Frelimo, Renamo and União Democrática by electoral constituency, 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections (figures in bold indicate which party won the majority of seats in a given constituency)

<i>Electoral constituencies</i>	<i>Registered voters (2004)</i>	<i>Seats (2004)</i>	Frelimo			Renamo (-UE)			União Democrática	
			<i>1994</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>(1994 only)</i>	
South	<i>Maputo City</i>	600,249	16	17	14	14	1	2	2	–
	<i>Maputo Province</i>	483,493	13	12	12	12	1	1	1	–
	<i>Gaza</i>	609,214	17	15	16	17	0	0	0	1
	<i>Inhambane</i>	579,356	16	13	13	15	3	4	1	2
Centre	<i>Sofala</i>	802,149	22	3	4	6	18	17	16	–
	<i>Manica</i>	531,264	14	4	5	7	9	10	7	–
	<i>Tete</i>	660,741	18	5	8	14	9	10	4	1
	<i>Zambezia</i>	1,749,121	48	18	15	19	29	34	29	2
North	<i>Nampula</i>	1,831,897	50	20	24	27	32	26	23	2
	<i>Cabo Delgado</i>	794,270	22	15	16	18	6	6	4	1
	<i>Niassa</i>	453,461	12	7	6	9	4	7	3	–
Emigrants	<i>Africa</i>		1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
	<i>Europe</i>		1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
Total	9,095,185	250	129	133	160	112	117	90	9	

Note: the allocation of the 250 seats among the various constituencies, which is based on population distribution, was slightly altered in 1999 and again in 2004.

and privileges of local party leaders (see Manning 1997: 93–4, 96). But the majority of state personnel still belong to Frelimo and thus, while state and party structures are now parallel rather than overlapping, the separation is largely an artificial one: to become real, it will have to wait until a different party takes power.

While internal party arrangements have by and large remained the same, they now have to accommodate a hugely increased party membership. Between 1977 and 1989, Frelimo developed as a party of ‘vanguard members of the working class ... [and] came to depend on a numerically weak but relatively privileged urban proletariat, a burgeoning state bureaucracy, and an external network centred on Moscow’ (Simpson 1993: 321–3). Selective requirements were meant to ensure high levels of commitment on the part of party leaders as well as of the rank and file. But when constitutional reform began to be discussed in the country, Frelimo also started to target groups who had been previously considered as ‘enemies’ – such as traditional leaders and religious communities, and even business people – and began to portray itself as an open and ‘vast front congregating Mozambicans of all social classes and strata’ (Frelimo 1997, art. 2.2).⁵ Party membership – which counted around 100,000 affiliates in the early 1980s and 250,000 in 1991 – increased dramatically, reaching the impressive figure of 1.4 million in the space of a decade.⁶

Inner processes, however, have continued to work in a top-down fashion. The authority of former combatants of the anti-colonial struggle in the *Comissão* and in the *Comité Central* has remained essentially unchallenged, in spite of the emergence of new technocrats in government and an influential parliamentary wing. ‘Freedom fighters’, who enjoy special privileges, are seen as guarantors of the superior ethics of the national leadership, in the face of the new and allegedly more corruptible politicians brought to the fore by multiparty politics. The much publicised ‘*renovação na continuidade*’ quota system, which allows the party to integrate younger generations or outsiders, also ensures a built-in conservative majority in all the party organs to which it applies.⁷

The way Armando Guebuza was selected, in mid-2002, as Frelimo’s candidate for the 2004 presidential election testifies to the strengths and limitations of the party’s organisation. On the one hand, it was not Chissano alone who appointed his successor, proving that any given individual in the party, powerful as he may be, has to take into account its institutional procedures. At the same time, however, the selection process was fundamentally oligarchic: a nomination was produced by the *Comissão*, and was then formally endorsed by the *Comité Central* and later approved by Congress. Guebuza was thus selected in a largely

consensual and disciplined, but explicitly top-down and undemocratic, manner. The party leadership hardly had any trouble in seeing its choice approved, showing that it is in full control of the party hierarchy and that the legacy of Marxist-Leninist 'democratic centralism' still exerts its powerful influence.

Renamo was originally a military organisation, and a relatively effective one, as it demonstrated by delivering peace after the peace agreement was signed in 1992. As it is currently working, however, the main opposition party manifests major weaknesses in its lack of a well-functioning organisation and, in part as a consequence, in its difficulties in operating within the new democratic institutions. The undisputed leadership of Afonso Dhlakama during the bush days played an important role in the subsequent development of the movement: 'the history of the rebellion is the history of a group completely centralised around its leader... [with a] hyper-concentration of power ... [that] could not avoid creating problems during Renamo's process of "civilianisation"' (Cahen 1998: 25). Dhlakama was not only 'a man alone' (*ibid.*: 28), but one who wished to remain so, and even under pluralist politics, he retained his unchallenged and personalist control over the party by systematically undermining the development of an effective and democratic party organisation.

The transformation of Renamo into a political party was supported by a UN Trust Fund which, in the run up to the 1994 election, handed over US\$17 million to the former rebel movement. As the transition was completed and it became clear that Renamo would not go back to the bush, the newborn party was left to walk on its own legs. Between 1999 and 2004, the party received about US\$1.4 million per year from the state, but almost half of this was apparently left unaccounted for. It is alleged that only party leader Afonso Dhlakama knows how this or other financial resources the party pulled together from private donations are spent. Most notably, money hardly trickles down to the districts. Establishing party local structures and keeping them alive with only a weak stream of funding coming in is an almost impossible task, and a chronic problem for African parties that are out of power. Renamo's branches on the ground are often little more than a flag on a member's house. Nevertheless, the sympathetic role of the many traditional leaders who have adhered to the party (see Harrison 1999: 171) was instrumental to keeping in touch with the population.

In spite of the major efforts embarked upon by the leadership to open the newly created party to qualified personnel – people who could staff its own cadre positions and represent Renamo within state institutions – the functioning of the organisation has remained almost totally in the hands of

its president and closed to either external or internal scrutiny. Dhlakama himself embodies the core of the party, the unifying centre of a network of different groups who hardly communicate with each other: groups such as the 'resistance' fighters who were in the bush (including the likes of Vicente Ululu, José De Castro or, until 2000, Raul Domingos); those 'from the cities', who had either been clandestinely active until 1992 or joined the party at that time; the former expatriates, also known as the 'Lisbon group', who supported the guerrilla from abroad; and the demobilised soldiers as well as those who joined the new Mozambican army – the FADM – who still see Renamo as their political referent.

Internal rules have little relevance to the working of the party. While party congresses should be organised every two years, for example, none was held between 1994 (when a small general meeting took place in Maringue) and 2001. In October 2001, a Congress re-elected Dhlakama as party president against two hopeless contestants who were meant to show a façade of internal democracy. A new National Council was also elected, with its membership expanded from 10–12 to 60. A new statute was approved that reportedly formalises the existence of the Political Commission after a decade or so of activity. But the restructuring of the party was again marred by confusion and overconcentration of power, and again, the personal whims of the party leader overruled formal regulations.

The authority of the Renamo president only seemed to be countered by an alternative source of internal power when a parliamentary wing of the party was formed. The (limited) autonomy of the latter, however, was undermined when, on the basis of some dubious accusations about secret deals and private interests that parliamentary party leader Raul Domingos was pursuing with the government, Dhlakama decided to expel him from the party in late 2000. It is widely believed that Domingos was perceived by Dhlakama as a threat, in view of the party Congress and an internal election for the party leadership (in fact, the former *bancada* chief went on to contest the 2004 presidential election with his own party). Less than two years on, the marginalisation of prominent figures developed into a pattern, reaching a point where total confusion seemed to dominate party affairs in mid-2002. A well-known MP was controversially suspended and another one resigned from the parliamentary group. The secretary general of the party was dismissed only months after he took office, as were the head of the party's National Council and, eventually, on grounds of 'unpatriotic' and 'undemocratic' behaviour, the whole Political Commission. Dhlakama himself took over as interim secretary general, combining the latter position with that of party leader and thus further

concentrating power and control over the party in his hands. Thus, Renamo gave a most patent manifestation of the weakness of the party's internal arrangements and of the persistence of its 'legendary disorganisation' (Cahen 1998: 30).

PROBLEMS OF PARTY SYSTEM LEGITIMACY

The fourth and final dimension of party system institutionalisation consists of a process by which political parties acquire legitimacy – i.e. a shared belief in and a broad consensus on their necessary and essentially positive functional role – both among the populace as well as between opposite political elites.

The popular legitimacy of socially rooted parties such as Frelimo and Renamo is likely to have three main sources: history, ideology and performance. As pointed out, for instance, both parties gained a significant legitimacy among specific sections of the population or areas of the country because, historically, they acted as instruments of resistance against Maputo's pre-independence or post-independence rulers. Similarly, ideology played an important role, notably in the formation of Frelimo and during its one-party regime. But, while ideology was meant to build popular legitimacy, many policies derived from it also cost the ruling party dearly, as already pointed out. Historical and ideological legacies of this kind certainly have a lasting impact on the way people look at the two major parties today. Performance, however, is likely to be an increasingly important criterion under multipartyism, as 'history' begins to embrace the notion of 'political record' and 'ideology' blurs with the notions of political platform or 'policies'. During the 1990s, for instance, Frelimo tried to strengthen its relatively weak legitimacy among the country's traditional leaders by acknowledging their role on land matters and giving them some tasks in municipal governments.

Evidence on whether political parties in Mozambique are perceived and supported as rightful and suitable organisations furthering the country's democratic politics is both relatively scarce and mixed. The very end of the civil war – that is, the acceptance of the new political set up on the part of the former rebels – can be taken as an indication of the relative legitimacy of the new party system, which is broadly acknowledged as the main channel for political participation, and the main ground where politics is to be played out. The fact that no domestic rebel or social movement has emerged since the peace agreement was signed may partly be due to the country's scarcity of resources for political activities and to the weakness of its civic associational life. But it is also a symptom that

Mozambique's main political constituencies are being represented by the party system as a whole, and notably by the two largest parties. Renamo leaders have occasionally organised vehement protests (notably the boycott of the 1998 municipal elections and the public demonstrations against the 1999 election results), or threatened a 'return to the bush' as a response to alleged malpractices on the part of the ruling group. Yet it has never been close to actually restarting the war and, in fact, it has contributed to keeping all sections of society within the new pluralist framework, thus avoiding violent challenges to the latter.

According to regional surveys carried out in Maputo, Sofala and Nampula provinces, 58.3% of ordinary Mozambicans claim they support a political party, as against 37.3% who say they do not. But political parties are perceived to be more involved in corruption than organisations such as parliament and provincial or district administrations, albeit less so than the police, the government, tribunals or entrepreneurs. While parties are believed to be more interested in ending corruption than all of the above-mentioned organisations and actors (except for the executive), almost half of those interviewed (47%) declared they had no confidence whatsoever in political parties, as against less than one in five (18.7%) saying that they trusted them (Ética 2001: 71–2, 86). These findings are, however, problematic. A different survey, for example, found that as many as 44.9% of Mozambicans express some measure of trust towards political parties, while only 20.3% state that, in varying degrees, they do not (CEP 2002: 13). A third investigation of public opinion, noted above, stressed a profound disparity between the high level of trust accorded to the ruling party (61%) and a confidence in opposition forces as low as 22% (Pereira *et al.* 2003: 21), something that was likely reflected in Frelimo's 2004 electoral landslide.

While the party system as the locus of pluralist representation enjoys some consensus, the mutual legitimacy of the two main contenders seems to be weaker. Each of them accepts, in principle, that an opposite party may gain power through the ballot box, but when it comes, specifically, to 'Frelimo' or 'Renamo', they trade hateful accusations and portray each other as bearers of inexcusable guilt. Frelimo is attacked by Renamo for its monopolisation of political power, for its centralising and undemocratic attitudes, and for the alleged manipulation of election results: relationships between parties cannot be friendly because 'there's too much political, economic and social exclusion ... [Frelimo] created an establishment and a status quo that they fear Renamo in power would destroy' (Simango *int.*). In the Assembleia, a Renamo parliamentarian having anything more than basic contacts with majority MPs undermines his own reputation

inside the party. The leadership group of the governing party, on the other hand, has long claimed a 'natural right' to rule Mozambique. Renamo's past association with rural terrorism and apartheid is a lasting memory in the mind of Frelimo politicians. The opposition's fitness to govern the country is systematically questioned to delegitimise it and present Frelimo, both domestically and internationally, as the country's only realistic option.

THE DYNAMICS OF INTER-PARTY RELATIONS

Since the new constitution was adopted in 1990, a number of minor parties have sprung up, but have made few inroads into an electorate shaped and dominated by the Frelimo-Renamo cleavage, a deeply rooted source of political identities generated by the country's past conflicts. The financial support initially provided by a UN Trust Fund for Assistance to Registered Parties to the unarmed oppositions was not enough, for most of them, to overcome the electoral threshold. Of the 18 minor parties taking part in the 1994 election, only the União Democrática alliance obtained the 5% of the vote necessary to gain representation. In the subsequent legislative contests, only the ten small parties of the União Eleitoral managed to enter parliament, through the backdoor, by forming joint lists with Renamo. In all three elections, the threshold had a significant albeit not a dramatic impact. In 2004, for instance, only 8.3% of the vote was lost to parties that did not pass the hurdle, that is, around 91.7% of the voters were represented in parliament (non-represented voters in 1994 and 1999 were slightly more numerous, around 12.7–12.8%). Unless or until some major political event generates the momentum for a third actor to challenge the current duopoly, small parties will continue to find it hard to enter parliament, as proved by the disappointing performance of a well-credited, well-financed and electorally active party such as Raul Domingos' *Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento* in the last election. State funding, which privileges parties with parliamentary representation, works as a further barrier to the success of would-be third parties.

The fragmentation of Mozambique's party system has thus remained very limited. The Laakso-Taagepera index of party system fragmentation ($ENPP = 1/\sum p_i^2$) measures the 'effective' number of parliamentary parties by weighing the relevance of each party according to its size, i.e. its share of assembly seats (p_i) (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 79). In the case of Mozambique's first three legislatures, the ENPP was 2.14 (1994), 1.99 (1999) and 1.85 (2004).⁸ Party fragmentation has long been associated with the instability not only of parliamentary governments but also of political

regimes – notably in presidential systems (see Mainwaring 1993) – and Mozambique's low score may thus have a positive upshot. In fact, the above values compare positively to those of 36 stable democracies, whose 3.16 average party fragmentation score falls between the two extremes of Botswana (1.35) and Papua New Guinea (5.98) (Lijphart 1999: 74, 76–7).

The country's gradually declining fragmentation scores reflect a shift from a first multiparty assembly where, besides the two major parties, the União Democrática also had a small representation, to a second legislature where Frelimo and Renamo confronted each other with *bancadas* of comparable sizes, and then to a third parliament in which Frelimo's majority has become overwhelming (see Table 2, above).

During the first and second legislatures, both party groups in the assembly displayed a relatively high degree of internal cohesion and voting discipline (see Macuane 2000: 104, 107ff.). But participation in parliament, as Manning (2002a) points out, represented a crucial new challenge that influenced the distinctive development of each of the two main parties, their integration in the new democratic system, and thus the latter's consolidation. In the case of Frelimo, since most party leaders are also MPs, parliament offered a welcome new arena for the party hierarchy to reshape the party identity and rationale as an 'interest articulator' and, tentatively, as a counterbalance to the party-in-government, which has been dominated by the more technocratic and economically liberal tendency in the party. For Renamo, on the other hand, parliamentary participation further exposed and exacerbated organisational and human resources lacunae, with technically poor parliamentary performances, dependence of the *bancada* on external decision-making (as Dhlakama does not sit in the assembly), frequent recourse to boycotts or extra-parliamentary strategies, and haphazard policy positions (notably on constitutional reform). In particular, as already mentioned, the creation of a parliamentary wing largely consisting of recently recruited and comparatively skilled party members initially clashed with Dhlakama's effort to maintain a personalistic and extra-parliamentary leadership style.

Parliaments are also an important locus of dialogue and socialisation between opposing political forces. But political conflict in Mozambique is deep-seated, and few contacts take place in an assembly where cross-party networks seem to be entirely absent. Especially within Renamo, there is a sustained perception that people should not talk to members of the majority – as they are 'Frelimo people' – and those who do so tend to be looked at suspiciously by their colleagues. The fact that Dhlakama never sat in parliament did not help the development of relations between the two parties. Personal negotiations between Chissano and Dhlakama were

key to the success of the transition, and to the stabilisation of the country's pluralist politics in its first years. Indeed, besides formal institutions and processes, a second 'track' for a top-leadership-level management of political conflict developed, which was based on informal and personalised negotiations. A pattern whereby 'the "losers" of formal processes are encouraged to disrupt, boycott or publicly disparage those processes in order to initiate informal bargaining [as occurred before or after the elections of 1994, 1998 (local elections) and 1999] ... is likely to undermine public confidence in formal democratic institutions' (Manning 2002b). The space for such informal and personalised negotiations, however, seems to have waned. During his last mandate, Chissano moved away from the model of inter-leadership consensus, rejecting the idea that the government needed Dhlakama's consensus on issues for which the latter insisted on being part of decision-making.

MOZAMBIQUE'S NEW DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: PEACEFUL AND
STABLE, BUT WEAK AND UNTESTED

Comparative analyses of the features displayed by the party systems emerging in Africa since the early 1990s have recently made their appearance (see Kuenzi & Lambright 2001; also Manning 2002b; Randall & Svåsand 2002b; van de Walle 2003). Such studies normally share a general starting point (the theoretical recognition of the role parties can play in consolidating new democracies), and broadly pessimistic conclusions (the structural limits met by African parties, their generally low level of institutionalisation, and their ambiguous contribution to democratic development). The unbalanced nature of most new party systems is a first problematic aspect that has been highlighted. Rather than alternation in power by different parties, African reformed polities typically display long-lasting dominance by the same party (more often than not, one that won founding elections and quickly developed privileged links with state organisations, which helped it secure subsequent elections). The large majorities that such parties pile up, election after election, can hardly be challenged by the many small, weak and volatile parties that surround the ruling group. Opposition parties are usually disorganised and fragmented, and, with no or little access to state assets, lack the resources necessary to develop their organisational structures and the capacity to mount effective campaigns. Thirdly, in most cases, African political parties appear to rest on a combination of personalistic factionalism and ethnic or religious solidarity. They normally lack significant socio-economic, ideological or programmatic foundations, as well as links with genuinely pluralist

organised interests; rather, African parties commonly emerge as clientelistic arrangements based on personal and communal loyalties. How does Mozambique fit the broader African picture with regard to the development of multiparty politics?

The end of the civil war in Mozambique paved the way to the partial constitutionalisation of the country's politics, notably through the introduction of electoral competition and its tentative routinisation. In this new context, the party system is a major instrument for political expression and for the channelling and peaceful management of conflicts. The very participation of the main political actors in the multiparty dispensation contributes to the assertion of constitutional rule and to the gradual adoption of democratic attitudes and behaviour, that is, to the progressive legitimisation and institutionalisation of competitive politics (see Diamond 1999: 65ff.; Linz & Stepan 1996: ch. 1).

The paper has shown how both Frelimo and Renamo – as well as the competition between them – have deep-seated historical origins and well-established regional roots. In this sense, the foundations of these two parties are more solid than those of many other African parties. Such solidity is reflected in the current stability of electoral competition (which is shaped by the cleavage generated by the civil war), and in the low fragmentation of the party system (which does not allow an easy entry to any third challenger). The resulting party system enables the new democratic framework to accommodate and integrate the country's most relevant political actors, and thus to gain a significant degree of legitimacy. The sustained presence of the main contenders throughout national elections, and the virtual lack of impact for the kind of 'flash' or single-election parties that have appeared elsewhere on the continent, also increase the potential for the electorate to hold the executive and legislators accountable.

Yet a number of aspects concerning the Mozambican party system are negatively affecting the deepening of democratic politics. For a start, the legitimacy of the party system is weakened by the persistence of the polarisation generated by the civil conflict, as the tough antagonism that divides the two parties only leaves marginal room for mutual recognition. Further, the relative ethno-regional entrenchment of the two main parties bestows a communal connotation on the electoral competition, which is underlined by a division of the country into Renamo-dominated *versus* Frelimo-dominated areas, a phenomenon similarly found in many other countries on the continent. Most importantly, Mozambique's two-party system remains unbalanced. This, as pointed out, is also a feature common to other African multiparty polities, where dominance by a

non-authoritarian party appears to be prevalent (see Randall & Svåsand 2002b: 35). In Maputo, power is still heavily concentrated in the hands of Frelimo, a party that has governed the country for three decades, that has repeatedly and successfully (if undemocratically) addressed the question of internal succession, and that retains a disciplined organisation and is fundamentally institutionalised. Despite its relatively stable electoral support, the Renamo opposition consists of a strongly personalistic and weakly organised party, struggling to operate within state institutions and to accommodate internal differences. In this sense, the party system went through not only a limited, but an uneven process of institutionalisation (see Randall & Svåsand 2002c: 8). The relative organisational vigour of the ruling party – crucially favoured by its control over state resources – far outdoes that of the main opposition and contrasts with the standard view of African parties. Renamo, on the contrary, is rather more established in the ‘public mind’ than in terms of functioning party internal arrangements (*ibid.*: 10). A disorganised opposition finds it difficult (and even ‘unnatural’) to try to articulate policy programmes or to scrutinise government activities in any systematic manner. The political socialisation and training of Renamo cadres are penalised by a leadership for whom skilful people are seen as potential challengers who have to be marginalised. This inevitably damages the capacity of the party to operate effectively within the democratic institutions of the state. None of this bodes well for the country’s democratic consolidation prospects.

Overall progress towards a pluralist political culture and a fully democratic politics in Mozambique has been limited. As a manifestation of illegal and unconstitutional practices, a highly increased rate of corruption risks weakening the level of citizens’ trust towards political institutions (Ética 2001: 22).⁹ So far, no significant support for non-democratic alternatives to the existing multiparty regime (such as one-partyism, traditional authority structures or the old colonial order) has been revealed by popular surveys. Mozambicans appreciate the recently acquired freedom to express their opinions, to exert their right to vote without pressures, and to belong to any organisation they like. Two-thirds of the population believe that the country is substantially democratic – albeit many of them acknowledge the persistence of ‘minor problems’ – and significantly high assessments are found in Renamo-dominated areas (Ética 2001: 96; CEP 2002: 78–9, 95); Pereira *et al.* 2003: 6, 11–2). Yet the population shows scant political tolerance towards dissent and open debate, surely the legacy of a monolithic political culture (CEP 2002: 27). Still only 43% of Mozambicans claim they can speak their mind about politics without concern, and most think that a democratic government should act like a

father guiding his children (76.1%), rather than being dependent on or at the service of its people (21.8%) (Pereira *et al.* 2003: 6; CEP 2002: 94ff.).

A major object of political controversy has been the legitimacy of electoral contests, which is not only the core of democratic politics but a key aspect for the consolidation of the new political system. Although all three rounds of national elections were recognised by observers as actual expressions of the will of the voters, in each case there were complaints about the results being either fixed by the two main parties (1994) or unilaterally manipulated by Frelimo (1999, 2004). In 1998, Renamo even staged a boycott of the country's first municipal elections. Two years later, in the northern town of Montepuez, police violence exploded at a public protest called by the party against the 1999 election results. The latest episode in the saga has been Renamo's rejection of its 2004 defeat. (Domestic and international election observers did acknowledge some voting irregularities and a certain lack of transparency, but agreed that such shortcomings did not significantly affect the result of the vote.) These episodes point, at a minimum, to a problematic acceptance of election outcomes – a problem that is shared by several other African countries. At best, the legitimacy of electoral procedures needs further verification. The so-called double-turnover test, whereby a ruling party leaves power to an election-winning opposition and the latter, in turn, does the same at a subsequent election, may provide additional corroboration. Yet, Frelimo has now been uninterruptedly in power for thirty years. The organisational ineptness of Renamo not only contributed to the ruling party's most recent electoral triumph, but raises further questions about the ability of the opposition to check and contain Frelimo's hegemonic control over the country's politics. A double-turnover is not to be expected any time soon.

NOTES

1. For a reflection on the notions of party and party system institutionalisation, including the possible tensions between the two, see Randall & Svåsand 2002c.

2. See, for instance, Morlino 1995 on southern European democracies (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), Kohli (1994) on the Indian experience, Rueschemeyer *et al.* 1992: 168 and Mainwaring & Scully 1995 on Latin American cases. For a differing view, based on study of eastern European post-communist states, see Tóka 1997.

3. The works of Vines 1996 and Geffray 1990 are a key part of a 'revisionist' school that has refocused the analysis of the civil war by emphasising the latter's domestic roots. See Hanlon 1991: 5 for a substantial rejection of such views.

4. Pedersen 1990. Pedersen's measure of the electoral volatility between two legislative (or presidential) elections is calculated as:

$$\frac{\Sigma|(\text{party X's \% at election I}) - (\text{party X's \% at election II})|}{2}$$

Volatility between a legislative *and* a presidential election ('legislative-presidential volatility') is calculated as:

$$\frac{\sum[(\text{party X's \% at presidential election}) - (\text{party X's \% at parliamentary election})]}{2}$$

5. At the 2002 Congress, the majority of the delegates were meant to come from the peasants (Simbine int.).

6. Tomé int. The 1982 figure is Cahen's (1985: 42), while the 1991 is also from Tomé.

7. According to the 'renovation within continuity' principle, a percentage of the members of each party organ (e.g. the Comissão) must be replaced at every internal election, thus guaranteeing that incumbents cannot entirely close the way to new aspirants. In 2002, for example, for the 15 members of the Political Commission, 5 had to be new members. So the Central Committee had to vote to re-elect 10 among the 15 sitting members, and then it selected 5 from a list of about 15 new candidates. The other side of the coin – i.e. the 'remaining' percentage – works as an assurance that old members will still take most positions (in the example, 66 % of the seats in the Comissão) even in a situation where, in the absence of quotas, pressures for change might have produced larger turnovers.

8. The Laakso-Taagepera index implies that, when two, three or more parties have exactly the same strength, each of them will be fully counted, giving an index value of 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 and so on. When one or more of the parties are evidently weaker, the ENP is lower than the actual number of parties. Mozambique's effective number of 'electoral parties' (ENP^e, based on the share of votes rather than on the share of seats obtained by each party) was 2.92 in 1994, 2.60 in 1999 and 2.12 in 2004, i.e. only slightly higher than the country's ENP^p values. (Since Renamo-UE presented unified lists at the 1999 election and later formed a single parliamentary group, they are here treated as one party.)

9. In the country's most notorious corruption scandal, Carlos Cardoso, a leading investigative journalist who had tried to expose major banking frauds, was murdered in 2000 with the alleged involvement of former President Chissano's son. AIM, 'Carlos Cardoso murder trial verdict – full report', 31.1.2003.

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