

Contrast, Denial and Negation*

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Lee, Hye-Kyung. (2002). Contrast, denial and negation. *Language Research* 38(4), 1257-1279.

The aim of this paper lies in providing a unified analysis of the meanings of the connective *but* in English and their counterpart particles in Korean. The two meanings of *but*, i.e., contrast and denial of expectation, are accounted for in terms of a unitary approach in which the two meanings are argued to have the same core meaning differing from each other in the amount of inference necessary to derive the representation on which the connective operates. The representations are figuratively shown by means of scales of meaning. Korean examples are also examined to show that Korean employs more complex methods of representing the relations between various meanings of *but*.

Key words: contrast, denial of expectation, scale of meaning, metalinguistic negation

1. Introduction

The meaning conveyed by the connective *but* is generally classified into two types, which are illustrated by the following examples:

- (1) a. Tom is tall *but* Bill is short.
- b. He got up early *but* he missed the train.

The first type is dubbed semantic opposition (Lakoff, 1971), contrast use (Blakemore, 1987, 1989), or external *but* (Halliday & Hasan, 1976), whereas the second is called denial of expectation (Lakoff, 1971; Blakemore, 1987, 1989) or internal *but* (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). While Lakoff assumes this distinction to be a semantic one, Dascal & Katriel (1977) and Blakemore

*I would like to thank Dr. Katarzyna Jaszczolt and two anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions. Of course, all remaining errors are mine.

(1987) argue that the two interpretations can be derived from a single meaning with reference to the context. In particular, Blakemore (1987) develops a unified analysis of the two uses of *but* and claims that *but* in both uses functions as a semantic constraint on relevance by guiding the hearer to interpret the proposition *but* introduces as being contrasted to the previous one (contrast use) or to a derived proposition (denial of expectation use). That is, the meaning of *but* is explained in tandem with her analysis of discourse connectives. It is also the case that *but* can connect two utterances that differ in their speech acts.

It is generally assumed that the meaning of *but* consists of *and* +something else, while the something else part does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance because the truth-value of the utterance connected by *but* would be decided depending on those of the two constituent propositions. Blakemore (1987), however, contends that *but* does not have *and* as part of its meaning in either use, because the sole function of *but* is to constrain the interpretation of the utterance it introduces in the specific context in which the interpretation of the preceding utterance is already made. In her later article (1989), this view is revised as to admit that at least in contrast use, *but* has *and* as part of its meaning. Contra Blakemore (1987, 1989), I argue that *but* has *and* as part of its meaning in both uses, i.e. contrast use and denial of expectation use, by providing some grammatical or syntactic evidence.

There is at least one more use of *but* that does not seem to be replaceable by *and*.

(2) A: Shut the door.

B: O. K., *but* don't give me orders. (Dascal & Katriel, 1977, p. 149)

As we can observe, (2) involves two different speech acts: a stating and a request, which is believed not to be possible in *and*-conjunction. However, contra this common belief, *and* also has a discursal function as in the following example.

(3) I don't like that. *And*, is he accepting it? (Schiffrin, 1987, p. 38)

It has been argued elsewhere that when *and* is used as a discourse connective, the propositions connected are not necessarily of equal status (Lee, 2002a, 2002b). That implies that there is a possibility that *and* can

connect two sentences that differ in speech acts. Therefore, I argue that cases like (2) do not constitute genuine counter-examples to the claim that *but* has *and* as part of its meaning.

I also hope to argue that in these three uses, the core meaning of *but* is *contrast*. (See e.g., Fraser & Malamud-Makowski, 1996; Fraser, 1998.) The difference between them lies in the level of representation in which the contrast occurs. That is, in the case of contrast use, the contrast occurs between the given propositions, whereas in the case of the denial of expectation use, the level on which the contrast occurs involves derived propositions. As we will see, the denial of expectation use requires more inference from the interlocutors than the contrast use.

I will also discuss Korean examples to show the different lexicalization of the scale of meaning. It will be shown that Korean employs more complex methods to represent the common properties of various senses of *but*.

2. Contrast Use of *but*

A typical example of contrastive use of *but* could be illustrated by the following:

(4) (=1) Tom is tall *but* Bill is short.

The lexical items *tall* and *short* form a semantic relation of antonymy that intrinsically entails the relation of contrast. According to Lyons (1977), the sense-relation that is called contrast involves various kinds, depending on the criteria of classification: binary vs. non-binary, gradable vs. ungradable, orderly vs. non-orderly, and so on. The example in (4) represents one of the many possibilities in which the notion of contrast is manifested. Here are some more possibilities that involve contrast between lexical items:

- (5) a. John gave toys to Mary, *but* Sara gave dolls to Jane.
 b. The cook fried the onions, *but* she steamed the cabbage.
 c. The WFL is a pretty good deal, [. . .] *But* the NFL is everybody's dream and few make it there. (Fraser, 1998, p. 310)

Here we can note that lexical items in each example comprise a contrast set: <toys, dolls . . .> in (5a), <frying, steaming, . . .> in (5b), and <. . ., good deal, everybody's dream> in (5c). The contrast occurs with reference to certain criterion. For example, the lexemes *toys* and *dolls* in (5a) contrast with each other in terms of things that the children are supposed to play with. Similarly, lexemes *frying* and *steaming* in (5b) are contrasted in terms of the way of cooking. In some cases, the lexical items may not constitute a strict semantic contrast set as in (5c). However, the set is somewhat *accommodated* by means of widening the scope of the notion of contrast according to the context (Hirschberg, 1985, 1991).

Concerning the so-called contrast use of *but*, I argue that as long as there are lexical items that can constitute a set of contrast, the default interpretation would be that of contrast use. In the case of (4), the contrast set would be something like <short, of average height, tall>. However, in some contexts, examples like (4) can be read as denial of expectation cases. For example, in a situation where Tom and Bill are brothers, we normally expect that if one of the siblings is tall, then the other tends to be tall as well. So, from the first conjunct of (4), we can reason the following:

- (6) a. If Tom is tall, Bill is tall. (Premise)
 b. Bill is tall. (Conclusion)

However, the conclusion in (6b) contradicts the second conjunct of (4). Analyzed this way, example (4) might be taken to be a case of denial of expectation, because a proposition derived from the first conjunct contrasts with the second conjunct. Though this kind of analysis is possible, it still seems to be likely that (4) is taken to be a contrast case by default.

It seems to be sometimes the case that the reading of *but*-constructions depends on some grammatical or syntactic factors, such as the identity of the subject, which also provides evidence that the two uses share the meaning of contrast. Let me examine the following pair:

- (7) a. His father owns a mini, *but* a Porsche as well.
 b. His father owns a mini, *but* mine owns a Porsche.

The pair in (7) is alike except for the subjects. That is, the subjects of two

conjuncts in (7a) are the same, while those in (7b) are different. This factor seems to affect the reading of the *but*-construction. As for (7a), from the first clause, we may derive an assumption that his father is poor. However, the interpretation of the second clause enables us to deny that assumption and to have the belief that he is rich. In this way, *his father* in (7a) comes to have one value in terms of wealth. Analyzed this way, (7a) should be a case of denial of expectation. In contrast, when two entities are involved as in (7b), the sequence tends to have the reading of contrast use. In the following section, the denial of expectation case will be addressed.

3. Denial of Expectation Use of *but*

Denial of expectation use of *but* refers to those cases in which the speaker denies a proposition that is derivable from the propositional content of the utterance just mentioned as in the following example. *But* in this use has a so-called cancellative function, i.e. it cancels assumptions derivable from the preceding proposition. (Bell, 1998)

(8) John is tall, *but* he's no good at basketball.

In (8), there is no pair of contrasted words that might have provided a reading towards the default contrast use. What is denied in the second conjunct is a proposition or an assumption that is derivable from the first conjunct. The hearer of (8) is believed to have access to the following reasoning and can derive a proposition that is a target for denying in the second conjunct:

(9) If John is tall, he is good at basketball.

The propositions derivable from the first conjunct could vary in their nature. In fact, the selection of the proposition is constrained by the propositional content of the second conjunct introduced by *but*. Blakemore (1987) contends that discourse connectives such as *but* have the role of constraining the interpretation of the utterance they introduce. However, it seems that discourse connectives also constrain the interpretation of the preceding utterance, as we can observe in the

analysis of (9): the connective *or* the content it introduces makes us do the reasoning in (9). Furthermore, it seems that the connective *but* or the proposition it introduces has a much more active role in constraining the way the first clause is interpreted. A sentence-based approach would not account for this phenomenon properly. This claim is evidenced by the variety of propositions that are derivable from the first proposition.

Let me illustrate the variety of the propositions that are derivable from the first conjunct depending on the context. As in (9), the derived proposition has the nature of common knowledge, i.e. tall people are normally good at basketball. Sometimes the derived proposition displays the propositional attitude of the speaker. Propositional attitudes refer to beliefs, doubt, intention, etc. towards a proposition.

(10) Tom is a dancer *but* he is not gay.

In a situation where the hearer of (10) is not aware of or not interested in the speaker's propositional attitude about the sexuality of male dancers, utterance (10) reveals it, and it can be phrased as in (11).

(11) The speaker believes that all male dancers are gay.

What is negated in the second conjunct in (10) is a proposition that Tom is gay, which in turn can be derived from the first conjunct of (10) and the belief in (11) by a series of reasoning as follows:

- (12) a. All male dancers are gay (Premise)
 b. Tom is a male dancer. (Premise)
 c. Tom is gay. (Conclusion)

Obviously the proposition that all male dancers are gay does not have the nature of common knowledge. This example also shows how the interpretation of the first conjunct is constrained by the interpretation of the second conjunct.

In some cases, the contrast occurs between the derived propositions of the two conjuncts. Note that in the preceding two examples (8) and (10), what is contrasted is a derived proposition of the first conjunct and the propositional content of the second conjunct. There is one more possibility in which the contrast occurs.

(13) He is in the office, *but* he is busy.

Let us assume that (13) is uttered by a secretary of a boss to a visitor. By hearing the first conjunct, the visitor will derive a proposition that the boss will see the visitor, which does not contrast with the explicit content of the second conjunct introduced by *but*. However, we can derive an assumption from the second conjunct that can be a candidate for the contrast with this derived proposition. That is, we can derive an assumption that the boss will not see the visitor from the proposition that the boss is busy. Thus, the contrast occurs on the level of derived assumptions rather than that of the expressed propositions. In cases like this, it is quite clear that the interpretation of each conjunct is dependent on that of the other in a specific context.

Another example of this type comes from Dascal and Katriel (1977, p. 144).

(14) (In the context: A and B are discussing the economic situation and reach the conclusion that they should hear the opinion of a specialist in economic affairs.)

A: John is an economist.

B: John is not an economist, *but* he is a businessman.

The first conjunct of B's utterance makes available the assumption that John should not be consulted, while the second one involves an opposite assumption that John should be consulted. Here again the contrast occurs between the two derived propositions.

What is common to both the contrast use of *but* and the denial of expectation use of *but* is that there is a contrast between two propositions. In the former use, the contrast occurs between the explicit propositional contents of the two conjuncts, while in the latter use, the contrast is either between a derived implicit assumption and an explicit content or between two derived implicit assumptions. As I claimed in Introduction, this does not warrant a two-way distinction between the contrast use and the denial of expectation use. Firstly, as we have examined, the same sequence can be interpreted in both ways depending on the context or the grammatical factors, which makes it untenable to maintain the binary distinction. Secondly, the contrast occurs between propositions whether the propositions are expressed ones or derived ones.

4. *But* as a Discourse Connective

The cases like (15) have been mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

- (15) (=2) A: Shut the door.
 B: O.K., *but* don't give me orders.

That is, *but* can connect two sentences that differ in their speech acts. Here are some more examples.

- (16) A: Don't you see that the door is open?
 B: I'm not blind, *but* if you want me to close it, why don't you say so straight out? (Dascal & Katriel, 1977, pp. 158-159)
- (17) A: Aren't we late?
 B: We are, *but* let's go quickly.

B's utterances in above examples contain, as the second conjunct, a request in (15), a question in (16), and a proposal in (17). The examples do not involve any lexical items that might lead to a contrast reading. However, I argue that they can be construed as communicating denial of expectation and accordingly involving contrast on the level of derived propositions. If my analysis is on the right track, then we can have a unitary approach to the connective *but*. Let us examine the above examples in turn.

First, (15B) as a whole can receive the following analysis from A's perspective:

- (18) a. If B says it's okay, then he is accepting my order and my power over him.
 b. If B asks me not to give him orders, then he is not accepting my order and my power over him.

The resultant clauses in (18a) and (18b) that are derived from the first conjunct and the second conjunct of (15B) respectively, are contrasted with each other. Hence (15B) as a whole can be regarded as a case of denial of expectation, the contrast lying in two derived propositions.

Examples (16) and (17) can also be given a similar analysis. The hearers of (16B) and (17B) might perform the following kinds of reasoning:


- (19) a. If B says he is not blind, he does not understand my intention to communicate through an indirect speech act.
 b. If B asks me to say straight out, he understands my intention to communicate through an indirect speech act.
- (20) a. If B says we are late, he thinks we'd better not go.
 b. If B suggests that we should, he thinks we'd better go.

The consequent clauses in (19a) and (19b) contradict each other. Again, we can observe that the contrast occurs on the level of derived propositions from the two given utterances. The same argument applies to the analysis given in (20).

Therefore, I argue that examples in (15), (16), and (17) are denial of expectation cases and therefore contrast cases. The difference between the apparent three uses lies in the amount of inference involved in deriving the proposition on which the contrast occurs.

I am going to represent the various meanings discussed up to now on the scale of meaning. The nature of scale of meaning has been discussed elsewhere (Lee, 2002a, 2002b). Briefly, the scale has two ends, one of which is logical meaning and the other is inferential meaning. Here, the logical meaning refers to the meaning that has the same function as that in first-order logic. On the other hand, inferential meaning is used to indicate whatever functions a connective has apart from its logical connection. The most crucial assumption concerning the scale of meaning is that the further the position of a connective is to the right end of the scale, the more inferencing is needed. Let me represent the various meanings of *but* by means of a scale.

Figure 1. The Scale of *but* in English



5. Truth-Conditional Relevance of *but*

As mentioned in Introduction, Blakemore (1987) argues that *but* does not have *and* as part of its meaning even though the sentence connected by *but* as a whole can be placed in the scope of logical operators such as *if-then* construction, which is generally used as a diagnostics for truth-conditionality of meaning.

- (21) If Susan is coming but Jane is not, then I shall cancel the lecture.
(Blakemore, 1987, p. 140).

(21) shows that the proposition, *Susan is coming but Jane is not*, as a whole is embedded into the scope of the *if* clause, although the contrast meaning conveyed by *but* does not seem to affect the assessment of the truth-value. Hence, *but* has the role of conjoining the two utterances as *and* does.

To support her argument, Blakemore suggests that there is a discrepancy between syntactic form and propositional form. That is, the syntactic representation does not necessarily reflect the propositional form. This claim seems to be supported by examples such as the following:

- (22) a. If you want to leave, you really want to leave, then I'll let you.
b. If you do this: turn left at the church, then you'll get there in five minutes. (due to Deirdre Wilson) (Blakemore, 1987, p. 141)

According to Blakemore, as we have examples such as (22) in which the antecedent does not form a conjoined proposition, the fact that the sentence connected by *but* can fall under scope of the logical operator as in (21) does not necessarily guarantee that it is a conjunction.

Contra Blakemore's claim, examples like (22) do not seem to support her argument. As Rouchota (1990) points out, even though the antecedent of (22a) is not a conjoined proposition, the utterances in the antecedent are identical in their propositional content. In (22a), the second utterance of the antecedent is used to emphasize the content of the preceding one by adding *really*. Thus, they are identical as far as the propositional content is concerned. Similarly, in (22b), the second utterance of the antecedent is a mere specification of the content of *this* in the preceding

utterance. In contrast, the content in the antecedent of (21) conveys two different processes. Hence, I would claim that the antecedent in (21) and those in (22) should not be discussed in a similar vein, because they are essentially different from each other in terms of the number of propositions they convey.

The examples in (22) might be amended to avoid reinforcement or specification so that Blakemore's argument concerning the discrepancy between the syntactic form and the propositional form might be evidenced. However, the existence of discrepancy should not be overgeneralized to include cases like (21) in which it is clearly shown that *but* has *and* as part of its meaning. As was mentioned in a preceding section, Blakemore herself admits in her later work (Blakemore, 1989) that at least in the contrast use, *but* has *and* as part of its meaning. She goes on to say that the speaker is understood to have presented a single conjoined proposition. However, I do not think this argument is convincing, because in some cases it is hard to distinguish the contrast use and denial of expectation use. Given this fact, it seems untenable to argue that only contrast *but* has *and* as part of its meaning.

Furthermore, it also seems possible that the contrast meaning of *but* itself might contribute to the truth-conditional content of what is said. An utterance like (23) might happily be used in a situation below:

- (23) (Context: A gang of robbers are discussing the robbery of a house for which two people are needed, one of whom should be tall and the other short)

It is not the case that Tom is tall but Bill is short. It is the case that Tom is tall and Bill is short. So let's send Tom and Bill this time.

Let me conclude this section by discussing cases that involve different speech acts. The question to be addressed is whether it is still the case that *but* in that use has *and* as part of its meaning. I have contended that *but* in this use is similar to *and* in a discourse use, in that both can connect propositions with unequal status. As *but* in this use would occupy a place near the inferential end, it does not have to retain the logical property. That is, it has less logical meaning of *and* than the contrast use does. Hence, whether *but* has *and* as part of its meaning does not matter in this use.

6. Contrast, Correction, and Another Dimension of Meanings of *but*

It has been noted in the studies of contrastive connectives that some languages employ distinct connectives for two different kinds of *but* connection, which are called concessive and contrastive *but* conjunctions by Horn (1985). The two are illustrated by the following examples, (24) being repeated from (14).

(Context: A and B are discussing the economic situation and reach the conclusion that they should hear the opinion of a specialist in economic affairs.)

(24) A: John is an economist.

B: He is not an economist, *but* he is a businessman.

(25) A: He is an economist.

B: He is not an economist, *but* a businessman.

In the same situation, (24B) and (25B) induce quite different interpretations. As for (24B), it has been discussed above that (24B) implies that John's opinion is worth consulting, because even though John is not an economist, he is a businessman. On the other hand, (25B) implies that there is no point of hearing John's opinion, because John is not an economist.

Even though the two uses are realized by the same lexical item in English, some languages employ different lexical items for these two uses, e.g. *aval* and *ela* in Hebrew, *pero* and *sino* in Spanish, *aber* and *sondern* in German, and *-ciman* and *-ko* or *-la* in Korean. It is true that English uses the same lexical item for these two, but there is some syntactic difference in these uses. That is, when used for the concessive meaning as in (24), the second conjunct takes the form of a full sentence, whereas in the contrastive conjunction as in (25), only the contrasted element is presented after the connective *but*. Alternatively, the contrastive conjunction can be manifested by means of juxtaposition as in the following:

(26) He is not an economist. He is a businessman.

We can notice the second conjuncts in (24B) and (25B) play quite different roles in our interpretation of the utterance. The role of the second clause of (24B) is as discussed, i.e. it has the role of denying or cancelling a derived assumption from the first conjunct. It is normally the case that the derived assumption from the second clause is perceived to be salient or correct by the interlocutors, unless the context tells otherwise. On the other hand, the second clause of (25B) has the role of providing an alternative to the negated element in the first clause. One of the grammatical characteristics of this use is that the first conjunct always carries the negative particle, though this is not a sufficient condition. Let me call *but* in this use the corrective *but*. At the same time, the second conjunct seems to provide further rectification for a derived proposition from the first conjunct. (Rouchota, 1990) For example, in the context in which (25B) is uttered, the content in the first clause allows us to derive a conclusion that John should not be consulted. The content in the second clause supports this conclusion further by providing the fact that he is a businessman whose opinion is not worth being consulted.

Horn (1985) claims that the contrastive environment shown in (25B) tends to be employed for metalinguistic negation (MN henceforth). MN refers to negation in such properties of an utterance as presupposition, implicature, phonology, morphology, style, register and so on rather than on the truth-conditional content of the utterance. The following is a typical example of MN.

(27) I did not see two MONGEESE, I saw two MONGOOSES.


Here, what is negated is not the proposition that the speaker saw two mongooses, but the plural form of the word *mongoose*. Horn's claim is based on the fact that in MN the constituent in the second clause is proposed as the appropriate substitution. In that respect, corrective negation in (25B) and MN share a common property. From a syntactic point of view, MN in English occurs in the same syntactic environments as the corrective use of *but*.

- (28) a. It isn't hot, but scalding.
 b. It isn't hot- it's scalding.
 c. #It isn't hot, but it is scalding.

- (29) a. We don't have three children, but four.
 b. We don't have three children- we have four.
 c. #We don't have three children, but we (do) have four.
 (Horn, 1985, p. 166)

With these facts, I contend that there is another dimension of the meaning of *but*, which again ranges from logical conjunction to inferential connection. The nature of inference involved in this scale is to be distinct from that involved in the scale discussed in the preceding section: it is towards a metalinguistic reading. It cannot be tested which dimension requires more inference, but I can say that the nature of the inference involved in the two dimensions must be distinct. Hence, the scale of *but* in English can be revised as follows:

Figure 2. The Scale of *but* in English (revised)



I do not have any explanation for the ordering between the denial of expectation use and the corrective use. In the mean time, it should be noted that the corrective use involves denotational rather than metalinguistic value. The similarity between the corrective use and the metalinguistic use is captured by the new dimension.

In English or French, the two dimensions can be covered by the same connective. Still, English employs syntactic devices to convey the difference of the two dimensions. As Horn (1985, p. 169) suggests, however, the syntactic devices in English are not absolute in the sense that the deviant marked examples such as (28c) and (29c) can be rendered acceptable when the context is properly given. For example,

Suppose that you have announced that you are looking for people with three children (to fill out a questionnaire, for example, or to offer aid and solace); then, if I assume that having four children qualifies me almost as well (or even better), I can nominate myself by uttering the suddenly redeemed A4b [=29c]. (ibid.)

This quotation suggests that the linguistic devices to represent the two distinct scales might not be absolute. Korean uses two different suffixes to represent the two dimensions in Figure 2. Let me discuss the distributional differences between the two suffixes in the following section.

7. Contrastive Connectives in Korean

There are various contrastive or concessive connectives in Korean: *-na*, *-eto*, *-taman*, *-nuntey*, *-nunteyto*, and *-ciman*. Among those, I am going to deal with *-na* and *-ciman*. The contrast use of *but* and the denial of expectation use can be translated as these two connectives as we can see in the following:

- (30) thom-un khu-*na*/*-ciman* pil-un cak-ta.
 Tom-Top tall-but Bill-Top small-DC
 ‘Tom is tall, but Bill is short.’
- (31) a. ku-nun samwusil-ey iss-*una*/*-ciman* pappu-ta.
 He-Top office-in be-but busy-DC
 ‘He is in the office, but he is busy.’
 b. thom-un mwuyongswu-i-*na*/*-ciman* keyi-ka an-i-ta.
 Tom-Top dancer-be-but gay-NM not-be-DC
 ‘Tom is a dancer but he is not gay.’

Whether the contrast is explicit as in (30) or implicit as in (31), the contrast meaning can be conveyed by these two connectives.

However, the following example shows a divergence between these two connectives:

- (32) ne-to al-kyess-?*una*/*-ciman* ku salam-un mopsi aph-a.
 you-too know-SUP-but that person-Top very sick-DC
 ‘Although you also may know, that man is very sick.’

It is not clear to what category the above example is assigned, but it can be assumed that it involves a denial of expectation use if we have the following analysis:

- (33) a. If the hearer already knows, the speaker doesn't need to say that that man is very sick.
 b. The speaker says that that man is very sick.

The resultant clause of (33a) and (33b) contrast with each other. That is why *but* can be used in this example. For this kind of example, while *-ciman* is perfectly acceptable, *-na* is less acceptable.

Another difference between these two connectives lies in the possibility of repetition of the same connectives. In English, only two sentences can be connected by contrastive connectives such as *although* and *but* while they are used in the same complex sentence.

- (34) a. **Although* you may know, *although* Tom is tall, Bill is short.
 b. *You may know, *but* Tom is tall *but* Bill is short.

- (35) *Although* you may know, Tom is tall *but* Bill is short.

The connective *-na* in Korean behaves quite similarly. It is not capable of connecting more than two sentences.

- (36) *ne-to al-kyess-*una* thom-un khu-*na* pil-un cak-ta.¹⁾
 You-too know-SUP-but Tom-CT tall-but Bill-CT short-DC
 'As you may know, Tom is tall but Bill is short.'

Interestingly, if we replace *-na* with *-ciman* in (36) the sentence becomes acceptable.


- (37) ne-to al-kess-*ciman* thom-un khu-*ciman* pil-un cak-ta.
 'As you may know, Tom is tall but Bill is short.'

Unlike *but* in English, *-ciman* can connect three sentences as above. When this is the case, the first clause suffixed by *-ciman* is on a different layer of representation from a semantic or pragmatic point of

1) One of the referees pointed out that if examples like (36) and (42) above are amended as to carry more formality, then the acceptability of these examples will increase. However, it still seems that the revised examples sound less acceptable than corresponding *-ciman* examples.

view. As for (37), the content in the first clause expresses the speaker's attitude towards the proposition in the following clauses rather than expressing a fact of the world. It does not matter whether the hearer already knows the fact stated in the following clauses. By using such an expression, the speaker is able to make it as if the following information was already available to both the speaker and the hearer.

Structurally the clause under consideration is positioned outside of the following clauses. A simple tree structure of (37) would be as follows:



This structural analysis is supported by two other pieces of evidence. First, when (37) is embedded in a sentence with the verb *-ko hata* QT 'say', the *-ciman* clause has wide scope over *-ko hata*.

- (39) *mianha-ciman kicha-ka imi ttena-ss-ta-ko hay-yo.*
 Be sorry-but train-NM already leave-PST-DC-QT say-DC
 'I am sorry to say, but they say the train has already left.'
 '*They say that they are sorry to say, but the train has already left'

Secondly, when a tag question is used, the *-ciman* clause has a wide scope over the tag question, which is illustrated by the following example:

- (40) *mianha-ciman kicha-ka imi ttena-ss-e-yo. kuleh-ciyo?*
 Be so-Q
 'I am sorry to say, but the train has already left. Hasn't it?'
 '*I am sorry to say, but the train has already left. Aren't I?'

When *-ciman* clause is used as in (39) and (40), it seems that the *-ciman* clause does not provide any proposition that explicitly contrasts with the following clause. Instead, it signals the speaker's concessive attitude in uttering the following clause. By means of using this kind of clause, the speaker is able to soften the bluntness or impoliteness the content the following clause might bring about. For this use, the connective *-(u)na*

can not be used. The example (39) might receive the following kind of analysis, which has the characteristics of the denial of expectation use:

- (41) a. If the speaker was sorry to say that they said that the train had left, he would not say it.
 b. The speaker says that they said that the train had left.

We can observe that the resultant clause in (41a) contrasts with (41b) and that the two propositions in (41) are derived ones from the *-ciman* clause and the second clause in (39) respectively. Hence, this is an instance of the denial of expectation use. Furthermore, I would like to argue that cases like (39) and (40) have additional characteristics to those of the denial of expectation cases, because the *-ciman* clauses in them have the function of softening the bluntness of the content of the following clauses. Hence, I would like to call the *-ciman* in this use the discursal use.

This difference seems to be further supported because *-ciman* is permissible when the second clause contains speech acts such as proposals, orders, and questions as shown in the following:

- (42) *nuc-ess-?una/ciman*
 be late-PST-but
 ppalli ka-ca/-kela/-lkka?
 quickly go-PR/ IM/ Q/ leave
 'It is late, but let's go/ go/ shall we go?'

It is argued that when the second clause involves a speech act, the connective is entitled to be termed a discourse connective because in that use, the statuses of the two clauses need not be equal (Lee, 2002a, 2002b). Accordingly, the meaning of the two suffixes discussed in this section would be represented as follows:

Figure 3. The Scales of *-na* and *-ciman* in Korean

		Inference	
		→	
<i>-na</i>	contrast	denial of expectation	
<i>-ciman</i>	contrast	denial of expectation	discursal

The scales of the two suffixes overlap as far as the contrast use and the denial of expectation use are concerned. So, I shall examine only the *-ciman* scale for convenience. In the next section, I will pursue the possibility of expanding this scale with reference to the metalinguistic dimension discussed previously.

8. Contrast and Negation on the Scale of Contrastive Connectives

It was mentioned in the preceding sections that Korean employs different suffixes from *-ciman* or *-na* for the corrective use. As in English, the corrective use of *but* in Korean is preceded by a clause that is explicitly negated. For this use, the suffix *-ko* is used. Let me clarify this phenomenon by the following example:

- (43) mwun-ul ye-n salam-un apeci-ka an-i-ko/*-ciman/*-na
 door-AC open-MD person-Top father-NM not-be-but
 nwuna-i-ess-ta.
 sister-be-PST-DC
 'The person who opened the door was not your father, but your sister.'

The economist vs. businessman examples provided by Dascal and Katriel (1977) would be realized by different suffixes in Korean, similar to Hebrew, Spanish, or German.

- (44) a. ku-nun kyengceyhakca-nun ani-ciman/-na saepka-i-ta
 he-Top economist-Top not-but businessman-be-DC
 'He is not an economist but he is a businessman. (So he should be consulted.)'
 b. ku-nun kyengceyhakca-nun ani-ko/-la saepka-i-ta.
 'He is not an economist, but a businessman. (So he should not be consulted.)'

In Section 6, it was discussed that *but* in MN is regarded as the corrective use that involves more inference from the interlocutors. It has also been concluded that if the context permits, the construction that is not normally permissible for MN can be construed as metalinguistic. Let


me examine the metalinguistic cases with reference to the contrastive connectives in Korean.

Based on the grammatical phenomena in (43) and (44), one may guess that the scale of English *but* presented in Figure 2 has a corresponding scale in Korean, one dimension of which is covered by *-ciman* and the corrective-metalinguistic dimension by *-ko*. However, the connective *-ciman* can be used in MN, though *-ko* would be equally or more common.

- (45) A: hankwuk-ey motoweyi-ka iss-ta.
 Korea-in motorway-NM be-DC
 'There are motorways in Korea.'
- B: hankwuk-ey motoweyi-nun/ka eps-ciman/ko kosoktolo-nun/ka
 iss-ta.
 Top/NM not-be but highways Top/NM be-DC
 'In Korea, there are not motorways, but highways.'

In the preceding section, the connective *-ciman* is discussed only in terms of one dimension. The example in (45), however, suggests that the connective at issue has to be addressed with reference to the other dimension towards the metalinguistic end. It should also be noted that the contrasted elements in (45B) can be suffixed either by the topic marker or the nominative marker. All these facts make it possible for us to represent the meaning of the suffixes *-ciman* and *-ko* as follows:

Figure 4. The Scale of *-ciman* and *-ko* in Korean (revised)



What could the reason be that *-ciman* is used both for denial of expectation use and for MN? As I argued before, this is because MN can be construed as a kind of denial of expectation. If we take (45B) as an example, the first conjunct would normally presuppose or imply that there are no motorways in Korea, whatever they are called. However, this presupposition or implication is denied or cancelled in the second conjunct. In this respect, denial of expectation cases and MN cases are

similar to each other. One might argue that *-ciman* is more oriented to the contrast-discoursal dimension than to the corrective-metalinguistic dimension. Then, the use of *-ciman* in metalinguistic interpretation could be accounted for satisfactorily with reference to the effect MN causes. As *-ciman* normally occurs in descriptive reading, the effect of MN could be increased if it is used for MN. That is, the rhetorical effect of MN becomes greater by disguising MN. However, this contention is rather speculative at this stage, because it is obvious that *-ciman* is also acceptable in MN, as we observe in (45).

On the other hand, the corrective use and MN share the property that the second clause has the role of replacing the denied element in the first clause. I argue that in Korean the similarity between denial of expectation and MN is manifested by the use of *-ciman*, whereas that between the corrective use and MN by the connective *-ko*.

9. Summary and Conclusion

In this paper, the contrastive connectives have been discussed both in English and Korean. Whatever the representation on which they operate, the connectives are argued to retain the core meaning, i.e., *contrast*. One point worth recalling is that another dimension of scale has been introduced to account for the use of *but* in a metalinguistic environment. It is obviously true that MN is a type of denial of expectation. However, it has a more salient function than simple denial of expectation, i.e. creating a rhetorical effect. Also, while the denial of expectation occurs on a descriptive or denotational level, MN occurs on a metalinguistic level. That is, the level on which contrast occurs is of quite a different nature. This is why a new dimension is introduced. Korean contrastive connectives have also been discussed in comparison with the ubiquitous *but*. It has been concluded that Korean uses more complex methods to display the common properties between the denial of expectation and MN on the one hand, and those between the corrective use and MN on the other.

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Received: Sept. 1, 2002

Revised version received: Nov. 5, 2002

Accepted: Nov. 27, 2002