

Creating National Attraction: Military Intelligence Sharing Building Foreign Military Interdependence

A Monograph

by

MAJ Kenneth W. Carel
United States Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Name of Candidate: MAJ Kenneth W. Carel

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Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Jeffrey J. Kubiak, PhD

_____, Seminar Leader
Yan Poirier, LCOL, Canadian Army

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL

Accepted this 21st day of May 2015 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

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Abstract

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This monograph uses three case studies to exemplify how the presence, or lack of, military intelligence sharing can increase the attractiveness of a state. The idea of state attractiveness is predicated on Joseph Nye's definition of attractiveness through soft power and how continued contact can increase the desire for further intelligence sharing. The co-creation of a detailed sharing agreement, especially with integrated facilities, appears to significantly increase the desire for continued sharing. Ultimately, shared interests are the catalyst for beginning to share intelligence and then continued sharing helps to further drive interests together. When states have converging interests they appear more likely to enter into intelligence sharing agreements and the formal agreements have a more profound impact on state attractiveness. This study concludes that states build attractiveness through military intelligence sharing due to the repeated cooperative efforts intelligence sharing requires, thereby creating an increasingly interconnected complex system, which amplifies the effects of their cooperation.

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Acronyms

IC	Intelligence Community
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WWII	World War II
NSS	National Security Strategy

Introduction

Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history. Yet political leaders have spent little time thinking about how the nature of power has changed and, more specifically, about how to incorporate the soft dimensions into their strategies for wielding power.

—Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*

Imagine sitting in the middle of the jungle in South America or along a border in the Middle East with the mission of advising and assisting a foreign military leader. The leader requests assistance in the form of information on his enemies, but you are unable to grant his request due to restrictive intelligence sharing policies. Not only did the inability to fulfill his request hinder the military-to-military relationship of the two states, but it also reduced the credibility and legitimacy of the partnership mission as well as the national goal of extending influence and building partnerships. According to the 2015 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) the President of the United States desires to increase our security cooperation in the Americas. The NSS also realizes the rise of global competition for influence but indicates the United States will work from a position of strength and that confrontation is not inevitable.¹

While serving in United States (US) Army South, I attended a briefing during which a senior Army officer discussed the need for the Army to engage with, and provide support to, governments throughout Latin America. He indicated that Army engagement in Latin America is vital to developing our partnerships in the future because there are other partnership options for these countries. He realized that other states have started more aggressive partnering attempts and will compete with the United States for long-term commitments with states in Latin America. This officer made a key statement, “we want to be the partner of choice for the countries of Latin

¹ Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), accessed 1 March 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

America,” and that statement generated many conversations about how to make US Army South the “partner of choice” and led to this monograph.²

The 2015 NSS discusses the important role of the modern international system, supported by international institutions, for spreading influence and creating enduring partnerships and alliances.³ Joseph Nye refers to the aforementioned influence and partnership building as soft power which he says, “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” through positive attraction based on the qualities of “benignity, competence, and beauty (charisma).”⁴ One area in which the US military focuses on building partnerships is called Phase 0, Shaping Operations, through the use of military partnerships with other national militaries.⁵ Phase 0 operations lay the groundwork for long-term cooperative partnerships. One area that enhances both the capabilities of the partner militaries and the relationship between them is intelligence sharing. This monograph examines the relationship between intelligence sharing and US engagement with other states by seeking to answer this question: how does the US intelligence sharing policy make the US military more attractive as a partner of choice during Phase 0 operations?

² Senior Army Officer, US Army South briefing, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, TX, 2012.

³ Obama, *National Security Strategy*, 23.

⁴ Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 92; Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.

⁵ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11 August 2011), accessed 23 January 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf, III-42.

Limitations of the Study

International relations are incredibly complex. This complexity plays out in intelligence sharing resulting in far too many variables to consider in this monograph. For that reason, this work will focus on military intelligence sharing and how military intelligence sharing effects long term partnerships with foreign militaries and governments. As indicated above, military intelligence sharing must remain nested with national policy that indicates that intelligence sharing occurs simultaneously at multiple levels. The results of sharing are not always directly attributable, vis-à-vis a cause and effect relationship, due to the complex nature of the international politics.⁶

Many other variables influence how military partnerships develop as well as the sustainment of those partnerships over time. However, to delineate all of the variables and analyze each in due course would far exceed the scope of this monograph. A review of the literature suggests that of the myriad variables that shape intelligence sharing relationships, the compatibility of interests between the participating states is critical, as indicated in the case studies below. How similarly do the states involved in the partnership see the world and their role in it? In order to maintain focus, this monograph will examine intelligence sharing and how the perception of complimentary national interests, discussed in the case studies, influences their propensity to share intelligence with the US and how intelligence sharing agreements drive long-term military partnerships.

⁶ Neil E. Harrison, *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm*, Suny Series in Global Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 12.

Methodology

There are many reasons why states enter into intelligence sharing agreements, and the impact of these agreements is difficult to discern precisely. This monograph will focus on the long-term benefits sought versus the short-term consequences of intelligence sharing. For that reason, this monograph first seeks understanding of intelligence sharing from the perspective of various international relations theories.

This monograph then employs case studies to examine intelligence sharing relationships in practice. The first case study is the long-term intelligence sharing agreement between the United Kingdom (UK) and the US (UK/USA agreement). The information for this case study is from a combination of sources, but is based primarily on the declassified agreements dated from 1940 to 1956 on the National Security Agency's internet site. This case study is an example of how states with shared interests will share intelligence, thereby increasing the likelihood to remain as long-term partners due to the increasingly interdependent nature of their intelligence sharing agreement and increasing the attractiveness as a partner. This data, coupled with various articles and books, will address the outcomes and possible long-term benefits of sharing intelligence with the United States and increasing military partnerships over time. The UK/USA agreement is a key component to this monograph because it is an incredibly well documented case of intelligence sharing and indicates that intelligence sharing, especially with specialization, decreases the possibility of defection from the agreement and enhances the desire to remain partners.

The second case study focuses on the US relationship with Latin American states. Sources used include declassified documents from the National Security Agency's World War II (WWII) collection efforts in Latin America and contemporary sources documenting the resurgence of cooperation during the US war on drugs. Research indicates that collection efforts against the German presence in Latin America were not very effective but set the conditions for

future military partnerships throughout the region by establishing the precedent for the states to collaborate. The states revived this relationship during the US war on drugs as a measure to increase security of both the host states and the United States. This re-emergence of the relationship, especially after 11 September 2001, occurred due to the possibility of terrorists using the same smuggling practices as illicit drug transporters.⁷ This case study also serves as an example of how different cultures, with different worldviews, will still participate in intelligence sharing, in order to achieve similar goals and how the states are able to revisit or increase these relationships over time.

The final case study focuses on intelligence sharing, or lack thereof, between the United States and France. Even though France was a western power in the post-WWII era, the United States chose not to share intelligence with France due to a variety of concerns. The primary concerns were focused on security of the information, access to desired intelligence, and access to locations favorable to collecting desired intelligence.⁸ The lack of intelligence sharing, coupled with other factors delineated in the case study, led to a long period where the United States did not maintain a positive relationship with France. This case study will indicate a correlation between the lack of intelligence sharing and the difficulty of building a long-term military partnership with another state.

The resultant analysis will then compare the current US intelligence sharing policy to the results of the case studies to highlight potential areas for policy adjustment that would enable the United States to increase soft power from its intelligence resources by sharing through combatant command regional relationships. This study concludes that states build attractiveness through

⁷ James I. Walsh, *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 78-84.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

military intelligence sharing due to the repeated cooperative efforts intelligence sharing requires, thereby creating an increasingly interconnected complex system, which amplifies the effects of their cooperation.

Intelligence Sharing in Theory

A central component of the theory behind this monograph is an understanding of international relations as a complex system and how one or two variables impact the future state of the system. It might be an oversimplification of a complex system to attempt to determine that one variable, intelligence sharing, directly leads to the attractiveness of continued partnership. In a complex system, there is the possibility of altering one of the conditions of the system to achieve larger results in the long term, especially as the system becomes more interconnected through cooperation.⁹

The concept of cooperation increasing attractiveness, due to the definition provided above, derives from the idea that continued cooperation is self-reinforcing because of the interdependent nature of an intelligence sharing agreement. There are multiple international relations theories that support this concept. The first of these theories is neoliberal institutionalism, whereby, creating international institutions reduces the effects of anarchy and increases security by providing a means for regulating the international environment.¹⁰ These institutions, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), contain elements that share intelligence to assist with collective security, consequently, creating conditions for continued

⁹ Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, 4th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 12; Robert Jervis, "Complexity and the Analysis of Political and Social Life," *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 4 (1997-1998): 574.

¹⁰ Brown and Ainley, 46.

cooperation. Neo-functionalism, which is an amalgamation of integration, federalism, and functionalism, suggests that cooperation at the political institutional level, as well as the functional level (e.g. economic, military, or specific industrial cooperation) leads to long-term cooperation or even to a voluntary reduction in state sovereignty to increase prosperity and security.¹¹ These theories indicate that continued cooperation leads to closer ties between governments, creating interdependent relationships increasing the attractiveness for the governments to continue working amicably together. These theories also lend support to the idea that initiating and sustaining intelligence cooperation, more specifically through military cooperation, can increase the attractiveness of military cooperation creating conditions for long-term partnerships.

Intelligence sharing assists with the creation of long-term partnerships by binding allies together through a multitude of methods. Intelligence sharing does not always mean a direct reciprocal exchange of intelligence information, but rather through a multitude of different methods for sharing intelligence. Professor of political science and international cooperation expert, James Walsh, indicates some of these methods are: trading intelligence for something else, pooling resources, hierarchical agreements, and specialization.¹² A state might trade intelligence for goods, services, or support because they do not require access to the broad spectrum of general intelligence. For example, Somalia might trade intelligence on pirates operating from their shores in return for aid in the form of food or medicine. Pooling resources is when states use their resources together to determine the veracity of their information. A good example of a hierarchical agreement was the US relationship with Germany just after WWII. The

¹¹ Brown and Ainley, 133-137.

¹² Walsh, 6-7.

United States was in direct control of West German collection efforts and then remained heavily embedded in the intelligence collection organization for years before completely transitioning the organization back to German control.¹³ Specialization is when different states concentrate on separate components or aspects of collection and then share the results for mutual benefit.¹⁴ One example is the case of the UK/USA agreement in 1946 where the United States provided the bulk of the funding and the UK provided access to locations around the world to enhance the collection process.¹⁵ This type of agreement establishes interdependency and the longer the agreement remains in effect the less likely it is for a state to defect because of the increased cost of obtaining the same amount of information. As each state builds capacity and capability in its specific area of specialization or region, the attractiveness of the partnership continues to increase and the likelihood of defection decreases.

Walsh discusses two barriers to intelligence sharing agreements. First, the bargaining problem occurs when states must determine what they will share and what costs they are willing to absorb. It is fundamentally an assessment of cost and benefit. Many of the benefits were discussed above, but sharing intelligence also comes with costs. States shape the perception of costs and benefits of intelligence sharing through legitimacy and credibility. Here, the security of the information a state receives from an intelligence sharing agreement plays a central role. For instance, the United States under Executive Order 13526-Classified National Security Information requires that personnel, working with classified information, must have a need to

¹³ Walsh, 52-53.

¹⁴ Ibid., 38-39.

¹⁵ Patrick Marr-Johnson and Hoyt S. Vandenburg, "British-U.S. Communications Intelligence Agreement," 5 March 1946, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, accessed 10 August 2014, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf.

know and pass the appropriate background investigations to determine eligibility for access to classified information.¹⁶ The two recent cases of Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden, both who leaked classified information which was subsequently published on the WikiLeaks website, have had a negative impact on US legitimacy and credibility.¹⁷ These leaks decreased the legitimacy of US classified information policies and the credibility of the ability of the United States to protect classified information. These breaches of security will likely have long-lasting impacts. It is possible that some international cooperation will cease, or continue at a reduced capacity, due to these leaks.¹⁸ The potential for future leaks may reduce other state's desire to enter into an intelligence sharing agreement with the United States or US military due to a perceived, or real, lack of legitimacy and credibility.

The second barrier Walsh identifies is one of enforcement. States must determine how to ensure the promised intelligence is delivered in accordance with the agreement and the other state does not renege on the agreement, also known as defection.¹⁹ Defection can occur voluntarily or involuntarily when one or more parties exit an agreement on unfavorable terms. One of the significant costs of defection occurs when states specialized in different types of collection, which

¹⁶ Barack H. Obama, "Executive Order 13526-Classified National Security Information," 29 December 2009, The White House, accessed 2 December 2014, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information>.

¹⁷ Julie Tate, "Bradley Manning Sentenced to 35 Years in Wikileaks Case," *The Washington Post*, 21 August 2013, accessed 28 December 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judge-to-sentence-bradley-manning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html.

¹⁸ Jeremy Kinsman, "Truth and Consequence: The Wikileaks Saga," *Policy Options* (February 2011), Institute for Research on Public Policy, accessed 15 December 2014, <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/issues/from-climate-change-to-clean-energy/truth-and-consequence-the-wikileaks-saga/>.

¹⁹ Walsh, 8-9.

means that when one state defects, both states lose access to the complete intelligence picture hindering their abilities to make decisions.²⁰ The possibility of defection may result from domestic political unrest or the sending state may have lost access to the desired intelligence due to compromise of their collection network. Any defection from an intelligence sharing agreement harms the ability of both states to collect intelligence. When defection is involuntary, the state did not choose to exit the agreement but the impact remains the same.

Risk

In addition to Walsh's two barriers, it is useful to examine the risk involved in intelligence sharing. There are many risks associated with intelligence sharing which leads the intelligence community to attempt to guard strictly the intelligence they produce, sometimes through over classification or a reluctance to downgrade relevant information for sharing. The Director of National Intelligence is the authority for developing policy and programs designed to "protect intelligence sources, methods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure."²¹ The primary concern for the protection of sources, methods, and activities is to ensure continued access to the information necessary to help provide national security. If the intelligence community loses access to information due to unauthorized disclosure, or even through over sharing, the loss could endanger American lives, civilian and military, because the government would not have advance warning of a possible attack and could not act to prevent the attack.

One of the most serious risks associated with intelligence sharing is the risk of compromising the source of the intelligence regardless of the means of collection. At the center of

²⁰ Walsh, 11.

²¹ George W. Bush, "Executive Order 13470 of July 30, 2007: Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities," Federation of American Scientists, accessed 25 March 2015, <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13470.htm>.

risk lies the paradox that intelligence is only useful when possessed by those with the means to use it, but harmful if the intelligence is compromised by sharing too widely and the source stops producing useful intelligence.²² When sources are compromised, for any reason, the states involved now have the responsibility to reevaluate the future value of dealing with each other, which also influences the credibility and legitimacy of any ongoing partnership missions. This issue influences the need to share intelligence balanced with the need to protect sources and methods of collection and is a key factor for enabling military partnership missions in foreign countries.

The potential for a state or military to share intelligence with a third party that was not a signatory of the original agreement is still another risk of intelligence sharing. The third party is not bound to the aforementioned agreement would not have the same requirement to protect the intelligence. Walsh concludes this is one of the biggest detractors for sharing intelligence.²³

A related aspect of risk is the ability, or lack thereof, to validate the shared intelligence by the receiving state. States and militaries rely on accurate intelligence to make decisions about policies or military plans and if the sender of shared intelligence manipulates the information, the receiver may make a decision with detrimental effects to its interests.²⁴ This poses a significant problem because analysts review collected information to create intelligence and the process lends itself to unintentional or purposeful manipulation, which could degrade the credibility of the

²² Richard A. Best Jr., Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL41848, *Intelligence Information: Need-to-Know Vs. Need-to-Share* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 6 June 2011), accessed 10 December 2014, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41848.pdf>, 1.

²³ Walsh, 11.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

relationship. Unintentional manipulation could relate to cultural or personal biases, while purposeful manipulation has the intent of deceiving the state receiving the intelligence.

Another risk, especially in the case of specialization, is that one state might use the sharing agreement as leverage to obtain a more favorable position in the relationship. For example, a state might threaten defection due to a lack of domestic support for the agreement with the United States when ultimately there is no serious threat on the domestic side.²⁵ This idea is similar to the manipulation of shared intelligence, but instead of changing the information, the sending state is leveraging the relationship in order to increase its gains whether for the interests of security and prosperity, or to include personal gains for officials.

A final risk pertains to the release of information process and ties directly to the effects of national policy. Executive Order 13526 delineates the base line process for releasing or declassifying intelligence and stipulates the Director for National Intelligence maintain oversight on the process.²⁶ The subsequent policies from this executive order create a quite lengthy process, depending on the fidelity of the intelligence sharing agreement. This process can lead to a situation where the requesting state becomes discouraged while waiting for the information, which can lead to a loss of legitimacy of the agreement and credibility for US partnerships. The information might also become stale, or useless, and the state receiving the intelligence would no longer have the ability to make a decision or take action on a possible threat or opportunity.

²⁵ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 434.

²⁶ Obama, "Executive Order 13526."

Intelligence Sharing in Practice

Case Study: United Kingdom

The political relationship between the UK and the United States has fluctuated over the years but generally strengthened since WWII. Ray Raymond, a senior advisor to Tony Blair and twenty-year veteran of the British Diplomatic Corps stated, “over the past 60 years, the special relationship has not only survived but prospered, making a vital contribution to international security.”²⁷ Mr. Raymond’s statement highlights the special relationship between the UK and the United States but how, and why, did this relationship continue to grow? Mr. Raymond offers three areas; common law, mutual investment, and diplomatic and security partnership. The similarity between UK and US laws dates back to the colonies and as the United States won independence, the Founding Fathers’ experience with law was directly tied to their experiences and education derived from the UK. The UK and the United States also invest in each other’s economies more heavily than any other two states in the world. Finally, Mr. Raymond attributes the “unique defense and intelligence relationship” to the efforts of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, which enhanced the relationship to a status previously unimagined.²⁸ The idea of the defense and intelligence relationship as one of the three key aspects of the UK/US special relationship indicates the important role of these agreements for enhancing the political relationship between two states.

²⁷ Ray Raymond, “The U.S.-UK Special Relationship in Historical Context: Lesson of the Past,” in *U.S-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*, eds. Douglas T. Stuart and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 1; SUNY Ulster, “Dr. Ray Raymond Leads International Student Conference,” accessed 3 March 2015, apps.sunyulster.edu/announcements/192.

²⁸ Raymond, 6, 8, 9.

The UK and the United States have a long history of sharing intelligence, which began with their shared interest of the German threat during WWII. This portion of the case study will examine the progression of the UK/USA intelligence sharing relationship, beginning when Lord Lothian, the UK ambassador to the United States, submitted the first formal request for intelligence sharing. On 8 July 1940, Lord Lothian requested:

It is not the wish of His Majesty's Government to make this proposal the subject of a bargain of any description. Rather do they wish, in order to show their readiness for the fullest cooperation, to be perfectly open with you and to give you full details of any equipment or devices in which you are interested without in any way pressing you beforehand to give specific undertakings on your side, although of course they would hope you would reciprocate by discussing certain secret information of a technical nature which they are anxious to have urgently.²⁹

The request continued on to recommend that a small, secret group of officers and scientists should travel to the United States to prevent divulging the desired information to the enemy.³⁰ As indicated above, the UK was willing to begin providing intelligence with only the possible expectation of a return on their investment. The UK likely wagered that the US response would be to reciprocate and share what the United States had garnered in the field of signals intelligence. Lord Lothian's request also indicated that the militaries would have deep involvement in the process from the very beginning, probably because both governments would require their militaries to both collect and act on future intelligence.

The US government routed the UK request through many different government officials and departments in order to determine if the agreement was feasible. President Franklin Roosevelt suggested that he would approve a sharing agreement pending review by the necessary

²⁹ National Security Agency, "Early Papers Concerning UK-US Agreements," 8 July 1940-24 April 1944, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, accessed 10 October 2014, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/early_papers_1940-1944.pdf, 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.

governmental departments. Intelligence sharing began 28 August 1940 based on an initial agreement; however, the final agreement was not signed until 5 March 1946.³¹ Even though the president could have directly endorsed the request for intelligence sharing, he sought to ensure the details would not derail his own governmental efforts by routing the request through the subject matter experts. The Secretary of War recommended the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, with support from the Chief Signal Officer, Logistics Officer, and the War Plans Division, act as the principle for coordinating the intelligence exchange.³² The lengthy approval process might have hindered sharing, but as indicated above, sharing began almost six years before the full agreement was completed.

In addition to the approval process, there were some concerns about what to share and how to share the intelligence. One concern was in the realm of procurement and that any UK request for materiel could not interfere with US military procurement.³³ This component of an intelligence sharing agreement could place an undue burden on one of the parties. This burden could occur when the agreement relied on shared equipment that only one state had the ability to produce. Requests from the other state could leave the producing state short on resources and unable to meet the requirements of its own military leading to involuntary defection if the receiving state perceived a breach of the agreement.

As the proposed agreement flowed through the different US departments, the intelligence department identified a few additional concerns. First, the US Navy was opposed to any transfer of cryptanalysis of foreign signals because it could have compromised sources and methods to the

³¹ National Security Agency, "Early Papers Concerning UK-US Agreements," 6.

³² *Ibid.*, 6.

³³ *Ibid.*, 7.

UK. The Navy also requested to withhold details on “the bombsight and the antenna mine with two-way firing device.” The Army requested not to share bomb ballistic tables.³⁴ The request by subordinate departments to withhold some information is not unusual but, as the agreement was in the initial stages, this type of request could ultimately have led to involuntary defection.

Intelligence organizations inherently prefer to maintain the secrecy of their information, which created some initial obstacles for the agreement. There were two different cases with the potential to create a situation where one state might defect from the initial agreement. When the United States sent two liaison officers to examine the Enigma Machine at Bletchly Park in the UK, the British required the liaisons to disclose the names of the personnel with whom they would share the information upon return to the United States. This request created confusion amongst the different US governmental departments, who were delineated in the initial agreement, and supposed to have access to the information. The US departments concluded the UK was not sharing in accordance with the initial agreement and thought they might not get access to the Enigma Machine, classified as ULTRA, and miss an opportunity to gain access to German communications. The second case was when Dr. Alan Turing, the pre-eminent British cryptologist, visited Bell Laboratories to learn about a new cryptographic system but was denied access. After some back and forth communication, both problems were rectified at the UK and US general staff level.³⁵ These are the types of issues that can lead to defection from an agreement. However, in this case it most likely had the opposite effect due to the subsequent communication and realization that both governments had, in fact, provided the requisite access and information. This realization would lead to increased trust and increase the attractiveness of continuing the partnership.

³⁴ National Security Agency, “Early Papers Concerning UK-US Agreements,” 25.

³⁵ Ibid, 87-93.

The UK and United States continued to work through issues toward making a lasting agreement and ultimately concluded that an additional organization would assist with sharing. In 1944, the United States and UK agreed to create an organization for dealing with ULTRA classified information to ensure proper dissemination to both countries and pertinent organizations, including the commonwealth states.³⁶ The rules for this organization helped to set down concrete policies for dealing with intelligence sharing between the two states and ultimately led to the establishment of a permanent intelligence sharing agreement in 1946. The agreement covered the tasks of specialization between the two states specifically through regional collection responsibilities. It also stipulated the requirements for sharing collected intelligence, primarily through the communications intelligence centers for each state manned initially by military members and later a mix of civilian and military members.³⁷ The UK and United States further updated the agreement in 1948, detailing continued cooperation and communication methods.³⁸

The militaries of both the United States and UK had a great deal of input to the agreement, even to the extent that the militaries held meetings to review the draft agreement and recommend changes to verbiage to ensure they received the information they would need to

³⁶ National Security Agency, “Early Papers Concerning UK-US Agreements,” 231.

³⁷ Thomas L. Burns, *The Origins of the National Security Agency 1940-1952*, United States Cryptologic History, series 5, vol. 1 (Fort Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1990), accessed 16 September 2014, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/origins_of_nsa.pdf.

³⁸ National Security Agency, “Tabular Comparison of Appendices to U.S.-British Comint Agreement,” as approved at 1946 and 1948 U.S.-British Technical Comint Conferences, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, accessed 16 September 2014, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/tabular_comparison.pdf, 46-48.

conduct military planning.³⁹ The 1946 agreement set the foundation for future continued intelligence sharing and served as a framework for how to initiate a broad intelligence sharing agreement with foreign states. The specialization between the UK and United States, including the Commonwealth states, increased interdependence, which reduced the chances of defection from the agreement as well as increasing the attractiveness of the partnership. In 1955, the two governments updated the agreement again indicating the continued desire for intelligence sharing and cooperation. Two primary examples from the updated agreement are the establishment of wartime cooperation principles, deemed necessary because of the possibility of global war, and how to streamline the implementation of further changes to the agreement.⁴⁰ This update indicated attractiveness continued to increase due to the establishment of procedures for continued cooperation and for cooperation during future wartime possibilities. In addition, the formalization of how to continue to update the agreement indicates that both states wanted the agreement to continue into the near future.

There are many examples of international intelligence sharing, but the UK/USA agreement set the standard for how to setup a long-term agreement. After 1955, the UK/USA agreement changed from a bi-lateral agreement into a multi-lateral agreement with the addition of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, ultimately known as Five Eyes.⁴¹ Former senior British

³⁹ National Security Agency, “Joint Meeting of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board and Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee,” 1 November 1945, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, accessed 16 September 2014, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/joint_mtg_1nov45.pdf, 5.

⁴⁰ National Security Agency, “Amendment No. 4 to the Appendices to the UK/USA Agreement,” 3rd ed., 10 May 1955, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, accessed 16 September 2014, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/new_ukusa_agree_10may55.pdf, 1-3.

⁴¹ The Vimy Report, “What Is ‘Five Eyes’?” 22 July 2014, accessed 13 March 2015, <http://thevimyreport.com/2014/07/five-eyes/>.

Intelligence Official Michael Herman, and retired Brigadier General James Cox, former Executive Secretary of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, recognized the UK/USA agreement as the “gold standard” of intelligence sharing agreements. Because the agreement was evolutionary, they indicate it will serve as an example for future sharing agreements.⁴² Brigadier General Cox recognized the importance of the Five Eyes partnership, named for the five contributing countries eyes-only. He indicated that the long, integrated history of the Five Eyes partnership built trust and confidence and will remain essential for continued intelligence sharing focused on long-term security for all of the states involved.⁴³ Brigadier General Cox’s recognition of the importance of the Five Eyes sharing agreement highlights the interdependent nature of the intelligence structure and the continued attractiveness of the agreement. Brigadier General Cox also suggests that because the different national defense departments meet on a regular schedule, a broad array of national interests are addressed through the intelligence collection and sharing effort.⁴⁴

The integration of the different states’ intelligence collection efforts created a desire for continued partnership and contact. The realization of this relationship occurred through the many different intelligence organizations, of which the US Defense Intelligence Agency plays a key role when dealing with security intelligence, and highlights the importance of working through defense and military organizations. Working through the combatant commands helps facilitate

⁴² Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 202; James Cox, Strategic Studies Working Group Papers, *Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community* (Alberta, Canada: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and Canadian International Council, December 2012), accessed 26 December 2014, https://d3n8a8pro7vnm.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/95/attachments/original/1413683744/Canada_and_the_Five_Eyes_Intelligence_Community.pdf?1413683744, 9.

⁴³ Cox, 9.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

sharing of this nature, and through continued contact, increases the attractiveness of military intelligence sharing.

Case Study: Latin America

This case study covers multiple states in Latin America, with a focus on Colombia. The purpose is to show how states with different cultural backgrounds still have the ability to cooperate over certain issues, thereby creating attractiveness for long-term partnerships. Beginning in 1940, Latin American states began to detect indications of clandestine German radio activity within their borders and sought US help to deal with the problem.⁴⁵ Almost simultaneously, Ecuador and Colombia requested US assistance; Ecuador requested direction finding equipment and Colombia requisitioned both direction finding equipment and personnel to operate the equipment and train local nationals on how to operate the equipment.⁴⁶ These requests indicated that an intelligence partnership with the United States was attractive due to US technical capabilities, expertise, and the willingness to share.

The Navy was the only US government organization with direction finding experience so they assumed responsibility for mission management and training in both countries in 1940.⁴⁷ This situation is an indicator for how the military helps to facilitate intelligence cooperation and begin the process of building partnerships. The US Navy developed a plan to supply two radios each for Ecuador and Colombia, beginning in Colombia, by establishing the proper contacts,

⁴⁵ David P. Mowry, *German Clandestine Activities in South America in World War II*, United States Cryptologic History, series 4, World War II, vol. 3 (Fort Meade, MD: Office of Archives and History, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, 1989), accessed 9 August 2014, www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/german_clandestine_activities.pdf, 35.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

supporting authorities, and coordination for logistical support to the mission provided by both the Colombian Army Air Corps and the US 15th Naval District.⁴⁸ As indicated, the Navy plan actually brought together more elements than just the intelligence components, which would help create interdependency to ensure mission success as well as possible leverage should one state decide to defect from the agreement.

The Navy ran into problems with their endeavor to establish a sound training, direction finding, and interception effort in Ecuador. As the US Navy operators began to set up the equipment and train the personnel provided by the Ecuadorian Navy, both organizations came to realize that they would rather have US operators only. Nonetheless, the US Naval Operations Center and the diplomats of both countries determined this would not be the best option.⁴⁹ The US officials realized the importance of the partnership mission, as well as the collection effort, and maintained the original arrangement for the Ecuadorian personnel to remain in training and serve as operators.

The mission was not without its share of problems. Due to the lack of secure operating locations, an unknown perpetrator shot and wounded one of the US personnel. The credibility of intercepted communications and direction finding were questionable due to the ad hoc reporting procedures. Some intercepts collected by Ecuadorian Navy personnel were routed to a French resident, then through the British consul, and on to the American consul. Then their path went through the American Legation, on to the Naval Attaché and State Department, and finally to the

⁴⁸ Mowry, 37.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 38.

15th Naval District.⁵⁰ This method for routing intercepted radio traffic posed a serious problem to security, since the message traffic passed through so many different personnel.

Other problems with the interception of radio traffic included Ecuadorian mission members intercepting high-powered stations from Germany and indicating that they were local transmitters in Ecuador. The same problem occurred with a US Navy operator that collected the same station traffic the year before.⁵¹ The lack of useful intelligence, as well as the example of poor work, might have led the United States to believe that the mission was not worth maintaining. After an investigation, two components of the results indicated that the mission should continue. The naval attaché in Quito thought the “goodwill value” of the mission was useful to the United States. The second component was, if the Germans increased their activity in Latin America the United States would have qualified personnel in place to exploit the transmissions.⁵² The situation remained attractive for the United States to maintain a presence in Ecuador for the possible future benefit of collection as well as the benefit from the cooperative agreement. This example indicates the willingness of the United States to continue sharing in order to build upon the established relationship, even though the current intelligence was not very useful. The situation in Colombia was different but not necessarily more productive.

The situation in Colombia was better in terms of functionality but similar in execution. The US operators were in the capacity of trainers only and only one Colombian officer was assigned to the mission for training and execution, with the result that the program was functional but lacked suitable locations or successful interceptions of clandestine German

⁵⁰ Ibid., 38-39.

⁵¹ Mowry, 39.

⁵² Ibid., 39.

communications.⁵³ In Colombia, the partnership was working as requested by their government but the actual collection was less than satisfactory for both the US and Colombian governments. David Mowry uncovered two possible reasons for the lack of success. The first reason was that the US personnel were only training one Colombian officer and not personally manning the equipment. A letter from J. Edgar Hoover, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, indicated the second reason that the Colombian officer was possibly an agent for the Nazis and reporting to “the German minister to Colombia.”⁵⁴ This situation could fall into the category of involuntary defection, because the state did not choose to send information to a third party. However the United States continued to work with Colombia via military trainers, which set the conditions for increasing cooperative efforts in Latin America, once the United States entered WWII.

As the United States entered WWII, the desire to ensure security throughout the Americas became far more important. As a result the United States sought to renew their efforts in Ecuador and Colombia, and to engage in possible partnerships with Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Chile; which eventually established a radio-monitoring network in Latin America operated by both local and US personnel.⁵⁵ The initial efforts in Ecuador and Colombia, even with their lack of success, appealed to other Latin American states, which subsequently requested assistance from the United States to help resolve the perceived problem of clandestine German operatives sending information from Latin American soil. From 1942 through 1945, military operators/trainers were sent to many countries throughout Latin America to establish a radio interception and direction

⁵³ Ibid., 40.

⁵⁴ Mowry, 40.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 44-49.

finding network, focused on German activities, with varying degrees of success collecting on, and dismantling, the German networks.⁵⁶ The collective efforts of the United States and Latin American states indicated that cooperation, and resultant successful action, was possible and could continue into the future.

One of the most successful components of the program established a facility in Brazil with the eventual assumption of responsibility, and continued operation, by the Brazilian military.⁵⁷ The establishment of an enduring program, even after the departure of US personnel, indicated the successful nature of cooperation in Latin American countries. Overall, the impact of signals collection and direction finding in Latin America did not appear to have a drastic impact on the outcome of the war but it set the precedent for cooperative action in the future.⁵⁸

Since WWII, the political situation between the United States and Latin American states has varied according to the attention the different administrations paid to Latin American states as well as differing cultural norms. There were many different reasons for cultural differences between the United States and Latin America, but in the larger security sense, the United States and Latin states were generally able to overcome these differences and create partnerships.⁵⁹ In 1950, the United States began to view Latin America as a possible source of communist uprising and signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance establishing an agreement for

⁵⁶ Ibid., 44-58.

⁵⁷ Mowry, 57.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 57-58.

⁵⁹ Gary M. Wederspahn, "Cross-Cultural Communication between Latin American and U.S. Managers," Professional Knowledge Center, Grovewell LLC, accessed 9 March 2015, <http://www.grovewell.com/pub-Latin+US-mgrs.html>.

mutual military support throughout the hemisphere.⁶⁰ The agreement might have provided the source of cooperation needed for a long-term intelligence sharing agreement but the agreement was not as grand as initially hoped. The Latin Americans did not view communism through the same lens as the United States; therefore, they did not want to participate in the active containment of communism and only Colombia sent a token force to help fight in Korea.⁶¹ However, the Colombian assistance indicated that at least Colombia was still willing to work with the United States and uphold the agreement providing an example of continued cooperation with the US military. During President Nixon's administration, the United States worked with Colombia and Mexico to reduce the flow of cocaine and marijuana into the United States.⁶² This action was the beginning of US-Latin American cooperation for counter drug operations and highlights Colombia as a potential future candidate for continued cooperation. Building upon this relationship with Colombia, future US administrations would continue to partner with Latin American states through military and governmental partnering while attempting to stop the flow of drugs into the United States.

Based on the established ability to partner with Latin American states, during the war on drugs the United States would again partner, and share intelligence, with its Latin American neighbors. In 1993, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 14, US Policy on International Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere, which altered the drug interdiction efforts to the source countries and primarily focused on Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia through

⁶⁰ Michael J. Kryzanek, *U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 4th ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2008), 56.

⁶¹ Kryzanek, 57.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 71.

increased assistance to the host states.⁶³ The shift in focus would again require the United States to work with Latin American states through intelligence sharing to diminish the flow of drugs to the United States. US Southern Command already operated some surveillance flights in the area. As the effort unfolded, the planners determined that the best method of diminishing the flow of drugs was denial of the air traffic routes drug transporters utilized for sending drugs to Colombia for follow on shipment.⁶⁴ A problem arose when Peru, followed closely by Colombia, decided to pass a law authorizing deadly force against aircraft suspected in the use of drug trafficking, which would violate US law if those states used US intelligence to kill drug traffickers, or accidentally killed civilians.⁶⁵

This problem could have been labeled involuntary defection from the agreement because the United States would have to cease intelligence sharing. The cessation of sharing would have decreased the attractiveness of the United States as a partner because of a loss of trust that the United States would continue to provide support for the combined effort. After a legislative and presidential review, the United States enacted a new law indicating that, if the US President approved of the methods employed by foreign states for interdiction of aircraft trafficking drugs, US personnel would not be held legally liable for foreign national military actions.⁶⁶ The United States obviously deemed this mission important and enacted a law permitting continued

⁶³ US Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report on a Review of United States Assistance to Peruvian Counter-Drug Air Interdiction Efforts and the Shootdown of a Civilian Aircraft on April 20, 2001*, 107th Cong., 1st sess., October 2001, accessed 23 November 2014, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs107th/10764.pdf>, 3.

⁶⁴ US Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report on a Review of United States Assistance to Peruvian Counter-Drug Air Interdiction Efforts and the Shootdown of a Civilian Aircraft on April 20, 2001*, 3-4.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

intelligence sharing and cooperation, thereby, ensuring the legitimacy and credibility of US agreements, which increases the attractiveness of military intelligence sharing, in this case through US Southern Command. The detection missions were composed of both bilingual US military members and either a Peruvian or Colombian military member in order to ensure the proper information was passed to the correct military for action, as well as separate chains of command so US personnel were not involved with the use of lethal force decisions.⁶⁷

The preceding example is an indicator of how two states can share intelligence for mutual benefit. The obvious willingness to cooperate by both sides indicates the desire for a continued partnership. The United States was able to increase its attractiveness as a partner by demonstrating commitment and flexibility by altering its laws in order to continue sharing intelligence. The programs and cooperation established before and during WWII set a precedent for successful cooperation and partnership between the United States and Latin American states indicating that military partnerships, and intelligence sharing, are an attractive component of the United States.

Case Study: France

The relationship between France and the United States has varied greatly since the American Revolution, between fast allies to undeclared war, and only recently proceeded in a positive direction since the end of WWII. According to Blazan Prize winner and member of the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, toward the end of WWII French and US relations began to diverge in large part due to perceived slights by other allied states towards France and President, Charles de Gaulle. The first of these was when the Soviet Union insisted that France's portion of occupied Germany come from the areas within UK

⁶⁷ Ibid., 6.

and US influence. The next factor was de Gaulle's refusal to take part in the San Francisco Conference because he was not "party to the preliminaries." Yet another factor was the perception, and possible truth, that the United States was fomenting anticolonial sentiment in some of the French colonies. Finally, the most significant factor for de Gaulle was his exclusion from the Yalta Conference where he believed that the United States, Soviet Union, and Britain were dividing "the world up into zones of influence" which he believed included France as a zone the three powers could influence.⁶⁸ These perceptions largely influenced the post-WWII French/US relationship due to de Gaulle's reluctance to work with the rest of the allies in shaping the post-WWII environment.

Another aspect that added to the poor French/US relationship was the rise of the communist party in France. Charles de Gaulle wanted the world to see a democratic government in France and facilitated the participation of the French communist party within the French government.⁶⁹ With the rising power of the Soviet Union and the rise of the communist party in France, the United States had a difficult time trusting the French government. This lack of trust was exemplified by the choice not to share intelligence with France as the Cold War began, to include not sharing intelligence through the NATO relationship.⁷⁰ The French people only partially bought into the idea of NATO protection because WWII could happen again with enemy occupation followed by liberation instead of defending France from the initial attack from the

⁶⁸ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present*, ed. Akira Iriye, trans. Derek Coltman, *The United States in the World: Foreign Perspectives* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 169-172; International Balzan Prize Foundation, "1982 Balzan Prize for Social Sciences: Jean-Baptiste Duroselle," accessed 14 March 2015, <http://www.balzan.org/en/prizewinners/jean-baptiste-duroselle>.

⁶⁹ Duroselle, 173.

⁷⁰ Walsh, 47.

Soviet Union.⁷¹ These are just some of many factors that explain the lack of mutual trust between the French and US governments, trust that has ebbed and flowed several times since. The period from 1958 to the early 1960s indicated increased cooperation between France and the US followed by a drastic decrease beginning in 1966 with France withdrawing from the military portion of NATO.⁷²

France's 1966 withdrawal from NATO caused many problems for the member states, and had further negative influence on the relationship between the United States and France. One of the main problems was France's declaration to exercise sovereignty over their entire territory indicating that NATO headquarters could no longer remain in France.⁷³ This abrupt shift further strained US-French relations but an established intelligence sharing agreement might have provided a mitigating factor had one existed. One instance of French and US intelligence cooperation was when the US Army invited Colonel Roger Trinquier to Korea and Japan to learn about how he conducted successful counterinsurgency operations in Algeria.⁷⁴ This instance of cooperation did not seem to influence the overall relationship between the United States and France and was not an enduring intelligence sharing agreement. From 1973 to 1980, US-French relations remained poor due to disputes over foreign policy toward the Middle East and Soviet Union with French policy still guided by Gaullist principles.⁷⁵ These disputes led to further

⁷¹ Duroselle, 184-185.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 232.

⁷³ Duroselle, 232.

⁷⁴ Christopher K. Ives, *US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Military Innovation and Institutional Failure, 1961-63*, Strategy and History (New York: Routledge, 2007), 42; Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare; a French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger, 1964), 35.

⁷⁵ Jacquelyn K. Davis, *Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners: U.S-French Relations at the Breaking Point* (Herndon, VA: Brassey's, Inc., 2003), 25, 29.

distancing of US-France relations and indicated a divergence of French-US interests throughout the world. As indicated earlier, one method of building shared interests is through intelligence sharing but sometimes shared interests are required to establish intelligence sharing. This reasoning seems circular and indicative of a paradox but at some point two states will find a reason to share intelligence and, as indicated below, for the United States and France that reason was Muslim extremism.

From 1980 to 2001, there were few reasons for US-French cooperation with the exception of Desert Storm. However, after 11 September 2001, their cooperation would change direction. After the attacks in the United States, President Chirac rushed to the United States to express support for the United States and helped usher in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 defining terrorist attacks as an international threat.⁷⁶ Although France immediately pledged support, there was still another obstacle for the two states to overcome before they could begin to grow closer together.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused consternation in France and led to poor relations between the two nations. One view that indicated this divergence of interests was that the United States was drifting away from Europe as a priority and choosing different means to protect its interests (i.e. the military means).⁷⁷ France generally promotes multi-lateral actions and disliked the idea that the United States would attempt to invade Iraq in the face of multi-lateral opposition, including opposition from France, which led to antagonistic relations for almost six years.⁷⁸ This

⁷⁶ Davis, 151.

⁷⁷ Paul Belkin, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL32464, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S. - French Relations* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 14 April 2011), accessed 3 March 2015, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32464.pdf>, 1-2.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

point in French-US relations was one of the many troughs of the cyclically high and low relationship but soon the two nation's interests would align more closely.

Even though there was still animosity between France and the United States, coming to support the United States in a time of crisis went a long way to begin rebuilding a relationship that was in decline since the end of WWII. France has a large population of Muslims, some illegal and unemployed, primarily due to France's colonial past.⁷⁹ This large population coupled with unemployment creates a recruitment pool for Islamic extremism. This significantly shaped the issue as a starting point for a possible alignment of interests between the United States and France. France has a significant human intelligence capability in many Muslim countries based on where they chose to colonize and maintain influence.⁸⁰ As these interests align, it is far more likely for France to want to enter into an intelligence sharing agreement with the United States.

As recently as 2013, France deployed military units to Mali in order to help contain the destabilizing effect of an Islamic extremist movement. The French chose to share intelligence with the United States to help facilitate France's contribution to the effort.⁸¹ France's interests in the region provided the impetus to request intelligence support from the United States and it is possible that if these ad hoc arrangements continue, they could lead to a lasting bilateral intelligence sharing agreement. France also appears to covet the relationship of the Five Eyes member states and will attempt to share with these states to gain ancillary access to intelligence

⁷⁹ Davis, 156.

⁸⁰ Christopher Zoia, Keenan Mahoney, Nemanja Mladenovic, Salvador Molina, Adam Scher, and Selma Stern, "NATO Intelligence Sharing in the 21st Century" (Capstone Research Project, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, New York, NY, Spring 2013, 9 March 2015), https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/AY13_USDI_FinalReport.pdf, 12.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

collected and vetted by Five Eyes members.⁸² Not only does sharing intelligence with states involved with Five Eyes increase the credibility of the intelligence received, it provides France access to a long-established intelligence sharing system with roots that helped establish a long-term sharing agreement. Access to this agreement could prompt the adoption of a similar agreement as France realizes the value of access to information provided by a long-term, evolutionary agreement that continues to provide increased access and integration over time.

Ongoing French-US cooperation in Africa is an indicator of increasing cooperation between the two states. The United States transferred ten million dollars in support of French counter-terrorism operations in Mali, Chad, and Niger. There are also indications of highly sensitive cooperation, most likely intelligence sharing from France to the United States, when a US air strike killed a co-founder of the Al-Shabaab organization.⁸³ As these indicators of converging interests build, it is likely that France and the United States could agree to begin a bilateral intelligence sharing agreement to facilitate future cooperation. As this relationship grows, the two states could grow to rely on intelligence sharing agreements, which could further the convergence of French and US interests and create an increasingly interdependent relationship.

Comparison of Case Studies to Current National Policy

This monograph began with the idea that an intelligence agreement can help increase national attraction over time. The key example is the UK/USA agreement, established just after WWII and still in effect today. The agreement has evolved over the years but still provides a foundation for the United States and UK to share intelligence on a daily basis, enhancing their

⁸² *Ibid.*, 15.

⁸³ Peter Tinti, "The US and France Are Teaming up to Fight a Sprawling War on Terror in Africa," *Vice News*, 15 September 2014, accessed 5 March 2015, <https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-and-france-are-teaming-up-to-fight-a-sprawling-war-on-terror-in-africa>.

shared understanding of the world. The agreement emerged from the shared desire to defeat a common enemy and after the war; the states realized it was in their interest to continue the relationship in order to overcome future threats. Common interests were a key instigator for initiating the intelligence sharing agreement but those interests grew closer over time as each state's global understanding continued to grow, and was subsequently shaped through intelligence sharing. The attractiveness generated by this agreement continued for all the parties involved even after the Commonwealth states separated from the UK and resulted in the Five Eyes agreement including the United States, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The reasons for the success of this agreement are supported by the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism, neo-functionalism, and systems theory, and indicate that interdependence also facilitates increased national attractiveness.

The UK/USA agreement seemed like a long process but the intelligence sharing began before an agreement was fully in place due to the necessity of the situation. Now it is criminal to share information without authorization from the original classification authority, except in extreme circumstances based on the policies discussed in the next section. While the rise of institutions created more pathways to share intelligence, continued maintenance of bilateral relationships is important. The agreement was facilitated through joint stationing established by, and continued through, the UK/USA agreement as indicated in the case study. The current national policy creates a difficult process for information sharing, but the United States and UK share intelligence through joint facilities and established release criteria. These methods of operation facilitate rapid intelligence sharing and increase attractiveness due to the timeliness and credibility of the shared information. Over time, this agreement helped create interdependence between the United States and UK making the loss of the agreement detrimental to both states; thereby, further increasing national attractiveness through the sharing agreement.

Intelligence sharing between the United States and Latin America began during WWII based on the desire for collective defense against a possible global German threat. After WWII, sharing continued throughout the years as the possible spread of communism made the United States willing to share intelligence and Latin American states were willing to request support to prevent the spread of communism. As the Cold War continued, the United States began to transition intelligence efforts towards a war against the rising drug trade and transnational criminal organizations trafficking illegal narcotics to the United States. Some of the organizations also threatened the internal stability of Latin American states, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia. The United States and Colombia had a tenuous but continuous political relationship over the years. Colombia even provided limited military support to the UN effort during the Korean War because of its ongoing relationship with the US.

The US war on drugs began to fall from public view as the war on terror gained prominence after 11 September 2001. The United States and Colombia developed even closer ties due to the possibility of international terrorist organizations using the same ingress routes as drug smugglers, which facilitated further cooperation with Colombia. As indicated in the case study, US policy facilitated intelligence cooperation with Colombia, which in large part is responsible, as the 2015 NSS mentions, for Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Columbia being close to a political resolution of their conflict.⁸⁴ National policy helped facilitate intelligence sharing between the United States and Colombia, increasing national attractiveness and the desire for Colombia to continue working with the United States. This example could lead to more opportunities for US military collaboration with individual states, and through the Organization of American States, to build the attractiveness of US partnership throughout Latin America.

⁸⁴ Obama, *National Security Strategy*, 28.

However, our current policies make it difficult for initial sharing with countries that do not have a previous long-term agreement with the United States.

Another component that may decrease attractiveness is a difference in culture. The Latin American case study indicated that culture appeared less relevant than shared interests did. Shared interests increased through communication and an intelligence sharing agreement creates a channel for increased communication, especially when there are shared or integrated facilities. The ability for the United States to meet the request of Latin American states during WWII set the stage for future cooperation during the cold war and through the US war on drugs. The initial cooperation led to future requests and enabled the United States to work toward its own interests in Colombia, while simultaneously helping Colombia with its internal security problem. While their interests and culture may have differed, the US and Colombian interests were met through sharing intelligence, but acting through different areas. The continued interaction over the years enabled the United States and Colombia to visualize how they could cooperate for a mutually beneficial outcome regardless of their cultural differences. Continued sharing also increases interdependency and makes future defection more difficult as time progresses.

The historically turbulent relationship between the United States and France appears to be in the process of becoming a mutually beneficial relationship with decreasing tensions between the states. The lack of intelligence sharing post-WWII decreased the ability for the two states to develop a shared global understanding and possibly increased the long period of poor relations. Over the years, the two states began to draw together as global problems developed into shared interests. Apparently, the two states have yet to establish a bilateral intelligence sharing agreement and instead rely only on pre-established multi-national sharing channels, albeit with some indicators of direct sharing. While, these multinational organizations provide a means to share intelligence, the specificity of the information may not be quite as useful compared to the information gained through a bilateral agreement. A bilateral agreement, like the UK/USA

agreement, provides far more integration and an increased ability to verify the quality of the intelligence provided through the agreement. Any intelligence sharing will assist with building national attractiveness, but a direct sharing agreement, coupled with integrated facilities, would have a much larger impact due to the constant contact between the states.

Increased sharing through the NATO and European Union largely mitigated problems the United States had for sharing intelligence with France over the years. The United States and France are just now getting to a point of trust that they have not had for many years, largely due to the relationship between the international security threat from transnational terrorism and the high Muslim population in France. There is finally a convergence of interests the United States could leverage for a bilateral intelligence sharing agreement with France. Current policy would dictate sharing occur through established channels and may delay information getting to France that could help with an immediate threat unless the National Command Authority would authorize an emergency release. However, continued long-term cooperation is faster, and more reliable, than an ad hoc or contingency sharing relationship, and assists with building the attractiveness of partnership with the United States. The UK/USA agreement indicates how attractiveness builds over time and national policy supports these types of sharing agreements but arriving at an agreement is sometimes quite difficult. Research indicates there was a dearth of intelligence sharing policy prior to WWII and the amount of regulatory policy has increased exponentially as exemplified in the next section.

The Effect of National Policy

Executive Order 12333-United States Intelligence Activities, dictates the guidance for the execution of intelligence activities. This order ensures that all intelligence activities, including those conducted by the military, fall under the purview of the national authority. However, different methods of collection are governed by the different agencies that specialize in those

fields.⁸⁵ This executive order began a process of further delineation of duties and specificity of collection and sharing responsibilities, which required further clarification in 2001. In the post-11 September 2001 security environment, the US intelligence community (IC) strengthened and integrated US intelligence priorities, directives, and guidance.⁸⁶ Due to the perceived intelligence failure resulting in the 11 September attack, the United States realized the need to reform intelligence policy. Based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the legislative branch enacted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which, among other components, directed the creation of a Director of National Intelligence with oversight and policy authority covering the entire US IC.⁸⁷ The creation of the Director of National Intelligence resulted in the addition of a single office to set the standards for the IC and an attempt to create a better integrative process for the IC. According to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Director of National Intelligence has the responsibility for oversight of all intelligence activities between the US IC and foreign governments or international organizations.⁸⁸ The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act delegates intelligence sharing oversight to the Director of National Intelligence which enables his office to create

⁸⁵ Ronald Reagan, “Executive Order 12333-United States Intelligence Activities,” 4 December 1981, US National Archives and Records Administration, accessed 14 October 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html>.

⁸⁶ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 2014* (Washington, DC: United States Intelligence Command, 2014, accessed 28 December 2014, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf, 1.

⁸⁷ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” accessed 17 September 2014, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm.

⁸⁸ US Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108–458, 108th Cong. (17 December 2004), accessed 29 December 2014, http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf, section 102.

controlling policy for all of the IC, including all Department of Defense intelligence components from the Defense Intelligence Agency through each military branch's intelligence elements.

All military intelligence sharing with foreign militaries falls under the aforementioned policies, which creates many difficulties. The primary difficulty derives from requests for the release of information. The military person requesting the release of a document, or portion thereof, must contact the original classification authority designated by the President of the United States, or a delegated representative to classify documents, and request the specific information for release to a stated third party or for complete declassification.⁸⁹ This process is very specific with training required for individuals with the responsibility to determine if the information meets the criteria for release. This can lead to an increased waiting time for the state requesting the intelligence and can result in a decreased value of the intelligence, or complete irrelevancy, before the requesting state has the opportunity to use the information.

In accordance with these documents, all intelligence activities fall under the purview of the national authorities so any military partnerships involving intelligence sharing directly relate to the credibility and legitimacy of the US IC. When a foreign state, or internal agent, compromises US intelligence information, the resulting international perceptions spread across the breadth and depth of US missions abroad, especially when there are close and continuing military partnership missions. Intelligence sharing assists with developing military partnerships by building credibility, legitimacy, and reducing the likelihood of defection.

There are risks associated with intelligence sharing but there are also ways to mitigate these risks. One risk is defection from the agreement. Defection can take many forms but ultimately ends with the dissolution of the sharing agreement. To prevent defection the states may specialize, thereby creating conditions for preventing a state from withdrawing because the costs

⁸⁹ Obama, "Executive Order 13526."

of losing the intelligence from the agreement became too high over time. Another risk is when a party to an agreement shares the intelligence with a party outside the agreement. A method to prevent third party sharing is creating co-use facilities where both states have the ability to monitor the flow of information to and from the location. These types of facilities help build trust between the states by providing them a means to verify how the intelligence is processed and utilized by the other states. The increased trust leads to an increase of national attractiveness through credibility and charisma, because each state sees the other acting in accordance with the rules of the agreement.

The central variable in most of these concerns about risk is trust. Walsh believes that trust between states desiring to share intelligence is paramount for the ability to overcome the barriers to sharing and this trust usually hinges on shared interests.⁹⁰ There are many different types of shared interests for states to use as a starting point for sharing intelligence, and as mentioned earlier, once two states begin to cooperate it becomes easier to continue to cooperate rather than defect from the agreement because defection impacts international credibility and legitimacy. Time, then, becomes an additional variable. The longer the relationship lasts, the stronger it can become.

Intelligence sharing agreements create cooperation and interdependence that help build long-term partnerships. This interdependency enhances the desire for a continuing partnership. Each of the case studies examined above includes an historical example tied to a current situation as an indicator of how past partnering influences continued partnering.

Conclusion

⁹⁰ Walsh, 13.

The length of this study afforded an opportunity to examine the relationship between only two variables that effect national attractiveness; intelligence sharing, and shared interests. The main goal was to understand the role intelligence sharing played in increasing national attractiveness and further the international relationship of states involved in the agreement(s). The UK/USA agreement is a great example of how two states integrate their intelligence collection and sharing ability and the evolution that can occur over many years of sharing. This evolution links the interests of the states more closely together as they build a shared understanding of the international environment. There are many more variables that help build mutual interests; like economic ties and memberships in international organizations, but it is clear that intelligence sharing can make a significant contribution.

US national policy dictates the terms of sharing intelligence with foreign states, which should facilitate international intelligence sharing. However, there are many obstacles to the negotiation of an agreement for intelligence sharing. The primary obstacle is the process for releasing information to other states. This process is quite lengthy and can result in the requesting state receiving useless information, which decreases the attractiveness of the United States. A bilateral sharing agreement bypasses a portion of this lengthy process by establishing set parameters for the types and parts of information the states can pass to each other. These preset sharing components increase the speed, and reliability, of the information increasing trust between the two states, thereby increasing attractiveness.

The 2015 NSS uses the term leadership throughout the document.⁹¹ If the United States wants to continue to shepherd the globe it needs to ensure that it builds national attractiveness, as a partner and an ally, throughout the world. As demonstrated throughout this monograph, one method of increasing national attractiveness is through intelligence sharing, especially through

⁹¹ Obama, *National Security Strategy*.

the military establishments around the globe. The regional combatant commanders can work through Phase 0 shaping operations to implement intelligence sharing agreements, supported by national policy, which will help build national attractiveness through ongoing intelligence sharing agreements between states and international organizations. These sharing agreements help build national attractiveness by increasing credibility, legitimacy, and charisma through continued contact and interaction that builds interdependency between the United States and other states. This interdependency will lead to increased attractiveness and as more states become involved in these agreements other states will also desire similar relationships due to the actual, or even perceived, benefits.

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