



Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement

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Abstract. The ongoing use of the concept of ‘corporatism’ in industrial democracies has been stretched to include overlapping but still distinctive realities, which in turn often produce different ‘lists’ of corporatist economies. Consequently, this analysis sets out to disentangle the concept of corporatism and to suggest a replacement. It includes a comparative classification of 24 long-term industrial democracies in terms of the corporatism scores given by 23 different scholarly analyses. The divisions in scoring certain important but problematic cases (such as Japan) can be explained by noting differing emphases in the term. I then propose an alternative, more focused summary measure of economic *integration* which is clearly linear and which has no ‘problem cases’. Precise scores on economic integration are given for four time periods from the late 1960s through the mid-1990s. It will be seen that the industrial democracies have always been dichotomised between integrated and non-integrated (or ‘pluralist’) economies.

Introduction

The economic crises affecting the advanced capitalist nations in the 1970s, and their comparative responses to this, were a large part of the reason why the study of neocorporatism grew to become a ‘growth industry’ (Panitch 1980). In later research widespread attention was paid to an understanding of why corporatist economies were believed to have performed in ‘superior’ ways (e.g., Schmidt 1982b; Bruno & Sachs 1985; McCallum 1986; Castles 1987; Calmfors & Driffith 1988; Pekkarinen et al. 1992), or to challenges to this supposed relationship (e.g., Therborn 1992; Woldendorp 1997). Independent of concerns with political economy, corporatist policy-making also came to be associated with one aspect of consensus – as opposed to majoritarian – democracy (Lijphart & Crepaz 1991).¹ Yet the ongoing use of the term ‘corporatism’ – often with such prefixes as ‘neo-’, ‘liberal’, ‘democratic’, or ‘social’ – has unfortunately been matched by its application in different situations and for what amount to rather different concepts. Similarly, there is increasing debate about which democracies are corporatist in addition to ‘standard’ cases such as Austria and Sweden – and even whether corporatism ‘matters’ in any case. In this regard, Therborn (1992: 40) has bluntly commented that ‘[a]n nth rerun of corporatism and whatever variable between the

OECD countries is hardly likely to add very much to our understanding of anything'.² All of this suggests that it is now time to disentangle the concept of corporatism and perhaps even to suggest an alternative concept.

The organisation of the following analysis develops in five parts. First, I will look at the conceptual differences, and suggest a summary 'ideal type' of corporatism. Second, I shall assess the comparative 'ranking' of the long-term industrial democracies in terms of corporatism and various sub-measures with differing emphases. Third, I shall deal with the conceptual and/or measurement problems with certain other alternative concepts. Fourth, I shall propose an alternative summary measure of *economic integration* which is clearly linear and which can better serve as a variable for those who so choose. Finally, I shall offer precise scores on economic integration for four time periods, from the late 1960s through the mid-1990s. It will be seen that in each decade the industrial democracies have been neatly dichotomised between integrated ('corporatist') and non-integrated ('pluralist') economies.

Usages of the term 'corporatism'

Analyses of corporatism have tended to involve two different uses (Lijphart & Crepaz 1991: 235). The first is corporatism as a system of interest representation (Schmitter 1979: 13). The second, and more common usage, is of corporatism as an 'institutionalized pattern of policy-formation' above all 'in the shaping of economic policy' (Lehmbruch 1979: 150). A definition similar to that of Lehmbruch was offered in the 1980s by Pryor (1988: 317): 'Corporatism is a type of organized or coordinated capitalism where power to make important economic policies is transferred from the parliament and government to semi-private organizations; these are based on economic function or industrial sector and include a strong representation of labor interests'. Recently Woldendorp (1997: 49–50) has written in the same vein that 'the term neo-corporatism is used to denominate any form of cooperation between the government and the relevant socio-economic interest groups of employers' associations and trade unions, aimed at forging a consensus over the formulation and implementation of socioeconomic government policies, which in turn enhances the effectiveness of these policies in terms of macroeconomic performance'.

More succinctly in this regard, Calmfors & Driffill (1988: 24) conclude that '[t]he concept of corporatism thus seems vaguely to capture the extent to which some broader interests influence the determination of individual wages'. For them, however, corporatism is essentially centralised wage bargaining (which may or may not involve the government) which they thus set out to rank. Woldendorp (1997: 52–53, 56–57) adopts a similar approach, but

he examines specifically the extent to which the government intervenes and ‘imposes’ an incomes policy or package on business and labour. Thus, ‘[t]he less authoritarian the incomes policy is the higher the degree of cooperation and, therefore, the stronger the corporatism in the country’ (Woldendorp 1997: 53). This focus solely on wage formulation can be seen simply as a version of interest intermediation, or instead as a third distinct usage of the concept of corporatism.

For our purposes, however, let us note the main features of the *concept* of (liberal) corporatism at the national level as reflecting: *within an advanced industrial society and democratic polity, the co-ordinated, co-operative, and systematic management of the national economy by the state, centralised unions, and employers (these latter two co-operating directly in industry), presumably to the relative benefit of all three actors*. If this is taken to be the core definition of corporatism, then its opposite (the lack of such co-ordinated and co-operative management) may generally be defined as ‘pluralism’. Usually scholars reduce this issue to these two categories, or at least a corporatism-pluralism continuum.³ In talking about the corporatism (or pluralism) as a *structure*, one can obviously measure the extent of its existence. Beyond this, if corporatism is seen as a consciously-chosen *strategy* of the government, then one can also evaluate its success in resolving conflict (Woldendorp 1995: 124). This article will, however, more modestly focus just on the issue of which advanced industrial democracies have in fact managed their economies in a corporatist, or more specifically *integrated*, way.

The ideal type of corporatism

Various factors have often been considered to be virtual ‘preconditions’ for the successful creation and/or maintenance of a corporatist system. I would argue that an ‘ideal type’ of corporatism involves four distinct aspects:⁴ (1) *structural features*, (2) *functional roles*, (3) *behavioural patterns*, and (4) *favourable contexts*. I thus wish to include here factors in addition to the structure notion of ‘interest intermediation’ and the functional notion of tripartite decision-making and implementation, so as to produce a fully detailed measure. Of course, this measure is much broader than the focus of the usual scholarly analyses, most of which only emphasise certain features – and then not necessarily the same ones (Hicks 1988a: 700–701).

In summary, then, an ‘ideal type’ corporatist political economy would first of all exhibit the following structures:

- (1) a high degree of unionisation, especially amongst blue-collar workers;

- (2) relatively few unions (Mitchell 1996) grouped into highly institutionalised peak confederations which have the key role in wage bargaining, with ideally only one confederation for blue-collar workers (Golden 1993); conversely, a low degree of autonomy for shop stewards and plant unions – in short a high ‘organizational power of labour’ (Cameron 1984: 168);⁵
- (3) a business community dominated by large export-oriented firms, with a relatively powerful and centralised employer’s federation. Indeed, business centralisation has tended to reinforce or even inspire labour centralisation, at least in Sweden (Fulcher 1991);
- (4) highly centralised wage bargaining, with national or a few key branch-level agreements (e.g., that of the metalworkers) setting the basis for the entire economy;
- (5) works councils in the main industrial firms *and* co-determination in key industries;
- (6) a centralised, powerful, and active state involved at least moderately in the economy;

with these actors involved in the following roles:

- (7) a central – and joint – role for labour and business in such policies as training, education, and social programmes, often implemented through tripartite boards or agencies;
- (8) the institutionalised input of business and labour in the government policy process, including the drawing up of the budget;

and showing the following patterns of behaviour:

- (9) a strong economic and social consensus shared by business, labour, and the state;
- (10) recognition by business and labour of being joint ‘social partners’ (Katzenstein 1985: 87–88), and resulting patterns of co-operation and coalescence;
- (11) a long-term outlook held by both business and labour;
- (12) low levels of strike activity;
- (13) voluntary and/or bargained incomes policies rather than state-imposed ones;
- (14) independence of internal decision-making of the key actors;

and existing in the following contextual environment:

- (15) a certain blurring of the public sector/private sector distinction;
- (16) a small (Pryor 1988: 326–327; Williamson 1989: 150–151) open economy;

- (17) which has benefitted from the free trade provided by the post-World War Two hegemony of the United States – indeed corporatist nations are often militarily neutral and/or spend little on defence;
- (18) a consensual or even consociational political tradition, rather than a ‘majoritarian’ one (Lijphart 1984);⁶
- (19) a long-term political role or even dominance of a united social democratic party, thus producing a leftist political ‘substructure’ [*Unterbau*] in the words of Schmidt (1982a);
- (20) with a resulting high level of expenditures on social programmes;
- (21) generally successful economic performance, especially regarding productivity, export competitiveness, and the maintenance of full employment; and
- (22) often because their success thus ‘exports’ unemployment elsewhere, to international economic stabilisers like the (non-corporatist!) United States and the United Kingdom.

Although this list is quite long, we would argue that the true ‘ideal type’ of corporatism does involve these various – and interrelated – factors. Moreover, what should be noted is that the *reality* of nations such as Austria, Norway, and Sweden is that they essentially have shown all or almost all of these factors, and thus approximate our ‘ideal type’.

Corporatism in Austria, Norway, and Sweden is centred around peak labour confederations (ÖGB, LO, and LO respectively) and powerful social democratic parties (SPÖ, DNA, and SAP respectively). One qualification should be noted here, however, as regards factors (10) and (18). Although Elder et al. (1988) consider the Scandinavian nations to have a consensual political tradition, Heclø and Madsen (1987: 30) disagree, noting that what appears to be consensus in Sweden is merely the reflection of the ‘shattering of opposition’ by social democratic hegemony. For his part, Therborn (1992: 35–37) distinguishes between two types of ‘relatively peaceful industrial orders’: the consensual social partnership found in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria, and the orderly regulation or even ritualisation of conflict in Scandinavia. Thus for Therborn capital and labour in Scandinavia are definitely *not* ‘social partners’, but rather autonomous ‘labour market parties’ who engage in positive-sum (potential) conflict. This distinction would thus leave Austria as *the* model type of corporatism (Marin 1985). However, it is highly problematic to reduce corporatism to ‘that which is found in Austria’, and given that in their own way Norway and Sweden – with some deviations during ‘bourgeois’ governments – have achieved ‘peaceful industrial order’ as well as the remaining factors, one can still consider the ideal type of corporatism to be what we shall call *Austro-Scandinavian* in nature.

Table 1. Comparative scholarly rankings of neo-corporatism

| | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 | C7 | C8 | C9 | C10 | C11 | C12 | C13 | PR1 | PR2 | PR3 | CN1 | CN2 | CN3 | CN4 | CN5 | WB1 | WB2 |
|----------------|----|----|----|----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Australia | . | 3 | 1 | . | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | N | . | N | . | . | 2 | . | 3 | 1 | N | . | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| Austria | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | Y | 5 | Y | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | Y | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Belgium | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1.5 | N | 4 | 3.5 | 3 | . | 3.5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | N | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Canada | 2 | 1 | 1 | . | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | N | 1 | N | . | . | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | N | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Denmark | 4 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | Y | 2 | . | 4 | 3 | 3.5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | N | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3.5 | 5 |
| Finland | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2.5 | Y | 3 | Y | 4 | . | 3.5 | 4 | (4) | 1 | N | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3.5 | 5 |
| France | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | CAM | 1 | 1 | N | 1 | CAM | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | N | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2.5 | 3 |
| Germany (West) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | Y | 3 | (3) | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 | Y | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3.5 | 4 |
| Greece | . | 1 | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | . | . | . |
| Iceland | . | 3 | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Ireland | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | . | N | 2 | . | 3.5 | . | 2 | 1 | . | 1 | N | . | 3 | 3 | 3.5 | 1 |
| Israel | . | 3 | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Italy | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1.5 | N | 1 | . | 3.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | N | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2.5 | 2 |
| Japan | . | 5 | 1 | . | 3 | CAM | 5 | 2.5 | N | . | CAM | . | . | I | . | 1 | 5 | Y | 4 | 5 | CAM | 2 | 3 |
| Luxembourg | . | 3 | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Netherlands | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | Y | 3 | Y | 3.5 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 5 | Y | 3 | 3 | 5 | 3.5 | 3 |
| New Zealand | . | 3 | . | . | 3 | 1 | . | 1.5 | N | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 3 | N | 2 | 1 | . | 3 | 2 |
| Norway | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | Y | 5 | Y | 4 | . | 5 | 5 | (5) | 5 | Y | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 |
| Portugal | . | 1 | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | . | . | 3 |
| Spain | . | 1 | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | . | . | 2 |
| Sweden | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | Y | 4 | Y | 4.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | (4) | 5 | Y | 4 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 5 |
| Switzerland | 3 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2.5 | 5 | 3 | Y | 1 | CAM | 4 | . | 2 | 3 | . | 5 | Y | . | 5 | CAM | 2 | 3 |
| UK | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | N | 2 | N | 2.5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | N | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2.5 | 1 |
| USA | 2 | 1 | 1 | . | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | N | 1 | N | . | . | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | N | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

C# = a ranking essentially of 'corporatism'; PR# = a ranking essentially of 'power resources'; CN# = a ranking essentially of 'consensus'; WB# = a ranking essentially of wage bargaining; . = data not given or implied; CAM = classified by an alternative measure than the scale used for the main ranking.

Sources to Table 1:

- C1: Schmitter (1981: 294) – social corporatism ranking compressed into a five-point scale.
 C2: Schmidt (1982b: 135; used again in Schmidt 1983: 20–21) – corporatism ranking of high (=5), medium (=3), or low (=1).
 C3: Czada (1983: 425) – classifications of neo-corporatist [= 5], sectoral [= 3], or pluralist [= 1].
 C4: Braun (1983), as cited in the appendix of Keman et al. (1985: 222) – three-point summary scale of neo-corporatism: little [= 1], moderate [= 3], and strong [= 5].
 C5: Keman (1984) reproduced in the appendix of Keman et al. (1985: 222) – reproduction of five-point summary scale of neo-corporatism.
 C6: Lehbruch (1984: 66) – a cumulative scale of corporatism [5 = strong, 3 = medium, 2 = weak, 1 = pluralism], with Japan and France separately listed as ‘corporatism without labour’.
 C7: Schott (1984: 43) – corporatism ranking of: strong [= 5], medium [= 3], and weak [= 1].
 C8: Bruno & Sachs (1985: 226) – additive 0 to 4 index of corporatism reproduced on a one-to-five scale.
 C9: Crouch (1985: 117) – basic yes/no [Y/N] dichotomy of corporatism (versus pluralism).
 C10: Marks (1986: 261) – a ranking of fifteen nations on neocorporatist incomes policy (he regroups these into four ordinal categories; we do so into five).
 C11: Wilensky & Turner (1987: 10–15) – presence of corporatism in various socioeconomic policy areas.
 C12: Compston (1997: 739) – mean values on an eleven-point scale of union influence over economic policy, regrouped into a five-point scale.
 C13: Wiarda (1997: 73–76) – distinction amongst strong corporatism [= 5], weak corporatism [= 1], and intermediate countries [= 3].
 PR1: Cameron (1984: 167) – values (out of 100) for the ‘organizational power of labour’ regrouped into a five-point scale.
 PR2: Marks (1986: 269, 277) – an ordinal ranking based on leftist control of government and union density, which he in turn finds strongly associated ($r = 0.91$) with his ranking of neocorporatism proper [C10].
 PR3: Garrett & Lange (1986: 533)/Lange & Garrett (1987: 262) – corporatist nations defined as those high in both leftist participation in cabinet and labour organisation [PR3 is an average of their two almost identical rankings].
 CN1: Paloheimo (1984a: 20, 1984b: 173, 1984c: 16) – ranking of strong [= 5], medium [= 3], and weak [= 1] on economic consensus only.
 CN2: McCallum (1986: 954) (see also McCallum 1983) – a distinction between high consensus [Y] and low consensus [N] nations based on strike levels and corporatist institutions.
 CN3: Tarantelli (1986: 12–13) – a ranking of neo-corporatism which reflects a key role of consensus, summary scores (up to 15) regrouped into a five-point scale.
 CN4: Schmidt (1986: 263) – distinctions amongst three types of policy ‘concertation’ (*Konzertierung*), that is to say, policy co-ordination: concertation and consensus [= 5], concertation without consensus [= 3], or fragmentation and conflict [= 1].
 CN5: Lehner (1988: 70–71) (see also Lehner 1987: 58) – a summary scale of public-private interaction consisting of: pluralism [= 1], weak corporatism [= 2], medium corporatism [= 3], strong corporatism [= 5], and ‘concordance’, a ‘broader, less focused’ system of concertation.
 WB1: Calmfors & Driffill (1988: 18) – an index of centralisation of wage bargaining refashioned into a one-to-five scale.
 WB2: Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991) – separate scores of union and employer co-ordination in collective bargaining, added together and then reproduced on a one-to-five scale; scores for Portugal taken from Layard (1991: 1–5), as cited in Tylecote (1992).

At the other extreme from the Austro-Scandinavian cases are Canada and especially the USA. These two neighbours essentially exhibit almost none of the aforementioned factors, with their relatively low levels of unionisation, decentralised labour relations, and nationally weak or even non-existent social democracy. In short, one can thus ascertain clearly the ‘model’ corporatist cases and the ‘model’ non-corporatist or pluralist ones (Bruno & Sachs 1985: 224–227). Other nations, however, may not be so easy to classify. Let us thus turn to how the advanced capitalist nations have in fact been ranked on this measure.

Ranking nations in terms of corporatism

In this section we shall summarise (in Table 1) the corporatist rankings of twenty-three different analyses made over the past two decades. Whereas most of these analyses classify ‘corporatism’ generally defined, others may refer to corporatism but in fact *focus* on what would be better called ‘the power resources of labour’, or ‘consensus’ (sometimes as the underpinning of corporatism), or simply the centralisation of wage bargaining. In this overall assessment we have been inspired by Lijphart & Crepaz’s (1991) summary of twelve authors (largely but not totally overlapping with our 23 analyses). However, whereas Lijphart and Crepaz basically standardised all rankings and produced an average for each country, we are also interested in the extent of agreement which can of course be totally obscured in a mean score.

To this end, as Table 1 shows, the rankings are recalibrated into a five-point scale, with ‘5’ always being strong corporatism and ‘1’ pluralism.⁷ It should be noted that two analysts do not provide a true continuum of measures. Colin Crouch [C10] gives a basic ‘yes’ or ‘no’ dichotomy (Y/N), which we thus translate into the extreme scores of 5 and 1. Equally, John McCallum [CN2] ultimately dichotomises nations into high and low consensus, which are likewise scored as 5 or 1. Conversely, Bruno & Sach’s additive index [C8] uses half points, and these are retained.

There are some national exceptions to a straightforward ranking (or dichotomy) of corporatism; these are the ‘problematic’ cases of France, Japan, and Switzerland. First of all, there is Lehbruch 1984 [C6], who refers to France and Japan as ‘corporatism without labour’; the term goes back to Pempel & Tsunewaka’s (1979) analysis of Japan. Wilensky & Turner (1987: 12) [C11] modify this alternative slightly, referring to ‘corporatism without full-scale participation by labor’ in Japan, France, ‘and perhaps Switzerland’. Nevertheless, the absence of labour (or at least its weakness) at the centre does seem to contradict far too much any basic notion of corporatism.

Secondly and more intriguingly, Lehner (1987, 1988) [CN5] classifies both Japan and Switzerland as examples of ‘concordance’, which he defines as the ‘comprehensive co-ordination of the interactions of the public and private sectors’, in order to minimise conflict almost as an end in itself. In Switzerland especially, this co-ordination involves more than economic actors and economic issues, reflecting in part the potential for a hostile referendum on most any policy issue. On Lehner’s ‘scale of interactions’ of the private and public sectors concordance is thus ranked highest, above strong corporatism. However, even though concordance may be broader in scope and relevant actors than corporatism, it still involves a less central role for labour.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2, which groups advanced industrial nations by the extent to which they are considered corporatist. The first column presents the mean values, then the standard deviation, then the number of observations. (The ‘alternative measures’ of ‘corporatism without labour’ and ‘concordance’ are scored a ‘2’, given the weaker central roles of labour in these suggested concepts.) For comparison, the mean scores determined by Lijphart & Crepaz (1991) are given in the final column; these are basically in agreement, at least for the top five groupings. The placement of most countries is not surprising. However, six industrial democracies – Luxembourg, Iceland, Israel, Spain, Portugal, and Greece – are not classified often enough to claim any scholarly agreement. Indeed, Lijphart & Crepaz (1991: 238) do not rank these nations either, since they limited themselves to nations with at least six measurements.

There is some disagreement over Finland especially between Paloheimo [CN1] and McCallum [CN2] on the one hand, and Layard, Nickell & Jackman [WB2] on the other. In part, this may reflect the fact that Finnish corporatism has increased over time (Pekkarinen 1992) – without, however, seeing strikes vanish completely. More problematic however are the three nations which in some scales have been classified by alternative measures: Switzerland, Japan, and France. France is in fact not all that controversial: it has an historic legacy of statism, now rather weakened, and certain areas of sectoral corporatism (above all in agriculture); however, it is essentially pluralist. Indeed, it only really has factors (6), (15), and (20) from our earlier list.

In contrast, Switzerland and especially Japan are ranked with much more variation. As Table 2 shows, *these are the two nations the mean scores of which have the highest standard deviations*. Table 3 explores this result further by giving the sub-scores wherever possible for the particular emphasis of the analysts: corporatism proper, power resources, consensus, or wage bargaining. As the table shows, the high variation in scores for Japan and Switzerland occurs in part because these two nations – or at least Japan –

Table 2. Agreed corporatist rankings

| | Mean | Standard deviation | (N) | Lijphart/Crepez score |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------------------|------|-----------------------|
| <i>Nations considered to be strongly corporatist:</i> | | | | |
| Austria | 5.000 | 0.000 | (23) | +1.600 |
| Norway | 4.864 | 0.351 | (22) | +1.531 |
| Sweden | 4.674 | 0.556 | (23) | +1.396 |
| <i>Nations considered to be moderately-to-strongly corporatist:</i> | | | | |
| Netherlands | 4.000 | 0.989 | (23) | +1.006 |
| Denmark | 3.545 | 0.999 | (22) | +0.518 |
| Germany (West) | 3.543 | 0.940 | (23) | +0.480 |
| <i>Nations considered to be moderately corporatist:</i> | | | | |
| Finland | 3.295 | 1.043 | (22) | +0.427 |
| Belgium | 2.841 | 0.793 | (22) | +0.258 |
| <i>Nations considered to be weakly or only somewhat corporatist:</i> | | | | |
| Ireland | 2.000 | 1.015 | (18) | -0.528 |
| New Zealand | 1.955 | 0.907 | (11) | -1.106 |
| Australia | 1.688 | 0.873 | (16) | -1.025 |
| UK | 1.652 | 0.818 | (23) | -0.862 |
| Italy | 1.477 | 0.748 | (22) | -0.851 |
| <i>Nations considered to be not at all corporatist, but rather pluralist:</i> | | | | |
| Canada | 1.150 | 0.489 | (20) | -1.335 |
| USA | 1.150 | 0.489 | (20) | -1.341 |
| <i>Nations classified too infrequently for an agreed placement:</i> | | | | |
| Luxembourg | 3.000 | 0.000 | (1) | n.d. |
| Iceland | 3.000 | 0.000 | (1) | n.d. |
| Israel | 3.000 | 0.000 | (1) | n.d. |
| Portugal | 1.500 | 1.000 | (4) | n.d. |
| Spain | 1.250 | 0.500 | (4) | n.d. |
| Greece | 1.000 | 0.000 | (2) | n.d. |
| <i>Nations without agreement on placement or even on conceptualisation:</i> | | | | |
| Switzerland | 3.375 | 1.286 | (20) | +0.505 |
| Japan | 2.912 | 1.603 | (17) | +0.053 |
| France | 1.674 | 0.792 | (23) | -0.725 |

Source: Table 1.

Table 3. Corporatist rankings by the nature of emphasis

| Maximum 'N' | Corporatism proper (13) | Power resources (3) | Consensus (5) | Wage bargaining (2) |
|----------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Australia | 1.375 | 2.50 | 1.50 | 2.50 |
| Austria | 5.000 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| Belgium | 2.750 | 3.50 | 2.60 | 3.00 |
| Canada | 1.100 | 1.00 | 1.40 | 1.00 |
| Denmark | 3.583 | 4.17 | 2.80 | 4.25 |
| Finland | 3.458 | 3.83 | 2.20 | 4.25 |
| France | 1.462 | 1.33 | 2.00 | 2.75 |
| Germany (West) | 3.308 | 2.67 | 4.60 | 3.75 |
| Greece | 1.000 | n.d. | 1.00 | n.d. |
| Iceland | 3.000 | n.d. | n.d. | n.d. |
| Ireland | 2.050 | 1.50 | 2.00 | 2.25 |
| Israel | 3.000 | n.d. | n.d. | n.d. |
| Italy | 1.583 | 1.00 | 1.20 | 2.25 |
| Japan | 2.688 | 1.00 | 4.20 | 2.50 |
| Luxembourg | 3.000 | n.d. | n.d. | n.d. |
| Netherlands | 4.269 | 3.00 | 4.20 | 3.25 |
| New Zealand | 1.900 | n.d. | 1.75 | 2.50 |
| Norway | 4.917 | 5.00 | 4.80 | 4.50 |
| Portugal | 1.000 | n.d. | 1.00 | 3.00 |
| Spain | 1.000 | n.d. | 1.00 | 2.00 |
| Sweden | 4.808 | 4.67 | 4.40 | 4.50 |
| Switzerland | 3.375 | 2.50 | 4.25 | 2.50 |
| UK | 1.577 | 2.67 | 1.20 | 1.75 |
| USA | 1.100 | 1.00 | 1.40 | 1.00 |

Source: Table 1.

are seen as low in 'power resources' by those who essentially conceptualise corporatism as such, whereas they are seen as high in consensus by those with this sort of operationalisation.⁸

Indeed, Shalev (1990: 65) refers to Japan dramatically as 'the veritable Achilles heel of empirical operationalizations of corporatism'. Even Lijphart & Crepaz's (1991) ranking of Japan is hardly decisive. The reality is that Japan and Switzerland have exhibited the co-operative behavioural patterns of corporatism, at least economically [factors (9) through (14)]; a 'free rider' role in the world (factor 17); and (most of the time) a high level of economic

success (factor 21), perhaps at others' expense (factor 22); whilst only having selected other factors.

Japan has a centralised business community (factor 3), an activist state (factor 6) but one with minimal defence spending (factor 17 again), and a very strong blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private sector (factor 15). This produces a 'total' of only twelve factors, or just over 'half' of the ideal type (not that each are necessarily equal). Given the very different nature of Japan's labour relations, welfare programmes, and policy formation in comparison with the social democratic nations of Western Europe, Shalev (1990) explicitly rejects the concept of corporatism as applicable to Japan, and thus criticises the various scholarly attempts to treat Japan as such. He concludes that Japan's

[l]abour quiescence since the middle of the 1970s is better explained by the whip of market conditions, the pressure of unified opponents, and the reinvigoration of the dual labour market, than by the elevation of peak labour organizations to the status of guardians of public order. (Shalev 1990: 87)

Compared to Japan, Switzerland exhibits slightly more factors beyond consensual economic behaviour, a centralised business community, a blurring of the state/society distinction, and economic success; in particular, Switzerland is a small open economy (factor 16) which is neutral (factor 17) and consociational (factor 18), and it does score highly on corporatist decision-making and implementation (factors 7 and 8). This is symbolised in the use of ad hoc commissions to prepare initial legislative proposals, followed by the government receiving the formal written opinion of the main interest groups (and other actors) before the proposal is finally submitted to parliament. Such a pattern of policy-formation is given a legal basis in the Swiss constitution, such as in article 32/3 (1947), which states that '[t]he interested economic associations have to be consulted with regard to the elaboration of the laws of execution and may be called to co-operate with the implementation of the executive rules' (quoted in Parri 1987: 89). Furthermore, the ability of organised interests to amass the necessary signatures for national policy referenda is an additional reason to include them in the policy process.

At the same time as one notes these decision-making patterns, one must also note the lack of centralised interest intermediation between business and labour, the general weakness of the left, a very *non-activist* state (that is, no factor 6, unlike even Japan), and indeed the extremely decentralised nature of the Swiss nation (Parri 1987; Kriesi 1990). In summary, Switzerland has (just) thirteen of the 22 ideal factors associated with the Austro-Scandinavian version of corporatism. Yet is this enough for a partial – or alternative – type?

Katzenstein (1984, 1985) would say so, for he calls Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands examples of 'liberal corporatism' implying bourgeois dominance and an outward-looking business community. Of these three nations, Switzerland is the epitome of such 'liberal corporatism'. This system can be contrasted with the 'social corporatism' best exemplified by Austria.

Moreover, Katzenstein may have raised various differences (especially the national role in the world economy) between Switzerland and Japan, but he does not seem to object to parallels being raised between Japan and the (liberal) corporatist systems of the small European states (Katzenstein 1988: 298). Thus for Katzenstein there seems to be three categories: social corporatism, liberal corporatism and (liberal) pluralism.

In contrast, Pekkarinen et al. (1992) imply that corporatism must be 'social' in nature. This would seem to exclude Switzerland, and indeed a major analysis of corporatism and Switzerland concludes by stressing the following:

If corporatism is defined as a pluridimensional concept, embracing centralization of government, employers, and unions, public involvement in relations between the government and the two classes, and class cooperation, then it seems more appropriate to think of the Swiss system as liberal capitalism. In the Swiss model, centralization of unions is absent and centralization of government is only weak; furthermore, public involvement is essentially lacking in matters of class conflicts. The Swiss model more closely resembles paternalistic-liberal capitalism of the Japanese type and may not therefore be considered a corporatist economy as such. (Blaas 1992: 369)

Certainly, in addition to or perhaps as part of 'concordance' (Lehner), Switzerland and Japan do seem to have more parallels with each other, especially a dualistic labour market, the paternalistic nature of employers (at least vis-à-vis core employees), a small welfare state, and a generally unique route to full employment and general economic success (Schmidt 1988a; Shalev 1990: 88). They thus have produced economic success without corporatism, or at least without 'proper' corporatism. The analytical effect of these two nations, though, implies that the macro distinction between corporatism and pluralism may not be able to capture the full range of advanced industrial political economies. Another approach is thus needed.

Alternatives to the corporatist paradigm

One such attempt is that of Hicks (1988b) who suggests a preliminary framework of national collective economic action which involves the following five types: the *capitalist pluralism* of the USA and the UK; the *capitalist statism*

of Japan, France, and Italy; the *social democratic corporatism* of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden; the *consociationalism* (or effectively liberal corporatism) of Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands; and the *quadripartite corporatism* of Germany. Hicks (1988b: 150) defines 'quadripartite corporatism' as involving not just the state, business, and labour but also a powerful financial actor, and he considers this four-actor pattern to be unique to Germany. However, in such a model not only are neither Japan nor Switzerland called corporatist, but they are each considered a separate paradigmatic type. This result, combined with the equivocal and even incomplete nature of many classifications, renders Hicks' framework more useful as a heuristic device than as a new paradigm.

Yet Hicks is certainly justified in raising the issue of national financial actors as they relate to business, labour, and the state. Moreover, his conclusion that the more successful economies all involve some macro-societal means for rational collective action implies that there is more than one successful organisational alternative to pluralism (Hicks 1988b: 150–151). Although intriguing, this conclusion, which parallels Manfred Schmidt's (1988a) notion of 'two routes to full employment', again leaves us with multiple categories.

A similar problem arises with the analysis of Korpi (1991: 336–339), who in a study of eighteen OECD nations discerns three different dominant patterns of conflict settlements in the period 1973–1986. First, there is the *societal bargaining* found in Sweden, Norway, Austria, Finland, and Switzerland.⁹ This arose either through left-wing dominance as in the first three cases, or via special constitutional factors which give veto power to the moderately strong left found in both Finland and Switzerland. The second pattern is one of *pluralism*, which is zero-sum and lacks the long-term business-labour understanding of societal bargaining. Korpi ascribes this pattern to most OECD nations, specifically the USA, Canada, Ireland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, the UK, and Denmark. One should stress that Korpi is the only scholar to consider (West) Germany and the Netherlands as essentially pluralist. Lastly, as was noted earlier, Korpi defines the dominant pattern in Japan, and only Japan, as one of *state-led capitalism*, involving the close co-operation of state and business, but not labour, elites.

Korpi notes the problems with the open unemployment rates of Japan and Switzerland, but still concludes that the average level of unemployment has been much lower since 1973 in nations with either societal bargaining or state-led capitalism than in the pluralist nations. Indeed, the largest increases in unemployment have come in nations Korpi calls pluralist with a left of medium strength, such as Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The comparative unemployment performance of OECD nations has largely

been as Korpi has described. Moreover, his cases of societal bargaining – Sweden, Norway, Austria, Finland, and Switzerland – have generally been post-war economic successes. However, so has West Germany (despite its lack of full employment) and Luxembourg (not discussed by Korpi but apparently pluralist on his definitions).¹⁰ One also has the same problem as in Hicks (1988b) of a merely *nominal* typology of advanced industrial political economies.

Integrated economies

Thus the issue remains as to whether it is at all possible to come up with a *uni-dimensional* and at least *ordinal-level* alternative to the corporatist-pluralist continuum which is also not problematic with regards to Japan and Switzerland – not coincidentally the two most difficult-to-classify advanced industrial economies. Although far from settling the debate, we would argue for an alternative term – **integration** – defined as follows:

a long-term co-operative pattern of shared economic management involving the social partners and existing at various levels such as plant-level management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of national policies in competitiveness-related matters (education, social policy, etc.)

It should thus be noted that the level(s) at which such behaviour occur(s) may not be the same in every nation. More generally, **integration** speaks to the *functional roles* and *behavioural patterns* noted in the ideal types of corporatism outlined earlier; however, it does not speak to – nor is it conditional on – *structural features* (such as the level of unionisation) or *favourable contexts* (such as the size or openness of a country, or the political role of social democracy).

Tables 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d set out to measure the levels of such integration at four sequential time periods: the late 1960s (during the ‘golden age of capitalism’); the late 1970s (after the OPEC shock), the late 1980s (with increased globalisation), and the current situation (as of the mid-1990s). Integration scores are calculated based on eight measures which we have averaged into a summary index. All measures are given on a scale from 5 (indicating greatest integration) to 1 (indicating least). Scores for 21 democracies are given for the first two time periods; with the addition of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, the N increases to 24 democracies for the last two time periods.¹¹

The first three columns indicate aspects of *social partnership*. First, there is the level of strikes, wherein the fewer the strikes the higher the integration.

Table 4a. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1960s

| Factor | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | Mean |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------------------------|
| Sweden | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4.750 |
| Austria | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Norway | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Israel | 4 | 4 | (5) | 5 | 2 | 4 | (5) | (5) | 4.500 |
| Denmark | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4.375 |
| Switzerland | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4.375 |
| Netherlands | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4.250 |
| Belgium | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4.125 |
| Germany (West) | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4.125 |
| Luxembourg | 5 | 3 | (4) | 5 | (3) | 4 | (4) | (4) | 4.000 |
| Finland | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3.500 |
| Japan | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | (2) | 5 | 3.375 |
| Iceland | 1 | 3 | (5) | 3 | 3 | 2 | (2) | (3) | 2.750 |
| Australia | 3 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (2) | 3 | 2.500 |
| New Zealand | 4 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | (2) | 2.375 |
| Ireland | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2.250 |
| Italy | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2.000 |
| UK | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2.000 |
| France | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.875 |
| USA | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | 1 | 1.750 |
| Canada | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | 1 | 1.625 |
| | | | | | | | | | <i>Period mean</i> |
| | | | | | | | | | 3.321 |
| | | | | | | | | | <i>Standard deviation</i> |
| | | | | | | | | | 1.133 |

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4a*(two-tailed significance, N = 21)*

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | Mean |
|------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| [1] | 1.000 | | | | | | | | |
| [2] | 0.483 | 1.000 | | | | | | | |
| | | (0.026) | | | | | | | |
| [3] | 0.396 | 0.258 | 1.000 | | | | | | |
| | | (0.075) | (0.259) | | | | | | |
| [4] | 0.725 | 0.718 | 0.528 | 1.000 | | | | | |
| | | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.014) | | | | | |
| [5] | 0.257 | 0.091 | 0.332 | 0.503 | 1.000 | | | | |
| | | (0.262) | (0.695) | (0.141) | (0.020) | | | | |
| [6] | 0.516 | 0.600 | 0.483 | 0.633 | 0.349 | 1.000 | | | |
| | | (0.017) | (0.004) | (0.027) | (0.002) | (0.121) | | | |
| [7] | 0.689 | 0.657 | 0.589 | 0.892 | 0.478 | 0.759 | 1.000 | | |
| | | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.000) | (0.028) | (0.000) | | |
| [8] | 0.577 | 0.622 | 0.561 | 0.811 | 0.207 | 0.540 | 0.683 | 1.000 | |
| | | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.008) | (0.000) | (0.369) | (0.011) | (0.001) | |
| Mean | 0.749 | 0.699 | 0.679 | 0.952 | 0.540 | 0.767 | 0.941 | 0.813 | 1.000 |
| | | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.011) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |

Table 4b. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1970s

| Factor | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | Mean |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------------------------|
| Sweden | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4.750 |
| Austria | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Norway | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Denmark | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4.375 |
| Switzerland | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4.375 |
| Finland | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4.250 |
| Israel | 4 | 4 | (5) | 5 | 2 | 4 | (5) | (5) | 4.250 |
| Luxembourg | 5 | 3 | (4) | 5 | (3) | 5 | (4) | (5) | 4.250 |
| Belgium | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4.125 |
| Germany (West) | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4.125 |
| Netherlands | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3.875 |
| Japan | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | (2) | 5 | 3.375 |
| Iceland | 1 | 3 | (5) | 3 | 3 | 2 | (2) | (3) | 2.750 |
| Australia | 3 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (2) | 3 | 2.500 |
| New Zealand | 4 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | (2) | 2.375 |
| Ireland | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2.250 |
| Italy | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2.125 |
| UK | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2.125 |
| France | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.875 |
| USA | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | 1 | 1.750 |
| Canada | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | 1 | 1.625 |
| | | | | | | | | | <i>Period mean</i> |
| | | | | | | | | | 3.351 |
| | | | | | | | | | <i>Standard deviation</i> |
| | | | | | | | | | 1.122 |

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4b*(two-tailed significance, N = 21)*

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | Mean |
|------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| [1] | 1.000 | | | | | | | | |
| [2] | 0.483 | 1.000 | | | | | | | |
| | | (0.026) | | | | | | | |
| [3] | 0.337 | 0.177 | 1.000 | | | | | | |
| | | (0.135) | (0.443) | | | | | | |
| [4] | 0.719 | 0.701 | 0.487 | 1.000 | | | | | |
| | | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.025) | | | | | |
| [5] | 0.257 | 0.091 | 0.420 | 0.563 | 1.000 | | | | |
| | | (0.262) | (0.695) | (0.058) | (0.008) | | | | |
| [6] | 0.537 | 0.598 | 0.454 | 0.682 | 0.375 | 1.000 | | | |
| | | (0.012) | (0.004) | (0.039) | (0.001) | (0.094) | | | |
| [7] | 0.662 | 0.647 | 0.611 | 0.871 | 0.582 | 0.778 | 1.000 | | |
| | | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.006) | (0.000) | | |
| [8] | 0.586 | 0.593 | 0.504 | 0.792 | 0.202 | 0.529 | 0.674 | 1.000 | |
| | | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.020) | (0.000) | (0.381) | (0.014) | (0.001) | |
| Mean | 0.745 | 0.679 | 0.646 | 0.953 | 0.597 | 0.789 | 0.949 | 0.786 | 1.000 |
| | | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.004) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |

Table 4c. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1980s

| Factor | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | Mean |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------------------------|
| Austria | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Norway | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Sweden | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Switzerland | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4.375 |
| Finland | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4.250 |
| Luxembourg | 5 | 3 | (4) | 5 | (3) | 5 | (4) | (4) | 4.125 |
| Germany (West) | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4.125 |
| Netherlands | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4.000 |
| Denmark | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3.875 |
| Belgium | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3.625 |
| Japan | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 | (2) | 5 | 3.625 |
| Israel | 2 | 4 | (5) | 5 | 2 | 4 | (3) | (3) | 3.500 |
| Australia | 4 | 4 | 5 | 1 | (2) | 4 | (4) | (3) | 3.375 |
| Iceland | 1 | 3 | (5) | 3 | 3 | 2 | (2) | (3) | 2.750 |
| Italy | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2.750 |
| Ireland | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2.375 |
| Portugal | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | (2) | (1) | 2.375 |
| France | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2.250 |
| New Zealand | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | (2) | 2.125 |
| USA | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | 1 | 2.125 |
| Spain | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | (1) | 1.875 |
| Canada | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | 1 | 1.750 |
| UK | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1.750 |
| Greece | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | (1) | (1) | 1.625 |
| | | | | | | | | | <i>Period mean</i> |
| | | | | | | | | | 3.188 |
| | | | | | | | | | <i>Standard deviation</i> |
| | | | | | | | | | 1.048 |

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4c*(two-tailed significance, N = 24)*

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | Mean |
|------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| [1] | 1.000 | | | | | | | | |
| [2] | 0.470 | 1.000 | | | | | | | |
| | | <i>(0.021)</i> | | | | | | | |
| [3] | 0.055 | 0.372 | 1.000 | | | | | | |
| | | <i>(0.799)</i> | <i>(0.074)</i> | | | | | | |
| [4] | 0.392 | 0.632 | 0.569 | 1.000 | | | | | |
| | | <i>(0.058)</i> | <i>(0.001)</i> | <i>(0.004)</i> | | | | | |
| [5] | 0.119 | -0.004 | 0.515 | 0.562 | 1.000 | | | | |
| | | <i>(0.579)</i> | <i>(0.986)</i> | <i>(0.010)</i> | <i>(0.004)</i> | | | | |
| [6] | 0.399 | 0.612 | 0.292 | 0.570 | 0.052 | 1.000 | | | |
| | | <i>(0.054)</i> | <i>(0.001)</i> | <i>(0.167)</i> | <i>(0.004)</i> | <i>(0.808)</i> | | | |
| [7] | 0.475 | 0.630 | 0.734 | 0.757 | 0.560 | 0.683 | 1.000 | | |
| | | <i>(0.019)</i> | <i>(0.001)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.004)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | | |
| [8] | 0.422 | 0.721 | 0.540 | 0.811 | 0.221 | 0.632 | 0.703 | 1.000 | |
| | | <i>(0.040)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.006)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.299)</i> | <i>(0.001)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | |
| Mean | 0.559 | 0.736 | 0.690 | 0.910 | 0.539 | 0.694 | 0.932 | 0.849 | 1.000 |
| | <i>(0.004)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.007)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | <i>(0.000)</i> | |

Table 4d. Integrated versus pluralist economies, mid-1990s

| Factor | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | Mean |
|---------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------------|
| Austria | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Norway | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Sweden | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4.625 |
| Finland | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4.375 |
| Switzerland | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4.375 |
| Denmark | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4.250 |
| Germany | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4.125 |
| Luxembourg | 5 | 3 | (4) | 5 | (3) | 5 | (4) | (4) | 4.125 |
| Netherlands | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4.000 |
| Belgium | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3.750 |
| Japan | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 | (2) | 5 | 3.625 |
| Israel | 2 | 4 | (5) | 5 | 2 | 4 | (3) | (3) | 3.500 |
| Australia | 5 | 2 | 5 | 1 | (2) | 3 | (3) | (3) | 3.000 |
| Italy | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3.000 |
| Iceland | 2 | 3 | (5) | 3 | 3 | 2 | (2) | (3) | 2.875 |
| Ireland | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2.625 |
| New Zealand | 5 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | (2) | 2.375 |
| Portugal | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | (2) | (1) | 2.375 |
| France | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2.250 |
| USA | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | 1 | 2.125 |
| Greece | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | (1) | (1) | 2.000 |
| Spain | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | (1) | 2.000 |
| UK | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2.000 |
| Canada | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | (1) | 1 | 1.875 |
| <i>Period mean</i> | | | | | | | | | 3.271 |
| <i>Standard deviation</i> | | | | | | | | | 0.995 |

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4d*(two-tailed significance, N = 24)*

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | Mean |
|------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| [1] | 1.000 | | | | | | | | |
| [2] | 0.204 | 1.000 | | | | | | | |
| | | (0.340) | | | | | | | |
| [3] | -0.147 | 0.304 | 1.000 | | | | | | |
| | | (0.492) | (0.148) | | | | | | |
| [4] | 0.095 | 0.712 | 0.569 | 1.000 | | | | | |
| | | (0.658) | (0.000) | (0.004) | | | | | |
| [5] | -0.003 | 0.039 | 0.515 | 0.562 | 1.000 | | | | |
| | | (0.990) | (0.855) | (0.010) | (0.004) | | | | |
| [6] | 0.209 | 0.572 | 0.330 | 0.679 | 0.222 | 1.000 | | | |
| | | (0.326) | (0.003) | (0.115) | (0.000) | (0.298) | | | |
| [7] | 0.281 | 0.629 | 0.729 | 0.830 | 0.605 | 0.694 | 1.000 | | |
| | | (0.184) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.000) | | |
| [8] | 0.267 | 0.712 | 0.540 | 0.811 | 0.221 | 0.604 | 0.724 | 1.000 | |
| | | (0.208) | (0.000) | (0.006) | (0.000) | (0.299) | (0.002) | (0.000) | |
| Mean | 0.275 | 0.719 | 0.691 | 0.934 | 0.585 | 0.727 | 0.956 | 0.844 | 1.000 |
| | | (0.194) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |

Notes to Tables 4a–d:

Indicators of social partnership:

- [1] Annual average level of strike volumes, 1963–1970 [Table 4a]/1973–1980 [Table 4b]/1983–1990 [Table 4c]/1993–1996 [Table 4d] (averaged from ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1971, 1981, 1991, 1997*; cf. Cornwall 1990: 121)
5 = less than 100 person-days per 1000 workers; 4 = 100 to 200 person-days per 1000 workers; 3 = 200 to 400 person-days per 1000 workers; 2 = 400 to 600 person-days per 1000 workers; 1 = more than 600 person-days per 1000 workers
- [2] Nature and goals of trade unions (Piehl 1978 [as cited in Czada 1984: 161]) with additions; cf. Slomp 1990; Armingeon 1994)
5 = reformist – balance of class forces (Germanic type); 4 = reformist – hegemonic (Scandinavian type) or acquiescent system conformation without active participation; 3 = conflictual – reformist with participatory goals (Belgian type); 2 = reformist – conflictual with goal of self-control rather than participation (British type); 1 = revolutionary – confrontational (Latin type)
- [3] Legal and state support for unions and union power (from Armingeon 1994, chapter 2, with Israel from Shalev 1992)
5 = full support (highest score on each component); 4 = strong support; 3 = moderate support; 2 = some (additional) support; 1 = only the basic rights of existence

Indicators of industry-level co-ordination:

- [4] Nature of economic ties and outlook of firms (Soskice 1990 and private communication)
5 = co-ordinated market economy; 3 = co-ordinated only in key regions; 1 = non-co-ordinated market economy
- [5] extent of co-determination in the workplace (from Armingeon 1994, chapter 2; Israel from Bar-Haim 1988)
5 = required and regulated, with broad involvement, and with the councils dependent on unions; 3 = required and regulated, with broad involvement, but without workers' representatives necessarily being from unions; 2 = permitted and common, but not regulated; 1 = permitted but rare

Overall national policy-making patterns:

- [6] Nature of (conflict resolution in) national industrial adjustment and wage setting (based on Zysman 1983, Lindberg 1985, Traxler & Unger 1990, Korpi 1991, and Compston 1997, with additions)
5 = bargained or networked; 4 = bargained or networked, with some state imposition of policies, or some pluralism; 3 = pluralist or liberal (generally hands-off state); 2 = statist, with some inclusion of economic actors; or pluralist, with some state imposition of policies; 1 = statist, with the state often imposing policies
- [7] Extent of 'generalized political exchange' in industrial relations and national policymaking (Crouch 1990, with additions)
5 = extensive, both at the sectoral and the national level; 4 = extensive at either the sectoral or the national level; 3 = formerly extensive, but now clearly weaker in various ways and at various levels; 2 = incipient or weak; 1 = none
- [8] general nature of public-private interaction (Lehner 1987/1988, with additions)
5 = concordance (encompassing co-ordination); 4 = strong corporatism; 3 = moderate corporatism; 2 = weak corporatism; 1 = pluralism

Indeed, a low level of strikes has often been used as a central feature of corporatism, yet this may be more of a reflection of broader *consensus*. In any case, both Cameron (1984: 152–157) and Blaas & Guger (1985: 268–273) have found clear relationships between high strike levels and ‘stagflation’ (high inflation combined with high unemployment). Since strike levels can ebb and surge, an average was taken in each case for an eight-year period.

The second indicator of social partnership is the nature and orientation of a nation’s trade unions – generally reflecting historical patterns which are decades if not indeed a century old. Integration is higher when unions are reformist rather than conflictual (or revolutionary), *and* where unions seek to be integrated into the political-economic system or are totally acquiescent rather than seeking to preserve a strong autonomy. However, unions which are reformist and integrated but seek ultimately to dominate the system (such as the Scandinavian labour movements) have somewhat more underlying conflict than reformist-integrated unions which are ‘content’ with a balance of class forces. This latter pattern is found in the Germanic nations, which are the paradigmatic cases here. This point relates to the fact that these nations are the ones wherein capital and labour are called ‘social partners’, a term less common in (and for Therborn inappropriate for) Scandinavia.

Of course, trade union behaviour does not occur in a vacuum. The third indicator, based on Armingeon (1994: 29–30), measures the extent to which unions are not merely permitted to exist and to strike, but are also legally recognised and supported in terms of their achieving centralised control, having the right to arbitration, and having broad influence (such as the extension of contracts to non-unionised workers). To be precise, Armingeon measures four factors, the first three of which are added together and then re-calibrated.

Next there are two indicators of *industry-level co-ordination*. David Soskice (1990, 1991) has developed the concept of a ‘co-ordinated market economy’, which is contrasted with a ‘non-co-ordinated market economy’ (factor [4]). This concept is concerned with the nature of firms, and reflects the following features: in terms of the major *companies* the extent to which there is a ‘virtuous circle of innovation, retraining and employment security’ (Soskice 1990: 196) arising from: (1) a long-term perspective of the firm itself; (2) an equally long-term perspective of related actors in finance, marketing, and research and development; and (3) the flexibility and co-operation of managers and employees, especially regarding (a) the need for international competitiveness and (b) skills formation, on which the firms spend significant sums.

A more macro-level version of the same point is made by Hart (1992: 284) who stresses that both the German and Japanese political economies can diffuse new technologies more easily and quickly than is possible in the UK,

the USA, or France. In Germany this occurs because labour is highly skilled and integrated into policy-making, thus comprising part of what Katzenstein (1977) would call Germany's *ruling coalition*. In Japan, in contrast, only the 'core' labour force is highly skilled, however non-core labour is too weak and divided to resist technological change. Moreover, not only is the business sector in *both* Germany and Japan well-organised (as Hart discusses) but each also has a long-term outlook as Soskice stresses. A similar focus on Germany and Japan as the major (in terms of size) co-ordinated and long-term oriented economies can be found in the more journalistic analysis of Keegan (1992, especially chapters 7 and 8). Michel Albert (1991) also focusses on the superior performance of what he calls the 'Rhinish' capitalism of Germany, its smaller neighbours, and Japan over the Anglo-Saxon and French versions of capitalism. Both Keegan and Albert note the irony that it was the more seductive but ultimately less successful Anglo-Saxon version of capitalism that was in the upswing in the Thatcherite–Reaganite 1980s, as well as being what has normally been stressed in the post-communist 'triumph of capitalism'. Since, as noted, at least 'core' labour must be part of the process for such patterns of co-ordination to occur, factor [5] of integration is the extent to which this is institutionalised through employee co-determination at the plant level and on company boards of directors. Armingeon's (1994: 30) fourth measure of labour relations is used here, with a slight modification.

Finally, there are three measures which define *overall policy-making patterns* in advanced industrial nations. These patterns, one should note, reflect some of the aspects of the corporatist paradigm. Factor [6] focusses on the tendency of the state to include, leave to, or override the social partners in the areas of national economic/industrial adjustment and wage setting. Perhaps ironically, many of the scholars cited here consider a strong state to be the most effective route to economic adjustment. Nevertheless, for our purposes such state-led imposition of change is the clearest antithesis of integration in this regard. Next, there is Crouch's (1990: 72) measure of 'generalized political exchange', that is to say, 'a dense web of interactions binding together a small number of actors' as applied to industrial relations and socio-economic policy-making. This tends to be the mode of exchange characteristic of neo-corporatism.

Lastly, factor [8] utilises Lehner's (1987, 1988) scale of public-private interaction, but in contrast to corporatism rankings the most integrated category here is that of the *concordance* which he finds in Japan and Switzerland. This factor, perhaps more than any other, speaks to the basic (but somewhat vague) notion of 'consensus'.

However, all of these factors contribute to an understanding of *integration*, the component measures of which almost always correleate significantly (at

least at the 0.01 level) with the mean in every or almost every time period.¹² Perhaps more crucially, there are no negative correlations between any of the component scores (cumulatively across the time periods). For the late 1960s, with an N of 21, the cumulative measure of integration has a mean of 3.321 and a standard deviation of 1.133. For the late 1970s, still with an N of 21, the cumulative measure of integration has a mean of 3.351 and a standard deviation of 1.122. In the late 1980s, with the full sample, the mean is down to 3.188 and the standard deviation is 1.048. Finally, in the 1990s the mean is 3.271 and the standard deviation is 0.995. In terms of extremes, in each time period Sweden, Austria, and Norway are clearly at the top. The very bottom is less sharp, but it includes Canada and later Greece. More crucially, in each time period the advanced industrial economies can in fact be grouped into two clear clusters: the integrated economies (those clearly above the mean in the period) and the non-integrated or shall we say pluralist economies (those below the mean). The only nation that has (temporarily) shifted between clusters is Australia, which by the late 1980s was into the (bottom of the) rank of integrated nations. This shift reflected the various Accords between the Labor government and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), but perhaps even more importantly the adoption of a 'Scandinavian' outlook by the ACTU. In 1986 senior unionists visited Europe, resulting in a comprehensive report (*Australia Reconstructed*) which recommended a shift to 'strategic unionism' with an integrated long-term strategy à la Sweden and Norway. The next year the ACTU adopted this as policy (Archer 1992: 405). However, by the 1990s the Accords became less substantive, and the return to power of the Australian conservatives in 1996 led to the ACTU returning to its traditional labourist outlook.

Although Australia has been the only case to cross clusters, there has been some movement *within* each cluster. On the one hand, Israel and Finland have basically changed places within the integrated cluster. Furthermore, after the 1970s integration clearly fell off in Belgium. From the 1960s to the 1970s, integration also weakened in the Netherlands, although it would recover somewhat from the early 1980s (Visser & Hemerijck 1997). On the other hand, within the pluralist cluster Italy has become clearly less pluralist; indeed, it may be the most likely candidate to become integrated at some future date. In any case, it is our view that the dichotomy of advanced industrial economies remains more crucial than any (sub-)movements. *In particular, it is important to stress that Japan, Switzerland, and Luxembourg have all been integrated political economies, despite the fact that they may not be corporatist in the traditional sense.*

Indeed, one of the realities of both Japan and Switzerland is the fact that co-operation between business and (core) labour occurs there in a much more

Table 5. Corporatism versus integration scores

| | Corporatism scores mean (std. dev.) | Integration scores | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | | Late 1960s | Late 1970s | Late 1980s | Mid- 1990s |
| Austria | 5.000 (0.000) | 4.625 | 4.625 | 4.625 | 4.625 |
| Norway | 4.864 (0.351) | 4.625 | 4.625 | 4.625 | 4.625 |
| Sweden | 4.674 (0.556) | 4.750 | 4.750 | 4.625 | 4.625 |
| Netherlands | 4.000 (0.989) | 4.250 | 3.875 | 4.000 | 4.000 |
| Denmark | 3.545 (0.999) | 4.375 | 4.375 | 3.875 | 4.250 |
| Germany (West) | 3.543 (0.940) | 4.125 | 4.125 | 4.125 | 4.125 |
| Switzerland | 3.375 (1.286) | 4.125 | 4.125 | 4.125 | 4.125 |
| Finland | 3.295 (1.043) | 3.500 | 4.250 | 4.250 | 4.375 |
| Iceland | 3.000 (0.000) | 2.750 | 2.750 | 2.750 | 2.875 |
| Israel | 3.000 (0.000) | 4.500 | 4.250 | 3.500 | 3.500 |
| Luxembourg | 3.000 (0.000) | 4.000 | 4.250 | 4.125 | 4.125 |
| Japan | 2.912 (1.603) | 3.375 | 3.375 | 3.625 | 3.625 |
| Belgium | 2.841 (0.793) | 4.125 | 4.125 | 3.625 | 3.750 |
| Ireland | 2.000 (1.015) | 2.250 | 2.250 | 2.375 | 2.625 |
| New Zealand | 1.955 (0.907) | 2.375 | 2.375 | 2.125 | 2.375 |
| Australia | 1.680 (0.873) | 2.500 | 2.500 | 3.375 | 3.000 |
| France | 1.674 (0.792) | 1.875 | 1.875 | 2.250 | 2.250 |
| UK | 1.652 (0.818) | 2.000 | 2.125 | 1.750 | 2.000 |
| Portugal | 1.500 (1.000) | – | – | 2.375 | 2.375 |
| Italy | 1.477 (0.748) | 2.000 | 2.125 | 2.750 | 3.000 |
| Spain | 1.250 (0.500) | – | – | 1.875 | 2.000 |
| Canada | 1.150 (0.489) | 1.625 | 1.625 | 1.750 | 1.875 |
| USA | 1.150 (0.489) | 1.750 | 1.750 | 2.125 | 2.125 |
| Greece | 1.000 (0.000) | – | – | 1.625 | 2.000 |
| <i>Mean</i> | <i>2.648</i> | <i>3.321</i> | <i>3.351</i> | <i>3.188</i> | <i>3.271</i> |
| <i>Standard deviation</i> | <i>1.234</i> | <i>1.133</i> | <i>1.122</i> | <i>1.048</i> | <i>0.995</i> |

Sources: Table 2, Table 4a, Table 4b, Table 4c, Table 4d.

decentralised way than in purely ‘corporatist’ nations with national tripartism (Armingeon 1997: 171–172). This situation has proven to be a comparative outlier or even a puzzle. In part this is because of the stress in the corporatist literature on centralisation – and indeed the fact that certain authors *define* corporatism in this way. In contrast, the concept of integration has no such presumption of centralisation. Yet it is relevant to note that the causal pattern ‘corporatist centralisation leads to economic success’ contains an assump-

tion of an intervening variable, that of a high degree of communication and goal sharing. In fact, as Hancock & Shimada (1993: 230–231) note, Japan ranks very highly in terms of positive-sum information sharing and goal coordination. Tsujinika (1993: 202) would agree with Hancock and Shimada; indeed he argues that there are ‘osmotic networks’ involving the Rengō labour confederation, large firms, and the state. However, whereas all of these authors would thus see Japan as having ‘functional corporatism’ because of this pattern, an alternative way of viewing Japan is to consider it as a highly *integrated* political economy.

Finally, it certainly is true that the nations about which there is general agreement on the presence of corporatism – such as Sweden, Austria, and Norway – are integrated nations. Equally, clearly pluralist nations like Canada, Greece, and the USA are also pluralist in the sense of being non-integrated. For the purposes of comparison, Table 5 gives our integration scores alongside the overall mean corporatism scores. The correlations with the aforementioned mean score of corporatism are in fact extremely high: the value (r) here is 0.914 for the late 1960s, 0.907 for the late 1970s, 0.911 for the late 1980s, and 0.924 for the mid-1990s. The differences, however, are crucial ones: as stressed above, by focusing essentially on roles and behaviour rather than the broader supposedly favourable structures and contexts, we have established the clear ordinal ranking of the long-term democracies, and the *certainty* of the integrated nature of the Japanese, Swiss, and Luxembourg economies. Consequently, we feel that the integration scores are a clear improvement in terms of comparative analysis.

Notes

1. Keman & Pennings (1995: 279) disagree, concluding that ‘corporatism should not be considered as an intrinsic component of consensus democracy’. Crepaz and Lijphart (1995: 288) hold to their argument, noting how corporatism correlates reasonably well with four of the five traditional measures of consensus democracy.
2. See also Therborn (1987).
3. One exception here is Golden (1986), who sees *two* types of policy-making networks at the opposite extreme from corporatism: pluralism and competitive symbiosis. These patterns (as well as the form of corporatism, and patterns of labour exclusion and demobilized democracy) are distinguished in large part by the unity or lack thereof of the political left, in particular the presence of a strong communist party. Such categorisations undoubtedly reflect Golden’s focus on post-war Italy; however, they do not seem broadly applicable.
4. The following analysis generally draws on Schmidt (1982b: 253); Bornstein (1984: 57–58); Held & Krieger (1984: 13–14); Paloheimo (1984a: 22–23); Bruno & Sachs (1985: 224–227); Scholten (1987: 124); Pekkarinen (1992: 298–301); and Woldendorp (1997: 54–61).

5. Indeed, Mitchell (1996: 422) argues that the number of unions is a better, and certainly a simpler, measure of labour concentration than the number of union confederations.
6. Of course, such durable consensual or even consociational patterns may only be a post-World War Two phenomenon. Indeed, in nations like Austria and Finland the pre-war behaviour or 'alternative' was often not so much liberal pluralism as it was class polarisation and even civil war (for example, 1934 Austria).
7. Pryor (1988: 326–327) has done a similar procedure, but only for six authors (and using a three-point scale).
8. Indeed, if the alternative measure 'concordance' used by Lehner [CN5] is re-scored with a '5' rather than a '2' so as to reflect his argument that these are the most consensual nations (even more so than the strongly corporatist cases), then the average sub-score for an emphasis on consensus would increase to 4.80 for Japan and 5.00 for Switzerland. The difference between these values and the sub-scores for an emphasis on power resources would thus increase correspondingly.
9. Indeed, in *The Democratic Class Struggle* Korpi also prefers the use of the term 'societal bargaining' to that of 'corporatism', which he associates with fascistic state corporatism. However, the patterns of behaviour associated with 'societal bargaining' as used by Korpi clearly parallel most usages of the concept of (liberal) corporatism (Korpi 1983: 20–21). Moreover, 'societal bargaining' seems to have as one precondition the effective power of the political left, factor (18) of our ideal type of corporatism. There is thus a clear relationship in Korpi's analysis (1991: 339 [Table 4]) between the dominant pattern of conflict settlement and the long-term strength of the political left – a narrower version of his notion of 'power resources'.
10. *Iceland* is another OECD nation which would seem to be pluralist in terms of Korpi's (1991) classifications – yet which had almost no unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s. The addition of both Luxembourg and Iceland would thus seem to weaken Korpi's overall conclusions, or else question his categorisation.
11. Even though Greece, Portugal, and Spain had each undergone a transition to democracy by the late 1970s, it was not until the 1980s that democracy was considered to be consolidated in each case. Consequently they are first scored for the late 1980s.
12. The main exception here is the level of strike volumes in the mid-1990s, where the correlation with the mean is only 0.275 (compared with 0.559 in the late 1980s) and which correlates negatively with factor 3 (although not at a significant level). This weakened relationship has arisen largely due to sharp drops in strike volumes in traditionally strike-prone pluralist nations, specifically Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK. One may thus question the (continued) utility of this measure. However, given that strike volumes are measured for a shorter period (of four years) for the final time period, there does not (yet) seem to be sufficient justification to discard the factor.

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