

**Critical Rationalism
And
Macrosociology of Globalisation**

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And
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Abstract

This thesis employs *Critical Rationalism*—an inter-subjective theory of rationality originated in Karl Popper’s conjectural theory of knowledge— in order to develop a new macrosociology of globalisation. It describes contemporary globalisation as the formation of a liberal globality through which the centrality of the Hobbesian struggle for political power has been superseded with the Lockean competition for economic interests. But the thesis argues that liberal globalisation suffers from fundamental societal deficits due to a global organisation of people based on economic competition rather than rational dialogue and social cooperation. The central question of thesis therefore is that ‘*how emerging utilitarian-based liberal globality can be transformed into a global society of free and equal citizens?*’ The thesis argues that people’s potential access to critical rationality enables them to agree upon one set of globally shared values concerning the equality of people and people-centric global institutions, which are required for creating a global society of free and equal citizens. Through its macrosociological analysis the thesis addresses the question of how such a system of globally shared values can operate as the cultural driving force of a radical global institutional change from the Lockean logic of economic competition to the Kantian logic of dialogue and social cooperation. The thesis concludes that intellectuals can employ the ideal-type of an open global society of free and equal persons in order to persuade global social movements to work for realising such a fundamental global institutional change towards a just and free global society.

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Part I

A Critical Rationalist Approach to Globalisation

Chapter 1

Principal Argument and Thesis Structure

Globalisation has grown to be a popular subject of study and research in the social sciences. Due to the proliferation of inquiries into globalisation, there are different conceptions and analyses of globalisation process. This thesis aims to introduce a *macrosociological* analysis of globalisation as one set of entwining cultural, political and economic learning processes. As an introduction to the thesis, chapter 1 begins with globalisation as a '*macro-sociological problem*' that is viewed in the context of societal deficits of contemporary globalisation. It then introduces the thesis' principal argument. The thesis structure will be outlined in the final section of this chapter.

1.1 Introduction: Globalisation as a Macro-Sociological Problem

The perspective I develop in this thesis suggests that contemporary globalisation is a global institutional change: a qualitative shift in the logic of global ordering of human societies from the centrality of the struggle for political power to a competition for economic interests, which is affecting people's lives around the globe in positive and negative ways. However, this liberal form of global institutional shift suffers from fundamental societal deficits because it aims to replace Hobbesian power politics with a Lockean economic rivalry, as opposed to a Kantian rational dialogue. While globalisation has partly transformed the anarchical context of the Cold War world order, it has not yet radically changed this context through its liberal logic. Not all global social disorders can be attributed to liberal form of globality, but paradoxically it has contributed to both global crises and global progress.¹

¹ Regarding the paradoxical nature of contemporary globalisation see: Lourdes Beneria, "Response: The Dynamics of Globalisation," *International Labor and Working-Class History*, (47) (1995), p.50.

The following three major points of evidence of *global societal deficits* urge us to rethink how contemporary globalisation affects both people's misery and prosperity. However, a more fundamental question is, 'can the utilitarian (economic) logic of contemporary globalisation be replaced by the cultural logic of a rational dialogue among world civilisations?'

Viewed as a type of global cultural deficit, global liberalism is unable to successfully reorganise national societies in a wider global order whilst respecting their cultural diversity. In the emerging transnational world order, powerful societies still impose their cultural identities upon powerless societies. Apart from the immorality of such a cultural hegemony, it has led to global cultural resistance, sometimes with a highly violent nature. The events of 11 September 2001 were an indication of Islamic extremists' reaction to an illegitimate presence of the West, specifically Americans, in their Islamic homelands. If our post-national world order suffers from a clash of civilisations, one of its major causes is the imposition of a liberal model of globality upon the whole world without prior consensus.²

As a global political deficit, the emerging global governance still remains too unaccountable to the world's population. Powerful societies still manage global politics and destroy the public sovereignty of powerless peoples by their political and military interventions. The emergence of global governance has not prevented wars and other forms of violence. The American invasion of Iraq was just one of the recent expressions of such interventions. Hence, liberal global governance does not fundamentally change the anarchical context of the Cold War political order, because it has not created an accountable governance to prospective global citizens.

As a global economic deficit, liberal globalisation mixes this unaccountable global governance with an oligopolistic world economy in which opportunities and resources are allocated highly unequally. This is because powerful economies impose their unjustly economic regulations upon the global market. In a highly unjust division of labour in emerging 'transnational' world economy, it is no surprise that weaker economies lose their share in the global product and suffer from poverty due to this oligopolistic model of economic globalisation. In a world economy in which roughly 44 percent of the world's population lives below the two dollars per day international

² See Robert W. Cox, "Civilisations and the Twenty-first Century," in *Globalisation and Civilisations*, (ed.) Mehdi Mozaffari, (London and New York, Routledge: 2002), p.4.

poverty line, who consume only 1.3 percent of global products, the poor peoples would need just 1 percent more of the global product to escape poverty, as defined above.³ The highly uneven distribution of welfare and the resulting poverty gap between the Global North and the Global South is the outcome of an unjust global division of labour that has been reinforced by oligopolistic economic globalisation.⁴

Not all global social disorders can be assigned to contemporary globalisation, because power politics has been established long before contemporary globalisation. However, global liberalism reshapes power politics in its economic form: i.e. the struggle for economic power. Nevertheless, globalisation should not be viewed an entirely negative phenomenon. In its cultural dimension, the emergence of global liberalism—despite its hegemonic nature—has globalised the culture of liberty and the rule of law. In its political aspect, the end of the superpower bipolarity and the emergence of multi-centric global governance have to some extent civilised global governance by prioritising economic competition over political clashes. In its economic aspect, globalisation has encouraged many national economies to open their markets to the world economy, thereby accelerating global economic growth with some positive externalities for less developed and developing countries.⁵

Viewed from an ideal type of global society, however, contemporary globalisation is far removed from a global society of free and equal citizens. Its liberal logic leads to a reorganisation of national societies into a multi-centric world order through encouraging a global competition for economic interests. But, this global competition does not lead national societies to a global society of free and equal citizens. In contrast, it actually operates as a quasi--global liberal empire that is unaccountable to the world population.⁶ Against this background, a central normative question for Globalisation Studies is how liberal globality could be altered into such a global society of free and equal citizens, which respects people's cultural diversity, political sovereignty, and equal right to enjoy from a decent life.

³ Thomas Pogge, "World Poverty and Human Rights," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 19 (1) (2005), p.1.

⁴ See D. Dollar, "Globalization, Poverty and Inequality," *Globalization: What's New?*, (ed.) M.M. Weinstein (New York, Columbia University Press: 2005), pp.96-128.

⁵ See World Bank, *Globalization, growth, and poverty: building an inclusive world economy*, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2002).

⁶ See Martin Shaw, "Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era," *Millennium*, 31 (2002), pp.327-336, and Jedediah Purdy, "Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments," *Ethics & International Affairs*, 17 (2), (2003), pp.35-47.

This thesis attempts to respond to such a normative question. It takes the view that moving from liberal globality to a global society of free and equal citizens is a central global macro-sociological problem. The thesis' central question therefore becomes: 'how can liberal globality be transformed into a global society of free and equal citizens through a rational dialogue among world civilisations?'

There is a substantial literature discussing alternative forms of globality and globalisation, the breadth of which makes comprehensive reference is not possible. However, we can recognise an *important linkage* between *the idea of world society* and *alternative understandings of globalisation* in this literature, which may be called a *world society tradition* in Global Studies. The thesis aims to reinvent the linkage between the very conception of globality and the meaning of globalisation by an *epistemic-institutional* approach—what it terms a *critical rationalist approach to globality and globalisation*. It aims to show how an alternative model of globalisation can be built based on a new normative conception of globality— i.e. the ideal type of an open global society, resting upon the premise of *equal access of human beings to critical rationality*. This alternative model of globality refers to an alternative global order as to how it could be, rather than how it is. Recognising the importance of our definitions of globality for alternative forms of globalisation, the thesis argues that the notion of 'world' or 'global' society has an important place in current Globalisation Studies. While many of those who define globalisation as the formation of a *world society* do not employ a normative ideal type of world society to describe the existing forms of globality and globalisation, their notions of world society have affected their analyses of globalisation. This key link helps us to create a new relation between a new 'normative account of global society' and a new 'normative vision of globalisation' on the basis of people's equal access to critical rationality.

As Barry Buzan argues, for most sociological approaches to world society, the *concept of world society* is used as "an attempt to capture the macro-dimension of human social organization as a whole."⁷ This *account of world society* has directly affected the analyses of globalisation. For instance, Martin Shaw defines globalisation as a process of world society formation because world society "exists through the social relations, involved in global commodity production and exchange, through

⁷ See Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2004), p.63.

global culture and media, and through the increasing development of world politics.”⁸ John Burton believes that, “communications, and not power, are the main organizing influence in world society.”⁹ Another sociologist, Nicolas Luhmann, discusses “if society exists only as (and through) a conglomerate of systems, and if these systems because of their functional definition operate transnationally, society is only possible on a world scale--it is world society.”¹⁰ The Stanford School (or sometimes ‘world polity’) views world society as shared norms, rules and institutions. It puts *global culture* at the centre of its analysis of world society.¹¹ For Leslie Sklair, world society has become a believable idea only when ‘*global*’ relations have found a distinctive meaning from ‘*inter-national*’ relations.¹²

The World Society Research Group (WSRG) stresses a holistic and multilevel approach to the idea and reality of world society, and puts some emphasis on shared culture and values as the essence of a world society. Viewed from a Weberian account of society as a rational agreement over mutual adjustments of interests, the WSRG regards the world society formation as an incorporation of international system and international society into a wider world order i.e. a world society.¹³ Similarly, Dietrich Jung’s political sociology of world society discusses that the tension between traditional social forms and rational social action is not only a historical divide but an ongoing dynamic, shaping a world society of the traditional and modern societies.¹⁴ In a Marxian-inspired sociological approach to world society, Immanuel Wallerstein and Christopher Chase-Dunn developed theories of the modern world-system for macro-sociological analysis of capitalist globalisation. For them, the modern world-system is a capitalist mode of production and the hierarchy of classes is structured in the center-

⁸ Martin Shaw, "Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical and Political Limits of International Society", *Millennium*, 21 (3) (1996), p.55.

⁹ John W. Burton, *World Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1972), p.45.

¹⁰ See Thomas Diez, "Cracks in the System, or Why Would I Need Luhmann to Analyze International Relations," Draft Paper for ECPR workshop on Modern Systems Theory and International Society, COPRI, (2000), pp.3-4. Also see: Niklas Luhmann, "Globalisation or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern Society," *International Review of Sociology*, 7 (1), pp.67-80.

¹¹ See Johan W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation States," *American Journal of Sociology*, 103 (1) (1997), pp.144-181.

¹² See Leslie Sklair, *Globalisation, Capitalism & Its Alternatives*, third edition, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2002), pp.12-28.

¹³ See Mathias Albert, Lothar Brock, Klaus Dieter Wolf (eds.), *Civilizing World Politics. Society and Community Beyond the State*, (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield: 2000), pp.1-17.

¹⁴ See Dietrich Jung, "The Political Sociology of World Society," *European Journal of International Relations*, 7 (4) (2001), pp.433-474.

periphery formation. The idea of a capitalist world society views the forces of capital as the driving power of a long-term historical process of capitalist globalisation.¹⁵

In sum, as Barry Buzan notes, “macro-sociological way of thinking is undeniably powerful and attractive.”¹⁶ However, such a macro-sociological approach to globality and globalisation should not be limited to analyses of the existing forms of globality and globalisation. We can also find those normative accounts of globality, which have affected an analysis of alternative globalisations. Among normative approaches to the idea of world society, Jürgen Habermas’ and Andrew Linklater’s ideas of dialogic world society are notable. They employ the notion of communicative rationality to discuss the possibility of the emergence of such a global human society.¹⁷ Inspired by such normative accounts of globality and globalisation, this thesis argues for a new normative vision of globalisation based on *the idea of an open global society*.

Habermas’ and Linklater’s accounts of a dialogic world society have provided us with a rich normative analysis of contemporary globalisation and its alternative form, as we will see in chapter 3. Nevertheless, these normative analyses can be advanced through introducing the ideal type of open global society, which is constructed based on the principle of people’s access to critical rationality, what Karl Popper terms as Rational Unity of Humankind. The thesis therefore introduces a *rationally* constructed normative *ideal type of an open global society* as the basis of its *critical rationalist* approaches to globality and globalisation. It dates the philosophical origin of this approach to Immanuel Kant’s concept of the *universal kingdom of ends*. Kant’s strong *epistemological faith* in human reason and its implications for moral equality of human beings led him to the ideal of a universal kingdom of ends.¹⁸

The thesis aims to reinvent this Kantian epistemological faith in human reason and rational dialogue by reconceptualising the notion of a universal community of ends with *the idea of open global society*, through turning Popper-Bartley’s conjectural

¹⁵ See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy*, (Cambridge University Press: 1984), and Christopher Chase-Dunn, *Global Formation. Structure of the World-economy*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Basil Blackwell:1989)

¹⁶ Buzan, *From International to World Society?* (2004), p.77.

¹⁷ See Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation, Political Essays*, (trans. and ed.) Max Pensky, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), and Andrew Linklater, "Globalisation and The Transformation of Political Community," in John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalisation of World Politics*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2001), pp.509-525.

¹⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, Hans Reiss (ed.) and H. B. Nisbet (transl.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1970), pp.41-53. Also see: J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.) *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press: 1997).

theories of knowledge and rationality into *critical rationalist models of human action and social organisation*. However, if at the time of Kant the global conditions were not prepared for an *active debate* about using people's access to rationality for the creation of an open global society; contemporary globalisation has paved the way for rethinking the possible creation of a universal community of ends.¹⁹ In line with the macrosociologies of S. N. Eisenstadt, Benjamin Nelson, Donald Nielsen, Björn Wittrock, and Jeffery Alexander, the thesis develop a new macrosociology of dialogic globalisation that rests upon Critical Rationalism as an analytical model for a rational dialogue among world civilisations.

Validating George Modelski's approach to globalisation's concept,²⁰ the thesis introduces globalisation as a global epistemic-institutional change that has paved the ways for the emergence of transnational social connectivity. However, the thesis' institutional approach differs from Modelski because it gives a *cultural meaning* to such a global institutional change. Inspired by Wittrock and Alexander,²¹ the thesis proposes a new macrosociological analysis of contemporary globalisation through exploring the cultural motors of global social changes.²²

1.2 Principal Argument

The thesis puts forward a main hypothesis for addressing the challenges of contemporary liberal globalisation: *a rational (open to criticism) dialogue among civilisations operates as a cultural mechanism for the creation of certain globally shared values that causes a global institutional transformation from the liberal globality into an open global society of free and equal citizens*. Given the dialogic solution of the thesis, the meaning of *rational dialogue* plays a key role in exploring the cultural motor forces of such an institutional change. As Fred Dallmayr argues,

¹⁹ Richard Falk, "Toward Global Parliament," *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (1) pp.212-220.

²⁰ See George Modelski, "Globalisation as Evolutionary Process", in George Modelski, Tesselano Devezas, and William R. Thompson, (eds.), *Globalisation as Evolutionary Process*, (London, Routledge: 2008), pp.11-29.

²¹ See Björn Wittrock, "Social Theory and Global History: The three Cultural Crystallizations," *Thesis Eleven*, 65 (27) (2001), pp.27-50., and Jeffery C. Alexander, *The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology*, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2003), pp.11-26.

²² On the cultural approach to globalisation, see: Mike Featherstone (ed.) *Global Culture. Nationalism, globalisation and modernity*, (London, Sage Publication: 1990); Roland Robertson, *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture*, (London, Sage publication: 1992), and Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation*, (London, Public-World: 1996).

understanding the very meaning of *dialogue* calls for a *theory of dialogue*.²³ The thesis argues that if *dialogue* is the most reasonable way of social organisation of equal and free persons either on a national or global scale, the main challenge of such a dialogic form of globalisation is addressing the possibility of a rational dialogue among civilisations. The thesis suggests *Critical Rationalism* as a *sophisticated theory of rationality*, and employs it to address the meaning of *rational dialogue*. On the basis of this critical rationalist model of inter-civilisational dialogue, the thesis argues for the possibility of emerging an *inter-civilisational consensus* over *globally shared values* regarding the equality of human beings and a people-centric social governance.

For Critical Rationalism, the term '*rational*' means '*openness to criticism*' or in better sense '*openness to rational criticism*'.²⁴ It refers to a method of social learning from mutually recognised errors. The thesis thus defines a *rational dialogue among civilisations* as an open dialogue to mutual criticism for achieving certain globally shared values. Upon this *critical rationalist-conception of rational dialogue*, the thesis explains the reasons why not only a *rational dialogue among civilisations* is possible but also it is the key cultural mechanism for the formation of the globally shared values in order to realise a *macro-institutional* transformation from liberal globality into an open global society of free and equal citizens. It argues that if world civilisations take a *rational dialogic position* to each other, the centrality of competition for economic interest can be replaced with rational dialogue and social cooperation for mutual interests.

Inspired by Mark Amadeus Notturmo's *Science and the Open Society*,²⁵ the thesis categorises three major *epistemological doctrines* to justify an epistemic possibility of rational dialogue among civilisations. These major doctrines are as follows: uncritical rationalism (absolutism), critical irrationalism (relativism), and critical rationalism as a sophisticated defense of rationalism, located between those extremes. Karl Popper has elaborated on Critical Rationalism as an epistemological *attitude* in defence of a sophisticated rather than dogmatic rationalism. He introduces his own account of

²³ For a review of the meaning of 'dialogue' and the need for a theory of dialogue see: Fred R. Dallmayr, 'Justice and Cross-Cultural Dialogue: From Theory to Practice', in Michalis S. Michael and Fabio Petito (eds.) *Civilisational Dialogue and World Order*, (USA, Palgrave: 2009), pp.29-45.

²⁴ The term "*openness to criticism*" is used in this thesis as "*openness to a 'rational' criticism*"-- as opposed to openness to any kind of criticism.

²⁵ Mark Amadeus Notturmo, *Science and the Open Society: The Future of Karl Popper's Philosophy*, (Hungary, Central European University Press: 2000), pp.xviii-xix.

Critical Rationalism through a critique of both absolutism and relativism, regarding them as different types of *irrationalism*. Popper defines Critical Rationalism as “*a way of thinking, and even a way of life: a readiness to listen to critical arguments, to search for one’s own mistakes, and to learn from them. I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.*”²⁶ The thesis argues that if civilisations of peoples say to each other, *I may be wrong and you may be right, let us discuss to solve our disputes*, they can arrive at one set of globally shared values, centered on a *global ethics of openness to criticism* that can form the moral basis of global institutions of democracy and justice.

The main aim of the thesis is to explain how a critical rationalist ideal-type of rational dialogue among world civilisations operates as a cultural driving force of the transformation of liberal globality into an open global society via the creation of the global ethics of openness to criticism in which people open their own fundamental beliefs and values to mutual criticism. It addresses the five major layers of a rational dialogue among civilisations, categorising them as: (a) philosophical; (b) moral; (c) legal; (d) political, and (e) economic layers. The conception of ‘*social learning*’ is used as an inter-subjective dialogue, and it has defined on the basis of critical rationality as an *inter-subjective logic of learning from criticism*, covering the elite and masses. Viewed from Popper’s logic of scientific knowledge discovery, the thesis argues that social learning amongst the elite and masses follows a general rule: *an inter-subjective learning from mutually recognised mistakes*. The elite use the general rule in its professional sense, whereas the ordinary people use the trial and error method in its ordinary account.²⁷

The thesis argues that if the absolutist epistemology rejects the need for a rational dialogue among civilisations, the reason is that it rests on the epistemological premise of ‘*perfect rationality*’. Viewed from such a premise, there is no need or function for a rational dialogue among civilisations, because they can claim that their systems of rationale and corresponding social institutions are perfect. Thus, their rationality does not need improvement brought about by dialogue with others. If the relativist epistemology rejects the need for a rational dialogue of civilisations, it is because it

²⁶ Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. 2 (London, Routledge: 1977), pp.231-232.

²⁷ For details of this critical rationalist conception of social learning through the mechanism of inter-subjective learning from mistakes, see: chapter 4. I have conceptualised the ideal type of an open global society as a *process of global social learning from an inter-subjective criticism*.

rests on the premise of *'impossible rationality'*. Viewed from such a premise, there is no need or function for a rational dialogue of civilisations, because there is not any objective criterion for a rational belief on which basis they can learn from each other. For this relativist epistemology, civilisations of peoples are in fact *incommensurable rationale systems*, which cannot understand each other, and there is no rational criterion, which can form a basis, according to which they can solve their ideational and material disputes.

However, the thesis argues that if the critical rationalist epistemology defends the need for a rational (open to criticism) dialogue among civilisations, the reason is that it employs the premise of *'objective' but 'imperfect' rationality*. Viewed from this premise, world civilisations need to engage in dialogue with each other because their systems of rationale and their patterns of social organisation are imperfect and thus need improvement. A rational dialogue of civilisations is possible because their competing systems of rationality are partly objective and can be improved through a critical dialogue that is open to mutual criticism. Epistemologically speaking, their systems of rationality *are not incommensurable* systems. In this sense, rational dialogue is not only possible, but also necessary, if civilisations of peoples want to improve their imperfect rationality and social institutions through an inter-subjective dialogue. A Popperian ideal-type of rational dialogue among civilisations is simple: *I may be wrong, you may be right let's discuss to learn from opening our fundamental beliefs and values to mutual criticism and making our mutual recognised critics as a basis for a set of globally shared values on which basis our global social organisation can be established*. In this way, the thesis aims to apply the Popperian logic of knowledge discovery for building a critical rationalist model of dialogue among civilisations that can operate as the mechanism of globally shared norms formation.

The thesis argues that using Critical Rationalism as an epistemological theory of rational dialogue among civilisations situates us in a *meta-civilisational epistemic position* because it demands that we regard that civilisations' fundamental beliefs and values are in principle equally open to mutual criticism. In other words, it implies that none of the world civilisations can claim having perfect rationale system and social institutions, hence they can learn from criticising each other's imperfect systems of rationality and imperfect social institutions. One may argue that employing Popper's Critical Rationalism reflects a Eurocentric or a Western approach to the very concept

of a rational dialogue itself. Yet, the thesis responds that even if we assume Critical Rationalism as Western reading of rationality, such a rationale system must be open to rational criticism itself. Hence, the critical rationalist epistemology can be used to question the fundamental beliefs of Western rationality and social institutions as well as it could be employed for criticising the non-Western ones. The thesis argues that this advanced account of critical rationalism has been offered by William Bartley, who called it as *Comprehensively Critical Rationalism*, according to which we should *hold open all of our fundamental beliefs to rational criticism*.

The core idea of this *comprehensive account of Critical Rationalism* implies that due to *inherent imperfection of human rationality*, all of our *fundamental beliefs* should be open to rational criticism. In this way, Critical Rationalism situates us in a meta-civilisational epistemological position in order to show how a rational dialogue among civilisations goes beyond fundamental beliefs of one civilisation. The thesis argues how this meta-civilisational position can facilitate a *convergence* of civilisations' rationale systems towards a kind of global standard of rationality through making civilisational fundamental beliefs open to mutual criticism.

Given the general perspective of the thesis' principal argument, in order to show how the thesis develops its macrosociology of globalisation we need to explain how the thesis' ideal type of open global society and the thesis' analytical model for analysing social changes through a critical rationalist model of social learning are constructed. If world civilisations open their fundamental beliefs about human beings and social order to mutual criticism; a rational dialogue among them works for the production of one set of globally shared values. The idea of (global) open society refers to a good society in which people hold their own fundamental beliefs open to mutual criticism. However, Popper's conception of open society does not show how such openness of fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism situates individuals in a rational dialogic position to each other through which they can arrive at certain socially shared values. Hence, Popper's ideal-type of open society should be *sociologically* reconstructed in order to show how openness of civilisations of peoples' fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism operate as the mechanism of the emergence of one core of globally shared values regarding equality human beings and a rational way of social organisation of such equal persons. The thesis suggests this ideal-type on the fundament of the core assumption of equal access of people to critical rationality.

The thesis argues that we require a key shift from Popper's *theory of knowledge* to Bartley's *theory of rationality* to formulate a *critical rationalist model of human action* and a *critical rationalist model of social order*. Popper used his critical philosophy to make a right distinction between *science* and *metaphysic*. However, he did not employ that critical rationality to separate 'rational belief' and 'irrational belief'. However, Bartley's theory of rationality—as openness to criticism—provides us with a criterion for defining what a 'rational belief' is and what can be a 'rational social order'? In this sense, the thesis argues that we need to an important shift from Popper's critical philosophy of human knowledge to Bartley's critical philosophy of human rationality for a reconstruction of the ideal-type of open society, and its application on a global scale. Popper views Critical Rationalism as a moral attitude: *an irrational faith in reason*.²⁸ However, for Bartley, Critical Rationalism—as a sophisticated defence of rationalism—does not need to have an *irrational faith* in reason.²⁹ Rationalism should defend itself with a *rational faith* in reason.³⁰ Bartley rightly argues that demarcating *rational beliefs* from *irrational beliefs* is much more fundamental than demarcating *scientific statements* and *non-scientific statements*.³¹ Bartley's expansion of Popper's *theory of knowledge* to a *theory of rationality* enables us to employ this fundamental shift for introducing a normative conception of the person due to his access to critical reason, which is the main micro-foundation of the ideal-type of open global society.³²

The ideal-type of open global society implies that due to people's access to critical rationality they can engage in a rational dialogue regarding the nature of their social organisation through arriving at a normative agreement over one set of social values. In other words, the cultural foundation of such a global society of equal and free persons originates from an inter-subjective dialogue that is open to mutual criticism.

²⁸ See Popper, *Open Society and its Enemies*, vol. 2 (1977), chapter 24.

²⁹ For a good review of Popper-Bartley Controversy see: Mariano Artigas, *The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper's Theory of Knowledge*, (Berlin, Peter Lang: 1999), pp.15-95.

³⁰ On Bartley's critique of Popper, see William W. Bartley III, *The Retreat to Commitment*, 2nd ed, (La Salle, Illinois and London: Open Court, 1984), and J.W.N. Watkins, 'Comprehensively Critical Rationalism', *philosophy*, 44 (167) (1969), pp.57-62.

³¹ For a good review of Bartley's theory of rationality as openness to criticism see: Noretta Koertge, "Bartley's Theory of Rationality," *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 4 (1974), pp.75-81.

³² On 'Critical Rationalism' as a theory of rationality see: William W. Bartley III, "Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality," in *The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy*, edited by Mario Bunge, (USA, The Free Press of Glencoe: 1964), pp. 3-31., and Tom Settle, I.C. Jarvie, Joseph Agassi, "Towards a Theory of Openness to Criticism," *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, (4) (1974), pp. 83-90. For a critique of Popper's reading of the moral foundation of the open society, from a Kantian perspective, see: Jeremy Shearmur, "Epistemological Limits of the State: Reflections on Popper's Open Society," *Political Studies* (1990) XXXVIII, pp.116-125.

An open global society is a global community of equal and free persons who have achieved a rational consensus over openness of their social organisation to mutual criticism because they have opened their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism.

Inspired by John Rawls' concept-model of a well-ordered society of free and equal persons, the thesis introduces an open global society as the process of the formation of a well-ordered global society of free and equal citizens who have consciously made an inter-subjective agreement over the nature of their social cooperation through a social learning process that has opened their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism.³³ This sociological process-based conception of the open society also benefits from Jürgen Habermas' ideal-type of *dialogic community* according to which the *public use of dialogic reason* by free and equal persons operates as the cultural driving forces of the formation of a rational social order.³⁴ In addition, it uses the insights of Alexander's sociological theory for addressing the key role of the *culture of openness to criticism* in the formation of legal, political, and economic institutions of an open global society.³⁵ The ideal-type of open global society-- as a normative concept of globality-- uses the premise of people's potential access to critical rationality for showing how civilisations of peoples can activate their rational capacities for producing one set of globally shared norms that are required for an institutional transformation from the existing unsatisfactory global order towards a just and free global order.

This ideal-type of the open global society provides a *macrosociological normative conception* of globality or global society because it links three major sub-processes of a global society formation, namely an *open global culture*, an *open global politics*, and an *open global economy*. This model of open global society creates systematic *sociological* linkages between dialogue of civilisations and the emergence of global institutions of democracy and justice. The thesis defines the ideal-type of open global society as a global society of free and equal citizens who consciously shape a universal kingdom of ends, in Kantian term, through an inter-civilisational dialogue. According to the ideal-type of open global society, contemporary globalisation suffers from an unsocial sociability, because it connects people around the world based on the

³³ See John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness. A Restatement* (London, Harvard University Press: 2001).

³⁴ See Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, (London: Polity Press: 1998).

³⁵ See Jeffery C. Alexander, "Theorizing the Good Society: Hermeneutic, Normative, and Empirical Discourses," *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 25 (3) (2000), pp.271-309.

utilitarian logic of economic competition rather than the logic of rational dialogue and social cooperation.

The thesis advances the ideal-type of open global society to an analytical model of social learning through which it argues that how people's access to critical rationality can engage them in a kind of global cultural preparation for producing one set of globally shared norms. To this end, the critical rationalist model of human action is used to construct a critical rationalist model of social learning in which the cultural learning through opening fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism plays the key role in the formation of a free and just global order.

In order to address the cultural function of globally shared values in the formation of a global society of free and equal persons, the thesis compares three concept-models of human action and social order, namely the Hobbesian, the Lockean and the Kantian models. It argues that the Hobbesian and the Lockean concept-models of human action rest on a *utilitarian principle*, which implies that human's action-goals are subjective utilities and they cannot be rationally (inter-subjectively) evaluated and identified. However, in this utilitarian concept of human action, *action-means* can be rationally justified. Hence, the *freedom of ends* finds a utilitarian meaning. Individuals are free to choose their own subjective ends because there is not a rational criterion for demarcating a '*rational goal*' from an '*irrational one*'. The thesis argues that the Hobbesian and the Lockean concept-models of social order rests on such a utilitarian account of human action that denies the possibility of a rational (inter-subjective) consensus over the ultimate goals of human action.

The utilitarian models of social organisation—as Talcott Parsons rightly argues—cannot address the emergence of a peaceful social order via a rational consensus among individuals. If individuals merely look for their own subjective goals, how a peaceful social order can be emerged from such competing goals. Hobbes asked that what happens if individuals act in a state of nature in which there is not external rules, constrains, laws, etc, and if people seek increasing their own personal utilities. People must fight each other to maximise their utilities while they compete for scarce goods.³⁶ The Hobbesian model of social order implies that human action was bound to lead to pervasive 'force and fraud,' because as individuals compete for scarce goods in the

³⁶ See Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knobl, *Social Theory: Twenty Introductory Lectures*, transl by Alex Skinner, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2009), pp.20-42.

absence of constraining rules each individual merely looks for his or her personal utility. Other people are either utilised as a means for satisfying one's own needs or they are deceived about others' intentions. Hobbes believed that only an absolute central power can create a peaceful social order whereas every individual pursues his or her egotistical utility. Since people are not shared over certain cultural values that can coordinate their action-goals they cannot trust each other. Hence, the war of all against all would be the necessary result of human actions oriented towards utility enhancement.³⁷

The thesis argues that while the Lockean action model follows similar utilitarian account of the ultimate goals of human action, it provides us with better account of the emergence of a peaceful social order in terms of a consensual agreement among rivals over the utilitarian principles of action and social order in contrast with the Hobbesian resort to force and fraud.³⁸ The Lockean model implies that seeking personal utilities by acts of exchange in the market society can improve mutual advantage. Truck and barter are good-natured utility-oriented activities through which all participant profits, and they are in fact the very condition for a durable social order. According to the Lockean concept-model, individuals seek their own personal utilities or subjective ends, whereas market sociability is organising principle of such utility-oriented activities.³⁹

In order to introduce its analytical model of a critical rationalist macrosociology of globalisation, the thesis refers to Parsons' and Habermas' critiques of the utilitarian models of action and social order. In this way, it tries to employ Bartley's theory of rationality (openness to criticism) for the formulation of a new concept-model of human action to show how people's openness to mutual criticism enables them to arrive at a normative consensus over the ultimate goals of their actions, which will be reflected in the society's shared norms. As Alexander argues, Parsons leads us to realise the key role of the culture, as one set of shared norms, in the emergence of a peaceful social order. In Alexander's words: "Parsons theorized that 'values' had to be central to actions and institutions if a society were to be able to function as a coherent enterprise."⁴⁰ Validating Parsons' critique of the utilitarian models, the thesis

³⁷ Ibid., pp.28-29.

³⁸ See Jeffery C. Alexander, "Global Civil Society," *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23 (2006), p.522.

³⁹ Joas and Knobl, *Social Theory* (2009), p.30.

⁴⁰ Alexander, *The Meaning of Social Life* (2003), p.16.

aims to use such a critique for introducing its own analytical model for addressing the question of how people's access to critical rationality lead them to one set of globally shared values and according a peaceful (open) social order. These critical rationality-cum-shared cultural values operate as driving forces of the transformation of existing utilitarian-based liberal globality into a global society of free and equal citizens.

Parsons formulated his model of action and his macrosociology through a critique of the utilitarian conception of human action. The thesis refers to Parsons' critique to show how the utilitarian concept-models can be used to address the cultural logic of contemporary liberal globalisation. In addition, it argues about an unsocial sociability of emerging liberal globality due to such an utilitarian origin. In his critiques of the Hobbesian and the Lockean concept-models of action and social order, Parsons leads us to realise the reason why the utilitarian model of human action cannot address the emergence of a peaceful social order because it does not explain the ultimate origins of action-goals. If all people seek their personal (subjective) utilities, how can goals of different actors be coordinated in a social division of labour?

Parsons rightly argues that if individuals merely pursue their egotistical utilities there can be no mechanism through which they be able to coordinate their competing interests. Instead of just pursuing their own subjective ends, they need to agree upon a system of shared values and common rules of behaviour on which basis they can pursue their personal ends while recognises same rights for others as the end in themselves rather than means. Validating Kantian transcendental philosophy, Parsons formulates a *voluntaristic theory of action* for addressing qualities of human agents might render social order possible. According to Parsons, it is wrong to assume that people have only very specific, individual goals and conception of utility, not all of which only randomly compute with those of other. However, people can use their rationality and moral autonomy to agree over one set of the ultimate values to which they orient their action-goals. Parsons' action model rests on a normative conception of human action, implying that people do not merely seek their egotistical utilities but they use their rationality to agree on cultural values that define their ultimate ends. In one sense, the notion of utility arises from the ultimate value system. Values cannot be themselves subject to utility calculations, because they are constitutive of every

criterion underpinning such calculations.⁴¹ In this way, Parsons paves the way for a cultural refounding of macrosociological theory that helps the thesis to argue for critical rationalist models of human action and social order as analytical bases for a cultural sociology of globalisation.

The thesis refers to Habermas' theory of communicative action to show how the Kantian model of human action and social order can be improved through using Bartley's theory of rationality as openness to criticism. Habermas argues that people's access to communicative rationality lead them to a cultural consensus regarding social norms. He leads us to see an important internal connection between *the theory of rationality* and the *theory of society*.⁴² In his critique of Parsons' action theory, Habermas argues that, "Parsons begins with the monadic actor ...The point of departure for his analysis is the singular action orientation conceived of as resulting from *contingent decisions between alternatives*. At the analytical level of the unit act, value standards are attributed to individual actors as something subjective; thus they need to be intersubjectively harmonized. ... [however] This view stands in contrast to the idea of a cultural system of values that is intersubjectively shared from the start."⁴³ Habermas argues that Parsons' action model does not address the question of how *actors' access to rationality* enable them to achieve an inter-subjective *consensus over a system of common values* that is intersubjectively shared from the start and directs actors' behaviors through identifying the ultimate goals of their action.

While the thesis refers to Habermas' solution for reinventing Parsons' concept-model action to address the question of how actors' access to rationality enable them to arrive at a system of shared values as the foundation of a stable social order, it criticises the Habermas' communicative action model itself from a critical rationalist perspective. Habermas recognises the weakness of Parsons' singular unit of action. However, his communicative theory of action regards cultural traditions as merely a background for human actions rather than the product of a communicative action. In addition, it focuses on a linguistic ability of people in their mutual communication for arriving at a rational consensus over one set of common values.

⁴¹ Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, (London and New York, Free Press: 1968), pp.43-76. Also see: Joas and Knobl, *Social Theory* (2009), pp.33-39.

⁴² Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, vol one, (London, Polity Press:1981), p.214.

⁴³ Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, The Critique of Functionalist Reason*, vol two, (London, Polity Press:1981), p.7.

For Habermas, communicative or discursive rationality refers to people's linguistic competence that enable them to use the force of better argument for arriving at an inter-subjective consensus. In this sense, people's access to communicative rationality leads them to common social norms that direct individuals' ultimate goals of action. Communicative rationality implies that an *inter-subjective consensus* among dialogic participants is the criterion of rationality. This discursive rationality assumes that reaching an *inter-subjective understanding* equals arriving at an *inter-subjective consensus*. The thesis argues that Habermas' theory of communicative rationality rests on his consensual theory of truth. Hence, discursive rationality is concerned with rational procedures rather than rational substances. If individuals shape an ideal-type free discourse amongst themselves, their inter-subjective agreement identifies what would be the truth itself. In this way, Habermas claims that without having a common account of rationality or rational dialogue, dialogic partners can arrive at an inter-subjective agreement upon what recognise as a rational consensus. In short, since people can understand each other, they can also arrive at inter-subjective consensus.⁴⁴ Viewed from communicative rationality, the unconstrained and consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech leads different participants to overcome their merely subjective views and to arrive at inter-subjective values that regulate their social relations.⁴⁵

The thesis criticises Habermas' consensual theory of truth and his communicative theory of action. It argues that an *inter-subjective consensus* cannot be the criterion of rationality that enables rational agents to arrive at shared cultural values. In addition, it argues that *mutual understanding* does not necessarily lead to *mutual agreement*. In other words, understanding does not presuppose agreement: if two people understand each other, it does not follow that they agree upon what has been understood.⁴⁶ Hence, this weakens Habermas' argument that communication presupposes the possibility of agreement. Habermas might be right for arguing that communication requires as a condition the possibility of understanding, but this does not mean that there is such a tense link between mutual understanding and the emergence of an inter-subjective agreement. As Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva argue, this problem comes to

⁴⁴ See Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol one (1981), pp.8-43.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.10.

⁴⁶ See R. Roderick, *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory*, (London, Macmillan: 1986), pp.158-159.

the surface especially when communication takes place between dialogic participants belonging to different cultures.⁴⁷ Even if one can imagine an ideal speech situation to exist, it is difficult to grasp how people would reach a consensus, without a common reading of rationality itself, when radically different forms of life based on different rationale systems are at stake. Under these conditions, Habermas' notion of '*the force of the better argument*' innocuous appears problematic, because the rules of valid argumentation themselves are indeed part of a cultural heritage and tradition, and therefore open to debate and criticism. In other words, people need to share a common account of rationality and rational dialogue, if their communication should lead them to a rational consensus. Hence, Habermas' discursive model of an inter-cultural dialogue-- resting upon the existence of communicative rationality-- fails to serve its practical purposes in the confrontation between different cultural settings.⁴⁸

Taking up Critical Rationalism as the foundation of its theory of rationality, the thesis argues that people's access to rationality can lead them to shared cultural values through the creation of an inter-subjective consensus that is open to mutual criticism. However, radically different cultural standpoints require opening their fundamental beliefs in particular about the very conception of rationality itself to mutual criticism, if they want to enter to a fruitful rational dialogue. Hence, they must accept a common criterion or account of rationality, i.e. openness of all fundamental beliefs to rational criticism. Under this condition, the *force of better criticism* can lead them to some mutual agreement that is open to revision due to the possibility of new criticisms. The thesis argues that world civilisations can enter to an inter-cultural dialogue in order to shape a set of global common values regarding human beings and social order, if they recognise such a common criterion of rationality, and accordingly if they open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism. Viewed from such a critical rationalist model of inter-civilisational dialogue, the thesis argues that world civilisations can arrive at an inter-subjective consensus regarding equality of human being and a people-centric global organisation. The premise of people's access to critical rationality operates forms the basis of such a human equality and the justification for a humane global government. Popper terms such a premise as '*Rational Unity of Humankind*'.

⁴⁷ See Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva, *Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, 2nd Edition, (London, Polity Press: 2010), pp.236-237.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

The thesis proposes a critical rationalist model of inter-civilisational dialogue and social learning in order to develop a new macrosociology of globalisation with the three major aims. Inspired by Theodor Adorno's critical theory, the thesis argues that a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation not only addresses the emergence of contemporary globalisation, but also it is critical of liberal model of globality. It suggests the epistemic possibility of an institutional transformation of the utilitarian-based liberal globality into a global society of free and equal persons.⁴⁹ Of the three major aims, the first objective of this macrosociology of globalisation is developing a new epistemic-institutional analysis of contemporary globalisation. The thesis introduces globalisation as a global enlargement of liberal social philosophy—as an ideational system—and its institutional expression in the formation of a transnational political economy. It introduces contemporary globalisation as a macro-institutional change from the Hobbesian social philosophy of the struggle for political power towards the Lockean social philosophy of competition for economic utilities.

The thesis diagnoses three major cultural, political, and economic institutional mechanisms for this *switch of the cultural logic of* global ordering of people. *Global liberalism*—as a cultural core of this switch of logic—has provided cognitive inputs for the liberal form of globalisation. If the Hobbesian logic of war of all against all no longer works to organise people and societies around the globe, the Lockean logic of the competition for economic utilities provides us with a better social philosophy for a more peaceful co-existence of radically different cultural standing points and political interests. Culturally influenced by such a liberal social philosophy, the collapse of the Cold War's world order leads us to explore the political mechanism of contemporary globalisation. Since the power-based struggle between the Western and Eastern blocs of nation-states could not remain as the institutional logic of a sustained world order a new multi-centric global governance is emerging that gives the priority to economic competition rather than political conflict.

Given the cultural and political mechanisms of this liberal mode of globalisation, the emergence of a transnational economy is another aspect of globalisation. Once the cultural and political obstacles for opening '*national economy*' to '*global market*' decrease, nation states reduce their *trade taxes* and open their *capital accounts* to

⁴⁹ On Adorno's approach to critical social theory see: T. W. Adorno, "Sociology and Empirical Research," in T.W. Adorno, H. Albert, R. Dahrendorf, J. Habermas, H. Pilot, and K. R. Popper, *The Positive Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. G. Adey & D. Frisby, (London, Heinemann: 1967), p.69.

global market. The macrosociology of globalisation analyses this interplay between the cultural force and institutional aspects of the development of liberal globality. The distinctive feature of this macrosociology is that it uncovers the key role of very idea of *liberalism* or *liberal social philosophy* in the formation of a transnational political economy--as a *macro-global institutional change* from superpower bipolarity to multi-centric global governance.

However, as Adorno argues, a critical sociology is critical of an unsatisfactory social order and thus of its subject matter of study i.e. the society itself. The thesis provides a macrosociological critique of liberal globalisation because of its ideational origin in liberal social philosophy in the context of unmasking an *unsocial sociability* of liberal globality. It argues that while the Lockean logic of '*rivalry*' is more capable for social organisation of people than the Hobbesian logic of '*enmity*', it still fundamentally suffers from the lack of a humane mode of social organisation, as Kantian social philosophy of '*friendship*' demands.⁵⁰ In the Lockean logic of rivalry, human beings are viewed '*others*' who are rivals, not friends. The thesis employs the Kantian social philosophy of friendship⁵¹ to uncover the unsocial sociability of liberal globalisation. It argues that liberal globality suffers from one set of societal deficits because of (a) the lack of a *global consensus* on its imposed model of global social organisation, (b) the lack of a global accountability of liberal global governance to people, and (c) an uneven distribution of globalisation's benefits and risks.

The thesis argues that a more important task of the macrosociology of globalisation is formulating a normative analysis of the possibility of transforming liberal globality into an open global society. To this end, the thesis addresses the five layers of an ideal-type global social learning. In each of these layers of global social learning, the *epistemological logic* of the '*openness to criticism*' operates as a mechanism of social learning, in its own right. The thesis links this normative social learning with a Popperian-informed theory of understanding. As James Farr argues,⁵² this theory of understanding employs Popper's theory of knowledge to address how our *imperfect understanding* shapes and how such an imperfect understanding can improve via opening fundamental premises of our interpretative frameworks to mutual criticism.

⁵⁰ On Kant's social philosophy see: *Kant, Political Writing*,(1970).

⁵¹ See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1999), pp.246-312. He describes these logics as the three cultural logics of 'Enmity', 'Rivalry', and 'Friendship'.

⁵² See James Farr, "Popper's Hermeneutics," *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 13 (1983), pp.157-176.

In another sense, such normative social learning implies that civilisations of peoples should open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism in order to discover their own mutual imperfections and reduce their mutual misunderstandings. In this way, a rational dialogue of civilisations acts for converging civilisations' rationale systems and civilizational-based patterns of social organisations towards a global standard of rationality and a global model of social ordering of people.⁵³

Viewed from this inter-civilisational model of mutual understanding and learning, the first layer of the global social learning refers to a philosophical learning. The thesis argues that a rational dialogue amongst civilisations, in its philosophical sense, refers to opening civilisations' fundamental metaphysical beliefs about the univers and human nature to rational criticism and accordingly to modified interpretations. Once civilisations open their *metaphysical views* to *mutual criticism* they can reduce their *misunderstandings* via the mechanism of learning from criticism. In this way, their competing world-views about the universe, human nature and social organisation can be involved in modified interpretations, mutual adjustments, and finally they can arrive at some mutual agreement on a common meta-civilisational world-view. This global learning can *converge* competing *world-views* into a higher understanding of regarding the universe and human beings. The thesis argues that this philosophical layer of dialogue among world civilisations can create a global standard of rationality, paving the way for developing one set common world-views.

The thesis employs three case studies of the civilisations of Islam, the West, and China to show how such a rational dialogue amongst civilisations may be shaped through the mechanisms of reducing misunderstandings and self-adjustments. Given this philosophical layer, the second layer of global social learning refers to an inter-civilisational moral learning. Once civilisational-based epistemologies and world-views open their fundamental premises to mutual criticism and involve in a set of error-correcting and mutual adjustment processes, their systems of morality would be also affected. It is possible then to argue that fundamental premises of different systems of morality become open to mutual criticism. In a word, they actually will involve in a moral learning through opening their systems of morality to criticism,

⁵³ For details of this Popperian-informed theory of understanding via openness to criticism, see *ibid.*

which can lead them to a set of global moral values. The thesis argues that a *global ethics of openness to criticism* would be at the center of such moral values.⁵⁴

A dialogic globalisation leads us to argue for the possibility of the emergence of a *global normative consensus* as the moral foundation of an open global society, i.e. the global ethics of openness to criticism. From the viewpoint of a critical social theory, the *transformative role* of such a dialogic globalisation refers to its capacity to address how rational dialogue among civilisations can change liberal globality to an open global society through creating a set of globally shared values, centred on *the global ethics of openness to rational criticism*.

The thesis then addresses the question of how the global ethics of openness to criticism can pave the way for the formation of the equal right of social criticism entitled for all prospective global citizens through the legal layer of such a dialogic globalisation. This equal legal right refers to an equal right of self-determination of global social order via realising the right of making global governance accountable to the world population. In this sense, it goes beyond the equal right of the freedom of expression or speech. This globally recognised legal right of criticism can operate as the legal foundation of a democratic global governance. The thesis argues that a critical rationalist account of global democracy rests on such an equal right of social criticism. Finally, the thesis argues that the emergence of such a democratic global governance will provide the political ground for an open (competitive and fair) global economy. All of these five layers of global social learning have been introduced as one set of potential and prescriptive social learning, which can be realised by the activation of people's access to critical rationality. In this sense, they can be realised, if the elite and masses activate their potential access to critical rationality in the context of a rational dialogue among world civilisations.

1.3 Thesis Structure

The architecture of the thesis is inspired by its principal argument. Part I develops the case of a critical rationalist approach to macrosociology of globalisation. It indicates how the thesis' research program employs Critical Rationalism for the construction of a methodology for a critical macrosociology of globalisation. Part II

⁵⁴ On the same line of reasoning Habermas and Linklater argue about the possibility of the emergence of a global discourse ethics. See Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation* (1998) and Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community, The Ethical Foundations of the Post Westphalian Era*, (1998). On distinctive feature of a critical rationalist account of global discourse see: chapters 5 and 8.

introduces the normative ideal type of an open global society as a macrosociological concept. It also aims to show how this new *normative ideal type of globality* can be applied for a new critique of contemporary globalisation. Part III develops a macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. It advances the ideal type of open global society to a *macrosociological analytical framework* for addressing the five layers of a global social learning for the transformation of liberal globality into a global society of free and equal persons. Part IV introduces global civil society as the key agent of dialogic globalisation. It explores an interplay between intellectuals and global social movements for turing the ideal of open global society into an institutional reality.

Given chapter 1 of the Part I as the thesis' introduction, chapter 2 explains the research methodology. It employs Critical Rationalism to introduce the methodology of critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. The research methodology shapes in the two contexts of the logic of scientific discovery that Popper calls them the context of '*discovery*' and the context of '*justification*'.⁵⁵ Recognising the thesis' macrosociological hypothesis as a non-empirical hypothesis, chapter 2 follows Popper's argument that conjectural theory of knowledge can be applied for a logical examination of non-empirical hypothesis.⁵⁶ The thesis argues that the methodology of macrosociology of globalisation uses the Popperian logic of knowledge discovery in two contexts of '*discovery*' and '*justification*'. In conjecturing its macrosociological hypothesis— i.e. the possibility of the transformation of liberal globality into an open global society via a rational dialogue among civilisations—the research methodolgy uses the methods of interpretative sociology and conceptual history for exploring how liberal globality is shaped through an interaction between cultural crystallisations and macro-institutional trajectories.⁵⁷ In the context of justification, chapter 2 uses '*logical evidence*' to examine its hypothesis. It argues that internalising Critical Rationalism in the logic of a critical macrosociology of globalisation needs to go beyond Popper's

⁵⁵ For these two contexts in Popper's theory of knowledge see: Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations, the Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1972).

⁵⁶ See Karl R. Popper, *Realism and the Aim of Science*, vol. I, W. W. Bartley III (ed.) (London, Hutchinson: 1983), p.179.

⁵⁷ On the 'Conceptual History' approach to historical macrosociology see Peter Hedstrom and Björn Wittrock, (eds.), *Frontiers of Sociology*, (Leiden, Brill: 2009), chapter 10: "History and Sociology", pp .97-106. Wittrock points out: "the full potential of research on the emergence and development of macro-societal institutions can only be realized if sociologists transcend the limits of historical institutionalism and engage in a study of the interplay between cultural crystallizations and the emergence of macro-institutional trajectories." See: *ibid.*, p.5.

logic of the social sciences. Inspired by Adorno and Habermas,⁵⁸ the chapter argues that a critical macrosociology of globalisation should question liberal globalisation because of its societal deficits. In addition, it must address the question of how an alternative globalisation can overcome such societal deficits.

Part II proceeds with chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 critically reviews three major normative critiques of globalisation. It introduces the nature of normative critiques of globalisation that paves the ground for a new normative critique of globalisation on the basis of the ideal type of open global society. Through its case studies of David Held's, Richard Falk's, and Jürgen Habermas's normative critiques of globalisation, Chapter 3 concludes that all of these normative critiques take the equality of human beings as their moral foundations for criticising contemporary globalisation. Hence, they share in globalisation's legitimacy crisis because of its unaccountability to the world's population—recognised as globalisation's democratic deficit. While all three case studies somehow share in their normative critiques of liberal globality, Falk's critique of globalisation directly targets liberal ideology as the ideational force behind contemporary globalisation.

Chapter 4 introduces the ideal type of an open global society. It critically reviews Popper's concept of the open society and its origins in Critical Rationalism. In order to develop a macrosociological model of global open society, chapter 4 employs the insights of Bartley's theory of critical rationalism to turn it to the moral foundation of a global open society. It argues that the global ethics of openness to criticism should be translated into global institutions of democracy and justice. Chapter 4 introduces the premises and institutional principles of the ideal type of open global society.

Part III consists of four chapters as follows. Chapter 5 provides a theoretical framework for the development of a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. It employs the critical rationalist theory of rational action to address a linkage between the *conception of human nature* and the *model of social organisation*. Chapter 5 argues that if Critical Rationalism be employed for modeling rational action, a new micro-foundation will be provided for macrosociology. Inspired by Hans Joas' action

⁵⁸ On this see D. Frisby, "The Popper-Adorno controversy: The methodological dispute in German Sociology," *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 2 (2) (1972), pp.105-119. ; R. Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1981), and H. T. Wilson, "Critical theory's critique of social science: Episodes in a changing problematic from Adorno to Habermas," Part III, *History of European Ideas* 7(3), pp.283-302.

theories' categorisation⁵⁹, chapter 5 reviews Talcott Parsons's and Jürgen Habermas's macrosociological theories. It concludes that we need to integrate Critical Rationalism into the micro-foundation of macrosociological theory in order to turn the ideal type of open global society into a *macro-sociological analytical model*. Chapter 5 refers to a three-fold classification of the relationship between *the conception of human nature* and the *models of social organisation*-- namely the Hobbesian, the Lockean, and the Kantian ideal types of *human nature* and *social organisation*.⁶⁰

Chapter 6 describes contemporary globalisation, from a critical rationalist macro-sociological perspective. It employs chapter 5's theoretical framework to explore how the cultural logic of Hobbesian global organisation has been to some extent replaced with the Lockean logic. Chapter 6 argues that contemporary globalisation is a macro global institutional change that is culturally fuelled by the Lockean ideal type of human nature and social order, which replaces to some extent the centrality of the Cold War order with a multi-centric global competition for economic interests.

Chapter 7 develops a sociological critique of liberal globalisation. It utilises the theoretical framework that developed by chapter 5 to criticise the Lockean ideal type of human nature and social organisation due to the Kantian social philosophy. Viewed from this framework, contemporary liberal globalisation suffers from a set of societal deficits, originating from the liberal model of social order. In spite of the domestic style of the liberal societies' formation, global liberalism has not emerged through a citizenry-based acceptance of the liberal social organisation on a global scale. On the contrary, it has shaped through a top-down learning process, mainly amongst political and economic leaders not ordinary people. Liberal globality has linked unaccountable global governance with an oligopolistic global market that forces oligopoly and protection for the strong and a socialisation of the risks and market discipline for the weak.⁶¹ Chapter 7 concludes that contemporary globalisation's unsocial sociability can be addressed as a package of cultural, political, and economic insufficiencies.

⁵⁹ See Hans Joas, *The Creativity of Action*, Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast, trans. (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1999).

⁶⁰ For a three-fold categorisation of the cultural logic of social organization, i.e., the Hobbesian, the Lockean, and the Kantian social philosophies see Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (1999), pp.246-312. As noted earlier, he describes these three logics as the cultural logics of 'Enmity', 'Rivalry', and 'Friendship'.

⁶¹ See Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," in Eivind Hovden and Edward Keene (eds.), *The Globalisation of Liberalism*, (London, Palgrave: 2002), p.129., Also see See Joseph S. Nye, "Globalisation's Democratic Deficit," *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (4)

Chapter 8 argues that if the lack of a global consensus on liberal form of globality is the ultimate origin of its societal deficits, an alternative globalisation must remedy this key shortage. If the Kantian-inspired ideal type of the open global society refers to a global organisation of free and equal persons who access critical rationalities, a rational dialogue among such rational agents can transform liberal globality into an open global society. Inspired by the works of S. N. Eisenstadt, Samuel Huntington, Randall Collins, Benjamin Nelson, Donald Nielson, Toby Huff, Jeffrey Alexander and Björn Wittrock, chapter 8 develops a sociological analysis of rational dialogue among civilisations. It argues that the ultimate source of the lack of global consensus over global social order originates from civilisations' competing *systems of rationale* and their different patterns of social organisation. It situates the possibility of rational dialogue of civilisations in the context of what Alexander calls the Strong Programme in Cultural Sociology in which the cultural forces are viewed as motors of social order formation.⁶² Chapter 8 suggests a new institutional reasoning for global democracy and global justice, inspired by Allen Buchanan's moral reasoning of the international institutions.⁶³ It highlights the global ethics of openness to criticism at the centre of a set of globally shared values due to people's access to critical rationality.

Part IV covers two following chapters. Chapter 9 explores the existing realities and potential functions of global civil society—as the agent of a dialogic globalisation. It argues that civil society refers to a social sphere between peoples and governance, in which a *cultural solidarity* among civil society's actors plays the key role in realising the ideal type of rational social order.⁶⁴ Inspired by Jeffrey Alexander's account of civil society, chapter 9 discusses a critical rationalist approach to global civil society. It then bases its own proposal for a global collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation on such a normative concept-model of global civil society. Chapter 9 discusses a systematic link between intellectuals, as the carriers of an alternative cultural model of social order, and global social movements as political agents of mobilising people to practically realise such a cultural ideal-type.

Chapter 10 summarises Critical Rationalism's contributions to macrosociology of globalisation. It argues that critical rationalism—as an epistemological model of

(2004), pp.1-6, and Andrew Linklater, "The Evolving Spheres of International Justice," *International Affairs*, 75 (3) (1999), pp.473-482.

⁶² See Alexander, *The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology* (2003), pp.11-26.

⁶³ Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination*, (UK, Oxford University Press: 2004).

⁶⁴ See Jeffery C. Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2006), pp.31-50.

rational action—provides us with a new micro-foundation for analysing cultural driving forces of globalisation. Chapter 10 highlights the key findings of the thesis' macrosociology of dialogic globalisation in three major areas; that is, contemporary globalisation; unsocial sociability of liberal globality, and an alternative dialogic form of globalisation. Chapter 10 finally outlines general themes of a '*scientific research program*' for '*building an open global society*', in particular via arguing for the need to formulate critical rationalist *theories* of human action and social learning in a systematic link with Jeffery Alexander's strong programme for a cultural refounding of macrosociological theory.

Chapter 2

Critical Rationalism and the Research Methodology

This chapter aims to show how critical rationalism can be used as the foundation of methodology of a critical macrosociology of globalisation. An application of critical rationalism for the development of the research methodology calls for addressing the question of how the core methodological idea of critical rationalism i.e. learning from criticism, provides a sound epistemological foundation for investigating the thesis' hypothesis, and for the development of valid arguments to defend it.

Chapter 2 proceeds in four sections. Section 2.1 explains analytical nature of macrosociology of globalisation. A critical macrosociology of globalisation aims to address the macro institutional change on a global scale due to interplay among cultural, political, and economic driving forces. Section 2.2 briefly addresses the relationship between *critical rationalism* and *the logic of the social sciences*. Given Karl Popper's central role in the elaboration of this relationship, the section highlights a Popperian-hermeneutic reading of the logic of social sciences, offered by James Farr. Section 2.3 argues while Popper's logic focus the explanation of the existing social realities, macrosociology of globalisation must to go beyond describing the existing global reality. It requires an uncovering of liberal globalisation's societal deficits, and an explanation of the mechanisms for the transformation of liberal globality into an open global society.

Recognising these needs, section 2.3 argues how critical rationalism can be utilised to develop the logic of critical social sciences. It refers to the Popper-Adorno controversy on the logic of the social sciences in order to use the insights for

introducing a critical rationalist approach to the critical social theory. Habermas' hermeneutic logic of critical social theory will be also discussed. Section 2.4 employs the logic of critical social sciences for introducing the thesis' research methodology.

2.1 The Nature of a (Historical) Macrosociology of Globalisation

In chapter 1, globalisation is defined as a macrosociological process: a changing of the institutional logic of global social organisation from the centrality of struggle for political power to economic competition. This global social organisational shift takes shape within a historical process as the context of such a macro institutional change. This section argues that a historical macro-sociological approach to globalisation is a recognised approach in Globalisation Studies. However, the thesis aims to advance this approach through arguing for a *cultural turn* in historical macrosociology of globalisation—what I called an *epistemic-institutional approach* to globalisation.

The Dictionary of the Social Sciences defines 'macrosociology' as an approach to the sociology that emphasises the analysis of social systems and population on a large scale, at the level of social structure, and at a high level of theoretical abstraction.⁶⁵ Apparently, for an historical sociology, this large-scale and structural change shape during a historical process. As Stephen Hobden argues, what ultimately links *history* and *sociology* is the study of 'time'. "Social relations do not stand apart from time. All social interactions are affected by what has gone before, and in the understanding of the present the past cannot be avoided."⁶⁶ D. Smith defines historical sociology as "a discipline which tries to make sense of the past (and present) by investigating how societies work and change."⁶⁷ For P. Abrams, historical sociology is "the attempt to understand the relationship of personal activity and experience on the one hand and social organization on the other, as something that is continuously constructed in time."⁶⁸ Charles Tilly argues that historical sociology situates social processes in

⁶⁵ See Craig Colhoun (ed.) *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (Article: Macrosociology), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also see Stephen K. Sanderson, *Macrosociology: An Introduction to Human Societies*, (London, Harper & Row Publisher: 1988).

⁶⁶ S. Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology*, (New York, Routledge: 1998), p.24.

⁶⁷ D. Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology*, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991), p.ix.

⁶⁸ P. Abrams, *Historical Sociology*, (Shepton Mallet, Open Books: 1982), p.16.

place and time.⁶⁹ Historical sociologists identify the large scale historical societal changes as the subject matter of historical sociology.⁷⁰

If historical sociology aims to address large-scale historical societal changes, a historical sociology of globalisation would target a global institutional change through which the nature of global social order would change from the Westphalian system to a post-national constellation. Hence, globalisation is recognised as a historical macro-sociological process. This global macro-sociological process, of course, consists of sub-processes, namely cultural, political and economic. Perhaps the most important theoretical task of a historical macrosociology of globalisation is to explain interplays among cultural, political, and economic dynamics of globalisation in the context of a large-scale historical and social change. To the contrary, the existing macrosociology of globalisation focuses on a socio-economic approach to the large-scale global social change. For instance, in *Globalisation and Historical Macrosociology*, Giovanni Arrighi refers to the two historical macrosociologies of globalisation, suggested by Charles Tilly and Immanuel Wallerstein. Arrighi writes:

...as a recent exchange between Tilly and Wallerstein shows each variant of historical macrosociology has its own blind spots and bright lights in *recognizing globalisation as a macrosociological problem*...Tilly, whose historical macrosociology has been squarely based on national states as privileged units of analysis, takes the emerging institutions of world capitalism so seriously as to dismiss the continuing significance of national states as movers and shakers of the contemporary world. Wallerstein, whose historical macrosociology has been just as squarely based on the world capitalist system as the privileged unit of analysis, upholds the continuing significance of national states—to the point of dismissing the novelty of the emerging of world capitalism [emphasis added].⁷¹

This thesis takes a critical rationalist approach to historical macrosociology of globalisation in which the interplay between cultural crystallisations and macro-societal institutions trajectories serves the key role. Hence, the *nature of the unit of analysis* in the historical macrosociology of globalisation can be realised by situating the interplay between cultural crystallisations and global institutional change in its historical context. It also leads us to explore an important insight for the possibility of an alternative interplay between the cultural forces and institutional trajectories. This

⁶⁹ Charles Tilly, *As Sociology Meets History*, (New York, Academic Press: 1981), p.52.

⁷⁰ See Theda Skocpol (ed.) *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1984).

⁷¹ Giovanni Arrighi, "Globalisation and Historical Macrosociology", in Janett Abu-Lughod (ed.) *Sociology for the Twenty-First Century. Continuities and Cutting Edges*, (Chicago, Chicago University Press: 1999), pp.122 and 124.

chapter aims to show how critical rationalism, as an epistemological doctrine, can provide us with a new methodology for addressing the interplay between the cultural crystallisations and the global institutional trajectories. Wittrock points out that, “Paradoxically, globalisation studies often seem premised on assumptions close to those of earlier forms of theorizing about convergence and modernization. They describe the global and all but inevitable diffusion and impact of market interactions and capitalist forms of production.”⁷² However, a cultural turn in the methodology of globalisation studies calls for an epistemic-institutional approach to macrosociology of globalisation. The distinctive feature of this *approach* is that it aims to uncover the power of *ideational forces* in shaping globalisation as a *macro institutional change*. It is important to note here that the epistemic-institutional approach to globalisation studies refers to what James Rosenau recognises its absence: “Efforts to develop broad-theory [of globalisation] that explains the social, political, and cultural dimensions and how they interact with economic dynamics are conspicuously lacking.”⁷³ He rightly argues that, “it is almost as if globalization defies the theoretical enterprise, being too amorphous and complex to allow for framing and testing of incisive and empirical hypothesis.”⁷⁴ As Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva point out: “This is certainly not to say that social theories are necessarily independent of the empirical study of society...But whether they are empirically grounded or not, the main purpose of social theories is obviously to theorize, and there is thus a clear distinction between the abstract nature of social theory and the practical orientations of empirical sociology.”⁷⁵ The thesis’ epistemic-institutional approach uses its critical rationalist-inspired method for a social theoretical investigation regarding how the interactions among cultural, political and economic dynamics of globalisation can be addressed in the context of a new macrosociology of globalisation.

2.2 Critical Rationalism and the Logic of the Social Sciences

If critical rationalism should be employed to develop a new epistemic-institutional approach to historical macrosociology of globalisation, we need a brief review of the

⁷² Wittrock, "Social Theory and Global History," (2001), p.31.

⁷³ James N. Rosenau, "Three Steps Toward a Viable Theory of Globalization," p.307, in Ino Rossi (ed.), *Frontiers of Globalization Research, Theoretical and Methodological Approach*, (USA, Springer: 2008).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva, *Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, 2th ed. (UK, Polity Press: 2010), p.1.

implications of critical rationalism for the logic of social sciences. The literature on Popper's critical rationalism and his logic of the social sciences is substantial. However, I shall merely refer to the core ideas of critical rationalism and Popper's logic of the social sciences as it serves the aims of this chapter. In addition, I will highlight those readings of Popper's logic that pave the way for an application of critical rationalism to the logic of macrosociology of globalisation. In this way, I am committed to the very logic of critical rationalism, as an epistemological doctrine, rather than to Popper's account of critical rationalism.

The logic of the social sciences has been contested due to different perspectives. For instance, Popper introduces '*conjectures and refutations*' as the logic of scientific discovery, whereas Imre Lakatos argues about the *methodology of scientific research programs* in which scientists investigate a series of theories-- as research programs-- rather than isolated theories, and they do not refute a research program if they find a contradicting evidence.⁷⁶ From a radically different perspective, Thomas Kuhn claims that the scientific research programs are *incommensurable paradigms*. Hence, they grow and collapse as a result of a non-rationalist mechanism. In other words, the scientific paradigms raise and collapse due to the *scientific revolutions*, which cannot be addressed based on a rational criterion.⁷⁷

If the thesis employs Popper's logic of the social sciences for developing a new methodology for critical macrosociology of globalisation, the main reason is that it rests upon critical rationalism, as the thesis' chosen epistemological doctrine. For a critical rationalist, Popper's logic of scientific discovery is ultimately originated from the premise of the limit of human knowledge.

Popper's logic of the social sciences follows his logic of knowledge discovery as *Conjectures and Refutations*.⁷⁸ This conjectural theory of knowledge does not see a fundamental difference between the logics of the natural and the social sciences. The logic of scientific discovery, for Popper, refers to a problem-solving process in which our conjectures are tentative solutions for our problems. Our solutions cannot be

⁷⁶ See Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1970).

⁷⁷ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1970). Also see: Steve Fuller, *Kuhn vs. Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science*, (London: Icon Book Led: 2003).

⁷⁸ See Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (London, Routledge: 1969).

regarded as perfects and justified solutions, hence they must evaluate by criticism or refutation. In *The Logic of the Social Sciences*, Popper links his conjectural theory of knowledge with critical rationalism. He argues that our knowledge is limited by our ignorance. Hence, scientific problems emerge due to an awareness of our ignorance. If we had a perfect knowledge, i.e. an absolutist epistemological position, we would not have any epistemic problem to solve. If we had a perfect ignorance; that is, a relativist epistemological position, we would not also have any epistemic problems at all. Since we can have an imperfect but objective knowledge, we *do* know that which we *do not* know. It means that we always have an epistemic problem that can be objectively solved through the mechanism of conjectures and refutations. Hence, once we recognise our epistemic problem, then we appeal to critical reason to solve the problem. We formulate a conjectural solution for the epistemic problem, but we cannot *prove* such conjectural solution because of our *imperfect* capacity to know. However, we can *refute* the conjectural solution. The conjectural theory of knowledge serves both the natural and the social sciences. The reason is that our limited capacity of critical reasoning has created our epistemic problems, as opposed to the objects of our scientific inquiry, either the natural world or the social world.⁷⁹

2.2.1 Historical Background of Popper's Conjectural Theory of Knowledge

Popper's conjectural theory of knowledge should be understood in the context of his historical epistemic problem. In *Conjectures and Refutations*, he describes how he developed this conjectural philosophy of sciences in a response to some problems associated with Hume's inductionism that shaped the need for the demarcation of sciences and metaphysic.⁸⁰ A brief reference to these problems helps us to uncover the linkage between conjectural theory of knowledge and critical rationalism, and its implications for the logic of the social sciences. As Notturmo argues, the historical importance of Popper's solution for Hume's induction problem and in general for the demarcation of sciences and metaphysic must be realised in a corresponding historical context of "the collapse of foundationalism, which can in turn be best understood as posing a problem regarding the rational authority of our beliefs. Traditional 'bedrock' foundationalism said that knowledge must be justified in order to be rational

⁷⁹ See Karl R. Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences", in Karl Popper, *In Search of a Better World. Lectures and essays from thirty years*, transl. Laura J. Bennett, (London and New York, Routledge: 1992), pp.64-81.

⁸⁰ Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, (1969), p.33.

knowledge...”⁸¹ Descartes represents this foundationalism approach. For him, the God-given intellect provides such knowledge as a justified belief.

By the eighteenth century, many philosophers had questioned the epistemological attempt to ground rational knowledge on a priori intuition. They, in contrast, regarded sense experiences as the only measure of truth. But, Hume then argued that the attempt to ground our scientific knowledge upon sense experiences leads us to irrationalism, because there is no ‘middle term’ that allows us to validly infer future events from past experiences, and hence such inductive inferences provide only psychological rather than rational justification through custom and habit. Hume concluded that neither deductive nor inductive inferences could lead us to a rational knowledge. However, Kant rejected Hume’s irrationalism. Kant thought that Hume’s empiricism was the main root of such irrationalism, hence he returned to the need for a priori knowledge after all, given that irrationalism is not acceptable. Kant tried to explain how a priori synthetic knowledge is possible by saying that the mind imposes its law upon nature in order to understand it, and that all rational beings impose the same laws. He viewed Newtonian mechanics as a good example of what he called a priori synthetic knowledge. As Notturmo argues, this was in fact an *historical situation in epistemology* before Einstein, and as Popper understood it.⁸²

Popper realised that Kant’s theory of knowledge for salvaging the rationality of science collapsed when Einstein imposed a non-Newtonian physic upon nature. Einstein theoretical descriptions of the natural world were corroborated by the results of the experiences that he conceived in order to test them. The success of Einstein's theory destroyed all hopes of explaining the rationality of sciences in terms of a priori synthetic knowledge.⁸³ Popper realised a *more fundamental* issue: the attempt to explain the rationality of science through *justification* had failed. He then proposed a *non-justificationist* logic of scientific discovery, emerged in this historical context. He recognised that both Hume and Kant viewed scientific knowledge as *justified belief*. Hence, Hume led to irrationalism because he rightly rejected the validity of an inductive inference. Kant led to a priori synthetic knowledge, but it was discredited by Einstein's physics. However, Popper found an *innovative solution* for both of Hume’s induction problem and Kant’s synthetic knowledge problem. He argued that Hume is

⁸¹ Notturmo, *Science and the Open Society*, (2000), p.98.

⁸² Op. cit., pp.98-99.

⁸³ Op. cit., p.99.

right in saying that an inductive inference is not logically speaking a valid inference, and Kant is right in saying that experiences and observations presuppose a priori ideas.

However, Hume is wrong in concluding that we cannot have a rational and objective knowledge because we cannot make a valid *inductive* inference, whereas we can formulate a valid *deductive* argument. Kant is also wrong in arguing that a priori synthetic knowledge is *certainly true*, where we can criticise such a priori knowledge. Popper writes: “When Kant said, ‘Our intellect does not draw its laws from nature but imposes its laws upon nature’, he was right. But in thinking that these laws are necessarily true, or that we necessarily succeed in imposing them upon nature, he was wrong.”⁸⁴ This epistemological critique of Kant and Hume’s theories of knowledge led Popper to his own conjectural theory of knowledge.

Popper concludes that a conjectural theory of knowledge can solve the historical problem of epistemology: On the one hand, Popper’s theory uses valid deductive argument in which the truth of conclusion depends upon the truth of the premises. On the other hand, it uses empirical criticism to evaluate the truth of premises themselves. In this way, this logic of knowledge discovery leads us to an empirical and rational knowledge. As Notturmo points out, “it is empirical because we *test* our solutions to scientific problems against our observations and experiences. And it is rational, because we make use of the valid argument forms of deductive logic, especially the *modus tollens*, to criticise theories that contradict the observation statements that we think are true. ... we must think of knowledge and of rationality in a way that does not presuppose that our knowledge must be justified in order to be rational.”⁸⁵ Viewed from this historical perspective, Popper’s epistemological breakthrough originates from a fundamental critique of the justificationist epistemology.

As William Bartley III remarks “the main originality of Popper’s position lies in the fact that it is the first *nonjustificational philosophy of criticism* in the history of philosophy.”⁸⁶ Stefano Gattei views Popper’s philosophical breakthrough in this way: “How do we learn, then? Popper’s answer is: by criticizing our errors. The idea that anything we say can be subjected to critical examination is the core of Popper’s

⁸⁴ Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, (1963), p.63.

⁸⁵ Notturmo, (2000), pp.101-102.

⁸⁶ See Mariano Artigas, *The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper’s Theory of Knowledge*, (ed.) Ivan Slade, (Berlin, Peter Lang, 1999), p.53.

philosophical attitude, his solution to the problem of rationality. ... This is the core of the revolution Popper marked in twentieth century philosophy of science—rationality requires no foundation, only critical dialogue.”⁸⁷ It is important here to note chapter 5 will argue how Popper’s conjectural theory of *learning from errors* can be employed for developing a critical rationalist *model of social learning*.

2.2.2 The Two Contexts of the Logic of Scientific Discovery

Keeping in mind the historical record of Popper’s theory of knowledge, we are now in a better position to realise his logic of the social sciences. However, we need to distinguish between two major contexts of this logic of scientific discovery. We can link the two contexts with 'conjectural' and 'refutational' steps of Popper's theory of knowledge. In Popper's terminology, the two contexts are called *the context of discovery* and *the context of justification*.⁸⁸ These contexts also construct Popper's Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) model of scientific discovery. They lead us to see how a valid deductive argument can be tested through falsifying evidences-- called also as *methodological falsificationism*. Viewed a science theory, either in the natural or in the social sciences, as an epistemic problem-solving framework under the limits of human knowledge, Popper argues that the two contexts of a conjectural theory of knowledge introduces the mechanisms of scientific discovery. This process of scientific discovery consists of the four major stages: (a) recognising an epistemic problem, (b) formulating a tentative theory or hypothesis for the problem, (c) eliminating errors, and (d) raising a new problem. Popper summarises this process as follows, which reflects the very meaning of *openness to rational criticism*.

$$P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$$

Where, P1 is the original problem; TT is a tentative theory, or solution to the problem; EE is error elimination, or criticism, and P2 is a new problem that emerges as a result of criticism. The *context of discovery* refers to the stages of the problem recognition and the formulation of the research hypothesis. However, the *context of justification* refers to the *error eliminating* stage or criticism. The context of justification or the *context of criticism* plays the key role in Popper's theory of knowledge. However, the context of discovery is also very important.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Stefano Gattei, "Karl Popper's Philosophical Breakthrough", *Philosophy of Science*, 71 (4), (2004), pp.463-464.

⁸⁸ See Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (1969), pp.43-78.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

We argued that this conjectural theory of knowledge implies that at the first place rationality of our scientific inquiry depends on recognising an epistemic problem and formulating it in the format of a valid deductive hypothesis. Without having a valid deductive theory or hypothesis, we cannot use empirical evidence to test the theory. In an invalid inductive formulation, the *conclusions* do not follow from the *premises*; hence a rejection of a premise, by empirical evidence, cannot lead us to subsequent rejection of the hypothesis' conclusion. However, once we formulate the hypothesis in the form of a valid deductive logic, especially the *modus tollens*, we have provided the logical ground to deliver the rejection of a premise of the valid hypothesis to its conclusions. As Notturmo points out, "in invalid and so called 'inductive' argument the *truth* of the conclusion is *consistent* with the truth of the premises. But *inconsistency*, ironically enough, is what really matters. In a valid deductive argument the *falsity* of the conclusion is *inconsistent* with the truth of the premises. It means that we cannot *simultaneously* assert the truth of those premises and deny the truth of that conclusion without contradicting ourselves."⁹⁰ As such, the main problem with an inductive argument is not that it never justifies its conclusion, but it never gives us reason to question its premises. In other words, an inductive argument never places us in a position in which we ought to choose between accepting their conclusions and denying their premises.

On the contrary, a valid deductive argument places us in such a position, hence we can use falsifying evidences to refute a conclusion of a hypothesis because of the rejection of one or more the premises.⁹¹ In this line of reasoning, Popper asserts that "[t]o give a *causal explanation* of an event means to deduce a statement which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more *universal laws*, together with certain singular statement, the *initial conditions*."⁹² The explanatory power of scientific theories depends upon their capacity to resistance falsifying evidences. One falsifying piece of evidence can refute the conclusions.

Recognising the two contexts of the logic of scientific discovery leads us to a key question for the logic of the social sciences: can we use empirical evidences to falsify the social sciences' hypothesis? The next sub-section argues, during the development of his philosophy of science and social philosophy, Popper realised that empirical

⁹⁰ Notturmo, *Science and Open Society*, (2000), p.65.

⁹¹ Op. cit., p.106.

⁹² Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, (London, Routledge: 1992), p.59.

criticism is merely one form of his general conjectural theory of knowledge. This argument prepares us to argue about Popper's hermeneutic approach to the logic of the social sciences, whereas he introduces a qualitative-- of course not a fundamental-- difference between the logics of the social sciences and the natural sciences.

2.2.3 From 'Empirical Falsificationism' to 'Inter-Subjective Criticism'

While Popper started with the problems of induction and demarcation, as his historical epistemological problem, in his later works, he revised his understanding of a prescription for demarcation and rationality. If in the early phase of his epistemological thought science was demarcating the metaphysical due to its critical method, in his later works Popper recognises that, like science, metaphysics can employ a critical rationalist method. Popper repudiates the possibility of a sharp demarcation between science and metaphysics.⁹³ He still believes that it is important to identify falsifiable theories, but Popper now considers this to be the only one technique within a more comprehensive approach to rationality, conceived as inter-subjective criticisability.⁹⁴ For Popper, now testability was merely "a certain kind of arguability: arguability by means of *empirical* arguments, appealing to observation and experiences."⁹⁵ Popper rightly concludes although metaphysical theories were empirically irrefutable they could still be rational. In addition, it is impossible to eliminate all metaphysical elements from science.⁹⁶ Due to these developments, we need to know how objectivity of a non-empirical hypothesis must be determined. For Popper, a non-empirical theory may be considered rational and objective if it is able to be criticised and discussed with reference to its problem situation.⁹⁷

Popper argues about one method of philosophy and of natural sciences: "that of stating one's problem clearly and of examining its various proposed solutions *critically*."⁹⁸ The general theory of knowledge thus becomes the "theory of problem solving, ... of the construction, critical discussion, evaluation, and critical testing, of

⁹³ Karl R. Popper, *Realism and the Aim of Science*, Volume I, *From the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery*, (ed.) William W. Bartley III. (London, Hutchinson: 1983), p.159.

⁹⁴ Geoffrey Stokes, *Popper: Philosophy, Politics and Scientific Method*, (London, Polity Press: 1998), p.126.

⁹⁵ Popper, *Realism and the Aim of Science*, (1983), p.161.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.179.

⁹⁷ Karl R. Popper, *Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics*. Volume III *From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, (ed.) William W. Bartley III, (London, Hutchinson: 1982), p.200.

⁹⁸ Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, p.16.

competing conjectural theories.”⁹⁹ Popper addresses this improvement in his theory of knowledge in this way: “inter-subjective *testing* is merely a very important aspect of the more general idea of inter-subjective *criticism*, or in other words, of the idea of mutual rational control by critical discussion.”¹⁰⁰ Hence, the logic of the social sciences, like the method of the natural sciences, “consists in trying out tentative solutions to those problems from which our investigation starts.”¹⁰¹ In this way, metaphysics, the social sciences and the natural sciences involve proposing tentative solutions to problems, whether of the practical or theoretical type, where the method of problem solving is ‘*trial and error*’. These different branches of knowledge inquiry should follow a common pattern: “ $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$. That is, human sciences begin with a problem (P1), and then a tentative theory (TT) is proposed to solve it. Next, the theory is tested, and an effort is made to eliminate errors (EE) in the theory. Following error elimination a new problem emerge (P2), and then the process begins anew.”¹⁰² As Lawrence Boland argues, a Socratic dialogic approach is central to Popper’s view of science. Accordingly, science is critical debate.¹⁰³ However, Popper rightly argues that there are some qualitative differences amongst different branches of science in the application of this critical method.

2.2.4 The Situational Analysis and the Hermeneutic Logic of the Social Sciences

Popper's *Situational Analysis* and its implications for his *Hermeneutic Logic* lead us to explore the aforementioned qualitative difference. As William Gorton writes, Popper recognises the difficulties of empirical falsification in the social sciences:

Popper admits even in the natural science no falsification can ever be deemed clear-cut or final...Evidence in the social sciences is also always theory-laden, and often to a greater degree than in the natural sciences. But social sciences also suffers from its own unique—and perhaps more daunting—problems of falsification. Among the most significant is the difficulty of making precise predictions. Some of the reasons for this difficulty have already been discussed, including the lack of law-like regularities in the social world, the difficulty if not impossibility of conducting controlled experiments, the complexity of social phenomena, and the Oedipal effect.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1972), p.142.

¹⁰⁰ Popper, *The Logic of Knowledge Discovery*, (1992), p.44.

¹⁰¹ Karl R. Popper, *The Myth of the Framework. In defense of science and rationality*, (ed.) M.A. Notturmo, (London and New York, Routledge: 1994), pp.92-101.

¹⁰² William A. Gorton, *Karl Popper and the Social Sciences*, (Albany, State University of New York Press: 2006), p.52.

¹⁰³ Lawrence A. Boland, *Critical Economic Methodology: A Personal Odyssey*, (London and New York, Routledge: 1996), p.275.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p.54.

Gorton argues the situational analysis in particular is hampered by falsifiability problems. As he observes, Popper argues that science tries to explain two basic types of phenomena: singular events and repeating events or regularities. While explaining the former requires scientists to invoke initial condition and universal laws, the latter requires construction of a model. In Gorton's words, "social science, Popper contends, is usually confined to constructing models of typical social situations."¹⁰⁵ This is because "explaining and predicting singular events by universal laws and initial conditions is hardly ever applicable in the theoretical social science ...Laws are simply not available in the social realm, and, owing to the complexity of the social world, it is difficult to isolate initial conditions."¹⁰⁶ These unique features of the social sciences' subject matter lead Popper to the need for modeling social theories by the situational logic. It is important to remember that the situational approach to modeling social phenomena refers to the context of discovery, rather than the context of justification. Any model of situational analysis needs an inter-subjective criticism to secure its objectivity in the context of justification.

Before arguing for situational analysis as a hermeneutic approach to formulating social sciences' hypotheses, I refer to Geoff Stokes' analysis of Popper's reasoning for the situational modeling of social phenomena. I shall then explain James Farr's hermeneutic reading of Popper's situational logic that contributes to developing a new logic for a critical macrosociology of globalisation. Stokes points out: "Popper's proposal that we construct a logic of the situation aimed to capture what he considered to be *the most important difference between natural and social sciences, namely, the feature of human rationality*. Because human beings are purposive and therefore rational in one of the sense employed by Popper, he suggests that social situations are just as amenable as physical events to explanation by means of the H-D [Hypothetico-Deductive] model"¹⁰⁷ (emphasis added). However, due to humans' purposive and rational actions, modeling human actions and social orders calls for a special reading of the conjectural theory of knowledge.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Popper, *The Myth of the Framework*, (1994), pp.155-156 and 172-173.

¹⁰⁷ Geoff Stokes, "Karl Popper's Political Philosophy of Social Science", *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, (27) (1997), p.69.

Popper argues that the fundamental problem of the social sciences “is to trace the unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions.”¹⁰⁸ In addition, he follows methodological individualism to address the unintended consequences of intentional human actions. For him, the core of methodological individualism lies in its prescription “that the ‘behaviour’ and the ‘action’ of collectives, such as states or social groups, must be [ultimately] reduces to the actions of human individuals.”¹⁰⁹ He links methodological individualism with a tradition of the study of the social institutions through which *ideas* may captivate individuals, and new social institutions may be created via a critical evaluation of traditional institutions.¹¹⁰ Since Popper takes individuals as ultimate impetus of social order, and since he views individuals as purposive and rational actors, he pays a special attention to ‘*human rationality*’ for modeling unintended social consequences of human actions.

Having argued for methodological individualism and the epistemic primacy of individuals’ readings of their rational action, the situational analysis can be described according to the three major elements: (a) the *rationality principle*, (b) the *social situation*, and (c) the *rational behaviour*.¹¹¹ The general relations among these key elements imply that since individuals act rationally, the social situations--as unintended outcomes of individuals’ rational behaviors-- can be analytically modelled through valid deductions that give the primacy to human actions as the ultimate driving force of social order. In this situational modeling of social orders, the rationality principle means that each person acts in accordance with his or her social situation. However, as Notturmo argues, it “is not the *empirical* hypothesis that each person acts adequacy to the situation. *That* hypothesis is clearly false. It is, on the contrary, a methodological principle... It says that if we want to explain a social event rationally, then we must assume that the people in it acted adequately to the situation, or, at the very least, that they acted adequately to the situation as they saw it.”¹¹² The rational behavior becomes thus an action that is *adequate* in the *given situation*.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p.342.

¹⁰⁹ Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. I, (London, Routledge : 1966), p.91.

¹¹⁰ Karl R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1961), p.149.

¹¹¹ See Karl R. Popper, "Models, Instruments and Truth: The status of the rationality principle in the social sciences," in Popper, *The Myth of the Framework*, (1994), pp .154-184. Also see Egon Matzner and Amit Bhaduri, "The Socioeconomic Context: An Alternative Approach to Popper's Situational Analysis," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 28 (4) (1998), p .485.

¹¹² Mark A. Notturmo, "Truth, Rationality, and the Situation," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 28 (3) (1998), p.405.

¹¹³ See Marzner and Bhaduri, op. cit., p.458.

From this point of view, a rational explanation of a social event is possible, if we assume that individual driving forces of the event take into consideration their social situation at least as they see it. Otherwise, we deal with a very confusing situation to address the unintended consequences of human actions, which do not follow any rational criterion in their conscious purposive actions. The social situation in this approach is a social environment or a societal problem-situation in which individual rational agents find themselves. This social environment consists of social institutions, traditions, rules, norms, organisations, as unintended consequences of human actions. This social environment cannot be described in psychological terms, but at the same time it is an outcome of intended human behaviours.¹¹⁴

In sum, a situational approach to modeling unintended consequences of intended human actions implies while there is not a universal laws serving as the premise for a valid deductive hypothetic in the social sciences, we can use the *rationality principle* as an *inquiry maxim* to formulate valid deductive models for testing our hypotheses. Given human rational action, the situational model of social theories enables us to construct scientific models of human actions and interactions, and to use those models to explain social orders.¹¹⁵ There are two accounts of Popper's concept of human rationality in his situational approach the logic of the social sciences. One reading implies that Popper utilises the notion of *complete rationality* to describe the rationality. Another implies that Popper uses the notion of learning from error to develop a hermeneutic logic of the social sciences. As we shall see, both readings can be linked to Popper's situational analysis. But, the second account is consistent with critical rationalism that defines '*rationality*' as the '*openness to criticism*'.

In an example of the first reading of human rationality in Popper's situational logic, Stokes points out, "situational logic establishes an optimum [complete] model of human rationality by which we may explain both typical forms of human behavior and deviations from it in any given social or institutional situation. ...Once the optimum rationality has been ascertained to operate as a kind of covering law that enables explanation to be put into the hypothetico-deductive form. One could then generate hypothesis in the form of prediction about how people would behave... Failing predictive success, one would attempt to explain why they deviated from the

¹¹⁴ Popper, *Open Society and Its Enemies*, p.96.

¹¹⁵ Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, pp.140-141.

ideal model.”¹¹⁶ Another example is offered by Matzner and Bhaduri. They argue that Popper’s concept of human rationality in his situational logic is rooted in neo-classical microeconomic whereas he assumes a complete informatics of rational maximising agents, as the main premise of his situational logic.¹¹⁷ On the contrary, Notturmo and Farr believe that Popper’s account of rationality is not limited to the assumption of perfect knowledge, but it can be expanded to rationality as ‘openness to criticism’.¹¹⁸

Of particular interest for the present argument is James Farr's reading of Popper's situational logic as a hermeneutics approach to the logic of the social sciences. As we shall see, this reading is consistent with the very logic of critical rationalism itself, even if Popper did not focus on it. In his article entitled, *Popper’s Hermeneutics*, Farr remarks: “...by looking at Popper’s hermeneutic methodology, we are looking at hermeneutic methods in the social sciences. Some might take my interpretation [of Popper’s hermeneutics] as a mischievous or subversive one: and so it is. I deliberately emphasise features of Popper’s methodology which often go unremarked, and which therefore should cast a different light on the whole.”¹¹⁹ Farr’s account of Popper’s hermeneutics methodology leads us to a better understanding of the role of human rationality in the situational logic. It links Popper’s conjectural theory of knowledge with his hermeneutic approach to the social sciences. Farr’s reading paves the way for replacing the Popper’s *weak* concept of human rationality--as an adequately behaviour in a given situation--with his *strong* concept of rationality--as openness to criticism. This *fundamental shift* puts us on an entirely new path for reconstructing Popper’s logic of the social sciences, as I shall argue soon.

Farr creates links amongst the situational analysis, the conception of rationality, and hermeneutics methodology of the social sciences. For him, “situational analysis does not, however, provide a mechanical set of rules for constructing concrete interpretations which would be definitive in every particular case; rather, like the ‘logic of discovery’ generally, it only provides standards for the *critical assessment of interpretative conjectures*.”¹²⁰ If we take Popper’s idea of inter-subjective criticism as

¹¹⁶ Stokes, "Karl Popper's Political Philosophy of Social Sciences," (1997), p.70.

¹¹⁷ Matzner and Bhaduri, "The Socioeconomic Context: An Alternative Approach to Popper’s Situational Analysis," (1998), pp.485-487.

¹¹⁸ See Notturmo, "Truth, Rationality, and the Situation," (1998), p.416-420., and Farr, "Popper’s Hermeneutics," (1983), pp.171-172.

¹¹⁹ Farr, "Popper's Hermeneutics," (1983), p.158., Also see Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p.162.

¹²⁰ Farr, "Popper's Hermeneutics," (1983), p.166.

the reference point of objective knowledge, we will see that the objectivity of this *interpretative conjectures* is not less than objectivity of other types of scientific conjectures.

Farr distinguishes between two forms of situational analysis due the two different conceptions of rationality each assumes. The first form proceeds on the assumption of complete rationality¹²¹ that entails perfectly informed, instrumental behaviour appropriate to market situations. Complete rationality is a hypothetical rationality. Deviations from it are considered less and less rational on the part of the rational agents. A situational model based on the assumption of complete rationality of individuals naturally leads to the gap between theoretical model and empirical reality. But, it provides a hypothetical standard, a deviation from it helps us to model actual reality which are formed on the basis of imperfect rationality. The second form of situational analysis proceeds on a wider conception of rationality. In other sense, it does not limit itself to a special reading of rationality like a market rationality. In this way, it allows the situational logic to accommodate different systems of rationale in its wider account of human rationality as openness to criticism.¹²²

Farr argues that this wider account of rationality can be used to elaborate Popper's hermeneutic logic of the social sciences. In according to the situational logic, we need to reconstruct agents' rational behaviours, as micro-foundations of macrosocial order, in order to provide a valid deductive model of social order formation. Hence, we need a theory for the rational reconstruction of humans' trains of thoughts, when they find themselves in the social situations. Farr argues that Popper's conjectural theory of knowledge provides such a theory of rational reconstructing of the human agents' actions, viewed from their own accounts of rationality. He writes:

The kind of understanding which science provides is but a systematically critical version of the kind of understanding we have in ordinary life. Like ordinary agents, scientists approach problems with a pre-understanding: i.e., with 'expectation inherent in our background knowledge'. ...For Popper, understanding—that is, *objective understanding*—is essentially a matter of *problem-solving by conjecture and refutation*. The *rational reconstruction of problem-solving* takes on this dialectical and admittedly oversimplified schema: $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$. P1 is the original problem to which TT, a tentative theory or conjectural solution, is then offered. In the Geisteswissenschaften (tentative) historical interpretation characteristically play the role of (tentative) theories. ...The interpretation must be backed by documentation and argumentation, and the subjected to critical discussion. *The main tools of criticism are logical*

¹²¹ Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, p.141.

¹²² See Farr, "Popper's Hermeneutics," (1983), pp.171-174.

contradiction and falsification. When error is found, *either of a logical or a factual*, it is then eliminated (EE). Characteristically, this leaves the interpreters with a new or a modified problem, P2¹²³ (emphasis added).

We can see both contexts of *discovery* and *refutation* in this *objective theory of understanding*. A social scientist or a historian, who wants to construct a situational model of a historic or social event, uses the premises about how human agents defined their historic or social situation and how they used their own accounts of rationality in order to formulate an interpretative conjecture about such an event. This interpretative conjecture will be subjected to critical discussion by the scientific community to discover *logical* and *factual* contradictions. Those interpretative conjectures that survive such an inter-subjective criticism can be regarded objective and rational knowledge of corresponding social and historical events as long as have not leveled a new criticism. Popper rightly points out: “the theory designed to solve the problem of understanding is a *metatheory*, since it is a theory part of whose task is to discover, in every particular case, what P1, TT, EE, and P2 actually consisted of.”¹²⁴ In Farr’s words, “in this way Popper forges a *systematic* and *highly suggestive* link between *the theories of sciences, human action, and interpretative understanding*”¹²⁵ (emphasis added).

Popper refers to situational analysis of Galileo's theory of the tides, as opposed to a non-situational analysis of it—as an episode in the history of science. Galileo persistently held to a theory of the tides, which denied any influence on the part of the moon. For this “even in our own time [Popper says] Galileo has been severely and personally attacked for his dogmatism in sticking obstinately to such obviously false theory.”¹²⁶ But, Popper argues that this non-situational interpretation of Galileo's theory and behaviour is a misinterpretation because it proceeds without adequate attention to the problem-situation in which Galileo found himself.

In the situation as he saw it, Galileo had good reasons to hold onto his theory, and to deny the lunar theory. First, viewed from the Copernican tradition, he was looking for an auxiliary theory of the tides to advance Copernicus' simple theory of the circular orbits of the planets about the sun. “Galileo thought this is possible on the

¹²³ Ibid, pp.159-163.

¹²⁴ Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p.177.

¹²⁵ Farr (1983) p .163. See: Jürgen Habermas, “Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences” in Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (1999), pp.21-42.

¹²⁶ Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p.173.

basis of the laws of inertia and the conservation law of rotary motions. These laws made no mentions of the earth could alone account for the rise and fall of the tides.”¹²⁷ Popper writes, “From the point of view of method of Galileo was perfectly right in attempting to explain everything on this narrow basis; for only if we try to exploit and test out fallible theories to the limit can we hope to learn from their failure.”¹²⁸ From Galileo's own perspective, his tenacity in holding onto a boldly simplified theory was not itself a sign of irrationality and dogmatism. Although, the very narrow basis of Galileo's theory proved to be false, and Kepler's elliptical theories of orbits and his theory of lunar-influenced tides, proved to be correct, a situational interpretation of Galileo's theory does not imply that his theory and behaviour were irrational because of the rejection of the theory.

Farr concludes that, “in trying to solve the (meta) problem of understanding how Galileo tried to understand and solve his own problem... Popper’s interpretation salvages Galileo from the charge of irrationality and dogmatism. He demonstrates how the rationality principle is used—viz., not as a falsifiable law, but creatively and sympathetically as a regulative maxim of inquiry. In this way, Popper purposefully reconstructs Galileo's problem-situation as Galileo himself saw.”¹²⁹ I shall argue how this hermeneutic approach to the logic of the social sciences can be employed for a *rational reconstruction* of the origins of contemporary liberal globalisation through identifying the *historical-problem* of those liberal thinkers, like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume and Adam Smith, who provided the ideational impetuses of the formation liberal social order.

It is important to note that this hermeneutic logic has been applied by so-called '*interpretative sociology*' for the study of historical macro-sociological problems. As Farr remarks, “the single closest theorist to Popper is undoubtedly Max Weber, whom Popper acknowledges.”¹³⁰ Toby Huff also reminds us although Weber was not a supporter of the hypothetico-deductive model he argued that interpretative sociology aims to provide a *casual explanation* of social actions.¹³¹ Weber linked the causal explanation and rational interpretation with the study of all the forms of rationality in

¹²⁷ Farr, (1983) p.172.

¹²⁸ Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p.173.

¹²⁹ Farr, (1983) p.173.

¹³⁰ Farr, (1983) p.161.

¹³¹ Toby E. Huff, *Max Weber and the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, (UK, Transaction Books: 1984), p.10.

a comparative historical perspective. As Huff points out, “Weber's notion of ‘rational interpretation,’ which included the idea that reasons and causes are related, had ultimately resulted in the elaboration of typologies of ‘social action’ or *culturally* embedded forms of *rationality*.”¹³² Not only did Weber recognise different forms of human rationality, but also he respected different rationale systems as the sources of different patterns of social action. Weber’s explanatory framework implied that the *reasons* and *motives*, which serve as the causes of social action, were derivative components of the implicit rational ordering of social action, imposed by a particular culture. *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalist* is a prime substantive illustration of this methodological approach. Weber uses *sociological ideal type* for a *rational reconstruction* of typical system of rationale and corresponding social action. He utilised the ideal type to generate general laws related to historical phenomena. Weber wanted to develop a tool that would enable comparisons between historical phenomena.¹³³ For him, the interpretation of human acts involves inferences that rest upon the assumption of the rational character of the actor’s motive, and thus the meaning of the action is directly connected to the rational context which constitutes the reasons or motives of such an action. He argues that the ideal types provide a *conceptual or interpretative conjecture* about how a special human rationality can be linked with a special pattern of social organisation in a causality manner.¹³⁴

In this line of argument, Jon Hendricks and Breackinridge Peters argue that: “If sociology has as its goal the meaningful explanation of what happens in the social world it must reflect the commonsense typologies and retain the subjectively intended referent. Ideal types are essentially abstractions of meaningful relationships: meaningful to both the subject matter and the observer.”¹³⁵ Weber used the ideal types to develop a comparative historical sociology of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Western Christianity, and Islam as the applications of his interpretive methodology of the social sciences.¹³⁶

¹³² Ibid., p.18.

¹³³ Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Sciences and Social Policy", pp.355-418., in Maurice Natanson (ed.) *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, (New York, Random House: 1963).

¹³⁴ Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, (USA, Totowa: 1968), pp.11-12.

¹³⁵ Jon Hendricks and C. Breckinridge Peters, "The Idea Type and Sociological Theory", *Acta Sociologica*, 16 (1) (1973), p.38.

¹³⁶ See Wolfgang Schluchter, *Paradoxes of Modernity: Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max Weber*, Trans. Neil Solomon, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp.360, 363-365., Also see Walter Wallace, *A Weberian Theory of Human Society*, (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press: 1994).

To summarise the preceding arguments, it refers to what Farr concludes about Popper's logic of the social sciences. He rightly argues that Popper's approach should be viewed in the wider context of his Critical Rationalism:

Popper's version is so general and disarmingly simple that it not only unifies the humanities and the natural sciences, but also mathematics and logic, art and music, ethics and moral reasoning, philosophy and metaphysics, and even common sense and ordinary action.¹³⁷ In other words, the whole domain of critical rational thought is unified. ... in Popper's broader and arguably more interesting version, unified method is less significant as a characterization of science *per se*, than of human thought and critical action generally. This puts the whole matter in an entirely new and different light. Popper wants us to see unity... [of science]. And when we survey all other forms of critical rational thought 'there are differences everywhere'. ... So how much difference *does* a difference make?¹³⁸

Popper leads us to realise that the differences between the natural and the social sciences' methodologies may be *qualitative* but not *fundamental*. What unifies these methodologies is the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Conjectures and Refutations.

2.3 A Critical Rationalist Approach to Critical Social Theory

Popper's methodology of the social sciences focuses upon explaining the existing social order as unintended consequences of intended human actions. However, it does not provide a research methodology for criticising the existing social world itself. In other words, it does not regard the subject matter of the study itself as the object of critical thinking. It also cannot help us to introduce a self-liberating social change for overcoming the existing social orders' contradictions. However, Critical Rationalism, as an epistemological theory can lead us to the logic for critical social theory, aiming to criticise the existing social world and to change it.

As Geoff Stokes points out, "since the 1950s a number of philosophers known as critical theorists have engaged in debate with Popper and offered a series of criticisms of critical rationalism. Although the 'positivist dispute' between Theodor Adorno and Popper in the 1960s is the most well known of these critical encounters, problems arising from it have occupied the attention of later critical theorists, such as Jürgen

¹³⁷ Besides Popper, see those who have extended critical rationalist insights to mathematics (Imre Lakatos, *Proofs and Refutations*, Cambridge 1967); to art and the history of art (Ernst Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, New York 1960; and "The Logics of Vanity Fair", in Karl Schillp (eds.), *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, LaSalle 1974; to moral reasoning (Hans Albert, "Social Science and the Moral Philosophy: A Critical Approach to the Value Problem in the Social Sciences", in Mario Bunge (ed), *The Critical Approach to Sciences and Philosophy*, New York 1964).

¹³⁸ Farr, "Popper's Hermeneutics," (1983), pp.175-176.

Habermas.”¹³⁹ I shall focus on the Popper-Adorno Controversy on the logic of the social sciences. In this way, I intend to utilise the controversy in order to argue that critical rationalism provides the foundation for a new logic of critical social sciences, whereas neither Popper nor Adorno argued for this logic.

2.3.1 Adorno’s Critique of Popper’s Logic of the Social Sciences

The occasion for the Popper-Adorno Controversy was a conference held in Tübingen in 1961 under the auspices of the German Sociological Association on the logic of the social sciences. Popper formulated his views of the logics of the social sciences in the form of twenty-seven theses that were replied to by Adorno.¹⁴⁰ This section is mainly concerned with Adorno's critique of Popper's logic of the social sciences, because we have already recognised the shortcoming of Popper's logic due to the lack of methodological concerns in criticising the existing social world. However, I shall then argue that critical rationalism, as an epistemological theory, can provide us with a foundation to criticise the existing social world.

It argued that for Popper the starting points of all scientific enquiries is a problem. This problem arises either due to realisation that something in our existing knowledge is not in order, or because a contradiction is observed between the existing knowledge and the existing facts. We saw that insofar as this is the case there are no fundamental differences between the natural and the social sciences, because both start with scientific problems. Popper argues that our logic of scientific problems' solving are not fundamentally different in the social and the natural sciences because they use the two steps of ‘conjectures’ and ‘refutations’. In short, “the method of science is thus the control of the tentative search for solutions by the sharpest possible critiques that is progress through trial and error.”¹⁴¹ Popper recognises a qualitative difference between the logics of the social and the natural sciences, whereas he argues about the situational and hermeneutics approaches to the logic of social sciences. However, he does not regard this difference as a fundamental one, because the logic of the social sciences still follows the conjectural theory of knowledge.

Adorno agrees with Popper on the nature of critical method: “Insofar as he [Popper] identifies the objectivity of science with the critical method, he raises the

¹³⁹ Stokes, *Popper. Philosophy, Politics and Scientific Method*, (1998), p.144.

¹⁴⁰ David Frisby, "The Popper-Adorno Controversy," (1972), p.105.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p .109.

latter to the organon of truth. No dialectician today would demand more.”¹⁴² However, Adorno rightly argues that it is impossible to limit the critical activity of the social sciences to self-criticism. By self-criticism, Adorno refers to what Popper introduces as uncovering a contradiction in the existing knowledge of social world, in particular human society, as the subject matter of a sociological theory. As argued, for Popper, problems are located in our knowledge, in our statements about reality—what Popper calls the third-world; that is, the world of our objective knowledge of the statements, as opposed to the first-world of our mental universe, and the second-world of external universe.¹⁴³ In this sense, the problems located in our knowledge or statements about reality. However, for Adorno, the problems of sociology, for example, are not created through our discovery that some aspect of our knowledge is not in order. Rather, the problem of sociology is the object of sociology itself—society.¹⁴⁴

Adorno interprets the conception of logic more broadly than Popper does. He understands this concept as the concrete mode of procedure of sociology rather than general rules of thought, of deduction.¹⁴⁵ Adorno recognises that Popper views the scientific problems as the epistemic problems, raising because of the contradictions between the existing knowledge and the external world, i.e., between the third-world and the second-world. However, for Adorno, in the final instance the problems refer to a problematic condition of the social world itself. In his words:

...the problems of sociology do not constantly arise through the discovery 'that something is not in order with our supposed knowledge, ...from the discovery of an apparent contradiction between our supposed knowledge and the facts'. The contradiction must not, as Popper at least presumes here, be a merely 'supposed' contradiction between subject and object...Instead, the contradiction can, in very real term, have its place in reality and can in no way be removed by increased knowledge and clearer formulation.¹⁴⁶

Adorno argues that knowledge derived from an uncritical acceptance of empirical facts becomes a reproduction of the existing unsatisfactory relations of society.¹⁴⁷ For him, if we accept the *contradictory nature of social reality*¹⁴⁸ we should go beyond the contradictions of supposed knowledge with the facts. We must include a self-

¹⁴² Theodor W. Adorno, "On the Logic of the Social Sciences", p.113. in Adorno *et al.* *The Positive Dispute in German Sociology*, (1969).

¹⁴³ See Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, (1972).

¹⁴⁴ Frisby, "The Popper-Adorno Controversy," (1972), p.111.

¹⁴⁵ Adorno, "On the Logic of the Social Sciences," (1969), p.105.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.108.

¹⁴⁷ Frisby, "The Popper-Adorno Controversy," (1972), p.113.

¹⁴⁸ Adorno, *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, (1969), p.109.

criticism of social reality's contradiction itself. Adorno concludes that our scientific criticism should not be only a critique for solving our epistemic problems, but also a critique of the existing society *per se*.¹⁴⁹ Adorno provides us with a good illustration of the task of a critical social science as follows:

... take the concept of liberal society as implying freedom and equality and, on the hand, disputes, in principle, the truth-content of these categories under liberalism--in view of the inequality of the social power which determines the relations between people--then these are not logical contradictions which could be eliminated by means of more sophisticated definitions, nor are they subsequently emergent empirical restrictions or differentiations of a provisional definition, but rather, they are the structural constitutions of society itself.¹⁵⁰

Adorno views a critical theory of society as a sociological critique for unmasking contradictions of the existing social order. For him, critical theory's conception of the *social* is thus one which is opposed to society as a *pure given object*. It attempts to break down its given objects into the existent and the *possible*, the *actually* and the *potentially*.¹⁵¹ A central task of a critical theory is to criticise the contradictions of *actually* existing social order, as a deviation from a *potential* desirable social order. Criticism of ideological foundation of the society's contradictions finds an important place in Adorno's critical sociology.¹⁵²

Adorno argues that the separation between the structure of science and reality is not absolute. "Nor may the concept of truth be attributed solely to the structures of science. It is no less meaningful to speak of the truth of a societal institution than of the truth of theorems concerned with it. Legitimately, criticism does not normally imply merely self-criticism—which is what it actually amounts to for Popper—but also criticism of reality."¹⁵³ In sum, Adorno's critique of Popper's logic of the social sciences does not refer to his critical method. It refers to his focus upon using the method to discover the contradictions within the existing structure of our knowledge. Other members of the Frankfurt School of the critical theory-- like Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas--follow more or less same direction to identify the methodological tasks of critical social theory. For instance, Horkheimer argues that the critical theory of society has as its object man as the producers of their total historical forms of life. The conditions of reality from which the science starts it not a

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.114.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.115.

¹⁵¹ Frisby, "The Popper-Adorno Controversy," (1972), p.116.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Adorno, "Introduction," p.25 in Adorno et al. *The Positive Dispute in German Sociology*, (1969).

given fact, what in each case is given depends not solely upon nature but also on what man wish to make it.¹⁵⁴

Habermas argues about a critical hermeneutic logic of the social sciences that aims to fulfil the tasks of critical social sciences. He points out: “Critical theory aims to restore to men an awareness of their position as active, yet historically limited subjects. Insofar as it discovers which forms of constraints on human freedom are necessary and which are historically specific, it generates a critique of society.”¹⁵⁵ It is important to note that the Horkheimer/Adorno approach to critical theory aimed to reinvent the Marxian social theory. They accepted Marx's critique of capitalist society¹⁵⁶, however they tried to provide new reading for this critique. For instance, Adorno remarks: “In a grand manner, the unity of the critique of scientific and meta-scientific sense is revealed in the work of Marx. It is called the critique of political economy since it attempts to derive the whole that is to be criticized in terms of its right to existence from exchange, commodity form and its immanent ‘logical’ contradictory nature.”¹⁵⁷ Habermas' critical social theory differs from those of Horkheimer and Adorno, recognised as the first generation of the Frankfurt School of the critical theory, due to a distinction he makes between the instrumental and communicative rationality. Andrew Linklater introduces Habermas' critical theory as a post-Marxian critical theory.¹⁵⁸ However, these critical thinkers share the key task of critical social theory i.e. criticising the contradiction of existing social world.¹⁵⁹

2.3.2 Critical Rationalism and the Logic of Critical Social Sciences

Adorno argues that the social sciences must unmask the contradictions of existing social world. He agrees with Popper's critical method, however, he does not argue how the critical method can be used to unmask the unsatisfactory nature of the society

¹⁵⁴ See Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory", in Paul Connerton (ed.), *Critical Sociology: Selected Readings*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin: 1978)

¹⁵⁵ Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1986). p.310. Also see Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory. Habermas and the Frankfurt School*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press:1981).

¹⁵⁶ See Maurice Dobb, (ed.) *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, (New York, 1970).

¹⁵⁷ Adorno, Introduction, p .25.

¹⁵⁸ See Andrew Linklater, "The Achievement of Critical Theory," pp. 45-59, in Linklater, *Critical Theory and World Politics. Citizenship, sovereignty and humanity*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2007). Also see: Thomas McCarty, *The Critical theory of Jürgen Habermas*, (USA, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 1978).

¹⁵⁹ See John P. Scott, "Critical Social Theory: An Introduction and Critique," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 29 (1) (1978), pp.1-21. Also see: K. Baynes, *The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls, and Habermas*, (Albany, Suny Press: 1992).

itself. Popper does not argue about using the critical method to criticise the existing social world, because he identifies the task of the social sciences as explaining the existing social world rather than criticising it. In this way, neither Adorno nor Popper does argue for employing critical rationalism to formulate a critical social theory. Hence, the question as to how critical rationalism and the conjectural theory of knowledge can be used to develop the logic of critical social sciences remains unanswered. This section offers a tentative solution for applying a conjectural theory of knowledge, as a methodological implication of critical rationalism, for introducing a hermeneutic approach to the logic of the social sciences.

As philosophers, both critical rationalists and the proponents of critical theory shared the Enlightenment view that the exercise of reason could lead to emancipation, but as social theorists they differ in the application of the reason for a self-liberating social change. Critical rationalists use the social sciences for improving social orders, whereas, the subject matter of study, i.e. the society is given and out of self-criticism. Critical theorists undertake “the task of criticism as ‘ideology-critique’ and proceeded by the method of internal or ‘immanent’ critique.”¹⁶⁰ They focus upon ‘immanent’ critique of the society as the object of the social studies itself. If they truly share in emancipatory role of reason and the critical method, they can be converged to develop a critical rationalist approach to critical social theory. How can we integrate Popper's conjectural theory of knowledge with Adorno's critical sociology? Addressing this question leads us towards a new logic of a critical macrosociology of globalisation.

I propose following steps for the development of a critical rationalist methodology for the critical social sciences:

(a) According to critical rationalism, *all of our criticisms* follow the conjectural theory of knowledge (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$), in spite of the fact that it is a critique of the contradiction between supposed knowledge and the existing facts, or a critique of the contradictions of the subject matter of the study, i.e., the society itself. In this sense, as Popper argues, all of scientific problems are epistemic problems, even those problems that refer to the contradictions of the social reality itself.

b) Our immanent critique of the society, as the object of study, uses the conjectural theory of knowledge (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$) to formulate *interpretative conjectures*,

¹⁶⁰ See Geoffrey Stokes, "Critical Rationalism and Critical Theory," p.145 in Stokes, *Popper, Philosophy, Politics and Scientific Method*, (1998).

regarding the reasons behind the society's contradictions, by attributing the contradictions to irrational beliefs and actions of individual members of the society. In this way, the *irrational reality* of the society is originated from irrational beliefs and actions of individuals.

c) Our immanent critiques of the society must use the *epistemological conception* of critical rationality; that is, *openness to criticism* and learning from error, which is manifested in the critical method itself (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$), to judge regarding rationality and irrationality of individuals' beliefs and actions. It leads us to a strong account of the principle of rationality—opposed to Popper's weak account, defined as an adequate behaviour in relation with the social situation. Connecting the patterns of social organisation and individuals' beliefs and actions validates the principle of methodological individualism and the Weberian interpretative method.

d) Viewed from the critical rationalism, the irrational reality of the society, as the main source of its contradictory nature, can be attributed to individuals' irrational beliefs and actions, as the result of their closedness to criticism. In this way, we lead to a critical rationalist approach to critical social theory, because we have used the conjectural theory of knowledge (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$), as an *explanatory theory*, for addressing the contradictions of the society itself. As Farr argues, Popper himself recognised this explanatory power of his theory of knowledge for addressing rational human actions. However, he did not introduce it as the foundation for the logic of a critical social theory.

e) This critical rationalist approach to critical social theory provides us with a logic for criticising the contradictions of the society due to its individual members' closedness to learning from their errors. It also provides us with a new logic for advocating an alternative (open) social order against which the deviations of the existing social order from the alternative can be diagnosed. This logic also leads us to explore how the transition from a contradictory to a desirable social order can use a critical rationalist approach to *social learning* as an epistemic driving force of such an institutional change. Here the term social learning refers to an inter-subjective learning amongst individuals through which they learn from recognising their mutual mistakes and accordingly learn to correct their errors (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$). A critical rationalist approach to the logic of critical social sciences internalises the

conjectural theory of knowledge in the logic of the social sciences by linking the theory of knowledge with a theory of rational human action.

In *Open Society and Its Enemies*, Popper criticises the closed society due to its the closedness of its individuals members to criticism. However, he does not turn this method into a logic for the critical social theory. In his controversial debate with Popper, Adorno accepted that the critical method is a sophisticated logic of an objective social inquiry. However, he does not argue that such a critique of the contradictory nature of the society can be the subject to the conjectural logic of scientific discovery. Hence, the key question for Adorno is what is the difference between a critique, which targets a contradiction between the existing knowledge and the facts and a critique that targets the contradictions of the society as the object of the study? I argue that in both cases, a social scientist deals with an *epistemic problem*. Our *conjectures* about the causes of the social contradictions by no mean *differ* from our *conjectures* regarding the causes of the contradiction between our supposed knowledge and the external facts. In both cases, we must use the logic of scientific discovery to address our epistemic problems.

Popper is right in saying that in each case we face an epistemic problem, which must employ the conjectural theory of knowledge. Adorno is right in saying that our problems are not merely shaped because of a contradiction between our supposed knowledge and the facts, and thus they cover the contradictions of the society *itself*. However, it seems that both of them ignore the possibility of using the conjectural theory of knowledge to address the epistemic origins of the society's contradictions. The key point here is that a critical rationalist approach to the logic of critical social sciences leads us to explore how using conjecture theory of knowledge --as an explanatory theory of human rational action—can be used for addressing the contradictory patterns of social organisation. It links Critical Rationalism with the three major tasks of the logics of critical social sciences: explaining the existing social world, criticising its contradictions, and advocating an alternative social order.

Habermas takes a similar approach to the logic of critical social theory, using his notion of communicative rationality. He argues that we can criticise the contradictions of a capitalist society due to its instrumental rationality, as a deviation from an ideal type communicative rationality-based dialogic society. I argue that we can use Critical Rationalism and its sociological expression in the ideal type of the open society to

explore the closed societies' contradictions because of their individual members' closedness to criticism and learning from their errors. Along this line of reasoning, Habermas writes:

...the institutions of a society are compared with the objective possibilities of human development, with *the ideal of a rational society*. In this way, actors can achieve a historically conditioned autonomy and so engage in *rational social change*. Therefore, *critical social theory* goes beyond the nomenological knowledge of the analytical-empirical approach in order to discover when they theoretical statements grasp 'invariant regularities of social action as such' and when they express 'ideologically frozen relations of dependence' (emphasis added).¹⁶¹

Habermas reminds us, a critical social theory combines the understanding of *subjectivity intended meaning* with *real causal mechanisms*.¹⁶² In a word, a critical social theory aims to unmask social institutions' malfunctions due to their individuals' closedness to criticism. A rational social change here can be regarded as a rational change in subjectivity intended meaning which directly affects real causal mechanism. As argued before, Farr's reading of Popper's hermeneutic logic of the social sciences, such as Weber's and Habermas' interpretative sociology, aims to link the subjectivity intended meanings, as epistemic motor forces, with the emergence of macro-societal institutions trajectories as an interplay between cultural model of social order and social institutions of the society in question.

2.4 The Logic of Macrosociology of Globalisation: A Critical Rationalist Approach

We are now in a position to introduce how the logic of critical social sciences can be employed for developing a critical macrosociology of globalisation. Chapter 1 discussed the three major aims of this macrosociology: (a) explaining contemporary globalisation, (b) criticising it because of its unsocial sociability or contradictions, and (c) advocating an alternative dialogic globalisation to overcome unsocial sociability of contemporary liberal globalisation.

According to the logic of critical social sciences, the first issue is defining the scientific problem. Secondly, a hypothesis as a tentative solution to solve the problem must be formulated. Finally, the conditions under which such a hypothesis can be examined must be defined. Since the thesis' hypothesis is not an empirical one, the research methodology uses *logical criticism* to evaluate its tentative solution. All

¹⁶¹ Scott, "Critical Social Theory: An Introduction and Critique," (1978), p.4.

¹⁶² Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1986), p.310

these methodological tasks must be viewed in line with the three major tasks of the thesis' research program.

The three aims of a critical social theory, like a critical macrosociology of globalisation, are not separate tasks. The opposite is the case: they are systematically linked. The logic of critical social sciences leads us to realise that we cannot explain the existing social order without recognising its contradictions or societal deficits. For instance, contemporary globalisation cannot be separated from its global democratic deficits. In addition, such societal deficits cannot be diagnosed without having an *ideal type* from which *deviations* of the existing globality can be recognised. However, objectivity of the investigation depends on its openness to inter-subjective criticism.

The thesis focuses on contemporary globalisation's macro-sociological problem. The problem is that the existing liberal model of globalisation suffers from a macro-social organising problem: a global organisation of peoples through the mechanisms of competition for economic interests, as opposed to a rational dialogue. The thesis' challenge is not only providing an explanation of this liberal mode of globality, but also an exploration of its causes. Due to thesis' epistemic-institutional approach to globalisation research, it must explore how *liberal model of social organisation*, as an ideational force, has affected a global macro-societal institutions' transformation. More fundamentally, the thesis must address the question as to how a new global epistemic shift in liberal pattern of social organisation can mitigate unsocial sociability of liberal globality.

As noted in chapter 1, the thesis proposes a hypothesis as its tentative solution for globalisation's macrosociological problem: *a rational dialogue amongst civilisations operates as a mechanism for transforming the existing liberal mode of globality into an open global society*. The development of valid deductive arguments for supporting this hypothesis requires two arguments: the first supportive argument relates to contemporary globalisation, and the second concerns with the contradictions of liberal globalisation. The first implies that *contemporary globalisation is a liberal model of global social organisation*. The second implies that *the contradictory nature of this liberal globalisation originates from an ideational structure of the liberal model itself*. Once the thesis developed these two supportive arguments, the ground will be paved to defend the thesis' main solution for globalisation's macrosociological problem; that is, a rational dialogue among world civilisations.

In terms of the discovery context, the thesis introduces a normative ideal type of globality by chapter 4 i.e. the ideal type of an open global society. This normative ideal type is a *logically constructed* normative ideal type and open to logical criticism. The idea of open global society is a *macro-sociological ideal type* that rests upon the premise of equal access of human beings to critical rationality. It therefore provides us with a global institutional outlook in which all peoples have equal rights of self-determination. If one does not accept an equal access of humans to critical rationality, he or she can reject this *logically constructed* normative ideal type. However, if she or he recognises this *fundamental premise*, he or she cannot reject the logical outcomes of the ideal type accordingly unless contradict her or himself.

In line with this discovery context, the ideal type of open global society will be advanced by chapter 5 in order to develop a theoretical framework for the research methodology. It enables the research to explore how *micro-epistemic motor forces* of contemporary globalisation have fueled its *macro-societal institutions*. In this way, it leads the thesis methodological approach to explore how *cultural crystallisations* interplays with global institutions' trajectories. It offers the research methodology a *hermeneutic model of situational analysis* through which the thesis connects micro-foundation with its macro-institutional trajectories. This hermeneutic model rests on a *critical rationalist* conception of *rationality*. It refers to a *rational reconstruction* of human agents' *trains of thought* as the micro driving forces of a global institutional change. Beside the ideal type of open global society, a Hobbesian ideal type of globality based on the logic of the struggle for political power, and a Lockean ideal type of globality based on the logic of competition for economic interest will be discussed. These ideal types will be used to describe the contradictions of the existing liberal globality and advocating the solution to overcome such contradictions.

In terms of the development of valid deductive arguments in defense of the thesis's hypothesis, Chapter 6 utilises the method of cultural history.¹⁶³ It looks for the ideational logic of contemporary globalisation in the West's cultural history. In the context of this cultural history, the thesis searches for the West's historical-political

¹⁶³ On the method of Cultural History, see Willem Melching and Wyger Velema, *Main Trends in Cultural History, Ten Essays*, (Amsterdam, Atlanta: 1994).

problem in the past three centuries.¹⁶⁴ It aims to explore how intellectual efforts for establishing a liberal or free society shaped the West historical-political problem.¹⁶⁵

Viewed from the hermeneutic model of situational analysis, the thesis searches for a historical emergence of the very *idea of a liberal society*, which was developed by liberal thinkers like Hobbes, Locke and Hume and Smith. It also searches for intellectual impacts of the liberal train of thought on the emergence of a liberal model of social organisation in the West and its outcomes for the formation of liberal globalisation. In this way, a *rational reconstruction* of the impacts of the West cultural crystallisations around the liberal model of social order leads the thesis to a new macrosociological explanation of contemporary globalisation. The hermeneutic model enables the thesis to develop the first supportive argument through linking the West's cultural history to the emergence of a post-national political economy as a global institutional change from the Westphalian world order toward a liberal global governance.

In order to address the question of why *contemporary liberal globalisation suffers from an unsocial sociability*, the thesis compares the existing global reality with the ideal type of open global society. It employs the thesis' hermeneutic model in order to investigate the reason why an institutional contradiction of liberal globality originates from its *ideational driving source* i.e. liberal social philosophy itself. Finally The thesis' research methodology paves the way for exploring the *transformative* capacity of a *rational dialogue* amongst civilisations, as a global self-liberating mechanism, which aims to mitigate the unsocial sociability of liberal globality and to build an open global society of free and equal citizens.

¹⁶⁴ On the linkage between the study of culture and that of politics on a historical scale, see: *ibid.*, p.2.

¹⁶⁵ Regarding the Europe's historical-political problem see: Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism* (1994).

Part II

Introducing the Idea of Open Global Society

Chapter 3

The Three Normative Critiques of Globalisation

Normative critiques of contemporary globalisation employ certain ideal types of global order for uncovering the deviations of the existing globalisation from the ideal types. Hence, the ideal type of global order plays the key role in normative critiques of contemporary globalisation. While the normative critiques rest upon the normative conceptions of globality, different ideal types of global order lead us to different normative critiques of globalisation. This chapter employs the phrase '*globalisation's societal deficits*' to argue on the contradictory nature of contemporary globalisation. The term '*societal*' does not refer to one aspect of this contradictory nature. For instance, it does not refer to merely a political, a cultural or an economic aspect. In contrast, it refers to a *package of societal deficits*, covering those three major aspects.

Viewed from an ideal type of global society, the term '*global societal deficits*' implies that if we evaluate the existing form of globality due its deviations from a global society of free and equal persons, we can find a package of cultural, political and economic deficits that construct *global societal deficits*. For instance, if contemporary globalisation suffers from a lack of a global consensus regarding social organisation of emerging global order or if it suffers from the lack of accountability to the world's populations, these different aspects of globalisation's deficits are a part of the *global societal deficits*. Normative critiques of globalisation may focus on merely one aspect of such deficits-- for instance on globalisation's democratic deficits.

However, the thesis uses the term *global societal deficits* in order to uncover globalisation's deficits as a package of cultural, political, and economic deficits.

This chapter aims to show the nature of the normative critiques of contemporary globalisation. It argues that the normative critiques logically depend upon their ideal types of global order. Given this reason, we do not need to provide a comprehensive review of all the normative critiques of contemporary globalisation. I have selected the three major approaches, as examples, to show the nature of the normative critiques and the link between normative conception of globality and normative vision of globalisation. The chapter's case studies paves the way for investigating how the ideal type of open global society, as a new normative account of globality, can advance the normative critiques of contemporary globalisation.

Chapter 3 consists of three sections. Section 3.1 develops the first case study regarding David Held's normative critique of globalisation due to his ideal type of global social democracy. Section 3.2 presents the second case study by arguing about Richard Falk's normative critique of globalisation based on his ideal type of humane global governance. Section 3.3 provides the third case study as Jürgen Habermas's normative critique by arguing about his ideal type of a dialogic world society. My critical reflections of these normative analyses have been presented in the final subsection of each case study.

3.1 David Held's Normative Critique of Globalisation

Viewed from the logic of critical social theory, this brief review of Held's normative critique of contemporary globalisation begins with its foundation in the idea type of global society democracy. Referring to the premises of global social democracy, I shall argue about Held's normative analysis of globalisation. Held's normative critique compares the existing form of globalisation with the ideal type of global social democracy. Finally, the problematic nature of Held's normative critique will be discussed. My criticisms of Held's analysis originate from a critique of the ideal type of global social democracy itself.

3.1.1 The Ideal Type of Global Social Democracy

Chapter 1 argued on the methodological function of a normative ideal type. For a critical social theory, a normative ideal type provides an ideal type situation model on which basis we can uncover the societal deficits of the existing social reality due to its

deviations from the ideal type. Such a normative ideal type of social order usually rests on certain premises about *the nature of human beings*. Held's normative ideal type of global social democracy introduces a democratic global order, as its reference point, for criticising the existing form of globality.

Held's principal normative argument is that if democracy is a legitimate form of social organisation, why should global governance not be democratic? To review the ideal type of global social democracy, I refer to Held's *definition of democracy*. Held conceptualises *democracy* as:

...only grand or 'meta-narrative' which can legitimately frame and delimit the competing 'narratives' of the good. It is practically important because it suggests a way of relating values to one another and leaving the resolution of value conflicts open to participants in a political dialogue, subject only to certain provisions, protecting the shape and form of the dialogue itself. Nevertheless, *what clearly is required is a 'precommitment' to democracy*, for without this there can be no sustained dialogue, and democracy cannot function as a decision-making process¹⁶⁶ [emphasis added].

Held claims that a *cosmopolitan community* does not require political and cultural integration in the forms of a consensus about a wide range of values and norms.¹⁶⁷ He believes that a *precommitment to democracy* functions as such globally shared values.

The ideal type of global social democracy rests on certain assumptions about *human nature*. It refers to a legitimate way of global ordering of peoples due to recognition of certain assumptions about human nature. Held's concept of (global) democracy rests upon a key premise of *humans' moral equality*: each person, as a member of humanity, is in a fundamental sense equal, and that she or he deserves equal political treatment. This equality implies that all individuals should be treated "based on the equal care and consideration of their agency, irrespective of the community in which they were born or brought up".¹⁶⁸ Held introduces eight premises of the ideal type of global social democracy: equal moral worth and dignity; active agency; personal responsibility and accountability; consent; collective decision-making about public affairs; inclusiveness; avoidance of serious harm, and environmental sustainability.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Daniel Archibugi and David Held (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Democracy, An Agenda for a New World Order*, (London, Polity Press, 1995), pp.115-116.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Held, *Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus*, (London, Polity Press: 2004), p.170.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p.171.

Regarding the first premise, Held writes: “To think of people as having equal moral value is to make a general claim about the basic units of the world comprising persons as free and equal being”¹⁷⁰ This moral equality has an important implication for Held’s conception of human nature. As the second premise, Held links *human moral equality* to his *active agency*: human beings are capable agents for the self-determination of their social organisation. The third premise implies that actors should be aware of, and accountable for, the consequences of their actions which may restrict or delimit the choices of others. The fourth premise means that a commitment to human moral equality, conscious agency and personal responsibility requires a non-coercive political process in and through which people can negotiate and organise their social relations. The premise of consent, i.e. the fourth premise, constitutes the basis of non-coercive collective agreement and governance. The fifth premise entails that if the *consent of all* is too strong a requirement of collective decision-making, a legitimate public decision should follow *the majority rule*. According to the sixth premise, collective decision-making is best located when it is closest to and involves those whose life expectancy and life chances are determined by significant social processes and forces. If the decisions at issue are trans-local, trans-national then political associations need also to have corresponding frameworks of operation. The seventh premise is a principle for allocating priority to the most vital cases of need and, where possible, trumping other less urgent public priorities until such a time as all human beings enjoy the status of equal moral value and active agency. Finally, the eighth premise implies that all economic and social development must be consistent with the stewardship of the world's irreplaceable and non-substitutable ecological resources.¹⁷¹

Held categorises the eight premises in three clusters. The first cluster (premises 1-3) set down the main organisational features of a cosmopolitan moral universe. The key values are that each person is a subject of equal moral concern; that each person is capable of acting autonomously with respect to the range of choices before them; and the claims of each person affected should be equally respected. In other words, they construct Held’s conception of human nature. The second cluster (premises 4-6) argues how individually initiated activity can be translated into collectively agreed or

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p.172.

¹⁷¹ For details of these eight premises, see *ibid.*, pp .172-176.

collectively sanctioned frameworks of action or regulatory regimes. They shape Held's ideal type of democratic social organisation. The third cluster, (premises 7- 8) refers to a base for prioritising urgent need and resource conservation.¹⁷² The eight premises altogether construct the ideal type of global society democracy. Held summarises the normative project of a global social democracy and its confrontation with liberal globalisation in this way:

The project of global social democracy can be conceived as a basis for promoting the rule of law at the international level; greater transparency, accountability and democracy in global governance; a deeper commitment to social justice in the pursuit of a more equitable distribution of life chances; ... and the regulation of the global economy through the public management of global trade and financial flows, ... These guiding orientations set the politics of global social democracy apart from the pursuit of the Washington consensus, neoliberalism, and the aims of those pitched against globalisation in all its forms.¹⁷³

Taking '*global social democracy*' as his normative ideal type, Held compares the existing liberal globalisation with the ideal type to unmask globalisation's democratic deficit. His model of global social democracy advocates a set of global institutional reforms for establishing a global social democracy. As argued, the *premise of moral equality* plays a key role in Held's idea of global social democracy.

3.1.2 Globalisation as a Shift in the Scale of Human Organisation

Held views contemporary globalisation as a global macro-organisational shift. For him, "Globalisation, at its simplest, refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human organisation that links distance communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world's regions. ... While globalisation generates dense patterns of transborder activities and network... it does not necessarily prefigure the emergence of a harmonious world society or a process of integration among nations and cultures."¹⁷⁴ In another sense, globalisation has not created a *harmonious world society*, that integrates national societies into a wider world society, but it has re-organised national societies in the context of a *transnational social order*.

Held argues that the existing form of globalisation is a new phase of a long-term economic and political change in the world order. While contemporary globalisation shares much in common with past phases, it is distinguished by unique spatial-temporal and organisational attributes i.e. by distinctive measures of the intensity,

¹⁷² Regarding this classification, see *ibid*, pp.175-176.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.16.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.1.

velocity and impact of global flows of capital, power, and ideas. In addition, since contemporary globalisation overlaps networks and constellations of power that cut across territorial and political boundaries, it presents a unique challenge to a world order designed in accordance with the Westphalian principle of sovereignty.¹⁷⁵ Held rightly regards contemporary globalisation as a new phase of global integration which is a unique challenge to the Westphalian world order.

To show the qualitative nature of this global shift in human organisation, Held situates his account of globalisation--what he calls a *transformative approach*--between two extreme positions: the first is taken by the hyperglobalisers, like K. Ohmae who claims contemporary globalisation has led to the demise of the sovereign statehood and has undermined the world order constructed on the basis of Westphalian norms.¹⁷⁶ The second is taken by skeptics who believe that globalisation is the great myth of our time and accordingly, the emergence of a new less state-controlled world order is not a global reality.¹⁷⁷

Held's middle position argues that globalisation is reconstituting or transforming the power, functions and autonomy of nation-states. He introduces Anthony Giddens and James Rosenau, among others, as the proponents of this middle way.¹⁷⁸ For this approach, "globalisation is associated with the emergence of a post-Westphalian world order in which the institutions of sovereign statehood and political community are being reformed and reconstituted. In this post-Westphalian order, there is marked shift towards heterarchy -- a divided authority system-- in which states seek to share the tasks of governance with a complex array of institutions, public and private, local, regional, transnational and global."¹⁷⁹ To explain such an institutional shift in global organisation from the Westphalian to the post-national order, Held creates a distinction between the two conceptions of *sovereignty*. On the one hand, sovereignty refers to "the rightful exercise of political power over a circumscribed realm. It seeks

¹⁷⁵ David Held and Anthony McGrew, "The End of Old Order? Globalisation and the Prospects for World Order," *British International Studies Association*, (1998), p.220.

¹⁷⁶ See for example K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation-State* (New York, 1995) and H.V. Perlonotter, 'On the Rocky Road to the first Global Civilisation, *Human Relations*, 44 (1) (1991), pp.992-6.

¹⁷⁷ See for instance, C. Brown in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*, (UK, Cambridge University Press: 1995), pp.90-109.

¹⁷⁸ See for instance, Anthony. Giddense, *The Consequences of Modernity* (UK, Cambridge University Press: 1999); D. J. Elkins, *Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty First Century* (Toronto, 1995); David Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy and Global Order, Alternatives*, (20) (1995), pp.415-429, and J. Rosenau, *The Domestic-Foreign Frontier* (UK, Cambridge University Press: 1997).

¹⁷⁹ Held, op. cit., *The End of Old Order?*, p.220.

to specify the political authority within a community which has the right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given territory and to govern accordingly...¹⁸⁰, and on the other hand, there is another concept of sovereignty that *does not* refer to the entitlement to rule over a bounded territory. It refers to *state authority* in terms of the central power of the nation -- state possesses *to articulate, and achieve policy goals independently*. Globalisation as a shift in the scale of human organisation from the states-system toward the post-Westphalain order means that a nation-state's authority to articulate, manage, and achieve its *national policy goals* has been substantially undermined by transnational economic and political forces.¹⁸¹

Held argues about some qualitative changes in global organisation of production, trade and finance as important mechanisms of undermining nation state's sovereignty. Economic globalisation has created a *transnational economic organisation of the productions* through rapidly developing *multinational corporations*. He points out: "A new highly specialized geographic division of labour has emerged, recasting the nature and form of production systems. Multinationals span every sector of the global economy--from agriculture to manufacturing and finance."¹⁸² With respect to the transformation in global trade, Held argues that in the past, international trade formed largely isolated from the rest of national economy. However, economic globalisation has integrated *transnational trade* into the national system of production in modern national economies as if now *international trade* is a significant proportion of their domestic product. The world's financial flows have grown exponentially, especially since the 1970s.¹⁸³

From a political view point, Held believes that it is important to explore the way in which the sovereign state is now criss-crossed by a vast array of networks and organisations that have been established to regulate and manage divers areas of international and transnational activity—trade, etc. The rapid growth of transnational issues has generated a multi-centric system of governance.¹⁸⁴ Held recognises the collapse of the Cold War order as an important political mechanism of contemporary

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p.221.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Held, *Global Covenant*, pp.22-23., Also see, Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," *Daedalus*, 124 (2) (1995), pp.23-35.

¹⁸³ Held, *Global Covenant*, p.25. Also see David Held, "Globalisation and Global Democracy," *Peace Review*, 9 (3) (1997), p.311.

¹⁸⁴ Held, *Global Covenant*, pp.74-75., Also see Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy*,(1995), pp.418-419.

globalisation. In his words: “The end of the Cold War and of the division of the world by two superpowers marks a new distribution of power among states, markets and civil society.”¹⁸⁵ As such, a major shift in the world politics is a shift from the *hierarchical organisation* of nation-states system to a *horizontal and multicentric* political organisation. Through diversifying the distribution of political power across different layers and centres, political globalisation has undermined the nation-states’ sovereignty and their capacity for national policy-making.

3.1.3 Globalisation’s Democratic Deficit

If the ideal type of global social democracy were given as a reference point, what can a normative critique of contemporary globalisation be? Held's normative critique shows that the contradictions of contemporary globalisation mainly originate from its *democratic deficit*. Since globalisation, as a global shift in the scale of human organisation, has not created an accountable global governance, it suffers from a *legitimacy crisis*. The idea of global social democracy implies that all sites of power--including national, regional, and global-- ought to be held accountable to people. However, the shift from the Westphalian to the post-national order does not signal such an accountability to the world population.

Globalisation's democratic deficit originates from an institutional gap between *global decision-makers* and *global decision-takers*. Due to the fact that the emerging global governance is not an accountable governance to peoples, it cannot take into account peoples' needs and their contribution to solve the global problems. Under this condition, on the one side globalisation has led to spill over of *negative externalities* of transnational flows of capital and power. On the other side, due to an unmonitored global interconnectivity, the emerging global governance has not developed a global mechanism for preventing the *negative externalities* and distributing *the positive externalities*. Held refers to the works of Inge Kaul *et al*¹⁸⁶ to address this *institutional gap*. They view the gap as a jurisdictional gap that means the discrepancy between national, separate units of policy-making and a regionalised and globalised world, which gives rise to the problem of externalities such as market volatility or the

¹⁸⁵ See Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, (1995), p.423.

¹⁸⁶ See: Inge, Kaul; Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (eds.) *Global Public Goods, International Cooperation In The 21st Century*, (New York: Oxford university Press: 1999), and Inge Kaul; Pedro Concelcao; Katell Le Goulvey, and Ronald U. Mendoze, (eds.) *Providing Global Public Goods, Managing Globalisation*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003).

problem of who is responsible for them, and how they can be held to account. Another gap is an intensive gap that refers to the challenge posed by the fact that, in the absence of any supranational entity to regulate the supply of global public goods, many states and non-state actors will seek to free ride or the lack sufficient motivation to find durable solutions to pressing global problems.¹⁸⁷

Viewed from its democratic deficit, globalisation has created a multicentric sites of power and decision-making, but there is no clear the division of labour among the myriad of international agencies; function often overlap, mandates frequently conflict, and aims and objectives too often get blurred. There are a number of overlapping global institutions all of which have some stake in shaping different sectors of global public policy.¹⁸⁸ In this condition, a key *global organisational problem* is the lack of *ownership of global problem*.¹⁸⁹ If the emerging global governance does not take the ownership of global problems and cannot solve them, the reason is that there is an institutional gap between '*global decision-makers*' and '*global decision-takers*'.¹⁹⁰

The ideal type of global social democracy calls for an accountable global decision-making system to global decision-takers whom are affected by those global decisions and have the *equal rights* to verify the decisions. Held's normative critique implies the contradictions of globalisation originate in this *political unaccountability* of global governance to the world's population. Given this democratic deficit, Held suggests his alternative model of globality (i.e., global social democracy) to overcome those contradictions. The main aim of this *social democratic globalisation* is to make the global governance an accountable global order to peoples in its political sense. For him, this accountability also provides the bases for a fair distribution of globalisation's costs and benefits.

3.1.4 The Problematic Nature of Held's Normative Critique

As argued, the methodological function of a normative ideal type of globality is to provide us with a reference point for uncovering the contradictions of the existing social reality as the deviations from the standard. Since Held's ideal type of global social democracy rests on a concept of democracy, assuming that a pre-commitment of different national societies to democracy is enough for establishing a global social

¹⁸⁷ Held, *Global Covenant*, p.90.

¹⁸⁸ David Held and Anthony McGrew, (eds.), *Globalisation Theory*, (UK, Polity Press: 2007), p.247.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ See Joseph Nye, "Globalisation's Democratic Deficit," (2001), pp.2-6.

democracy, his normative critique of globalisation focuses on the deviation of the emerging global order from a democratic global governance. The problem with this normative critique is that it assumes that such a pre-commitment to democracy does not need a *global cultural convergence* on a set of *globally shared values* about human moral equality and democracy as a desirable model of social governance. The key problem with Held's model of global social democracy is that without a pre-commitment to moral equality of human beings amongst world civilisations, they cannot arrive at a pre-commitment to social democracy as the best way of social ordering of peoples. Held's ideal type actually assumes that without an inter-civilisational *consensus on human nature*, they will not arrive at a global pre-commitment to social democracy. In arguing for this problematic nature of Held's analysis, Adam Lupel writes: "Held's cosmopolitan democracy is designed to maximize self-determination; but in the absence of a *pre-existing consensus*, the institutional reform necessary to constitute such a system would tend to require coercive means. ...his model requires *convergence upon a global overlapping consensus: the development of a common political culture*."¹⁹¹ Normative ideal type of global order must include the need for a *global consensus* on social democracy.

Without such a global consensus, Held's model of global social democracy must be unilaterally imposed on the emerging global governance. In supporting this argument, Heikki Patomaki and Teivo Teivainen write: Held "claims that: 'without a politics of coercion or hegemony, the *only basis* for nurturing and protecting cultural pluralism and a diversity of identities is through the implementation of cosmopolitan democratic law...But this 'only basis' would presuppose that *the cosmopolitan democratic law is neutral* with respect to *different values*'" (emphasis added).¹⁹² The problematic nature of Held's ideal type leads us to recognise the need for including a *cultural dimension* in our normative idea type of globality.

3.2 Richard Falk's Normative Critique of Globalisation

The second case study concerns Falk's normative critique of globalisation. To this aim, this section starts with Falk's ideal type of humane global governance. Viewed from this ideal type, the section argues that Falk's criticism of contemporary

¹⁹¹ Adam Lupel, "Tasks of a Global Civil Society: Held, Habermas and Democratic Legitimacy beyond the Nation-State," *Globalisations*, (2005), 2 (1) pp.121-122.

¹⁹² Heikki Patomaki and Teivo Teivainen, *A Possible World, Democratic Transformation of Global Institutions*, (London and New York, Zed Books: 2004), p.144.

globalisation, as a globalisation-from-above, is concerned with realising universal human rights. Like Held, Falk emphasizes globalisation's democratic deficits. However, he pays more attention to the role of liberal ideology in the formation of contemporary globalisation. The section argues that Falk's normative critique has not systematically integrated the cultural dimension in its normative critique.

3.2.1 The Ideal Type of Humane Global Governance

Generally speaking, the ideal type of humane global governance refers to a model of global governance that realises the *equal human rights*, in its comprehensive sense. Falk argues that such humane global governance can realise the four major values of a cosmopolitan community. These goals consist of: (a) the minimisation of large-scale collective violence; (b) the maximisation of social and economic well-being; (c) the realisation of fundamental human rights and conditions of political justice, and (d) the maintenance and rehabilitation of ecological quality.¹⁹³ In one sense, Falk assumes that these principles are core values for humanity as a whole, in spite of their cultural and moral differences. The ideal type of humane global governance advocates a *humane globalisation* for realising these core values. Hence, Falk's normative critique of globalisation explores the extent to which the core values are not realised by contemporary globalisation.

Falk situates his normative vision of humane global governance in the context of a *global community of peoples with equal human rights*. Falk conjectures an imagined community for the whole of humanity which overcomes the most problematic aspects of the present world scene. In his model, "the part (whether as individual, group, nation, religion, civilisation) and the whole (species, world, universe) are connected; difference and uniformities across space and through time are subsumed beneath an overall commitment to world order values in the provisional shape of peace, economic well-being, social and political justice, and environmental sustainability."¹⁹⁴ Falk assumes that those values are already shared on a global scale. If so, the ideal type of humane global governance is a justified model of global governance by the world population due to its faith in four common values that all humanity. Falk points out: "At the core of humane governance is the conviction that societal relations from the

¹⁹³ Richard Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds*, (New York: Free Press, 1975), chapter 1.

¹⁹⁴ Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance, Towards a New Global Politics*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p.243.

personal to the inter-civilisational can be addressed nonviolently.”¹⁹⁵ Like Held's ideal type, Falk's humane global governance rests on the fundamental assumption of human equality. However, Falk views this equality in terms of the four core values in which context all peoples actually become equal persons.

3.2.2 Globalisation-From-Above: Liberal Ideology and Capitalist Interests

Similar to Held, Falk describes globalisation as a shift in the Westphalian order toward the post-national order, which is imposed from above, as a result of liberal ideology and capitalist intensive. In this way, Falk advances Held's analysis of globalisation by adding an *ideational force* to the *political and economic causes* of globalisation. While globalisation-from-above is fuelled by such an ideological and materialistic force, it remains an illegitimate way of global ordering of peoples due to the fact that it has not realised the four key values of humanity.

Like Held, Falk argues that economic and political globalisation have re-organised modern states-system towards a post-national world order. However, for Falk, *neo-liberal ideology* and *capitalist incentive* have operated as two motor forces of this global organisational change. In his words:

Globalisation has undermined the certitudes associated with proclamation of a state-centric world. At the same time, globalisation has helped to conceal the emergent locus of real power in relation to the shaping of global economic policy. Leaders of states are constrained by these structural forces, although to varying degrees, and seem to be receptive to the interpretation of global market priorities as perceived through the prism of neo-liberal ideas.¹⁹⁶

In this way, Falk rightly diagnoses a causal function for the liberal ideas and capitalist motivations that operate as driving forces of globalisation-from-above. In this global organisational change, national states are no longer dominant forces of the social ordering of peoples on a global scale. Political globalisation has shaped a multi-centric global governance. Globalisation-from-above refers to an interaction between liberal ideas and capitalist interests. Inspired by liberal ideas and motivated by capitalist interests, globalisation has re-organised national economies in a capitalist world economy-- without a concern with the core values of humanity.¹⁹⁷ Falk rightly argues that, “the state-centric world of Westphalian was based on neglect of the whole, according primacy to the *parts*, conceived as self-regulating, sovereign

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p.15.

¹⁹⁶ Richard Falk, *Predatory Globalisation, A Critique*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp.45-46.

¹⁹⁷ Richard Falk, “State of siege: will globalisation win out?” *International Affairs*,73 (1997), pp.121.

economic and political units... Market-driven globalism subordinates the part to the whole on the basis of calculations such as profit margins, comparative efficiencies of production and distribution, and growth prospects ...”¹⁹⁸ He links liberal logic of profit maximising with economic globalisation. A market-driven globalisation integrates its constituting parts through *economic motivations* like profits, capital expansion and efficiencies of scale production. This economic logic has two aspects. On the one hand, it refers to the liberal ideology, claiming the emergence of a *global competitive market* maximises *economic profits* for all. On the other hand, since the preconditions of such a global competitive market *do not exist*, economic globalisation works for a capitalist classes and powerful groups which have more access to the global market.

These ideological and operational aspects of globalisation are associated with the way in which transnational market forces dominate the policy scene. This pattern of development is identified by Falk as a ‘globalisation-from-above’, a set of forces and legitimating ideas that is in many respects located beyond the reach of territorial authority and that has enlisted most governments as tacit partners.¹⁹⁹ Globalisation is a transition from Westphalian geo-politics to the post-Westphalian's geo-governance. This transition refers to a process through which the territorial state is displaced from its dominant role in the era of geo-politics, however such form of displacement is not concerted with the core values of humanity, because it follows the logic of maximising profits or a global competition for economic interest.²⁰⁰ This top-down form of displacement is not concerned with the legitimacy of the geo-governance. As Falk points out, “globalisation-from-above undermines the postulates of sovereignty, but without truly extending the sense of [a global] community.”²⁰¹ In essence, the emergent world order after the cold war is shaping up in the short run as an attractive, globalism for the benefits of the rich and an oppressive statism to keep the poor in check.²⁰²

3.2.3 The Absence of a People-Driven Globalisation

Falk employs his ideal type of humane global governance to uncover the societal deficits caused by globalisation's deviation from a *people-driven globalisation*. In

¹⁹⁸ Falk, *Predatory Globalisation*, p.52.

¹⁹⁹ Op. cit., p.130.

²⁰⁰ Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance*, p.79.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p.88. Also see Falk, op. cit., "State of siege: will globalisation win out?"

²⁰² Falk, *Predatory Globalisation*, p.59.

contrast to globalisation-from-above, a people-driven globalisation integrates peoples by a humane global governance. Falk points out:

...people-driven globalism subordinates the part to the whole on the basis of human values, including such goals as ecological sustainability, alleviation of suffering caused by changing patterns of production and consumption, establishment of communities that uphold the security and economic and social rights of all their inhabitants, and a reduction of violence at home and abroad.²⁰³

In comparison with this people-driven approach, contemporary globalisation-from-above deviates from the core values of humanity. One of the key contradictions of contemporary globalisation is while it has undermined the state-system, it has not created an alternative to fulfill the nation state's function. In the Westphalian order, the function of sovereignty was to help overcome often civic disorder and an endless round of feudalistic struggles that made it possible to construct commercial markets of sufficient scale and efficiency.²⁰⁴ However, in the post-national order such functions must be done through global governance. Due to the absence of a people-driven globality, contemporary globalisation remains unable to face many global crises such as global environmental, security and economic instabilities.²⁰⁵ If globalisation-from-above cannot overcome the emerging global problems, the main reason is that it remains unaccountable to peoples' needs and it does not utilise peoples' contributions to solve the global problems.

The transnational market forces play the key role in re-organisation of peoples and societies in the emerging post-national order. Falk argues that '*transnational market forces*' enjoys the *normative support of the liberal ideology*, advocating the expansion of markets to the global scale. However, '*transnational democratic forces*' can employ the *normative force of a humane global governance* to re-organise peoples on a global scale. Falk proposes the terminology of 'globalisation-from-below' to identify these transnational democratic forces, and their implicit dedication to the creation of a global civil society for creating a humane global governance.²⁰⁶

Validating Held's model of global democracy, Falk identifies his own reading of global democracy in this way: "To the extent that citizen-elected representatives from different countries and civilisations convene formally in a climate of civility to

²⁰³ Ibid., p.52.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p.87.

²⁰⁵ See Richard Falk, "The First Normative Global Revolution?" in Mozaffari (ed.), *Globalisation and Civilisations*, (2002), pp.51-76.

²⁰⁶ Falk, "The World Order Between Interstate Law and the Law of Humanity," (1995), p.18.

advance mutual interests and address differences, peaceful resolution of conflict would tend to become institutionalized.”²⁰⁷ Hence, any serious attempt to mitigate globalisation's democratic deficit must consider the creation of some type of popularly elected global body.²⁰⁸ Similar to Held, Falk believes that global democracy cannot be properly apprehended as the extension of democracy as it has functioned on the level of a territorial sovereign state to the global level.²⁰⁹ Against this background, Falk proposes a *Global Peoples Assembly* at the core of his institutional reforms for the creation of a humane global governance.²¹⁰

Falk rightly argues that achieving global democracy depends on internalising the sort of values and global outlook that would allow that kind of political development beyond the sovereign state to take place. He emphasises the importance of making peoples around the world much more familiar with a *culture of human rights*. For him, the essence of global democracy therefore involves a shift in expectations from a *geopolitics of force* to a *geopolitics of dialogue*, collaboration, and persuasion.²¹¹ In this way, Falk leads us to see why democracy needs a *cultural dialogue on political democracy*. He recognises that an inter-civilisational dialogue is a *crucial part of this world's cultural preparation* for the development of a humane global governance. In his words: “Human solidarity as a ground condition of global governance needs to be understood as fully consistent with civilisational diversity *and the importance of inter-civilisational dialogue as the foundation for an acceptable normative (law and ethics) order*”²¹² (emphasis added). In this way, the lack of a *cultural dialogue amongst civilisations* can be regarded as an important part of Falk's normative critique of contemporary globalisation. If globalisation-from-above suffers from a package of societal deficits, globalisation's democratic deficits cannot be isolated from the shortage of a dialogue amongst civilizations on moral equality of human beings. Globalisation's democratic deficit itself originates from a cultural deficit, the lack of an inter-civilisational consensus regarding the equality of human beings and democratic way of social order of equal persons.

²⁰⁷ Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty," *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 36, (2000), p.193.

²⁰⁸ Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "Toward Global Parliament," *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (1), pp.212-232.

²⁰⁹ Richard Falk, *Achieving Human Rights*, (London: Routledge, 2008), p.62.

²¹⁰ See Falk and Strauss, "On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly", (2000)

²¹¹ Falk, *Achieving Human Rights*, op. cit., p.66.

²¹² Falk, *Predatory Globalisation*, op. cit., p.4.

3.2.4 Falk's Normative Critique: A Weak Link between 'Culture' and 'Politics'

While Falk allows us to see the importance of inter-civilisational dialogue in creating a humane global community, he limits the linkage between a global cultural preparation and the emergence of global democracy in familiarizing peoples with the human rights' culture. But, the function of a *cultural dialogue* amongst civilisations goes much more beyond this. Falk *assumes* that the four core values of humanity are those values that are *already* globally shared values. On the contrary, it seems that there is a notable conflict of opinions over those values amongst world civilisations such as Islamic, Chinese or the Western civilisations. If all civilisations of peoples agreed on such core values, there would not be an important role for dialogue amongst civilizations to create a global consensus over such values. The main cultural function of such a dialogue is perhaps the creation of a *global consensus* on the core values of humanity.

Falk points out, "the Western origins and orientation of human rights may be a burden in a period of greater civilisational assertiveness, but to some extent non-Western civilisations have their own equivalent or parallel standards of approved conduct that have been shaped through time, including in interaction with the West. In this respect a *global socialization process* has been *internalized in all civilisations* a resonance to many *basic human rights claims*, although there are contested zones where contradictory claims are being made and important differences as to languages, substance, and relation to the past"²¹³ (emphasis added). If a global socialisation process has internalised in all civilisations a resonance to *basic human rights claims*, what would be the role of a global dialogue in such rationalization? This question leads us to the need for exploring a strong link between the *cultural dialogue* and *political democracy* in the normative ideal type of a global society.

3.3 Jürgen Habermas' Normative Critique of Globalisation

This section discusses Habermas' ideal type-- the dialogic world society-- as his reference point for a normative critique of globalisation. Contemporary globalisation will be reviewed from Habermas' viewpoint in order to explore how he diagnoses the deviations of globalisation from the ideal type. Habermas' normative critique creates a stronger link between the cultural and political dimensions of globalisation's societal

²¹³ Ibid., p.109.

deficits. My critical reflection about Habermas' normative critique of globalisation terminates this section.

3.3.1 The Ideal Type of Dialogic World Society

Compared to Held and Falk, Habermas' normative critique of globalisation rests upon a *sociological conception of world community*. In one sense, the ideal type of dialogic world society is a normative sociological account of cosmopolitan society. The ideal types of global social democracy and humane global governance use the premise of the equality of human being, in its *moral and legal senses*, for defining an ideal type global governance rather than an *ideal world community*, in its sociological sense. It is important to note that while the phrase *dialogic world society* has not specifically been used by Habermas for the development of his normative analysis, such an account can be drawn from his works.

Habermas' ideal type and normative critique of globalisation can be traced in his works in particular in his book entitled, *The Postnational Constellation*. It seems Habermas uses the premise of human's *equal access to communicative rationality* as the foundation of his ideal type of dialogic world society. Habermas' critical social theory implies that individuals' moral and political equalities ultimately originate from individuals' *epistemic equal access to communicative rationality*.²¹⁴ Max Pensky in his introduction to *The Postnational Constellation* introduces this issue in this way:

Habermas argues that universality is embedded in the most basic capacities that we possess as persons capable of speaking, hearing, giving and accepting reasons for our actions, and conducting our lives correspondingly. *In the most fundamental and distinctive human capacity-- the ability to speak to one another*, to decide on the basis of reasons and arguments, to distinguish between understanding and deception-- Habermas insists *we find a universal*, if modest, basis for the great political innovations of popular sovereignty, legally enforceable human rights, democratic procedures...through the mutual recognitions of the status of personhood. The central claim of Habermas's theories is that the institutions based on the *communicative use of human reason*, from our moral intuitions to the institutions of the democratic constitutional state under the rule of law, are *reasonable*...²¹⁵[emphasis added].

Given Habermas' account of universality, the main premise of the ideal type of dialogic world society is an equal access of humans to communicative rationality. Habermas links such an *epistemic equality* with the individual's legal and political

²¹⁴ See David M. Rasmussen, *Reading Habermas*, (USA, Basil Blackwell: 1990), pp.57-74.

²¹⁵ Jurgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation, Political Essays*, transl. and ed. by Max Pensky, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p.ix.

equality, where he argues that in our ability to *speak with each other* we find a universal basis for the rule of law and democracy. If dialogic world society rests on peoples' communicative rationality, peoples can use such a rationality to shape a set of globally shared values on *human nature*.

Andrew Linklater points out: "For Habermas, the role of communicative action in social existence makes the establishment of a universal communicative community possible. ...The normative task of critical theory is to defend the ideal of universal communities of discourse, the sociological dimension of critical inquiry ought to investigate the forms of social learning which are capable of turning ideals into reality. ..."²¹⁶ The importance of the cultural sphere for creating a universal social democracy means that it can emerge through a *social learning process* in which the core values of human equality find a *global respect*. The ideal type of the dialogic world society creates a *strong link* between *global culture* and *global politics*. Habermas does not specifically argue on an *inter-civilisational dialogue* as a cultural mechanism for the formation of a universal dialogic community, but Linklater and Marc Lynch, among others, apply Habermas' theory of social learning to address the possibility of a universal dialogic community emerging.²¹⁷

3.3.2 Globalisation as the Emergence of a Post-National Constellation

Like Held and Falk, Habermas describes globalisation as a global organisational transition from the modern states-system towards a post-national world order. The dynamic of globalisation is, for Habermas, reasonably clear in one respect, "it heralds the end of the global dominance of the nation-state as a model for political organization."²¹⁸ The term 'postnational' here means that globalisation of economic processes, of modes of communication and commerce, and of culture all increasingly reduce the role of national states in global organisation of peoples. It fundamentally challenges the relevance of the nation-state as a continued political model.²¹⁹ However, the quality of Habermas' analysis of the dynamic of globalisation differs from Held and Falk. Similar to their position, Habermas views contemporary globalisation as a '*global system integration*' that has mainly shaped through global

²¹⁶ Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (1998), p.142.

²¹⁷ Linklater, "Globalisation and the Transformation of Political Community,"(2003), and Marc Lynch, *The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Sphere*, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2000, 29 (2), pp.307-330.

²¹⁸ Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, p. xiii.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

markets forces. He writes, “This form of ‘functional integration’ of social relations via networks competes with an entirely distinct form of integration-- with a ‘social integration’ of the collective life-world of those who share a collective identity...”²²⁰ In this way, Habermas recognises a *key deviation* of contemporary globalisation from the ideal type of dialogic world society.

Globalisation has opened *national societies* to an *economically driven post-national constellation*. While not all of nation-states are democratic, the national form of social organisation that emerged after the American and French Revolutions has successfully spread over the globe. The nation state fulfils important preconditions for the societies constituted within determinate borders to exert a democratic form of self-control. In post-war Europe, the democratic process-- in the context of the nation-state system-- has been more or less institutionalised under four dimensions. However, since the end of the 1970s such forms of institutionalisation have come under increasing pressure from the forces of globalisation. Habermas introduces the four aspects of the democratization process after postwar Europe in this way: (a) the emergence of the state as an administrative state supported by taxation; (b) maintaining sovereignty over a determinate geographical territory; (c) in the specific form of the nation-state, and (d) which then democratically developed into a legal and social state.²²¹

The first aspect of the democratic process refers to the separation of *state* and *society* through the formation of an administrative state, constituted in the form of positive law and the differentiation of a market economy, institutionalised via the principles of individual private rights. ‘Law’ in this separation process operates in order to privatise society from the state. In this sense, the modern state is a *legal state*, limited by the rule of law and it protects the decentralised function of a market economy. This separation means the most important regulatory powers of public administration remain reserved for the state and the state's power to levy taxes depends on resources generated by economic activity delegated to the private sphere. The second aspect implies that nation-states system provides geographical condition for realising a self-controlled society because a state's territory will encompass the sphere of validity for a state-sanctioned legal order. A self-controlled society requires

²²⁰ Ibid., p.82.

²²¹ Ibid., p.62.

rational-based conception of law that regulates a number of persons-- united by the decisions to grant one another precisely those rights. Hence, the nation-states system created the borders of the territorial state in which population of a state is defined as the potential subject of self-legislation who organises their society.²²²

The third aspect implies that democratic self-determination of national societies can only come about if the *population of a state* is transformed into a *nation of citizens* who take their *political destiny* into their own hands. Habermas argues that a *democratic self-organised* society depends on a *prior cultural integration* of what is initially a number of people who have been thrown together with each other. Such a cultural integration makes the residents of a single state-controlled territory aware of a *collective belonging*. Only the symbolic construction of 'a people' makes the modern state into a nation-state.

Habermas leads us to see a strong interplay between *culture* and *politics* in the formation of the modern nation state. The fourth aspect reveals that a *democratic mode of legitimation of political authority* has been advocated by the nation-state system. The transition from *princely* to *popular sovereignty* transforms the rights of *subject* into the *rights of human beings*, into liberal and political civil rights. *The democratic constitutional state* satisfies a political order created by the people themselves and legitimated by their *opinion and will-formation*. He connects the democratic constitutional state *with a political culture* in modern democratic society that is rooted in '*discourse rationality*'. In this way, the *rule of law* and *popular sovereignty* have been legitimated through *communicative use of human reason*. The emergence of social welfare state was a result of the dialectic of '*legal equality*' and '*factual inequality*', whose principal goal was secure the societal conditions to create an opportunity for an equal distributed basic rights possible.²²³

If we take the four aspects of the democratic process into account, the role of the nation-state system with regard an international ordering of peoples becomes clear. Habermas rightly argues that after the 1970s the forces of globalisation have made the nation-state a problematic model of social order. For him, contemporary globalisation refers to a transition from the state-system to a postnational constellation in which nation-states no longer operate as the main units of the political and economic actions

²²² Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation* pp.62-63.

²²³ *Ibid.*, pp.64-65.

on a global scale. Recognising different aspects of globalisation, Habermas claims the most significant dimension of globalisation is an economic one. Various features of globalisation, in particular its economic feature, "...weaken the capacity of the nation-state to maintain its borders and to automatically regulate exchange process with its external environment."²²⁴ Habermas argues economic globalisation has significantly increased global economic transactions, and is reaching levels achieved in no other epoch, directly affected national economics on a previously unprecedented level. These developments include an unparalleled acceleration of capital flows, a significantly increased the number of transnational corporations with global production facilities, and the increase in direct foreign investment.²²⁵ Habermas evaluates the impacts of globalisation on the political capacity of nation states due to the four aforementioned aspects of the democratic process. Hence, his normative critique of globalisation covers the dynamics of the emergence of the post-national constellation.

Globalisation has opened societies to an economically driven post-national order, but the emerging global governance has not yet realised global public sovereignty. Habermas criticises this emerging world society due to its costs for transforming the nation-state system towards a post-national order, whereas it does not meet the conditions of a dialogic world society. In this way, he employs the four aspects of the democratic process to uncover the societal deficits of contemporary globalisation. An important impact of globalisation on the organisational capacity of a nation-state originates from increased *capital mobility* at the global level that makes the state's access to profits and monetary wealth more difficult, and consequently increased local competition reduces the state's capacity to collect taxes. Such negative effects of economic globalisation on the state's tax revenue undermine the state's capacity to execute its welfare state's functions. In this way, the nation-state cannot perform its predictable role in realising the rule of law through creating the societal prerequisites of individuals' equality before the law. In addition, the emerging global markets work to the disadvantage of the state's autonomy and its capacity for policy-making for their own societies, while global governance has not taken the responsibility of such a socio-economic regulation. As market-driven globalisation grows, the nation-state

²²⁴ Ibid., p.66.

²²⁵ Ibid., pp.66-67., Also see David Held, "Democracy and Globalisation", op. cit., p.251-297., and Ulrich Beck *What is Globalisation?* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 2000).

loses its capacities to achieve taxes and stimulate growth, and with them the ability to secure the essential foundations of its own legitimacy.²²⁶

3.3.3 Globalisation's Societal Deficits: Culture, Politics and Economy

The term *globalisation's societal deficits* has been used here to describe Habermas' normative critique of contemporary globalisation due to its wider definition, as argued at the beginning of this chapter. Taking into consideration that Habermas' ideal type of dialogic world society is in fact an application of his sociological conception of dialogic community, it is revealed how he explores the deviations of contemporary globalisation from his ideal type. Globalisation has created a transnational economy, but it has not created a parallel democratic global governance to regulate socio-economic relations of peoples on a global scale because it has not involved peoples in an inter-subjective consensus over global shared values about a democratic model of governance. In this way, globalisation's societal deficits ultimately originate from the absence of a global consensus on the democratic governance (i.e., a cultural deficit) which is reflected in the lack of a global democracy (i.e., a political deficit) and the lack of a global justice (i.e., a socio-economic deficit). According to the ideal type of dialogic world society, these three aspects of globalisation's societal deficits or unsocial sociability of contemporary globalisation are closely linked to each other. Hence, Habermas' normative critique advances Held's and Falk's critiques by adding a strong cultural dimension, i.e. the need for a set of globally shared values, to their normative critiques of globalisation.

Habermas argues that if the *democratic legitimacy* of a social order originates from the *discursive rationality*, and if the democratic legitimacy provides a basis for legitimacy beyond nation-states system, in a *post-national era* neither *state structure* nor *market mechanism*, but *popular process of collective will-formation* will have to provide it. Such a global public sovereignty cannot be realised without creating a *transnational public sphere* that privileges *communicative use of reason*. Habermas' normative critique of globalisation implies that the inability of post-national governance to realise the freedom of its citizens is a result of uncontrolled world economy on the one hand; and an irrational manifestations of national sovereignty on

²²⁶ Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, pp.68-78. Also see David Held, "Democracy, the Nation State and the Global System," in Held (ed.), *Political Theory Today*, (Cambridge, Polity Press:1991), pp.197-235 and R. O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1984).

the other hand.²²⁷ Like Held and Falk, Habermas attributes this inability to the unaccountability of post-national governance to the world's population. However, unlike Held and Falk, he ultimately attributes these political and economic failures to the absence of globally shared values on global social democracy itself, originating from an under-utilisation of communicative rationality on a global scale. Global societal deficits or unsocial sociability of globalisation do not only include an unaccountable global governance to the world's population and an unjust world economy, but also they include the shortage of globally shared values on communicative use of reason, reflected in the lack of a global consensus on global social democracy. Habermas rightly argues that the transition from the state-system to the post-national constellation has undermined the democratic functions of the nation-state; however, it has not replaced a dialogic world society as an alternative way of global ordering of peoples.

For Habermas, current globalisation is a '*global system integration*'. This form of functional integration of global social relations via money and power competes with an entirely distinct form of social integration of the collective life-world of those who share a collective identity; a social integration based on inter-subjectively shared norms, and collective values. Normative critique of Habermas therefore targets this global system integration that has reorganised 'national societies' into a post-national constellation through a systemic force, as opposed to a social integration through an inter-subjective consensus. In contrast, the existence of communicative rationality can stimulate a global social integration by creating a global consensus on global social democracy. Habermas recognises a key *cultural deficit of globalisation*: "I see no structural obstacles to expanding national civic solidarity and welfare-state policies to the scale of a postnational federation. But *the political culture of a world society lacks the common ethical-political dimension that would be necessary for a corresponding global community--and its identity formation*"²²⁸ (emphasis added).

He concludes we will only be able to meet the challenges of globalisation in a reasonable manner, if we can successfully develop new forms of the democratic self-steering of society on a global level.²²⁹ He does not illustrate how such a global

²²⁷ Robert Fine and Will Smith, "Jurgen Habermas's Theory of Cosmopolitanism," *Constellations*, 10 (4) (2003), p.482.

²²⁸ Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation* (1998), p.88.

²²⁹ Ibid.

political culture can be formed to provide such a global common ethical identity. Habermas criticises liberal globalisation because it has not been concerned with the creation of such a global political culture. Linklater follows the same line of critique of liberal globalisation because it is unable to realise the ideals of global justice and global democracy.²³⁰

The ideal type of dialogic community is applied to address the possibility of transforming the post-national order into a universal dialogic community. Linklater defines a '*universal dialogic community*' as a post-national community in which "every human being has an equal right to participate in dialogue to determine the principle of exclusion and inclusion which governs global politics."²³¹ He views such a dialogue an inter-societal learning process through which the power structure of the post-national constellation can be replaced with dialogue and consent. This inter-societal learning refers to the recognition of "the injustice of many of the social and political barriers to involvement in open dialogue, and to the practice of questioning the rituals of exclusion which prevent the feature of communicative action from being more widely accepted as principle of international relations."²³² For Linklater, an inter-civilisational dialogue might be understood as an institutional framework which expands the boundaries of the dialogic community.²³³ He applies Habermas' communicative theory of rationality to argue for the possibility of a consensual transformation of the post-national order into a universal dialogic community.²³⁴

Marc Lynch elaborates a Habermasian-inspired analysis of inter-civilisational dialogue to argue for the possibility of a consensual change in the existing power-based world order. He argues for an *international public sphere theory* which utilises Habermas' notion of the public sphere to show how inter-civilisational dialogue can create a global public sphere for a *global communicative use of reason*. Lynch applies Habermas' concepts of *instrumental* and *communicative* actions to address different approaches to an inter-civilisational dialogue, where he writes: "The presence of communicative action, argumentation before an audience oriented towards achieving

²³⁰ Ibid, pp.94-95., Also see: Linklater, "The Evolving Sphere of International Justice," (1999), p.473.

²³¹ Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, (1998), p .107.

²³² Ibid., p.119.

²³³ Ibid., p.7.

²³⁴ For details of Linklater's arguments with this respect see Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, (1998), pp.77-168. Also see: Linklater, "Globalization and the Transformation of Political Community," in John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2001), pp.709-725.

consensus, defines public sphere sites. ... [global] public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity...Public spheres exist when action is co-ordinated through discourse oriented to the achievement of consensus.”²³⁵ Lynch believes that communicative action can exclude power from the exercise of reason. A rational consensus is a consensus in which all affected parties would agree in the absence of force. Indeed, taking dialogue seriously at the global level suggests an alternative to the inevitable clash of civilisations and the primacy of force and violence in organising social world.²³⁶ For Lynch, it shows that the potential for communicative action can be exploited to create a global public sphere through which the application of the force and violence to organise global order will be illegitimated. In short, these applications of Habermas' ideal type of dialogic world society for introducing an alternative globalisation have been fuelled by Habermas' critical social theory and his communicative rationality. More details on Habermas' communicative rationality and his sociological conception of dialogic community will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5. But before closing this chapter, a briefly account of my critical reflections on Habermas' normative analysis of globalisation is provided.

3.3.4 Communicative Rationality and Dialogue of Civilisations

We argued that Habermas does not directly engage in the question as to how a *global political culture* can be the basis of a dialogic world society. While the efforts of other scholars have paved the way for using Habermas' communicative rationality to address the role of inter-civilisational dialogue in such a global cultural preparation,²³⁷ we need to examine the epistemological capacity of communicative rationality for initiating such an inter-civilisational dialogue.

Habermas' communicative epistemology views the mechanism of the '*the force of better arguments*' as its epistemic logic for emerging an inter-subjective (societal)

²³⁵ Marc Lynch, "The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Sphere," 29 (2) (2000), p.317.

²³⁶ Ibid., p.330.

²³⁷ For other scholarly efforts in this line of thought, see Alexander Anievas, "Critical Dialogues: Habermasian Social Theory and International Relations", *Politics*, 25 (3), (2005), pp.135-143.; M. Weber, "Engaging Globalisation: Critical Theory and Global Political Change", *Alternatives* 27 (2002) pp.301-325. ; D.L. Jones, "The Global and the Local: 'System' and 'Lifeworld' in the Study of World Order," *Co-operation and Conflict*, 36 (3) (2001) pp .296-305., and James Bohman "The Globalisation of the Public Sphere", *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 24 (2/3) (1998), pp.199-216.

consensus.²³⁸ The communicative epistemology implies that humans' equal access to linguistic ability of *speaking with each other* provides an epistemic competence²³⁹ for solving their conflicts of opinions, either at a national or at a global level. However, it seems that we need to go beyond this *linguistic ability* to address the possibility of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations.²⁴⁰ As argued in chapters 1 and 2, this thesis employs 'critical rationalism' as its *epistemological theory* of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. According to this theory--as a conjectural theory of rationality--our ability for a rational dialogue with each other, either at the national or at an inter-civilisational scale, originates from our *equal access to critical rationality*.

Critical rationality refers to (a) our ability to respect the regulative idea of truth; (b) our ability to formulate valid deductive arguments, and (c) our ability to test our deductive conjectures through *falsifying evidence*. These epistemic competences enable us to shape a rational dialogue among ourselves. Chapter 2 argued about this conjectural theory of rationality ($P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$). This thesis finds this conjectural theory of rationality a powerful explanatory theory for addressing the functions of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. It aims to address the mechanism of dialogue of civilisations through opening their *systems of rationale* to mutual criticism. Donald Nielsen criticises Habermas' communicative epistemology due to its insufficiencies to provide a historical sociology of civilisations. He writes:

Habermas's theory appears to rest on the redemption of validity claims to truth, rightness, and authentic subjectivity through discourse oriented to understanding and agreement via the *force of better reason*. ... the force of the better reason, in *general* or in *abstract*, cannot be a basis for a notion of consensual agreement and emancipation from distorted communication, because it depends itself on prior concrete historical-civilisational definitions of what can *possibility* count as a better reason. However, these collective definitions of what can count as the better reason are open in different civilisations to varying degrees of public discursive examinations. ... Indeed, is it likely that a 'paradigm of language' can provide at *all the general foundations for sociology*...²⁴¹

²³⁸ See Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, (trans.) Thomas McCarthy, (UK, Blackwell: 1981), pp.1-77.

²³⁹ For an analysis of Habermas's communicative epistemology as an especial reading of 'philosophy of language', see David Rasmussen, *Reading Habermas*, (1990), pp .18-55.

²⁴⁰ For a critic of applying Habermas's dialogic politics in international relations see C. Rustin, "Habermas, Discourse Ethics and International Justice," *Alternatives*, 24 (1999), pp.167-192., and for a reply to the critics see: Andrew. Linklater, "Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process," *Review of International Studies*, (2005), 31, pp.141-154.

²⁴¹ Donald A. Nielsen, "A Theory of Communicative Action or a Sociology of Civilisations? A Critique of Jurgen Habermas", *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 1 (1) (1987), pp .162 and 165.

The thesis aims to employ *Critical Rationalism* as its epistemological foundation for the development of a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. Replacing *communicative rationality* with *critical rationality* provides us with a new logic and a new explanatory framework for addressing the function of dialogue of civilisations as a mechanism of the transformation of the existing contradictory globalisation towards a humane globalisation. Perhaps a key contribution of a *critical rationalist theory of dialogue of civilisations* is that: It recognises different civilisational-based *systems of rationale*, and it argues that *opening these systems of rationale* to mutual criticism can lead them to a *global social learning* from mutual errors ($P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$). It argues that it can lead them to a higher level of *global critical rationality* that provides a normative foundation for an open global society of free and equal peoples. However, the development of critical macrosociology of globalisation based on such a theory of dialogue of civilisations calls for a *new normative ideal type of global society*. The next chapter uses critical rationalism to introduce this new ideal type: *the idea of an open global society*. This new normative vision of global society provides us with a new analysis of globalisation's *societal deficits*.

The main function of this chapter was to show how different normative ideal types of global community lead us to diverse normative critiques of globalisation. However, it also provided a good base for addressing the question of how the ideal type of an open global society must introduce a new normative logic for arriving at a global consensus about an alternative global order.

Chapter 4

The Ideal Type of Open Global Society The Premises and the Principles

The main aim of this chapter is to employ Critical Rationalism for introducing the Ideal Type of Open Global Society for the development of a critical macrosociology of globalisation. This ideal type describes the premises and institutional principles of a global society of free and equal citizens due to their access to critical rationality. The next chapter will advance this *conception* to an *analytical model* for analysing a dialogic globalisation as the formation of an open global society. In this way, chapters 4 and 5 present the thesis' conceptual and analytical models for the development of a new macrosociology of dialogic globalisation with three major aims: (i) analysing contemporary globalisation (chapter 6), (ii) criticising liberal globalisation (chapter 7), and (iii) advocating a dialogic form of globalisation (chapter 8). As Linklater argues, the normative task of a critical theory of world community is to defend the *ideal* of a universal dialogic community, in this case the ideal of an open global society. The sociological task of such a critical theory is to investigate the *forms of social learning* which are capable of turning the *ideal* into *reality*.²⁴² By analogy, this chapter defends the *ideal* of an open global society, the next chapter addresses the *form of global social learning* that are capable of turning the idea of open global society into a global institutional reality.

²⁴² Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, (1998), p.142.

Chapter 4 proceeds in three sections. Section 4.1 briefly explores implications of Popper's attitude of Critical Rationalism for his definition of the Open Society. It argues that Popper introduces the open society as a social arrangement that sets free critical power of human reason. Section 4.2 introduces the idea of an open global society. It conceptualises this ideal type as a global society of free and equal persons whose access to critical reason entitles them to appeal for one set of comprehensive rights of self-governance. The ideal type of open global society performs as a macrosociological regulative principle for addressing the nature of such a self-governance. It parallels the five layers of a normative concept of the person, who has access to critical rationality, to the five corresponding social institutions of such an open global society. Section 4.3 argues that the idea of open global society leads us to explore new normative critique and vision of globalisation. Chapter 4, as a whole, uses critical rationalism to introduce a new normative model of global society.

4.1 Critical Rationalism and Popper's Philosophy of the Open Society

The literature on Popper's critical rationalism and philosophy of the open society is substantial. Hence, it is neither possible nor necessary to address this literature on this occasion. I shall merely address the most relevant points that are directly concerned with my argument. To this aim, I first review Popper's Critical Rationalism and its implications for his conception of human nature, as a *normative ideal type*. Viewed from such a conception, I will then address Popper's idea of open society. Finally, I will connect Popper's idea of open society with his social philosophy. All of these pave the way for introducing the idea of open global society by this chapter.

4.1.1 Critical Rationalism and the Conception of Human Nature

Popper has not specifically identified the outcomes of his Critical Rationalism for his vision of human nature. Nevertheless, it is possible to explore such outcomes in his works. There is an inter-play between Popper's epistemology and his reading of human nature.²⁴³ I focus on the outcomes of Critical Rationalism for Popper's concept of human nature because of its importance in understanding the meaning of an open

²⁴³ For a good review of this inter-play see Geoff Stokes, "Politics, Epistemology and Method: Karl Popper's Conception of Human Nature," *Political Studies*, (1995), XLIII, pp.105-125.; Jeremy Shearmur, "Epistemology and Human Nature in Popper's Political Theory: a Reply to Stokes," *Political Studies* (1995), XLIII, pp.124-130., and Geoff Stokes, "Popper and Human Nature Revisited," *Political Studies*, (1995), XLIII, pp.131-135.

society. As Geoff Stokes argues, it is also possible to explore how Popper's reading of human nature has affected his critical epistemology.²⁴⁴

In order to explore the outcome of Critical Rationalism for the concept of human nature, as a normative construct, I first briefly introduce Critical Rationalism. It is important to note that this initial explanation of the essence of critical rationalism will be developed by the next section, whereas my critique of popper's attitude of Critical Rationalism will be proposed. Popper introduces '*Critical Rationalism*' in this way:

So what I called Critical Rationalism is an attitude which I described only in a roundabout way, namely I said it is the attitude 'I may be wrong, and you may be right, but let us sit together and discuss matter critically, and in the end we may not agree but we will both have learnt something'. That attitude I called Critical Rationalism.²⁴⁵

Critical Rationalism thus is an *attitude* of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from criticisms. This attitude rests on the premise of human fallibility. The attitude of '*I may be wrong*' means my knowledge and rationality are imperfect. The attitude of '*You may be right*' means your knowledge and rationality are also imperfect but that they may be right. The attitude of '*let us discuss*' means through a rational dialogue and inter-subjective learning from criticism we may get closer to the truth. This epistemological logic is manifested in Popper's conjectural theory of knowledge (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$). In this sense, the very conception of a *rational dialogue* exists in Popper's attitude of critical rationalism. The motto that Popper used to formulate his critical rationalism is implicit in the three following principles that he thought, "form the basis of every rational discussion, that is, of every discussion undertaken in the search for truth."²⁴⁶ The principles in Popper's words:

1. The principle of [human] fallibility: perhaps I am wrong and perhaps you are right. But we could easily both be wrong.
2. The principle of rational discussion: we want to try, as impersonally as possible, to weigh up our reasons for and against a theory: a theory that is definite and criticizable.
3. The principle of approximation to the truth: we can always come closer to the truth in a discussion which avoids personal attacks. It can help us to achieve a better understanding; even in those cases where we do not reach an agreement.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁴ Geoff Stokes, "Politics, Epistemology and Method," *Political Studies*, (1995), p.114-116.

²⁴⁵ Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. 2, (London, Routledge: 1997), p.224.

²⁴⁶ Karl Popper, "Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility," in Karl Popper, *In Search of a Better World*, (trans.) Laura J. Bennett, (London, Routledge: 1992), p.199.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

As noted in chapter 1, in this thesis, the term “*openness to criticism*” refers to the principles of Critical Rationalism. In the next section, I shall elaborate these principles as a middle way between *absolutism* (Uncritical Rationalism) and *relativism* (Critical Irrationalism). It is important to note that Popper regards himself “as a disciple of Socrates, that is of the speaker of Apology”²⁴⁸ and his method of critical dialogue. He also acknowledges the contributions of Kant's critical philosophy to his critical epistemology.²⁴⁹ Like Kant, Popper argues: “*Man can know: thus he can be free.*”²⁵⁰ Humans' access to reason can lead them to a self-liberation through knowledge. Given this account of critical rationalism, the implications for Popper's conception of human nature are important. As Geoff Stokes reminds us, Popper does not argue about a *theory of human nature* as the basis of his social theory of the open society. However, it does not preclude him from holding a substantive view on the nature of human being.²⁵¹ Popper's critical rationalism affects his account of persons as *rational agents* whose *critical rationality* can free them through establishing an open social order.²⁵²

According to Popper, the major distinguishing characteristic of human beings is their ability to consciously create new plans for trial and error, and transcend the limits of the trials previously performed.²⁵³ The hallmark of creative thinking is the selection of trails and to the refutation of errors rather than to allow them to occur by chance.²⁵⁴ What sets human beings apart from *organisms* like the amoeba is the ability of humans to be *self-consciously critical of their knowledge*. In this sense, person's access to critical reason or his capacity of learning from trial and error is the distinctive feature of human creatures. Popper recognises the importance of '*language*' for such a critical reasoning. Human language has both descriptive and argumentation functions that provides a framework for a critical reasoning.²⁵⁵ However, setting free critical power of reason requires the attitude of I may be wrong you may right, let us

²⁴⁸ Karl Popper, "Replies to My Critics," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, (Illinois, Open Court: 1887), p.962.

²⁴⁹ On this see, Karl Popper, "Immanuel Kant: The Philosopher of the Enlightenment," Popper, *In Search of a Better World*, (London, Routledge: 1992), pp.126-134.

²⁵⁰ Karl Popper, "On the Source of Knowledge and Ignorance," in Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (1965), pp.3-39. Also see Reiss (ed.), *Kant, Political Writings*, (1970), pp.41-53.

²⁵¹ Stokes, "Politics, Epistemology and Method," (1995), p.107.

²⁵² See Karl Popper, "Emancipation through Knowledge," in Popper *In Search of a Better World*, (1992), pp.137-149.

²⁵³ Karl Popper, *Unended Quest: an Intellectual Autobiography*, (London, Fontana/Collins: 1997), p .45.

²⁵⁴ Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, pp.24-25 and 70.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.235-236.

discuss to learn from our errors in order to get closer to the truth. Human language provides just a *tool* for realising such a critical attitude and rational dialogue. Without respecting the principles of critical rationalism, there is not a *common criterion* of rationality on which basis we can turn our linguistic dialogic into a mechanism of learning from errors and an approximation to the truth. In this sense, for the critical rationalist approach to the human nature, the *unforced force of learning from errors* makes a *rational dialogue* an epistemic mechanism for the approximation to the truth.

Popper recognises that human beings are self-preserving agents who set different *ends* for their lives and seek suitable *means* to realise the ends. Human beings have inborn needs or expectations.²⁵⁶ However, they have also a *creative capacity* for identifying new ends and building new means to satisfy the ends. Such capacities also originate from their *conscious human agency*. Popper acknowledges the importance of inborn needs such as those to love, sympathise and communicate, however the '*need for regularity*' has a special importance for him.²⁵⁷ For Popper, the inborn 'need for regularity' motivates people to learn the laws of their natural surroundings and the traditions of their social environments. It also explains why peoples tend to create traditions and taboos.²⁵⁸ As Stokes points out:

Popper's conception of human nature is neither rigidly environmentalist nor biologically determinist. ...Central to this process is the self, a 'ghost in the machine' which observes, interprets and acts in attempting to solve the practical and theoretical problems around it. ...the self comprises two parts, the passionate and rational ...this higher [rational] self develops a moral capacity which operates as a kind of cultural control upon the lower self.²⁵⁹

Like Kant's cognitivist ethics, for Popper, humans' *access to critical rationality* is the fundament of developing such a moral capacity. In this way, Popper leads to a normative conception of the person. Like Kant, Popper argues that humans can *know*, thus they can be *autonomous moral beings*. In other words, for both of them, the *moral equality* of individuals is drawn from their *epistemic equality* of a potential access to critical reason. This normative conception of human nature plays a key role in the normative ideal type of the open society: people *should* employ their *conscious human agency* for realising their moral equality in order to claim for a legal, political, and economic self-governance.

²⁵⁶ Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p.47

²⁵⁷ Popper, *Unended Quest*, pp.50-51.

²⁵⁸ Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p.132.

²⁵⁹ Stokes, "Popper, Politics, Epistemology and Method," (1995), p.117.

4.1.2 Critical Rationalism and the Meaning of Open Society

Popper's concept of human nature provides important epistemic and moral inputs for his ideal type of the open society. The central role of self-consciousness and equal access to critical reason in his conception of human nature leads him to a normative account of the open society in which the ultimate constituent unit is a *critical rationalist knower*. If people, due to their equal access to critical rationality, *ought* to use their critical reason to *rationalise* their personal and social life through *dialogue* rather than force, they must build a society of free and equal persons (an open society) upon this motto of critical rationalism. In this sense, such an open society is a society of free and equal persons who have *activated* their *potential* access to critical rationality in order to build a dialogic social organisation that respects their equality and freedom. This dialogic society recognises the three key principles of the human fallibility, rational discussion and the approximation to the truth.

Popper's *open* society ideal is the abstraction of meaningful social organisation that aims to describe and to criticise an existing *closed* society due to its deviations from such an ideal type. As Ian Jarvie points out: "An ideal type, according to Weber, is an analytical construct built out of empirical material but, since it is an idealization, it corresponds to no concrete reality. The ideal type is created for purpose of thought and exists nowhere; *it is in this sense utopian*, but it is rooted in reality, so that it is criticizable, *though not for its idealization as such*"²⁶⁰ [emphasis added]. The ideal type of open society is rooted in this profound reality: all humans are fallible creatures and hence there is a need to employ a rationalist attitude to organise their society upon a rational (open to criticism) dialogue rather than force. Hans Albert summarises three functions of Popper's normative ideal type of the open society in this way:

His [Popper] idea of open society is an attempt to transform the European idea of freedom into a sociological construction that can be seen an ideal type in the sense of Max Weber. Three remarks are perhaps appropriate here. First: the idea of such a society is an ideal, so that a concrete society can approximate it more or less. Second: this ideal can be used as a standard for criticizing the existing social orders also as a guide for attempts to reform them. And third: attempts to approximate this ideal can lead to very different

²⁶⁰ Ian Jarvie, "Popper's Ideal Types: Open and Closed, Abstraction and Concrete Societies," in Ian Jarvie and Sandra Pralong (eds.), *Popper's Open Society After Fifty Years. The continuing relevance of Karl Popper*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2005), p.72.

constitutions, for in the endeavour to achieve it one has to take into account the different historical conditions in each case.²⁶¹

Albert argues that Popper inserts the construction of his model of the open society into a historical, sociological and anthropological frameworks that has received different critical reflections. However, for a reasonable assessment of such a model, we need to distinguish between his *normative project* and his theoretical hypothesis and historical analyses of the closed and the open societies connected with it.²⁶² Validating this argument, I am mainly concerned here with exploring the outcomes of Popper's Critical Rationalism for his normative ideal type of the open society.

Popper integrates his *normative* attitude of critical rationalism in his normative ideal type of the open society. If human beings are fallible creatures, they need a rational dialogue to organise their society and to avoid the usage of force in their social relations. If so, the freedom of thought (i.e., openness to criticism) provides required epistemological fundament for the social organisation of an open society. It implies a systematic relationship between an *ideational* openness and an *institutional* openness to criticism.²⁶³ Since Popper's Critical Rationalism has a strong normative content-- due to its advocacy for taking the motto of openness to criticism --²⁶⁴ his ideal type of the open society also advocates an open social organisation. I will argue that in order to systematise normative implications of individuals' access to critical rationality for moral foundation of an open society, we need a sociological conception of the open society-- what is under-conceptualisation in Popper's ideal type of the open society.

The idea of open society takes *the rational attitude* of the science as its *paradigm* to argue how the normative content of the open society originates from the normative attitude of critical rationalism itself.²⁶⁵ As Jarvie points out, for Popper, "the difference between science and magic does not lie in the content of their claims but in the attitude adopted to their claims. ...In the case of magic and taboo the attitude is uncritical; its contrast is critical. The critical attitude is what Popper attempts to

²⁶¹ Hans Albert, "Karl Popper and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," in Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford, and David Miller (eds.) *Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment*, Vol I, (UK, Ashgate Publishing Limited: 2006), p.8.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, Also see: Popper, *The Open society and Its Enemies*, Volumes I and II,

²⁶³ Albert, "Karl Popper and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," (2006), p.8.

²⁶⁴ See Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, (1992), pp .50-56. Also see: John N. Gray, "The Liberalism of Karl Popper," *Governance and Opposition*, 11, (1976), p .339.

²⁶⁵ See Richard Vernon, "The 'Great Society' and the 'Open Society': Liberalism in Hayek and Popper," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, IX (2), (1979), p.267.

capture and institutionalise in his methodological rules for science [P1→TT→EE→P2].”²⁶⁶ Viewed from this critical attitude, Popper defines the closed society as a social organisation of closed minded peoples who arrange their social relations on basis of the old and modern form of magic and authority. The closed societies may be tribal societies, dominated by magic and taboo, irrational prejudice, racism and rule by hereditary groups or oligarchies, or they may be reflected in modern types of dictatorship, run by rulers who claim superior knowledge with which they can produce a good life for everyone.²⁶⁷

On the contrary, an open society refers to a rational (open to criticism) society that takes the rational motto of science to argue why social order should be established on the basis of dialogue as opposed to any forms of force. In an open society, social institutions are modified by continually monitoring of effects, and in the light of their ability to solve the social problems they are supposed to solve. Upon this normative vision, the closed society’s deviation from the ideal type of open society is ultimately originated from its epistemic deviation from the very attitude of critical rationalism itself. In this sense, an institutional transition from the closed to an open society can be introduced as a deep-seated epistemological transition from an uncritical motto of magic and taboos to the attitude of critical rationalism.²⁶⁸

Of special importance in Popper’s ideal type of the open society for the thesis’ *macrosociological conception* of an open global society is how the normative idea type of open society can perform as a *sociological regulative idea*. Under Popper’s hand, “the ideal type of science as an institutionalisation of the attitude of open-mindedness and rationality is given a central place in his social thinking.”²⁶⁹ In *The Open Society* Popper applies *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* at a sociological level. He takes the rationality of scientific institutions, as an ideal type, for a corresponding sociological attitude that implies that social institutions should be built to foster the motto of critical rationality to encourage a critical attitude towards the institutions themselves. Popper thinks that such a *sociological connection* between *critical rationalism* and the *social institutions* can possibly be regarded as a *sociological law*:

²⁶⁶ Jarvie, "Popper's Ideal Types: Open and Closed, Abstraction and Concrete Societies," (2005), p.75.

²⁶⁷ See Popper, *The Open society and Its Enemies*, vol I

²⁶⁸ See Popper, *The Open society and Its Enemies*, vols I and II, Also see Anthony O' Hear, "The Open Society Revisited," in Philip Catton and Graham Macdonald, (eds.), *Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2004), pp.189-202.

²⁶⁹ Jarvie, "Popper's Ideal Types: Open and Closed," (2005), p.76.

There can be sociological laws, and even sociological laws pertaining to the problem of progress; for example, the hypothesis that, wherever the freedom of thought, and of the communication of thought, is effectively protected by legal institutions and institutions ensuring the publicity of the discussion, there will be science progress.²⁷⁰

In this way, Popper views the ideal type of the open society as a sociological law on which basis we can trace a deep-seated epistemic foundations of macro-societal institutions. In the closed society, uncritical attitudes of magic and taboos cognitively fuel the emergence of the closed macro-social institutions. In the open society, the attitude of critical rationalism fuels the openness of its macro-social institutions. If democracy finds an important place in Popper's conceptions of the open society, the reason is that for him democracy is the most important institutional manifestation of the *freedom of thought* or openness to criticism.²⁷¹ If we take Popper's motto of critical rationalism as the epistemological fundament of an open society, we can realise the essence of the idea of open society, as Notturmo formulates:

Open society is based on respect for other people, for their freedom and autonomy as rational agent—or, as Kant would have put it, for *people as ends in themselves*. It is not that we regard their ideas as evils that we have to tolerate for civility's sake. And it is not even that we regard them as the ideas of other people who have just as much right on ideas as ourselves. That, at best, would be paternalism. And it would have nothing at all to do with *recognition of our own fallibility*. Respect, on the contrary, means that we take the dissenting opinions of other seriously, and that we regard them as possibly true²⁷² [emphasis added].

This Kantian-inspired ideal type of open society views people as *ends in themselves* due to their access to critical reason. In an open society, social institutions must protect *the freedom of thought*, because individuals are regarded as equal sources of criticism. In this way, the normative conception of persons, as possessors of critical rationality, entitles them to claim the equal rights to self-governance. But, in a liberal democrat society, the rule of law and constitutional state are closely adopted for the protection of the property rights as the main source of individuals' freedom. As Notturmo writes, “Popper contrasted open society with closed society. But, he did not identify it with any specific political or economic system. His experiences in Vienna had convinced him ...[about] the dangers in socialism... But he was also well aware of the dangers in unrestricted capitalism...”²⁷³ Bryan Magee believes that Popper's

²⁷⁰ Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Volume II, (1962), p.322, note 13.

²⁷¹ Popper, *The Math of Framework* (1994), p.110.

²⁷² Notturmo, *Science and the Open Society*, (2000), p.38.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.4.

open society is a philosophy of *democratic socialism*.²⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Popper's idea of open society needs to be advanced for the development a *macrosociological ideal type* of an open society in which the culture, politics and economy find systematic *sociological* links.

4.1.3 Critical Rationalism and Social Philosophy of the Open Society

Popper's social philosophy of open society has been received notable critical reflections. As Hans Albert argues, Popper's contribution to social philosophy has played an important role in public discussion in the last century. In his book, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Popper attempted to explain the intellectual bases of the totalitarian systems due to his ideal types of the closed and the open societies. However, these ideal types have scarcely played an important role in Anglo-Saxon discussion in the second half of the twentieth century. In contrast, the centre of Anglo-Saxon discussion of the last part of the century largely revolved around John Rawls' theories of political liberalism and justice as fairness.²⁷⁵

In his main work of social philosophy, *The Open Society*, Popper creates a close link between his theory of knowledge and his social philosophy. If we define social philosophy as a *philosophical attitude of social organisation*, Popper's conception of the open society is the base of his social philosophy. If nobody has an intellectual authority to unilaterally determine what a desirable social organisation is, the society must be *organised* through a rational dialogue in which all people are viewed as equal sources of rationality and self-determination. Popper does not specify his social philosophy as the cultural base for his sociological law of the open society. In another sense, the question of how the attitude of critical rationalism can be turned into a set of shared cultural values on which basis social institutions of the open society can be stood is under-explanation in Popper's social philosophy. But, he generally explained the relationship between the motto of critical rationalism and social philosophy of the open society. Perhaps due to the shortage of such a macrosociological model of an open society in his social philosophy, Popper's philosophy is somehow regarded as a pro-liberal democracy model. In addition, Popper's social philosophy of the open society does not make a clear distinction between an open society and a capitalist

²⁷⁴ Bryan Magee, *Popper*, (London, Collins: 1973), p.83.

²⁷⁵ Albert, "Karl Popper and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," (2006), p.7.

society. But, Popper's emphasis on *democracy* and *justice* leads us to recognise that an open society goes beyond a liberal democratic model of social order.

Popper recognises an *epistemic function* for democratic governance due to his critical philosophy of knowledge. He employs the idea that *reason* should be used to criticise and challenge instead of to justify and defend the existing social order, for introducing an epistemic function of democracy. Viewed from this epistemic function democracy is a political system in which *peoples' votes* (i.e., via the majority rule, political parties, free media, etc.) operate as an epistemic mechanism of recognising a political system's errors and getting rid of the political rulers without bloodshed and revolution when people no longer think that they are fit to rule.²⁷⁶ Of course, this ideal type of democracy has not yet been fully realised anywhere.

Popper believes that we can use a *piecemeal social engineering* to construct social institutions for the democratic control of economic power and for our protection from economic exploitations.²⁷⁷ As Celia Kerstentzky points out, for Popper: "in a thicker conception, thus, democracy is also the 'political control of the economic power of the ruled by rulers'."²⁷⁸ Nevertheless, Popper's social philosophy suffers from the lack of a *sociological linkage* among culture, politics and economy. On the contrary, we can see such a linkage in Habermas' ideal type of dialogic community.²⁷⁹ Inspired by Habermas' conception of dialogic community, in the next chapter, I will attempt to formulate a sociological linkage in my conception of the open society.

4.2 Critical Rationalism and the Ideal Type of an Open Global Society

Chapter 3 noted that if we replace Habermas' communicative rationality with Popper's critical rationality, we can lead to a new epistemological base for normative ideal type of a global society of free and equal persons. This section aims to use critical rationalism—as *a theory of rationality*—to introduce the five major premises and the five macro-social institutions of an open global society. Given these premises

²⁷⁶ See: Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. I (1954) ; Gray, "The Liberalism of Karl Popper," (1976), pp.334-345. ; Wayne J. Norman, "A Democratic Theory for a Democratizing World? A Re-assessment of Popper's Political Realism," *Political Studies*, (1993), XLI, pp .252-268, and Jeremy Shearmur, *The Political Thought of Karl Popper*, (London, Routledge: 1996).

²⁷⁷ Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1971), p.129. For a critique of Popper's piecemeal social engineering see: Michael Freeman, "Sociology and Utopia: Some Reflections on the Social Philosophy of Karl Popper," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 26 (1) (1975), pp.20-34., and for a reply to the critique see: Gray, "The Liberalism of Karl Popper," (1976), pp.342-355.

²⁷⁸ Kerstentzky, "Hayek and Popper on Ignorance and Intervention," (2007), p.50.

²⁷⁹ See Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (Cambridge, Polity: 1996).

and principles, chapter 5 will argue that how such premises can be used for exploring a form of global social learning which is capable of the turning the *ideal* of open global society into a global institutional *reality*. These premises and principles operate as a *regulative sociological framework* for describing the nature and characteristics of a global society of free and equal persons. Due to the shortage of such a sociological account in Popper's ideal type of the open society, I develop my own sociological account of an open global society through reinventing Popper's conception of human nature, as a normative account of the person, and by introducing the five premises about humans' equality due to their access to critical rationality. As I will conclude in this chapter, the ideal type of open global society does not refer to a global society in which all of the existing world civilisations and national societies will be disappeared in favore of one fully united global civilisation. Such an open global society of free and equal persons coexists with modified civilisations and national societies through opening their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism. However, from a sociological perspective, an open multi-civilisational global society of free and equal persons —as a *global layer of social organisation of the world population*—can be regarded as a *global human society* in its own right, despite all of its internal diversities.

4.2.1 Developing Popper's Normative Conception of the Person

To expand the ideal type of open society to a global scale, we need to develop Popper's normative conception of the person. Popper argues that due to a person's access to critical rationality, he or she has the moral capacity of self-control and rational action. As argued, these epistemic and moral capacities justify an open society that can set free the critical power of reason. But, Popper's Critical Rationalism does not logically lead us to a systematic link between persons' access to critical rationality and their moral equality. In addition, it does not lead us to explore how such epistemic and moral equalities can be connected with a person's legal, political, and economic rights. Popper's *sociological law* of the open society aims to explore the possibility of setting free the critical power of human reason through a social arrangement that secures the publicity of rational dialogue. But his account of human nature is insufficient for proving required micro-foundation to address such a macro institutional function. I aim to develop Popper's normative ideal type of the

person to provide a new micro-foundation for a macro-sociological ideal type of an open global society.²⁸⁰

To develop a new normative conception of the person, as micro-foundation of the ideal type of open global society, I begin with a shift from Critical Rationalism as an *attitude* to Critical Rationalism as a *theory of rationality*. Popper's *attitude* of critical rationalism does not lead us to an *epistemological necessity* for justifying individuals' moral equality. His normative conception of the person does not make clear that why peoples' equal access to rationality justify their moral equality as well. However, if we view Critical Rationalism as a theory of rationality, we can conclude individuals' moral equality from an epistemological viewpoint. This epistemologically informed moral equality then leads us to identify a set of persons' legal, political, and economic equal rights. In this way, the normative conception of the person covers the five layers of human equality.

Popper defines critical rationality as an *irrational* faith in *reason*. If persons' equal access to critical rationality refers to an *irrational* faith in reason, how can their critical rationality *logically enforce* them to take a rational (correct) moral decision? Suppose that a person argues that he or she has taken a *moral* (pre-rational) decision in favor of irrationalism. He or she cannot be *reasonably* criticised because of his or her moral decision. The person is free to *accept* or *deny* critical rationalism itself. In other words, in Popper's conception of the person there is not a logical link between persons' access to rationality and their moral capacity of choosing between 'right' and 'wrong'. If a person's access to critical rationality does not enable him or her to distinguish between a right (rational) and a wrong (irrational) decision, how can it be the source of his or her *equal moral capacity* of taking a right (rational) decision?

In Popper's normative account of the person, the moral equality of human beings is not supported by the principles of critical rationalism because it is just a moral attitude. To the contrary, if we shift critical rationalism from an *irrational* faith in *reason* to a *rational* faith in *reason*, we can connect individuals' epistemic equality-- due to their access to critical rationality-- with their equal moral capacity of taking a rational (right) or irrational (wrong) decision. From this viewpoint, individuals' *moral*

²⁸⁰ Inspired by Popper, George Soros outlines an idea of global open society. However, in my view, it does not provide us a sociological conception of an open global society. See George Soros, *On Globalisation*, ((New York, Public Affairs: 2002).

equality refers to their equal moral capacity to use their critical rationality to opt between a wrong (irrational) and a right (rational) decision. If individuals' access to critical rationality is defined as if it *cannot* cognitively inform them what are right and wrong decisions, we do not have in fact a *rational criterion* for claiming that peoples are moral equal beings.

Popper's ethical position involves in a form of *relativism* because it disconnects its linkage with his epistemology of critical rationalism. If persons are free to take either a rational or an irrational faith in reason, they are also free to take a rational or an irrational decision in favour of an open or a closed society. This relativist ethics does not provide a moral foundation for the open society. However, when we shift from critical rationalism as an attitude of rationality towards critical rationalism as a theory of rationality, we are led to a reasonable moral foundation for the open society. Jeremy Shearmur recognises the relativist nature of the ethical foundation of Popper's idea of open society, and introduces its remedy:

The ethical theory of Popper's *Open society* threatens, against his wishes, to lapse into a form of relativism. This consequence is avoided if a closer parallel that Popper himself allows for is drawn between his ethical theory and his epistemology. This [closer parallel] produces a fallibilistic ethical intuitionism, in which the judgments of the individual are subject to criticism by the judgments of others. From this, however, an epistemological rationale is provided for the [moral] autonomy of the individual...²⁸¹

Popper does not allow such a closer parallel between his epistemology (critical rationalism) and his ethical theory, since he has already rejected critical rationalism a *rational* faith in reason. If critical rationality finds a rational base itself, the person's access to critical rationality informs his moral decision, as a rational decision. From this perspective, individuals are equal moral beings because they have equally armed with critical reason in order to make their moral decisions accountable to their critical rationality. Regarding critical rationalism as a theory of openness to criticism (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$), ethical beliefs can be subjected to an inter-subjective criticism. That moral debate is epistemological in character. In other sense, when we define critical rationalism as an openness of all of our beliefs to an inter-subjective criticism, the rationality of our moral decisions can be tested through such a mutual criticism. This refers to what Shearmur argues as the judgments of the individual as subject to criticism by the judgments of others. So, an epistemological rationale is provided for

²⁸¹ Jeremy Shearmur, "Epistemological Limits of the State: Reflections on Popper's Open Society," *Political Studies*, XXXVIII, (1990), pp.116.

moral decision and *moral autonomy* of the person. This new link between Critical Rationalism and ethical theory of an open society leads to a moral base for the open society: *an ethics of openness to criticism*.

Such a linkage between *epistemology* and *ethics* leads the normative conception of the person to the following key outcomes. Persons's epistemic equality of access to critical rationality justifies their moral equality of taking a right (rational) decision. Our equal access to critical rationality leads us to our equal moral capacity for employing our rationality to identify what is a right (rational) or a wrong (irrational) decision. Once this logical linkage between the person's epistemic competence and his moral autonomy was established, the way is paved for establishing the subsequent linkages among those capacities and the person's equal legal, political, and economic rights. These rights shape the five layers of the person's fundamental equalities in the context of an ideal type critical rationalist normative concept of the person.

The person's critical reason entitles him or her to an equal moral right of criticism. In other words, if individuals are entitled to equal moral autonomy, they must also have an equal right to establish a rational social order for realising such moral autonomy. This legal equality will be realised, if peoples have equal political right to actualise such a legal right of establishing a rational social order. Without such a political right, individual members of society cannot realise their moral and legal self-governance. Persons's equal political right of criticism entitles them for an equal economic right of having a decent life because of their contributions to social division of labour. In this way, the five layers of the person's equalities are originated from his equal access to critical rationality. Popper's normative conception of the person recognises that the person's access to critical rationality justifies his or her moral equality. But, due to the *disconnection* between his *epistemology* and his *ethical theory*, there is not a *logical way* to argue that the person's access to critical rationality is the main source of his or her equalities in a wider *societal* sense.²⁸²

It is important to note this normative conception of the person recognises that the individual's desires are the impetuses of their self-preservation activities. But, it argues that *human desires* can be *rationally* managed by a higher-self that cognitively informs them *rightness* or *wrongness* of their moral decisions for realising the desires.

²⁸² For a good review of the development of the person's citizenship rights see: T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*, (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press: 1973).

The ideal type of open global society rests on a normative conception of human nature that implies individuals can rationally justify their moral decisions. The ideal type acknowledges that *actual individuals* may *not* activate this critical rationality for taking a correct moral decision due to personal or social reasons. However, such an inactivation does not refute the *normative* conception of the person, because it does not contradict the person's potential access to critical reason. An ideal type refers to a latent capacity that can be realised, but it has not been actualised yet. As Jarvie argues an ideal type is an *idealisation* that is "created for purpose of thought and exists nowhere; it is in this sense utopian, but it is rooted in reality, so that it is criticizable, *though not for its idealization as such.*"²⁸³ As such, the critical rationalist conception of human nature refers to a logically constructed normative conception of the person.

John Rawls uses a normative conception of the person for formulating his ideal type of a well-ordered society. He employs the notion of '*the veil of ignorance*' to abstract his normative account of human nature for the formulation of his model-conception of a well-ordered society. In his words, "the veil of ignorance implies that persons are represented solely as moral persons and not as persons advantaged or disadvantaged by the contingencies of their social position, the distribution of natural abilities, or by luck and historical accident over the course of their lives."²⁸⁴ The normative conception of the person in the ideal type of open global society refers to a *moral person* whose potential access to critical rationality is abstracted from his social and historical conditions. However, it is still very rooted in fundamental human and social realities; that is, the principle of human fallibility and the possibility of a rational social dialogue through learning from mutual criticism. It is important to note that Habermas's ideal type of dialogic community stands on the similar premises of human access to communicative rationality. The moral persons of Habermas are able to use their communicative rationality in order to shape a rational social order.²⁸⁵

4.2.2 Epistemology and Social Philosophy of an Open global Society

The normative conception of the person rests upon the application of Critical Rationalism for defining the five layers of human fundamental equalities. In order to use this new normative conception of the person as a micro-foundation of our macro-

²⁸³ Jarvie, "Popper's Ideal Types: Open and Closed, Abstraction and Concrete Societies," (2005), p.72.

²⁸⁴ John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 77 (9) (1980), p.256.

²⁸⁵ See Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. one.

sociological model of open global society, I briefly address this theory of rationality. It not only reinforces the introduced five-layer normative conception of the person, but also leads to an epistemology and social philosophy of open global society.

As one of the best students of Popper's critical epistemology, William Bartley III recognises that Popper's defence of rationalism, as merely an *attitude*, cannot be a strong defense against rationalist identity. The ultimate aim of Bartley was to *advance* Popper's *attitude* of critical rationalism to a *theory* of rationality. An aspect of Popper's critical rationalism that annoyed Bartley was his '*irrational faith in reason*'. Bartley realises that whilst Popper strongly emphasises the *conjectural character* of all human knowledge and in this way he adopts an anti-dogmatic position in which there is no place for any dogmatic or irrational faith, his critical rationalism rests upon an *irrational faith in reason*, as a moral decision in favour of rationalism.²⁸⁶ I am not about here to enter into an informal debate between Bartley and Popper over this issue in detail, I merely refer to the core debate as it provides the grounds for justifying the preceding arguments regarding links amongst the five layers of the human equality and its implications for moral foundation of an open global society.

Popper denies the possibility of a '*comprehensive rationalism*'—the attitude of one's not being prepared to accept any proposition that is neither based on argument nor evidence. He concludes thus that rationalism must rest on a *pre-rational* decision: no rational argument will have an effect on a man who does not *want* to adopt a rational attitude. Hence, critical rationalism needs an *irrational faith in reason* as a *moral decision* in favour of *rationalism*.²⁸⁷ Bartley rightly argues that if our defence of rationality rests upon a moral decision, an irrationalist may *reasonably* argue that he or she has taken a moral decision in favour of *irrationalism*.²⁸⁸ Hence, critical rationalism must provide us with a *theory* of rationality, not just a *moral attitude*, resting on an *irrational faith in reason*.

According to Bartley, "just as in the Christian tradition the essence of being a Christian, or of Christian identity, had been traditionally subordinated to the essence of the Christian message, so in the rationalist tradition rationalist identity has often

²⁸⁶ For a detail review of Bartley-Popper informal controversy see: Artigas, *The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper's Theory of Knowledge*, (1999), pp.18-102.

²⁸⁷ See Popper, *In Search of a Better World* (1992), pp.208-212.

²⁸⁸ See W.W. Bartley III, *The Retreat to Commitment*, 2nd, (Illinois, La Salle: Open Court: 1984).

been subordinated to the essence of rational belief.”²⁸⁹ He reminds us ‘*comprehensive rationalism*’ was an effort to introduce the essence of rationalist identity. However, the criterion it introduced for a rational belief was a *justified true belief*.²⁹⁰ In this way, *comprehensive rationalism* claims that we can justify all of our beliefs. Bartley validates Popper's critical philosophy as “the first nonjustificational philosophy of criticism in the history of philosophy.”²⁹¹ Popper discovered that our scientific conjectures (beliefs) cannot be *justified*. However, they can be *falsified*. In this way, *criticism* becomes the *criterion* of rationality of scientific knowledge. As argued in chapter 2, with the latter developments in his philosophy, Popper accepted that *inter-subjective criticism* is the criterion of an objective and rational knowledge. Popper partly incorporated Bartley's critique in new version of chapter 24 of *The Open Society*.²⁹² While Popper accepted Bartley's argument in that ‘criticism’ is the essence of a *rationalist identity*, he did not argue about critical rationalism as a theory of rationality and rational action.

In *Rationality Versus the Theory of Rationality*, Bartley develops his critique of Popper and argues for a *comprehensive critical rationalism*. He rightly notes, “Popper has throughout his writings practiced nonjustificational criticism without explicitly discussing it in general terms.”²⁹³ Bartley wants to *explicitly* introduce *openness to criticism* as a *theory of rationality*. He writes:

Implicit in such a nonjustificational approach are a new philosophical program and new conception of rationalist identity. The new framework permits a rationalist to be characterized as one who holds *all* his beliefs, including his most fundamental standards and his basic philosophical position itself, *open to criticism*; who never cuts off an argument by resorting to faith or irrational commitment to justify some belief that been under severe critical fire. I shall call this conception *comprehensively critical rationalism*.²⁹⁴

Bartley’s critique of Popper has received different reflections from philosophers²⁹⁵. Along the same line of reasoning, Tom Settle, Ian Jarvie and Joseph Agassi, argue for

²⁸⁹ W.W. Bartley III, *The Retreat to Commitment* 1st, (London, Chatto & Windus; 1964), p .108.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Artigas, *The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper's Theory of Knowledge*, (1999), p.53.

²⁹² Ibid., p.36.

²⁹³ W.W. Bartley III, "Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality," in Mario Bunge, *The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy*, (London, Macmillan: 1964), p .23. Also see N. Koertge, "Bartley’s Theory of Rationality," *Philosophy of Social Science*, (4) (1974), pp.75-81

²⁹⁴ Bartley III, *The Retreat to Commitment* 1st, (1964), p.164.

²⁹⁵ See J. W. N. Watkins, "Comprehensively Critical Rationalism," *Philosophy*, 44 (167) (1969), pp .57-62., A.A. Derksen, "The Failure of Comprehensively Critical Rationalism," *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 10 (1980), pp.51-66., and W. W. Bartley, "On the Criticizability of Logic—A Reply to A. A. Derksen," *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 10 (1980), pp.67-77.

a *theory of openness to criticism*.²⁹⁶ My special interest in Bartley's theory of rationality as '*openness to criticism*' relates to the grounds that it provides us for defending preceding arguments, implied that individuals' access to critical rationality justifies their human equality in a wider societal sense. If we employ Bartley's theory of rationality as our epistemological theory of the person's equal access to critical rationality, we lead to the five-layer normative conception of the person that provides the micro-foundation of a macro-sociological model of an open global society. It is important to note that an important link between the theory of rationality and a theory of rational action is recognised as micro-foundation of macro-sociological theory. I will argue in detail about this in the next chapter. It is important to note that an application of Bartley's theory of rationality for identifying how a rational dialogue among world civilisations is possible implies that they should open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism in order to shape a dialogic position to each other.

In *Reading Habermas*, David Rasmussen points out: "...the sociological and the philosophical projects can be brought together in such a manner that social theory according to Weber and company can be integrated with a philosophical theory conceived as a theory of rationality."²⁹⁷ This link between *epistemology* and *social theory* is logically established by a *theory of human action*. If Critical Rationalism is our epistemological theory of rationality, what would the implications be for our theory of action and sociological theory? Rasmussen argues that Habermas' critical sociology originates from his communicative theory of rationality and communicative action.²⁹⁸ Habermas' communicative epistemology also informs his discursive theories of ethics, law and democracy.²⁹⁹ By analogy, we need to address the outcomes of Bartley's theory of critical rationality for a critical rationalist macrosociology. I will discuss this issue in detail in chapter 5. The present argument refers to the outcomes of such a link between the theory of critical rationality and the five-layer normative conception of the person. It is important to note that linking the theory of rationality with the normative conception of human nature leads us to a

²⁹⁶ See Tom Settle, I.C. Jarvie, Joseph Agassi, "Towards a Theory of Openness to Criticism," *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 4 (1974), pp.83-90.

²⁹⁷ David M. Rasmussen, *Reading Habermas*, (USA, Blackwell: 1990), p.23. note 17.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.23-25.

²⁹⁹ See Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, (Cambridge, MIT Press: 1999). I will discuss in more detail about a critical rationalist approach to the ethics in chapter 5.

cognitivist model of human society. As William Outhwaite argues, this cognitivist model views the society as more or less an outcome of *conscious human agency*.³⁰⁰

Upon the normative account of the person, a sociological concept of open society describes the institutional principles of a global society of free and equal persons in which individuals *activate* their *potential* access to critical rationality to agree about certain global shared values for their global social organisation. If they do not arrive at such globally shared values, they cannot establish those global social institutions that are needed to protect them as free and equal persons. The sociological ideal type of open global society links the person's access to critical rationality with moral capacity of individuals to achieve one set of globally shared values regarding how global order can be organised to treat all peoples as free and equal persons. In this way, the whole idea of open global society depends upon critical rationalism as an epistemological theory of rationality that justifies the five layers of the equality of the person. It leads to the exploration of the reason why critical rationalism can address the function of rational dialogue amongst civilisations of peoples.

To illustrate the essence of the idea of open global society, I make a close inspection of the epistemological logic of Critical Rationalism to address the nature of a rational dialogue among civilisations. As argued before, Bartley's critical rationality defends the rationalist identity as a *rational* faith in *reason*. It introduces Critical Rationalism as a theory of rationality that shifts the *criterion of rationality* from '*justification*' to '*criticism*'. This shift plays a key role in introducing the logic of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. If individuals, as rational moral persons, should activate their critical rationality for solving their disputes, they must follow the *ethics of openness to criticism*. If we address what is the essence of theory of critical rationalism, we can argue that why a rational dialogue of civilisations is a feasible global project.

Inspired by Mark Notturmo's *Science and the Open Society*,³⁰¹ I use the following threefold categories to locate Bartley's theory of rationality (openness to criticism) in a middle way between two competing epistemologies. It paves the way for arguing the possibility of the emergence of a global ethics of openness to criticism, if

³⁰⁰ William Outhwaite, *The Future of Society*, (London, Blackwell Publishing: 2005), p.27. This book also provides a good critical review of competing conceptions of the society and a defence of the society's conception.

³⁰¹ See Notturmo, *Science and the Open Society*, (2000), pp.xviii-xxvii.

civilisations take the motto of critical rationality. It leads us to explore a key link between epistemology and social philosophy of open global society. The threefold category is as follows:

- **Uncritical Rationalism** (Absolutism)
- **Critical Rationalism** (Openness to Rational Criticism)
- **Critical Irrationalism** (Relativism)

I follow Popper's ethics of critical rationalism: I may be wrong, you may be right, let us discuss to get closer to the truth. '*I may be wrong*' means my rationality is limited. '*You may be right*' means whilst your rationality is also limited, you may be partly right. '*Let us discuss*' means that I learn from your criticism of my limited rationality and you learn from my criticism of your limited rationality. In this way, the theory of critical rationalism, as '*openness to criticism*', means that we both should open our *fundamental beliefs* to a mutual criticism and learning from our socially recognised errors, and in this way to get closer to the truth, as the source of our open-ended consensus. In this sense, the *criterion of openness to criticism* can be applied at a rational dialogue amongst civilisations, if they activate their motto of critical rationality. From this point of view, taking a moral decision in favour of such rational dialogue would have an *epistemological necessity* and *dynamic*. It implies that their critical rationality advocate that they ought to do so, if they do not want to contradict themselves.

The three epistemological doctrines can be defined due to their premises about the *criterion* of rationality. The first one, Uncritical Rationalism or absolutism implies that we *can* justify the rationality of all of our beliefs. It uses deductive or inductive logic for justifying the beliefs. Hence, the criterion of rationality is '*justification*' and the logic of rational discourse is either *inductive* or *deductive*. The third epistemology, Critical Irrationalism or relativism, implies that we *cannot* justify our beliefs, hence neither deductive nor inductive logic can justify our beliefs. Like an absolutist, a relativist assumes that '*justification*' is the criterion of rationality. But, the second epistemology (critical rationalism) implies that we *cannot justify any* of our beliefs but we *can criticise all* of them, as Bartley argues. Critical rationalism accepts the *imperfection* and the *objectivity* of our rational beliefs, because it has shifted the criterion of rationality from '*justification*' to '*criticism*'.³⁰² As Notturmo writes:

³⁰² Op. cit, pp.xviii-xxv.

Rationality, according to Popper, is not so much a property of knowledge as a task for humans. ... We are rational to the extent to which we are *open to criticism*, including self-criticism; and to the extent to which we are willing to change our beliefs when confronted with what we judge to be good reason. We are, in short, *rational to the extent to which we are willing to appeal to reason and argument*, as opposed to violence and force, to resolve our dispute³⁰³ [emphasis added].

Given that rationality is here taken as the openness to criticism, the aforementioned epistemologies have far-reaching outcomes for the possibility and the need for a rational dialogue of civilisations. If we follow Uncritical Rationalism, civilisations do not need a rational dialogue, because they have their *perfect systems of rationale* and they do not need to learn from other civilisations. They do not need dialogue, because they are right and others are wrong. If we follow Critical Irrationalism, civilisations do not require a rational dialogue because there is no truth in their universe, deserving to be learned. Their systems of rationale remain incommensurable paradigms that cannot rationally discuss and learn from each other. Popper rejects this Kuhnian claim as the Myth of Framework.³⁰⁴ However, if we follow Critical Rationalism, there is a *strong epistemological necessity* for a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. If all human civilisations are the human-made historical constructs, all of them rest upon their imperfect rationale systems. Hence, they must say to each other I may be wrong, you may be right, let us discuss to learn from our mutual criticism.

In order to develop this critical rationalist logic of dialogue amongst civilisations--as a moral foundation for a multicivilisational open global society, we require a closer inspection of the very criterion of rationality as *criticism* versus *justification*. I use the insightful arguments of Mark Notturmo to address this criterion. Without a direct involvement in Bartley-Popper debate, Notturmo leads us to see what the essence of a *critical rationalist theory of rational dialogue* is. If we aim to explain the essence of a *rationalist identity*, we have two options: using '*justification*' as our criterion of rationality or using '*criticism*' as our criterion. If we are an irrationalist, we need neither *justification* nor *criticism* to test the rationality of our beliefs. We can choose whatever we please! A critical rationalist theory of dialogue addresses following three questions: (a) what is the function of a *valid deductive argument* in a rational dialogue? (b) what is the function of a *falsifier evidence* in a rational dialogue?, and

³⁰³ Op. cit., p.xxv.

³⁰⁴ See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (1992), and see Popper, *The Myth of Framework*, (1994).

(c) what is the function of the *regulative idea of the truth* in a rational dialogue? They shape a theory of rationality to address a *global ethics of openness to criticism*.³⁰⁵

The first question: What is the function of a valid deductive argument in a rational dialogue? For a critical rationalist theory of dialogue, neither *deductive* nor *inductive* inference can justify the rationality of a knowledge claim. Inductive inference cannot verify it, because in an inductive argument the *truth* of the conclusion is *consistent* with the truth of premises, but the *inconsistency* of the premises cannot falsify the argument's conclusions. Hence, if we use an inductive inference, we cannot *refute* the conclusion of the arguments due to the *inconsistency* of the premises. As such, an inductive argument does not *logically force a rational dialogue* to choose between the truth of its conclusions and the falsity of (one or more) of their premises.

A valid deductive inference cannot justify rationality of a belief because we cannot absolutely verify its premises, but a valid deductive argument (especially the *modus tollens*) can transmit the *inconsistency* of the premises of arguments to its conclusions. Hence, it acts as the *logic of criticism*. When we use a valid deductive inference in our rational dialogue, and if the conclusion of our deductively valid argument is false, then one or more of its premises must be false as well. Hence, such a rational dialogue *logically forces dialogic counterparts* to accept the falsity of their conclusions due to the falsity of their premises. A valid argument logically forces us to *learn from criticism*, if we do not want to *contradict ourselves*. Only a valid deductive argument allows us to exercise *rational control* over an *inter-subjective dialogue*, because we cannot simultaneously assert the truth of the premises and deny the conclusions without contradicting ourselves. A valid deductive argument presents us with a set of *mutually exclusive alternatives*. We can choose to accept its premises, in which case we must also accept its conclusions; or reject one or more of its premises, in which case we must reject its conclusions as well.³⁰⁶ Hence, the first principle of a *rational dialogue* is the usage of a *valid deductive argument*. The global ethics of openness to criticism implies that if we use valid deductive arguments in their moral dialogue with other civilisations, there is an epistemological necessity that leads us to a set globally shared values, because we must be ready to accept the falsity of our arguments, if our premises are false. In this way, there is an epistemological mechanism for exercising a

³⁰⁵ Settle, Jarvie, and Agassi, "Towards a Theory of Openness to Criticism," (1974), pp.83-89.

³⁰⁶ Notturmo, *Science and the Open Society*, (2000), pp.65, 105, and 113.

rational control over the dialogue among conflicting moral opinions. A good example for this claim is an actualised rational dialogue and an open-ended consensus amongst global community of scientists who are committed to the motto of scientific methods. Remember that Popper extended the scientific method to his social philosophy of the open society, and this thesis aims to internalise Critical Rationalism in the ideal type of an open global society.

The second question: What is the function of *falsifier evidences* in a rational dialogue? For a critical rationalist theory of dialogue, a falsifier evidence, either empirical or logical, criticises the premises of a valid deductive argument. In this way, it plays a key role in a rational dialogue as a *process of learning from criticism*. Without such a falsifier evidence, a valid deductive argument cannot work as the logic of criticism. We use a falsifier evidence to show that one or more premises of our counterpart's arguments contradict the facts. In this way, we want to persuade our counterpart that his or her conclusions cannot be true due to the falsifier evidence. The key criterion of rationality, as *openness to criticism*, is that we must use falsifier evidences to criticise the premises of our valid deductive arguments. The growth of our rationality, as the growth of scientific knowledge, through a rational dialogue, is depended on the criticisms of the premises as *the mechanism of learning from errors* (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$).

However, such falsifier evidences do not act as *conclusive disproof*. As we cannot *absolutely justify* our arguments, we cannot *absolutely refute* the premises of a valid deductive argument. Like an *uncritical rationalist*, we *do* accept the possibility of a rational dialogue via a valid deductive inference. But, unlike a *critical irrationalist*, we must not regard *criticism* as conclusive disproof, because if we *absolutely refute* rationality of a belief, it means that it is *absolutely wrong*, however due to the limits of knowledge, we cannot prove that it is absolutely wrong. In this way, the middle way of critical rationalism becomes clearer through recognising the role of falsifier evidence. Critical Rationalism differs from Uncritical Rationalism and Critical Irrationalism because they both views justification as the *criterion of rationality*. For Uncritical Rationalism, since we *can* justify all of our belief, we *can* have an absolute rational belief. For Critical Irrationalism, since we *cannot* justify our beliefs, we *cannot* have any rational belief at all. On the contrary, Critical Rationalism *shifts* the *criterion of rationality* from *justification* to *criticism*. This theory of rationality

implies that we *can criticise all of our beliefs: critical rationality means all of our opinions must be open to endless criticism.*³⁰⁷

A rational dialogue amongst world civilisations is possible, if they open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism. When they use valid deductive arguments, in such an open dialogue, they can logically demand that their dialogic counterparts accept the falsity of their conclusions if the premises are criticised. In this way, their rational dialogue can be converged towards an *open-ended consensus* due to a *mutual correction of socially recognised criticisms*. However, they should take the criticisms as an inconclusive disproof, because their criticisms and the resultant consensus is always open to new line of criticisms. If they view their criticisms as conclusive disproof, they remain closed to learning from new line of criticisms. Hence, the second principle of a *rational dialogue* is looking at falsifier evidences as un-finished sources of the growth of our rationality through learning from new line of criticisms.³⁰⁸ If civilisations open their systems of rationale to other civilisations' criticisms, they have actually engaged in producing a meta-civilisational ethics of openness to criticism as moral foundation of a multi-civilisational open global society.

The third question: What is the function of *the regulative idea of the truth* in a rational dialogue? Due to our limited rationality, we cannot fully match our rational conjectures with the fact. However, if we take this impossibility as an absolute disconnection between the conjectures and the facts, we already have denied the objectivity of our rational conjectures. A critical rationalist position implies that we cannot fully match our conjectures with the facts because we have rejected absolutism. However, we cannot also absolutely disconnect our conjectures with the facts because we have already rejected relativism. As such, we can *imperfectly* match our conjectures with the facts. The correspondence theory of truth and the regulative ideal of truth refer to such an *imperfect matching*. Without the regulative idea of the truth, we cannot claim that our conjectures are rational and objective. The principle of approximation to the truth rests upon the acceptance of the regulative idea of truth. An important function of the regulative idea of the truth, in a rational dialogue, is that it leads us to see how criticising the premises of deductive arguments through elimination of errors (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$) approximates the dialogue to the truth.

³⁰⁷ Op. cit., pp .113-118.

³⁰⁸ See W.W. Bartley III, "On the Criticizability of Logic," (1980), pp.67-77.

As such, a rational dialogue amongst competing moral values can be converged towards a revisable moral consensus. The third principle of a *rational dialogue* is that a *revisable inter-subjective consensus* among dialogic counterparts is possible due to their respect for the regulative idea of truth. The global ethics of openness to criticism implies that an approximation to a common global ethics is a feasible global project due to an epistemological necessity that is engaged in a rational dialogue amongst civilisations.

According to the preceding arguments, the essence of a *rationalist identity* are (a) making valued deductive arguments; (b) using falsifiers evidences, either factual or logical, to criticise the premises of our valid arguments, and (c) respecting the principle of the approximation to the truth. If individuals' access to rationality refers to their capacity to be rational moral creatures, they can be engaged in an inter-civilisational dialogue regarding one set of globally shared values that are necessary for creating those global social institutions that protect universal human rights. Such a rational dialogue uses persons' capacity for rational dialogue with each other as the motor force of the emergence of a global ethics of openness to criticism. In this way, the critical rationalist theory of rationality leads us to the moral foundation of the ideal type of open global society. As I will argue later, this moral foundation justifies a global social democracy, because the global ethics of openness criticism recognises all persons as equal possessors of the rights of making global governance accountable to their demands, and equal possessors of the right of having a descent life.

Before ending this sub-section, it is worthy of note that such an ideal type of open global society--as a Kantian imaginary global community-- should not be seen as an unrealistic utopia. In *Theorizing the Good Society*, Jeffrey Alexander points out:

If we study the social movements, the scandals, the crises, the individual and group demands for inclusion and exclusion in contemporary societies, we find that these very practical actions refer to the existence of an imaginary world of a very utopian kind. The world Kant imagined as a priori is, in empirical terms, a *regulative if imaginary ideal*. The people who inhabit this ideal sphere are conceived of as "*our equals*" in status, a status that is neither economic, political, religious, or ethics but *specifically human*. At the basis of this imagined community there exists an idealization of the "*free and autonomous individual*", an actor who is conceived as inherently possessing fundamental capacities and rights. These individuals are believed to form a community, membership in which exhibits solidarity of a collective binding type. ... It creates the notion of "the people". These are imagined, however, only as a people of a very specific type, namely, those who are *capable of*

maintaining individuality and openness in self-governing, democratic community (emphasis added).³⁰⁹

Alexander argues that the historical constructed existence of such an idealized community within the hierarchical and segmented cultural and organisational structures of developed societies has created in democratic and semi-democratic societies a fundamental tension between 'the ideal' and 'the real.' He calls this imaginary sphere as the sphere of civil society, which struggles to turn the ideal of a community of the ends into a social reality. As he reminds us, because democracy allows self-motivate action, the people who make up it must be considered as being capable of activism and autonomy as opposed to being inactive and reliant. They must be seen as rational and reasonable rather than passionate. Persons who are active, self-governing, rational, quiet and realistic will be capable of forming an open social relationship, rather than secretive one.³¹⁰ In other words, Alexander shows that the ideal type of a democratic community is closely rooted in human equal capacities and rights.

4.2.3 An Institutional Outlook for an Open Global Society

The five premises of the normative conception of the person refer to the five major capacities and rights of human beings as *ends in themselves*. The ideal type of open global society employs these premises to introduce the institutional structure of a global society of free and equal persons. The idea does not introduce a mechanism of employing human capacities in order to realise the institutional principles. However, it does defend the ideal type as a logically constructed normative ideal type of global order that is rooted in human beings' real capacities and rights. It shows that if we accept the premise of the five-layer of the normative conception of human nature, we must also recognise the need for the emergence of parallel global social institutions to realise those human capacities and rights. As Linklater reminds us, the task of a normative ideal type of global order is defending it as a legitimate normative goal. However, this ideal type, as a conceptual framework, must be developed into a theoretical framework that addresses the forms of global social learning, capable of turning the ideal type into an institutional reality.³¹¹ Parallel to the five premises of our normative conception of person, an open global society requires the five

³⁰⁹ See Jeffery C. Alexander, "Theorizing the Good Society," *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, (2000), p.295.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.229-300.

³¹¹ Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, (1998), p.142.

institutional principles to introduce a desirable social organisation of an alternative humane globality. These five institutional principles can be suggested as follows:

- The Institution of Global Freedom of Thought
- The Institution of Global Ethics of Openness to Criticism
- The Institution of Global Law of Humanity
- The Institution of Global Democracy
- The Institution of Global Competitive Market

The Institution of Global Freedom of Thought: If human beings are equal in their potential access to critical rationality, they need a global cultural institution to set free their critical rationality. I call this global cultural institution as the institution of a global freedom of thought. Like other social institutions, cultural institutions play an *organisational role* in a social ordering of peoples. A cultural institution provides an ideational space and shared values for justifying certain models of social organisation. Since individuals are rational moral beings, they need a cultural justification for the legitimising their pattern of social organisation. A cultural institution refers to such an ideational justification and shared values for a special model of social organization that rests upon the society's world-views.³¹² The cultural models of social organisation assume certain premises about the person as the ultimate units of social organisation. The institutions of global freedom of thought refer to a meta-civilisational sphere that protects the epistemic equality of persons through making them available alternative systems of rationale. The freedom of thought requires an access to alternative systems of thought. However, the existing civilisational-based cultural spaces do not provide such a global freedom of thought. The main function of the institution of global freedom of thought is to provide persons alternative systems of rationale to enable them to exercise their freedom of thought as the essence of an open global society.

The Institution of Global Ethics of Openness to Criticism: If human beings are equal in their moral capacity to choose their moral values, they require a global ethical institution to protect their moral equality. Peoples are organised in nationally or civilisational-based moral systems, hence their moral freedoms are limited to those schemes of morality. In other words, they do not have the required moral freedom to choose other civilisations' schemes of morality. The institution of global ethics of openness to criticism refers to a meta-civilisational ethics, which protects moral equality of peoples by providing them alternative schemes of morality. The existing

³¹² See Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (USA, First Mariner Books edition: 2005).

pre-global systems of morality do not provide alternative ethical schemes for peoples to choose. The global ethics of openness to criticism is in fact a meta-civilisational moral institution-- which whilst it respects civilisational-based moral systems-- provides peoples with alternative systems of morality that can be selected by themselves.³¹³

The Institution of Global Law of Humanity: If human beings are equal in their legal rights for determining how their social organisation should be taken form, they need a global legal institution to protect their legal equality. In contemporary national-based legal systems or international law, the legal rights of persons are mainly limited to their nationally recognised rights. While a set of minimum legal rights are globally recognised for all peoples, the legal rights are mainly defined due to individuals' national citizenship. If the existing nationally-organised legal systems do not protect persons' equal rights of criticism for making emerging global governance accountable to their demands, a meta-national legal system is required to satisfy such a legal equality. The global law of humanity refers to this meta-national legal institution that protects persons' legal rights, in spite of their national citizenship. At the core of this global legal right is an equal legal right of criticism that enables peoples to realise their moral autonomy beyond their national citizenship.³¹⁴

The Institution of Global Democracy: If human beings are equal in their political rights of self-governance, they need a global body politic that is answerable to the world populations. In the existing global governance, a post-national layer of political governance has been shaped. But, it is not an accountable body politic to the world's population. The institution of global democracy refers to a post-national democratic governance which protects the person's right of political criticism to make global governance accountable to the prospective global citizens. The institution of global democracy goes beyond one civilisation's model of democracy. It aims to protect the rights of peoples to make global governance accountable to the world's population, wherever global relations affect their personal life.

The Institution of Global Competitive Market: If human beings are equal in their socio-economic rights of having a decent life, they need a global economic system,

³¹³ See John Chaevet, "The Possibility of a Cosmopolitan Ethical Order Based on the Idea of Universal Human Rights," pp.8-29., in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner (eds.), *Ethics and International Affairs: Extent and Limits*, (Tokyo, United Nation University Press: 2001).

³¹⁴ See Falk, "The World Order Between Interstate Law and the Law of Humanity," (1995), pp.15-21.

which protects such a right. While the emerging post-national economy has to some extent opened national economies to a global market, the benefits and costs of this new global division of labour is highly unevenly distributed. The institution of global competitive market refers to a global market in which equal rights of peoples for having a decent life can be realised by providing them equal opportunity to enter into a global economic competition. If the existing distribution of economic resources and benefits does not satisfy a decent life for the majority of the world's population, it requires some key institutional reforms.

The five major macro-societal institutions of an open global society do not aim to provide us with an imposed institutional blueprint of such a global society of free and equal persons. Without a dialogue among world civilisations, one cannot address the institutional structure of open global society in detail. The institutional principles provide a model-conception to understand the institutional nature of an ideal open global society. I will develop this model-conception to a theoretical framework by chapter 5 and a macro-sociological analysis of the formation of open global society by chapter 8 that will provide a more details about the institutional structure of the open global society. The premises and the institutions of open global society can be summarised in this way:

- 1) The concept of the open global society is an ideal type, so that a concrete global social order can approximate it more or less. This ideal type can be used as a normative standard for criticising the existing global social order, and also as a guide for attempts to reform it.
- 2) The ideal type of open global society rests on a *normative conception of the person* as a 'rational moral agent' whose critical rationality cognitively fuels his moral capacity to choose between 'wrong' and 'right' action.
- 3) The main and the first premise of the ideal type is the equal access of persons to critical rationality, i.e., their capacity to make valid deductive arguments, to use falsifier evidences to criticise the valid arguments, and to approximate to the truth.
- 4) The second premise of the ideal type is a person's moral capacity of rationalising their actions through opening them to criticism to achieve a cognitive moral autonomy.
- 5) The third premise of the ideal type is a persons' equal legal right of criticism, i.e., their equal right to use their moral autonomy to appeal for a legal self-governance.
- 6) The fourth premise of the ideal type is a persons' equal political right of criticism, i.e., their equal political right for demand a political self-determination.
- 7) The fifth premise of the ideal type is a persons' equal economic right of criticism, i.e., their equal right to having a decent life.

- 8) The first and the main institutional principle of the ideal type refers to a global culture of the freedom of thought which creates a meta-civilisational culture for protecting persons' freedom of thought by providing access to alternative rationale systems.
- 9) The second institutional principle of the ideal type refers to a global ethics of openness to criticism that produces a meta-civilisational ethics for protecting persons' diversity of ethical choose by providing access to alternative moral systems.
- 10) The third institutional principle of the ideal type refers to a global legal system that creates a global law of humanity for enabling peoples to make global governance accountable to their needs whereas global decisions making affect their lives.
- 11) The fourth institutional principles of the ideal type refers to a global political system that produces a global democracy for realising peoples' equal rights to the self-determination on a global scale, whereas global political decisions affect their lives.
- 12) The fifth institutional principle of the ideal type refers to a global economic system which creates a global competitive division of labour for realising peoples' equal rights to having a decent life.
- 13) The open global society, as a global society of free and equal persons, refers to a *global layer* of peoples' social organization on a global scale, which can coexist with local, national, and regional layers of social ordering of peoples. While it organises peoples on a planetary scale, it *does not* refers to a single global civilisation in which civilisational-based systems of rationality, of moral systems, of legal orders, of political systems and economic organisations lose their own meanings at all.
- 14) The open global society's conceptions of freedom of thought; the ethics of openness to criticism; the rule of law; democracy and social justice differ from those nationally or civilisational-based readings of the conceptions. However, they are systematically informed by the critical rationalist theory of rationality.

4.3 Towards a New Normative Vision of Dialogic Globalisation

The macrosociological ideal-type of the open global society has used critical rationalism to present a schematic picture of a potential global society of free and equal persons as a *global layer* of social ordering of peoples. This ideal-type leads us to explore the deviations of the existing global order from the ideal type. In this way, it leads us to develop a new normative critique and a new vision of globalisation. If contemporary globalisation suffers from one set of deep societal deficits, the main reason perhaps is that globalisation has interconnected the whole world, but it has not created an *accountable global organisation* to peoples. Our global social (dis)orders are ultimately originated in the absence of such a global layer of social organisation. If civilisations have not arrived at a pre-commitment to global social democracy, the cultural reason is that they do not share about a common vision regarding the equality of human beings. The human rights are defined for them based on radically different world-views. Hence, without one set of globally shared values regarding human equality, a global layer of democracy and justice cannot be established through a consensual procedure.

The thesis develops a new normative vision of dialogic globalisation on the basis of the premises and institutional principles of the ideal type of open global society. While this ideal type leads us to trace the deviations of liberal model of globality from a dialogic globalisation, we need to advance the ideal type to a *theoretical framework*. The idea of an open global society implies that humans' access to critical rationality can logically provide the epistemological foundation of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. However, the ideal type itself cannot address such rational dialogue--as a global social transformative mechanism that aims to change the exiting global order towards an alternative open global order. The next chapter uses critical rationalism to provide a theoretical framework to address such a transformative function. In this way, it will introduce *rational dialogue* amongst civilisations as a form of global social learning with a macro-institutional transformative function.

Part III

**Developing
a Critical Macrosociology of Globalisation**

Chapter 5

Towards an Analytical Framework for a Macrosociology of Globalisation

The ideal type of open global society introduced the premises and social institutions of such a global society of free and equal persons. But, it does show how human capacities can be used to create such an open global order. This chapter uses the ideal type for the development of an analytical model to address the mechanisms of an open global society formation. The model leads us to explore the transformative functions of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. It employs the principles of Critical Rationalism to introduce a *critical rationalist form of global social learning*.

Chapter 5 begins with section 5.1 that utilises critical rationalism to advance the normative conception of human nature to a critical rationalist model of human action. To this end, it critically reviews three competing models of human action, namely the Hobbesian, the Lockean and the Kantian action models, and their implications for analysing the emergence of social order. It critically reviews Kantian-inspired models of action that are suggested by Talcott Parsons and Jürgen Habermas. It argues that these Kantian-inspired models can be advanced by a critical rationalist model of human action. Section 5.2 applies the critical rationalist model to introduce a *critical rationalist form of social learning* as a mechanism of social changes. In this way, it provides a micro-foundation for a macrosociological analysis of transition from a closed to an open global society. Section 5.3 applies the critical rationalist model of social learning at a global scale to argue for a global social learning through a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. It aims to show how people's access to critical

rationality enables them to engage in such global social learning, operating as the mechanism of one set of global social changes.

5.1 Towards a Critical Rationalist Model of Human Action

Sociological theory is concerned with human action at the micro-level and social order at the macro-level. As Milan Zafirovski argues, sociological theory achieves an integration between the analysis of individual actions and analysis of the formation of social order.³¹⁵ As Hans Joas reminds us, sociology requires a fundamental theory of action that is able to define various types of action according to how they differed, especially from rational action. For him, such a sociological theory refers to a theory of society, as an interconnection of actions that goes beyond merely the unintentional linking of actions motivated by self-interest. It aims to analyse the formation of human society as the result of a normative agreement amongst individual members of the society.³¹⁶ Viewed from this *micro-macro* link, a macrosociology of dialogic globalisation, aiming to address the formation of an open global society, requires a theory of human action that rests upon the premises of the ideal type of open global society, in particular the premise of the person's access to critical rationality.

5.1.1 Three Competing Models of Human Action

In order to advance the conception of human nature to a critical rationalist model of human action, it is important to recognise a key function of *action theories* in the development of sociological theories. According to Hans Joas:

In sociology, the classical thinkers of the discipline in this century who have shaped mainstream theory formation—be they Max Weber and Talcott Parsons—attempt to ground not only their own studies but also the discipline as a whole in a theory of action. ...Almost all of the most important contemporary [sociological] theories can be characterized in terms of a specific theory of action.... The best-known and most significant of these are Habermas's theory of communicative action, Giddens' theory of (activistic) structuration...³¹⁷

Joas provides an analysis of the emergence of *competing action theories* and their impacts on the emergence of sociological theories. In the same line of reasoning, Jeffrey Alexander writes, “every macrotheorist of social systems or institutions makes assumptions about how individuals act and interact; these assumptions are crucial to

³¹⁵ Milan Zafirovski, "Unification of Sociological Theory by the Rational Choice Model," *Sociology*, 33, (1999), p.509.

³¹⁶ Hans Joas, *The Creativity of Action*, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1996), p.35.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.2.

their large-scale theories even when they not made explicit—as, indeed, they usually are not.”³¹⁸ Hans Joas believes that Parsons' argument regarding action theories is the best way to introduce the central discourse on the implications of action theories for sociology.³¹⁹ He situates Parsons' action theory in a major confrontation between a Kantian model of human action and a Hobbesian one. Parsons introduces his theory of action as a Kantian-inspired alternative to a Hobbesian model of action as a *utilitarian model of action*.³²⁰

Parsons claims that his theory of action uses the insights of a common conception of action theory which can be detected in the works of four representative authors from four countries; namely; Alfred Marshal (England), Vilfred Pareto (Italy), Emile Durkheim (France), and Max Weber (Germany). Joas argues that Parsons' claim about such common conceptions is criticised. Nevertheless, his central debate about a major confrontation between the Kantian and the Hobbesian models remains a valid argument in the discourse of action theories.³²¹ I argue that we can add a Lockean model of human action as a middle ground between the Hobbesian and the Kantian models of human action. This Lockean model refers to a different version of the utilitarian model of action, but it should be separated from the Hobbesian model. In this way, the three competing models of human action can be categorised as follows:

- The Hobbesian Model of Human Action
- The Lockean Model of Human Action
- The Kantian Model of Human Action

I situate Parsons and Habermas' models of human action in the Kantian model. A Popperian-informed (critical rationalist) model of human action advances the Kantian-inspired models of human action. A critical review of the Hobbesian action model is the starting point of my discussion in this section. To introduce the Kantian model, Parsons' critique of the utilitarian model of action will be discussed, and followed by Habermas' critique of Parsons' action theory. Finally, I will propose the critical rationalist action model, as an alternative for Habermas' communicative action model.

³¹⁸ Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Action and Its Environment," p.290. in Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, Richard Much, and Neil J. Smelser, (eds.) *The Micro-Macro Link*, (London, University of California Press: 1987).

³¹⁹ Joas, op. cit., (1996), p.8.

³²⁰ See Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, vol.1, (USA, The Free Press: 1968), pp.43-87.

³²¹ Joas, *The Creativity of Action* (1996), pp.1-34.

It is important to note that the action theory plays an *explanatory role* for the sociological analysis of the emergence of a peaceful social order, because it addresses the causes of human actions as the ultimate impetuses of social order. A human action refers to a *goals-means framework* in which context the dynamic of human actions can be addressed. Hence, a theory or a model of human action must lead us to see how 'action-goals' take shape, and operate as the ultimate causes of human behaviours. It also must lead us to explore how 'action-means' work to realise the action-goals. In this sense, the key function of a model of human action is to address the ends-means framework as the context of human action's formation. An action theory can be linked with the *theories of rationality* because human rationality affects choice of action's goals and means. Competing models of human action provide a different analysis of *human action's ends-means framework* and their relations with *human rationality*. They lead us to see different causality analyses of the motor forces of human action that pave the way for different sociological analyses of the emergence of social order.

The Hobbesian Model of Human Action: Thomas Hobbes put the following question for modern sociological theory: How could persons whose tendency in the conditions of nature is to *act egoistically* develop a peaceful social order?³²² Hobbes' action model provides a micro-foundation to address this macro-sociological question. In the Hobbesian model of human action, *the passions or desires* determine action-goals and *reason* is a servant of the passions or desires. For this model, *reason* is the faculty of devising means to secure what one desires. Desires are random and there is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of desires themselves.³²³ The Hobbesian model is a utilitarian model of action because it views desires or utilities as the ultimate ends of action.³²⁴ In this model, action-goals are subjective and have been separately shaped for each person. In this sense, action-goals are viewed as given and exogenous to the ends-means framework. People use their reason for not *rationally* justifying their action-goals but for finding the best means to satisfy the given goals for which there is not a *rational criterion*. For the Hobbesian model, reason *cannot* identify the *rightness* or *wrongness* of action-goals. If action-goals are subjectively determined by each person and are unique to that person, they do not

³²² Op. cit., p.9.

³²³ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons: 1962), pp.64-87.

³²⁴ Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, (1968), p.90.

have a necessary relation with other peoples' action-goals. The others only constitute the means or conditions for the fulfillment of one's own goals.³²⁵

The Hobbesian goals-means framework rests upon a pessimistic epistemology that rejects the possibility of a achieving a rational consensus on action-goals amongst individuals. For Hobbes, “The conflict of opinions over the good has produced the war of all against all... The incompatibility of opinions regarding the good has produced absolute evil.”³²⁶ In the absent of a rational consensus over the action-goals, individuals adopt in their subjective ends the most effective available means. These means are found to be the force and fraud. The others become the means for the individual's own ends. In this way, peoples become enemies of each other and can use force and fraud to make others their own means.³²⁷ As such, the state of nature would inevitably be the state of war. As Istvan Hont argues, the Hobbesian model refers to “the opposite of society as a shared system of values ...[but] a state of permanent hostility, or war...”³²⁸ If private appetite is the measure of good and evil, and the desires determine human action and if the reason is a servant of the passions; peoples cannot have a shared value-set to which they locate the origins of their action-goals.

Alexander Wendt argues that Hobbes' account of human nature leads to a *culture of enmity* in which individuals do not recognise each other as equal persons. Hence, they use the force and fraud in order to enforce others to act as the means for realising their own ends. The logic of enmity is the ‘war of all against all’, in which actors operate on the principle of ‘kill or be killed’. This social philosophy originates from Hobbes' action model: action-goals are subjective and cannot be rationally evaluated. Hence there is no a rational foundation on which they can base and organise their social order.³²⁹ Hobbes' action model fuels his political philosophy.³³⁰ Since there is no a mechanism for people's self-preservation in an anarchical society or in the state of permanent hostility, each person has the *absolute right* to self-preservation. However, in order to realise this absolute right, persons must give up their own rights to another person or to the assembly of them, i.e. *Leviathan*: an absolute power that

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, (1994), p.23.

³²⁷ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (1962), p.66.

³²⁸ Melching and Velema, *Main Trends in Cultural History*, (1994), p.60.

³²⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (1999), pp.266-267.

³³⁰ On Hobbes' political philosophy see: Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis*, (Oxford: 1936) and Richard Tuck (ed.) *Hobbes Leviathan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996).

makes social order possible. But, the paradox of Hobbesian solution to the emergence of a peaceful social order, is that it aims to concentrate power in the hands of a single authority in the hopes that this dictator will prove a partial exception to the rule that human are bad and should be regarded with distrust.³³¹ As Parsons argues, the Hobbesian model of human action does not provide us with a micro-foundation for a sociological analysis that aims to address the possibility of a peaceful social order.³³²

The Lockean Model of Human Action: John Locke's model of human action shares attributes with the Hobbesian model in terms of "a plurality of discrete individuals, each pursuing his own ends independently of the others. Though there is not explicit statement that these ends are random, as there is in Hobbes's work, yet it is quite clear that Locke entertains no clear conception of any positive model of relation between them."³³³ Locke does not argue that a rational consensus on the ultimate goals of actions is possible. The only explicit treatment of action's goals is that of the natural rights, which humans hold by nature. However, these natural rights are to be regarded as the universal conditions of the attainment of individual ends, not as the ultimate ends in themselves. They are the things that all rational persons want as the means regardless of the character of their action-goals.³³⁴ The Lockean model shares with the Hobbesian model saying that humans are rational in looking for suitable means to realise their goals.³³⁵ As A.P. Brogan writes, "Locke's doctrine concerning the nature of human action is both egoistic and hedonistic...The egoistic or selfish theory is taken so much for granted by Locke."³³⁶ Given our previous arguments, the Lockean model of human action is a utilitarian model that limits the rationality of action to the rationality of its means as opposed to the rationality of its goals.

It is important to note that, as David Levy argues, that Locke's model of action is a *theological utilitarian* model. In this model, action-goals are subject to some kind of *rational judgment* but not because humans can rationally justify action-goals. Locke argues that peoples' rational faith in religion, like the Christian theology, create some

³³¹ See Robert O. Keohane "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics," p.168. in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds.) *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalisation and the End of the Cold War*, (Oxford, Westview Press: 1995).

³³² It is worthy of note that sociological theories that use the Hobbesian style of human action, as their micro-foundation, emphasises on conflicting nature of social order. For instance, the lack of subjective consensus in micro-level relates with the conflicting social order in macro-level in Structural Marxism.

³³³ Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, (1968), p.95.

³³⁴ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, Everyman (ed.) (London: 1690), p.119.

³³⁵ Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, (1968), p.95.

³³⁶ A.P. Brogan, "John Locke and Utilitarianism," *Ethics*, vol. 69. No.2 (1959), p.80.

moral constrains on their goals. As Levy points out, "...theological utilitarianism presupposes a system of belief in which an action goal is articulated that is of higher order of important than any other goal the individual may conceivably have."³³⁷ Locke assumes that individuals possess sufficient rationality to follow the God's commands, limiting their action goals. Unlike Hobbes, Locke recognises that humans' moral freedom to respecting the God's commands is rooted in their access to rationality.³³⁸ However, he does argue that human reason cannot independently provide judgments for the rightness and wrongness of the action-goals. In Levy's words: "For Locke, this [moral] motive is provided by Christian revelation of the reality of heaven and hell. In Locke's polemical account, classical philosophy does not provide a foundation for principle behavior. ...Moral choice is utility-maximizing when the infinite value of the side-payments promised in Christian revelation are taken into account."³³⁹ Locke uses this action model for the development of his theories of '*property right*' and '*constitutional state*'.

Since the moral imperatives for Locke are determined by divine revelations, he employs the action model to draw his social philosophy. All individuals are God's property, such that no one has the right to harm himself or anyone else. God gave the world to humanity as a whole. God gave humans reason. With these three revelations, Locke argues that property could have arisen rightfully.³⁴⁰ If the property right is a natural outcome of a rational faith in the Christian moral codes, and if the most urgent and important human need is to survive, individuals require social institutions to protect their property right. However, the person's right to property is essentially prior to the institution of society, independent of a consensus with others. Unlike Hobbes, Locke rightly argues that for protecting this natural right, individuals *cannot* give up their own rights in favour of an absolute monarchy that is unaccountable to them. Locke's model of human action provides a micro-foundation for his macro-analysis of

³³⁷ David Levy, "Rational Choice and Morality: economic and classical philosophy," *History of Political Economy*, 14 (1), (1982), p.12. Also see: John Colman, *John Locke's Moral Philosophy* (UK, Edinburgh:1983).

³³⁸ Locke, op. cit., pp.61 and 63. Also see: Peter Laslett (ed.) *Locke, Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge, Combridge Press: 2009).

³³⁹ Levy, op. cit., p.13. Also see John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, I. T. Ramsey (ed.) (Stanford, California: 1958), p.61.

³⁴⁰ Locke, *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, (1690), pp .6, 25, and 26., Also see John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of The Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government'*, (Cambridge: 1969). Also see: Frederick Pollock, "Locke's Theory of the State,"(Proceedings of the British Academy: 1904).

the need for establishing a constitutional state.³⁴¹ For Locke, the right to property is a non-negotiable right, because it has already been justified by a faith in Christian theology. However, people can agree on a social contract, in terms of a constitutional state, to protect their non-negotiable natural property rights.³⁴²

As Wendt argues, the Lockean social philosophy rests on a model of the person as 'rival' rather than 'enemy'. Nevertheless, "like enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence, but these representative are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their 'life and liberty' as a *right*."³⁴³ This logic of rivalry implies that individual members of society are equal because of their natural right to property. However, they are not equal because of their equal access to reason. As E.J. Hundert points out, "liberalism's most distinctive feature is its assertion of individual, pre-political property rights, and views this claim as part of a comprehensive social philosophy of the individual's place in society."³⁴⁴ Their social agreement is a consensus amongst *rivals* who maximise their own utilities, whereas their property rights are protected by a constitutional state. But there is no a rational consensus regarding their action-goals. This social consensus leads rivals to a commercial society, as a middle ground between the society as a system of shared values (the Kantian model of social order) and the society as the war of all against all (the Hobbesian model of social order).³⁴⁵

In a commercial society, rivals "can enter into a network of reciprocal associative relationship before or without forming common values, because they might find that association is the only way to guarantee survival. They would associate not because they love...They would be guided by the utility offered by human association and cooperation. ...market sociability is transactional, and its principle is utility."³⁴⁶ These utility maximising competitors seek for their own subjective goals because the Lockean model, like the Hobbesian model, assumes that they cannot employ their

³⁴¹ On this see: Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, (1994), pp.39-52.

³⁴² Ibid, pp.48-52. Also see: Quentin Skinner, *The Foundation of Modern Political Thought*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1978).

³⁴³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (1999), p.279.

³⁴⁴ E.J.Hundert, "Market Society and Meaning in Locke's Political Philosophy", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 15 (1) (1977), p.33.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.33-44.

³⁴⁶ Istvan Hont, "Commercial Society and Political Theory in the Eighteenth Century," pp.60-61., in Melching and Velema (eds.), *Main Trends in Cultural History*, (1994).

critical reason to agree on one set of shared action-goals. In this sense, the Hobbesian and Lockean models of human action are shared in this key premise of the utilitarian model: a rational dialogue amongst conflicting opinions over the good is not possible, hence action-goals are purely determined subjectively.³⁴⁷

The Kantian Model of Human Action: Unlike Hobbes and Locke, Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy implies that individuals' access to critical reason enable them to enter into a rational dialogue about the ultimate goals of their action. In other words, Kant does not limit human reason's usage to merely finding suitable means for realising action-goals. Kant assumes that individuals can utilise the reason to make an *independent moral judgment* regarding the rightness or wrongness of their action-goals. Kant's *cognitivist ethics* connects his critical philosophy with his ethical theory.³⁴⁸ In his analysis of the *Metaphysic of Morals*, he argues that since all human beings are rational agents, each of them should regard the other as an end *per se*. As such, the main moral principle is that peoples should treat each other as the end *per se* rather than means. The Kantian model of human action refers to a moral action that recognises others as the end in themselves due to their access to critical reason.³⁴⁹ It is worthy of note, as Alexander argues, different assumptions regarding the action's relative rationality separates action models from one another.³⁵⁰

Viewed from Kantian conception of human nature, he was a political thinker of the Enlightenment who perhaps best captured the tremendous moral ambiguity of commercial sociability.³⁵¹ As Hont writes, "he saw the need for a science of society which could complement his ethical theory and could give historical meaning to his moral teleology. He recognised, however, that anybody who wanted to become a Kepler or Newton of the science of humankind had to accept that mankind, through

³⁴⁷ The utilitarian model of human action is developed in the context of the rational choice theory. However, the central logic of the utilitarian model remains unchanged: 'action-goals' are subjective and 'action-means' are rational and objective since they lead us to a rational calculation of the suitability of action-means to action-goals. For a good review of the rational choice theory see: James S. Coleman and Thomas J. Farrao (eds.), *Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique*, (Beverly Hills, Sage: 1992). Also see: James S. Coleman, "Microfoundations and Macrsocial Behavior," pp.153-171 in Alexander, et al., *The Micro-Macro Link* (1987).

³⁴⁸ Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Kant, *Political Writings*, (1991), p.43. Also see: K. Fikschuh, *Kant and Modern Political Philosophy*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2000).

³⁴⁹ See Immanuel Kant, "Metaphysical Foundation of Morals," Trans. by Carl J. Friedrich in *The Philosophy of Kant—Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings* (New York, The Modern Library: 1949), pp.140-208.

³⁵⁰ See Alexander, "Action and Its Environment," p.295 in Alexander et al. (1987).

³⁵¹ Hont, "Commercial Society and Political Theory," (1994), p.70.

the civilizing process, could develop a model 'law-governed social order'.³⁵² For Johan Heilbron, the new moral philosophy was most clearly reflected in the work of Kant. "Moral rules were obligations and their rational foundation was one of his best-known contributions."³⁵³ Kant was fully aware of the contradictions involved in the commercial sociability, what he called '*unsocial sociability*'.³⁵⁴

He realised that in commercial society, individuals are forced to cooperate with others (*rivals*) yet they are thinking only of themselves. If individuals cannot agree on shared values, their utilitarian sociability rests on their separated ends. This model of social cooperation was regarded as an *unsocial sociability* in which individuals do not recognise others as *ultimate ends in themselves*, because the others matters as much as they are useful means for realising one's own ends. They may respect each others' equal right to property, but they do not recognise the others as *ends in themselves* because of their equal access to critical reason and as equal moral beings.³⁵⁵

On the contrary, as Wendt argues, the Kantian philosophy refers to a *philosophy of friendship*. Individuals can be involved in a social cooperation in which others are viewed as friends (*ends in themselves*) who can arrive at a rational consensus regarding how their social order must be organised to satisfy the interests of all persons.³⁵⁶ Kant believed that a social learning in the form of reaching an agreement about universal moral principles--which are present in human reason--can lead individuals to a normative agreement over their action-goals as the moral basis of their social order.³⁵⁷

Talcott Parsons has tried to formulate a Kantian-inspired sociology on the basis of Kantian conception of the human nature. To this end, Parsons uses Kant's cognitivist ethics to introduce a human action model, implying that action-goals are shaped through individuals' voluntarily normative orientations to the society's value systems. Parsons' action theory recognises that action-means refer to suitable ways of realising of normatively orientated action-goals. But he rightly argues that, in addition,

³⁵² Kant,(1991), p.45.

³⁵³ Johan Heilbron, *The Rise of Social Theory*, (London, Polity Press: 1995), p.76.

³⁵⁴ Kant, (1991), p.45. For a Marxian critique of liberal man see: Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in a Capitalist Society*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1976).

³⁵⁵ See Johan Heilbron, Lars Magnussob and Bjorn Wittrock, *The Rise of the Social Sciences and the Formation of Modernity*, (London, Kluwer Academic Publishers: 1996), pp.100-101.

³⁵⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (1999), pp.298-302.

³⁵⁷ Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations, A Contemporary Reassessment*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2006), p.118. , note 3

individuals have a moral capacity to choose their normative orientations to their action's goals, in the context of the society's value system. Hence, peoples can collectively agree on one set of ultimate action-goals as a reference point for their social cooperation. As noted, Parsons' theory of action is called as a voluntaristic theory of action.³⁵⁸ This theory implies that human beings enjoy a certain moral capacity-- due to their access to reason-- that enables them to choose their normative orientations to a value system. This moral capacity leads them to a societal agreement regarding a set of common action-goals. The emergence of a peaceful social order is possible, because individuals voluntarily establish such a moral foundation for their social order.³⁵⁹

Parsons uses the Kantian logic to criticise the utilitarian model of action, in its the Hobbesian or the Lockean version. The key difference between Parsons' theory of action and the utilitarian theory of human action refers to the possibility of achieving a rational consensus amongst individuals over action-goals. As argued, the utilitarian action model does not recognise such an epistemological possibility. For utilitarians, action-goals are subjective and private, unique to each person. Hence, individuals' action-goals are separately determined. Using the Kantian logic, on the contrary, Parsons argues that because of humans' access to reason, individuals are able to arrive at a set of common action-goals on which basis they can regulate their social relations. Parsons argues that the utilitarian theory of action is unable to address the *origin of action-goals* because it views action-goals as given and as an exogenous to the goals-means formwork. If they are determined outside of the framework, how can the framework (the model of action) address their origins?

Parsons argues that the freedom of human choice refers to the individuals' ability to employ their reason to inform their moral decisions. In this sense, humans' moral freedom implies that they can select their normative orientations in relations to the society's value system. However, for the utilitarian theory of action, action-goals are subject to random variation. This conception of choice freedom is insufficient for addressing voluntaristic nature of human action, as Parsons argues.³⁶⁰ The utilitarian model of action fulfils a necessary condition for conceptualising the actor's freedom of choice: the ends can be different, independent of the means. But, it does not

³⁵⁸ See Joas, *The Creativity of Action*, (1996), pp.9-34.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p.12.

provide a sufficient account of the freedom of choice, because so long as normative concept of human action relates only to the effectiveness of the means to successfully realise the ends, and so long as, beyond such decision maxims, no values or rationality are permitted to regulate selection of the end themselves; the utilitarian model of action cannot lead us to explore how actors make a mistake in terms of their selections of action-goals. However, if our access to reason leads us to realise the '*rightness*' or '*wrongness*' of our moral decision, our *moral freedom* must reflect itself in our choice of action-goals.³⁶¹ The Kantian *cognitivist ethics* implies that we can select our action-goals due to our access to reason. Hence, our rationality is the ultimate impetus of our moral choice.

As argued in the Hobbesian and the Lockean models of action, if we regard the passions or interests as the main impetus of human actions, the reason becomes a servant of those variables. Under these conditions, human rationality just finds an instrumental function: matching suitable means to subjectively determined goals. In this case, humans are not free to choose their own action-goals. However, if we view the passions and interests as servants of human reason, reason empowers us to select action-goals themselves. If so, action-goals cannot be merely subjective ends. Human rationality shapes them inter-subjectively. For Parsons, action-goals form through individuals' voluntarily orientations to the society's value system. As such, their normative consensus over a set of common action-goals leads them to a consensual-based social cooperation for achieving the goals. However, the utilitarian action model is insufficient for addressing the emergence of a peaceful social order because it has already ruled out the possibility of arriving at a rational consensus over action-goals. Even in the case of a liberal society, people's inter-subjective consensus over liberal values paves the way for the formation of liberal social institutions such as a constitutional state and a market economy.

Parsons rightly argues that if we limit the freedom of action-goals to their random variation we cannot address the emergence of a peaceful and free society:

There would be no guarantee that any large proportion of such goals would include a recognition of other people's ends as valuable in themselves, and there would thus be no necessary limitation on the means that some, at least, would employ to gain their own ends at the expense of others. The relations of individuals then would tend to be resolved into a struggle for power—for the means for each to realize his own ends. ...Insofar, however, as

³⁶¹ Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, (1968), pp.63-64.

individuals share a *common* system of ultimate ends, this system would, among other things, define what they all hold their relations ought to be, would lay down norms determining these relations and limits on the use of others as means, on the acquisition and use of power in general. Insofar, then, as action is determined by ultimate goals, the existence of a *system* of such ends common to the members of the community seems to be only alternative to the state of chaos—a necessary factor in social stability.³⁶²

As noted, Kant believed that individuals can arrive at a normative consensus over the moral foundation of a law-governed social order because of their access to reason. Parsons provides a *sociological explanation* of the need for such a moral foundation by linking his normative theory of action to his sociological analysis. Individuals can share a common system of ultimate ends due to their moral freedom for taking a normative orientation to such a common value system. Insofar as individuals' actions are determined by the ultimate goals, such a value system makes possible a peaceful social cooperation. Parsons acknowledges that, “this [normative] position of Kant's is clearly of central important to the general theory of action. We hold that it is locus of the most fundamental underlying premises or assumption of *social* ordering at the human level.”³⁶³ Richard Munch explains this Kantian core of Parsons' action theory and its outcomes for modern sociological theory.

Munch points out that, “just as Kant developed his theory of [social] action as an alternative to philosophical utilitarianism, Parsons developed his theory of action as an alternative to sociological utilitarianism. This alternative Parsons terms voluntaristic action theory. ...As soon as a centralized force does not provide a factual order by causality determined compliance, social order is only possible as long as the actors voluntarily consent and bind themselves to common normative frame of reference.”³⁶⁴ Parsons' solution for a peaceful social order originates from his Kantian model of human action in which humans' access to rationality make them moral agents capable of arriving at a normative agreement. However, a key question for Parsons's theory of action and his sociological theory are that why individuals agree on different value systems as the moral foundations of their different patterns of social organisation.

³⁶² Talcott Parsons, "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory," *International Journal of Ethics*, 45 (3) (1935), p.295.

³⁶³ Talcott Parsons, *Action Theory and the Human Condition*, (New York, Free Press: 1978), pp.370-371.

³⁶⁴ Richard Much, "Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action, I. The Structure of Kantian Core," *American Journal of Sociology*, 86 (4) (1981), pp.718 and 722.

Parsons believes that sociologists should take the historical diversity of normative agreements as a given fact, and then they should attempt to determine what are the ultimate value-systems relevant to understanding human actions in a given society at a given time?³⁶⁵ But, if we move from the level of domestic society to a global scale, we cannot take this value system's diversity as a given fact. From the Kantian cosmopolitan viewpoint, if all human beings are *ends in themselves*, due to their access to reason, their submission to universally accepted values must lead them to a global value system. Hence, we need to develop our human action's model as if it can address the possibility of a rational dialogue amongst competing value systems. In other words, the emergence of various value systems must be addressed as an indigenous variable of our human action's model and our sociological analysis.

Parsons does not enter into the debate regarding how a rational dialogue amongst individuals has led them to their normative orientation to the value-system itself. However, we can find such a debate in Habermas' communicative theory of action and his critical sociology of dialogic community. Habermas' theory of communicative action can be regarded as a Kantian-inspired action model since it gives the primacy to a dialogic reason as the impetus for human action. He replaces the subject-centric rationality with a communicative rationality as the basis of his communicative theory of action. His action theory is in fact a critique of the utilitarian model of action. More fundamentally, Habermas' theory of action leads us to an *epistemic dynamic* of social order formation: a *social learning* process through which peoples rationally agree on the normative foundation of their social order. It enables us to explore how a rational dialogue amongst competing value systems is possible and why it can lead us to a common value-system on a global scale.

Habermas rightly argues that in order to address the question as to how action-goals are inter-subjectively defined and determined, we need first to explain how individuals' access to a communicative reason enables them to agree on such mutual definition of action-goals. Addressing the formation of action-goals must be an indigenous part of a human action model, which must address how such inter-subjectively shared action-goals emerge. Habermas criticises Parsons' action theory because of his failure to address the epistemic nature of individuals' normative orientations towards their value-system. He attributes this failure to epistemological

³⁶⁵ Ibid., pp.297 and 312.

basis of the Parsons' action theory: *a subject-centred rationality*. It means that the individuals' rationality is shaped through a one sided relation between the *knowing subject* and the *subject matter of the study*. From the Kantian view, if individuals' action-goals is shared, the reason is that they can use their subject-centred rationality to recognise particular norms by submitting to universally-accepted values that present in human reason. Habermas believes that actors' rationality does not form through such one sided relation. In contrast, his communicative rationality refers to a discursive model of reason that defines human rationality as the product of an inter-subjective consensus. Habermas' theory of rationality shifts the criterion of rationality from the correspondence of subjective conjectures with the objective facts towards an *inter-subjective consensus*.³⁶⁶

I shall argue about problematic nature of Habermas' communicative epistemology in the next sub-section. Nevertheless, his theory of communicative action significantly contributes to the development of a critical rationalist model of human action, because it leads us to explore how the moral order (value-system) of the society is shaped through a rational dialogue amongst individuals due to their access to reason. On a global scale, we can apply this dialogic logic to argue for the possibility of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations' value systems. But Parsons' action theory does not provide us such a framework. Keeping this in mind, Habermas defines *rational action* in this way:

Actions or symbolic expressions are 'rational' insofar as they are based on knowledge which can be criticized. ...[It] links the term 'rational' to the notion of intersubjective assessment and thereby points towards a broader concept of *communicative rationality* in which various participants overcome their *merely subjective views* and, by virtue of *the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction*, assume themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their life-relation [emphasis added].³⁶⁷

Habermas' action model implies that persons' access to communicative rationality enables them to arrive at an *inter-subjective consensus* regarding action-goals. Hence, the value system is not exogenous to the action model. In the communicative action model, '*language*' is medium of reaching an inter-subjective consensus. Habermas views communicative action as a '*speech act*'. He believes that while Weber and Parsons distinguish various types of human action and link them to the establishment

³⁶⁶ Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action. The Critique of Functionalist Reason*, vol. two trans. by Thomas McCarthy, (London, Polity Press: 1981), pp.273-344.

³⁶⁷ See John B. Thompson, "Rationality and Social Rationalization: An Assessment of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action," *Sociology*, 17 (2) (1982), p.282.

of social relationships, their subject-centred model of goal-directed action is the reference point of their action theories. The communicative theory of action shifts this reference point to an *inter-subjective model* of goal-directed action that can address the question of how *action goals* themselves are inter-subjectively determined.³⁶⁸ Habermas' action theory advances Parsons' voluntaristic action model. It enables us to explore how a rational dialogue among individuals can bring about a social learning for the formation of the society's value system. Delanty reminds us the contribution of Habermas' social theory to the development of social theory in twenty century is substantive: "The most ambitious attempt after Parsons to impose a synthesis of theoretical traditions in social theory was that of Jurgen Habermas. ...In this pivotal work Habermas attempted to reconcile the critique of instrumental reason—from Marx through Weber to the Frankfurt School—with the functionalist tradition and symbolic interaction, from Durkheim and Mead to Parsons."³⁶⁹ Habermas' sociology can be advanced by employing critical rationalism as a new base for defining rational action.

5.1.2 Critical Rationalism and the Origins of Action-Goals

Critical Rationalism as an inter-subjective theory of rationality can lead us to a new analytical model of human action that aims to address the origins of human's action-goals. As argued, a theory of human action is a theory that addresses the causes of human action. Inspired by the Kantian cognitivist ethics, Critical Rationalism, as a theory of human rationality, leads us to argue for a new model of rational action in which human actions are rational insofar as they are open to *inter-subjective criticism*. If human actions are different patterns of human action's goals-means, the key reason is that different patterns of rationality influence human action's goals-means. Different patterns of human action's goals-means in turn pave the way for the emergence of different patterns of social organisation. If we take critical rationality as the basis of our model of rational action, we can categorise different rationale systems and different patterns of social organisation due to their *closedness* or *openness* to inter-subjective criticism. Peoples in different societies follow different rationale systems to shape their value systems as ultimate sources of their action-goals. In a word, a critical rationalist model of action can describe and evaluate human action through

³⁶⁸ Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. one (1981), pp.96-102.

³⁶⁹ Gerard Delanty, "The Foundations of Social Theory: Origins and Trajectories" p.44. in Bryan Turner (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory*, (London, Blackwell: 2006).

connecting their goals-means frameworks to actors' closedness or openness to inter-subjective criticism and learning from mistakes.

A critical rationalist action model leads us to explore how the rationale systems operate as the epistemic driving forces for human actions and social organisation. But, as noted above it goes beyond the description of the existing social organisations due to their closed or open rationale systems. It causes us to evaluate those patterns of social organisation due to closedness or openness of their systems of rationale to inter-subjective criticism. For critical rationalism, the criterion of a rational action is its openness to *inter-subjective criticism* rather than its origin in an *inter-subjective consensus*. Due to their access to critical rationality, individuals can enter into a rational dialogue that is open to inter-subjective criticism in order to shape normative order of their social order. At the center of this normative order we can situate the ethics of openness to criticism.

As noted earlier, the *ethics of openness to criticism* would be the value system of such an open society. In his defence of Bartley's theory of critical rationality, Noretta Koertge recognises the importance of such a theory for the development of a new rational action model. She argues that while the theory of rational action must be linked with a theory of rational belief, we must acknowledge that the question of the rationality of 'ends' is largely ignored, whereas the rationality of 'end' is closely connected with the rationality of our beliefs. For her, Bartley's theory of rationality provides a sound basis for linking the rationality of our beliefs with the rationality of our actions through a critical rationalist justification of the action's ends themselves.³⁷⁰

In comparison with Habermas' communicative action theory a critical rationalist model of action becomes understandable. Habermas' theory of communicative action rests upon his consensus theory of rationality. Based on this theory, he builds his discourse theory of ethics. Individuals use their communicative rationality to enter into a moral-practical learning process regarding how society should be organised to satisfy the interests of all persons. Communicative rationality introduces an *inter-subjective consensus* as the criterion of rationality and rational action. The discursive ethics implies that "only those norms are valid to which all affected persons could

³⁷⁰ See: Noretta Koertge, "Bartley's Theory of Rationality," *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 4 (1974), pp.75-81.

agree as participant in rational discourse”.³⁷¹ The discursive principle is not just a moral principle; it covers morality, law and democracy.³⁷² A critique of Habermas' communicative rationality affects his critical social theory of a dialogic community, as a whole.

Habermas' discursive model of rationality originates from his consensus theory of truth. The consensus theory of truth implies that the truth of a statement rests on a rational consensus. Habermas claims that facts are not things or events on the face of the globe, rather, they are derived from a state of affairs, and a state of affairs that are the propositional content of statements.³⁷³ Given this linguistic definition of the facts, the truth-problem emerges as an inherently discursive affair. Habermas is then in a position that the truth-problem centres on the validation of claims made in language rather than on the verification of experiences. For him, the logic of truth discovery is a *consensus of all*. This epistemological logic shapes Habermas' critical social theory as a whole. People can understand each other hence they arrive at an inter-subjective consensus. Habermas assumes that there is a necessary link between *reaching understanding* and arriving at an *inter-subjective agreement*.³⁷⁴ As Jeffrey Alexander writes, “Habermas has claimed that engaging in communication assumes the capacity for reaching rational agreement. Understanding is identified with agreement, and agreement is identified with unconstrained cooperation. Agreement, understanding, and the lack of constraint add up to rationality.”³⁷⁵ For Habermas, an unconstrained cooperation requires an *ideal speech situation* with a collection of at least four requirements: (i) unrestricted participation; (ii) equality of chances to contribute or terminate discourse; (iii) equality of status, and (iv) equal degree of truthfulness and cooperative motivations.³⁷⁶

Habermas' consensus theory of truth and his communicative theory of rationality have been criticised from different angles. One important line of critique refers to the

³⁷¹ Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to the Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, trans. William Rehg, (London, Polity Press: 1996), p.107.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, pp.79-80.

³⁷³ Jürgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," *Philosophy and the Social Sciences*, 3, (1973), pp.167 and 168.

³⁷⁴ See Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. one, (1981), pp.287-288., Also see Allen W. Wood, "Habermas's Defense of Rationalism," *New German Critique*, no. 35, (1985), pp.158-159.

³⁷⁵ Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Habermas's New Critical Theory: Its Premises and Problems," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 91 (2) (1985), p.419.

³⁷⁶ See Alessandro Ferrara, "A Critique of Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth," *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, (13) (1987), p.53.

relation between 'truth' and 'consensus'. Paul Healy argues that in developing his consensus theory of truth, Habermas does not address the question of why *consensus* can yield *truth*. He points out "in the absence of a demonstrated intrinsic guaranteeing criterion of truth, consensus cannot be a logically guaranteeing criterion of truth. ...Perhaps, as Habermas himself (borrowing from Dewey) suggests, his theory is in this regard best identified as one of 'warranted acceptability'. If this is so, then Habermas' principle error is that of confusing warranted acceptability with truth."³⁷⁷ Consensus cannot be the criterion of truth or rationality, but it can lead us to the process of truth discovery.³⁷⁸ From a critical rationalist viewpoint, the regulative idea of the truth acts as an epistemological maxim for the approximation to the truth. However, an inter-subjective consensus itself cannot be the criterion of the truth. For critical rationalism, *inter-subjective criticism* as opposed to *inter-subjection consensus* is the logic of the approximation to the truth. Hence, openness to criticism is the criterion of rationality, as was argued in detail in chapter 4.

Another line of critique of Habermas' theory of the truth relates to the ideal speech situation, as an *ideal type to achieve a rational consensus*. Alessandro Ferrara rightly argues that: "the ideal speech situation supposedly allows for an ongoing critique of the adequacy of the paradigm within which we are operating. This assessment, in turn, cannot be done except by bringing the whole paradigm into a comparison with reality...Thus rational consensus cannot be the only or the fundamental criterion of truth, because in every judgment on the validity of a statement considerations of consistency and correspondence retain a decisive, yet unacknowledged, role."³⁷⁹ He leads us to realise that the ideal speech situation does not contribute to the correct selection of the best argument amongst several competing ones, but rather defines the one deemed the best as the argument to which it is rational to consent. In addition, the consensual theory of truth implies that the truth of a statement depends solely on the properties of the context within which we have been persuaded about the validity of the statement. As such, experiments and observation become quite irrelevant for advancing science.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁷ Paul Healy, "Is Habermas's Consensus Theory A Theory of Truth?," *Irish Philosophical Journal*, 4 (1987), p.150., Also see JariI. Niemi,"Habermas and Validity Claim," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 13 (2) (2005), pp.227-244.

³⁷⁸ Healy, *ibid.*, pp.148-150.

³⁷⁹ Ferrara, "A Critique of Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth," (1987), p.48.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.52-53.

For a critical rationalist, the selection of the best argument amongst competing ones takes shape through *criticism* rather than *consensus*. In this sense, *the force of better criticism* makes an ideal speech dialogue a rational context in which dialogic participants can approximate to the truth via *eliminating errors*. In sum, Habermas' logic of a rational consensus through *the force of better argument* does not lead us to explore how competing arguments arrive at revisable rational agreement, because *consensus* does not address the logic of knowledge discovery. Upon the Popperian-informed logic of knowledge discovery, the mechanism of the approximation to truth is learning from criticism (errors).

These epistemological critiques of Habermas' consensus theory of truth affect his communicative rationality and his discursive theories of ethics, law and democracy. I suggest using critical rationalism as an alternative theory of rationality, as Bartley argues, and accordingly as a new basis for an alternative model of a rational action. Critical Rationalism *does not* equate *understanding* with a *rational agreement*. It argues that a rational agreement is possible if participants in a rational dialogue accept a *common criterion of rationality*. They may understand each other, but due to their *different criteria of rationality*, they will not achieve an inter-subjective agreement. For this theory of rationality, our inter-subjective consensus is always revisable and does not require a perfect consensus. In contrast, it leads us to be concerned with the *absence of* an inter-subjective *disagreement*. Any inter-subjective disagreement can shift our open-ended consensus to a new one that is still open to new criticism. In this way, the logic of truth discovery is an *inter-subjective learning* from *disagreements* or *criticisms*. As Lawrence Boland argues, Popper's theory of learning refers to the discovery of the errors in one's knowledge.³⁸¹ If we recognise Critical Rationalism as our theory of rationality, our action model must be also reinvented to accommodate new definitions of human rationality and rational action, and a new model of social (inter-subjective) learning.

Critical Rationalism, as a theory of rationality, addresses the origins of action-goals, resulted from an inter-subjective dialogue among open-minded persons that leads to a system of shared values. This critical rationalist action model provides the ground for addressing the emergence of the ethics of openness to criticism as the moral foundation of an open social order. It means that if people use their critical

³⁸¹ Boland, *Critical Economic Methodology*, (1996), p.265.

rationality, they can arrive at a revisable inter-subjective consensus over the ethics of openness to criticism. The ethics of openness to criticism leads us to law and politics of openness to criticism. For a critical rationalist, individuals' access to critical rationality can logically force them to enter into a rational dialogue with other open-minded persons to achieve a revisable inter-subjective consensus over their action-goals. When people recognise each other as equal *rational moral beings* because of their equal access to critical reason, they can form the legal order of the society on the basis of the person's equal legal right of criticism. This equal right of criticism makes social order accountable to peoples' needs, when it is supported by a politics of openness to criticism. Peoples are equal possessors of political rights of questioning their social governance.

The critical rationalist model of human action advances the five-layer normative conception of human nature towards a critical rationalist model of human action, because it turns the premise of humans' access to critical rationality to an *explanatory variable* for addressing the origins of action-goals. Ian Jarvie has tried to apply Popper's theory of the third world-- as a social product of open-minded peoples-- to address the process of social order's formation. He argues that socially acting persons on the model of critical rationalist agents can form their social order. In his words:

...the social [the third world] is an independent realm between the hard physical world and soft mental world: This realm, reality, world, whatever we choose to call it, is very diverse and complex and people in society are constantly striving by trial and errors [critical rationality] to come to terms with it; to map it; to coordinate their maps of it. Living in an unmanageably large and changing society permits neither perfect mapping, not perfect coordination of maps. This means that the members of the society are constantly learning about it; both the society and its members are in constant process of self-discovery and of self-making.³⁸²

The critical rationalist-inspired human action model provides a micro-foundation to address such societal self-discovery and self-making. Viewed from the ends-means framework, a human action is determined by its action-goals. The critical rationalist model provides us with an explanatory framework to address self-discovery and self-making process of an open society formation because it leads us to explore the origins of action-goals in humans' access to critical rationality. In the five-layer conception of human nature, we can see the linkage amongst five capacities of human beings. However, the critical rationalist model of human action introduces humans' access to

³⁸² Ian. C. Jarvie, *Concepts and Society*, (London, Routledge: 1972), p.165.

critical rationality as a *driving force* of a rational human action. If social orders are ultimately outcomes of conscious human agency, persons' access to critical rationality plays the key role to address the emergence of an open social organisation.

However, we still need to advance this critical rationalist form of human action to a sociological model of social learning through which people's access to critical rationality lead them to a macro-institutional transition from the closed society toward an open society. In this way, we aim to explore a critical rationalist form of social learning that aims to transform macro-social institutions of the closed society into an open society. Popper recognised that his theory of knowledge can be used to address ordinary peoples' model of knowledge formation,³⁸³ but he did not turn his theory of knowledge into a theory of rational action because he defines critical rationality as merely an *irrational faith* in reason. In *Conjectures and Refutations*, Popper writes:

My interest is not merely in the theory of scientific knowledge, but rather in the *theory of knowledge in general*. Yet the study of the growth of scientific knowledge is, I believe, the most fruitful way of studying the growth of knowledge in general. For the growth of scientific knowledge may be said to be the growth of ordinarily human knowledge *writ large*...³⁸⁴

Popper identifies his theory of knowledge a general theory of ordinary people's knowledge formation. However, he does not employ it as an epistemological base for a theory of human rational action as micro-foundation of a macrosociological theory. As argued, perhaps the main reason is that he does not introduce openness to criticism as a theory of rationality. In *Realism and the Aim of Science*, Popper argues about three entirely different activities, which are all called 'learning'. He writes:

I shall call them (1) learning by trial and error (or by conjecture and refutation); (2) learning by repetition proper; and (3) learning by imitation (or by absorbing a tradition). ... Only the first of these three ways of learning, *learning by trial and errors*, or by conjecture and refutation, is relevant to the growth of our knowledge; it alone is 'learning' in the sense of acquiring *new* information: of discovering *new* facts and *new* problems, practical as well as theoretical, and *new* solutions to our problems, old as well as new.³⁸⁵

Popper recognises the importance of the learning by trial and errors method, but as noted earlier, he does not lead to this key fact that the conjectural theory of knowledge through a *conjectural theory of rationality* can provide the foundation of a new model of social learning that aims to address the process of the formation of social orders.

³⁸³ See David A. Harper, *Entrepreneurship and the Market Process, An enquiry into the growth of knowledge*, (London, Routledge: 1996).

³⁸⁴ Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, (1969), pp.292-293.

³⁸⁵ Karl R. Popper, *Realism and The Aim of Science*, From Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery, W.W. Bartley, III (ed.) (London and New York, Routledge: 1983), pp.39-40.

Among contemporary social scientists, David Harper, as an economist, employs Popper's conjectural theory of knowledge to provide a new micro-foundation for macro-economic theory. Harper argues that, "theories of the growth of (scientific) knowledge can provide significant insights into how market operates and how economic agents learn from their experiences within the market. ...there is a need for a growth-of-knowledge conception of economic agents, which could lead to a more dynamic view of economic learning goes beyond the narrow 'mainstream' view of rationality as typified by a maximising behavioural postulate. ... [this approach characterizes] entrepreneurs as Popperian decision-makers and the market process as a Popperian learning procedure ..."³⁸⁶ But, we require to go beyond economy, and argue for an application of Popper's conjectural theory of knowledge in macrosociology that aims to address an interplay amongst culture, politics and economy. This thesis is an effort to internalise the Popperian conjectural theory of knowledge, in its modified version by Bartley's conjectural theory of rationality, in macrosociology via a critical rationalist model of social learning--as the mechanism of a conscious social transformation from the closed to an open society.

5.2 Critical Rationalism and Social Learning for Building an Open Society

The critical rationalist model of human action operates a micro-foundation for a macro-sociological analysis of a deep-seated institutional transition from a closed to an open society. This section argues for a macro-sociological framework of the emergence of an open social order through introducing a critical rationalist form of social learning. In this way, the critical rationalist model of human action leads us to a theoretical framework for analysing a transformation of the closed society into an open society that is applicable at a global scale. I will use the insights of Habermas' theory of social learning as the mechanism of an emancipatory social change. I will also argue that Popper's argument for a *piecemeal social engineering* is insufficient to address a fundamental transformation that is required for altering a closed society to an open society.

5.2.1 A Critical Rationalist Model of Social Learning

A sociological theory of society addresses the question as to how a society works and changes. Hence exploring mechanisms of *social order formation* and social order change find a central place in sociological theories. It was argued that human actions

³⁸⁶ Harper, *Entrepreneurship and the Market Process* (1996), pp.4 and 31.

are the ultimate impetus of social order formation. Parsons and Habermas' theories of actions provide the micro-foundations for their sociological analyses of the emergence of a peaceful social order. Habermas' macrosociology can significantly contribute to the development of a critical rationalist sociological framework for analysing the transition from a closed to an open society. It paves the way for using critical rationality to explore a systematic link between the theory of rationality and theories of ethics, law and politics. This sub-section introduces a critical rationalist form of social learning, as the mechanism of a *conscious social transformation* from the closed society to an open social order.

Parsons uses his voluntaristic theory of action to develop a sociological theory regarding the emergence of social order. I merely refer to his theory insofar as it is concerned with the present argument. Parsons' sociology has created functional links amongst four components of the social system; namely *societal community*, *culture*, *politics* and *economy*. He uses his theory of action for addressing the emergence of social system through explaining an interaction amongst these four components. Parsons gives a central role to the societal community in his analysis. The norms are structural components of societal community at the core of social system. Due to individuals' moral freedom, they voluntarily orient their action-goals towards the norms. These normative orientations lead individuals to a value system whose main function is creating social integration. Parsons views societal community as a network of interpenetrating collective loyalties and memberships, shaped by voluntarily consensus on a value-system or ultimate action-goals. In his words, "It is members' consensus on value orientation with respect to their own society, then, that defines the institutionalization of value patterns. ...self-sufficiency in this context concerns the degree to which the institutions of society have been *legitimized* by the consensual value commitment of its members."³⁸⁷ Parsons' voluntaristic theory of action constructs a micro-foundation for his sociological analysis concerning the role of normative consensus in the emergence of social order. The societal functions of polity and economy are also addressed according to this normative consensus.

For Parsons, the legal and political sub-systems of the society work together to realise such a normative consensus: "A complex normative order requires not only

³⁸⁷ Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies*, (USA, Harvard University Press: 1971), p.9. Also see, Talcott Parsons, "Culture and the Social System," in Parsons, *Theories of Societies*, (New York, Free Press: 1961), pp.30-79.

enforcements, however, but also authorization interpretation. Court systems have very generally come to combine the determination of obligations, penalties, ... What treats a phenomenon as political insofar as it involves the organization and mobilization of resources for the attainments of the goals of a particular collectivity".³⁸⁸ The function of economic sub-system is the differentiation of autonomous structures that necessitates the development of a generalised monetary medium in association with the market system.³⁸⁹ In Parsons' macrosociology, culture, polity and economy find their ultimate origins in the societal community, which is shaped through normative orientations of individuals to the society's value system. However, in this sociological analysis, the formation of the value system itself is to some extent under-explained. Put differently, the mechanisms of a social learning process through which individuals use their rational reason for taking such normative orientations to the value system is under-explained in Parsons' sociological framework. Parson's theory of action does not lead us to explore such a social learning process.

Habermas' macrosociology uses communicative theory of action—resting on his consensual theory of truth—to present us an insightful sociological argument on the basis of which we can apply critical rationalism to address the aforementioned social learning process. Habermas' critical sociology leads us to see how individuals' access to communicative rationality can activate their moral capacity for shaping a discursive ethics on the basis of which the functions of a discursive law and polity are addressed. My intent here is not to argue in detail about Habermas' sociological theory of interaction amongst rationality, ethics, law, polity and economy. The aim is using the insights of Habermas' macrosociology of dialogic community to explore how critical rationalist model of human action contributes to the development of a theoretical framework to address the emergence of an open society.

Habermas' macrosociology employs his discursive model of action to address the function of a *dialogic form of social learning* through which peoples arrive at an inter-subjective consensus on normative base of their social orders. As Linklater points out:

The notion of 'communication action' lies at the heart of Habermas's analysis of social learning. His pivotal observation is that human subjects make claims about the truth, rightfulness, sincerity and intelligibility of their views

³⁸⁸ Ibid., p.16., Also see, Talcott Parsons, "The Political Aspect of Social Structure and Process," in David Easton (ed.) *Varieties of Political Theory*, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prectice-Hall: 1996).

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p.17., Also see: Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, *Economy and Society*, (New York, Free Press: 1956).

whenever they are involved in an attempt to arrive at an understanding with each other. A commitment to be guided by the unforced force of the better argument is made wherever subjects bring their respective views before the tribunal of open discussion and explore the prospects for an inter-subjective consensus. Habermas's account of discourse theory of morality exalts features of communication which are universal in that they arise whenever human beings cooperate to reach an understanding. ... This is why Habermas claims that the very first speech act already anticipated the creation of a communicative community which includes the whole of humankind.³⁹⁰

Habermas' analysis of social learning is derived from his discursive model of human action, rooted in his communicative theory of rationality. He believes that persons' access to communicative reason enables them to enter into a social learning through which they will arrive at inter-subjective consensus regarding the normative order of society. In other words, Habermas advances Parsons' analysis of the origins of action-goals from their normative orientation to the society's value system to their communicative competence that enables them to justify the value-system itself. If people activate their rationality, they can turn their mutual understanding into an inter-subjective consensus over social norms. The transformative capacity of such a social learning refers to its ability to change normative base of society from a pre-discursive towards a discursive ethics.

In *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas leads us to see interactions amongst the discourse ethics and discursive law and polity. He elaborates on these connections on the basis of his communicative model of action. He argues that the absence of the *conception of life-world* in Parsons' the social system does not allow him to address the question regarding how social learning can provide a rational basis for normative orientations of persons to the value system. The conception of life-worlds refers to a complex of interpenetrating cultural traditions, social orders, and personal identities in which individuals learn to use their communicative competence to organise their social relations based on a rational discourse rather than force.³⁹¹

Habermas defines discourse ethics as it covers both morality and law. Once the ethical foundations of society find a discursive character, law operates a dual character: "on the one hand, legal rights and statutes must provide something like a stable social environment in which persons can form their own identities as members of different traditions and can strategically pursue their own interests as individuals;

³⁹⁰ Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, (1998), pp.119-120.

³⁹¹ Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (London, Polity Press: 1996), pp.22-23.

on the other hand, these laws must issue from a discursive process that makes them rationally acceptable for persons oriented toward reaching an understanding on the basis of validity claims.”³⁹² For Habermas, the discursive democracy refers to a political system in which “voting, for example, should not simply aggregate given preferences but rather follow on a process of ‘thoughtful interaction and opinion formation’ in which citizens becomes informed of the better arguments and moral general interests.”³⁹³ In terms of the function of economic sub-system, Habermas believes that; “Modern societies are integrated not only socially through values, norms, and mutual understanding, but also systematically through market and the administrative use of power. ...Both media of system integration, money and power, are anchored via legal institutionalization in orders of the life-world, which is in turn socially integrated through communicative action.”³⁹⁴ These interactions amongst rationality, ethics, law, polity and economy construct the structure of Habermas' macrosociology of dialogic community.

Recalling preceding critiques of Habermas' discourse model of human action, my proposed critical rationalist action model leads us to a new sociological analysis of the emergence of a dialogic or open society. Individuals' access to critical rationality operate as an epistemic impetus for shaping their rational actions in terms of engaging in an inter-subjective learning from socially recognised mistakes, which is open to criticism and transforms the normative structure of a closed society into the ethics of openness to criticism. *The concept of social learning* here refers to an *inter-subjective criticism* (P1→TT→EE→P2). A critical rationalist model of social learning follows a Popperian logic of scientific discovery: an inter-subjective learning from an inter-subjective criticism. If persons are equal possessors of critical rationality, they can use their *conjectural rationality* for entering into a *societal scale of trials and errors*, as Jarvie noted before. If they follow the logic of critical rationality in their rational action, they will arrive at an ethics of openness to criticism as their recognised social norms for solving their disputes. In this way, such an activation of critical rationality operates as an epistemic engine for the emergence of the ethics of openness to criticism, which constructs a moral foundation for an open society. In this way, the

³⁹² Ibid., p.xix.

³⁹³ Ibid., p.viii.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., p.40.

critical rationalist action model provides a *new explanation* for normative orientations of peoples to the value system of an open society.

The ethics of openness to criticism creates the central core of normative order of an open society. However, this ethics must be turned into a *legal system* if open-minded persons want to legalise the ethics in the constitutional structure of their (open) society. Hence, those open-minded persons can go on to establish a legal system that devotes an equal right of criticism to all persons in order to form and reshape the society's legal order so as enables them to realise their moral autonomy and self-governance. Once open-minded persons transformed the legal structure of a closed society towards a legal system that is open to inter-subjective criticism, the way is paved for the emergence of a political consensus on the equal political rights of persons to make their political governance accountable to their votes. Finally, people who have arrived at such a political consensus need to go further to give an equal economic right to all persons, which causes the society's economic system to be hold accountable to peoples' demands of having a decent life.

A deep-seated epistemic transformation from a closed 'philosophy' and 'value system' into an open 'philosophy' and 'value system' to criticism is the key epistemic impetus of a macro-societal institutions' transition from a closed to an open society--in its wider sociological sense that covers law, politics, and economy. These epistemic and institutional transformations can occur through a critical rationalist ideal type of social learning. In this way, Habermas' ideal type of social learning, which rests on his communicative rationality, can be re-invented by using the critical rationalist models of action and social learning. People enter into an *inter-subjective learning* from their *mutually recognised mistakes* where they deal with establishing a peaceful social order. The transformative role of this ideal type of social learning process refers to its capacity to persuade *dialogic counterparts* to accept the outcomes of their rational dialogue, if they want do not contradict themselves. I argued how respecting the principles of Critical Rationalism; namely (a) regulative idea of the truth, (b) the valid deductive arguments, and (c) falsifier evidence necessitates that we accept the outcomes of a rational dialogue. The critical rationalist ideal type of social learning can be elaborated by dividing it into internal five layers as follows:

- A philosophical layer of social learning
- A moral layer of social learning
- A legal layer of social learning
- A political layer of social learning
- An economic layer of social learning

These five-layers of an ideal type social learning mutually reinforce one another. However, my argument focuses on *causality relations* from the philosophical layer to a moral layer; from the moral layer to a legal layer; from the legal to a political layer, and finally from the political layer to an economic layer.

The *philosophical layer* of the social learning refers to an inter-subjective learning from opening different metaphysical views and rationale systems to mutual criticism. Since dialogic participants in such an ideal type learning process respect the principles of critical rationalism, the *logical force of better criticism* necessitates them to adjust their previous world-views, due to learning from their critical dialogue, toward a new metaphysical view: *a metaphysic of openness to criticism*. At this philosophical layer, peoples learn to regard all of their metaphysical views as equally imperfect yielding a capacity to learn from an inter-subjective criticism. The philosophical outcome would be an *open metaphysic* that in turn paves the way for the emergence of an open ethical system to criticism. If peoples regard the other's world-view as an incorrect metaphysic, they account associated moral systems as an invalid ethics. Hence, the *ethics* of openness to criticism requires the pre-existence of the *metaphysic* of openness to criticism. The transformative role of the philosophical layer of social learning refers to the ground that it can provide for the emergence of the ethics of openness to criticism as the moral foundation of an open society. This ethics constructs value-system of the open society to which open-minded persons *orientate* their action-goals. In other words, individuals *rationalise* their action's goals-means through respecting the *central social norm* of openness to criticism. Peoples' actions become rational because they rest on a *social knowledge* that is objective and rational due to its *openness to criticism*.

The ethics of openness to criticism itself is the output of a moral learning process. In this *moral layer* of social learning, people learn to regards all members of society as equal moral beings (ends in themselves) because of their potential access to critical rationality. People's access to critical rationality enables them to judge regarding the rightness or wrongness of their moral chooses. Once peoples recognise such a moral

equality, they have actually learned to establish the *core value* of an open society, i.e. the ethics of openness to criticism. The transformative role of this moral dimension of such a normative social learning is that it opens the closed systems of morality to inter-subjective criticism of other morality schemes. Peoples accept moral equality of others as the central value of their social organisation, if they want do not contradict themselves.

As Shearmur points out, “he [Popper] suggested that the idea of the validity of an ethical norm can play a role in moral argument similar to that of the regulative idea of truth in science. Popper himself did not discuss these ideas further ...however, all that we need is that idea that claims about moral judgment and about the validity of moral theories may be the objects of inter-subjective discussion. ...For once one applies critical rationalism to ethics, he and other citizens are accorded dialogic rights of an enhanced character...”³⁹⁵ But, Popper did not systematically integrate this critical rationalist ethics in his social theory of open society that must address the formation of an open society as an epistemic-institutional social change.

The ethics of openness to criticism leads peoples to another layer of social learning that involves in more institutional feature: a *legal layer* of social learning. Individuals create legal institutions to realise their own rationally justified value-systems. They orient their action-goals to this value system. However, if the value system does not find a legal manifestation, individuals do not know what would be outcomes of respecting or violating the value-system. The legal system signals them how they should organise their action's goals-means to respect the legal outcomes of the value system. The legal learning process refers to an institutional building process within which individuals validate each others as equal sources of legal criticism.

If the legal system must reflect the ethics of openness to criticism, it must shape a legal code of practice in which all persons have equal right of making the law-making process accountable to their own views. The transformative role of this legal openness to criticism is that it makes the closed legal systems accountable to peoples' views. Once peoples *recognise* each other as equal legal sources of criticism, they actually *learn* to establish those legal institutions that respect their legal equality before the rule of law. As Habermas' discursive theory of law implies, the law must be

³⁹⁵ Jeremy Shearmur, *Hayek and After, Hayekian Liberalism as a Research Programme*, (London and New York: 1996), p.191.

accountable to people's dialogic reason. The legal right allows for peoples' self-governance because it enables peoples to *observe* the legal codes of practice that they have already *agreed*.

The political layer of the ideal type social learning gives peoples the equal rights to create their political self-governance. It requires that they realise their legal rights by establishing a parallel political system that is accountable to citizens' criticisms. This *political openness* means that peoples are entitled to a political power to make their social governance accountable to their votes. Building a democratic governance refers to a *political layer* of such a social learning process that makes the political system open to citizens' critical votes. Once peoples *recognise* the others as possessors of an equal right to political criticisms, they actually *learn* to institutionalise this legal equality in the context of a political democracy, which is accountable to peoples' votes and removable by their refutation.

The transformative role of the political layer of social learning is that it enables peoples to change a closed political system to an open one. This political learning for creating a democratic governance informs people to recognise their equal rights of having a decent life. Hence, people go on to call for the establishment of a fair economic division of labour for realising such a decent life. However, this requires an equal right of free entrance to economic competition. People therefore can use their equal political power to make economic governance accountable to their decent life. In other words, they learn how to realise their right to having a decent life through establishing a competitive and fair economy. The transformative function of the *economic layer* of social learning for making economic institutions accountable to people's decent life can be viewed in its role in removing those institutional barriers that prevent free and fair entrance of potential economic actors to market competition.

The transition from the closed society towards the open society is a deep-seated epistemic and institutional transformation. The ideal type five layers of philosophical, moral, legal, political, and economic learning refers to an emancipatory social change in which individuals' access to critical rationality perform as micro epistemic motor force of a macro-institutional change. The metaphysical and ethical dialogues can transform the cultural foundations of the closed society toward the culture of openness to criticism. This fundamental cultural change can enable people to claim for their equal rights of self-governance and a decent-life. In this way, the critical rationalist

ideal type of human action has provided a new micro-foundation for a new macro-sociological analysis based on its own ideal type social learning model. In this way, Critical Rationalism, as a theory of human rationality is internalised into the ideal types of human action and the normative sociological analysis of the open society formation that can be regarded as a *conscious social rationalisation process*.

This analytical framework enables us to explore the role of competing models of human action in the formation different patterns of social organisation through social learning processes. In this way, we can use a critical rationalist analytical model of sociological analysis to show how the Hobbesian ideal type of human action leads to an anarchical type social order, or the Lockean ideal type of human action leads to a liberal model of social organization. It enables us to address the question of how the Kantian-inspired ideal type of human action can lead to an open society of free and equal citizens.

It should be acknowledged that the aforementioned analytical model of a critical rationalist form of social learning should be developed through further empirical investigations in order to show people have already used critical rationality or the method of learning from errors to rationalise their actions and their social organisation in the existing more or less open societies, and how they can improve their learning and open social order. To this end, Jeffrey Alexander's microempirical model of action and macrosocial order can be employed.

In short, Alexander's microempirical model views "action as moving along two basic dimensions: interpretation and strategisation. Action is understanding, but it is also simultaneously practical and utilitarian. These two dimensions of actions should be conceived as analytic elements within the stream of empirical consciousness"³⁹⁶ Alexander discusses that interpretation consists of two different processes: one, typification and another invention. By the former he invokes "the phenomenological insight that all actors take their understanding of the world for granted. They do so because they fully expect that every new impression will be 'typical' of the understanding of the world they have already developed ... Even if we encounter something new and exciting we expect this newness and excitement to be understandable."³⁹⁷ Upon this micro-foundation, socialisation, an inter-subjective

³⁹⁶ Alexander, "Action and Its Environment" (1987), p.300.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

process, means learning to typify within the framework provided by one's particular world.

For Alexander, "every member of the collectivity must learn to explain, to name, to discover the typical terms of every possible situation. The most basic rule for acquiring sociological citizenship is 'no surprises,' and typification is the characteristic of consciousness upon which such inclusion depends. ...To be socialized into world is to take your understanding of it for granted, and to live in that world is to document every new object as evidence for this ontological certainty."³⁹⁸ As a theory of rational and objective understanding, as argued by chapter 2, James Farr has led us to see how Popper's critical rationalism can be used as an explanatory theory of human action in terms of one set of problem-solving conjectures and refutations.³⁹⁹ Alexander's approach to microempirical model of action can pave the way for a new Popperian-informed empirical theory of action. In chapter 10, I will argue about the need for further inquiries into such kind of applied research for the formulation of a macrosociological theory of globalisation.

The second element of Alexander's microaction model is 'strategisation': "Action is not merely understanding the world, it is also transforming and acting upon it. Actors seek to carry out their intentions through *praxis* ...and for this reason they must act with and against other peoples and things. Such practical action certainly occurs only within the confines of understanding, but within the terms of clearly understood events it introduces the strategic considerations of least cost and most reward. To act against the world requires time, energy, and knowledge."⁴⁰⁰ Our critical rationalist action model also considers this instrumental aspect of rational action because it defines a rational action as an action whose goals and means are rationalized through basing them upon an objective knowledge which is resulted from learning from errors ($P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$). In this way, both elements of Alexander's micro-empirical model can have a critical rationalist account.

Alexander utilises his micro-empirical action model to advance Parsons's macrosociology. In short, he discusses that "the social system constitutes a major

³⁹⁸ Ibid. Also see: Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press: 1967) and Mark Addleson, *Equilibrium Versus Understanding: Towards Rehumanization of Economics within Social Theory* (London, Routledge: 1995).

³⁹⁹ See Farr, "Popper's Hermeneutics" (1983). pp.157-176.

⁴⁰⁰ Alexander, op., cit. p.302.

environment for action by providing actions with real objects. ...these objects are human beings. The division of labor and institutions of political authority provide crucial settings for individual interpretation and strategization. ...Solidarity is another significant dimension through which the social system exercises its environing effects.”⁴⁰¹ Alexander’s macrosociology recognises that, “actors do not encounter the objects of social systems simply as external objects, even as objects that are normally defined. They encounter those objects from within, as the referents of symbol systems, which means, for all practical purposes, as symbols themselves. Symbols are signs that have a generalized status, that provide categories for understanding the elements of social, individual, and organic life. This understanding is the ‘meaning of life’. ...These symbols, in other words, form a system of their own. This cultural system ...has an independent internal organization whose principles of functioning inspires and constrains interpretative action and strategization in complex ways.”⁴⁰² Alexander improves our understanding of the socio-cultural environment of human action. However, we need still to explore how such a societal environment can be reproduced through a conscious social learning, which can be originated from one set of emancipatory human actions. The critical rationalist model of human action enables us to criticise the existing social system due to its cultural, political, and economic closedness to rational criticism. In this sense, social transformative capacity of human action itself should be included in such a micro-empirical model of action.

5.2.2. Civil Society and Social Learning for Creating an Open Society

The preceding arguments implied that the transformation of a closed into an open society is a *conscious social change* via different layers of social learning. Popper’s idea of *piecemeal social engineering* does not cover such a deep-seated epistemic-institutional transformation,⁴⁰³ because Popper has not defined Critical Rationalism as a theory of rationality and an epistemological base for addressing conscious social change. Popper’s idea of piecemeal social engineering refers to those social reforms, which can take place within a liberal democracy, rather than a radical transition from the closed to an open society, which may require a critique of liberal democracy itself.

⁴⁰¹ Op. cit., pp.304-305.

⁴⁰² Op. cit.,p.306.

⁴⁰³ For a good review of Popper’s idea of piecemeal social engineering see: Cella Lessa Kerstentzky "Hayek and Popper on ignorance and intervention," *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 3 (1) (2007), pp.33-53. For a critique of Popper’s piecemeal social engineering see Michael Freeman, "Sociology and Utopia: Some Reflections on Social Philosophy of Karl Popper," *British Journal of Journal*, (1975), pp.20-34.

The conceptions, such as civil society and public sphere do not play a notable role in Popper's social philosophy of the open society.⁴⁰⁴ Nevertheless, Popper recognises that transition from the closed to an open society is a conscious social change:

...the transition from the closed society to the open takes place when social institutions are first consciously recognized as man-made, and when their conscious alteration is discussed in terms of their suitability for the achievement of human aims or purposes.⁴⁰⁵

However, Popper's idea of *piecemeal social engineering* does not allow him to explore how can such a radical institutional transition be addressed as a social learning process based on the critical rationalism analytical model of social change. The ideas of man-made social institutions and their conscious alteration need to a more radical model of social engineering, compared with the piecemeal social reform. The transition from the closed to the open social institutions is a fundamental social transformation that takes place through an emancipatory social learning in which civil society plays the key role.

In chapter 9, I will argue in detail about civil society's concepts and its role in realising a social transformation from the existing closed world order into an open global society. Here I very briefly argue regarding the functions of civil society in realising the five layers of social learning for building an open society. To this end, I very briefly refer to Habermas' and Alexander's approaches to civil society. In short, civil society is defined as an independent societal sphere between people and the governance.⁴⁰⁶ However, there are very different analyses of this independent social sphere in civil society's literature. Viewed from a more or less cultural approach to civil society, we can link emancipatory functions of civil society in the formation of a normative social learning for building a free and just society. In this cultural account, concept-models of Habermas and Alexander regarding civil society deserve an especial attention. Habermas views civil society those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organisations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in private life spheres. For him, the core of civil society comprises

⁴⁰⁴ Regarding this see Shearmur, *Hayek and After*, (1996), pp.214-220.

⁴⁰⁵ Notturmo, *Science and the Open Society*, (2000), p.263.

⁴⁰⁶ For a good review of the conception of civil society see Krishan Kumar, "Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of a Historical Term," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 44 (3) (1993), pp.377-383.

a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres.⁴⁰⁷

If we use our critical rationalist model of problem-solving to address the epistemic function of civil society, we can explore a key role of civil society in activating peoples' potential access to critical rationality for realising social learning for building an open society. It is important to note that whilst people potentially have access to critical rationality, their actual existing rationality is shaped within their existing cultural environments. In this sense, ordinary people can be informed regarding their potential access to such rational capacity by people who have already activated such a capacity. If we call them *intellectuals*, they can play a key epistemic function to invite ordinary peoples into the five layers of a critical rationalist social learning, which are required for a transition from the closed to the open society.

Alexander leads us more concrete cultural core and epistemic function of the civil sphere. I will argue in details about Alexander's analytical model of civil society in chapter 9, but it suffices to note here that he devotes a substantive core to the cultural content of civil society. In *The Civil Sphere*, Alexander points out:

...civil society should be conceived as a solidary sphere, in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes to be culturally defined and to some degree institutionally enforced. To the degree that this solidary community exists, it is exhibited and sustained by public opinion, deep cultural codes, distinctive organizations—legal, journalistic and associational—and such historically specific interactional practices as civility, criticism, and mutual respect. ...Civil society is a sphere of solidarity in which individual rights and collective obligations are tensely intertwined. It is both a normative and a "real" concept.⁴⁰⁸

Alexander also views the social movements as social transformative devices that construct translations between the discourse of civil society, which rests upon an idealised social order—demanding for concrete collective actions, and specific institutional reforms that fulfill such an idealised commitments.⁴⁰⁹ In chapter 9, I will use Alexander's account of civil society to argue for a critical rationalist concept of global civil society as the global agent of a dialogic globalisation.

⁴⁰⁷ Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (1996), p.367. Also see Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, (Cambridge, Mass:1992).

⁴⁰⁸ Jeffery C. Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2006), pp.31 and 53.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.229-234.

5.3 Macrosociology of Dialogic Globalisation: A Critical rationalist Analytical Framework

I discussed the critical rationalist model of human action and social learning. The main premise of these models is humans' access to critical rationality. It refers to a rational unity of humankind. As such, the critical rationalist models of human action and social learning are not limited to a national-scale of social ordering of peoples. Indeed, their applications are global. An open global society of free and equal persons is the subject of the thesis' inquiry. The thesis employs these models, as its analytical framework, to formulate a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation.

The critical rationalist model of human action operates as a micro-foundation for a macrosociology of globalisation with three aims: an analysis of contemporary form of globalisation; a critique of the contradictions of existing forms of globalisation, and an introduction of an alternative dialogic globalisation. The critical rationalist model of human action leads us to investigate those forms of social learning that have been motor force of contemporary globalisation. If the Kantian style of human action and social organisation is not the impetus of contemporary liberal globalisation, we need to explore micro-foundation of globalisation-- as a macro-institutional change-- in the Hobbesian and the Lockean-styles of human action and social ordering of peoples on a global level. The three competing models of human action and social organisation lead us to develop a macrosociology of contemporary globalisation.

The critical rationalist action model implies that human action and social learning are ultimately the outcomes of those systems of rationale that are operating to shape the normative bases of the social order. On a global scale, such systems of rationale should be explored as an epistemic motor force of a global institutional change. Our models of human action and social learning empower us to trace the link amongst the epistemic and institutional changes on a global scale. For instance, contemporary globalisation is described as a macro-institutional change from the Hobbesian to the Lockean model of social order because of an epistemic shift from the Hobbesian to the Lockean-style of human action. The critical rationalist model of social learning enables exploration of global social learning processes that have transformed the Hobbesian style of thought and action into the Lockean-styles of thought and action. In this sense, our theoretical framework paves the way for a sociological analysis of

contemporary liberal globalisation as a global social learning that cognitively fuels the emergence of a liberal globality.

The critical rationalist ideal types of action and social learning lead us to explore the contradictory nature of liberal globality. If peoples are viewed as rivals as opposed to friends, a global organisation of peoples on the basis of such vision suffers from the same problems that it faces at the national level. An epistemic critique of the liberal globality will shape an important part of a macrosociology of globalisation. Compared to the Kantian models of human action and social learning, the Lockean model leads global order to a global commercial network. Unsocial sociability of this utilitarian based global organisation of peoples refers to making human beings the *means* for satisfying the *goals* of powerful groups and countries rather than ends in themselves. This epistemic critique of globalisation uses the competing models of human action and social learning in order to unmask the contradictions of the liberal form of globality due to its origins in the liberal philosophy of action and the liberal model of social organisation.

More fundamentally, the critical rationalist models of human action and social learning enable the exploration of the transformative roles of a dialogic globalisation. If the existing form of globalisation is contradictory and problematic, what forms of global social learning can transform it into a global society of free and equal citizens? Recognising macro-institutional changes as the outcomes of a deep-seated epistemic shift, the critical rationalist macrosociology of dialogic globalisation explores the ideal type forms of global social learning through which the Lockean-styles of action and social ordering of peoples can be systematically transformed into the Kantian-styles. This macrosociology of dialogic globalisation must address the transformative functions of a rational dialogue amongst world civilisations and its implications for altering the institutional structure of emerging liberal globality to a multi-civilisational open global society.

Chapter 6

Contemporary Globalisation: Global Liberalism and Transnational Political Economy

This chapter describes contemporary globalisation as an epistemic-institutional shift from the centrality of the struggle for political power to a competition for economic interests. The emergence of *global liberalism* addresses a global epistemic shift from the Hobbesian to the Lockean social philosophy. This global epistemic shift has paved the way for a global institutional transition from the Westphalian order to a *transnational political economy*. Contemporary globalisation is described as an interplay between globalisation of liberalism and the emergence of a transnational political economy. This chapter develops a new macrosociological analysis of contemporary globalisation to address an interplay between the cultural force of liberalism and a transnational constellation of politics and economy.

The chapter proceeds in five sections. Section 6.1 reviews two major approaches to globalization: a *connectivist* and an *institutional* approach. It chooses the institutional approach to globalization. Section 6.2 develops the institutional approach to include the cultural dimension. To develop a macrosociology of globalisation, three following sections address cultural, political, and economic dynamics of contemporary globalisation. Section 6.3 argues that global liberalism has shaped the cultural model of contemporary globalisation that refers to an epistemic shift from the Hobbesian to the Lockean models of human action and social organisation. Section 6.4 explains the institutional implications of global liberalism for the formation of a multi-centric global governance. Section 6.5 argues that global liberalism and the collapse of the Cold War order have provided cultural and political conditions for the emergence of transnational markets.

6.1 Two Competing Approaches to Globalisation

The literature relating to the conception of globalisation is substantial; hence, a comprehensive overview of this literature on this occasion is not possible. However, as Mathias Albert argues, an overview of globalisation concept must take into account different disciplinary backgrounds.⁴¹⁰ This chapter argues for a *sociological* conception of contemporary globalisation in which an interplay amongst cultural, political, and economic globalisation is central. From a sociological view, it is important to know how the three aforementioned sub-processes of globalisation—as a macro social organisational change—have interacted to shape globalisation.⁴¹¹ However, it seems that the concepts of globalisation have been mainly focused on an expansion of global interconnectivity, as opposed to a global organisational change. I shall distinguish between two competing accounts of globalisation in order to pave the way for a new approach contemporary globalisation as a *global epistemic-institutional transformation* from *the Hobbesian logic* of the struggle for political power to *the Lockean logic* of the competition over economic interests.

6.1.1 Globalisation as the Expansion of Global Interconnectivity

As George Modelski points out: “An institutional approach [to globalisation] might best be contrasted with a ‘connectivist’ one in which globalisation is seen primarily as a condition of interdependence.”⁴¹² According to connectivist approach, globalisation refers to “growing interconnectedness reflected in the extended flows of information, technology, capital, goods, services, and people throughout the world.”⁴¹³ This global interconnectivity also implies the movement of the world as a whole in the direction of unicity—meaning oneness of the whole world as a single interconnected socio-cultural unit. As Robertson and White write, “This, in turn, indicates that the singularity of the world increasingly diminishes the significance of territorial boundaries...hence the emphasis on borderlessness in much of the literature on

⁴¹⁰ Mathias Albert, "Globalisation Theory: Yesterday's Fad or More Lively than Ever?," *International Political Sociology*, 1, (2007), p.116. For a review of concepts of globalisation due to its cultural, political, and economic dimensions see Roland Robertson and Kathleen E. White, "Globalisation: An Overview," in Robertson and White (eds.), *Globalisation: Critical Concepts in Sociology*, vol. I, Analytical Perspective, (London, Routledge: 2003), pp.1-34. Also, for an attempt to provide a comprehensive review of globalisation concept and research see Jan Aart Scholte and Roland Robertson, *Encyclopedia of Globalisation*, (London, Routledge: 2006).

⁴¹¹ See William G. Martin and Mark Beittel, "Toward a Global Sociology? Evaluating Current Conception, Methods, and Practices," *The Sociological Quarterly*, 39 (1) (1998), pp.139-161.

⁴¹² George Modelski, Tessa Lenno Devezas, and William R. Thompson, (eds.), *Globalisation as Evolutionary Process, Modeling Global Change*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2008), p.11.

⁴¹³ See National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the global future*. (Honolulu, Pacific Press: 2004),

globalisation.”⁴¹⁴ Some scholars, like Roland Robertson, add a '*global consciousness*' dimension to this global interconnectivity. Robertson believes that the two most important general features of the process of globalisation are: “(1) *extensive connectivity*, or interrelatedness and (2) *extensive global consciousness*, a consciousness which continues to become more and more reflexive.”⁴¹⁵ Globalisation, as the expansion of global interconnectivity, does not imply whether the expansion of global interconnectivity involves a global institutional change or not. It views contemporary globalisation as a more or less transnational space of social relations. These global social relations may be economic, political, cultural or technological. They have connected people around the globe.

For instance, Anthony Giddens defines globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”⁴¹⁶ Malcolm Waters views globalisation as “a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangement recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding.”⁴¹⁷ Jan Aart Scholte defines globalisation as “...ongoing large-scale growth of transplanetary—and often also supraterrestrial—connectivity. ...[for him] this conception of globalization has a distinctive focus. It is different from ideas of internationalization, liberalization, universalization and westernization.”⁴¹⁸ The connectivist approach acknowledges that transplanetary connectivity affects institutional features of the emerging world order. But, it does not highlight globalisation as a global institutional change. Martin Shaw discusses that globalisation has changed political organisation of the Cold War order to a Western Global State, but he does not devote an especial institutional meaning to such a global organisational change.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁴ Robertson and White, *Globalisation: Critical Concepts in Sociology*, (2003), p.4. Also see David Jacobson, *Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press: 1996); Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 1996), and Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalisation: A Critical Introduction*, (London, Macmillan: 2005).

⁴¹⁵ Robertson and White, op. cit., (2003), p.6., Also see Ulrich Beck, *What Is Globalisation?*, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 2000); John Tomlinson, *Globalisation and Culture*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1999)., and Mauro F. Guillen, "Is Globalisation Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble?" *Annual Review Social*, 27 (2001), pp.235-260.

⁴¹⁶ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, (USA, Stanford University Press: 1990), p.64.

⁴¹⁷ Malcolm Waters, *Globalisation*, (London, Routledge: 1995), p.3.

⁴¹⁸ Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (2005), p.84.

⁴¹⁹ See Martin Shaw, *The Theory of Global State*, (2000), pp.1-21.

6.1.2 Globalisation as the Emergence of Institutions of Planetary Scope

The institutional approach to globalisation situates global interconnectivity into a global institutional context, within which the movement of the world as a whole in direction of unicity finds a macro-societal institutional meaning. In addition, it leads us to explore a link between a global social learning process and such a global social organisation change. Modelski rightly argues that the institutional approach has been developed by David Held and his collaborators, and goes beyond the ‘connectivist’ approach.⁴²⁰ As noted in chapter 4, Held describes globalisation as a transition in the global scale of human organisation that links distant communities and expands the research of power relations across the world’s regions.⁴²¹ Held points out:

...the historical wave [of globalisation studies] drawing upon the historical sociology of global development, was principally concerned with exploring in what way, if any, contemporary globalisation could be considered novel or unique—whether if defined a new epoch, or *transformation, in the socio-economic and political organization of human affairs*—and if so, what the implications were for the realization of progressive values and projects of human emancipation (emphasis added).⁴²²

Like Held, Habermas views globalisation as a social organisational (institutional) change on a global scale. Max Pensky reminds us, “for Habermas...it [globalisation] heralds the end of the global dominance of the nation-state as a model for political organization.’Postnational’ here means that the globalisation of markets and of economic processes generally, of models of communication and commerce, of culture, and of risk, all increasingly deprive the classical nation states of its formally assured bases of sovereign power.”⁴²³ For the institutional approach to globalisation, global interconnectivity is analysed in the context of a global institutional transition from the Westphalian order towards a post-national political economy in which national sovereignty no longer plays the main institutional role in global social organisation.

As Modelski rightly argues, the institutional approach to globalisation analyses the *expansion of global interconnectivity* in the context of a set of *global organisational changes*. These global organisational changes refer to the infrastructure of global interdependence or “a new architecture of world order.”⁴²⁴ He leads us to see that such

⁴²⁰ Modelski, *Globalisation as Evolutional Process*, (2008), p.12.

⁴²¹ David Held, *Global Covenant*, (2004), p.1.

⁴²² David Held and Anthony McGrew, (eds.), *Globalisation Theory*, (London, Polity Press: 2007), p.5.

⁴²³ Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, (2001), p .xiii.

⁴²⁴ Modelski, *Globalisation as Evolutional Process*, (2008), p.12.

a global interconnectivity is “the product of a set of organizational and institutional arrangements. They derive from the organisations that originate and manage these flows; the regimes that facilitate and govern them... and the systems of knowledge that guide them.”⁴²⁵ Modelski defines globalisation as the construction (and/or emergence) of the *institutions of a planetary scope*. He links this institutional approach to globalisation with a global social learning process. This process of social learning provides an explanatory framework for addressing the emergence of a post-national political economy. He recognises this global social learning as a *global problem solving process* that regards the formation of institutions of a planetary scope as an organisational solution to deal with the global problems.⁴²⁶

6.2 Global Social Learning:

An Epistemic-Institutional Approach to Globalisation

The institutional approach can be advanced to a macrosociological conception of globalisation, if we recognise global social learning as an epistemic mechanism for a global institutional change. Recalling preceding arguments regarding social learning and institutional changes, an epistemic-institutional approach to globalisation refers to an interplay between ideational force and a social institutional change. However, we must distinguish between this epistemic-institutional account of globalisation and those macrosociological analyses of globalisation that give the primacy to the economic or political forces of globalisation. As noted in chapter 1, globalisation is recognised as a macrosociological process. Scholars like Wallerstein and Tilly have adopted historical macrosociologies of globalisation.⁴²⁷ They have not argued about such a macrosociological process as a global social learning process, originating in an epistemic shift in the logic of global social organisation. The epistemic-institutional approach aims to develop a macrosociology of globalisation that describes it as a global institutional change that originates in a global epistemic shift from the Hobbesian to the Lockean logic of social organisation. The term *epistemic-institutional* refers to an inter-play between *global liberalism* and *transnational political economy*. In this way, I argue for a radical cultural turn in the conception and analysis of contemporary globalisation. It should be noted here that this epistemic-institutional approach to globalisation leads us to define the conception of globality

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., pp.12-13.

⁴²⁷ See Giovanni Arrighi, "Globalisation and Historical Macrosociology", (1991), pp.117-133.

(what is global?) based on a sociological account. From such sociological perspective, globality refers to a global condition or a global structure in which social organisation of people creates a kind of global sociability. On this measure, contemporary globality refers to a global market sociability.

Björn Wittrock recognises that Globalisation Studies require such a *radical cultural turn* to explore the *epistemic impetus* of global institutional changes:

...globalisation studies often seem premised on assumptions close to those of earlier forms of theorizing about convergence and modernization. They *describe the global* and all but inevitable diffusion and impact of market interactions and capitalist forms of production. ...[But] the formation of modernity *cannot* be reduced to *the processes of transformation in political and economic practices*... Instead, it has to be located within the context of a *deep epistemic and cultural shift* as well. ... In recent years one may even speak of something of a *school of new historical sociologists*, such as Johann Arnason, Johan Heilbron, Hans Joas, and Peter Wagner, who trace *historical interactions of ideational and macro-institutional transformations*... [emphasis added].⁴²⁸

A historical macrosociology of contemporary globalisation must therefore trace an inter-play between the *ideational force of global liberalism* and the emergence of *post-national institutions*. This macrosociological approach is an epistemic approach to globalisation because it recognises a key role of the ideational force of liberalism in shaping the post-national political economy. It is also an institutional approach to globalisation because it views globalisation as a macro-institutional change from the centrality of the struggle for political power to competition over economic interests. I will use the three competing models of human action and social learning, argued by chapter 4, in order to apply this epistemic-institutional approach in order to describe contemporary globalisation.⁴²⁹

6.3 The Emergence of Global Liberalism as a Global Epistemic Shift

A critical rationalist macrosociology of globalisation employs the epistemic-institutional approach in order to explore a cultural dynamic of globalisation in which context the political and economic dynamics of globalisation are shaped. This cultural dynamic of contemporary globalisation leads us to discover a global epistemic shift that has cognitively fuelled the emergence of a post-national political economy. In

⁴²⁸ Björn Wittrock, "Social Theory and Global History," (2001), pp.31 and 35.

⁴²⁹ See Bjorn Wittrock, "History and Sociology," in Peter Hedstrom and Bjorn Wittrock, *Frontiers of Sociology*, (Leiden, Brill: 2009), pp.77-111.

order to address this global epistemic shift, I begin with a cultural historiography of the Western liberal-democratic model of social organisation.

6.3.1 Toward a Cultural History of the Western Liberal-Democracy

Contemporary globalisation refers to a macro-institutional change in the world's political economy over the past two decades, but the cultural origins of this global institutional change date back to the past two centuries. In this sense, globalisation is a historical macro-sociological phenomenon whose epistemic impetus originates in the Enlightenment in Europe where its institutional manifestation was realised in the form of a liberal-democratic model of social organisation. Stephen Gill argues that the neo-liberal globalisation is “the latest phase in a process that originated before the dawning of the Enlightenment in Europe, and accelerated in the nineteenth century with the onset of industrial capitalism and the consolidation of the integral nation-state.”⁴³⁰ In order to explain how a *global epistemic shift* in the logic of social organisation has influenced globalisation, I refer to an argument offered by Barry Buzan and Richard Little that reveals why globalisation is a global institutional change, which has been fueled by liberal social philosophy. They write:

The globalisation argument is not just that economic interaction is becoming more and more important in the day to day life of units [nation states], but also it is *transforming the units themselves*. The pursuit of *liberal goals* that are seen to be essential to the promotion of the late twentieth century capitalism requires a big reduction in the state's control of the national economy, and a general opening of borders to economic transactions. ... If the *military-political sector is losing dominance as the defining process* of the [nation-state] system, and if globalisation is pushing the state out of many aspects of the economy, can the traditional dominance of the Westphalian state as the defining unit of the international system be maintained?⁴³¹

A significant reduction of the state's control of the national economy does not indicate merely an expansion of global trade and investment. It leads us to a deeper transformation within the social organisation of current world order: an institutional transformation from the centrality of the struggle for political power to a competition over economic interests. In this institutional transformation, power politics loses its defining role in favour of competition for economic interests. Economic globalisation ultimately originates from a change in the political function of the nation states. But, the emergence of this transnational political economy itself originates from the pursuit

⁴³⁰ Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," p.124. in Hovden and Keene (eds.), *The Globalisation of Liberalism*, (UK, Palgrave: 2002), p.124.

⁴³¹ Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the 'Fall'," *British International Studies Association*, (1999), p.93.

of a liberal logic: a notable reduction of state control over the society, referring to a global epistemic shift towards liberalism as a globalising social philosophy. As Buzan and Little point out, “for liberals, the forty years of Cold War are now depicted not as a struggle for power, but as an ideological battle between capitalism and communism from which capitalism has emerged triumphant.”⁴³² The central argument of this chapter is that the emergence of global liberalism had cognitively fuelled the collapse of the Cold War political order through which an enabling environment was created for the emergence of a transnational economy. A critical rationalist approach to macrosociology of globalisation explains how the emergence of global liberalism, as a global epistemic shift, led to the collapse of the Cold War as a political source of the emergence of a transnational economy.

A transition from the Hobbesian to the Lockean social philosophy in the West can be understood as an epistemic-institutional development. This epistemic-institutional transformation enabled the West to be a winner of an inter-bloc competition with the Eastern bloc during the Cold War era. The emergence of global liberalism can be addressed on two major levels: a) the rise of Western liberalism, and b) the globalisation of the Western liberalism. The first level refers to as an epistemic-institutional change within the Western societies that led to one set of shared values among the Western peoples regarding liberal-democratic model of social organisation. The second level refers to the expansion of the Western liberalism to a global scale that refers to a global expansion of the liberal model of social organisation. The emergence of global liberalism cognitively justified an institutional change in the world-order in favour of the liberal model of social organisation. I will situate my analysis of the global epistemic shift towards liberalism in the context of a move from the Hobbesian to the Lockean social philosophy. It is important to note this global epistemic shift shows a different pattern of social learning in comparison with its domestic counterpart, i.e., an epistemic shift for the formation of the Western liberal democracies. But the general logic of social organisation is to some extent the same.

The Emergence of Liberal Democracies in the West: A central argument is that the Western modern societies emerged through a conscious social transformation in which liberal ideas and values were publicised through a social learning process. In other words, through a social learning process Western peoples arrived at a more or

⁴³² Ibid., p.89.

less normative consensus regarding the liberal values, in Parsons' sense. This normative consensus paved the way for an institutional transformation from monarchies into liberal-democracies. I will apply the *critical rationalist analytical framework* developed in chapter 5, to show how a micro-foundational change in the Western peoples' behaviours led to a macro- institutional change in the Western social institutions. To this aim, I use the Hobbesian and the Lockean models of human action and social organisation for a *rational reconstruction* of a historical transformation from pre-liberal to liberal-democratic societies in the West. Along this line of reasoning, I will refer to a *cultural historiography* of an interplay between the epistemic and macroinstitutional change, leading to the Western liberal democracies. The main task of this cultural historiography is to uncover the epistemic role of liberalism, as a set of ideas and values, in the emergence of modern social institutions in the Western societies.

A cultural historiography of the Western modernity over the past three centuries suggests that a deep-seated epistemic transformation occurred at the turn of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries.⁴³³ This cultural historiography leads us to explore the ways through which distinctively modern conceptions of human nature and social order emerged during the great transition in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Eisenstadt argues that central to this distinctively modern conception of human nature was:

...an emphasis on the autonomy of man: his or her ...emancipation from the fetters of traditional political and cultural authority. In the continuous expansion of the realm of personal and institutional freedom and activity, such autonomy implied, first reflexivity and exploration; second, active construction and mastery of nature, including human nature. This project of modernity entailed a very strong emphasis on the autonomous participation of members of society in the constitution of the social and political order...From the conjunctions of these different conceptions arose a belief in the possibility that society could be actively formed by conscious human activity.⁴³⁴

The notion of autonomy of human cognitively fuelled the behaviours of modern man. In *Enlightenment and the Institution of Society*, Keith Baker argues that an essential relation was formed between this autonomy of human beings and emergence of the modern concept of society. In this way, this conception of the individual, as a conscious human agent, led to a social belief in the possibility of a conscious re-

⁴³³ Björn Wittrock, "Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition," *Daedalus*, 129 (1) (2000), p. 41.

⁴³⁴ S. N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernity," *Daedalus*, 129 (1) (2000), p.5.

construction of social order—what Karl Polanyi called the *'discovery of society'*. As Baker elegantly remarks, “its discovery disengaged from the religious representations in which it had hitherto expressed its own existence. Not until the ideological primacy of individual interests was postulated...could constrain upon those interest be discovered in the operation of an autonomous social order subject to its own laws.”⁴³⁵ In other words, once individuals cognitively recognise themselves as autonomous rational agents, capable of the social reconstruction of their own social order, modern social institutions of liberal democracy emerged. It was a conscious epistemic-institutional transition from the traditional account of human beings-- as the subjects of monarch rules-- to a modern account of the individual, assumed to the equal members of a self-determined liberal democracy.

This historical emancipation from the traditional authorities to the modern concept of the individual refers to a deep-seated epistemic transformation that manifested itself in the intellectual history of liberalism and an institutional development of the liberal-democracies. The critical rationalist sociological framework allows us to see how such a micro-foundational transformation in the Western people's conception of the person towards a rational moral agent, led to a macro-institutional change from monarchies to liberal-democracies. In his cultural history of liberalism, Pierre Manent describes the European's *epistemic-institutional problem* in this way:

For almost three centuries this political doctrine [liberalism] constituted the principle current of modern politics in Europe and the West. ... One of the principle 'ideas' of liberalism, as we know, is that of the 'individual.' The individual is that being who, because he is human, is naturally entitled to 'rights' that can be enumerated...How can rights be attributed to the individuals...it is on this idea...that the liberal body politic was progressively constructed. ... the content of modern liberalism derives from a fundamental orientation towards politics chosen by early-modern Europeans in order to free themselves from the intellectual and spiritual influence of the Catholic Church; that adopting this orientation required the theoretical materials provided by the founders of liberalism.⁴³⁶

The epistemic-institutional problem of Europe and the West during the Enlightenment was how to shape a new social order to rescue individuals from the intellectual and institutional influence of the Church. Hence the key question for the present argument is 'how did the founders of liberalism pave the way for a social learning of the liberal-democratic models of human nature and social organisation?'

⁴³⁵ Keith Michael Baker, "Enlightenment and the Institutions of Society," in Melchng and Velema, (eds.), *Main Trends in Cultural History*, (1994), p.112.

⁴³⁶ Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, (1994), pp.viii and xvi.

The emergence of the Western liberal-democracies was an intended conscious social change brought about by a public recognition of liberal models of human action and social order. Recalling the preceding arguments about the functions of the intellectuals and social movements in a conscious social transformation, the founders of liberalism provided an ideational frame of reference within which early-modern Europeans made their fundamental choices towards the liberal accounts of human action and social order. In other words, the early modern Europeans realised that if they wanted to free themselves from the intellectual influence of the Church, the liberal account of human nature and social order would be an effective alternative. In this way, they opted to become the individual who was equally entitled to the self-construction of their social order, rather than the subjects of the monarchies.

Manent argues that the period preceding the establishment of liberal societies in the West is conventionally called an ancient regime that can be also referred to as the era of absolute or national monarchies.⁴³⁷ In this way, the deep-seated epistemic-institutional shift, about which Wittrock argues, refers to a historical transformation from absolute monarchies into liberal-democracies in the Europe and the West. Hence, if we want to address such a profound transformation, it is necessary to explore how early Europeans' *pre-liberal accounts* of human nature and social order developed into a *liberal account* of human nature and social order. Additionally, it is necessary to discuss how this epistemic change led to an institutional reformation of the absolute monarchies and developed into social institutions of liberal-democratic societies.

To address such a social transition from monarchies to liberal-democracies, it is important to address the question as to how did the *very idea of the individual* emerge and how it cognitively guided Europeans to construct an *individualistic social order* freeing themselves from the authority of the church. The European theological-political problem centred around the question as to how the monarchy could be superseded with a people-centric social order. This fundamental question manifested after the fall of the Roman Empire, during which the Catholic Church's solution for establishing such a humane society was unsuccessful. Instead, the Europeans were led to an absolute monarchy. The Hobbesian models of human action and social order reveals the function of the European absolute monarchy. In this sense, the transition

⁴³⁷ Ibid., p.3.

from the absolute monarchy to a liberal-democracy was an epistemic-institutional transformation from the Hobbesian to the Lockean model of social order.

To challenge with the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church proposed the spiritual idea of 'salvation'. However, the idea of salvation did not provide an institutional alternative for social organisation to the Roman Empire. In addition, it had been assigned by God himself and by his Son the mission of leading human beings to salvation, for which the Church, was the unique vehicle. Since all human actions are faced with the alternative of good and evil, the church had a duty to oversee all human actions, in particular rulers' actions. The contradictory nature of the Catholicism's idea of salvation was that whilst the church did not suggest an institutional alternative for the Roman Empire, it preserved the right and duty to oversee the rulers and everything that could place this salvation in peril. This logically led to the church claim's of a supreme spiritual power in which peoples were free to organise themselves within the social sphere as they saw fit. Ironically, at the same time, such spiritual power was imposing a theocracy on them. The European theological-political problem, after the fall of the Roman Empire, was searching for a social order between the city-state and an empire, given the imposed the spiritual power of the church.⁴³⁸

Early Europeans found that in facing with the church, the city-states were relatively weak, hence it would be difficult to challenge it. As for the Empire, the key problem was not its political weakness, but rather the Empire's political sphere of influence was far from the radiating centre of the Christian presence, the pope. Hence, they searched for a middle way. It was *national absolute monarchy*. Like the emperor, and unlike the city-state, the king, as the head of the national monarchy, was able to claim to 'divine right' over his peoples because all power comes from God. Yet in contrast with the emperor, the king did not lay claim to a universal monarchy, whereas the church's universality was a given condition. In addition, the natural position of a monarch's subjects was one of obedience that suited the church's intellectual authority better. In national absolute monarchies, people's beliefs in the church's teaching remained unchanged and cognitively supported by the institutional performance of the absolute monarchies, because natural position of a monarch's subject was one of obedience which was consistent with both the monarchy and the church. Hence, the absolute monarchies raised the key questions regarding what an

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p.9.

individual's rights should be and what an individualistic social order that liberates peoples from the spiritual influence of the church should be?

Pre-liberal thinkers, like Thomas Hobbes, and liberal thinkers, like John Locke, provided the intellectual foundations for a conscious social transition from absolute monarchies to liberal-democracies, in Europe in particular, as well as in the West in general. I argue while pre-liberal thinkers, such as Hobbes, were generally rescuing peoples from the monarchical social order, their ideas about human nature and social organisation actually *re-produced* the intellectual base and institutional functions of the absolute monarchies. On the contrary, liberal thinkers like Locke, among others, criticised the absolute monarchies and provided a new intellectual foundation for a self-governing individualistic society in the Europe and the West.

Hobbes' critique of the church's intellectual influence targeted the micro-foundation of the church's teaching about the human nature. The church's salvation thesis implied that since mankind has a good soul, if he follows the commands of God, his life will be emancipated. As argued in chapter 5, Hobbes suggested an alternative model of social order. However, the Hobbesian alternative did not contradict the absolute monarchy, but rather it paved the way for the emergence of the authoritarian style of social order. Hobbes developed his political philosophy as an institutional solution for overcoming the national monarchy's contradictions. As Reinhart Koselleck argues, "Hobbes's doctrine of the State grew out of the historical situation of civil war [in England]. ...Hobbes asks what causes civil war. ...To get the bottom of civil warfare... He develops an individualistic anthropology, one corresponding to a human nature that has come to view its social, political, and religious ties as problematical."⁴³⁹ The Hobbesian model of human nature implies that humans are egoistic and power loving and their reason is a servant of their passions. They cannot overcome their conflict of opinions over the good. He employed this individualistic anthropology to get to the bottom of the civil war in England.⁴⁴⁰

The natural outcome of Hobbes' model of human action is the war of all against all as the state of nature. Hobbes believed that England's civil war was a good example of

⁴³⁹ Reinhart Koselleck, "Hobbesian Rationality and the Origins of Enlightenment," in Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis. Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, (Oxford, Berg Publishers Limited: 1988), p.24. Also see Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis*, (1936), p.15.

⁴⁴⁰ See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (1962), p.6.

this state of nature. In his eyes, the political and religious strife of his country was only a particularly rounded manifestation of behaviours natural to human beings when they live without undisputed masters. Viewed from this micro-analysis, Hobbes argues for two major causes of the civil war: a *secular cause* was found in the influence of the universities that educate the elite; and a *religious cause* was found in the influence of Puritans, who are made up of lay people. The former cause stems from Greek and Roman models of glorifying freedom. The latter cause stems from a religious conception attributing to everyone who shares the right and duty to obey individual inspiration. Hobbes argues that these causes conspire to stimulate the spirit of disobedience and consequently the civil war. Such a spirit of disobedience was not rooted in the real nature of human beings. The former originated from the Greek and Roman's belief in that individuals can use their reason to peacefully live together. The latter originated in the Protestantism belief that God bestows his grace on anyone who approaches him with a pure and humble heart. Hobbes claims that the experience of the civil war showed that humans neither as rational creature, nor as a holy creature could address such a social catastrophe in England. In contrast, the egoistic nature of human reveals the origins of the civil war. He proposes that if all persons give up their rights to a central absolute monarchy, a peaceful social order becomes possible. In this way, while Hobbes aimed to find a realistic solution for the social disorders of his society, he re-produced the institutional logic of the absolute monarchy.⁴⁴¹

The Hobbesian models of action and social order reflect the reality of the absolute national monarchies in early modern Europe. However, it does not lead us to those intellectual bases that cognitively fuelled a conscious social transformation from the monarchies into liberal democracies. John Locke was among the most important liberal thinkers whose ideas of human nature and an individualistic social order found a public recognition. David Hume and Adam Smith, amongst others, developed the Lockean model of liberal-democracy. Europeans gradually changed their religious-informed conception of human nature and model of social organisation to the liberal accounts of the individual and social organisation. This epistemic transformation led Europeans to a new set of social institutions, called later a liberal-democratic model of social organisation.

⁴⁴¹ See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (1962), pp.11, 13 and 30, Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, (1994), pp.21-29., and Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York: 1958), p.139.

As argued in chapter 5, John Locke introduced another version of the utilitarian social philosophy. While he agreed with Hobbes in that individuals cannot rationally overcome their conflict of opinions over the good, he did not arrive at the conclusion that the war of all against all is necessarily the state of nature. Locke recognised that the civil war was a good approximation of the war of all against all, but he rejected that the civil war as the truth of political life. It was only in exceptional circumstance from which nothing general can be inferred for organising 'ordinary' social life. Locke criticised the micro-foundation of Hobbes' macro-political philosophy, implying that since individuals are egoistic and power-loving, the state of nature is essentially the state of war. While Hobbes believed that individuals exists only through a kind of negative sociability, that of war, hence they have the absolute right of self-perseveration, Locke argued that the most fundamental human right is the right to property. He developed a *liberal conception of the person* in which the main concern of the individual is satisfying his material needs and the main right of the individual is the right to property to make sure the realisation of such material needs. As noted in chapter 4, Locke provided a *theological utilitarian* account of human action for justifying the person's fundamental right to property. Locke derived his institutional alternative for the absolute monarchy, i.e. a *constitutional state*, from his new account of human nature.⁴⁴²

Locke's social philosophy rests upon his new conception of the individual. Once this conception found a public acceptance, a liberal society emerged. A liberal society is a society of liberal-minded persons who exercises equal right to property and self-governance in order to satisfy their needs. Locke developed the right to property into a political right to self-governance through shaping a constitutional state. However, the property right remained as the most fundamental element of his social philosophy.

As argued in chapter 5, Locke uses his theological utilitarianism to defend the individual's right to property, wherein all individuals are God's property, so that no one has the right to harm himself or anyone else. God gave the world in common to human. God gave people reason. With these three revelations, Locke argues that property could have arisen rightfully.⁴⁴³ If the property right is a logical outcome of a

⁴⁴² Manent, op. cit.,(1994), pp.39-52.

⁴⁴³ Locke, *Two Treatise of Civil Government*, (1690), pp.6, 25, and 26., Also see John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of The Argument of the 'Two Treatise of Government'*, (Cambridge: 1969).

rational faith in the Christian morality, and if the most urgent and important human needs are their materialistic needs to survive, individuals require social institutions to protect their property rights. Locke argues that in order to protect their natural right to property, individuals *cannot* give up the right in favour of an absolute monarchy. If all peoples are egoistic and power-loving, none of them can be exempted from this general rule. Locke's conception of human nature provided a micro-foundation for his macro-solution for establishing a constitutional state to protect the right to property.⁴⁴⁴ For him, people can agree on a social contract, in terms of a constitutional state, to protect their property right.⁴⁴⁵ The right to property led Locke to the individual's right to political self-governance.

As Manent reminds us of Locke's view of society, in its essential elements, the society is born before the political institutions. What Locke allows us to see is the development of a liberal society from its modest beginning in a liberal (wo)man who pursue their self-preservation whilst regarding the others as economic rivals, as opposed to political enemies. However, they come to a societal agreement regarding how their economic relations can be organised to protect their property right, as the main means for their material survival and individual freedom.⁴⁴⁶ These liberal-minded peoples can establish a representative political organisation to protect their natural right to property. But, such political institutions do not have an absolute right to govern the people. It must be itself be subjected to the laws it enacts.

The Lockean model of social order provides a reasonable institutional solution for creating a liberal society in which social institutions protect the rights of individuals. Keith Baker argues that a fundamental shift from traditional societies toward modern society in the West occurred when liberal thinker like Locke and Mandeville proposed their solutions for a social order based on the action of free and equal individuals.⁴⁴⁷ In this way, liberal society originated from a conscious social change through which liberal ideas and values were socialised. As Tom Young writes:

Liberal society and liberal democracy are forms of social and political order which require citizens who think of themselves as individuals, characterized by material interest between which there can be trade-offs. Market and civil society constitute spheres of interaction for such individuals. Yet, *far from 'the' market and civil society being 'spontaneous' social developments*, as

⁴⁴⁴ On this see: Manent, (1994), pp.39-52.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid, pp.48-52.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid, pp.44-46.

⁴⁴⁷ See Keith Michael Baker, "Enlightenment and the Institutions of Society,"(1994), pp.109-110.

liberal myth requires, to be effective they must be penetrated and *shaped by a modernizing state, a modernizing state moreover which is driven by a ruling elite* armed with new forms of expertise ... [emphasis added].⁴⁴⁸

When early Europeans recognised new conception of the individual, a deep-seated epistemic shift-- from the individual as the subject of a monarchy's rules to the individual as possessor of equal right to property and self-governance-- occurred. Such an epistemic shift in the concept of the individual led to an institutional self-making of liberal-democracies. The ideas of liberal thinkers, like Locke among others, provided cognitive inputs for those emancipatory social movements whose purpose was to realise a society of free and equal persons. Such an emancipatory social learning informed Europeans that if they want to realise their rights of self-governance, they must contribute to a societal-institutional change from a monarchy to a liberal-democracy: a new institutional order that aims to protect the property right and self-governance. Friedrich Hayek points out that, "throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century the European country which seemed to be nearest to a realisation of the liberal principles was Great Britain. There most of them appeared to be accepted not only by a powerful Liberal Party but by the majority of the population, and even the Conservatives often become the instrument of the achievement of liberal reforms. ...In the intellectual sphere during the second half of the nineteenth century the basic principles of liberalism were intensively discussed."⁴⁴⁹ In the same line of analysis, Habermas discusses that the republican preferences of the bourgeoisie first emerged in opposition to the hidden and private activities of the King's household in patrimonial absolutist regimes. This bourgeois preference for open and public relationships culminated in the conversation-filled coffeehouse and salons of the eighteenth-century British and French commercial centers. According to Habermas, it was in these public houses that the emerging middle classes debated plan for establishing liberal democracy in a rational manner.⁴⁵⁰

Later liberal thinkers developed the Lockean models of human action and social order. Such developments affected the emergence of liberal-democratic societies in the Europe and the West. For instance, David Hume and Adam Smith, amongst others, criticised Locke's theological utilitarianism. They believed that "political order

⁴⁴⁸ Tom Young, "A Project to be Realized: Global Liberalism and a New World Order," p.185 in Hovden and Keene (eds.), *The Globalisation of Liberalism*, (2002).

⁴⁴⁹ Fredrick A. Hayek, *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas*, (London, Routledge: 1990), pp.128-129.

⁴⁵⁰ See Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, (1989), chapter 3.

rested on no deeper foundation than opinion and put their faith in the tendency of the modern socio-economic order to generate sufficient social cohesion to carry the weight of the political community.⁴⁵¹ Locke's political philosophy was not directly confronting the intellectual influence of the Catholic theology. It aimed to modify it in the context of the Protestant theology that recognised the property right as a God-given right. However, Hume and Smith did not see such a link between the Church theology and the intellectual foundations of the modern liberal society as a necessary relation.⁴⁵² Hence, they suggested a secular ideational foundation for a liberal society in which individuals look after their self-interests, without a need for a theological justification for their equal rights to property and the creation of a representative state. In this sense, they changed epistemic foundation of the liberal model of social order from a *theological* towards a *secular utilitarianism* in which individuals agree upon a secular social contract for protecting their rights to property and self- governance.

For them, liberal society was a middle ground between the Hobbesian absolute monarchy and the Kantian rational society. Once individuals recognised each other as useful means for their ends, they would have entered into a social contract, guided by the liberal conception of the individual, as a utility-maximising agent. A liberal society is created by liberal-minded peoples who regard themselves as useful means for each others. Hence, the liberal model of society reflects market sociability--a form of social organisation that its principle is utility, what Kant called an *unsocial sociability*.⁴⁵³ Different accounts of liberalism were shaped in Europe and the West that cognitively fuelled diverse forms of social order,⁴⁵⁴ but a set of liberal-democratic ideas and values are more or less shared amongst these. As Peter Wagner writes:

I do think...that *individualism-cum-liberalism* has been an *organizing centre for social and political thought during the past two centuries [in the West]*, this is to say that hardly anybody could avoid referring to this--itself rarely spelt out--discourse, affirmatively or critically. I do not think, though, that a commitment to "modernity" ...irrefutably demands a commitment to this discourse. My conclusion could thus be summarized as saying that there was

⁴⁵¹ See Istvan Hont, "Commercial Society and Political Theory in the Eighteenth Century: The Problem of Authority in David Hume and Adam Smith," (1994), pp.55-57.

⁴⁵² See John Dunn, "From Applied Theology to Social Analysis: The Break Between John Lock and the Scottish Enlightenment", in I. Hont and M. Ignatieff (eds.), *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*, (Cambridge: 1983), pp.119-136.

⁴⁵³ Hont, "Commercial Society and Political Theory in the Eighteenth Century," (1994), pp.60-61.

⁴⁵⁴ See Seidmaw Steven, *Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory*, (Berkeley, University of California Press: 1983).

an *historical*, but not a *theoretical* inevitability of individualism-cum-liberalism (emphasis added).⁴⁵⁵

Wagner discusses modern political philosophers of liberalism, from Hobbes to Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau tried to address the question of how human nature would lend itself to a political order without externally imposed unity and rules of action. So-called democratic revolutions in North America and in France gave institutional expression to the political aspect of a broader culture of the individual autonomy, which was a key element of the emergence of the modern societies.⁴⁵⁶

6.3.2 The Emergence of the Western Liberal-Democracies' Bloc

As Wittrock argues, the historical process of economic and political modernity in Western Europe and North America in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that there have been differences between countries. "It is simply not true that all these countries have had roughly similar types of economic and political institutions in this historical period."⁴⁵⁷ However, there have been similar cultural orientations in the intellectual and institutional landscape of Europe and the West in the course of the past two centuries. The liberal-democratic form of social ordering of peoples has been central to this cultural constitution of Western modernity.

The institutional projects of Western modernity--be they a democratic nation-state and a liberal market economy-- cannot be understood unless their grounding in the profounded cultural or epistemic shift is recognised. These institutional projects were premised on new assumptions about human beings, their right and agency. As Wittrock argues, these epistemic changes entitled promissory notes that came to constitute new affiliations, identities and ultimately, institutional realities.⁴⁵⁸ It was argued that at the core of these promissory notes was the epistemic shift from the conception of a person as the subject of monarchy's rule to a person who entitles the equal right to property and self-governance. In this sense, an epistemic-institutional shift from the Hobbesian to the Lockean social philosophy leads us to *the cultural constitution* of the Western modern liberal societies. The liberal ideas and values were central in the cultural constitution of the Western modernity however these ideas and

⁴⁵⁵ Peter Wagner, "Certainty and Order, Liberty and Democracy, the Birth of Social Sciences as Empirical Political Philosophy," pp.260-261. note 4., in Heilbron et al., *The Rise of the Social Sciences and the Formation of Modernity*, (1996).

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., pp.242-243.

⁴⁵⁷ Wittrock, "Modernity: One, None, or Many?" (2000), p.33.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid., pp.36-37.

values have found various interpretations in the Western countries. In addition, there have been some exceptional ideologies and political regimes in the West that did not follow this cultural constitution namely Nazism and Fascism.

The liberal model of social organisation implied that individuals or nations can shape a liberal form of social order through making their social cooperation useful for each other. In the twentieth century, the Western liberal democracies were faced with a common ideological and institutional rival, i.e., the communist bloc of nation states under leadership of the Soviet Union. The liberal logic led them to a political and economic cooperation in order to make them one bloc of nation states in their conflicting position to the Eastern bloc. Without such cultural sharing around liberal-democratic values, they could not trust each other in order to find themselves reliable partners of such political and economic cooperation. In spite of their internal differences, they came to form a Western bloc of liberal-democracies. The cultural constitution of Western modernity-- in terms of some common account of the individual's rights to property and self-governance-- enabled them to form such political and economic bloc in the form of the Western bloc of nation-states.

The emergence of liberal global governance has originated from such a cultural sharing amongst the Western liberal-democracies. Viewed from the Lockean models of action and social organisation, the Western nation states found such a collation a useful cooperation for their confrontation with the Eastern rival. In order to survive in a bipolar world order of the twentieth century, such a political and economic collation was useful for all of them. While they were rivals of each other within the West, the liberal logic convinced them to shape a Western-collation of liberal-minded states to engage in an inter-bloc competition. Their cultural sharing concerning liberal ideas and values, in particular the liberal conception of the person, justified such political and economic collation. In this way, liberalism, as an ideational system, paved the way for the emergence for the Western bloc of liberal-democracies in a bipolar world order. While not all of the Western societies had similar accounts of liberalism and liberal society, the liberal logic enabled them to overlook their internal differences in favour of a global scale of cooperation that was *useful* for all of them. The Western liberal-democracies learned to overlook their internal differences in favour of an international cooperation for securing cooperative gains resulting from their unified political and economic position in their competition with the Eastern bloc of nation-

states. Hence, the emergence of global liberalism originated from an inter-societal learning amongst the Western liberal-democracies, informed by their cultural sharing over the liberal ideas and values.

6.4 Cultural Logic of Global Liberalism and Political Collapse of the Cold War

This section argues that the emergence of global liberalism, which originated from the aforementioned cultural sharing among liberal-democratic countries in the West, played a key epistemic role in the collapse of the Cold War political order. It leads us to illustrate how the emergence of global liberalism, as a global epistemic shift towards a liberal mode of global organisation, had paved the way for a political change from bipolar to multi-polar global governance. From a cultural perspective, a comparative ideational advantage of the Lockean model of social organisation-- due to its more realistic premises about human nature compared to the Hobbesian model-- leads us to explore the cultural causes of the political collapse of the Cold War. In a word, this section shall argue that the ideational logic of liberalism was a significant cultural motor force of the end of the Cold War, because it enabled the Western bloc of nation-states to better organise their domestic and international affairs, compared with their Eastern rival.⁴⁵⁹

6.4.1 The Emergence of a Bipolar Political Order

From the perspective of historical sociology, the emergence of twentieth century's bipolar order can be better understood in the context of socio-political conditions of the nineteenth century. The nineteenth had often been demarcated by the end of a set of pan-European wars, in 1815 and the beginning of another, in 1914. Michael Mann has defined this century as a long century, beginning with the industrial revolution around 1790 and ending in 1914.⁴⁶⁰ I am not about here to argue in detail about the historical conditions of the emergence of the bipolar world order in the twentieth century. My aim is merely to outline a Hobbesian style of the conflict of opinions as the cultural motor forces of the emergence of the Cold War political order.

Andrew Linklater argues that in a transition from territorial states towards a nation-state world order of the twentieth century we should remember that the world was not

⁴⁵⁹ On the role of the culture in an explanation of social order formation see: Magaret Anrcher, *The Place of Culture in Social Theory*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1988) and D.M., Warren, L. J. Slikkervera, and D. Brokensha, *The Cultural Dimension of Development: Indigenous Knowledge Systems* (UK, International Teoherly Publication: 1995).

⁴⁶⁰ See Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1993).

“naturally divided into nations. States played a central role in creating national cultures not least by building education systems that promoted common values and loyalties. ...Turning point in modern history was the French Revolution, which created the idea of the ‘nation in arms’ along with national conscription.”⁴⁶¹ Historical sociologists, like Martin Shaw, argue that preconditions of the bipolar order of the twentieth century were prepared in nineteenth-century developments. As Shaw argues, in the nineteenth century, “the national-international order was consolidated. The economic and political infrastructure for total war was created... Modern mass militarism developed at the core of society: not only in the technological ‘industrialization’ of warfare, but in the creation of conscript mass armies and other means of modern state mobilization, including the socio-cultural forms of mass society which were to serve total war.”⁴⁶² While liberal democratic societies were emerging as domestic forms of social organisation in the West, the modern Europe of nation-states, as an international political order, was formed in the nineteenth century.

In Shaw’s words, “it was consolidated only after the revolutions of 1846 and German and Italian unification in the 1870s and fully realized through the twentieth century—in the revolutionary waves of 1917-19, 1944-45, and even 1989-91. ...The dominant form of the state was not, therefore, simply a nation-state, but *the nation-state-empire within an international state-system*.”⁴⁶³ Each European nation-state-empire, such as the British and French nation-state-empires, was looking to build a world-order in its own right due to their ideologies and socio-economic interests. With the Soviet Union’s Communist Revolution in 1917, a new ideological battle began between the Western liberal-democracies and the Eastern communist bloc.

While the pre-1917 world was an international state-system in which nation-state-empires have paved the way for the emergence of a Hobbesian-style war of all against all, the post-1917 world was a bipolar states-system, and each of them was operating as a global military/political empire. It shaped a cold war of two major blocs of states against each other. As the Hobbesian model of social order implies, the conflict of opinions over the good is the ultimate source of the political struggle for power. The

⁴⁶¹ Andrew Linklater, "Globalization and the transformation of political community," p .713 in Baylis and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, (2005).

⁴⁶² Martin Shaw, "Internationalized bloc-states and democratic revolution", in Shaw, *Theory of the Global State, Globality as an Unfinished Revolution*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2000), p.103.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

emergence of the Cold War or bipolar world order was a political manifestation of an ideological battle between liberal-democracies and communist states. Hence, the political organisation of these two antagonistic blocs of the Cold War order originated from their ideological conflicts over the model of social organisation itself.

In his historical sociology of the states-system, Linklater recognises the difference between the Hobbesian and the Kantian approaches to historical sociology of the states-system. For him, these approaches can be distinguished in this way: “the Hobbesian or Machiavellian approach which concentrates on long-term historical processes that include the rise of fall of hegemonic powers...the Kantian approach which focuses on long-term historical processes in which visions of the unity of the human race influences the development of states-systems.”⁴⁶⁴ The Hobbesian model indicates the reality of the Cold War political order. Cold War politics shaped due to a conflict of opinions over the good between the two blocs of nation states.

Due to such *ideational conflict* over how to organise peoples, the bipolar order followed the Hobbesian-style cold war of all against all. In this cold war, the struggle for political power was a defining feature of world politics. The absence of one set of inter-blocs' shared values regarding the conception of a person and the mechanism of social ordering of peoples was the cultural deficit of the Hobbesian Cold War order. However, as the Hobbesian social order faced overwhelming social critics on a domestic level, it had also faced with similar crises on a global scale. The post-1917 bipolar world order led to the international political and economic crises that paved the way for the collapse of the Cold War order.

6.4.2 The Cultural Logic of a Bipolar Cold War and Its Political Outcomes

The bipolar world order emerged where there was not an inter-national consensus upon how international society should be organised to satisfy the interests of all parts. Each of the two states-blocs used their own ideas and values to organise their domestic and international affairs. The substantive conflict of opinions over models of human action and social order between liberal democracies and communist states was reflected in their inter-bloc cold war. They entered into political and military races—as a defining feature of the Cold War order. This Hobbesian-style of international order originated from a profound cultural source: if the liberal West and the

⁴⁶⁴ Andrew Linklater, *The English School of International Relations*, (2006), p.190.

communist East could not arrive at an ideological consensus regarding how to organise their inter-societal relations, the natural outcome of this unsolved conflict of opinions was an inter-bloc cold war. In this sense, the political architecture of the Cold War order had a profound cultural source.

As Robert Keohane argues, “the Soviet Union chose an essentially Hobbesian path: internally, by constructing a centralized authoritarian state and externally, by seeking autarchy and being suspicious of international cooperation and its institutionalized forms.”⁴⁶⁵ From a domestic point of view, the political and economic crises of the Soviet Union were the natural outcomes of a Hobbesian style of social organisation. The low economic growth and low political legitimacy are logical outcomes of absolute monarchies. An arrogation of all the key property rights to the state—that is to the Communist Party-- did not create a competitive economic sphere for an endogenous economic growth. In addition, the absence of a market economy, whereas a centralised economic planning was the mechanism of resource allocation, led to an inefficient usage of the production factors and inappropriate division of the outputs.⁴⁶⁶ The central economic planning led to inappropriate resource allocation that could not rightly respond to consumer needs and mobilise producer supplies. The results were a low economic growth, high rates of poverty, unemployment and inflation, and an unjust distribution of wealth. If we add a heavy investment on arm-race to this list, it would be easy to understand why the Soviet system, faced with overwhelming economic and political crises, collapsed.

From an international perspective, the Soviet Union was unable to make credible international commitments. Due to its Hobbesian logic, as Shaw points out, “the whole Soviet Union's system was built on the notion of threats both internal and external, so that mobilization for war was the only way of mobilizing the economy.”⁴⁶⁷ This approach to international order made *the logic of enmity* a defining feature of the world-order. For the Soviet Union, the international market was not playing the same role as it did for its Western rival. For the liberal model, economic growth depends upon an institutional framework of market exchanges. Improvement in productivity results from the division of labour, whereby the division of labour is

⁴⁶⁵ Robert O. Keohane, "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society", in Hans-Henrik Holm and George Sorenson (eds.), in *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalisation and the End of the Cold War*, (Oxford, Westview Press: 1995), p.170.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.170-171.

⁴⁶⁷ Shaw, *Theory of Global State*, (2000), p.118.

limited by the extent of the market. Markets are defined as economic frameworks over which transactions can take place at similar prices. This approach to economic growth calls for political action to remove exchange barriers. The Western international policy was removing the barriers to meet required economic growth. However, Hobbesian monarchs had incentive to expand the internal market, since they would capture part of the gains from trade, but the time horizons for them were shorter than those of the state that they controlled; thus, they had incentive to capture immediate gains at the expense of the long-term economic growth.⁴⁶⁸ The Soviet Union's economy did not use the international market as an important source of domestic economic growth to finance its political-military competition with the West. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, the Western bloc established an unjust global economic order to finance their military-political race with the Eastern bloc.

In contrast, due to this Lockean model of social organisation, the liberal-democracies were more successful in managing their internal and external socio-economic affairs. In addition, as Mary Kaldor argues: “the West needed a Soviet threat to legitimize the construction of the Western bloc. The Soviet system did represent an undesirable alternative, even though few people at that time viewed it as a territorial threat.”⁴⁶⁹ The Western bloc used shared ideas and values to form and legitimise the construction of the Western bloc. From the domestic perspective, the market-based national economy, under the protection of a constitutional state, secured the right to property, as an important source of economic development. In comparison with the Soviet Union's centralised economy, the Western commercial societies led to more likely growth rate, a better resource allocation, and lower unemployment, poverty, and inflation rates during the Cold War era. The liberal West expanded domestic markets to a global scale through setting up of certain international economic rules, which provided the West required financial resources to meet the costs of its military and political competition with the Eastern enemy. The Cold War's political economy was shaped due to the different the Western and Eastern cultural models of social organisation. As Shaw writes:

Instead of a single dominant bloc, therefore, two antagonistic blocs formed, Western and Soviet, through the military dependence (forced, in the case of

⁴⁶⁸ Keohan, "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics," (1995), pp.169-170.

⁴⁶⁹ Mary Kaldor, "Nations and blocs: towards a theory of the political economy of the interstate model in Europe", in A. Hunter (ed.), *Rethinking Cold War*, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press: 1998), p .201.

the Soviet bloc) of the secondary members-state on the respective leading states or 'superpowers'. *Within each bloc, the core states had similar political systems and ideologies.* ... This meant that from the mid-1940s, state power in the northern industrial world was increasingly configured in a radically different way from the whole of the previous historical period. Before 1939 there had been a large number of more or less autonomous nation-states, of which the major states constituted rival world-empires, and between which competition could ultimately lead to arrange of possible wars. Now there were two competing state-blocs, whose rivalry dominated world politics... A world dominated by two blocs, major Western and minor Soviet, was very different indeed from the previous national-international world based on rival European empires⁴⁷⁰ [emphasis added].

Along the same line of analysis, Kaldor argues that the emergence of the Cold War order prefigured new methods of political organisation that arose because of the limitation of the nation-state system. The Cold War order was a way of reconciling the attachment to nation-state with the need for a larger political organisation.⁴⁷¹ In one sense, while world politics required a macro political organisation to manage the political affairs on a global scale, the conflict of opinions over the good between the two antagonistic blocs led such a post-1914 political order to a new Hobbesian political order in which two antagonistic blocs dominated the world politics.

6.4.3 An Inter-Bloc Social Learning and Institutional Reforms

The contradictions of the Hobbesian Cold War led to an overwhelming series of domestic and international crises. At the domestic level, the Soviet Union faced with economic and political catastrophes and at the international level, political and military tensions between antagonistic blocs increased. In Keohane's words, the Hobbesian logic was self-defeating: it created internal oppression, external strife, economic decay and political tension.⁴⁷² The contradictions of the bipolar world-order paved the way for a socio-political learning and policy reforms on an inter-bloc scale. These learning processes and policy reforms started from the political leadership of the Soviet Union and led to the revolutions of 1989.⁴⁷³

Global leadership is regarded as a global political institution. As Fluvio Attina argues, global leadership is a global institution that gives uniform direction to the global political system by selecting and executing coherent programs and strategies of

⁴⁷⁰ Shaw, *The Theory of Global State*, (2000), p.118.

⁴⁷¹ Kaldor, *op. cit.*, p.194.

⁴⁷² Keohan, "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics," (1995), p.170.

⁴⁷³ On the outcomes of the end of Cold War for globalization studies see: Victor Roudometof, "Gusts of Change: The Consequences of the 1989 Revolutions for the Study of Globalization," *European Journal of Social Theory*, (2009), 12, pp. 409-424.

government with regard to the world's problems and relations between state actors.⁴⁷⁴ Given these functions of global leadership, the Soviet Union's leadership played an important role in ending the Cold War order. This role can be addressed through inter-bloc social learning and institutional reforms through which the contradictions of the Hobbesian Cold War were recognised. The Soviet Communist Party, in particular Mikhail Gorbachev, initiated a domestic and international learning process with comparing relative advantages and weakness of the Western and the Eastern models of social organisation. The political leadership of the Soviet Union realised that the Hobbesian model of social organisation has been the major source of the Soviet's domestic problems and international inefficiencies.

As Shaw reminds us, the upheavals in the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s were anticipated by the democratic revolution throughout the Soviet bloc over the previous three decades. However, the political and economic changes of the mid to late 1980s were the fundamental changes at the centre of the Soviet bloc, when Gorbachev became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985. Gorbachev clearly understood the complexity of his regime's crises. To overcome these crises Gorbachev proposed an economic restructuring plan (*perestroika*), a political openness reform (*glasnost*) and an international *détente*.⁴⁷⁵ Gorbachev's analyses of the roots of the Soviet's crises lead us to explore inter-bloc socio-political learning that started from the Soviet's society, but expanded to the global level.

Gorbachev skillfully started a public communicating with his own party and peoples on the one hand, and with the West's political leadership and the world on the other hand. He aimed to justify his radical economic and political reforms at both the domestic and international levels. In *Gorbachev, Man of the Twentieth Century?* Mark Sandle argues how in his initial 14-15 months in power Gorbachev “contained a number of the key speeches, broadcasts and media appearances which was the first signs of a distinctive Gorbachevian message emerging.”⁴⁷⁶ Gorbachev was aiming to publicise his lessons learned about the origins of the domestic and international crises in order to justify his reform's plans.

⁴⁷⁴ Fulvio Attina, "Theories of long-term change and the future of world political institutions," p.109., in Modelski, et al., *Globalisation as Evolutionary Process*, (2008)

⁴⁷⁵ See Shaw, *Theory of Global State*, (2000), p.152.

⁴⁷⁶ Mark Sandle, *Gorbachev, Man of the Twentieth Century?*, (London, Hodder Education: 2008), p.41.

In his pathology of the Soviet's social crises, Gorbachev highlighted the economic and political problems that had been not addressed as a major source of the Soviet's crises. He described the roots of his society's socio-economic underdevelopment in a misunderstanding of socialism as a centralised economy and an authoritarian political system. In fact, he criticised the Hobbesian reading of socialism in favour of a *democratic socialism*.⁴⁷⁷ Gorbachev linked his lessons learned about the deep-seated epistemic roots of the Soviet's crises with a historical consciousness. For him, the knowledge of the fatherland history, specially the post-October period, allows people to draw a lesson today for renewing their society and tap more fully the potentials of socialism by recognising the importance of his economic and political reforms.⁴⁷⁸ The nature of an epistemic-institutional transformation that occurred in the Soviet society will be revealed from his analysis of the outcomes of the 1989 revolution:

Society has acquired freedom and liberated itself politically and socially ... A totalitarian system, which has deprived the country of an opportunity to become wealthy and prosper a long time ago, has been liquidated. A breakthrough on the way to democratic transformation has been accomplished. Free elections, free press, religious freedom, representative power bodies and multiparty system have become a reality and human rights have been recognized as the highest principle. A movement towards a mixed economy has started. Equality of all forms of property is being established. ... The economic freedom of the producer has been legalized and enterprising, joint-stock companies and privatization have started to gain force. ... *We are living in a new world. The Cold War is over* [emphasis added].⁴⁷⁹

Gorbachev's analysis clearly shows that the Soviet Union was experiencing an institutional transition from the Hobbesian model of social order towards the Lockean model. These political and economic reforms were originating from a deeper ideational reform or epistemic shift in the Soviet's political leadership that rooted in an inter-bloc social learning from the outcomes of the Western and the Eastern models of social organisation for peoples' life. In fact, there was a close linkage between domestic reforms in the Soviet bloc and the collapse of the Cold War. Once the Soviet's political leadership learned from his own critique of the Soviet' social organisation's errors (i.e., P1→TT→EE→P2), it launched one set of the domestic and

⁴⁷⁷ See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestorika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, (London, Collins Press: 1987)

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.29.

⁴⁷⁹ Sandel, *Gorbachev, Man of the Twentieth Century?* (2008), pp.270-271. For the outcomes of the end of the Cold War for Globalisation Studies see: Victor Roundometof, "The Consequences of the 1989 Revolution for the Study of Globalization," *European Journal of Social Theory*, 12 (3) (2009), pp.418-419.

international reforms which notably affected the defining feature of bipolar world order as a political system on the basis of the struggle for power.

The collapse of the Cold War, as a macro institutional change on a global scale, was originated from the refutation of the Hobbesian model of social organisation. In the Western societies, the transition from the Hobbesian to the Lockean model of social order took place by the liberal social movements from below. However, in Soviet society and in its affiliated nation-states, such epistemic-institutional transition was mainly a social learning and institutional reform from above that was led by Soviet political leadership. The collapse of bipolar world order can be regarded as an outcome of an epistemic-institutional shift from the Hobbesian to the Lockean model of social order. Soviet Union's political leadership initiated such a transition, which was deeply originating from the social crises of the Hobbesian-style of social order--inside of the Eastern bloc and between two antagonistic blocs of nation-states.

6.4.4 The Collapse of the Cold War and the Emergence of Global Governance

The advantages of the Lockean model of social organisation made the West as a winner of the end of the bipolar order. The Eastern bloc recognised this advantage, while it tried to provide a socialist reading of its democratic and market reforms. The emergence of global liberalism was an epistemic and institutional outcome of such a discourse between the Western and the Eastern models of social organisation. As Buzan and Little points out, “for liberals, the forty years of Cold War are now depicted not as a struggle for power, but as an ideological battle between capitalism and communism from which capitalism has emerged triumphant.”⁴⁸⁰ While the liberal model of social organisation itself suffers from a deep unsocial sociability, as I will argue in the next chapter, its relative advantage in comparison with the Hobbesian model, turned it into a globalising model of social organisation. Given this background, the end of the Cold War resulted in important outcomes for the emergence of multi-centric global governance.

The Lockean models of human nature and social order rest upon more realistic assumptions. The Hobbesian model implies that individuals are egoistic agents who cannot arrive at a rational consensus upon their social organisation; hence, the state of nature is necessarily the state of war. The Lockean model implies that individuals can

⁴⁸⁰ Buzan and Little, "Beyond Westphalia", (1999), p.89.

agree on some basic rights, hence the state of nature is not necessarily a war of all against all. The Hobbesian model claims that in the condition of war of all against all, each person has the absolute right to self-preservation. But since they cannot achieve a societal consensus on how to organise their social relations for their self-preservation, they must give up their absolute right to a central absolute power.

The Lockean model rightly implies that if all human beings are egoistic agents, why should some of them be excepted from the general rule? The Lockean model suggests a constitutional state that is an accountable body politic to people hence it can avoid an absolute monarchy and the condition of war of all against all. The Lockean model implies that the individuals' right to property and self-governance provides the legal grounds for a competitive market economy. This advantage of the liberal model-- due to its more realistic assumption of human nature and its more reasonable institutional solution for a peaceful social order-- led to new global political order in which the political struggle of superpowers was no longer the defining feature of world politics.

The collapse of the Cold War paved the way for the expansion of the Lockean model on a global level in terms of the emergence of more constitutional states and market economies. In addition, it changed the very nature of international political organisation. As Buzan and Little argue, the pursuit of liberal logic refers to a qualitative change in the function of the nation state as the main units of the Westphalian world order. With the collapse of the Cold War, the military-political sector is losing dominance as the defining process of the system. Instead, the liberal logic requires a big reduction in the state's control of the national economy. As a result, the end of Cold War led to the emergence of a new global governance in which the struggle for political power is no longer the defining feature of the world politics. Instead, a global competition for economic interests has shaped the political organisation of the nation-states and non-governmental actors.⁴⁸¹ In her critique of liberal globalisation, Jackie Smith recognises liberal ideology as a system of thought that sees market economy as the most efficient and effective mechanism for allocating

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., p.95.

the resources of society, while challenging the notion that the state should perform regulatory and redistributive tasks in a liberal society.⁴⁸²

The end of the Cold War removed some constraints on the development of a more consensual-based world order,⁴⁸³ because the Hobbesian conflict of opinions over good were to some degree superseded by the liberal beliefs in the possibility of a consensus on the basis of the individual's rights to property and self-governance. The key outcome of this ideational change for world politics was a move from the bipolar rivalry toward a multi-centric global governance. As Tom Young remarks, "the dynamics of the Cold War paradoxically strengthened the elements of pluralism within the [global] system. Universalism was constrained by superpower rivalry... the demise of the Soviet bloc removed that shelter. We can now see the postwar period as a deviant phase. Since the end of the Cold War the universal elements of the liberal project have come to the fore."⁴⁸⁴ The end of the Cold War meant that the global political order could no longer be managed by the two superpowers. When the military-political struggle was superseded by a competition for economic interests, the Cold War order was replaced by multi-centric global governance. In fact, political globalisation refers to this institutional transformation from the bipolar order to a multi-polar political order, what is called *global governance*.⁴⁸⁵

The liberal model of global order advocates a kind of cultural and political pluralism on a global scale. While it claims that radically different cultural standing points and political interests cannot arrive at a *rational consensus* over the good, they can agree upon one set of basic human rights like the right to property and the right to self-governance. In this way, it shifts the reference point of a global consensus from the conflict of opinions over the good to the acceptance of one set of basic rights that are necessary for the emergence of global governance. If radically different cultural viewpoints and political interests agree on the individual's right to property and self-governance, and if such rights must be protected by the rule of law that global liberalism does not need more than a global consensus regarding such rights and law. The post-Cold War governance is multi-centric global governance, whereas the

⁴⁸² See Jackie Smith, *Social Democracy for Global Democracy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press: 2008), p.69.

⁴⁸³ Linklater, *The English School of International Relations*, (2006), p.145.

⁴⁸⁴ Young, "Global Liberalism and a New World Order," (2002), pp.181-182.

⁴⁸⁵ See Moeten Ougaard and Richard Higgott (eds.), *Towards a Global Polity*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2002), pp.1-21 and 169-187.

plurality of the cultural and political systems does not create an institutional obstacle for shaping a new global political order.

The defining feature of this global governance is an economic competition amongst societies rather than a political struggle between the two antagonistic super-powers. If competing national economics accept global liberalism's rules of the game, they have also accepted a new global political order. The emerging global governance follows the liberal logic of social organisation in terms of giving the primacy to economic logic of social cooperation. In the same line of reasoning, Ronnie Lipschutz describes the post-Cold War order as an organisational change that has shifted world order from bipolarity to multi-polarity:

*...anarchy, as the organizing principle of the international system, is withering away. This is the result not so much of sudden changes in the global political scene—a shift from bipolarity to multipolarity or unipolarity—as the long-term acceptance of liberalism as a global 'operating system'... Moreover, the provision of security by states has become problematic... because of the growing 'density' of the global system. This, paradoxically, provides the political space for non-state actors to create alliances and linkages across borders and around the globe*⁴⁸⁶[emphasis added].

Like a domestic liberal society, in a liberal global order the main social organising principle is individuals' usefulness to each others. Viewed from this perspective, after the collapse of the Cold War, we are moving toward a global commercial order whose major aim is regulating an economic competition rather than a political struggle. This emerging global governance is not a hierarchical political order. It consists of multi-centric political organisation in which nation-states, non-governmental, civil society organisations, and private sectors make a contribution.⁴⁸⁷ The multi-centric concept of governance is privileged over recent decades. For instance, James Rosenau defines governance as an 'order' plus 'intentionality'.⁴⁸⁸ Scholars such as Jackie Smith view liberal global governance as a capitalist global order. Globalisation “refers to global economic integration, which is essentially the expansion of global capitalism. This is the form of global integration advanced by neoliberal globalizers.”⁴⁸⁹ She reminds us that liberal globalisation follows its interests by advocating a model of national state that favors capitalist interests as it was argued in terms of turning the logic of the state

⁴⁸⁶ Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 21 (3) (1992), pp.418-419.

⁴⁸⁷ See Aseen Parkash and Jeffrey A. Hart, (eds.), *Globalisation and Governance*, (London and New York, Routledge: 1999), pp.31-50.

⁴⁸⁸ James N. Rosenau and Ernest-Otto Czempiel, (eds.), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, (UAS, Cambridge University Press: 1992), p.5.

⁴⁸⁹ Smith, *Social Movement for Global Democracy* (2008), p.43.

into the logic of liberal man who pursues its economic interest rather than a struggle for political power.⁴⁹⁰ In chapter 4, I discussed this linkage between liberalism and capitalism.

In the same line of reasoning, Jeffrey Alexander points out that “the possibility for civil control, as opposed to military violence or political domination, can be traced back to the idea of the social contract, to the Lockean vision of consensual agreement and persuasion in contrast with the Hobbesian resort to force and fraud.”⁴⁹¹ For him, globalisation has emerged as a response to the trauma of the 20th century and as a global change from the Hobbesian logic of struggle for power to the Lockean logic of consensual agreement. Alexander views globalisation's origins in the Enlightenment's idea of world peace and global justice.⁴⁹²

6.5 The End of the Cold War and the Emergence of a Transnational Economy

Globalisation of liberalism facilitated an institutional change from an *international economy* to a *post-national economy*. The critical rationalist macrosociology of globalisation analyses the formation of such a post-national economy in the context of cultural and political globalisation. As argued in chapter 5, one of the main functions of such a macrosociology is to explain how a global epistemic shift towards the liberal model of social organisation has reflected itself in a post-national political economy as a macro institutional change from the centrality of the struggle for political power to a competition over economic interests. Viewed from the institutional approach, economic globalisation refers to an institutional change in the very logic of global economic organisation. It does not merely imply an explanation of global trade and investment or a global manufacturing of goods and services. This section aims to explain this economic institutional change, as a global economic learning process.

6.5.1 The Liberal Logic of Economic Competition

It was argued that the Lockean model of social organisation gives the primacy to a competition amongst economic rivals, whereas the individuals' rights to property are protected by a constitutional state. For the liberal model, the rights to property is the key institutional requirement of the emergence of a competitive market. Some

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., p.65.

⁴⁹¹ Alexander, "Global Civil Society," *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23 (2006), p.521.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

proponents of market economy, such as the Austrian School of Economics,⁴⁹³ argue that the property right provides legal requirement for a free entrance of economic agents to economic competition. They introduce *market competition* as an *economic learning process*, facilitated by the property right. Hayek introduces this learning process in this way:

In a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, *prices* can act to coordinate the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts of his plan. ...*We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function--a function which, of course, it fulfills less perfectly as prices grow more rigid...The most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates...*⁴⁹⁴(emphasis added).

The liberal logic implies that the individual's right to property and self-governance are necessary conditions of the function of market prices and accordingly for shaping economic competition. Openness of market economy to free entrance of economic agents plays a key institutional role in the shaping of a competitive market economy. The rule of law and the constitutional state provide the legal and political institutions for protecting the individual's right to property and their free entrance to economic competition. In this way, economic agents form market competition through using market prices as learning framework. David Harper summarises relations in this way:

...entrepreneurial profit *presupposes the institutions of private property and associated market prices*. The institutions of private property and money are essential for guiding entrepreneurs in their judgments of the potential profitability of alternative ventures...In contrast, a socialist system of economic organization is based on constitutionally established public or state ownership of the means of production, which implies the absence (or constitutional abolition) of private property rights, markets, and market prices for production resources. ...It is only the imagination and alertness of single mind—namely, that of the central planner—that shapes the pattern of decisions made within the single attempted plan. However, without markets for productive resources, the socialist-planning agency cannot allocate resources rationally (emphasis added).⁴⁹⁵

Viewed from such a concept of economic competition and its legal and political preconditions, we now can explore how the emergence of liberal global governance

⁴⁹³ On Austrian School of Economics see: Israel M. Kirzner, *The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics*, (London, Routledge: 1992) and Israel M. Kirzner, *The Deriving Forces of the Market: Essays in Austrian Economics*, (London, Routledge: 2000).

⁴⁹⁴ Friedrich Von Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," *The American Economic Review*, 34 (4) (1946), pp.526-527.

⁴⁹⁵ David A. Harper, *Foundation of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development*, (New York, Routledge: 2003), p.77. Also see R.N. Langlois, "Knowledge and Rationality in the Austrian School: An Analytical Survey," pp.118-140., in John C. Wood and Ronald N. Woods (eds.), *Fredrick A. Hayek, Critical Assessments*, (London, Routledge: 1991).

has paved the legal and political pre-conditions for the formation of a post-national world economy.

6.5.2 The Cultural Politics of the Emergence of a Transnational Economy

From a connectivist point of view, economic globalisation is often regarded as an expansion of global economic relations like global trade and investment.⁴⁹⁶ However, from the institutional perspective, economic globalisation is viewed as an institutional change: a systematic openness of national economies' actors to global markets for the formation of a post-national sphere of economic activity. In this post-national market, the logic of economic activities-- like trade, investment, and production-- differs from an inter-national economy. The nation-states are no longer the main economic actors in this post-national economy. Instead, the private sectors construct the structure of global market and determine its regulative principles. But, without global liberalism and liberal global governance, the transition from inter-national to this post-national economy was not possible. The cultural politics of the post-national economy refers to the preconditions that were provided by an interplay between the globalisation of liberal social philosophy and the emergence of liberal global governance.

The globalisation of liberal social philosophy provided an ideological pre-condition for reducing the legal and political obstacles to free entrance of national economies' private sectors to global markets. Stephen Gill describes this ideological environment as a spatial expansion of the liberal definitions of social purpose and possessively individualist patterns of actions and politics.⁴⁹⁷ If the liberal model calls for a significant reduction in the state's role in economy in favour of the private sector, economic globalisation is a logical consequence of such an ideological justification.

While the emergence of global liberalism has provided an encouraging cultural space for justifying the liberalisation of national economies, the end of the Cold War has paved the way for reducing the legal and political obstacles for opening national economies to emerging global markets. This cultural politics of contemporary global liberalism provides an institutional framework for the emergence of the post-national economy. During the Cold War era the ideological and political conflicts between the

⁴⁹⁶ See Paul Hirst, Garham Thompson, and Simon Bromley, "Globalisation and the History of the International Economy," in Hirst *et al.* third edition, *Globalisation in Question*, (London, Polity Press: 2009), pp.24-67.

⁴⁹⁷ Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," p.124. in Hovden and Keene (eds.), *The Globalisation of Liberalism*, (UK, Palgrave: 2002).

two antagonistic nation-state blocs prevented national economies from opening their private sectors to global markets. But the end of the cold war to some extent removed such legal and political impediments.⁴⁹⁸ From an economic perspective, the post-Cold War provided a more enabling environment for opening national economies to global markets. In this sense, economic globalisation finds a close relation with the rise of global liberalism and the end of the Cold War order.

6.5.3 Economic Dynamics of the Transnational Economy

The pursuit of liberal logic demands a notable reduction in the state's share in economy at the national or global levels. When the Hobbesian logic of the struggle for political power was superseded with the end of the Cold War, there was no longer an institutional obstacle to prevent national economies from opening their private sector's activities to a post-national economic space. On the contrary, nation states have found themselves in an encouraging political environment that enabled them to perform as a *liberal unit of economic action*. Nation-states realised that in order to adapt their national power to the conditions of new global political order, they must create a fundamental change in their Cold War-based economic policies. If they want to maximise their economic utility, they must look at other nation-states as *economic rivals* rather than *political enemies*.

Under this new global political order, economic function of the nation-states changed. This institutional change can be described in this way: since nation-states are not principally established for performing an economic function, given the new global political condition, they must liberalise their private sectors for an active entrance to global markets. This economic policy change on behalf of nation states led to the formation of a post-national economic sphere in which nation-states themselves are no longer a regulative agency. In this way, a *transnational gathering of private sectors* emerged.

The expansion of the global flows of trade and investments and global exchange of goods and services are the outcomes of the emergence of this new post-national institutional environment for economic activities. This institutional change was occurred through a global economic learning process in which nation-states recognised that their Cold War economic policies must be radically changed.

⁴⁹⁸ See Young, "Global Liberalism and a New World Order," (2002), p.182.

While empirical data shows the increasing trend of the expansion of global trade and investments after the end of the Cold War,⁴⁹⁹ some argue that such expansion of global trade and investment is not unprecedented. Through a brief review of this argument, the *qualitative nature* of contemporary economic globalisation will be better realised. Paul Hirst and collaborators argue that current economic globalisation is not unprecedented. They write, “it is one of number of distinct conjectures or states of the international economy that have existed since an economy based on modern industrial technology began to be generalized from the 1860s....In some respects, the current international economy has only recently becomes as open and integrated as the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914.”⁵⁰⁰ They define an international economy as an economic framework in which the main entities are *national economics*. International trade and investment produce growing interconnection between these national economics. The importance of trade, in contemporary highly internalised economy progressively, is replaced by the centrality of investment relations between nations that increasingly act as the organising principle of the international economy. But, relative separation of the domestic and the international framework continues in terms of economic policy-making. In this highly internationalised economy, the basic processes of resource allocation and production and the formation of the prices of the key variables all takes place principally in national economic spaces. In fact, they do not regard a post-national space of economic activity as an independent sphere.

In a globalised economy, national economies and their international interactions have been shaped by global processes. Economic actors and activities become disembodied from their national economies and domestic policies, whether private corporations or public regulations.⁵⁰¹ From this view, a transnational economy can be regarded as a globalised economy in which the nation-states are no longer the main units of international economic activity. However, Hirst et al establish their argument in the context of an international economy, as opposed to a transnational economy. Hence, they use a quantitative comparison to show that contemporary economic

⁴⁹⁹ See Christopher Chase-Dunn and Andrew Jorgenson, "Trajectories of Trade and Investment Globalization, pp.165-184. in Ino Rossi, *Frontiers of Globalization Research*, (2008).

⁵⁰⁰ Hirst, et al *Globalisation in Question* (2009), p.3.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp.19-20.

globalisation is not a significant development in history of world economy. Given such definitions of 'inter-national' and 'trans-national' economy, they write:

A key question...is whether the integration of the international system has dramatically changed since the Second World War. Clearly, there has been considerable international economic activity ever since the 1850s, but can we compare different periods in terms of their openness and integrations? One way of doing this is to compare trade to GDP [Gross Domestic Product] ratios. ...Apart from the dramatic difference in the openness to trade of different economies...the startling feature is that trade to GDP ratios were considerably higher in 1913 than they were in 1973...the evidence also suggests greater openness to capital flows in the pre-First World War period compared to the period up to the mid-1990s.⁵⁰²

However, this comparison does not take into account the content of international trade and investments. For instance, in 1913 the major part of trade to GDP ratios was the trade of raw material while in 1990s was manufacturing production. Hence, this qualitative difference is not reflected in such a quantitative comparison.

From an institutional perspective, the level of openness of national economies to global markets can be measured by two key policy variables: (a) taxes on trade, and (b) openness of the capital account. The first policy variable i.e. *trade taxes* regulates the policy framework of international trade. If national economies want to reduce the legal obstacles for free trade of goods and services, they must reduce their taxes on trade. In this way, they encourage their private sectors to increase their economic activities across national borders. The trade taxes act as a regulative policy tool to organise the global trade of goods and services.

The same can be said about the capital account. When national economies open their capital accounts to international investments, they facilitate their private sectors' entrance to foreign investments. The end of the Cold War encouraged national economies to use these two key policy variable in order to reduce their trade taxes and open their capital account to facilitate their private sectors' entrance to global markets, whereas the centrality of the struggle for political power was shifted to a competition for economic interests. John Gerard Ruggie writes: "international economic regimes provide a permissive environment for the emergence of *specific kinds* of international transaction flows..."⁵⁰³ Reducing trade taxes and opening capital accounts have been two major components of national economies' liberalisation and privatisation policies.

⁵⁰² Ibid., pp.34-35., Also see Sven Grassman, "Long-term trends in openness of national economies," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 32 (1), (1980), pp.123-133.

⁵⁰³ John Gerard Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions, and change; embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," *International Organization*, 36 (2), (1982), p.383.

In this sense, just a quantitative comparison between the pre-1917 and post-1990s world economy cannot reveal a qualitative institutional change in the world economy.

Geoffrey Garrett argues that there has been a strong correlation between the growth of international economic flows and liberalisation of national economies: “the correlation between *global trade flows* and (unweighted) average *taxes on trade* ... between 1973-1995 was 0.89. ...a similar pattern [can be seen] with respect to international capital flows (combined portfolio and FDI) and the portion of countries in the world with open capital accounts ...*it was only in the 1990s that countries in large numbers opened their capital accounts.*”⁵⁰⁴ According to him, the conventional wisdom of economic historians implies that the world economy is no more globalised today than it was 100 years ago. But, there is a qualitative difference between these periods. As Garrett points out:

In the 1870-1914 period, the bulk of—and the fastest growth in—world trade was in raw materials (agriculture and minerals), as the industrial revolution reduced the costs for the first industrial nations of extraction and transformation from their colonies. Today, international trade is dominated by manufactures... Trade in services was unheard of 100 years ago, but it is of considerable and rising importance these days. The nature of international capital movements also clearly differs between the two epochs of internationalization. ...The basic features of today's multinational firms—captured in management jargon such as breaking up the international value chain and global strategic alliances—have no historical parallels. One clear indication of the proliferation of multinational production is the estimate that intrafirm trade...comprises roughly one third of all global trade.⁵⁰⁵

These qualitative differences enable us to explore an institutional change that occurred after the Cold War in the world economy. The quantitative amount of global trade and investment may not be more than a hundred years ago however the very logic of international economic activity has changed. In a post-1990s world economy, the key development is not about the amounts of global trade and investment. The key point is that national economies have systematically liberalised their economic policy to facilitate their private sectors' participation in a global competition for economic interests. This openness to global markets has created a *transnational institutional framework* for different types of economic activities that are no longer under the supervision of national states. The qualitative difference between pre-1914 and post-1990s world economy refers to a new institutional framework that is created for post-

⁵⁰⁴ Geoffrey Garrett, "The Causes of Globalisation," *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (2000), pp. 948-949.

⁵⁰⁵ Garnett, "The Cause of Globalisation" (2000), p.955.

national economic activities: the emergence of a post-national constellation of private sectors that have created their own *self-governing sphere* of transnational economic activities. They act as liberal units of economic activity that follow the liberal logic of economic competition. Hence, they are no longer very committed to the economic interests or economic policies of their nation-states. The behavioural logic of the *transnational* economy goes principally beyond an *international* economy in which the main units of economic actions were national economies. The nation-states have lost their economic control over this emerging transnational markets, as much as they lose their political sovereignty over liberal global governance.

The economic dynamics of globalisation has created such a transnational economy, where the globalisation of liberal social philosophy and the end of the Cold War have provided the cultural and political infrastructures of such a post-national economic activities. Within such cultural and political environments, national economies have learned to play a new economic function in order to adopt themselves to the global organisational shift from the centrality of the struggle for political power to competition for economic interests. To this end, they liberalised their national economies through reducing their trade taxes and opening capital accounts. These policy changes have led to a transnational pattern of production, trade and investment. In this post-national economy, the private sectors are the main economic actors. When governments liberalise national economies, they shaped a new institutional sphere for their private sectors' transnational economic activities.

Chapter 7

Unsocial Sociability of Liberal Globalisation

Contemporary liberal globalisation through its post-national culture, politics and economy has created more enabling environments for peoples' participation in global decision-making. However, if this liberal globalisation is evaluated on the basis of the Kantian-inspired ideal type of an open global society, it suffers from serious societal deficits or *unsocial sociability* in Kant's terms. This chapter advances the normative critique of globalisation, offered by chapter 3. To this aim, it provides a sociological critique of liberal globalisation that covers three major aspects of globalisation's unsocial sociability; namely the cultural, political, and economic deficits. It tries to link the three aspects of globalisation's societal deficits in the context of a macro-sociological critique of emerging liberal globalisation.

The chapter consists of five sections. Section 7.1 briefly argues about the key developments in liberal social philosophy and liberal model of social organisation, from its classical version to the modern liberalism, in order to provide a better ground for comparing the Lockean and the Kantian model of social organisation, in the context of the idea of open global society. Employing this idea, section 7.2 explores the cultural deficits of contemporary liberal globalisation. It argues that the absence of a global consensus upon liberal model of globality is ultimate source of globalisation's unsocial sociability. Section 7.3 argues about the political deficits of liberal global governance. Given the absence of a global consensus regarding how global order can be organised to satisfy the interests of all persons, globalisation's political deficits referred to an unaccountability of liberal global governance to the world's population.

In the context of these cultural and political deficits, section 7.4 explains globalisation's economic deficits. It argues that whilst the post-national economy has to some extent opened global market to a free entrance of potential economic actors, such a post-national market cannot be still regarded a competitive global market. Section 7.5 integrates the three dimensions of liberal globalisation's societal deficits in a macro-sociological critique of globalisation that shows how problematic nature of the liberal model of global social organisation has been systematically reflected in the contradictions of the emergent post-national political economy. As argued in chapter 2, the approach of a critical social theory's is employed in order to link institutional contradictions of liberal globalisation with its deep-seated epistemic origin in liberal social philosophy. This epistemic-institutional critique of liberal globalisation leads us to a macro-sociological analysis of globalisation's unsocial sociability.

7.1 A Critical Review of Liberal Social Philosophy

In order to develop a macrosociological critique of liberal globalisation, this section paves the way for a more advanced comparison between the Lockean and the Kantian models of human action and social organisation. The Kantian-inspired ideal type of open global society is the reference point for an epistemic-institutional critique of liberal globalisation. It is important to note that the term *social philosophy* here refers to the *cultural model of social organization*, which rests upon a conception of human nature. In this way, the key developments in liberal social philosophy can be linked with the progress in conceptions of human nature or the models of human action. Whilst it is not possible to provide a comprehensive review of liberal social philosophy's developments during the past centuries here, these developments are very briefly described from classical to modern liberalism by referring to some key liberal thinkers: from John Locke to David Hume and Adam Smith, and from Friedrich Hayek to John Rawls.⁵⁰⁶

7.1.1 From Locke's Theological Liberalism to Hume-Smith's Secular Liberalism

As Richard Falk argues, "the history of liberalism is complex and contradictory, and includes an early-century emphasis, most obviously in the writing of John Locke,

⁵⁰⁶ It should be acknowledged that there are other important liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Edmund Burke, and Isaiah Berlin, among others, to whom I have not referred here. But, I think that the selected liberal thinkers are provided us with a reasonable list.

on property rights and minimalist governments.”⁵⁰⁷ However, a key development in liberal social philosophy was a move from the Locke's theological utilitarianism to the Hume-Smith's secular utilitarianism.

Liberal social philosophy was developed when Locke's theological liberalism was suppressed by Hume-Smith's secular liberalism. But, the utilitarian logic of liberal model of social order did not change, in which individuals are merely useful means for other's ends. According to this logic, individuals follow their own subjective goals but they rationalise their social relations in order to employ the others' contributions to realise their ends. Locke constructed his social philosophy based on a theological account of human nature: God-give reason leads individuals to follow the revelation. Locke's Christian theology leads him to a theory of property rights. As David Levy argues, the classical liberal, like Locke, argued that action-goals can be rationalised on the basis of theological morality. He calls this theological approach to human's action-goals a theological utilitarianism, in which individuals' utility-maximising behaviours become rational through their rational faith in God-given rights, including the right to property.⁵⁰⁸

The rational faith in Christian morality let people know how to choose their action-goals based on Christian moral code of practice.⁵⁰⁹ “If a rational morality specifying the [action] goals to which people ought to aspire is the constant, then individuals who accept this morality ought to bend to its imperatives.”⁵¹⁰ Locke's social philosophy implies that the individual's rights to the property and self-governance are originated from a theological utilitarianism. In this sense, for Locke, “without a Christian political ontology the image of a decent and ordered political world (of justice and rights, freedom and toleration) was simply not credible.”⁵¹¹ This religious conception of a liberal social order was later criticised by Hume and Smith.

As John Dunn argues, Hume and Smith did not believe that Christian theology can provide a moral justification for rationalising human's action-goals. They argue for a new utilitarian morality that can be called a *secular moral philosophy*. Dunn points

⁵⁰⁷ Richard Falk, "Liberalism at the Global Level: Solidarity vs. Cooperation," p.55. , in Hovden and Keene, *The Globalisation of Liberalism*, (2002). Also see R. Grant, *John Locke's Liberalism*, (Chicago, Chicago University Press: 1987).

⁵⁰⁸ See David Levy, "Rational Choice and Morality" (1982), pp.1-36.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid., p.5.

⁵¹¹ Hont , *Commercial Society and Political Theory*, (1994), p.56., Also see J. Colman, *John Locke's Moral Philosophy*, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press: 1983).

out that: “Hume and Smith, political theorists, largely are the skeptical and secular idiom... believed that political order rested on no deeper foundation than opinion and put their faith in the tendency of the modern socio-economic order to generate sufficient social cohesion to carry the weight of the political community.”⁵¹² Hume argues that the Lockean moral theology cannot lead us to what really motivates human action. For Hume, while the primary task of reason is the discovery of the truth or falsehood of matters of fact, it does not determine rightness of human action. Human reason can only influence human action indirectly in its capacity as “slave of the passions”.⁵¹³ In this way, Hume makes a return to the Hobbesian moral philosophy. Hume does not search for the moral origin of human action outside of the society. He believes that all standards of morality are established historically and due to social needs for making a social order beneficial for those who look at each other as useful means for their ends.

The utilitarian social philosophy does not require a theological moral justification. It can be addressed based on a secular utilitarianism. For Hume, individuals' needs are unlimited, but the resources to satisfy them are generally scarce. “If every man had a tender regard for another, or if nature supplied an abundantly all our wants and desires...the jealousy of interest, which justice supposes, could no longer have place; nor would there be any occasion for those distinctions and limits of possession, which at present are in use among mankind.”⁵¹⁴ In order to search for a moral foundation of human action and its outcomes for the individual's right to the property and self-governance, Hume argues that the emergence of these rights cannot be attributed to the individual's rational faith in Christian morality. In contrast, due to human's limited generosity, imperfect reason and scarcity of the means of satisfying human needs, the nature of these circumstances gives rise to the stability of possessions, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises. Hume views property rights as an unintended outcome of those moral requirements of social life that are

⁵¹² Hont, *ibid.*, p.57. For such a transition from Locke to Hume and Smith's moral philosophy of liberal society see John Dunn, "From Applied Theology to Social Analysis: The Break Between John Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment", in I. Hont and M. Ignatieff (eds.), *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*, (Cambridge: 1983), pp.119-136.

⁵¹³ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*, (eds.) L.A. Sedly-Bigge, revised by P.H Nidditch (Oxford:1989), p.15. Also see, J. Harrison , *Hume's Moral Epistemology*, (Oxford: 1976), pp.115-124.

⁵¹⁴ Hume, *ibid.*, p.494.

originated from human's limited generosity and intellectual imperfection and the unalterable scarcity of the resources.⁵¹⁵

Hume and Smith used the aforementioned reasoning to introduce liberal society as a secular-based commercial society. As Dunn reminds us, for Hume and Smith, "a commercial society was rather an alternative model of imagining how human beings can form a society, for example a sustained form of common living, if they did not share such bonding principles as ones offered by Christianity. ...Commercial society was a middle-way between these two polar [i.e., the Hobbesian and the Kantian's models of human society]...They would associate [in this commercial society] not because they loved or even cared for each other not for any other noble purpose but because they could be useful for each other."⁵¹⁶ In this manner, Hume and Smith provided a secular utilitarian foundation for liberal society. Since people are useful means for satisfying each other's ends, their action would be guided by the utility offered by such commercial-based social cooperation. Their society would emerge out of the practice of exchanging either goods or services. The commercial society rests on market sociability (or unsocial sociability in Kant's terms) that its principle is utility: usefulness of humans to each other.⁵¹⁷ Like Hume, Adam Smith argues that the bonding agent of Christian sociability is love and fellowship. However, the sociability that holds together the commercial society of those--who do not love each other, who are neither benevolent nor charitable, nor comrades in faith-- is exchange and mutual needs satisfactions.⁵¹⁸

7.1.2 Friedrich Hayek, Human Ignorance and a Liberal Society

Friedrich Von Hayek is among the most influential proponents of modern or neo-liberalism. Stephen Gill points out: "Newliberalism is also associated strongly with some neoclassical political economics, especially in traditions established during and after the Second World War at the LSE (by F.A. Hayek)..."⁵¹⁹ In *Hayek and Modern Liberalism*, Chandran Kukathas introduces Hayek's social theory of a liberal society as an important attempt to reinvent classical liberalism. Hayek "insists that ...he is returning our attention to the neglected insights of the early thinkers of classical

⁵¹⁵ See David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, (1975), Section III

⁵¹⁶ Hont, *Commercial Society and Political Theory*, (1994), pp.60-61.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.61.

⁵¹⁸ See Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations*, R.H. Campbell, A.S Skinner, and W.B. Todd, 2 Vols., (Oxford: 1979).

⁵¹⁹ Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,"(2002), p.147.

liberalism...⁵²⁰ However, his aim is the reconstruction of the logic of liberal society due to a conception of human nature in which a special attention is paid to *human ignorance* and its outcomes for the emergence of *spontaneous social order*. Kukathas points out: “Hayek’s defense of liberalism ... is grounded in a comprehensive social doctrine. It offers a political philosophy for modern society...”⁵²¹ John Gray regards Hayek’s modern liberalism as the rebirth of classical liberalism in order to formulate a new philosophy for a liberal-democrat society.⁵²²

The micro-foundation for Hayek's modern philosophy of a liberal society does not change the main principle of secular utilitarianism. It just reinterprets such a utilitarian philosophy on the basis of the assumption of a *radical human ignorance*. In *The Constitutions of Liberty*, Hayek writes, “the Socratic maxim that the recognition of our ignorance is the beginning of wisdom has profound significance for our understanding of society. ... This fundamental fact of man's unavoidable ignorance of much on which the working of civilisation rests has received little attention.”⁵²³ Norman Barry remarks, “underlying all Hayek's social philosophy is a theory of knowledge. The most significant features of this theory is Hayek's emphasis on man's ignorance.”⁵²⁴ Barry rightly argues that Hayek's conception of *ignorant man* may be well considered as an alternative account of the Hobbesian *egoistic man*. Hayek attempts to advance liberal social philosophy through using the key premise of *ignorant man* in social theory of liberal society. In this way, Hayek's theory of knowledge provides micro-foundation for his modern social philosophy of liberalism.

While Hayek has used both Hume’s and Kant’s epistemologies to formulate his ignorance-based theory of knowledge and social philosophy, his analysis of liberal society is mainly influenced by Hume's skeptical or anti-rationalist epistemology. In order to highlight the importance of human ignorance as a key explanatory variable of analysing the emergence of a spontaneous social order, Hayek rejects conscious human agency as the impetus of the social order's formation. In his words, “the conception of man deliberately building his civilisation stems from an erroneous intellectualism that regards human reason as something standing outside nature and possessed of knowledge and reasoning capacity independent of experiences. But the

⁵²⁰ Chandran Kukathas, *Hayek and Modern Liberalism*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1989), p.5.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*, p.viii.

⁵²² John Gray, "F.A. Hayek and Rebirth of Classical Liberalism," *Literate of Liberty* (5) (1982), p.19.

⁵²³ Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Constitutions of Liberty*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press: 1960), p.22.

⁵²⁴ Norman P. Barry, *Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy*, (London, Macmillan Press: 1979), p.9.

growth of the human mind is part of the growth of civilisation; it is the state of civilisation at any given moment that determines the scope and the possibilities of human ends and values.”⁵²⁵ Given this conception of human nature, Hayek concludes that, “the classical arguments for tolerance formulated by John Milton and John Locke and restated by John Stuart Mill and Walter Bagehot rests, of course, on the recognition of this ignorance of ours. It is a special application of general considerations to which a *non-rationalist insight* into the working of our mind. ...all institutions of freedom are adaptations to this fundamental fact of ignorance, adopted to deal with chances and probabilities” (emphasis added).⁵²⁶ If humans’ radical ignorance is so fundamental to a spontaneous formation of liberal institutions of freedom, the most important aspect of a social theory of a liberal society is to address how such a society has emerged under the condition of human's radical ignorance in which every individual is free to identify their own ends and means for satisfying their action-goals.

For Hayek, the conception of individual liberty refers to the *absence of coercion*.⁵²⁷ By coercion, he means, “such control of the environment or circumstance of a person by another... Coercion is evil precisely because it thus eliminates an individual as a thinking and valuing person and makes him a bare tool in the achievement of the ends of another. Free action, in which a person pursues his own aims by the means indicated by his own knowledge, must be based on data which cannot be shaped at will by another.”⁵²⁸ In this sense, the conception of human's action-goals, as Parsons and Habermas argue about that, is not included in Hayek's model of human action due to his notion of human radical ignorance. For Hayek, ignorant men cannot achieve a common societal knowledge on which basis they establish their social order because the free action of a liberal (wo)man rests on his or her own subjective knowledge of the ends. Hayek reproduces the classical notion of liberalism in a modern way in which a rational consensus over action-goals is impossible. Hence, human rationality can be used to check the rationality of action’s means but not for the rationalisation of action’s goals. Upon such a micro-foundation, Hayek defends the institutions of

⁵²⁵ Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, (1960), p.24.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.30.

⁵²⁷ On the conceptions of 'positive' and 'negative' liberty see: Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays On Liberty*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1969). Also see: John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, (UK, ADigiroad.com Book: 2010).

⁵²⁸ Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, (1960), pp.20-21.

freedom, similar to the case with property rights, a constitutional state, and market economy as social institutions of a free society that protect human freedom from coercion. He writes:

Since coercion is the control of the essential data of an individual's action by another, it can be prevented only by enabling the individual to secure for himself some private sphere where he is protected against such interference. ...The recognition of private or several property is thus an essential condition for the prevention of coercion... the rule of law means that government must never coerce an individual except in the enforcement of a known rule, it constitutes a limitation on the powers of all government, including the powers of the legislature.⁵²⁹

Hayek's social theory of liberal society is not fundamentally different from Hume and Smith's theories in terms of its main organisational principle, i.e. the notion of the usefulness of individuals to each other. Hayek's social philosophy follows the Humean anti-rationalist epistemology for justifying an impossibility of a rational consensus over humans' action-goals due to his conception of ignorant (wo)man. However, Hayek's conception of liberty under the rule of law and constitutional state advances the classical social philosophy of liberal society in terms of how the coercion as the control of an individual's action by another can be prevented by the protection of the property rights and self-governance under the rule of law. Perhaps this line of Hayek's contributions to social philosophy of liberal society originates from his usage of Kantian logic of regarding the rule of law as a key institution of treating human beings as ends in themselves rather the means for other's end.

In *Principle of a Liberal Social Order*, Hayek emphasises that “the test of the justice of a rule is usually (since Kant) described as that of its ‘universalizability,’ i.e. of the possibility of willing that rules should be applied to all instances that correspond to the conditions stated in it (the ‘categorical imperative’).”⁵³⁰ Hayek applies Kantian universalisability to the maxims that make up the legal order yields liberal principles of justice, which confers maximum equal freedom upon all.

7.1.3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, and a Well-Ordered Society

John Rawls' political liberalism and its implications for a new account of liberal society—as a well-ordered society of free and equal persons— has found an important place in the Western political philosophy. Whilst it does not seem that Rawls has

⁵²⁹ Ibid., pp.139-140 and 205.

⁵³⁰ F. A. Hayek, *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1978), p.168.

fundamentally changed the organising principle of secular utilitarianism, in terms of an impossibility of a *rational* consensus amongst conflicting opinions over the good (i.e. the ultimate goals of human action), he has provided a new pluralistic account of a liberal-democratic society. In contrast to Hayek, Rawls' normative concept of the human nature refers to a *conscious human agency* and its outcomes for the *conscious social formation* of a liberal-democratic society.

As Peter Jones points out, "the problem that concerns Rawls is this. In modern democratic societies people hold a variety of different and incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. ...Rawls describes the existence of these diverse doctrines as 'the fact of pluralism'. ...[If so,] what sort of theory can provide the basis for a stable society characterized by reasonable pluralism?"⁵³¹ Rawls defines a stable society, under reasonable pluralism, a society whose members voluntarily accept its structure hence they supports the society's orderliness without any need for force. Given this account, Rawls claims that a political theory that rests on a comprehensive moral doctrine is potentially at odd with the many other comprehensive doctrines to which the democratic society's citizens are committed. In this way, Rawls aims to formulate the concept of a well-ordered society so that it can address the possibility of a political liberalism without standing upon just one comprehensive moral doctrine.⁵³²

Hence, his conception of liberal society is merely a political conception, separated from a particular moral content. Rawls's account of justice has adapted to his political concept of a well-ordered society, so that remains independent of any comprehensive moral doctrine.⁵³³ Hence, for Rawls, the idea of a well-ordered society of free and equal citizens substantively rests on his belief in a rational consenses among competing account of the good and accordingly the ultimate goals of human action is not possible. Hence, it does not change this base of the liberal model of social order.

For Rawls, "a well-ordered society is one which is regulated by a public conception of justice and in which members view each other as free and equal moral persons."⁵³⁴ However, this equal membership must be understood in the very context of Rawls' political account of both 'equality' and 'freedom'. Like aforementioned

⁵³¹ See Peter N. Jones, "Two Conceptions of Justice, Two Conceptions of Liberalism," *British Journal of Political science*, 25 (1995), p.518.

⁵³² John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, (New York, Columbia University Press: 1993), pp .15-22.

⁵³³ Jones, op., cit., pp.519-520.

⁵³⁴ John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 77 (9) (1980), p .521.

liberal accounts of freedom and justice, Rawls's political liberalism stands on an subjective epistemology which rejects the possibility of an inter-subjective consensus over human's action goals. A key question for Rawls's model of a well-ordered liberal society is that if people cannot rationally agree upon one moral doctrine, how have they agreed over such a political conception of liberty and justice as the organising principle of their democratic society. Rawls employs a Kantian rational constructivist approach to address the above equation, whereas he tries to remain outside of the Kantian moral doctrine as one comprehensive moral doctrine itself.

Rawls rightly argues what distinguishes Kantian constructivism is a normative conception of persons as equal and free rational agents who construct their social order through a reasonable social agreement and social cooperation. He argues that the societal role of a conception of justice—i.e. the equality of every members of the society, as ends in themselves – means that a just social order should enable all of its member to make mutually acceptable to one another their social institutions. This mutually reasonable consensus constructs the political culture of a liberal-democratic society.

The two basic model-conceptions of this political conception of justice as fairness are “those of a *well-ordered society* and of a *moral person*. Their general purpose is to single out the essential aspects of our conception of ourselves as moral persons and our relations to society as free and equal citizens. They depict certain general quality of what a society would look like if its members publicly viewed themselves and their social ties with one another in a certain way.”⁵³⁵ A liberal democratic order is a well-ordered society of equal and free citizens who have consciously agreed upon one set of liberal-democratic values whose core is a *political conception of liberty and justice*.

Rawls' model-conception of the person, as a rational agent, differs from Hayek's ignorant person, but what joins them into a common category of the liberal model of social organisation is that both of them reject an epistemological possibility of a rational or inter-subjective agreement among conflicting opinions over the good. In other words, a well-ordered liberal society is a conscious social agreement amongst liberal-minded persons who regard each other as equal possessors of the rights to the property and self-governance. However, such a liberal society still does not include a

⁵³⁵ Ibid., p.520. Also see: John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness, A Restatement," (London, Harvard University Press: 2001), pp.1-12.

non-liberal moral doctrine, because Rawls assumes that liberal and non-liberal societies cannot agree on the very conception of a liberal (wo)man as equal and free persons and accordingly cannot agree upon the political culture of a liberal democracy. In another sense, liberal and non-liberal persons cannot agree upon one set of political conceptions of liberty and justice, because they follow radically different moral doctrines! If individual members of a pluralist liberal-democratic society can agree over such a morally non-sensitive political conception of freedom and justice, why can individual members of an international society of liberal and non-liberal persons not arrive at an overlapping consensus upon such a political conception?⁵³⁶ I will argue about this in more detail in chapter 8.

Rawls's liberal persons are not those people who can arrive at an epistemological consensus over their ultimate action-goals, as Parsons' and Habermas' persons can. In Rawls' liberal democracy, "a political conception of justice must be one that can be endorsed by widely different and opposing though reasonable comprehensive doctrines."⁵³⁷ But, these reasonable doctrines cannot agree on one conception of the good or the ultimate action action. Rawls claims that since there is no reasonable religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine affirmed by all citizens, the political culture of a liberal democratic society is limited to an *overlapping consensus* of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.⁵³⁸ He writes:

...a conception of justice is supported by an overlapping consensus. It means that it is supported by a consensus including the opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over generations in the society effectively regulated by that conception of justice. These opposing doctrines was assume to involve conflicting and indeed *incommensurable comprehensive conceptions of the meaning, values and purpose of human life (or conceptions of the good)*, and there are no resources within the political view to judge those conflicting conceptions (emphasis added).⁵³⁹

Rawls regards incommensurability of competing accounts of the good as a given fact, which shows that he links the existing moral pluralism with a type of relativist epistemology. As such, the political culture of a liberal-democratic society indicates an overlapping consensus of incommensurable doctrines. Rawls accepts a kind of epistemological relativism, because he claims that no one set of beliefs can be proven

⁵³⁶ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited*, (USA, Harvard University: 1999), pp .59-87.

⁵³⁷ Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, (1993), p.38.

⁵³⁸ John Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*,7 (1), pp .1-25.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.9. Also see John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 14 (3) (1985), pp.223-251.

more truthful than another. Put differently, there is not a rational and objective belief. Despite the irrationality of our beliefs, as reasonable people, we must be able to reach on overlapping consensus about the principles that we share. Only by virtue of such an overlapping consensus will we then be able to pursue our distinctive values to the maximum degree.⁵⁴⁰ However, as Alexander argues, “how do we get to be reasonable about the pursuit of beliefs when we are fundamentally unreasonable in finding them? How can we be rational about them when we irrationally ‘cherish’ them as sacred?”⁵⁴¹ Rawls faces a difficulty to rationally justify an *irrational faith* in liberal social order. If there is not any objective belief, our overlapping consensus cannot be excepted from the general rule.

As Jones points out: “an ‘overlapping consensus’ is a partial consensus achieved amongst reasonable comprehensive doctrines when those doctrines, despite their different and conflicting content, ‘overlap’ in supporting the political conception of justice.”⁵⁴² Given this partial consensus, according to Rawls, liberal persons have agreed over a political conception of justice and freedom as the core value of their own well-ordered society. If Rawls is right about the possibility of an overlapping consensus among incommensurable doctrines within a liberal society, he must also expand this notion of a well-ordered society to a global scale, which covers moral doctrines of other world civilisations like Islamic or Chinese civilisations. But, he claims that at a global scale a reasonable consensus between liberal and non-liberal societies is impossible.⁵⁴³

In his critical review of Rawls’ political liberalism, Samuel Scheffler argues that the overlapping consensus in a liberal society is a social consensus upon liberal values rather than an overlapping consensus among radically different moral doctrines within liberal society. These liberal values do not actually cover non-liberal values. A liberal democracy tolerates non-liberal values insofar as those values do not confront the liberal values. Such non-liberal values do not play a similar key role as liberal values in the cultural constitution of a liberal democracy.⁵⁴⁴ In one sense, Rawls’ analysis of overlapping consensus over the political conception of justice, as a liberal value itself, does not actually include those non-liberal moral doctrines, like Islamic or Chinese’s

⁵⁴⁰ Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, (1993), pp.133-150.

⁵⁴¹ Alexander, *The Civil Sphere* (2006), p.15.

⁵⁴² Jones, op. cit., (1995), p.525.

⁵⁴³ See Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, (1999), pp.62-78.

⁵⁴⁴ See Samuel Scheffler, "The Appeal of Political Liberalism", *Ethics*, 105 (1) (1994), pp.4-22.

moral systems, that may actually exist in a liberal society, but their political accounts of justice is different from the liberal account. Nevertheless, it seems that Rawls has described the pluralistic nature of a liberal society better than Hayek due to his more realistic premises regarding human nature and the political culture of liberal society.

It is important to note that Rawls' conception of human nature and his cooperative model of social organisation can be viewed as a Kantian approach to the formation of a well-ordered liberal society. But, Rawls' model of social cooperation still suffers from a Lockean content because it does not recognise the possibility of a rational consensus regarding the ultimate goals of human actions. In this sense, in Rawlsian concept-model, social cooperation among liberal (wo) men has not been shaped based on a normative agreement concerning the ultimate goals of liberal persons, but on an overlapping consensus over this principle that each person should follow his or her moral doctrines of what is a good life, i.e. the freedom of the ultimate ends. This distances the Rawlsian model of social cooperation based on such an overlapping consensus from the Parsonsian and the Habermasian models of social cooperation based upon an inter-subjective consensus over the ultimate goals of human actions.

7.1.4 A Kantian-Inspired Critique of Liberal Democracy

Istvan Hont rightly reminds us that, "the Enlightenment political thinker who perhaps best captured the tremendous moral ambiguity of commercial sociability was Immanuel Kant. ...Kant was fully aware of the contradiction involved in calling commercial sociability... His famous phrase that the sociability underlying modern commercial society was 'unsocial sociability'... fully captures its explosively paradoxical content."⁵⁴⁵ As argued, the moral foundation of a liberal society rests on a social consensus on liberal values. The liberal values refer to a utility-based unsocial sociability. This unsocial sociability implies that individual members of liberal society cannot achieve a rational agreement upon their action-goals, because the goals are purely subjective. Liberal-minded peoples organise their social cooperation upon the utility-maximising principle. If Kant rightly argues that such a liberal society deeply suffers from an unsocial sociability, the reason is that such type of social order does not ultimately recognise *the other* as equal and free persons.

⁵⁴⁵ Istvan Hont, "Commercial Society and Political Theory," (1994), pp.70-71. Also see Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in H.B. Nisbet and H. Reiss (eds.) 2nd edition, *Kant. Political Writing*, (Cambridge: 1991), p.44. Also see: Flikschuh, *Kant and Modern Political Philosophy* (2000).

It is possible to argue that liberal-democratic model of social order-- from the classical to the modern liberalism-- is committed to the key premise of liberal values as the moral foundation of a liberal democratic society. This moral foundation has been interpreted differently by liberal thinkers from Locke to Hume and Smith, and from Hayek to Rawls, amongst others. However, a key common feature of liberal-democratic society is a liberal account of the person on which basis individual members of the society cannot rationally overcome their conflicts of opinions over the good. Hence, they follow a *utilitarian logic* on the basis of which their action-goals are subjective and unique to themselves, but their action-means can be rationalised in terms of their capabilities for satisfying action-goals. In this way, human actions are motivated by the utility principle, and individuals can merely rationalise their action-means for realising their subjective goals. In this sense, a type of instrumental rationality is an inseparable part of liberal social philosophy.

Before Kant, in his critique of liberalism Jean-Jacques Rousseau recognised the *unsocial sociability* of a liberal society. For him, the condition of modern liberal (wo)man is contradictory. Due to the unsocial sociability of liberal society, modern liberal (wo)man is forced to collaborate with others, yet she or he is thinking only of her or himself. This reasoning directly targets the utilitarian philosophy of a liberal democracy. If individual members of society have nothing in share with others unless a usefulness of others for their ends, social cooperation is merely established upon self-interests and self-love. As Manent points out:

Rousseau asks; what happens to the *soul* of someone who lives according to the maxims of such a [liberal] society? Everybody is obliged to live by them, since all the citizens are dependent and competitors. Since they are dependent, they are obliged to do no harm to each other. As competitors, they are obliged not to do good, or at least not to want to do good to each other. None of the great human passions can emerge in such society. Instead of the active love of fellow citizens ...we find that self-love (*amour-propre*) is the unique passion of modern man.⁵⁴⁶

Rousseau accepts that self-love is the most powerful drive in human action, but denies that it is a 'natural' drive. For him, a commercial liberal society as purely based on the utilitarian view of human nature creates not only tremendous social misery and injustice but in the end leads to an unstable political order.⁵⁴⁷ After Rousseau, it was Kant, who criticised the utilitarian foundation of a liberal society, where he introduced

⁵⁴⁶ Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, (1994), p.70.

⁵⁴⁷ See Milton L. Myyers, *The Soul of Modern Economic Man, Ideas of Self-Interest, Thomas Hobbes to Adam Smith*, (Chicago and London, The University of Chicago: 1983), chapters 2, 3, and 8.

a liberal sociability as an *unsocial sociability*. Kant argued that the moral foundation of a free society should not be derived from an *empirical study about how and why people behave*-- as liberal thinkers such as Hume and Smith believed. For Kant, such a moral bases and rules should be regarded as 'duties' and were not to be confused with factual questions of how and why people behave.⁵⁴⁸

This Kantian-inspired critique of the unsocial sociability of a liberal society was developed by sociologists like Parsons and Habermas. As argued by chapter 5, they criticised the utilitarian logic of social organisation according to which peoples cannot arrive at a rational consensus regarding their ultimate action-goals. Habermas advanced the Kantian critical epistemology to a theory of communicative rationality on which basis individual members of the society can enter into a rational dialogue about the moral foundations of their society. He developed a comprehensive social theory of a dialogic community in which moral and legal bases of social order are subject to a rational dialogue among individual members of society.

Robert Wokler writes: "over the past thirty years, Jürgen Habermas—perhaps the best-known enthusiast of Enlightenment principles among contemporary social theorists – has promoting validity on their behalf and against their detractors, in promoting eighteenth-century ideas of rational and critical discourse ... bourgeois public sphere, comprised of citizens committed to the pursuit of indefinite social progress through all the richly textured mediums of self-emancipation."⁵⁴⁹ Thomas McCarthy argues that Habermas's idea of a 'discourse ethics' is "a reconstruction of Kant's idea of practical reason in terms of communicative reason. ...it involves a procedural reformulation of the Categorical Imperative; rather than ascribing to others as valid those maxims I can will to be universal laws, I must submit them to others for purposes of discursively testing their claim to universal validity."⁵⁵⁰ Habermas criticises liberal democracy because it does not recognise the possibility of a rational

⁵⁴⁸ Johan Heilbron, "French Moralists and the Anthropology of the Modern Era", pp.99-100 in Johan Heilbron, *et al The Rise of the Social Sciences and the Formation of Modernity*, (1996).

⁵⁴⁹ Robert Wokler, "The Enlightenment and the French Revolutionary Birth Pangs of Modernity," p .62., in Heilbron et al, *The Rise of the Social Sciences*, (1996).

⁵⁵⁰ Thomas McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue," *Ethics*, 105, (1994), p.45.

consensus among conflicting opinions over the good, where such a consensus is possible and has occurred over liberal values in the context of liberal democracy.⁵⁵¹

A fundamental difference between a Kantian-inspired dialogic social democracy and the Lockean liberal-democratic society is that the former regards all moral and legal foundations of social order as open to a rational discourse, whilst the latter claims that the society's moral and legal foundations cannot be justified through a rational dialogue. In one sense, a liberal-democratic society rests upon a kind of relativist epistemology. However, for Habermas, "...rational political opinion- and will-formation is at all possible, the principle of [discursive] democracy only tells us how this can be institutionalized, namely, through a system of rights that secures for each person as equal participation in a process of legislation whose communicative presuppositions are guaranteed to begin with."⁵⁵² A liberal democracy does not emphasise such a system of rights. Locke believed that the individual's right to property is a prior right to socially constructed institutions of the society. Hayek's defence of liberalism also does not give liberal-democracy such a discursive legal foundation. Rawls' political liberalism separates persons' moral equality from their political and legal equalities in his political concepts of freedom and justice.⁵⁵³ David Miller argues about a confrontation between *liberal democracy* and *social democracy* in this way:

Empirically, liberals did not believe that a just society was compatible with an unrestricted franchise. Social justice meant, as we have seen, the distribution of material rewards according to deserve, within a framework of formal equality. As essential means to this end, the liberals defended private property, freedom of contract and limited government. But would property be safe and government remain limited if political rights were extended to the whole population, including the propertyless masses? Few liberals thought so: somehow a line had to be drawn so that those who might threaten the property system were excluded. ...*political rights should not be extended beyond the point at which property might be endangered*⁵⁵⁴[emphasis added].

Although modern liberals recognise the political equality of people, such equality is not fully institutionalised in the legal systems of existing liberal democracies. For instance, it is not clear that if fellow-citizens of a liberal-democracy want to radically

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., p.55. Also see: Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," pp.109-142. in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun, (Cambridge, MIT Press:1992).

⁵⁵² Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (1996), p.110.

⁵⁵³ Ibid., p.79.

⁵⁵⁴ See David Miller, "Democracy and Social Justice," p.81. in Pierre Birnbaum, Jack Lively, and Geraint Parry (eds.), *Democracy, Consensus and Social Contract*, (London, Sage Publication: 1978).

revise the social institutions of private property and limited governance, how the society's legal systems allow them to create such a radical institutional change. However, as Miller argues, the ideas of *democracy* and *social justice* are closely related. If each person is equally entitled to self-respect and moral equality irrespective of his or her merit, we can justify their political equality in terms of their legal rights of self-governance that is prior to their rights to property. In this way, the individual political rights must be extended beyond the point at which the property right might be criticised.⁵⁵⁵

It was argued in detail in chapter 5 that there are good reasons for using Critical Rationalism as a theory of rationality to address the function of a rational dialogue amongst individual members of the society on conflicting opinions over the good. Critical Rationalism led us to the ideal type of global open society. As a Kantian-inspired conception of a global society of free and equal persons, the ideal type of open global society can be used to criticise the cultural constitution of a global commercial society. It was argued that the moral-foundation of an open society rests upon a dialogic ethics: the ethics of openness to criticism. Peoples can enter into a rational dialogue about their social organisation, if they activate their critical rationality. This epistemic-based moral openness to criticism enables the legal system of open society to improve through learning from an open-ended legal criticism. Political democracy in such a society of open-minded persons rests on the ethics of openness to criticism and the equal legal rights of social criticism.

The open society differs from a liberal-democracy because it refers to a social organisation in which all of legal, political and economic orders are open to criticism. If we extend the ideal type of open society to a global scale, an open global society refers to similar equal rights, as described in detail in chapter 4. The ideal type of open global society leads us to explore the societal deficits of contemporary liberal globality. When we take into account liberal social philosophy's key developments, from its classical to its modern manifestations, the main characters of a liberal-based social order can be compared with the ideal type of open global society in which the principle of social organisation is a rational dialogue and friendly social cooperation amongst individuals, rather a utility-maximising behaviour amongst competitors. The societal deficits of liberal globalisation originate from the unsocial sociability of the

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., p.98.

liberal model of social ordering of peoples. Our Kantian-inspired ideal type of open global society provides a normative reference point from which to criticise an unsocial sociability that is manifested in the liberal mode of globalisation.

7.2 The Cultural Shortfalls of Liberal Globalisation

As argued previously, contemporary liberal globalisation originates from a *global social learning* from which the Hobbesian culture of enmity was to some extent suppressed with the Lockean culture of rivalry. If we compare this new global cultural environment with the Kantian culture of friendship and cooperation, we can explore the cultural shortfalls of emerging liberal globalisation. The Lockean model of social organisation, from its classical to its modern forms, implies that societies of peoples, at the national or a global scale, cannot overcome their conflicts of opinions over the good. In this sense, different cultural viewpoints remain incommensurable paradigms. They can merely achieve a consensus over basic rights such as the individual's rights to property and self-governance. While the liberal model advocates the possibility of arriving at such a consensus, the existing global reality shows that world civilisations have not yet accepted the liberal concepts of the person and social order in their profound cultural senses. The emergence of a global liberalism has been a *top-down social learning* that has been occurred among elite rather than ordinary peoples. In this sense, despite of the domestic style regarding the emergence of liberal society, on a global level ordinary peoples have not directly been involved in a social learning through which the conception of liberal (wo)man could be publicised.

Viewed from the idea of an open global society, contemporary liberal globalisation suffers from the lack of a cooperative mentality amongst societies or civilisations of peoples.⁵⁵⁶ The main reason perhaps is that the civilisations' cultural positions over the good are still radically different. There is not a global consensus on one concept of the person amongst national societies. Hence, they are not culturally prepared for recognising the liberal model of global organisation as a legitimate model of globality.

As argued, one of the key features of liberal model of social organisation refers to what Tom Young remarks: "Virtually all contemporary liberal theory takes as its *starting point* various 'rights' which are not amendable to democratic change."⁵⁵⁷ For, instance, Locke claims that the property right is not an amendable right to democratic

⁵⁵⁶ See Baniel, Bell, *The Cultural Contradiction of Capitalism* (USA, Basic Books: 1996), pp.33-85.

⁵⁵⁷ Young, "Global Liberalism and a New World Order," (2002), p.179.

change. Hayek takes the same position. In contrast, in an open global society, there is not such a starting point. The starting points are amendable to a democratic change by the world's population. The transition from a Hobbesian conflict of opinions over the good towards the Lockean consensus upon such non-amendable rights was a significant progress. But, it is still far away from a rational consensus upon the good amongst civilisations of peoples. In *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*, Peter Kivisto criticises liberal model of global organisation due to its intolerance with respect to illiberal values.⁵⁵⁸ From a Kantian cosmopolitan view, David Hollinger argues for the need for going beyond liberal multiculturalism. In his account of a global society, cultural diversity is not limited to an overall liberal value but it provides a global cultural environment in which individuals are in a position to pick and choose from multiple cultural values,⁵⁵⁹ among which liberal values are just one set of values.

In chapter 4, I argued about the institution of global freedom of thought as the foundation of the idea of open global society to show the need for such a global multiple cultures that is open to criticism. The global unsocial sociability of liberal globalisation ultimately originates from its cultural deficit in terms the lack of a global consensus upon the liberal conception of the person and the utilitarian principle of social ordering of peoples. This cultural deficit leads us to the political deficits of liberal globalisation: an unaccountability of liberal global governance to the mosaic of the world's population.

7.3 The Political Insufficiencies of Liberal Globalisation

At the national level, liberal social movements, via some bottom-up revolutionary changes, led liberal democracies to a constitutional state under the rule of law that has made liberal nation-states to accountable to their own peoples. However, liberal globalisation has not created a global democratic system, accountable to the world's population. The emerging post-national political system, as a transition from superpower rivalry to multipolar global governance has created a more open global governance to the participation of different global actors. However, it is still deeply unaccountable to the world population. This unaccountability of emerging global

⁵⁵⁸ Peter Kivisto, *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*, (London, Blackwell: 2002), p.37.

⁵⁵⁹ See David Hollinger, *Post-Ethic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*, (New York, Basic Book: 1995).

governance to the prospective global citizens has been widely recognised. In James Bohman's words, "talk of a 'global democracy deficit' comes from many quarters."⁵⁶⁰ Viewed from the idea of an open global society, a major reason for this '*global democracy deficit*' is that accountability of global governance *has not been* a key concern for liberal globalisation. As Richard Falk recognises:

The new geopolitics of world order tends to be economic in the sense of being restructured in accordance with global market forces. These dynamics have generated a setting for political life that is increasingly associated with 'globalisation'....In the context of global governance, liberalism has managed to promote the idea of international organization, but only as an *instrument* of statecraft and geopolitics, not as an *alternative* based on a real shift from unilateralism and militarism to world community procedure.⁵⁶¹

In the absence of a democratic global state, liberal globalisation has turned the nation-state to an agent of a global oligopolistic market. Political globalisation has not created a global constitutional state under a global rule of law. The political dimension of existing liberal globalisation suffers from a deep-seated global democracy deficit due to the lack of a democratic global state. Under these conditions, opening national borders to global markets converts nation-states to agents of global capitalism, because the benefits and costs of such an openness are not accountable to national societies's citizens. In this way, nation-states actually serve the functions of a global oligopolistic market. For Jackie Smith, liberal globalisation advances a model of the state that favors global capitalism and employs its multilateral institutions—such as International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and World Trade Organisation—to enforce national states to do liberal policies. Hence, the state's policies are accountable to capital rather than to the people.⁵⁶²

Chris Brown reinforces the above argument by reasoning that whilst contemporary globalisation *does* create a sense of universal connectedness, it *does not* generate an equivalent sense of community based on shared values.⁵⁶³ Liberal globalisation has not created the ethical resources for democratic global governance, because the transition from the Hobbesian bipolar order to Lockean global governance has not

⁵⁶⁰ James Bohman, "International regimes and democratic governance: political equality and influence in global institutions," *International Affairs*, 75 (3) (1999), p.499. Also see James Crawford and Susan Marks, "The global democracy deficit: an essay on international law and its limits," in D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Kohler, (eds.), *Reimagining political community*, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1998), pp .499-513.

⁵⁶¹ Falk, "Liberalism at the Global Level", (2002), pp.76 and 94.

⁵⁶² See Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy* (2008), pp.65-88.

⁵⁶³ See, Chris Brown, "International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community," in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1995), chapter 4.

replaced the struggle for power with rational dialogue and human solidarity. Hence, the unsocial sociability of liberal globality reflects in the lack of global governance's legitimacy. The ethical resource for creating a democratic world community cannot be provided with the logic of competition for interests. Linklater discusses a movement from egotistical moral system to a Kantian ideal of thinking from the standpoint of all others as providing such an ethical resource.⁵⁶⁴ Held and McGrew refer to democratic deficits of *liberal global governance* in this way:

In a post-imperial world, the institutional infrastructure of global governance legitimizes a new form of a global domination... In effect, global governance is essentially *liberal* global governance since promotes and advances the project of a liberal world order in which global markets, the international rule of law, liberal democracy and human rights are taken as the universal standards of civilisation. ... Of course, these values are not promoted in a balanced way, as is evident by the priority that is attached to the expansion and reproduction of global market. ...liberal economics normally wins out against other liberal values. This is principally because the project of liberal global governance is informed by an unwritten constitution that structurally privileges the interest and agenda of Western globalizing capital, more often than at the expense of the welfare of the majority of nations, communities and the natural environment...⁵⁶⁵

As such, it is possible to argue that liberal global governance is mainly concerned with liberal economic values, as opposed to the individual's political and social rights to make global governance and global economy accountable to the world's population. In other words, while liberal global governance has created a more sensitive political system to the human rights, it has not yet realised the political right of prospective global citizens to make their global order accountable to their needs. As Habermas reminds us, the nation-states are losing their central positions in shaping global decision-making, but "in an interdependent world community there is less and less congruence between the groups of participants in a collective decision and the total of all those affected by their decisions."⁵⁶⁶ According to Habermas:

Neoliberal theory deals with private subjects who 'do and permit what they will' according to their own preferences and value orientations within the limits of legally permissible action. They are not required to take any mutual interest for one other; they are thus not equipped with any moral sense of social obligation. The legally requisite respect for private liberties that all competitors are equally entitled to *is something very different from the equal respect for the human worth of each individual*⁵⁶⁷ [emphasis added].

⁵⁶⁴ Andrew Linklater, *Critical Theory and World Politics, Citizenship, sovereignty and humanity*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2007), pp.186-187.

⁵⁶⁵ David Held & Anthony McGrew, *Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation*, (London, Blackwell: 2002), pp .62-63.

⁵⁶⁶ Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, (1998), p.70.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.97.

Habermas rightly argues that neo-liberalism does not pay enough attention to the republican idea of self-legislation because “it closes itself from the intuition that citizens can be free only if they can regard themselves as both the authors and the addressees of the law at the same time.”⁵⁶⁸ Against this background, liberal global governance has created a more enabling political environment for respecting private liberties, but such a global political progress is something very different from the emergence of a democratic global governance by which an equal respect for the human worth of each individual must be protected. The Kantian-inspired ideal type of open global society rests upon such an equal respect for all persons due to their equal access to critical rationality. The global ethics of openness to criticism provides the moral resource that is required for the emergence of a global democratic governance, which is accountable to the world population and removable by them.

7.4 The Economic Deficits of Liberal Globalisation

Liberal globalisation's economic deficits should be discussed in close relationship with its cultural and political shortcomings. Stephen Gill, amongst others, recognises this issue, arguing that globalisation is part of a broad process for restructuring political economy and culture. Viewed from the logic of liberal global governance, we can understand a problematic nature of contemporary economic globalisation. As Gill writes: “the current phase of economic globalisation has come to be characterized increasingly not by free competition as idealized in neo-classical theory, but by oligopolistic neoliberalism, oligopoly and protection for the strong and a socialization of their risks, market discipline for the weak.”⁵⁶⁹ As argued before, a free economic competition, according to the liberal model, requires the protection of property rights and a minimal constitutional state.

However, liberal global governance does not create such preconditions on a global scale. In Alexander's words: “there is not a world government to curb a hegemonic state bent on defending its interests. The nascent global civil sphere has none of the institutions that, in a fully functioning democracy, allow public opinion to produce civil power and thus regulate the state, such as independent courts, party competition,

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., p.94.

⁵⁶⁹ Gill, Globalisation, "Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," (2002), p .129. Also see Giovanni Arrighi, "Globalization and Uneven Development," pp.185-201, in Ino Rossi, *Frontiers of Globalization Research*, (2008).

and elections.”⁵⁷⁰ Hence, the collapse of the Cold War order and the emergence of post-national world economy have not created the legal and political preconditions of a free global economic competition. Instead of such a free competition, economic globalisation has been characterised by an oligopolistic global market. This uneven transnational economy socialise its risks by exporting the negative externalities to less developed economies. It serves to reduce state spending on social services, where transnational corporations find new opportunities for more free entrance to global markets.⁵⁷¹

Viewed from the ideal type of open global society, the emergence of an open global economy depends on pre-existence of a global democracy, a global rule of law and untimely pre-existence of a global culture of the freedom of thought. But, liberal globalisation has merely transformed the bipolar world order into a multi-polar governance that has realised none of these preconditions of a competitive global economy. This multi-polar world order does not refer to a democratic global order. If this multi-polar order becomes accountable to the world population, it provides the pre-condition of a free entrance of economic agents to global market. The absence of such a global political accountability is closely linked with an unevenness of economic globalisation. This uneven globalisation perhaps can be regarded as the main manifestation of contemporary globalisation's economic deficits.

Empirical research shows that economic globalisation has led to an uneven economic growth and integration in the world's different regions. These regional differences can be traced to those cultural and political pre-conditions that affect the level of openness of national economies to global market. National economies have opened to the global market in different quality and quantity, hence their benefits from economic globalisation have been widely unequal. This inequality is reflected in various levels of integration of national economies in world economy.

In his empirical study of cross-national variations in a global economic integration, Garrett argues that, “the magnitudes of enduring cross-national disparities in international economic flows and foreign economic policies are sufficiently large that they cannot be dismissed as mere noise on the path to a single seamless global

⁵⁷⁰ Alexander, "Global Civil Society," (2006), p.523.

⁵⁷¹ See Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy*, (2008), pp.69-72.

market.”⁵⁷² He explores the effects of four types of variables that received considerable attention in the political economy of emerging global market: economic size, the level of development, the balance of power between pro- and anti-market forces and the effects of formal political institutions.⁵⁷³ As in the post-cold war era, he writes, “in the 1990s, for example, foreign economic policies were much more liberal in the OECD nations than in the world's poorest countries...There are at least two clear differences between the two groups. The OECD countries are wealthy and have long histories of stable democracies; the poor countries have much shorter (if any) democratic histories.”⁵⁷⁴ While the end of the Cold War order was a transition from bipolarity to multi-polarity, it did not refer to a similar level of liberalisation of national economies towards the global economy in terms of reducing their trade taxes and opening their capital accounts.

Once the bipolar world order was suppressed by a liberal global governance, the political conditions were to some extent provided for a more free entrance of private sectors into the global market, but developed countries and less-developed countries had radically different domestic capacities to benefit from this new global political environment that was provided for by the collapse of the Cold War. In this way, due to pre-existence of enabling domestic environments, developed countries have had much more ability to use the new global environment to facilitate their private sectors' active participation in the emerging global markets. Jackie Smith writes, “since the 1980s, neoliberal proponents have made significant headway in transforming the state from an entity concerned with ensuring some level of social welfare to one devoted to providing a secure and productive environment for global capital.”⁵⁷⁵ This transformation of the state's function turns it to a global agent of global capitalism that co-exists with liberal global governance. The global economic institutions have effectively influenced states' economic policies by making access to international financing contingent upon adherence to ‘structural adjustment’ policies.⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷² Garrett, "The Causes of Globalisation," (2000), p.970.

⁵⁷³ Ibid., p.971. Also see: David A. Leblang, "Domestic and systems determinants of capital controls in the development and developing world," *International Studies Quarterly*, (1997), pp.41, 435-454 and Dani Rodrik, "How far will international economic integration go?," *Journal of Economic Perspective*, 14 (1) (2000), pp.177-186.

⁵⁷⁴ Garrett, (2000), p.971.

⁵⁷⁵ Smith (2008), p.70.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid., p.79

Paul Hirst *et al.* refer to the aforementioned cross-border variation as evidence of their claim that implies the world economy is far from being genuinely 'global'. They point out: "trade, investment and financial flows are concentrated in the Triad of Europe, Japan/East Asia and North America...these major economic powers, centered on the G8 with China and India, thus have capacity... to exert powerful governance pressures over financial markets and other economic tendencies. Global markets are thus by no means beyond regulation and control...objectives of economic governance are limited by the divergent interest of the great powers and the economic doctrines prevalent among their elites."⁵⁷⁷ In other words, the post-national economy is concentrated on the economic activities of developed countries' private sectors. In this sense, the post-national economy is an oligopolistic global market in which the major economic activities are managed by large transnational firms, originated from developed countries' private sectors. Whilst transnational corporations have emerged as powerful competitors of those state-based economic activities on an international level,⁵⁷⁸ such transnational firms are themselves affiliated with developed countries.

Leslie Sklair, amongst others, links the function of transnational corporations with the emergence of a global capitalist class. He argues that economic globalisation has created new groups of transnational investors as members of a transnational capitalist class whose aims and functions goes beyond national interests. In this sense, the global capitalist economy is mainly located in the major transnational corporations. The members of the transnational capitalist class drive the post-national economy. They manage the post-national manufacturing.⁵⁷⁹ Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder point out:

The major beneficiaries of financial deregulation and the revolution in information technologies have been the multinational corporations. Since the mid-1970s the multinationals have grown more rapidly than the world economy. In 1975, the fifty largest industrial corporations worldwide had sales of \$ 540 billion and \$ 25 billion in profits. In 1990, sales figures for the top fifty had climbed to \$ 2.1 trillion and their profits has reached \$70 billion. ...Some of the larger multinationals continue to have sales figures far in excess of the GDP of smaller national economies.⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁷ Hirst et al. *Globalisation in Question*, (2003), p.3.

⁵⁷⁸ Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, (2001), p.78.

⁵⁷⁹ See Leslie Sklair, *Globalisation, Capitalist & Its Alternatives*, Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002), pp.84-117.

⁵⁸⁰ Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder, *Capitalism and Social Progress, The Future of Society in a Global Economy*, (London, Palgrave: 2001), p.103.

If the major beneficiaries of economic globalisation are transnational firms as the economic actors of emerging post-national economy, and if they are under influence of the powerful and wealthy classes in developed countries, globalisation suffers from the absence of an economic accountability to the world population as well. Viewed from the open global society ideal type, existing economic globalisation is far behind an open and competitive global economy that must facilitate a free entrance of all potential economic agents to global market, allowing them to achieve a decent life through their active participation in world-wide economic activities. Given such an economic unaccountability, contemporary globalisation has not used the global market's opportunities for a reduction of world poverty and income inequality.

Robert Hunter Wade points out: "If the number of people in extreme poverty is not falling and if global inequality is widening, we cannot conclude that globalization in the context of the dollar-Wall Street regime is moving the world in the right direction, with Africa's poverty as a special case in need of international attention. The balance of probability is that –like global warming—the world is moving in the wrong direction."⁵⁸¹ For Ino Rossi, while economic globalisation has brought a new level of economic integration to the world economy, not all national economies share equally in the economic benefits produced by increased economic transactions.⁵⁸²

Thomas Pogge writes, "I see the appalling trajectory of world poverty and global inequality since the end of the Cold War as a shocking indictment of one particular, especially brutal path of economic globalization that our governments have chosen to impose. ...but a different path of globalization [is possible], involving political as well as economic integration, that would fulfill human rights worldwide and afford people everywhere an opportunity to share the benefits of global economic growth."⁵⁸³ Pogge's argument implies that the lack of such human rights worldwide can be closely linked to world poverty and income inequality, and if economic globalisation is unable to face with such poverty and income inequality, the key reason is that global governance has not realised such world-wide human rights.

⁵⁸¹ See Robert Hunter Wade, "Is globalization reducing poverty and inequality?" *World Development*, 32 (4) (2004), p.16.

⁵⁸² Ino Rossi, *Frontiers of Globalization Research*, (2008), p.12.

⁵⁸³ See Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, (London, Polity Press: 2008), pp.18-19.

7.5 A Macrosociological Critique of Liberal Globalisation

From a macro-sociological perspective, the three major societal deficits of liberal globalization--or what was called the unsocial sociability of liberal globality-- are systematically interconnected. Throughout the preceding arguments, we have seen such an interconnection. This section uses the insights of the preceding arguments to summarise liberal globalisation's unsocial sociability.

It started with the cultural deficits of contemporary globalisation, then led to the political and economic dimensions of globalisation's unsocial sociability. As argued in chapter 3, such a connection among various aspects of the contradictory nature of contemporary globalisation is recognised by global thinkers such as Habermas, Falk, and Held. Viewed from the open global society ideal type, however, such a linkage finds a different interpretation. As introduced in chapter 4, the ideal type of open global society can be used as a normative ideal type to unmask the contradictions of the existing global reality.

From a cultural perspective, the expansion of liberal model of social organisation to a global scale suffers from an unsocial sociability because it advocates a mode of social organisation on the basis of a global economic competition as opposed to a rational dialogue among civilisations of peoples. The liberal model of post-national social organisation views individuals as *competitors* rather than *rational agents* who can organise their global social relations based on dialogue and consent. As Habermas argues, this liberal model deals with individuals who do and permit what they will according to their own preferences within the limits of legally permissible action: a freedom of choice under the rule of law. Individuals are not required to take a mutual interest for one other, because they are just competitors and not friends. However, the legally requisite respect for the private liberties that all competitors are equally entitled to is something very different from the equal respect for the human worth of each individual as a human being.⁵⁸⁴

For the ideal type of open global society, the cultural shortfalls of contemporary liberal globalisation originate from its Lockean premises about human beings and their social ordering according to the principle of economic competition rather than a rational dialogue over human action-goals. The unsocial sociability of a global commercial community refers to the logic of competition over economic interests

⁵⁸⁴ Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, (2001), p.97.

without a notable concern with achieving a rational agreement amongst prospective global citizens over how the global rules of this global competition should be justified by all who would be affected by the rules. The existing liberal model of global organisation leads to a unilateral imposition of the model on the rest of the world without their pre- consensus. The reason is that the need for such a global consensus has been outside of the model, whereas it does not rest upon an equal respect for the human worth of individuals. The maximum capacity of the existing liberal model of global organisation is to advocate the need for establishing a global rule of law under which individuals can secure their freedom of choice: individuals who do and permit what they will according to their preferences within the limits of global legally permissible action. But even this ideal type global liberalism is not still concerned with a global consensus on how emerging global community should be organised through a rational dialogue in order to satisfy the interests of all persons. In practice, the existing liberal globality has not realised the ideal of a liberal social order as it has been actualised on a domestic level.

The unsocial sociability of liberal globalisation is also reflected in the political insufficiencies of liberal globalisation. The unsocial sociability manifests its political nature in the lack of an accountability of liberal global governance to the most of the world's population. As Held and McGrew argues, emerging global governance is essentially a liberal global governance while promotes and advances the liberal model of world order in which global market, the international rule of law, and liberal democracy are taken the universal standard of civilisation. But, since there is not a global consensus regarding the liberal conception of the person and liberal model of social organisation, globalisation of liberalism suffers from a global democratic illegitimacy. As a result, Held and McGrew rightly remind us that liberal values are not promoted on a global scale in a balanced way, as is evident by the priority that is attached to the expansion and reproduction of global markets. In this way, liberal economics wins out against other liberal values like the global rule of law and global democracy. This is principally because liberal global governance is informed by a liberal model of social order, in which economic rights, in particular property rights, are prioritised over other political and civil rights like the right of self-governance through democratic procedures. As a result, liberal global governance privileges the

interests and agenda of Western globalising capital, often at expense of the welfare of the majority of world's population.⁵⁸⁵

The existing global governance has created a more enabling political environment for the participation of more global actors in global decision-makings. However, it still is too unaccountable to the world's population. The democratic deficits of liberal global governance originate from its cultural logic: the superseding the Hobbesian logic of the struggle for political power by the Lockean logic of competition over economic interests. If we take the Kantian logic of rational dialogue as our normative reference point, the democratic deficits of liberal global governance can be recognised in the very premises of the liberal models of human nature and commercial society. The unsocial sociability of liberal globality is reflected in such a global democratic deficit. Liberal global governance is not principally shaped for the creation of a global democratic governance, accountable to peoples and removable by them, but for a multi-centric global political system, which to some extent has suppressed the struggle for political power with competition for economic interests. The political deficits of liberal global governance have led us to the economic unevenness of liberal globalisation.

Uneven economic globality is another aspect of liberal globalisation's unsocial sociability. While there is strong correlation between the growth of transnational economic flows and the liberalisation of foreign economic policies around the globe, the growth of transnational economic flows has been unequally distributed across the world's regions and countries. Different countries and regions have very unequally benefited from economic globalisation. Perhaps one of the major reasons for this cross-national variation in this post-national economic integration and enjoying its benefits originates from very different domestic capacities of countries and regions in terms of their ability to open their national economies to global market. The liberal logic of economic globalisation has forced national economies to open their private sectors to global markets, but such openness has occurred due to internal capacities of the national economies. While national economies have differentially opened up their private sectors to global market, the emerging global economic governance has not been concerned with altering the existing cross-border variation towards an equal opportunity for the private sectors' participations in the global market.

⁵⁸⁵Held & McGrew, *Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation*,(2002), pp.62-63.

The thesis' macro-sociological critique of liberal globalisation leads us to explore systematic linkage among the three cultural, political, and economic aspects of liberal globality's unsocial sociability. In this sense, the uneven distribution of economic benefits and risks of globalisation is internally linked with the unacceptability of liberal global governance to the world's population, and such an unaccountability is closely connected with the social philosophy (the cultural model) of global liberalism. This social philosophy rests upon the utilitarian logic of global competition for economic interests as opposed to the logic of rational dialogue amongst civilisations of peoples for the creation of a global society of free and equal citizens, as reflected in the ideal type of open global society. As I shall argue in the next chapter, the ideal type of open global society is defined to provide a normative standard from which the deviations or unsocial sociability of the existing liberal globality can be unmasked and overcome by a dialogic form of the development of globality.

Chapter 8

Towards a Dialogic Globalisation The Formation of an Open Global Society

This chapter uses the ideal type of open global society and the critical rationalist model of social learning to argue for an alternative dialogic globalisation. It will argue that liberal globalisation's unsocial sociability can be overcome through a rational dialogue amongst world civilisations. The chapter explains this rational dialogue as an ideal type global social learning through which the Lockean logic of liberal globality can be superseded with the Kantian logic of an open global society. An expression of such an ambition can be found in Jackie Smith's question of:

...how people have come together to articulate and promote ideas of a global society that differ dramatically from the world economy promoted by far more powerful corporate and political actors. These people and the movement they comprise have been labeled "anti-globalization," but as we will see, in reality they are not anti-global but rather they work toward a vision of globalization based on cooperation and inclusion rather than economic competition.⁵⁸⁶

Due to the centrality of an inter-civilisational dialogue in this alternative account of globalisation, section 8.1 explains the cultural logic of civilisational formation. To this end, it refers to competing systems of rationality, as the cornerstone of such a cultural logic. Section 8.2 reviews three major world civilisations of Islam, West and China to explore how such systems of rationality have influenced the patterns of social organisation. In this manner, section 8.2 paves the way for exploring the reasons why

⁵⁸⁶ Jackie Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy*, (2008), p.5.

a dialogue of civilisations would be a dialogue of competing systems of rationality. Section 8.3 argues that a rational dialogue amongst competing systems of rationality and patterns of social organisation is possible if they open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism. It attempts to explain reasons why such a rational dialogue can transform liberal globality into a multi-civilisational open global society. Section 8.3 argues for the five layers of such an ideal-type global social transformation. Section 8.4 explores macro-institutional outcomes of such a global transformation. It employs Critical Rationalism to address a *moral institutional reasoning* for critical rationalist accounts of global democracy and global justice.

8.1 The Cultural Logics of Civilisational Formation: Competing Systems of Rationale

The central argument of this chapter is that individuals, as equal possessors of critical rationality, can be involved in a rational dialogue on a global scale regarding their global social organisation. However, since they have been already categorised in radically different civilisations, such a rational dialogue amongst them must take place in the context of an inter-civilisational dialogue that recognises their different systems of rationality and cultural identities. This leads us to the need for an exploration of the cultural logic of civilisational formation. This section argues that competing systems of rationale have been central to the cultural logic of civilisational formation. A critical rationalist approach to a dialogue amongst civilisations refers to a dialogue among competing systems of rationale that makes fundamental premises of those systems open to mutual criticism. Referring to sociological accounts of civilisation, this section defines a civilisation as the *highest level of cultural grouping of peoples* on the basis of a common account of rationality and shared accounts of human nature and social organisation. The sociological approach to civilisation is used for developing a macrosociology of dialogic globalisation.

8.1.1 Civilisations as ‘Highest Cultural Grouping of People’

In order to address the central role of the systems of rationality in the civilisational formation and their implications for a rational dialogue amongst civilisations, a brief review of the major approaches to the sociology of civilisations, especially those approaches that pay special attention to the cultural logic of civilisational formation is required. Donald Nielsen argues that, “the creation of a new science of civilisations

remains a neglected item on the agenda of contemporary sociology.”⁵⁸⁷ S. N. Eisenstadt believes that the early 1970s was a starting point for a civilisational return in sociological analysis.⁵⁸⁸ In *Civilisations in World Politics*, Peter Katzenstein outlines three major sociological theories of civilisations, developed by Eisenstadt, Collins and Elias.⁵⁸⁹ We can add an ‘interactionists’ approach to civilisational analysis—suggested by scholars such as William McNeill, Jack Coody and Janet Abu-Lughod. They argue about a long-term mutual intercourse and influence amongst civilisations.⁵⁹⁰ However, on the contrary, Samuel Huntington focuses upon the clash of civilisations instead of dialogue amongst them.⁵⁹¹ In contrast with Huntington's thesis that takes the cultural differences as the main source of the clash among civilisations, proponents of the idea of civilisational dialogue rightly argue that inter-civilisational exchanges have not been limited to conflicts of opinions and institutions, but positive encounters and dialogue. From this perspective, the idea of dialogue among civilisations has found its justification as a response to Huntington's thesis of the civilisational clash.⁵⁹²

The importance of those sociologies of civilisations that defends the dialogue of civilisations for the present argument is that they have paid attention to a key role of competing accounts of rationality to address the dynamics of civilisational formation. A brief review of the conception of civilisation in these civilisational analyses leads us to the central role of competing accounts of rationality in these sociological analyses. As Johann Arnason argues, the recovery of civilisational analysis is closely linked to a broader cultural turn in the human sciences. He writes:

Comparative civilisational approaches accept the primacy of culture, but at the same time, they strive to avoid the cultural determinism familiar from twentieth-century sociology, especially from the Parsonian version of

⁵⁸⁷ Donald A. Nielsen, "Rationalization, Transformation of Consciousness and Intercivilisational Encounters. Reflections on Benjamin Nelson's Sociology of Civilisations," *International Sociology*, 16 (3) (2001), p.407.

⁵⁸⁸ Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "The Civilisational Dimension in Sociological Analysis," *Thesis Eleven*, 62 (1) (2000), p.1.

⁵⁸⁹ Peter J. Katzenstein, (ed.), *Civilisations in World Politics. Plural and Pluralist Perspectives*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2010), pp.14-23.

⁵⁹⁰ On this see William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West, A History of the Human Community* (Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press: 1963); Jack Goody, *The East in the West*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996) and Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony. The World System A.D. 1250-1350*, (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1989)

⁵⁹¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, (London, Simon & Schuster UK Ltd: 1996), pp.183-291.

⁵⁹² See Fabio Petito, "Dialogue of Civilisations as an Alternative Model for World Order," in *Civilisational Dialogue and World Order*, (2009), pp.61-62.

functionalism. To situate this twofold strategy within contemporary cultural sociology, it seems useful to link up with the distinction between a strong and a weak program for the sociological analysis of culture proposed by Jeffery Alexander and Philip Smith. The strong program, also described as cultural sociology, stresses the constitutive role of culture in all domains and across the field of social life... civilisational analysis is, first and foremost, a particularly ambitious version of the strong program; its emphasis on *different cultural articulations of the world, as well as on the large-scale and long-term social-historical formations crystallizing around such articulations* adds new dimensions to the autonomy of culture [emphasis added].⁵⁹³

The critical rationalist approach to macrosociology of a dialogic globalisation validates Alexander's strong program in cultural sociology because it gives the primacy to the cultural motor of social change. Hence, a dialogue amongst civilisations emphasises the cultural driving forces of dialogic globalisation. As argued in chapter 1, peoples' access to critical rationality can act as the cause of the formation of some shared values on a global scale if world civilisations open their fundamental cultural beliefs to mutual criticism. I will argue in more detail regarding Alexander's strong program in cultural sociology in chapter 10. It suffices to note that for cultural sociology, "socially constructed subjectivity forms the will of collectivities; shapes the rules of organizations; defines the moral substance of law; and provides the meaning and motivations for technologies, economies, and military machines."⁵⁹⁴ This chapter takes this strong approach to cultural sociology in order to explore the substantive role of civilisational cultural logics, in terms of their rationale systems, in the emergence of socially constructed subjectivity and its profound implications for different patterns of social organisation across civilisations.

Against this background, while Huntington introduces a civilisation as the highest cultural grouping of people, it creates an unnecessary linkage between cultural identity of a civilisation and its political performance as a global political actor.⁵⁹⁵ In this manner, for Huntington, a civilisation operates as a kind of *mega nation-state* that transfers its cultural identity to its world politics. As such, conflicts of opinion amongst civilisations, including their competing systems of rationality, leads directly to a political conflict on an inter-civilisational level. On this basis, Huntington uses

⁵⁹³ Johann P. Aranason, "The Cultural Turn and the Civilisational Approach," *European Journal of Social Theory*, 13 (1) (2010), p.67. Also see: Jeffrey C. Alexander and Philip Smith, "The Strong Program in Cultural Sociology," pp.11-26., in Alexander, *The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology*, (2003) and Johann P. Aranason, "Civilisational Analysis, Social Theory and Comparative History," in G. Delanty (ed.), *Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory*, (London, Routledge: 2006), pp.230-241.

⁵⁹⁴ Alexander, *The Meaning of Social Life*, (2003), p.5.

⁵⁹⁵ See Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations*, (1996), pp.125-174.

the conception of civilisation, as a kind of mega nation-state, to develop a new Hobbesian logic of the struggle for cultural hegemony and to address the outcomes of such a struggle for the post-Cold War political order. In this way, civilisations become the major political building blocks of the post-Cold War world order.⁵⁹⁶

As Katzenstein argues, whilst Huntington's main thesis of clash of civilisations refers to the growing importance of civilisational unit in the analysis of the post-Cold War order, its dependency upon an internal cultural unity of civilisations⁵⁹⁷ dismisses "the key importance of the internal pluralism of civilisational constellations."⁵⁹⁸ In addition, it does not pay enough attention to constructive aspect of civilisational intercourse. Nevertheless, the idea of dialogue of civilisations can utilise the insights of Huntington's definition of civilisation for the development of a dialogic model of world order. According to Huntington, a civilisation is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity that people have. People can and do redefine their civilisational identities, and as a result the composition and boundaries of civilisations change. Huntington argues that civilisations' world-views shape the cultural logics of their social grouping of peoples. But he does not link this cultural logic to the systems of rationality.⁵⁹⁹

Eisenstadt develops an epistemic-institutional account of a civilisation. For him, "the central core of civilisations is the symbolic and institutional interaction between the formulation, promulgation, articulation, and continuous reintegration of the basic ontological visions prevalent in a society, its basic ideological premise and core symbols on the one hand, and on the other the definition, structuration and regulation of the major arenas of institutional life."⁶⁰⁰ For Eisenstadt, civilisations' ontological visions and ideological premises have led to particular social-institutional features.

In comparison with Huntington, Eisenstadt does lead us to see how the cultural logic of civilisations affects the institutional structures of civilisations.⁶⁰¹ He argues that a civilisational world-view cognitively fuels the cultural logic of social ordering of people around one set of ontological visions and moral values. He recognises that

⁵⁹⁶ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?" *Foreign Affairs*, (1993), 72 (3), pp.22-49.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.21-29.

⁵⁹⁸ Katzenstein, *Civilisations in World Politics*, (2010), pp.6-10.

⁵⁹⁹ Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?" (1993), pp.23-25.

⁶⁰⁰ S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Civilisational Dimension in Sociological Analysis", (2000), p.2.

⁶⁰¹ See S. N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilisations and Multiple Modernities*, (Leiden, Brill: 2003), chapter four.

civilisations are internally pluralistic units of analysis and externally building blocks of the emerging world order, what he prefers to call a global civilisation of modernity that has been emerged through an inter-civilisational dialogue regarding modernity. However, it seems that Eisenstadt's analysis of the existing performance of inter-civilisational dialogue about modernity is an overestimation of the function of such capacity in the creation of a global civilisation. Nevertheless, it paves the way for exploring the conditions of an ideal type rational dialogue among civilisations for creating a multi-civilisational global society.

Randall Collins' definition of a civilisation also contributes to understanding the cultural logic of civilisational formation and the inter-civilisational dialogue. Collins argues that competing schools of thought affect the cultural logic of civilisations. He views civilisations as zones of prestige and social contact. Inter-civilisational relations are composed of competing social networks, which are cognitively informed by competing schools of thought. Collins points out: "my approach to civilisations is to stress their characters as networks of social action, and as historical phenomena. ...the conception of civilisation as a zone of prestige directs our attention both to social activity and to cultural variety."⁶⁰² Collins's account of civilisation is drawn from his work on the comparative history of philosophies and the social networks, which have carried them.⁶⁰³ The reading of civilisation leads us to see the *social networks of intellectuals* as the agent of cultural dialogue amongst civilisations, originating from the schools of thought. Collins does not directly discuss about the role of competing systems of rationality in the emergence of competing schools of thought. This link can be traced to the works of other sociologists of civilisations like Benjamin Nelson and Donald Nielsen.

Norbert Elias' analysis of the civilising process also contributes to the conception of civilisation. Elias applies his civilising process's analysis at the European level.⁶⁰⁴ Andrew Linklater and Stephen Menell have employed Elias' analysis to develop an inter-societal analysis of such a civilising process.⁶⁰⁵ Katzenstein validates Nelson's

⁶⁰² Randall Collins, "Civilisations as Zones of Prestige and Social Contact", *International Sociology*, 16 (3), (2001), pp .422.

⁶⁰³ See Randall Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*, (USA, Harvard University Press: 1998).

⁶⁰⁴ Regarding Elias's theory of Civilizing Process see: Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilisation*, vol. 2, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1986).

⁶⁰⁵ See Andrew Linklater, "Norbert Elias, the Civilizing Process and the Sociology of International Relations, *International Politics*," (2004), 41, pp .3-35., and Stephen Menell, "The Globalisation of

sociology of civilisations as a global application of Elias's civilising process theory.⁶⁰⁶ Of special interest of Nelson's conception of civilisation and his sociological analysis for the present argument is that it leads us to explore the link between competing accounts of human rationality and the cultural logic of civilising process on an inter-civilisational scale. While both Eisenstadt and Collins argue about the cultural dynamics of civilisational formation via the social networks of elites and intellectuals, they do not lead us to recognise a key function for competing accounts of rationality as an epistemic impetus of such intellectual networks. Nelson argues that his comparative sociology of civilisations⁶⁰⁷ advances the works of Joseph Needham and Max Weber. For him, civilisations are distinctive structures of collective and historical consciousness, resting on different levels of rationalisation, and competing rationale systems. Nelson connects civilisational identities to competing rationale systems. These alternative systems of rationale have led to competing world-visions regarding the universe, the human nature and social institutions. From such a perspective, Nelson defines civilisations in this way:

By the *civilisations* of peoples I wish to refer to the governing cultural heritages that constitute the accepted milieus of 2 + n societies, [or] territories, areas which generally enjoy or have enjoyed a certain proximity. These strongly-based acceptances will normally be discovered to constitute configurations of the following elements: identities of language, the highest level of technology of the group, which I would call the 'prime material facilitations and skills', of the group; the central patterns reciprocities including juridical rules; the fundamental canons governing the decision-matrices in the spheres of opinion and act...the taken-for granted structures of consciousness, comprising cultural world-views, logics, images of experience, self, time, the beginning and the end, the extraterrestrial powers.⁶⁰⁸

Nelson rightly recognises competing systems of rationale as the cultural logics of civilisational formation. He argues that there are various '*cultural logics*' which serve to regulate the possibilities of thought and action. The most important of these elements are those which Nelson "designates as 'rationales,' or 'rationale-systems' which are the 'fundamental canons governing the decision-matrices in the spheres of

Human Society as a Very Long-Term Social Process: Elias's Theory," *Theory, Culture & Society*, (7) (1990), pp.359-371.

⁶⁰⁶ See Katzenstein, *Civilisations in World Politics*, (2010), p.40.

⁶⁰⁷ Benjamin Nelson, "Civilisational Complexes and Intercivilisational Encounters," *Sociological Analysis*, 34 (2) (1973), pp.83-86. For a review of Weber's sociology of world civilisations see: Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H.H. Gerth and C.W Mills (Ed. & Rr.), (New York, Oxford University Press: 1946). For Needham's civilisational analysis see: Joseph Needham, *Science and Society in East and West*, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 1969).

⁶⁰⁸ Nelson, "Civilisational Complexes", (1973), p.82.

opinion and act.”⁶⁰⁹ The civilisations' rationale systems are in fact the “structures of reason, explanations, procedures establishing requirements in respects to truth, virtue, legality, fittingness.”⁶¹⁰ In this way, Nelson links civilisational rationale systems with the cultural dynamics of civilisational complexes. He argues that three civilisational Consciousness Types have influenced the formation of civilisations. In Consciousness Type 1, civilisations are shaped on the basis of those world-views which assert an absolute authority of magical-prescriptive structures. He believes those sacro-magical structures anchored a wide variety of archaic civilisations, including Ancient China, India, Judaism, as well Greece and Rome in their early phases.

With Consciousness Type 2, Nelson views “a decisive breakthrough occurs...in which all [peoples] are enjoined to enter into mediation, producing a faith-structure of consciousness. The faith-structure requires that all individuals and groups, however differentiated, are under the obligation to engage in continuous purgation and catharsis of evil thoughts... The faith-consciousness already implies a kind of *logos* or world soul in which participation is accessible through psychic conformities.”⁶¹¹ The faith-structures provide potential for universal participation, and hence lay the necessary foundations for further total rationalisations. Nelson locates the main historical breakthrough from sacro-magical structure to the faith structure in the transition from Judaism to Christianity in the Hellenistic and Roman eras.⁶¹² However, Nelson's historiography of the three consciousness types is mainly drawn from the historical recorder of West and it does not seem as an outcome of a universal historiography. Nelson's sociology of civilisations nevertheless leads us to explore those cultural logics that shape civilisations' consciousness structures and the inter-civilisational exchanges.

In *Globalisation and Civilisations*, Mehdi Mozaffari defines civilisation as “a junction between a world vision and a historical formation. In other words, when a specific world vision is realized through a historical formation, this fusion is called civilisation.”⁶¹³ Robert Cox views civilisation as “a correspondence between material

⁶⁰⁹ Op., cit.

⁶¹⁰ Benjamin Nelson, "Scholastic Rationales of 'Conscience', Early Modern Crises of Credibility, and the Scientific-Technological Revolutions of the 17th and 20th Centuries," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 7(2) (1968), p.163.

⁶¹¹ Nelson, (1973), p.92.

⁶¹² Op. cit.

⁶¹³ Mehdi Mozaffari, "Globalisation, civilisations and world order. A world-constructive approach," in *Globalisation and Civilisations*, (2002), p.26.

conditions of existence and inter-subjective meanings.”⁶¹⁴ For David Inglis “...a focus on inter-civilisational interactions can lead to productive rapprochements between civilisational analysis and globalisation theory... The pioneering work in this regard of Benjamin Nelson is shown to provide a basis for future civilisational analysis of globalisation. ...”⁶¹⁵ Validating this civilisational return in globalisation studies, a key link can be traced between competing rationale systems and sociology of civilisations.

8.1.2 ‘Rationale Systems’ and the ‘Logics of Cultural Grouping’ of People

We need to explore relationships amongst (a) civilisational account of rationality, (b) civilisational world-visions, and (c) civilisational models of social organisation. Validating Nelson's analysis, Toby Huff writes, “understanding the cultural rationales becomes a key to understanding the breakthroughs and resistances to such in the spheres of act and opinion in the realms of theology, philosophy, law, and science. According to Nelson, rationales so conceived are at the heart of orderly social process.”⁶¹⁶ Nelson himself notes “without such rationales, orderly social process and social accounting are unthinkable; the work of the world does not get done. Social and cultural regressions to the so-called 'state of nature', manifest themselves when the established rationales go out of the phase or lack a compelling and vital center.”⁶¹⁷ Huff rightly argues that the conception of rationales promises to open one of the most fruitful lines of inquiry to be pursued specially as it applies to the comparative and historical sociology of science.⁶¹⁸

Nelson's sociology of civilisations needs to be advanced for the formulation of a macrosociology of globalisation, with the aim of addressing the formation of a multi-civilisational open global society. Donald Nielsen's critical reconstruction of Nelson's sociology helps us to develop such a macrosociology of globalisation. While Nielsen believes that the creation of a new science of civilisations remains a neglected item on the agenda of contemporary sociology, he finds Nelson's sociology of civilisations an

⁶¹⁴ Robert W. Cox, "Civilisations and the twenty-first century," in *Globalisation and Civilisations*, (2002) p.4.

⁶¹⁵ David Inglis, "Civilisations or Globalisation (s)?: Intellectual Rapprochements and Historical World-Visions," *European Journal of Social Theory*, 13 (1) (2010), p.135.

⁶¹⁶ Toby E. Huff, "Is a Theory of Sociocultural Process Possible without Reference to 'Civilisational Complexes?'," *Sociological Analysis*, 35 (2) (1974), p.89.

⁶¹⁷ Nelson, (1968), p.163.

⁶¹⁸ Huff, (1974), p.92. ,Also see Huff's application of the conception of 'rationales' to his comparative sociology of the rise of early modern sciences in Islamic, Chinese and the Western civilisations in *The Rise of Early Modern Science*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2003).

insightful departure point for the formulation of such a new science of civilisations.⁶¹⁹ My intention is to show how Nielsen's critique of Nelson's sociology contributes to our understanding of the cultural logic of civilisational formation and its outcomes for a macrosociology of dialogic globalisation.

Nielsen validates Nelson's sociology of civilisations because it allows us to see reasons why “comparative historical research needs to focus on *actual variations* in the *operation of reason, rationale, rationalizations*, etc. across civilisations.”⁶²⁰ Nielsen believes that “despite Weber's early warning on this matter, we still lack a full historical and sociological analysis of *the ideas and institutions* connected with the various *notions themselves* of reason, rationales, rationalization, rationalism, rationality, etc”⁶²¹ (emphasis added). He views Nelson's sociology as an attempt to advance Weber' comparative sociology of world religions.⁶²²

In Nielsen view, they are “the systems of rationales that constitute the structures of consciousness of societies. Such categories serve as hinges on which turn the basic rationales and the concrete modes of reasoning of historical actors. They define the worlds in which people live. Changes in the collective meanings and the institutional embodiments of these categories or the elaboration of wholly new categories and meanings mark decisive turning points in the civilisational histories of mankind.”⁶²³ Nielsen elaborates this line of reasoning for a critical reconstruction of Nelson's sociology of civilisations with a direct attention paid on competing rationale systems as the cultural logics of civilisational formation. Nielsen links competing rationale systems with different types of civilisational consciousness, which operate as the mechanisms of cultural groupings of people around one set of common world-visions. For him, civilising process is a *socio-cultural process* that occurs not only at the level of *world-views*, but also at the level of *social institutions* and involves the relation of the '*concrete individuals*' to '*universal norms*' in all spheres of human life.⁶²⁴

⁶¹⁹ Donald A. Nielsen, "Rationalization, Transformations of Consciousness and Intercivilisational Encounters," *International Sociology*, 16 (3) (2001),

⁶²⁰ Donald A Nielsen, "A Theory of Communication Action or a Sociology of Civilisations? " *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 1 (I) (1987), p.163.

⁶²¹ *Ibid.*, Also see Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans, Talcott Parsons, (New York: Scribner's Sons: 1958), p .26.

⁶²² See Nielsen, (2001), p.406. Also see Wolfgang Mommsen, "Max Weber's political sociology and his philosophy of world history," *International Social Science Journal*, XVII (1), (1965), pp.23-43.

⁶²³ Nielsen, (1987), p.165.

⁶²⁴ Nelson, (1981), p.9. Also see Nielsen, (1987), p.168.

Nielsen argues that Nelson's sociology of civilisations leads us to realise that “the ‘macro’ concept of civilisational complexes points to the highest level categories constituting the structures of consciousness of civilisations, but they are experienced and put to work by individuals in real ‘micro’ situations and predicaments where conduct, opinion, thought and imagination take place.”⁶²⁵ It is important to note that while Nelson's sociology of civilisations has advanced Weber's legacy, it suffers from a Eurocentric tendency. Nelson's sociological analysis of consciousness-types “focuses on the advancement of rationalization processes in the West, yet it is framed by an equally strong concern with the pre-consciousness of civilisational patterns, the inter-civilisational character of cultural production, the centrality of intercivilisational conflicts, and the shifts in global civilisational ascendancy.”⁶²⁶ However, it does not properly address inter-civilisational encounters of the consciousness-type shifts. It takes the Western model of rationalisation as its reference point for judging about other civilisations' rationale systems.

According to Nielsen, Nelson follows Weber's Eurocentric reading of Western rationalisation path: “Weber's way of posing his questions frequently involves asking why in one civilisation (the 'West') cultural developments of 'universal significance and value' emerged which did not occur independently elsewhere... It too easily becomes a study of the 'success' and (especially) the 'failure' of civilisations in the gestation of particular cultural forms (for example, modern science) abstracted from universal history. It obscures a more central question: what structures, histories and experiences did actually occur in different civilisations?”⁶²⁷ Nielsen's critique implies the need for a new historical sociology of inter-civilisational relations in which competing rationale systems are recognised as the epistemic impetuses for inter-civilisational exchanges. He writes, “intracivilisational conflicts on an increasingly global scale over the meaning of a rationalized structure of consciousness have resulted in *competing conceptions of 'rationality' itself*”⁶²⁸ (emphasis added).

Along the same line of reasoning, Jack Coody reminds us that one of the major sources of inter-civilisational conflict has been the West's tendency to regard its

⁶²⁵ Nielsen, (2001), p.410.

⁶²⁶ Ibid. Also see Nelson, (1981), pp.8-9. This line of critique can be leveled at Tony Huff's historical sociology of the rise of early modern science, which takes the West as its reference point. See: Toby Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science*, (2003).

⁶²⁷ Nielsen, (2001), pp.411-412. Also see Weber, (1958), p.13.

⁶²⁸ Nielsen, (2001), p.410.

system of rationale as a superior account of rationality. In his words, “one tendency has been to ascribe to Europe the ability to modernize, whereas others could but copy.”⁶²⁹ Goody attributes this superiority claim to a particular rationality: a Western rationality, originated from the Greek’s philosophy and logic that developed during the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment.⁶³⁰ However, viewed from other civilisations' perspective, Western rationality is an imperfect rationality hence it must be open to mutual criticism. In a modified world-systems perspective, Abu-Lughod challenges Eurocentric reading of civilisational intercourse in which Western rationality play the key role. However, such a world-systems point of view has been criticised by Donald Nielsen due to an insufficient attention to the key role of the cultural logic of civilisational formation.⁶³¹

8.2 ‘Rationality’ and ‘Social Organisation’ in Three World Civilisations: Islamic, the Western, and Chinese Civilisations

I argued that one of the major sources of the clash of civilisations originates from their competing accounts of rationality. This section illustrates concrete examples of such competing systems of rationale and their outcomes in social institutions in three major world civilisations.⁶³² These three case studies show how competing systems of rationale operate as epistemic sources of the formation of macro-societal institutions on a civilisational scale. It, as a whole, prepares us for the next section to address the central questions of why a rational dialogue amongst civilisations can work through opening civilisations’ systems of rationale to mutual criticism. It is also important to note that these case studies are focused on those particular aspects of civilisational formation and intercourse that is concerned with (a) civilisational world-views, (b) civilisational accounts of human nature and (c) civilisational models of social ordering of peoples. Hence, many of other aspects of inter-civilisational exchanges such as the trade of sciences and technology remain peripheral to the main focus of these cases studies. I will explore centrality of three systems of rationale, so-called as three *civilisational wisdoms* that are reflected in the three patterns of social organisation in these civilisations.

⁶²⁹ Jack Goody, *The East in the West*, (1996), p.8.

⁶³⁰ Ibid., p.11. Also see McNeill, *The Rise of the West*, (1963), Part II, Eurasian Cultural Balance.

⁶³¹ See Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*, (1989). For a critique of Abu-Lughod's analysis see: Donald A. Nielsen, "After World Systems Theory: Concerning Janet Abu-Lughod's *Before European Hegemony*," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 4 (4) (1991), pp.481-497.

⁶³² Huntington classifies contemporary civilisations into Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilisation. See: Huntington, (1993), p.25.

8.2.1 Islamic Civilisation: The Wisdom of God and Islamic Social Order

Sub-section 8.2.1 explains the Islamic system of rationale in following pages and its outcomes for the Islamic conception of human nature and the Islamic model of social organisation. It also argues how Islamic world-visions affect the institutions of Islamic society as a community of believers. It explores relations between the wisdom of God and the institutions of the Islamic society. Finally, it briefly argues that the Islamic civilisation has been involved in some intellectual and institutional reforms, particularly in terms of a set of new interpretations and understandings of the wisdom of God, of the Islamic account of human nature and the Islamic pattern of social organisation.

Rationality in Islamic thought is understood on *two major levels*. On the first level, in Islamic thought, human beings are possessors of the God-given faculty of reason, which enables them to recognise the wrong and the right and to think about the universe and themselves.⁶³³ On the second level, Islamic thought implies that once individuals have arrived at a rational faith in the First Principles of Islam; namely the Unity of God, God as Creator of the Universe, and God as the Master of the Day of Judgment, they follow the wisdom of God to organise their personal and social life as such principles demand.⁶³⁴ The wisdom of God is embodied in the final revelation that God delivered in his final messenger: the Prophet Mohammad. This wisdom is later collected in the holy book of Islam, i.e., The Quran and the Hadith (i.e. the behaviours of the Prophet). Hence, in Islamic civilisation, the wisdom of God (i.e. The Quran and the Hadith) constructs the main source of Muslims' rational behaviour.

A rational faith in the First Principles, that is key to the Islamic world-vision, leads people to a rational acceptance of the wisdom of God, because God has perfect knowledge of the universe; of the Day of Judgment, and He knows how people should act to achieve the best life. When Muslims (i.e., peoples who recognised the First principles) become faithful in the wisdom of God, they employ God's commands—called Shariah law—in their personal and social life. In this way, they consciously shape macro-social institutions of an Islamic community of believers: called as the Ummah. The essence of Islamic civilisational identity, therefore, becomes the belief

⁶³³ See M. Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). On this level, there is a similarity between Islamic thought and the Lockean Christian-inspired theological anthropology, as argued in chapter 4.

⁶³⁴ On this see: Muhsin Mahdi, "Islamic Theology and Philosophy," In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, (9) (1974), pp.1012-1025.

in the wisdom of God, which is manifested in Muslims' personality and their Islamic patterns of social organisation through a social learning of the message of the Prophet Mohammad.

The centrality of divine wisdom in Islamic rationality does not mean that Islamic thinkers and Muslims have not used independent sources of reason and rationality for an independent understanding of the universe and human nature. Islamic philosophers used Greek philosophy to develop Islamic theology, and they used empirical methods to develop sciences and technology under the civilisation of Islam. In *A History of God*, Karen Armstrong discusses the developments of science and technology under Islam.⁶³⁵ However, the present argument aims to uncover the centrality of the wisdom of God in shaping the key directions of Islamic rationale system and Islamic social institutions—what distinguishes Islamic civilisation's identity from other civilisations.

In order to explore how the wisdom of God has shaped a distinctive conception of rationality and an epistemic foundation for Islamic social institutions, we need to briefly review the principles of Islamic world-visions. The first principle is the Unity of God (*tawhid*). The word '*Islam*' itself means the act of *submitting to the Unity of God*. The conception of the Unity of God has been developed through the formation of Islamic philosophy and theology.⁶³⁶ Some Islamic philosophers argue that they have developed the meaning of the Unity of God, drawn from teachings of the Quran itself. The Quran defines the Unity of God in this way: there is no god but Allah' (*la ilaha ill Allah*). Perhaps one of the most profound readings of this Quranic message has been developed by Muhyid Din-Ibnul Arabi. According to him, the Unity of God means that the being of all things is God. In other words, every part of the world is the whole universe: the God.⁶³⁷

The Unity of God as an *ontological* world-vision not only rejects the worship of false gods, but also denies the very existence of such gods. God's Unity leads Muslims to the second most important principles of the Islamic world-vision: God as the Creator of the universe. If there is nothing except God, or if the whole universe is God itself, He does not have a beginning. And if the whole universe is God, there is no end

⁶³⁵ See Karen Armstrong, *A History of God* (London, Ballantine Books: 1993).

⁶³⁶ See William, M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, (UK, Edinburgh University Press: 1985).

⁶³⁷ A.E Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Myhuid Din Ibnul Arabi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939) p.56. The same line of argument was developed by an Iran Islamic Philosopher called Mulla Sadra. His philosophy later termed as 'Hekmatt Mottallieh', see Watt, (1985) p.153.

to His existence.⁶³⁸ If the God is prior to everything, He must be the Creator of the universe, including human beings. While everything has its own beginning and end, only the God, whose existence is absolute, can be the Creator of the whole universe. The concept of God as the Creator leads Muslims to the purpose of creation of the universe and humankind. The Islamic thought proposes that the purpose of creation is the evolution of creatures towards God Himself. The idea of the Day of Judgment implies that human beings will be returned to life on the Day of Judgment to see the consequences of their actions in this world.

If the wisdom of God should be followed by peoples who have accepted Islam-- as their ontological vision of the universe, of the human nature and the proper way of social life-- they should follow God's commands in their personal and social life. Hence, they must collectively establish a community of pious peoples who have accepted the First Principles of Islamic faith. The laws of God must be institutionalised in social institutions of Islamic community: the Ummah. The Ummah as community of believers has been described by the Quran in this way: "You have become the best Ummah are raised up for the mankind, enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong, and having faith in God."⁶³⁹ From the Islamic point of view, the Ummah is that portion of the world population to whom the messenger of Islam is sent, and who accepted the wisdom of God; that is, Islamic faith. The Shariah law defines the institutional structure of the Islamic society. As such, the Shariah vision of Islam finds a central place in the entire corpus of Islamic thought. However, there are different interpretations amongst Islamic schools of thought -- like Shi'ism and Sunnism-- on the content of the Shariah law. Nevertheless, they share in this belief that the main sources of the Shariah law are the Quran and the Hadith. It is important to note that human reason cannot play a central role in the Shariah vision of Islam, because it by definition rests upon God's commands.

The meaning of rationality for Muslims--in their highest cultural grouping, i.e., Islamic civilisation--refers to the wisdom of God which is mainly reflected in the Shariah vision of Islam. Historically speaking, the Shariah law has been developed by an Islamic science of law, called Fiqh. The Quran and the teachings of the Prophet

⁶³⁸ Duncan. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), pp.319-323.

⁶³⁹ See: *The Quran* (Sura 3: Ayeh 110).

(the hadith or the Sunna) are the main sources of the Shariah law.⁶⁴⁰ In the early formative age of Islamic Fiqh, the Quran and the Sunna were regarded as the two main sources of divine knowledge that preserved the unity of the Shariah vision.⁶⁴¹ However, with the development of Islamic Fiqh, analogical reasoning (*Qiyas*) and consensus of religious scholars (*Ijma*) were added to the main sources of the Shariah law in order to draw those religious duties that could not be directly discovered by a reference to the main sources. There are various readings as to how these sources should be used to explore the God's commands, but there is no doubt that they merely must explore the message of the Quran.⁶⁴²

As Amira Bennison argues, the conception of Islamic Ummah gained its tangible form in the juridical sphere: to be a Muslim means the acceptance of Islamic Law, the Shariah.⁶⁴³ Marshal Hodgson argues that we can situate the Shariah vision of Islam at the center of the Islamic ideational system, which played the key function in the integration of Islamic civilisation despite all its internal diversity.⁶⁴⁴ The Shariah vision of Islam has close relation with the Islamic ontological vision. Fazul Rahman argues that the concept of Shariah refers to “the divinely ordained pattern of human conduct.”⁶⁴⁵ The word Shariah is used as *the highway of good life*, which is reflected in the divinely given code of conduct.⁶⁴⁶ Recognising that wisdom of God is central to Islamic system of rationale, it leads us to explore the cultural logic of Islamic civilization formation. In this way, we realise how Islamic rationality affects the concept of an Islamic person and how such personality influences Islamic pattern of social institutions according to the wisdom of God.

Islamic civilisation, historically speaking, emerged because peoples accepted the wisdom of God as the epistemic source of their proper code of social conducts. William Montgomery Watt provides us with a sociological analysis of how such public acceptance of the wisdom of God led to the emergence of Islamic societies. In *Islam and the Integration of Society*, he argues that, in the course of its historical

⁶⁴⁰ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, (New York, Doubleday: 1968), pp.110-116.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

⁶⁴² Marshall G.S Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in a World Civilisation* vol.1, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 1974), pp.315-358.

⁶⁴³ Amira K. Bennison, "Muslim Universalism and Western Globalisation," in *Globalisation in World History*, (ed.) A.G. Hopkins (UK, Pimlico: 2002), p.76.

⁶⁴⁴ Hodgson, op., cit.

⁶⁴⁵ Rahman, *Islam*, (1968), p.68.

⁶⁴⁶ Op. cit., pp.68 and 100.

formation, Islamic civilisation realised a kind of social learning process through which peoples accepted the wisdom of God. Once peoples became faithful in Islamic world-visions, they accepted the Shariah law as their actions' guidelines and practised it in their social behaviours.⁶⁴⁷ The historical formation of the Islamic ideational system started from the acceptance of the Islamic world-visions and took its macro-societal institutional shape by practising the Shariah law in the Muslim communities.

The Islamic civilisation was shaped because it created a historical and large-scale social learning around its world-visions about the God, about an Islamic conception of the person and about an Islamic ideal-type of social organisation. It created a civilisational-scale social consensus regarding the wisdom of God. In his study of the historical development of Islamic civilisation, Mozaffari points out, “the entire [Islamic] system was cemented by a message determining the world vision of the new Community.”⁶⁴⁸ While Islamic civilisation has found different institutional shapes in its affiliated societies, a general guideline for addressing Islamic civilisation's formation is exploring how Muslims have applied their readings of the Shariah vision to shape their social institutions. For instance, two major political systems amongst Islamic societies-- called Khalafat and Emamat—can be recognised due to their different readings of the Shariah vision of Islam.⁶⁴⁹

Islamic civilisation has been involved in intellectual and institutional reforms.⁶⁵⁰ Some of the Islamic reformists argue that these intellectual and institutional reforms originate from epistemological developments that have led to new understandings of the wisdom of God. For instance, an Iranian scholar, Abdolkarim Soroush, employs Popper's critical epistemology to show how Muslims' understandings of Islamic faith have changed because of the developments in their non-religious knowledge.⁶⁵¹ This line of reform in Islamic thought leads to what he calls an Islamic social democracy, as institutional reforms that seek to reconcile Islamic model social organisation with a

⁶⁴⁷ See William Montgomery Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1961), Part III, The Role of Ideation, pp.43-86.

⁶⁴⁸ Mehdi Mozaffari, “Islamic civilisation between Medina and Athena,” in *Globalisation and Civilisations*, (ed.) Mozaffari, op. cit., (2002), p.199. For an analysis of the historical formation of Islamic civilisation see Mozaffari, *ibid.*, pp.198-217.

⁶⁴⁹ On this see Watt, (1985), Chapter 9: The Polarization of Sunnism and Shi'ism.

⁶⁵⁰ See William M. Watt, *Islam, Fundamentalism and Modernity*, (London and New York, Routledge:1988)

⁶⁵¹ See Ali Paya, 'Popper in Iran,' in *Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment*, vol. I, (eds.) Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford, and David Miller, (UK, Ashgate Publishing Limited: 2006), pp.147-154.

social-democratic pattern of ordering peoples.⁶⁵² Many Islamic countries like Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia and Egypt have experienced such a line of ideational and institutional reforms.⁶⁵³ Perhaps, the recent uprisings in the Middle East can be linked with people's call for an Islamic democracy. Taking into account this brief case study of Islamic civilisation, we can argue that one of the main channels of a rational dialogue of civilisations is new interpretations of their systems of rationale. From this perspective, opening the civilisational rationale systems to mutual criticism can be a mechanism of the reinterpretation of the rationale systems and new account of social ordering of peoples due to such a reinterpretation.

8.2.2 Western Civilisation: Liberal Wisdom and Liberal Democracy

Western civilisation also shows close links between rationality, human nature and social organisation. Whilst Western civilisation originates from Greek's rationalist philosophy and Roman civic organisation, its ideational fundament and social institutions, over past three centuries, have been shaped on the basis of a liberal wisdom, reflected in the liberal-democratic model of social organisation.

The Greek heritage of intellectual thought, in particular its commitment to rational dialogue and decision-making through dialogue, is viewed as the origin of Western civilisation.⁶⁵⁴ A rationalistic culture shaped during the 12th and 13th centuries in Europe,⁶⁵⁵ that paved the way for the later rationalisation of Western societies in the 17th and the 18th centuries. Wittrock argues that European paths to the formation of distinctly modern societies, in the last two centuries, are rooted in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. An important element was the so-called Papal Revolution, and its outcomes for the long-standing de facto separation of ecclesiastical and mundane power. According to Wittrock, in the same period, universities were formed as a self-governing corporation with at least partial autonomy.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵² See, Abdolkarim Soroush, *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, Essential writings of Abdolkarim Soroush*, (eds.) N. Sadri and A. Sadri, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2000).

⁶⁵³ On this see Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religions Thought in Islam*, (London, 1934); Muhammad Abduh, *Islam and Modernization in Egypt*, (London, 1933), and Martin Heper, Ause Ocii, and Heinz Karmer (eds.), *Turkey and the West*, (London, I.B.Taurus: 1993), pp.199-218.

⁶⁵⁴ A. C. Crombie, 'Designed in the Mind: Western Visions of Science, Nature, and Humankind,' in *History of Science*, 26, (1988), pp.1-12.

⁶⁵⁵ See M. D. Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*, selected, eds, and trans., by Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1968).

⁶⁵⁶ Wittrock, (2000), p.40.

Along with the same line of argument, Toby Huff points out that in the eleventh century Europe had a thousand-year-old religious tradition, but it had lost much of Rome's heritage, especially the Roman legal tradition, as well as the major portion of Greece's heritage. In his words, "it is not surprising, therefore, that when the European translators, such as Adelard of Bath (fi. 1116-42), Gerard of Cremona (ca. 1114-87), and Michael Scot (1217-35), among others, began to encounter the rich intellectual heritage of the Middle East (largely in Spain), they quickly became enthusiasts of and promoters of the wisdom of their Arab masters."⁶⁵⁷ The early modern Europe in the 12th and the 13th centuries employed Islamic and Chinese civilisations' achievements for developing new accounts of human rationality and human nature. As Huff reminds us, it was "a philosophical view of man as a rational being possessed of reason, who could arrive at ethical and moral truths *unaided by revelation* (emphasis added)."⁶⁵⁸ This refers to a key switch in the system of rationale of Western civilisation, from the wisdom of Christianity to the wisdom of independent reason.

As Wittrock argues, while early modern Europe paved the way for such new conceptions of rationality and human nature, an entirely new account of conscious human agency was shaped in the 17th and the 18th centuries. In Chapters 6 and 7, it was argued how the Western social philosophy was developed for a self-liberation from intellectual authority of the Catholic Church by introducing new accounts of rationality, human nature and social organisation, suggested by liberal thinkers like Hobbes, Locke and Hume, amongst others. It is true that the modern conceptions of human nature and the liberal-democratic form of social organisation were ultimately originated in Europe's early modern philosophical view of man as a rational being possessed of reason; however, actual formation of these epistemic and institutional developments occurred over the previous three centuries in Western civilisation.

During the intellectual reforms-- from its early modern Europe type to its post-Enlightenment form-- the meaning of the God-given agency of human reason was notably changed. It was an important change from the conception of human being as a rational agent who could use his reason to understand the message of the God towards

⁶⁵⁷ Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science*, (2003), p.97. Also see Chartes Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, (London: Athlone Press: 1976). For a similar contribution of Chinese civilisation to the development of Western civilisation see Joseph Needham, "The Conditions of Travel of Scientific Ideas and Techniques Between China and Europe," pp.240-243 in *Science and Civilisation in China*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1954).

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.109.

a new account of rationality as an independent source of ethical and moral truth. In this sense, the cultural logic of Western civilisation shifted from the centrality of the wisdom of Christian God to the centrality of an unaided human reason. This shift in the cultural constitution of Western civilisation occurred when a model of rational inquiry was established on which basis everything was examined for the purpose of finding the causes and giving the reason thereof.⁶⁵⁹

Scholars like Peter Abelard, amongst others, sought to explicate the separation between the autonomous forces of nature and those of the divine explanations whenever they could be worked out.⁶⁶⁰ William Conches argued that “it is not the task of the Bible to teach us the nature of things; this belongs to philosophy.”⁶⁶¹ But, these early modern waves did not stop here “they went on to examine and even criticise the Bible and to suggest that if a message of the Bible contradicts reason and the natural order, it should not be taken literally.”⁶⁶² Toby Huff connects this deep-seated epistemic shift in the conception of human conscious agency with an institutional revolution in early modern Europe. For him, at the center of this development, “one finds the legal and political principle of treating collective actors as a single entity--*a corporation*.”⁶⁶³ The legal principle of treating collective actors as a single entity brought in its train constitutional principles establishing such political ideas such as constitutional government. However, he acknowledges that medieval European constitutionalism was unable to deter rulers who trampled on the social and political rights of the citizenry. With the arrival of the modern nation-state, this problem became acute and led to various forms of political revolutions. Also, given the tripartite division of powers in modern constitutional state, the idea of rule of law found an institutional form in Western liberal democracies.⁶⁶⁴

As Wittrock reminds us, the deep-seated epistemic transformation, which occurred at the turn of the 18th and the 19th centuries⁶⁶⁵ leads to explore the conceptions of rationality and human nature in the modern phase of Western civilisation. Chapters 6

⁶⁵⁹ See Nelson, *On the Roads to Modernity*, (1981), pp.190 and 197, note 6.

⁶⁶⁰ On this see Tina Stiefel, 'Science, Reason, and Faith in the Twelfth Century: The Cosmologists' Attack on Tradition,' *Journal of European Studies*, (1976), 6, pp.1-16.

⁶⁶¹ See M. Finocchiaro, *The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), p.96.

⁶⁶² Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Sciences*, (2003), p.101.

⁶⁶³ Op.cit., p.116.

⁶⁶⁴ Huff, op. cit., p.145.

⁶⁶⁵ Wittrock, op. cit., (2000), p.41.

and 7 argued about Western modern rationality and its close relationship with a liberal wisdom-- what is called as the Lockean ideal types of human nature and social organisation. Here I briefly refer to those arguments to argue how the liberal wisdom constructs the system of rationale in Western civilisation. While the West replaced the centrality of the God's wisdom with an independent human reason, the modern expression of this conscious human agency is reflected in the liberal wisdom. Hence, if we identify this liberal wisdom with a kind of relativist epistemology, the centrality of God's wisdom has been suppressed with the centrality of liberal wisdom. This new account of rationality introduces human beings as utility-maximising agents who employ their faculty of reason to achieve their personally defined action-goals through rationalising their action-means to the subjective ends.

Over the past three centuries, Western civilisation became a liberal civilisation, as an intellectual and institutional liberation from an authority of the Catholic Church. As Manent argues, the key philosophical and political questions of Europe over the past three centuries are related to how peoples can build a new human association, free from the authority of the Catholic Church.⁶⁶⁶ This does not imply of course that contemporary Western societies are entirely non-religious societies, or religion does not play an important role in these societies.⁶⁶⁷ It implies that religious wisdom has lost its previous defining function in Western understandings of human reason and rationality, and in the Western readings of human nature and social organisation.

Chapters 6 and 7 argued in detail about the liberal conceptions of rationality, human nature and social organisation by referring to the ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Hayek and Rawls, as some important liberal thinkers. Liberal wisdom defends the co-existence of *rivals* under the rule of law instead of the Kantian logic of a rational dialogue and social cooperation among individuals as end in themselves. The centrality of liberal wisdom and its outcomes for liberal democratic model of social order does not imply a lack of alternative logics of human rationality in this civilisation. The West, as a whole, has always included alternative readings of rationality and social order beyond liberal wisdom and liberal democracies: for instance from social democracy to Communism.

⁶⁶⁶ Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, (1994), pp.3-9. Also see: Steven, *Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory* (1983).

⁶⁶⁷ See Anselm Davis, *American Theocracy*, (USA, Davis Writing: 2009)

The wisdom of liberalism leads us to recognise a set of shared ideas and values in the Western civilisation around the conception of liberal (wo)man and liberal-democratic social order. A liberal (wo)man uses her or his faculty of reason to find suitable means to satisfy her or his action-goals under the protection of the property right by the constitutional state. The liberal wisdom and liberal conception of human nature have been micro-foundations of social institutions of the liberal-democratic model of social order. In sum, Western civilization, as a highest cultural grouping of liberal-minded peoples has used liberal world-views and values to organise people in the context of liberal-democratic nation-states.

8.2.3 Chinese Civilisation: Chinese Wisdom and The Family Pattern of Social Order

The main sources of rationality and human nature's concept in Chinese civilisation, like Islamic and Western civilisations, are its philosophical viewpoints. In response to the question of what was the philosophical basis of Chinese civilisation, we can argue about Confucianism as one of the most important schools of thought, which plays a central function in the formation of ideational system of this civilisation. However, Taoism and Buddhism are also important for exploring the cultural logic of Chinese civilisation. This subsection focuses on Confucian social philosophy,⁶⁶⁸ with some very brief references to Taoism and Buddhism. As such, I shall address rationality and human nature concepts from the perspective of Confucianism and their outcomes for a family pattern of social ordering of peoples in Chinese civilisation. Along this line of argument, the relationship between the conception of rationality and models of human action and social order in the Chinese civilization will be explored.

Xiaoming Huang argues that conceptions of rationality and human nature in Chinese civilisation are included in Confucius moral approach to social order. In other words, as Hobbes suggested his accounts of rationality and human nature as the base of his analysis of his society's social order, Confucius accounts of human nature and rationality formed to address the social problem of Chinese society at his time. In Huang's words, "the problems that faced Confucius, and Hobbes and Machiavelli were essentially the same. In a social setting where the feudal system built on simple lord-vassal relationships collapsed and more sophisticated form of production,

⁶⁶⁸ Xiaoming Hunag, "What is Chinese about Chinese civilisations?" in *Civilisations and Globalisation*, (2002), p.226.

distribution and social organization emerged and where authority relations within the system became more complicated and ambiguous, individual compliance become the key to the effective exclusion of any meaningful social agenda which would require the cooperation of the population.”⁶⁶⁹ Like Hobbes, Confucius developed his approach to the conceptions of rationality and human nature in order to find a solution for the problem of social order.

I use the term the *wisdom of the past* for the Confucian system of rationale and the term the *family pattern of social order* as the corresponding logic for social ordering of people in Chinese civilisation. If we look at Chinese civilisation-- as an approach to the problem of social order-- we must sketch Chinese civilisation's rationale system in those conceptions of rationality and human nature that are defined in the context of an ideal-type (wo)man of Confucianism. Hence the cultural logic or social philosophy of Chinese civilisation is linked with Confucian accounts of the Chinese ideal (wo)man. Benjamin Schwartz argues that the Chinese cultural orientation should be sought in the history of ancient thought in China and its account of ideal (wo)man and ideal social order.⁶⁷⁰ From a Confucian view, it is only the human heart or mind which possesses the capacity to ‘*make itself sincere*’ and having made itself sincere to the extent this transcendent capacity realise the *tao* as the ideal-type social ordering of people.⁶⁷¹

For Confucius, human nature (*jen*) refers to a moral power that can make itself sincere, if it follows the proper code of social practice, delivered from the past to us in the terms of good customs and ceremonial action (*li*).⁶⁷² In other words, human nature is defined on the basis of its capacity to become one with *tao* (the way) as a given direction, identified by the wisdom of the past (*li*). The *tao* is a roadmap (the way) on the basis of which one finds his true direction toward a moral personal and social life. It allows us to see the Confucianism system of rationale that is the wisdom of the past (*li*).⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid., pp.229-230.

⁶⁷⁰ Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), p.10.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid., p .406. Also see: Shigeki Kaizuka, *Confucius*, (London, Allen and Unwin: 1956); Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2. (1968), p.8.

⁶⁷² Hsu Fu-Kuan, *A History of Theories of Human Nature in China* (Taichung, Yunghei University Press: 1963).

⁶⁷³ Arthur Waley, *The Way and the Power, The Tao Te Ching and its place in Chinese Thought*, (London: Unwin Paperbacks: 1977), p.30.

In the *Analects*, Confucius links his account of human rationality with his reading of human nature-- as the foundations of his approach to the moral order of society. The concept of *li* refers to what Confucius means by rationality or the wisdom of the past. This concept is linked with the Confucian reading of human agency (*jen*) and the Confucian ideal-type of a moral social order (*tao*). Without recognising the Confucian account of rationality and vision of human agency, his moral solution for overcoming social disorder cannot be understood.

While the pre-Confucian approach to *jen* is defined it as an inner moral power for linking the social order with the inner virtue of Kings, Confucius expands this concept to show that “the moral power is not the prerogative of those [kings] in authority--that commoners like himself may possess virtue.”⁶⁷⁴ Rationality is embodied in a body of objective prescription of moral behaviours that have been transmitted by a long sacred tradition, resulting from the wisdom of the past. In this line of thought, human nature (*jen*) is an inner intellectual capacity of the submission to such objective account of rationality.⁶⁷⁵ The term *li* literally means 'rite'; that is, the rules or customs. It refers to the rules of correct or rational behaviour in every social situation. Confucius views the main source of this rational behavior in the wisdom of the past-- accumulated as a set of objective body of moral standard of action. The *li* therefore can be compared with the Shariah law in Islamic thought. Human reason and rationality is viewed in a social context that was formed by wisdom of the past.

Schwartz argues for an important difference between Confucius and Socrates on the source and the method of identifying rational action and a moral society. Socrates introduces his method of exploring 'goodness' on the basis of a dialectical inquiry, going beyond all tradition and customs. Confucius introduces customs and tradition as the main source of rational action. Arthur Waley observes the Confucian approach in this way: “there has emerged within the history of the civilized world a universal and tested body of what might be called in Hegelian term an 'objective ethical order' embodied in the rites, practices and basis institutions of the *tao* of the three dynasties.”⁶⁷⁶ This Chinese account of rationality is the wisdom of the past. As Arthur Wright argues, when the wisdom of the past (*li*) was institutionalised in social order,

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., p.76.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid., p.77.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid., p.78.

peoples find their moral solution (*tao*) towards a good society.⁶⁷⁷ From a Confucian view, the word *tao* means “an all-encompassing state of affairs embracing the 'outer' sociopolitical order and 'inner' moral life of the individual.”⁶⁷⁸ In sum, the concept of *tao* refers to a unique way for all things, which links the inner life of individuals (human nature) with the proper code of social practice.⁶⁷⁹

However, as Joseph Needham points out, for Taoism, “the *Tao* or Way was not the right order of life within human society, but the way in which the universe worked; in other words, the Order of Nature.” It was necessary, “to imitate the *Tao*, which works unseen and does not dominate.”⁶⁸⁰ Needham writes: “Taoist patterns of thought and behavior included all kinds of rebellion against conventions, the withdrawal of the individual from society, the love and study of nature, the refusal to take office, and the living embodiment of the paradoxical non-possessiveness of the *Tao Te Ching*, production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination.”⁶⁸¹ Taoism was an anti-feudal philosophy and thus against the government. But Confucianism was used as a governmental ideology to preserve the Chinese authoritarian political and social system. One of important roles of Taoism in the historical formation of Chinese civilisation refers to its implementation in the work of secret societies, sects, and peasant movements that have been linked to revolutionary activity throughout Chinese history.⁶⁸²

Confucius argues that the family is the basic unit of a good society. The wisdom of the past is embodied in the family pattern of social life. Hence, the challenge of establishing a good society is reduced to the challenge of the creation of a ruling class who have cultivated their inner moral power in order to organise their society based on the proper code of social practice. As Huang argues, Confucius strategy for solving social problems in the Chinese society of his time was to take a moral approach to social ordering of peoples. It referred to a moral cultivation of individuals, in particular the ruling class by making them social agents for the creation of a good

⁶⁷⁷ Arthur F. Wright (ed.), *Confucianism and Chinese Civilisation* (California: Stanford University Press, 1964) pp.ix and x.

⁶⁷⁸ Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China*, (1985), p.67.

⁶⁷⁹ It should be noted here that this interpretation of ‘*tao*’ is a ‘Confucian’ account rather than a ‘Taoist’ interpretation of ‘*tao*’.

⁶⁸⁰ Needham, (1968), pp.36-37.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp.164.

⁶⁸² *Ibid.*, pp.193-65. See Wolfgang Frank, *A Century of Chinese Revolution*, (New York, Harper Torch Books: 1979).

society. A society follows the wisdom of the past by taking its paradigm as the family pattern of social organisation.⁶⁸³

Confucianism believes that the family pattern in the early Chou dynasty leads us to a well-tested model of human relationships based on inner virtue, love and authoritative cooperation. Wright points out "the basic social unit of the Confucian system was the well-ordered family. The family pattern was seen as a microcosm of the sociopolitical order; the wise father was a model for the wise ruler. Both the family and the state governed by the *li* as the norm of proper social behavior."⁶⁸⁴ In this way, rationality as the wisdom of the past was institutionalised in Chinese family pattern of social order. The family pattern is a well-ordered mode of social life in the past and should be applied on a societal scale. It leads us to recognise reasons why, "the father to be a living source of authority and power... Without the universal kingship through which virtuous kings may influence an entire society, the separate *li* cannot be ultimately realised. Thus, the *li* must in every way support the institutions of Kingship".⁶⁸⁵ This Confucian account of an ideal human society allows us to realise an authoritative nature of the Chinese civilisation's social order.

Chinese Taoism existed in a peculiar balance within the structures of consciousness of Chinese civilization, and it has integrated into Chinese life more deeply than its revolutionary character would imply.⁶⁸⁶ Concerning this fact, Joseph Levenson writes, "together Confucianism and Taoism made the whole [Chinese] man, one implying a testimonial to civilisation and the values and goals of social life released from society and social concerns".⁶⁸⁷ With the widespread introduction of Buddhism into China in the third century, despite its initial tension with Taoism, they became inextricably mixed within popular Chinese religion.⁶⁸⁸ Confucianism rose on the premise of solving the Chinese's social disorder. But the 'Confucianisation' of the uncultivated Chinese's citizens was not able to overcome such a disorder. Confucianism was adopted and transformed into a state ideology for the purpose of helping maintain the political and economic order.⁶⁸⁹ Inefficiencies of Confucianism

⁶⁸³ See Huang, op. cit, (2002), pp.226-234.

⁶⁸⁴ Wright, *Confucianism and Chinese Civilisation*, (1964), pp.ix and x.

⁶⁸⁵ Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China*, (1985), p.68.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.65.

⁶⁸⁷ Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*, (Berkeley, University of California Press: 1968), p.44.

⁶⁸⁸ See Arthur Wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1971).

⁶⁸⁹ Huang, (2002), pp.226-227.

led to the rise of a new social philosophy, shaped as the result of the prevalence of Mao's Communist Revolution in the mid-twentieth century. Modern China is no longer committed to Confucianism as it was before. It has learned to improve its account of rationality and its model of social ordering of peoples.⁶⁹⁰

8.3 Inter-Civilisational Dialogue and the Open Global Society Formation: Towards a Macrosociology of Dialogic Globalisation

In chapter 5, a critical rationalist model of social learning was proposed, which used an inter-subjective learning from mutual criticism as the mechanism of a conscious social transformation from a closed society into an open society. In this model, due to their access to critical rationality, individuals can enter into a social learning process that employs the method of learning from errors ($P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$) to shape a normative consensus regarding the moral foundation of social organisation—what was called the ethics of openness to criticism. In this section, I argue for an application of such a critical rationalist model of social learning on an inter-civilisational scale. In addition, I will argue for the transformative role of such a global social learning in the formation of an open global society. This global social learning as a rational dialogue amongst civilisations, targets the cultural logic of global social organisation. The key argument here is how a critical rationalist approach to dialogue amongst civilisations can transform the Lockean logic of economic competition into the Kantian logic of social cooperation on the basis of rational dialogue. This leads us to explore possibility of a profound institutional change on a global scale from liberal globalisation toward a dialogic globalisation via inviting civilisations to opening their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism.

From an epistemological perspective, the critical rationalist approach to dialogue of civilizations enables us explore reasons why a dialogue amongst competing rationale systems, as the cultural logic of civilisational formation, is possible and it can converge those systems of rationale toward a meta-civilisational standard of rationality. To these ends, the section starts with a brief review of the dynamic of the Axial Age civilisations to recall the key role of dialogue in the inter-civilisational intercourse. It then argues that the conflicting systems of rationale act as obstacles for a rational dialogue of civilisations. However, competing conceptions of rationality can be transformed into a higher meta-civilisational rationality, if they open the key

⁶⁹⁰ Op. cit., pp.230-234.

premises of their systems of rationality to mutual criticism. A macrosociology of dialogic globalisation uses Critical Rationalism to address the emergence of such a global conception of human rationality, as an inter-civilisational learning from mutual criticism. This section employs the notion of a *global critical rationality* to address the five layers of an ideal type global social learning for the formation of a multi-civilisational open global society.

8.3.1 Axial Age Civilisations and Inter-Civilisational World Order

Sociologists of civilisations, like Eisenstadt, Wittrock, Nelson and Nielsen, view the Axial Age's civilisations as an important turning point in the function of inter-civilisational dialogue in the formation of world order. I refer to this historical background because it leads us to see how competing systems of rationale are connected with the dialogue of civilisations as a mechanism of world order formation. Wittrock argues that the Axial Age shaped an initial stage of cultural crystallisation and macro-institutional change on a global scale.⁶⁹¹ He refers to Karl Jaspers' work entitled *The Origin and Goal of History* to address the emergence of Axial Age civilisations in the context of such cultural crystallization and macro-institutional change. For Jaspers, our understanding of history is related to the emergence and institutionalisation of some forms of critical reflexivity, which originate from the capacity of human beings to reflect upon and to give expression to an image of the world. Jaspers marked this capacity with the transition from *Mythos* to *Logos* as a breakthrough in critical reflexivity and the emergence of global history as a historical consciousness.⁶⁹² He termed the historical turning point in such a transition' as the Axial Age, covering the centuries around the middle of the first millennium BCE.⁶⁹³

Eisenstadt and other historians have expanded Jaspers' idea and have given it an empirical basis. Wittrock argues that with all its openness to criticism the idea of the Axial Age civilisations is to-date the most ambitious and encompassing one that outlines key features of a first global cultural crystallisation and its outcomes for the world order. In his words, “the concept of the Axial Age encompasses deep-seated intellectual and cosmological shifts that occurred in different forms ... across the

⁶⁹¹ See Wittrock, "Social Theory and Global History," (2001), p.33.

⁶⁹² See Karl Jaspers, *The Origin of and Goal of History*, (New Haven, Yale University Press: 1953). It is important to note is that this line of thought about world history is not altogether different from the one Hegel proposed on the philosophy of history.

⁶⁹³ Wittrock, (2001), pp.33-34.

Eurasian hemisphere. These shifts were manifested in such different forms as the thought of Confucius and Mencius in China, Buddha in India, the Hebrew prophetic movement and the classical age in Greek philosophy.⁶⁹⁴ The Axial Age's ontological and societal changes are analogous to the formation of the modern age in terms of such kinds of transformations in world vision and social order. A macrosociology of dialogic globalization, that aims to address interactions of the ideational force and macro-institutional transformation, needs to refer to Axial Age civilisations. My intention here is to show that competing systems of rationale-- originated in the first global cultural crystallisation-- have remained as the core ideational source of civilisational conflicts and dialogue since. However, despite Eisenstadt's argument, the transition of the Axial Age civilisations to the modern age has not been a transition to the formation of a global civilisation of modernity. World civilisations are still radically different building blocks of a multi-polar world order, due to their conflicting accounts of rationality, of human nature and social order.

For Eisenstadt, it was through the emergence of the Axial Age that civilisations formed as distinct entities and an explicit consciousness thereof developed.⁶⁹⁵ The central aspect of these revolutionary breakthroughs was the emergence and realisation of the basic ontological conceptions that a gulf exists between transcendental and mundane social orders. The institutionalisation of new ontological conceptions entailed that the mundane order is incomplete and in need of reconstruction. It was perhaps the first global attempt for reconstructing social order based on a conscious human agency that led to an increasing historical consciousness within and amongst the Axial Age civilisations.⁶⁹⁶ However, the most important transformation of this sort was the construction of culture or religious forms of ethical and political identities, which reflected in their civilisational shapes. These cultural identities provided epistemic dynamics of world order formation or what Nelson calls civilisations' systems of rationale.

All of these developments opened up the possibility for the *conscious ordering of society*, but they also exposed society to potential class and ideological conflicts. The

⁶⁹⁴ Op. cit., p.34. Also see: Barry Gills and Andre Frank, *The World System: Five Hundred Year or Five Thousand*, (London, Routledge: 1994).

⁶⁹⁵ Eisenstadt, "The Civilisational Dimension in Sociological Analysis," (2000), p .4. On this line of argument also see: Wolfgang Schluchter, *The Rise of Western Rationalization: Max Weber's Developmental History*, 2nd ed, (Berkeley, University of California Press: 1985).

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid., p.5.

distinctive vision in each Axial Age civilisation led to next phase of civilisational conflicts and dialogue.⁶⁹⁷ It supports the idea that later conflict and dialogue of civilisations originated in their competing systems of rationale and different patterns of social organisation, which were reflected in their competing ontological visions about human nature and social order. Sociology of Axial Age civilisations implies that with the process of institutionalising these civilizations, a new type of intercivilisational world history emerged. Eisenstadt claims that the expansion of Western modernity to most other parts of the world led to a global civilisation of modernity.⁶⁹⁸ However, it does not seem that non-western civilisations signal such an integration into a global civilization, although non-Western civilisations have been affected by a global condition that has been created by Western modernity.⁶⁹⁹ Perhaps a key reason is that they still follow their own systems of rationale rather than the Western liberal wisdom and liberal-democratic model of social organisation. The emerging liberal globality follows the logic of competition rather than rational dialogue and social cooperation.

8.3.2 A Critical Rationalist Model of Inter-Civilisational Dialogue

Competing rationale systems and models of social organisation are major sources of contemporary multi-civilisational global order. The emerging liberal global order recognises this competition, but it implies that radically different civilisations, due to their incommensurable rationale systems, cannot overcome their conflicts of opinion over the good (the ultimate goals of human action) through a rational dialogue. Hence, liberal globalisation is not concerned with the key issue of how emerging global order can be rationalised through a dialogue among civilisations. It is mainly focused on a global economic competition amongst radically different cultural standing points and political interests. In chapter 7, the unsocial sociability of emerging liberal globality was discussed. The liberal logic of social organisation does not enable us to overcome globalisation's unsocial sociability because it regards civilisations of peoples as incommensurable systems of rationale with incommensurable conceptions of human

⁶⁹⁷ On this see Shamul Eisenstadt, *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilisations* (Albany, Suny Press: 1986) and Eisenstadt, "The Axial Age: The Emergence of Transcendental Visions and Rise of Clerics," *European Journal of Sociology*, 23 (2) (1982), pp.294-314.

⁶⁹⁸ On this see Shemul Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus*, 129 (1) (2000), pp.1-29. Also see Eisenstadt, "The Civilisational Dimension of Sociological Analysis," (2000), pp.12-18.

⁶⁹⁹ On this see Huff, op. cit., *The Rise of Early Modern Science*, (2003), p.383 and Wittrock, "Modernity: One, None, or Many?" (2000), pp.56-59.

nature and incommensurable patterns of social organisation. However, if globalisation can be viewed as a global institutional mechanism for the creation of a global society of free and equal persons, a kind of convergence is required amongst these competing systems of rationale towards a meta-civilisational account of rationality, a meta-civilisational conception of human nature and a meta-civilisational model of social ordering of free and equal persons. As Nielsen rightly argues, controversies in the 20th century have had much the same fundamental quality as the controversies in the 12th and 13th centuries:

...comparative historical research [on sociology of civilisations] needs to focus on *actual variations* in the *operation of reason, rationale, rationalization*, etc. across civilisations. Indeed, despite Weber' early warnings on this matter, we still lack a full historical and sociological analysis of the ideas and institutions connected with the various *notions themselves* of reason, rational, rationalization, etc. ...Controversies in the 20th century have much the same 'fundamental' quality, so that shared rationales usually elude the opposed parties. Like the twelfth and the seventeenth centuries, this century is one of debate as the level of the highest civilisational [rationale] structures.⁷⁰⁰

As argued in chapter 5, from a Kantian perspective, the ideal-type of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations of peoples is achievable. The possibility of this rational dialogue leads us to explore the possibility of the emergence of a meta-civilisational system of rationality and value system with important consequences for the possibility of the formation of people-centric global institutions. This section argues that critical rationalism provides an epistemological logic to address the mechanism of such convergence of rationale and value systems and its outcomes for a global institutional change from exiting liberal globality to an open global order. From a critical rationalist perspective, all civilisational-based rationale systems are imperfect: hence epistemologically speaking they should open their fundamental premises to mutual criticism. As Bartley rightly argues, Critical Rationalism implies that all of our fundamental beliefs must be open to mutual criticism. An emergence of a meta-civilisational account of rationality refers to a process of opening world civilisations' fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism, an openness that leads to an inter-societal learning from such mutual criticism on a civilisational scale. If a rational dialogue of civilisations limits its own account of rationality to the system of rationale or fundamental beliefs of one civilisation, it is hard to realise how other civilisations' rationale systems can be converged with that particular rationality. On the contrary, if

⁷⁰⁰ Nielsen, (1987), pp.163 and 165.

we take a meta-civilisational account of rationality that demands openness of all of our fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism, the way will be paved for exploring the possibility of a higher level of global rationality that goes beyond one civilisation's fundamental beliefs and values.

By saying a critical rationalist approach to dialogue amongst civilisations, I mean that civilisations of peoples have ability to criticise their own historically constructed fundamental beliefs regarding human rationality, human nature and the patterns of social order through activating their access to critical reason. Recalling chapter 4, by critical reason, I referred to the three principles of Critical Rationalism: (a) peoples' ability to formulate a valid deductive argument; (b) peoples' ability to criticise the premise of such a valid deductive argument; and (c) peoples' ability to respect the regulative idea of the approximation to the truth. Given these main principles of critical rationality, if civilisations of peoples want to enter into a critical rationalist dialogue, they must respect such abilities for each other. Despite Habermas' theory of communication action, this thesis does not argue that since civilisations of peoples can enter into a *linguistic dialogue*, they can arrive at a meta-civilisational consensus over one set of global shared values. It argues that if world civilisations want to shape a set of globally shared values as the moral foundation of their global social order, they must accept a *common criterion of rationality* on which basis they can achieve an inter-subjective consensus over such shared values.

A critical rationalist ideal-type of an inter-civilisational dialogue implies that, due to peoples' access to critical reason, civilisations of peoples have the required epistemic capability of going beyond their own systems of rationale and criticise their fundamental beliefs concerning rationality, human nature, and the patterns of social organisation. In this way, Critical Rationalism provides us with a new epistemological theory of dialogue among civilisations based on the logic of openness of fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$).⁷⁰¹

As argued before, mutual understanding and exchange of views has already operated as the mechanism for inter-civilisational intercourse. In one sense, through such inter-civilisational dialogue some common standards of rationality already exist globally in such sciences as mathematics, physics, medicine, engineering, chemistry,

⁷⁰¹ On a critique of Habermas's theory of communicative rationality, as the base of a rational dialogue see: chapter 5.

biology and some aspects of international relations like diplomatic negotiation, and international law. However, our multi-civilisational world order suffers from the lack of a global standard of human rationality, a globally shared account of human nature and a globally validated pattern of social organisation. Linklater rightly questions "...how far progress towards solidarism is possible in a universal international society which lacks a common [global] culture..."⁷⁰² The main function of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations is the creation of such a global culture-- as a set of shared values about human nature and social organisation-- through an inter-civilisational dialogue. The *modern conception of rational dialogue of civilisations* must fundamentally go beyond that of the common scientific or diplomatic standards of rationality. It requires a global common culture as one set of globally shared values regarding human beings, their rights of self-determination and a people-centric model of global social order.

The main aim of this modern account of rational dialogue amongst civilisations can be creating a common understanding regarding how emerging world order should be reorganised in order to recognise all human beings as an end in themselves. It seems that contemporary world civilisations, due to their different accounts of human nature and social organisation, are not yet ready to give up their own readings of human nature and social order in favour of other civilisations. However, such a resistance does not imply an impossibility of a convergence of their points of view towards a meta-civilisational perspective. As Linklater argues, whilst some reject "the Kantian tradition with its progressivist faith in the human capacity to agree on universal norms which would secure a passage from a system of states dominated by power and force to a world community governed by dialogue and consent"⁷⁰³, the thesis argues that a rational dialogue among civilisations can lead peoples to such a global agreement on universal norms. The main function of these universal norms is shaping a set of global shared values as the moral foundation of global order.

Habermas argues, "the normative model for a community that exist without any possible exclusion is the universe of moral persons—Kant's 'kingdom of ends'. It is thus no coincidence that 'human rights,' i.e. legal norms with an exclusively moral content, make up the entire normative framework for a cosmopolitan community."⁷⁰⁴ However, he recognises that the *political culture* of emerging *world society* lacks the

⁷⁰² Linklater, *The English School of International Relations*, (2006), p.147.

⁷⁰³ Ibid., p.153.

⁷⁰⁴ Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, (2001), p.108.

common ethical-political dimension that would be necessary for a cosmopolitan society.⁷⁰⁵ How can a critical rationalist model of dialogue among civilisations lead us to explore the possibility of the formation of such a global common culture through the critical rationalist ideal-type global social learning? To address this question, the insights of the previous section regarding competing systems of rationale and social organisation amongst the three world civilisations of the Chinese, Islam and the West should be used. If a global culture is required for the formation of a global society of free and equal citizens, how could the cultural logics of civilisations be converged towards a global culture that rest upon a globally shared accounts of human nature and social organisation?

The Kantian moral conception of the person should not be taken as an already existing fact. On the contrary, such a moral conception must be created through an inter-civilisational dialogue and social learning. As the ideal type of open global society implies, equal access of peoples to *critical reason* can operate as an explanatory mechanism for addressing the emergence of a Kantian moral person among civilisations. While people have been influenced by their own civilisational-based understandings of rationality, their potential access to critical reason enables them to question and to revise their own socially constructed fundamental accounts of rationality and their value systems. If we do not recognise such a capacity, we assume that peoples would forever remain as the prisoners of their own socially constructed rationalities. These abilities of self-awareness and self-learning from criticism (i.e., $P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$) can lead peoples towards a meta-civilisational account of rationality; that is, a *global critical rationality* on which basis they must open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism. The idea of rationality, as openness to rational criticism on an inter-civilisational level, reflects what Karl Popper terms as *rational unity of humankind*. It also can lead us to a meta-civilisational account of human nature, as a critical rationalist decider, who can distinguish between the right and the wrong actions, beyond his or her civilisational defined account of rationality and a moral action. In other words, when we recognise peoples as rational agents who can use their critical reason to form valid deductive arguments and to criticise the premise of such arguments, we have assumed the existence of a meta-civilisational

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

capacity for peoples to rationally evaluate and criticise their own civilisational-based fundamental beliefs about human beings and social order.

8.3.3 Transformative Capacities of the Five Layers of Inter-Civilisational Dialogue

Against this background, the main role of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations is the creation of a global consensus upon such a moral person due to his or her access to critical rationality. Individuals are armed with the ability to engage in critical argument. They are not prisoners of their civilisations' accounts of human nature and social order. Hence, they can enter into a critical discussion on fundamental premises of their own civilisational beliefs and value system. Recalling the five layers of a critical rationalist model of social learning from chapter 5, the first layer refers to a philosophical learning process. The transformative role of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations in this layer can be seen in it enables peoples to liberate themselves from their limited civilisational accounts of human rationality and people's world-views. If they use their access to critical reasoning to question fundamental premises of their metaphysical views about human beings and whole world, they recognise the imperfection of their civilisational accounts of human rationality and human nature. In addition, they recognise they if they open their fundamental beliefs to criticism, they can learn from other civilizations' beliefs and values systems.

For instance, if a Muslim accepts that his or her system of rationale is imperfect due to the fact that it is his or her own reading of the wisdom of God, his or her mind would open to other civilisations' rationale systems. By the same reasoning, once a liberal (wo)man recognises that her or his account of rationality is an imperfect human-made account, she or he would readily to learn from non-Western systems of rationale. This process of inter-subjective learning from opening fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism addresses an inter-civilisational process of self-adjustment and convergence towards a meta-civilisational standard of rationality on which basis a metaphysic of openness to criticism can take shape. This philosophical layer of global social learning can lead to peoples of different civilisations towards a new metaphysical foundation according to which human beings because, despite their civilisational or national affiliations, they are recognised as equal moral beings due to their equal access to critical reasoning that make them the end in themselves.

From an epistemological perspective, this process of social learning from opening people's fundamental metaphysical beliefs to mutual criticism ($P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$) can lead them to a normative societal agreement. For instance, if a Western, a Chinese or an Islamic (wo) man recognise the imperfection of her or his own civilisational account of rationality and human nature, she or he has actually engaged in a global social learning that can lead her or him to a normative global conception of the person. This normative conception of person, in Kantian term, refers to the conception of the prospective global citizens as equal moral beings. The main identity of this global normative account of the person refers to his or her ability to use his or her critical reason to engage in a rational dialogue despite his or her civilisational or national affiliation. If we take seriously the possibility of this philosophical layer of a normative global social learning amongst civilisations, we might be persuaded that the emergence of new meta-civilisational conceptions of rationality and rational action through is a reasonable global project.

As argued in chapters 2 and 5, there are some epistemological necessities to enforce the potential participants in such a rational dialogue to accept the results of such a dialogue, if they do not want to contradict themselves. If those who belong to different civilisational zones respect the principles of critical rationality, they must accept logical outcomes of such critical discussion amongst themselves. The *logical* outcome would be a *critical rationalist conception of the person*, as defined in detail in chapter 4. Despite their civilisational accounts of human being, peoples can arrive at a global account of human nature. Kant's moral person is a universal person who potentially has access to critical reason that enables him or her to judge about the rightness or wrongness of his or her action. This epistemological-cum-normative learning process can create a globally shared moral conception of the person.

This moral person is a rational decision-maker who must be respected as an end *per se* due to his or her capacity to employ critical reason for taking a right moral decision, and for creating a moral social order. Once civilisations of peoples enter into a rational dialogue about the imperfection of fundamental premises of their systems of rationale, they have already started to build such a new conception of a moral person. In the Popperian-informed critical rationalist account of human nature, the main feature of the person is his or her ability to use critical reason for taking a right moral decision. This philosophical layer of the ideal type of global social learning paves the

way for a subsequent moral layer of social learning. Without an inter-civilisational metaphysical consensus on such a normative account of human nature, the Kantian concept of moral person will not actually emerge. In other sense, the Kantian moral person must be created through the philosophical layer of global social learning.

If world civilisations arrive at a common metaphysical account of human nature, they can establish a meta-civilisational moral vision of the person that goes beyond their civilisational-based moral accounts of the person. In this way, the philosophical layer of our ideal-type global social learning paves the way for an inter-civilisational moral learning. In the previous section, it was argued that the civilisations of the Chinese, the West and Islam have introduced their patterns of social organisations based upon their moral philosophies, which originate in their systems of rationale. Hence, conflicting moral philosophies have been one of the major sources of the clash of world civilisations. The Islamic civilisation defines its own moral philosophy based on the wisdom of God, implying that a moral person is a person whose actions are cognitively fueled by the God's commands. The Western civilisation defines its moral philosophy according to the liberal wisdom: a moral action is an action that originates in the person's self-reading of the proper code of practice in terms of how such an action satisfies his or her subjective utilities. The Chinese civilisation defines its moral philosophy based on the wisdom of past in which a moral action is an action that follows such a wisdom.

However, if civilisations of peoples arrive at an inter-subjective consensus over a new global conception of rationality (openness to criticism) and accordingly a new account of moral person, they must also modify their civilisational moral philosophies in favour of a *global moral philosophy* or what I called a *global ethics of openness to criticism*. In this way, they require to achieve an overlapping consensus regarding the ethics of openness to criticism, implying that their fundamental beliefs are open to mutual criticism and revision. Such a deep-seated moral transformation of the existing civilisational-based moral systems into the global ethics of openness to criticism can take shape through the moral layer of such a global learning. Through such a moral learning process radically different civilisational moral schemes can learn to subject their own attitudes of a moral person to the judgment of other moral philosophies and learn to respect each other's people as equal moral beings due to the need for such an inter-subjective criticism. The organising principle of this global ethics of openness to

criticism is that since individuals are equal possessors of critical rationality-- capable of taking a right moral decision-- they should be regarded as ends *per se* despite their affiliations to different civilisations, religions, races, and classes, and nationality. The global ethics of openness to criticism realises the Kantian universal moral person, which is rooted in Kant's critical philosophy.⁷⁰⁶ In this sense, the philosophical layer of the ideal type global social learning paves the way to understand the possibility of such a global moral learning.

In *Towards a Sociology of Global Morals*, Linklater argues that humans' access to communicative rationality "raised the possibility of a worldwide communication community in which all persons enjoined an equal right to advance claims about any decisions that may affect them. ...Collective learning process over many centuries have brought these possibilities to light. ...Collective learning process replaced mythical narratives with 'rationalized world views' which valued 'argumentative foundation' and which broke through morally parochial ways of life."⁷⁰⁷ Along the same line of reasoning, the emergence of global ethics of openness to criticism originates in an inter-civilisational moral learning through which world civilisations recognises each other's peoples as equal moral beings. In this way, the emergence of such a global conception of a moral person becomes the main product of such a global moral learning.

By employing the logic of social learning from errors, people can question their own civilisational accounts of a moral person. For instance, the Chinese peoples can use their critical reason to question the wisdom of the past as the basis of their moral action, Muslims can question their own religious account of a moral behaviour and the Western peoples can criticise their utilitarian account of a moral code of conduct. Such mutual criticisms, in this moral sense, can operate as the mechanism of global moral learning through subjecting moral beliefs to an inter-civilisational judgment.

The emergence of a global ethics of openness to criticism is closely dependent upon the realisation of a critical rationalist ideal type of dialogue among world civilisations.

⁷⁰⁶ On this see: Kant, *Political Writing*, (1970).

⁷⁰⁷ See Andrew Linklater, "Towards a sociology of global morals with an 'emancipatory intent'," in Linklater, *Critical Theory and World Politics*, (2007), pp.185-187. Also see: Linklater, "The Dialogic Ethics and the Transformation of Political Community", in Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, (1998), pp.77-108., and Linklater, "Globalisation and The Transformation of Political Community", in J. Baylies, S. Smith (eds.), *The Globalisation of World Politics*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2005), pp.709-752.

Without a deep-seated epistemological transition from existing civilisational systems of rationale to a global standard of human rationality, the global ethics of openness to criticism will not be actually realised. As noted before, in current debates regarding dialogue of civilisations, we can trace similar ideas of the need for a global discursive ethics in Habermas's and Gadamer's debates, followed by Linklater and others.⁷⁰⁸ They argue that the normative goal of a dialogue amongst civilisations is to achieve a global consensus about one set of universal norms. Inspired by Habermas, Linklater points out, "norms cannot be regarded as valid unless they have, could command, the consent of all those who stand to be affected by them."⁷⁰⁹ While the centrality of a dialogic normative order for remaking world order is recognised,⁷¹⁰ there are some differences among dialogic cosmopolitanism over its purpose.⁷¹¹ From a critical rationalist viewpoint, the moral goal of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations is to produce a global moral account of human beings due to their equal access to critical rationality.

This global moral philosophy goes beyond a civilisational moral philosophy since it invites all world civilisations to open the fundamental premises of their moral schemes to an inter-subjective criticism. Once the morality schemes become open to inter-subjective criticisms, this mutual openness ($P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$) operate as the mechanism of moral learning, leading to the global ethics of openness to criticism. In Talcott Parsons' terms, if each human society requires a normative consensus regarding the ultimate ends of its own citizens, the aforementioned moral learning can be viewed as a global mechanism for producing such a normative agreement for the formation of a global society of free and equal persons. This normative consensus can be shaped through constructing a global account of equal moral persons who are ends *per se* rather than means for others. Once civilisations of peoples recognise each other

⁷⁰⁸ On this see, Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, (2001); Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Oxford, Polity Press:1998), and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Gadamer Reader*, (ed.) R.E. Palmer, (Evanston IL, Northwestern University Press: 2007).

⁷⁰⁹ Linklater, (1998), p.96.

⁷¹⁰ See Eduard Jordaan, "Dialogic Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice," *International Studies Review*, 11 (2009), p.739.

⁷¹¹ For critics and supporters of the goal of dialogic cosmopolitanism see: Jordaan, (2009), pp.739-741. ; Thomas Dize and Jill Steans, "A useful dialogue? Habermas and International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, 31, (2005), pp.127-140.; Marc Lynch, 'The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Sphere,' (2000); Alexander Anievas, "Critical Dialogue: Habermasian Social Theory and International Relations," *Politics*, 25 (3), (2005), pp.135-143., and Richard Shapcott, *Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2001).

as ends in themselves, as opposed to means for others, the moral dimension of an emancipatory global social learning has been actualised. This moral layer of global social learning turns the *epistemic capacity* of global critical rationality into a *global moral capital* for the formation of an *open global society*.

Logically speaking, the global ethics of openness to criticism requires a new global legal system to turn such a *global moral capital* into a *global human right system*. Hence, the third layer of our ideal type rational dialogue amongst civilisations refers to a legal dialogue regarding how the existing nation state-centric international law can be dialogically transformed into an institution of global law-- what Richard Falk calls the law of humanity.⁷¹² From a critical rationalist view, the main aim of the global law of humanity should be the legalisation of the epistemic and moral equalities of human beings as the end in themselves in the context of a global constitutional right. Whilst the existing international law gives legal priority to nation states, the law of humanity prioritises individuals' rights over all other forms of legal rights. As Falk argues, the character of the law of humanity is not self-evident. It could be mean law that is enacted by and for the peoples of the world.⁷¹³

The key function of a legal dialogue amongst civilisations regarding the law of humanity is to justify the need for establishing such a global legal system. When civilisations of peoples arrive at a moral consensus on the global ethics of openness to criticism—in which all persons are respected as equal moral beings or ends in themselves—a global legal dialogue over the law of humanity finds a meaningful moral reasoning. If peoples are equal moral persons, due to their ability to use critical reason for taking a right moral decision, they must formally entitled for an equal legal right to realise such a moral autonomy. In other words, if they do not have such an equal legal right, they cannot employ their critical rationality in practice to appeal their moral equality and to establish a legitimate global order. This indicates a radical legal change from the inter-state law to the law of humanity. If we look at our three cases of the Chinese, Islamic and the Western civilisations, we can recognise that one of the major sources of existing inter-civilisational conflicts over the very conception of human rights originates in different civilisational-based legal systems. From an Islamic view, the Shariah Law identifies what are Islamic human rights, while from a

⁷¹² On this see: Falk, "The World Order Between Interstate Law and the Law of Humanity," (1995), pp .14-21.

⁷¹³ Falk, (1995), p.15.

Chinese view it may be the proper code of social practice that is originated in the Chinese wisdom. In the Western law, the equality before the law is defined on the basis of a liberal conception of human rights. An ideal type legal dialogue amongst world civilisations can lead them to a meta-civilisational account of the human right: *the law of humanity*. The global ethics of openness to criticism logically justifies the need for establishing the law of humanity.

If people have equal capacity to learn from criticism, they must actualise this moral capacity through having an equal right of legal criticism. The term legal criticism here refers to a right of making the society's legal system accountable to the interests and views of all persons as they express within an inter-subjective dialogue. The emergence of this global legal right—what can be termed as an *equal legal right of social criticism*— would be the outcome of the legal layer of dialogue amongst world civilisations. From a critical rationalist perspective, a new meta-civilisational account of human right refers to persons' equal right of social criticism that enables all of them to question the society's legal system and re-shape it via an inter-subjective consensus. In this sense, the fundamental premises of world civilisations' legal system must be opened to mutual criticism by the world population.

Whilst the aforementioned normative global learning processes are essential for the formation of an open global society of free and equal citizens, a dialogic globalisation also involves in global political and economic learning. Logically speaking, the global ethics of openness to criticism and the law of humanity must be enforced by some kind of global executive power. The emergence of these global executive power can be regarded as the outcome of an ideal type political layer of dialogue amongst civilisations. Political globalisation has to some extent transformed the nation-state system into a multi-centric global governance in which a global competition for economic interests is preferred to the struggle for political power. But, this emerging global governance is substantially unaccountable to the world's population. Jan Aart Scholte diagnoses this global unacceptability here: “governance of global space... lacks democratic legitimacy. Current arrangements...rest--at best--on very limited explicit consent from the affected populations.”⁷¹⁴ Jedeiah Purdy and Martin Shaw

⁷¹⁴ Jan Scholte, "Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance," *Global Governance*, (8) (2002) p.289.

view emerging global governance as a quasi-global liberal empire that is not accountable to peoples.⁷¹⁵

From a critical rationalist perspective, a rational dialogue of civilisations includes an ideal type global political learning that aims to turn peoples' legal right of criticism to an equal political right of self-determination that aims to make global governance an accountable global body politic to the interests of all persons. Logically speaking, when civilisations of peoples and their affiliated national societies are persuaded to recognise the moral and legal equality of their fellow-members, there is a strong political justification to make the existing liberal global governance accountable to the world population. This global normative political learning can produce the very conception of global democracy itself. Hence, global democracy cannot refer to the Western model of liberal-democracy. It covers other possible readings of an accountability of a political system to its fellow-citizens such as an Islamic or a Chinese democracy. The political aspect of a rational dialogue of civilisations refers to a global political discourse in which civilisations of peoples recognise each other, as equal holders of the political right of self-governance, since they have already recognised each other as equal moral beings due to their potentially equal access to critical rationality.

A critical rationalist ideal type of global democracy would emerge through a global political learning that turns the equal legal right of social criticism into an equal political power of self-governance. Hence, we can avoid those criticisms of David Held's model of global democracy-- such as Heikki Patomaki-- that views it as a Eurocentric model of global democracy.⁷¹⁶ However, for the critical rationalist model of global democracy, a democratic global governance only can be created through a rational dialogue among world civilisations. As Barry Gills rightly argues, the very conception of global democracy must emerge as a global product of a dialogue amongst civilisations.⁷¹⁷

⁷¹⁵ On this see: Jedediah Purdy, "Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments," *Ethics & International Affairs*, 17 (2) (2003), pp.35-47., and Martin Shaw, "Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (31) (2002), pp.327-336.

⁷¹⁶ See Heikki Patomaki, "Problem of Democratizing Global Governance: Time, Space and the Emancipatory Process," *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (3), (2003), pp.347-376.

⁷¹⁷ See Barry K. Gills, "Democratizing Globalisation and Globalizing Democracy," *The Annals*, 581 (1) (2002), pp.158-171.

Keeping in mind these four layers of global social learning, the formation of an open global society also requires the formation of an open global economy that can be created through a global economic learning. By this economic learning, I mean the creation of a global economic sphere in which potential economic actors can learn to turn their own moral, legal, and political right of criticisms into an equal economic right for using global economic opportunities to realise a decent life. The emergence of a global competitive and fair global market would be natural outcome of such free and equal entrance of potential economic actors to a global economic competition. In the context of this fifth layer of global social learning, the existing unequal post-national world economy can be transformed into a competitive and fair global economy within which economic opportunities and resources are distributed to activate potential economic agents for a free entrance into global markets.

From a critical rationalist viewpoint, the economic layer of global social learning refers to the creation of a global competitive economy in which people can use their rights of self-governance to create certain global economic institutions that protect their free entrance to global competition. If people's equal legal and political right of self-determination were globally recognised, the ground is logically paved for making the emerging post-national economy accountable to peoples' decent life. A *global welfare state* can play a key role in providing those *global public goods* that are essential for the realisation of a world-wide decent life. In addition, it can take some distributional policies to face global problems such as world poverty and global income inequality.

8.4 The Core Values and Social Institutions of an Open Global Society

I argued about five layers of an ideal type rational dialogue amongst civilisations, in terms of an emancipatory global social learning. This section addresses the key institutional features of an open global society that can be emerged through such a social learning-cum-global institutional change. The five layers of social learning find their own corresponding institutional expressions in the processes of an open global society formation.

The ideal type of open global society implies that a global society of free and equal citizens cannot be emerged without a rational dialogue amongst civilisations and their consensus over one set of *global core values*. It implies that peoples' access to critical

rationality via such a social learning can produce the global core values as normative foundation of an open global society, as the *global ethics of openness to criticism*. Now, we require to argue how this *global core value* provides moral justification for *social institutions* of the open global society. The idea of open global society leads us to see the links amongst three major institutional aspects of a global society of free and equal persons: a '*global dialogue*', a '*global democracy*' and a '*global justice*'.

An open society is a *dialogic society* because it respects public use of reason as the main social organising principal of a rational society. An open society is a *democratic society* because it sets free critical power of human reason in order to shape a legitimate social governance. As Scholte notes, “a common thread runs through all conceptions of democracy: it is a condition where a community of people exercises collective self-determination.”⁷¹⁸ The idea of an open society links this political self-determination to the dialogic nature of an open society. The open society is a *just society* because it views all members of the society as equal sources of criticism in the course of shaping such a self-determined social order. In other words, all persons have equal opportunities for self-determination because they are equal possessors of critical rationality. In short, the open society is a *dialogic, free and just* society of open-minded persons, who hold all of their fundamental beliefs open to criticism. Hence, critical rationalism provides a new epistemic logic for justifying the consistency of *cultural dialogue, political democracy* and *social justice* as three main institutional features of the open society.

8.4.1 An Institutional Moral Reasoning for Open Global Society

If I am correct in arguing that a rational dialogue amongst civilisations of peoples can lead them to *core values of 'human equality' and 'human freedom' due to their access to critical rationality*, what the outcomes would be for *social institutions* of an open global society? The global core values in the first place reflect their implications for global social institutions through their legal outcomes: *a legal equality of all persons before the law of humanity due to an equal access to critical rationality*. This legal outcome of the core values leads us to explore social institutions of global democracy and justice. Allen Buchanan puts forward a forceful argument about the

⁷¹⁸ Scholte, (2002), p.285.

moral foundations of international law.⁷¹⁹ He argues why our justice-based moral conception of human equality must be integrated into institutions of the international legal system:

A moral theory of international law must build upon or at least be consistent with the best available positive theories of international institutions, but must go beyond them, providing a coherent, defensible, organized set of prescriptive principles that apply not just to the conduct of individuals who occupy positions of authority in institutions, but also to the institutions themselves. Thus the *moral philosophy of international law* must include *institutional moral reasoning*: some of its most important principles must be formulated and justified in light of the assumption that they will be embodied in institutions [emphasis added].⁷²⁰

Buchanan employs this *institutional moral reasoning* to explore legal problems in existing international law and to address how it should be reformed towards a justice-based morality as the foundation of a fair international law. He links his accounts of international democracy and social justice to his moral reasoning of international legal institutions. Buchanan focuses on moral reasoning of the institutions of international law, however I utilise his insightful arguments for linking such an institutional moral reasoning with the global law of humanity that can be justified based on the global ethics of openness to criticism. I will then argue regarding the implications for the legal foundations of social institutions of an open global society.

Buchanan's moral reasoning of the legal system implies that the legitimacy of international institutions rest on the moral equality of human beings. In other words, international law is a just law if its main goal would be realising the moral equality of individuals. I apply this moral institutional reasoning to argue for a critical rationalist reading of global social democracy that rests upon the person's equal legal right of criticism, originating in his access to critical rationality. I aim to show that there are systematic links between the global ethics of openness to criticism on the one hand, and the legal foundations of global democracy and global justice on the other hand. This leads us to new institutional conceptions of global democracy and global justice that can be only understood in the context of epistemological theory of Critical Rationalism.

As Richard Falk points out, “interstate law presupposed the autonomy of the territorial state, although such a presupposing was always a legal fiction given the

⁷¹⁹ See Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Moral Foundation for International Law*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2004).

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.18.

hierarchical reality of geopolitics. ...it is only in recent decades, with the collapse of colonialism, that interstate law was an encompassing global reality.”⁷²¹ Buchanan argues whilst the main moral reasoning for international law has been the prevention of war amongst states, we need to set new moral goal for such an institutional moral reasoning i.e., *the justice*. For him, the main moral goal of an international law is realising people's *equal access to the international institutions* that protect their equal right.⁷²² While Buchanan does not focus on the need for the law of humanity in the post-national world order, Falk argues about it:

...the erosion of territoriality has undermined the major premise of inter-state law and its derivative claim to operate as the guardian of human well-being. This erosion can be understood from different angles: matters of vulnerability--the state has lost the capacity to uphold security in light of nuclear weaponry and long-range delivery systems; matters of environmental protection--the state cannot safeguard its territory from the adverse effects of extra-territorial behavior...; matters of economic viability--the state, even those that are well-endowed and large, can no longer provide an adequate framework for economic activity. ...In these three types of erosion, the well-being of humanity requires law to be operative on a regional, or global, scale that corresponds to the scope of operations.⁷²³

Falk concludes that in the emerging post-national world order, while the capacities of inter-state law erode, the failure of a more responsive law of humanity has created a normative vacuum in a legal sense.⁷²⁴ However, the law of humanity can be defined through a new moral institutional reasoning based on the global ethics of openness to criticism. The law of humanity goes fundamentally beyond the interstate law, because its central goal is no longer the preventing war amongst the nation states. In contrast, the moral objective of the law of humanity is realising moral equality of persons that is reflected in their equal legal right of criticism.

The existing international legal system recognises the equality of human rights in terms of their equal right to have an adequate standard of living and freedom. However, the international law's central moral reasoning is to prevent an international war. If national societies, in the context of their inter-civilisational dialogue, agree on a new moral institutional reasoning that recognises the equal legal right of criticism, they have also agreed upon an entirely new moral reasoning for the legal structure of the emerging global order.

⁷²¹ Falk, "The World Order Between Interstate Law and the Law of Humanity," (1995), pp.15-16.

⁷²² Buchanan, (2004), pp.76-82., Also see, John Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, (8 vols.), (Washington, Government Printing Office: 1906), pp. viii-11.

⁷²³ Falk, op. cit., p.16.

⁷²⁴ Op. cit.

In *Law, Justice and the Idea of a World Society*, David Armstrong argues that, “a sovereign state cannot formally be subject to any external jurisdiction except by its own consent. ...profound the changes in international relations in the past 50 years have been, [but] they have not altered this central fact. ...International law, therefore, remains the law of states associated in a society of states, not of people who are members of some larger community. As such it inevitably reflects the interests of the more powerful members of international society...”⁷²⁵ Validating Armstrong's argument, the legal task of a rational dialogue among civilisations refers to producing a justification for a post-national (global) legal system in which sovereign states *can formally* be subject to a global law of humanity. This global right recognises the primacy of individuals' right of social criticism in order to make global governance accountable to their views and needs.

8.4.2 A Critical Rationalist Approach to Global Democracy

Perhaps one of the most advanced institutional models of global democracy is provided by David Held.⁷²⁶ He applies his concept of democracy, as a collective self-determination by equal and free citizens, to a global scale. Like Falk, Held argues that, due to the erosion of nation-state capacities, people's self-determination cannot be realised without global democracy. Held argues that global governance can be democratised through making the different sites of global power accountable to peoples. Held's model of global democracy implies that if political power should be accountable to peoples wherever is located and however far removed its sources are from those whole it significantly affects, democratising global governance requires a radical global political reform.

Inspired by Kant, Held argues that such reform should be based on a cosmopolitan democratic law. In his words: “a democratic public law –establishing the accountability of power system—entrenched within and across borders. ...For Kant, the foremost interpreter of the idea of a cosmopolitan law, [it] is a 'necessary complement' to the unwritten code of existing national and international law, and a

⁷²⁵ David Armstrong, "Law, Justice and the Idea of a World Society," in *International Affairs*, (1944), 75 (3), pp.547-561.

⁷²⁶ On this see: David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, (Oxford, Polity Press: 1995); Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.) *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order*, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1995), and Anthony McGrew (ed.) (1997) *The Transformation of Democracy*, (ed.), (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1997).

means to transform the latter into a public law of humanity.”⁷²⁷ However, Held does not argue how this public law of humanity can be emerged itself. The key issue of the mechanism of the emergence of the law of humanity remains unclear in Held's global democracy model.

For a critical rationalist, the mechanism of the formation of the law of humanity is a rational dialogue amongst world civilisations through which the equal right of criticism would be recognised. This moral reasoning rests upon the ethics of openness to criticism. This mechanism justifies the legitimacy of the law of humanity because it emerges through an inter-civilisational consensus. Held's model of global democracy does not lead us to explore the origin and the mechanism of the emergence of global public law,⁷²⁸ as Patomaki argues. On the content of the law of humanity, Held's model emphasises the role of cosmopolitan public law in making the sites of power accountable to peoples. A critical rationalist approach argues that the global sites of power will become accountable to peoples, if peoples' legal rights of questioning those sites of power are formally recognised in the context of a global constitution. It thus calls for a radical institutional reform in the existing inter-state law towards the global law of humanity.

The main institutional reform problem with Held's model of global democracy is that it does not address the question of how a global consensus can be created on such institutional reforms, required for building global democracy, in particular where Held defines global democracy based on Western ideal-type of democracy. But in order to avoid a Eurocentric reform, world civilisations must be involved in a rational dialogue on the very conceptions of the law of humanity, of global democracy and global justice. Heikki Patomaki describes one important aspects of the Eurocentric nature of Held's global democracy in this way: “as a special instance of this Eurocentrism, cosmopolitan democracy comes to be modeled on--and is also idealized and abstracted from—the process of European integration. Indeed, Held's model has been explicitly inspired by the European integration process...”⁷²⁹ A critical rationalist model of global democracy rests on the person's equal legal right of criticism. If civilisations of peoples recognise such an equal legal right, they lead to a multi-

⁷²⁷ David Held, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200th Anniversary of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace'", *Alternatives*, 20 (1995), p.422. Also see: Immanuel Kant, in H. Reiss, (ed.), *Kant's Political Writing* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1970), pp.107-108.

⁷²⁸ On this Patomaki, (2003), pp.352-388.

⁷²⁹ Patomaki,(2003), p.355.

civilisational account of global democracy in which the main criterion of global democracy is its accountability to all prospective global citizens and this requirement will be met, if all of them have an equal legal power to question the performance of the existing global governance.

8.4.3 A Critical Rationalist Account of Global Justice

According to the ideal type of open global society, global justice co-exists with global democracy. A global society is a just society, if its fellow citizens have 'equal' right of a collective self-determination. A global society is a free society, if its fellow citizens voluntarily select their social governance. If our conscious human agency makes this equal and free self-determination possible, political democracy and social justice are closely dependent on the freedom of thought or a culture of the openness to criticism. The culture of the freedom of thought provides the moral foundation of social justice as it provides normative base of political democracy. On a global domain, the global ethics of openness to criticism can play such a role through justifying the equal legal right of criticism. A global society is a just society, if its fellow citizens have 'equal' legal right of self-determination. As such, democratic global governance is itself the main agent of global justice. This procedural conception of global justice can be completed with a distributional account of global justice.

As Chandran Kukathas points out: "Just institutions would ensure not only that the distribution of benefits and burdens was morally justifiable but also that people were secure against the predations of despots and warlords. The security of people's individual liberties and political rights is also a matter of justice. To establish global justice requires institutions that secure human rights broadly understood."⁷³⁰ In this sense, without the formation of global democratic governance, global justice in its procedural sense will not be realised. As it was argued, if peoples do not have 'equal' right of self-determination-- particularly through their equal voice in the formation of their their society's legal order-- how can they be convinced that the distribution of benefices and burdens across the society is just? While many theories of global justice are focused on the distributive justice, we can trace the procedural conception of justice in their institutional analyses against or for the possibility of a global justice. A

⁷³⁰ Chandran Kukathas, "The Mirage of Global Justice," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 23 (2006), p.1.

critical rationalist account of global justice supports the need for both procedural and distributional global justice.

I propose a critical rationalist account of global justice through making clear its defining feature, in comparison with some of the major institutional approaches to global justice. We can distinguish two major accounts of global justice due to two positions about a possibility or an impossibility of social justice on a global scale. The first approach implies that justice, in particular social justice, is something that cannot be attained globally but can be pursued nationally. The most influential expression of this approach is offered by John Rawls in *The Law of Peoples*. Another notable defense of this approach is suggested by David Miller who argues regarding a case for limiting the scope of distributive justice and Michael Walzer that claims justice cannot be a global ideal but only a local one.⁷³¹ The second approach argues that there are standards of justice that should be regarded as globally valid and significant. For the second approach, “individuals have basic rights in virtue of their humanity, then these are rights they hold as against the whole world; and responsibility for upholding them falls upon the world as a whole rather than upon the nations in which they happen to reside.”⁷³² Allen Buchanan, Darrel Moellendorf, Thomas Pogge and Simon Caney, among others, have argued for the second approach to global justice.⁷³³ A critical rationalist model of global justice defends the second approach to global justice, but it provides a new moral institutional reasoning for global justice in its procedural and distributional senses.

A third approach to global justice is also recognisable that is taken by Kukathas, implying that if according to the first approach distributional justice should not be followed on a global scale, there is no reason to follow it at the national level as well. In Kukathas' words, “advocates of global or cosmopolitan justice have a point in demanding consistency from those who argue for justice at home but are prepared to

⁷³¹ See John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); David Miller, "Justice and Global Inequality," in A. Hurrell and N. Woods, (eds.), *Inequality, Globalisation, and World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.187-210. ; David Miller, "National Self-Determination and Global Justice," in Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000), Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, (Oxford, Blackwell: 1983), and Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders, A Global Political Theory*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2006).

⁷³² Kukathas,(2006), p.2.

⁷³³ See Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination*, (2004); Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Malden, MA, Polity Press: 2002), Darrel Moellendorf, *Cosmopolitan Justice* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press: 2002), and Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders* (2006).

tolerate injustice abroad.”⁷³⁴ Like Kukathas, a critical rationalist account of global justice argues that if there are good reasons to pursue justice within the nation-state, those reasons also support to pursue justice across the globe. But, unlike Kakathas, it argues that justice is *possible* at both national and global levels.

If justice is not only a matter of equal application of the law, but also a matter of the fairness of the law itself, we need a moral theory of global justice on which basis the fairness of global law-making is integrated with the equality of the people before the fair global law. As Linklater points out, "it is the consent of all who stand to be affected by these [global] arrangements, irrespective of their citizenship or residence, which is the preferred ethical objective."⁷³⁵ Such reasoning calls for an institutional conception of global justice that integrates the moral equality of peoples with the very definition of justice itself. The global ethics of openness to criticism implies that all peoples have equal right to determine what a fair global law is and how such a fair global law can be equally applied to all persons.

If there is an obstacle for realising such legal equality, a global welfare state should take one set of global measures to redistribute global resources for realising such rights. Hence, a critical rationalist model of global justice integrates the procedural and the distributional accounts of global justice in order to secure the core conceptions of social justice; that is, the equal access of peoples to global institutions, which protect their fundamental rights. If all persons are equally entitled to the rights of self-determination of a fair global law, they must also have equal power to monitor an equal application of such a fair global law. Hence, they can also agree on a redistribution of global resources and opportunities to improve global society's well-being as a whole.

The literature advancing the case for global justice is substantial. Rather than to address it as whole, I will focus on arguments developed by Rawls against applying national conception of justice at a global level, and the arguments of Buchanan, Pogge and Caney to defend global justice. Rawls's approach to global justice entail that we cannot apply national content of justice in liberal societies at an international scale: Because while the members of liberal societies *do not* share substantive ends, they *do*

⁷³⁴ Kukathas(2006), p.3.

⁷³⁵ Linklater, "The Evolving Spheres of International Justice," (1999), p.477.

share what might be called a core conception of social justice, the idea of a society as a cooperative venture among free and equal persons.

The existing international order contains societies that do not share this liberal conception of social justice. Rawls argues the core conception of justice supplies a foundation for a morally robust system of law in a liberal domestic society; its absence implies the moral content of international law must be minimal when compared with former. Hence, Rawls' argument implies that cultural shared values on the core conception of justice provide moral foundation for legal fairness of social order. But Rawls takes the lack of such normative consensus among national societies as a given fact. Hence, he claims that national content of social justice cannot be applied at an international level.⁷³⁶ If Rawls's premise regarding the impossibility of achieving a rational consensus upon the core conception of justice is correct, his conclusion of the impossibility of global justice would be also correct. But a rational dialogue among civilisations of peoples is possible. If the result of such inter-civilisational dialogue can be a global ethics of openness to criticism, it provides the emerging world society a global consensus about two major components of global justice. First, all of persons have equal right to determine what a just global law is, and second all of them have equal right of monitor an equal application of the just law itself. If achieving a global (inter-societal) consensus on the moral foundation of an open global society is possible, global justice is not an unachievable end because a rational dialogue of civilisations can provide such a globally shared account of justice.

Since Rawls rules out the possibility of a rational consensus among societies over the core conception of justice, he concludes that at the international level we should tolerate injustice. Hence, he follows a moral minimalism on this level because of the fact that peoples in non-liberal societies do not share with those in liberal societies in very conception of a just society, as a cooperative venture amongst free and equal persons. In one sense, Rawls accepts a relativist morality according to which non-liberal and liberal societies cannot agree upon the core conception of a just society. He claims that their different accounts of justice as reasonable for themselves. If an authoritarian society denies the equality of peoples, it is reasonable account of justice because the cultural model of the society justifies such an inequality. However, if in a

⁷³⁶ See: John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, (1999), Sections 15-16.

democratic society people respect such an equality, it is also reasonable because the cultural model of such a democratic society recognises the equality.

In other words, there is not a meta-civilisational conception of social justice or human equality on which basis we can argue that peoples should be treated equally in all societies either liberal or non-liberal one. In short, the lack of a globally existing shared conception of social justice leads Rawls to an impossibility of global justice and the need for tolerating a massive global injustice. David Miller follows the same line of reasoning by arguing that the conceptions of social justice are non-comparative or incommensurable conception on a global level.⁷³⁷

Liberal and non-liberal societies have different understandings of justice, but they can agree on a common definition of justice, if they open the fundamental promises of their different accounts of justice to mutual criticism. For a critical rationalist, a globally shared concept of social justice can be emerged through a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. If we take an epistemological relativist position, we would lead to a moral relativism position on a global level and subsequently an impossibility of a globally shared account of global justice. However, global justice is possible because the emergence of a globally-shared account of justice is possible.

Contrary to Rawls, Buchanan, Pogge and Caney argue that a globally shared account of justice is possible and even it has been to some extent realised. A critical rationalist model of global justice may advance their approaches to global justice by arguing that such a globally shared conception of social justice can be built through a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. In addition, the global ethics of openness to criticism can shape the core content of this concept-model of global justice. Like Rawls, Buchanan takes a procedural approach to social justice. However, he argues that a globally shared account of justice is possible. If justice, as Rawls asserts, is the first virtue of social institutions then “justice is a morally imperative institutional goal,” in the global and in the domestic sphere.⁷³⁸ Buchanan here endorses Pogge's contention that the global basic structure is a *human creation*, and that to accept it *uncritically* would be to support massive injustices.⁷³⁹ However, Rawls regards

⁷³⁷ See David Miller, "Justice and Global Inequality," (1999), and David Miller, "National Self-Determination and Global Justice," (2000).

⁷³⁸ Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination*, (2004), pp.84-85.

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.85. Also see: Thomas Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) and Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Malden, MA, Polity Pres:2002).

various accounts of a just society as a *given fact* that leads him to an impossibility of a global account of a just society. Buchanan and Pogge base their views of global justice on a *moral equality principle*. They argue how global institutions of justice should be defined as to ensure us that all peoples *have access to those institutions* that can protect their basic rights.⁷⁴⁰

According to Buchanan, there is “an expanding global culture of human rights that exhibits a broad consensus on the idea that justice requires respect for the inherent dignity of all persons.”⁷⁴¹ He rejects the controversy that there is widespread moral disagreement on social justice, and the idea that no global moral consensus can emerge.⁷⁴² Buchanan’s concern is to present a case for the creation of reform of basic international institutions in order to bring about a more just world. Kukathas points out that “despite some significant philosophical difference between their approaches, Buchanan's concerns are shared by Thomas Pogge, who also calls for reform of the basic structure of international society, but whose writing on global justice have focused on the problem of world poverty and human rights rather than on international law.”⁷⁴³ Despite Buchanan, Pogge takes globalisation as a serious matter in which to argue for global justice.

Pogge argues that social justice cannot be realised in the local level. Institutional interconnections across the planet, he argues, “render obsolete the idea that countries can peacefully agree or disagree about justice, each committing itself to a conception of justice appropriate to its history, culture, population size and density, natural environment, geopolitical context, and stage of development.”⁷⁴⁴ On the contrary, in a globalising world order, peoples' lives are profoundly affected by global rules of governance, trade, and diplomacy; and about such institutions, we cannot agree or disagree, since they can only be structured one way—not differently in each country. If they are to be justified to all persons in all parts of the world, “then we must aspire to a single, universal criterion of moral judgment which all persons and peoples can accept, as the basis for moral judgments about global order.”⁷⁴⁵ Pogge argues that this moral acceptance is vitally important, for it matters that a society's international order

⁷⁴⁰ Buchanan, (2004), p.88.

⁷⁴¹ Op. cit., p .42.

⁷⁴² See Kukathas, (2006), p.16.

⁷⁴³ Op. cit., p.17.

⁷⁴⁴ Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, (2002), p.33.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid.

be endorsed by those to whom the order applies. For him, “we should try to formulate the universal criterion of justice so that it can gain universal acceptance.”⁷⁴⁶ If we define global justice as the equal legal right of peoples to determine what a *global just law* is and how can it be equally applied, we can find a universal criterion of a moral conception of global justice. The global ethics of openness to criticism provides us with such a moral institutional reasoning for global justice.

Simon Caney defends a global principle of the equality of opportunity, implying that it is unfair if someone has worse opportunities because of their national or civic identity. Caney disagrees with those objections of global equality of opportunities because of the existence of great cultural diversity on a global scale, and the need for close interconnection amongst those who must be entitled as equal opportunities possessors, and finally the impossibility of thrust liberal ideals like global equal opportunities on non-liberal peoples. Caney rejects that cultural relativism prevents the impossibility of the formation of global justice or a justice beyond borders.⁷⁴⁷

Like global democracy, global justice should not be imposed by one civilisation on others. It must be shaped through an inter-civilisational dialogue about the very meaning of social justice. We can add a global distributional justice to our procedural concept-model of global justice. If the majority of the world population finds the existing massive global injustices unacceptable, they can agree about some global redistributional measure for rescuing about half of the world population, suffering from poverty. In this sense, Rawls' national scale distributive justice should be applied to a global scale. As Rawls' Difference Principle requires, the basic structure of society should be arranged so that inequalities in prospects of obtaining the primary goods of wealth, income, power, and authority must work to the greatest benefits of those persons who are the least advantaged with respect to these primary goods.⁷⁴⁸

To the extent that Rawls argues that his theory of justice and the difference principle in particular, can only apply to a closed society or a self-contained system, Pogge rightly argues that it is hard to see why it should not apply to the world if it can apply to the United States, which is neither closed nor self-contained. If Rawls would

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid., pp.102-104.

⁷⁴⁷ See Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Border*, (2007), and Simon Caney, "Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities," *Metaphilosophy*, 32 (1-2), (2001), pp.11-134.

⁷⁴⁸ See John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 2001).

argue that his theory of justice should be applied merely to a liberal society because of the lack of a globally shared conception of justice, a critical rationalist's response is that a rational dialogue amongst civilisations leads us to such a global conception of social justice. As Kukathas concludes, “the development of [a just and democratic] cosmopolitanism should not be the product of a [global] political reform. It may well be that there will be a convergence across the globe on common moral standards in the years to come. Unless that happens, however, we cannot even begin to think in terms of global justice.”⁷⁴⁹ The critical rationalist account of global justice and global democracy lead us to realise that a *rational dialogue amongst civilisations* is the main mechanism of the emergence of such a *global moral convergence* as the normative foundation of a global society of free and equal citizens.

⁷⁴⁹ Kukathas,(2006), p.28.

Part IV

A Global Agent of Dialogic Globalisation

Chapter 9

Global Civil Society and Dialogic Globalisation

The ideal type of dialogic global social learning, introduced in chapter 8 provided an analytical framework regarding the epistemological possibility of an institutional transformation from a liberal form of globality into an open global society of free and equal persons. However, the question of who are global agents of such a dialogic form of global social change has not yet been addressed. This chapter attempts to address the question of how emerging global civil society can operate as global agent of such an ideal type global learning and social change. It argues that the ideal type of open global society can be integrated in the functions of global social movements against liberal globality through a *global collective action frame*.

The chapter proceeds in four sections. Section 9.1 briefly reviews the historical formation of *civil society*'s concepts and functions. This section emphasises a cultural approach to civil society's conception, mainly inspired by Jeffery Alexander's approach to civil society. Section 9.2 distinguishes the two major approaches to the emergence of *global civil society*, one of which argues that global civil society cannot be simply regarded as an expansion of domestic civil society to a global scale and another argues that global civil society originates in its cultural roots in the Enlightenment era. Section 9.3 argues for a critical rationalist normative concept-model of global civil society and a global collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation. Section 9.4 proposes the major steps and the essential conditions of remaking global civil society for a dialogic form of globalisation.

9.1 Civil Society's Concepts and Functions: A Brief Review

The concept of 'civil society' entered into social understanding in the late 17th century.⁷⁵⁰ Contemporary social theorists conceptualise civil society in different ways. Krishan Kumar describes the meaning of civil society for the 18th century's social thinkers as follows:

Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the term 'civil society' was synonymous with the state or 'political society'. Here it reflected precisely its classical origins. 'Civil society' was a more or less direct translation of Cicero's *societas civilis* and Aristotle's *koinonio politike*. Locke could speak of 'civil government'... Kant sees *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, as that constitutional state towards which political evolution tends. For Rousseau the *etat* civil is the state. In all of these uses the contrast is with the 'uncivilized' condition of humanity... But there was a decisive innovation in the latter half of the eighteenth century that broke the historic equation of civil society and the state.⁷⁵¹

In the later half of the eighteenth century, civil society was referring to a sphere of society distinct from the state with own forms and dynamics. If in the early eighteenth century, civil society referred to a *civilised society*, in the second half of that century, it implied a *sphere between the state and peoples*. For John Keane, this was an achievement of British and American thought. In the writings of Locke and Paine, and in those of Ferguson and Smith, they discern the basic elaborations of a sphere of society that is distinct from the state.⁷⁵² They proposed a *political conception* of civil society, i.e., a sphere between peoples and the state. As Jeffery Alexander argues, "the possibility for civil control, as opposed to military violence or political domination, can be traced back to the idea of the social contract, to the Lockean vision of consensual agreement and persuasion in contrast with the Hobbesian resort to force and fraud."⁷⁵³ The political concept of civil society emphasises the possibility of such a civic control of the state by the people through the institutions of civil society.

If the concept of civil society for these writers was largely political, Marx offered an economic approach to civil society. He associated the emergence of a societal space between peoples and the state with the growth of capitalism. For Marx, civil society evolved directly out of production and commerce, which has always been

⁷⁵⁰ Jeffrey C. Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2006), p.24.

⁷⁵¹ Krishan Kumar, "Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of a Historical Term," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 44 (3) (1993), p.377. Also see: Michael Edwards, *Civil Society*, 2nd Edition, (London, Polity Press: 2009), pp.5-17.

⁷⁵² John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*, (London, Verso: 1988), pp.36-50., Also see Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, (London, A. Miller and T. Caddel: 1797).

⁷⁵³ See Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Globalization as Collective Representation: The New Dream of a Cosmopolitan Civil Sphere," p.376. in Rossi, (ed.) *Frontiers of Globalization Research*, (2008).

everywhere the ‘motor’ of history. Civil society shapes the basis of the state and the ideational superstructure of the society. It could only come about at a particular stage in a capitalist mode of production: “the stage at which the bourgeoisie could establish an economy in principle and to a good extent in practice distinct from the state and all other regulatory bodies.”⁷⁵⁴ Marx situates the civil society's political function within capitalist society's economic dynamics. For him, the term ‘civil society’ emerged in the eighteenth century, when the *property relationship* had already removed itself from the medieval communal society.⁷⁵⁵

9.1.1 ‘Political’ Versus ‘Economic’ Concept-Models of Civil Society

Alexander distinguishes three analytical models of civil society.⁷⁵⁶ We can regard these three models as political, economic and cultural approaches to civil society. This sub-section discusses political versus economic concept-models, while the next sub-section argues for the cultural core of civil society.

According to Alexander, the first analytical-model (i.e. the political approach) defines civil society as “an umbrella-like concept referring to a plethora of institutions outside the state. It concluded the capitalist market and its institutions, but it also denoted what Tocqueville called voluntary religion ...private and public associations and organizations, and virtually every form of cooperative social relationship that created of trust—for example, currents of public opinion, legal norms and institutions, and political parties.”⁷⁵⁷ This approach to civil society originated in the writings of figures like Locke and developed subsequently by such Scottish moralists like Ferguson and Smith and used by Rousseau, Hegel and Tocqueville.⁷⁵⁸ The political core of the first model can be viewed in its emphasis on the definition of civil society as a social sphere outside of the state. But, this social sphere was endowed with a distinctively moral and ethical force. The capitalist market was understood as producing self-discipline and individual responsibility. Despite this individualistic ethic that emphasised individual power, which could be realised by an independent political-economic sphere outside the state, a pejorative association of capitalism with

⁷⁵⁴ Kumar, op. cit., p.377.

⁷⁵⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, (ed.) P. Pascal, (New York, International Publishers: 1963), pp.26-27.

⁷⁵⁶ See Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, (2006), pp.24-36.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.24.

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Also see: Mary Kaldor, "Civil Society and Accountability," *Journal of Human Development*, 4(1), (2003), pp.6-7.

inhumane instrumentality, domination, and exploration emerged that led to an economic approach to the very meaning and functions of civil society. As Karl Polanyi argues in *The Great Transformation*, a civil movement shaped from the civil side of the society against the market unsocial sociability.⁷⁵⁹ In this historical context, the second analytical model of civil society was shaped that emphasised economic functions of civil society.

In the economic account, civil society came to be mainly associated with market capitalism alone. In Alexander's words: "not only does civil society come to be treated simply as a field for the play of egoistical, purely private interests, but it is now viewed as a superstructure, a legal and political arena that camouflages the domination of commodities and the capitalist class."⁷⁶⁰ Marx believes that "the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the example of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of 'civil society'."⁷⁶¹ As Jean Cohen observed in her critique of the economic account, in Marx's theory of civil society "social, political, private, and legal institutions were treated as the environment of one capitalist system, to be transformed by its logic but without a dynamism of their own."⁷⁶² Alexander rightly reminds us that nothing more evidently illustrates a paradigm shift--from civil society as a socio-political sphere outside the state, creating a civil control over the state itself, to civil society as an instrument for the capitalist social system to maintain its exploitative function--than the accusations Marx made against Hegel. For Marx, Hegel justified such a privatized, selfish vision of civil society, that he has identified the civil sphere only with the system of needs.⁷⁶³

However, Hegel recognises an emancipatory intention in the history and meaning of civil society. Civil society for the first time gave *all determinations of the Idea their due*. For him, civil society becomes a part of an ethical life--opposed to an egoistic life of economic interests. It thus provides a unity of 'abstract right' and

⁷⁵⁹ See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, (Boston, Beacon Press: 1985).

⁷⁶⁰ Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, (2006), p.26.

⁷⁶¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works in Two Volumes*, (Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House: 1962), vol.1, p.362. Also see Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*, (London and New York, Verso: 1994), pp.123-142.

⁷⁶² Jean Cohen, *Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory* (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press: 1982), pp.5, 24.

⁷⁶³ Alexander, *The Civil Sphere* (2006), pp.26-27.

'subjective morality' that is the formal principle of ethical life.⁷⁶⁴ Hegel argues that the *concrete person* of civil society differs from an *isolated moral person* of the ethical life. Civil society, as a process of mediation between the family and the state, refers to a *social learning process* through which the isolated moral person gradually comes to recognise him or her self as a member of society and realise that for achieving his ends he must work with others. For Hegel, "through working with others, his particularity is mediated; he ceases to be a mere unit and eventually becomes so socially conscious, as a result of the educative forces of the institutions of civil society, that he wills his own ends only in willing universal ends and so has passed beyond civil society into the state."⁷⁶⁵ Hegel recognises a self-liberating social learning role for civil society in educating people to reduce their particularity in favour of the creation of a cooperative social order.

In *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato rehabilitate the Hegelian conception of civil society. They conceptualise civil society "as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of association (especially voluntary organizations), social movements and forms of public communication".⁷⁶⁶ They lead us to an analytical model of civil society in which intellectuals and social movements are two major civil society groups, where non-governmental organisations interplay with them. In one sense, intellectuals, social movements and non-governmental organisations can be called 'Civil Society Organisations' (CSOs).⁷⁶⁷

Marx's economic concept-model of civil society led Marxism away from an active engagement with the central subject matter of Sociology i.e. *societal structures* of civil society. But, sociologists, like Saint Simon, Auguste Comte, Max Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville, Emil Durkheim, Ferdinand Tonnies, and Talcott Parsons attempted to situate civil society in the central problem of modern society. They tried to address the question of "how to find a 'third way' between the atomization of competitive market society, on the one side, and a 'state-dominated existence,' on the other. The solution

⁷⁶⁴ See T. M. Knox (ed.) and (transl.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1942), pp.110 and 267.

⁷⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.353-54 and 365.

⁷⁶⁶ See Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, (London, Verso: 1992), pp.ix and 107.

⁷⁶⁷ See John Clark (ed.) *Globalizing Civic Engagement: Civil Society and Transnational Action*, (London, Sterling: 2003), pp.164-167.

has gradually been seen to lie in a structure of 'natural' or voluntary groups and organizations through which the individual develops the sense of social solidarity and civic participation."⁷⁶⁸ This essentially Hegelian-inspired concept of civil society was reshaped in the context of de Tocqueville notion of *political society*. In a civilised society, for de Tocqueville, there are *political associations*, such as local self-governments, juries, parties, and public opinion, and there are *civil associations*, such as churches, moral crusades, schools, and scientific communities.⁷⁶⁹

9.1.2 The Cultural Core of Civil Society's Function: Human Solidarity

Alexander leads us to realise a culturally informed analysis of civil society's concept and functions. Recognising insufficiencies of the political and the economic analytical models of civil society, Alexander defines civil society in this way:

... civil society should be conceived as a *solidary sphere*, in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes to be culturally defined and to some degree institutionally enforced. To the degree that this solidary community exists, it is exhibited and sustained by public opinion, deep cultural codes, distinctive organizations—legal, journalistic and associational—and such historically specific interactional practices as civility, criticism, and mutual respect. ...Civil society is a sphere of solidarity in which individual rights and collective obligations are tensely intertwined. It is both a normative and a "real" concept.⁷⁷⁰

Alexander discusses that the economic approach to civil society is quite mistaken to link the emergence of individualism and the collective sense of social obligation with market sociability. For him, "the individuality that sustains civil society has a long history in Western societies, as a moral force, and institutional fact, and a set of interactional practice. It has a non-economic background in the cultural legacy of Christianity, with its emphasis on the immortal soul, conscience, and confession; in aristocratic liberty, and Renaissance self-fashioning; in the Reformation's insistence on the individual relation to God; in the Enlightenment's deification of individual reason; in Romanticism's restoration of expressive individuality. Institutions that reward and model individuality can be traced back to English legal guarantees for private property in the eleventh century..."⁷⁷¹ However, the rise of modern liberalism in the past three centuries should be regarded as a new phase of cultural justification

⁷⁶⁸ See Alvin Gouldner, "Civil Society in Capitalism and Socialism," in *The Two Marxisms*, (London, Macmillan: 1980), p.371, and John Keane, *Civil Society, Old Images, New Visions*, (UK, Polity: 1998).

⁷⁶⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, (1988), pp.521-522.

⁷⁷⁰ Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, (2006), pp.31 and 53.

⁷⁷¹ Op. cit., pp.31-32. Also see: Toby Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Sciences* (2003).

of individuality in the Western civil sphere, which goes beyond its early formation in the 11th and 12th centuries, as Wittrock among other reminds us.⁷⁷²

Alexander argues that it was from such an already existent individualistic culture that emerged protests against capitalism on behalf of the 'the people.' "To identify civil society with capitalism is to degrade its universalizing moral implications and the capacity for criticism and repair that the existence of a relatively independent solidary community implies. The civil society sphere and the market must be conceptualised in fundamentally different terms. We are no more a capitalist society than we are a bureaucratic, secular, rational one, or indeed a civil one."⁷⁷³ Viewed from this culturally inspired reading of civil society, we can also uncover shortfalls of a purely political concept-model of civil society. In the political approach the core cultural function of civil society, in which a certain kind of universalising community comes to be culturally defined, has been ignored. In this sense, the political conception of civil society is also quite mistaken due to such an ignorance of the cultural core of civil society's function. Alexander rightly argues that, "this is the criterion of justice that follows from ideals that regulate the civil sphere. The codes and narratives, the institutions, and the interactions that underlay civil solidarity clearly depart from those that regulate the world of economic cooperation and competition..."⁷⁷⁴ It has been the subjective demands for the civil sphere that have provided the possibilities of justice and freedom.

A link between the *cultural* and the *political* functions of civil society can be found also in Antonio Gramsci's revised version of the Marxist approach to the meaning of civil society. Gramsci sets himself against the purely economic conception of civil society. For him, the State equals 'political society' plus 'civil society'. Political society is the arena of coercion and domination; civil society is the sphere of *cultural consent* and *intellectual leadership*.⁷⁷⁵ He is mainly concerned with the central role of civil society in the production and maintenance of hegemony. Civil society is the area where hegemony is exercised: the State exists as a point of equilibrium between political society and civil society. Civil society refers to an hegemony of a social group over the entire society, exercised by the so-called private organisations such as

⁷⁷² See Wittrock, "Modernity One, None..." (2000).

⁷⁷³ Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, (2006), p.33.

⁷⁷⁴ Op. cit.

⁷⁷⁵ Norberto Bobbio, "Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society," in Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (1988), p.82,

the Church, the trade unions, and schools, etc. But, it is precisely in civil society that *intellectuals* operate specially. It is here that the *elite perform their key function* of supplying legitimacy and creating consensus on behalf of the ruling groups.⁷⁷⁶

For Gramsci, “civil society is the sphere of culture in the broadest sense. It is concerned with the manners and mores of society, with the way people live. It is where values and meanings are established... It is the necessary complement to the rule of a class through its ownership of the means of production and its capture of the apparatus of the state.”⁷⁷⁷ While Gramsci focuses on the hegemonic function of civil society, as Robert Cox points out, Gramsci’s thought “embraced both meanings: civil society was the ground that sustained the hegemony of the bourgeoisie but also the basis on which an emancipatory counterhegemony could be constructed.”⁷⁷⁸ In this sense, emancipatory potential of civil society was also the object of Gramsci’s thinking. Nevertheless, as Alexander argues, “while Gramsci challenged the instrumentalism of Marx’s thinking about the civil sphere, he reinforced CSII [i.e., the economic concept of civil society] by insisting that, within the confines of capitalist market society, there would never be the scope for institutionalizing solidarity of a more universalistic and inclusive kind. Gramsci did not associate civil society with democracy. It was a product of class-divided capitalism understood in the broad socio-cultural and economic sense. The values, norms, and institutions of civil society were opposed to the interests of the mass of humanity, even if they did provide a space for contesting their own legitimacy in a public, counterhegemonic way.”⁷⁷⁹ In this sense, it is hard to situate Gramsci's approach in a culturally inspired concept-model of civil society.

Habermas’s account of civil society leads us to better explore the cultural core of civil society. As he argues, even in the eighteenth century, civil society was a societal sphere for rational and critical discussion among elites, who were committed to the pursuit of definite social progress.⁷⁸⁰ He writes:

⁷⁷⁶ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, (eds.) and (transl.) Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (London, Lawrence and Wishart: 1971), p.56.

⁷⁷⁷ Kumar, (1993), pp.382-383.

⁷⁷⁸ Robert W. Cox, "Civil society at the turn of the millenium: prospects for an alternative world order," *British International Studies Association*, (1999), 23, p.3. Also see: Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantal (eds.) *Gramsci and Global Politics, hegemony and resistance*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2009), p.108.

⁷⁷⁹ Alexnader, *The Civil Sphere*, (2006), p.29.

⁷⁸⁰ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, (USA, MIT Press: 1989).

Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form of the public spheres. *The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres.* ...this public is made of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations for their social interests and experiences and who want to have an influence on institutionalized opinion- and will-formation⁷⁸¹ [emphasis added].

Viewed from such an account of civil society, with a critical rationalist approach to civil society we can explore a self-liberating function for civil society in setting free peoples' access to critical rationality. While people potentially have access to critical rationality, their existing rationale system is shaped in the context of dominant cultural environments. In this sense, people who have already activated their critical rationality can inform ordinary peoples about their potential access to critical reason. If we call them *intellectuals*, they play a key epistemic function to set free ordinary peoples' capacity for a self-liberating social learning, which is needed for an institutional transformation from the closed to an open society. In Alexander's terms, the ideal of open society can play the function of a universalising community of the ends, which provides the cultural model of the civil sphere. In a word, it advocates a cultural solidarity that rests on the universal commitment to view each person as possessor of critical rationality, worthy of equal respect and treatment. In this account, the emancipatory role of intellectuals, at the core of civil society's cultural function, finds different shapes within different layers of such a self-liberation social learning.⁷⁸² The social network of intellectuals-- as an *epistemic community*--is connected with social movements and non-governmental organisations who want to create a social change.

This wider account of a social network of intellectuals goes beyond Peter Haas' technocratic expert focused definition of an epistemic community. Haas "offers an approach that examines the role that networks of knowledge-based experts --epistemic communities-- play in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective

⁷⁸¹ Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (1996), p.367. Also see: Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, (Cambridge, Mass: 1992). For the development of a social theory of civil society based on Habermas' communicative rationality also see: Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, "Civil Society And Social Theory," *Thesis Eleven*, (1988), 21(40), pp.40-64.

⁷⁸² On self-liberation via social learning see: Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, (London and New York, Continuum International Publishing Group: 2000).

debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation.”⁷⁸³ While technocratic experts are in fact a part of the wider account of the social network of intellectuals, intellectuals are not limited to the experts. This deeper account of epistemic community, as a social network of intellectuals, has not received a formal definition in current literature of the epistemic community; however, as Delanty reminds us, Habermas’s works refer to it.⁷⁸⁴

In a *framing* approach to social movements, Hank Johnston and John Noakes write, “mobilizing people to action always has a subjective component, and in recent years this subjective component—the elements of perception or consciousness—has been conceptualized as a social-psychological process called framing.”⁷⁸⁵ In the framing process individuals must be convinced that an *injustice* has occurred, persuaded that collective action is called for, and motivated to act for a social movement to occur. In their words, “the process of defining what is going on in a situation in order to encourage protest is referred to as the forging of *collective action frames*...”⁷⁸⁶ Robert Benford also argues that, “frames are modes of interpretation that are socially/culturally constructed. ...movement actors bring a repertoire of socially constructed frames to any particular movement encounter.”⁷⁸⁷ In a critical review of social movement theories, Alexander discusses the need for the formulation of a new model of social movements, which incorporates the cultural core of civil society in the very functions of civil society.

In this line of reasoning, he argues that, “behind social movements there is reference to a highly idealized community, one that demands that the universal become concrete. Demands for a concrete universal are made against the backdrop of a utopian notion of community, according to which rational actors spontaneously forge ties that are at once self-regulating, solidaristic, and emancipatory, and are

⁷⁸³ Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination," *International Organization*, 46 (1) (1992), p.3.

⁷⁸⁴ Gerard Delanty, *Social Theory in a Changing World*, (London, Polity Press: 1999), pp.68-69.

⁷⁸⁵ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (eds.), *Frames of Protest, Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, (USA, Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc: 2005), p.2. Also see: William Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," pp.53-76. in *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory*, Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.) (New Haven CT, Yale University Press: 1992)., and David Snow and Oliver Pamela, "Social Movements and Collective Behavior: Social-psychological Dimensions and Considerations," pp.571-599. in *Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology*, Karen Cook, Gary Fine, and James House, (eds.), (Boston, Allyn and Bacon: 1995).

⁷⁸⁶ Johnston and Noakes, *ibid*.

⁷⁸⁷ Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective," *Sociological Inquiry*, 67 (4) (1997), pp.420 and 422.

independent of market rewards ... It is the existence of this regulative ideal, and its promised or partial realization in the communicative and regulative institutions at a particular time, that allows protests that emerge in one structural sector to be transferred into the domain of civil society.”⁷⁸⁸ For Alexander, social movements are translators of the regulative ideal of a universal community into an analysis of the causes of the contradictions of the existing social order. “Insofar as they succeed, social movements strike up a conversation with society and draw their members’ attention to a more generalized understanding of their cause. When this happens, the social problem and group managing it enter firmly into the public life of the civil sphere.”⁷⁸⁹ From this perspective, social movements are viewed as social devices that construct translation between the discourse of civil society and the institutional reforms that are required to overcome the social crises.

In sum, the cultural concept-model of civil society leads us to see systematic like between the universalising ideals of solidarity as the cultural driving forces of those intellectual movements who want to transform the existing unjust social order into a just and free social arrangement. As we will see, in this sense, global civil society can be a global agent of dialogic globalization with the ultimate aim of a global society of free and equal persons.

9.2 Global Civil Society: ‘Existing Realities’ and ‘Potential Capacities’

Keeping in mind three aforementioned accounts of civil society, the emergence of global civil society has been analysed from different perspectives. In comparison with ‘*domestic*’ civil society, two approaches to ‘*global*’ civil society are notable.⁷⁹⁰ The first one argues that ‘*global*’ civil society differs from the ‘*domestic*’ equivalent. The second one views ‘*global*’ civil society as a type of global expansion of ‘*domestic*’ civil society. I shall argue that a *critical rationalist* account of *global civil society* can use the insights of both approaches, which reveal the existing realities and potential capacities of emerging global civil society.

⁷⁸⁸ Alexander, *The Civil Sphere*, (2006), pp.230-231.

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.231.

⁷⁹⁰ Mary Kaldor discusses about five meanings of global civil society. For details see: Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society, An Answer to War*, (London, Polity Press: 2003), pp.1-14.

9.2.1 Differences between ‘Domestic’ and ‘Global’ Civil Sphere

The question of whether a ‘*global*’ civil society is comparable with its ‘*domestic*’ counterpart has been addressed by two major approaches. This sub-section discusses the first approach that does not view global civil society as an equivalent of its domestic counterpart. For instance, Robert O’Brien *et al.* write:

There are difficulties with the appropriating of notions of civil society and social movements from the domestic context. The global civil society concept goes against the basic ontology of most international relations literature. The traditional international relations approach to ‘international society’ has to speak of a society of states... This leaves no room, for discussion of civil society because non-state actors are defined out of society. While traditional international relations scholarship may reject the notions of global civil society and GSMs [Global Social Movements] because of its state centric approach, others will raise debates about the existence of a global civil society and GSMs in the absence of a global state.⁷⁹¹

The first approach discusses that global civil society differs from its domestic version. In addition, the Western conception and experience of civil society cannot be the reference point for the definition of a ‘*global*’ civil society. The global civil society is viewed as an arena for conflict that interacts with both the interstate system and the global economy, as opposed to a *normative* global social structure.⁷⁹² The approach focuses on the existing reality of global civil society rather than its normative potential that can originate in the ideal of domestic civil society.

In adopting such a reading of global civil society, Jan Aart Scholte emphasises an active *political* orientation in defining global civil society: in his word, “an active political orientation is key to this conception of civil society. ...The conception of civil society adopted here also encompasses considerable cultural diversity. In earlier Lockean, Hegelian, and Gramscian formulations, civil society related to Western politics in a national context. However, talk of ‘civil society’ today circulates all over the world...[and] derives largely from non-Western traditions.”⁷⁹³ Similar to Alexander, Scholte argues that civil society lies outside the ‘public sector’ of official governance and the ‘private sector’ of market economy. In this independent space, civil society exists whenever people mobilise by voluntary associations for shaping or remaking social order. Global civil society addresses transnational issues, it involves

⁷⁹¹ Robert O’Brien and et al. *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements*, (London, Cambridge University Press: 2000), p.13.

⁷⁹² *Ibid.*, p.15.

⁷⁹³ Scholte, "Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance," (2002), pp.284-285.

transborder communication and has a global organisation, and finally it acts on a premise of supraterritorial solidarity.⁷⁹⁴

The first approach views the emergence of global civil society in connection with contemporary globalisation. According to Scholte, “the contemporary expansion of global civil society can also be ascribed in part to a more general altered position of the state in the face of globalisation. ...Global civil society has therefore also grown in part as citizens have attempted to acquire a greater voice in post-sovereign governance...”⁷⁹⁵ In this approach, as far as nation-states have been confronted with global problems-- similar to the climate change, stability of financial markets, and the protection of human rights-- they have set up global inter-governmental actors.⁷⁹⁶ In an analysis of the emergence of global civil society, Ronnie Lipschutz argues for the key role of global liberalism:

...the emergence of global civil society can be explained by interacting phenomena, at the macro, or structural, level, and at the micro, or agency, level. At the structural level ...anarchy, as the organizing principle of the international system, is withering away. This is the result ... of a shift from bipolarity to multipolarity or unipolarity—as the long-term acceptance of liberalism as a global ‘operating system’... At the level of agency, national governments are unable, or loathe, to provide the kind of welfare services demanded by citizens. ...This micro response is to find new ways of providing these services, and citizens are increasingly capable of doing this...*The results are networks of skilled individuals and groups, operating in newly politicized issue areas, who are helping to modify the state system*⁷⁹⁷ [emphasis added].

Given this analysis, the participants in this global political sphere interact with states over global policy issues. They try to organise global efforts into a legitimate form of global protest against the contradictions of contemporary globalisation.⁷⁹⁸ Greenpeace, for example, in itself constitutes a global network engaged in both anti-state and state-reforming tendencies.⁷⁹⁹ Another bold example of global civil society's network is the human rights organisation: Amnesty International. As Lipschutz

⁷⁹⁴ See Jan Aart Scholte, "Global Civil Society: Changing the World?" *CSGR Working Paper* 31 (99) (1999), pp.1-34.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.15-16.

⁷⁹⁶ See Sydney Tarrow, "Transnational Politics: Contentions and Institutions in International Politics," *Annual Review of Political Sciences*, 4 (1) (2001), pp.1-20. Also see: Leslie Sklair, *Globalisation, Capitalist & Its Alternatives*, (2002), chapters 10 and 11.

⁷⁹⁷ Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 21 (3) (1992), pp.418-419.

⁷⁹⁸ See David Knoke, *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1990), pp.76-81.

⁷⁹⁹ See, for example, Paul Wapner, *Making States Biodegradable: Ecological Activism and World Politics*, (American University, Washington. DC: 1991).

reminds us, “a broad range of organizations has come into existence as a response to the global institutionalisation of norms relating to human rights.”⁸⁰⁰ The problem of indigenous peoples is another subject for a growing network in global civil society that “composed of groups of indigenous people; that is, tribes, clans, societies and cultures that predate the arrival of colonialism or the mass urbanisation of population.”⁸⁰¹ We can also situate John Keane’s definition of global civil society in the first approach: it “refers to *a dynamic non-governmental system of interconnected socio-economic institutions that straddle the whole earth...*”⁸⁰² Keane believes that global civil society is an unfinished project, where it has “*the deliberate aim of drawing the world together in new ways.*”⁸⁰³ As such, Keane pays equal attention to both descriptive and normative aspects of emerging global civil society.

In sum, the first approach to global civil society has conceptualised it as a global socio-political sphere between peoples and global governance. Economic and political globalisation have paved the way for the emergence of global civil society because they have reduced the anarchical context of the Cold War and facilitated the entrance of private sector actors into the global market. At the same time, shortcomings of the emerging global political economy to fulfill the needs of the world's population have led global civil society organisations to look for new solutions to global problems.

9.2.2 A ‘Global’ Expansion of ‘Domestic’ Civil Sphere

For the second approach to global civil society-- in addition to the political and economic dimensions-- the cultural sphere plays an important role in the emergence of global civil society. As William Coleman and Sarah Wayland argue, this approach views global civil society as an arena of political activity that has grown gradually and continuously since the mid-nineteenth century, with perhaps some acceleration in the period after 1945.⁸⁰⁴ They note that John Boli and George Thomas have argued that a *world culture* and a *world polity* have emerged over this period. The contemporary world has become “conceptualized as a unitary social system, increasingly integrated by networks of exchange, competition and cooperation, such that actors have found it

⁸⁰⁰ Lipschutz, (1992), p.394.

⁸⁰¹ Op. cit., p.395.

⁸⁰² John Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2003), p.8.

⁸⁰³ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁴ William D. Coleman and Sarah Wayland, "The Origins of Global Civil Society and Nonterritorial Governance: Some Empirical Reflections", *Global Governance*, 12 (2006), p.242.

‘natural’ to view the whole world as their arena of action and discourse.”⁸⁰⁵ For Boli and Thomas, this world polity consists of a world culture, “a set of fundamental principles and models, mainly ontological and cognitive in character, defining the nature and purposes of social actors and actions.”⁸⁰⁶ This culture is global, in that it is cognitively constructed in similar ways and is applicable throughout the world.⁸⁰⁷ They refer to five aspects of the world culture by exploring the character and operations of international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs).

The second approach argues that global civil society emerges gradually as INGOs come to interact more frequently and in greater numbers with nation-states and inter-governmental organisations. Global civil society has emerged via “the extension of European Enlightenment principles onto a world stage—comprises the Western institutional innovations of the nation state, law governing interstate relations, and voluntary association. In this respect, it stands as the global equivalent of domestic civil society in Western democratic nation-states.”⁸⁰⁸ However, this equilibrium between ‘global’ and ‘domestic’ civil society seems to be an exaggeration, because the second approach uses a special reading of domestic civil society when it claims that it stands as the global equivalent of domestic civil society. Viewed from the cultural-concept-model of civil society we do not yet have a global civil society that stands as a global equivalent of domestic civil society because emerging global civil society has not created a cultural solidarity among global civil society’s actors. If domestic civil spheres in the Western societies were shaped as a societal sphere between peoples and national state, they originated from a type of cultural consensus over the liberal values and ideas among civil society actors. But we cannot find an equivalent global consensus among civil society’s actors on a global scale.

Alexander leads us to deeper analysis of the emergence of global civil society and its origins in liberal discourse of the Enlightenment era. He writes:

‘Globalization’ appeared as a response to the trauma of the 20th century, in a moment of hope when it seemed, not for the first time, that the possibility for a world-wide civil society was finally at hand. Since before the

⁸⁰⁵ John Boli and George M. Thomas, "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture", in Boli and Thomas, *Constructing World Culture: International Non-governmental Organization Since 1875*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1999), p.14.

⁸⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Also see Mike Featherstone (ed.) *Global Culture, Nationalism, globalisation and modernity*, (1990); Roland Robertson, *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture*, (1992), and Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation*, (1996).

⁸⁰⁷ Boli and Thomas (1999), p.18.

⁸⁰⁸ Coleman and Wayland, (2006), p.243.

Enlightenment, the idea of world peace has accompanied the expansion of organizational and cultural power. From the 17th century on, the political theory of high and organic intellectuals alike has articulated the idea of peaceful conflict resolution through the concept of civil power. The possibility for civil control, as opposed to military violence or political domination, *can be traced back to the idea of the social contract, to the Lockean vision of consensual agreement and persuasion in contrast with the Hobbesian resort to force and fraud* (emphasis added).⁸⁰⁹

Alexander views the ultimate origins of the emerging global civil sphere in the 17th, 18th, and 19th century movements for creating world peace and justice. For his cultural approach, the ideal of civil society refers to the ideal of a liberal discourse that is at once critical and tolerant, and to the institutions of mass media, to voting and law that allows collectivities to be directed by symbolic communication among independent and rational citizens who feel connected by ties of an ideational solidarity.⁸¹⁰ But he recognises that, “there is not a world government to curb a hegemonic state bent on defending its interests as nationally conceived. The nascent global civil sphere has none of the institutions that in a fully functioning democracy, allows public opinion to produce civil power and thus regulate the state, such as independent courts, party competition, and elections.”⁸¹¹ Yet, he believes that, despite its unsuccessful efforts, “the dream of cosmopolitan peace has not died. The forceful hope for creating a global civil sphere remains. It is embodied in the collective representation of globalization. ...There is a global stage in which local events are evaluated, not only nationally or ethnically, but according to the standards of the civil sphere.”⁸¹² In the same line of thought, Kaldor connects the emergence of global civil society with the collapse of the Cold War and the emergence of liberal globality:

...there were indeed new ideas in the revolutions of 1989 and they can be summed up in the concept of global civil society. What was new about the concept, in comparison with earlier concepts of civil society, was both the demand for a radical extension of both political and personal rights—the demand for autonomy, self-organization or control over life—and the global content of the concept. ...To achieve these demands, the new civil society actors found it necessary and possible to make alliances across borders and to address not just the state but international institutions as well. ...The 1989 revolutions...permitted the emergence of global politics—the engagements of

⁸⁰⁹ Jeffery C. Alexander, "Global Civil Society," *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23 (2006), p.521.

⁸¹⁰ See Alexander (2006). For the meaning of toleration in the liberal discourse, see: Peter Nigle Jones, "Toleration and Recognition: What should we learn?" *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 42 (1), (2010), pp.38-56.

⁸¹¹ Alexander, "Global Civil Society," (2006), p.523.

⁸¹² *Ibid.*, p.523.

social movements, NGOs and networks in the process of constructing global governance.⁸¹³

Kaldor's analysis reveals a link between intellectual ideas and social movements that took place in the course of the Cold War's collapse. She leads us to a normative ideal type of global civil society that refers to those "global process through which individuals debate, influence and negotiate an ongoing social contract or set of contracts with the centers of political and economic authority...[and] it includes all those organizations, formal and informal, which individuals can join and through which their voices can be heard by decision-makers."⁸¹⁴ This line of analysis can be seen in some Habermasian-inspired approaches to the global public sphere. For instance, Marc Lynch views dialogue of civilisations as a global public sphere in which the act of dialogue would build mutual understanding amongst people for making a new contract with the global centers of political and economic power.⁸¹⁵ James Bohman discusses the emergence of a global public sphere through a global cultural interaction. For him, such a global public sphere requires the development and expansion of a transnational civil society.⁸¹⁶

The first and the second approaches to global civil society lead us to insightful lessons regarding the potential roles of emerging global civil society in realising a dialogic globalisation. Both approaches share an analysis that implies global civil society has been developed as a result of the end of the Cold War.⁸¹⁷ Referring to the existing reality of global civil society, the first approach rightly argues about diversity of aims and functions of global civil society's organisations due to their origins in different national identities. However, for the second approach, the existing global society suffers from a lack of democratic global institutions that can give a civil power to people for controlling global governance due to the absence of a global cultural solidarity among global civil society's actors. The insightful implications of the two approaches for a critical rationalist concept-model of global civil society are that global civil society's existing realities and potential capacities should be both taken into account, if it should play the role of a global agent of dialogic globalisation.

⁸¹³ Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, (2003), pp.76-77.

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.79.

⁸¹⁵ Marc Lynch, "The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Sphere," (2000), pp.324-325.

⁸¹⁶ James Bohman, "The globalisation of the public sphere," *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 24 (2/3) (1998), pp.199-216.

⁸¹⁷ For a critique of the transition from the nation-state system to a post-national world order see: R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside International Relations as Political Theory*, (UK, Cambridge University Press: 1993) and R.B.J Walker, *After the Globe, Before the World*, (London and New York, Routledge: 2010).

In order to shape a global civil sphere, in Alexander's terms, we need to cultivate a global cultural solidarity among nationally rooted global civil society's actors.

9.3 A Critical Rationalist Approach to Global Civil Society: Toward a Global Collective Action against Liberal Globalisation

Popper did not discuss 'civil society' as the agent of a radical institutional change from the closed to the open society. However, a critical rationalist concept-model of civil society can be introduced for an exploration of the question of how the emancipatory function of global civil society can be conceptualised based on Critical Rationalism. If we replace Habermas's communicative rationality with Popper's critical rationality, and if we situate our critical rationalist model of social learning in Alexander's cultural conception of civil society, we would arrive at a new normative concept-model of global civil society. This concept-model in turn enables us to address the question of how the ideal of open global society can be translated into emancipatory driving force for global social movements through a global collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation.

9.3.1 Critical Rationalism and Normative Conception of Global Civil Society

The aforementioned two approaches to global civil society recognise a normative content in the emerging global civil society. However, the second approach pays more attention to this normative aspect. Kaldor describes this normative aspect in this way:

The normative content of the concept of civil society was to be reconstructed by Kant in the late eighteenth century...For Kant, morality could be derived from reason in a way that was independent of actual experience and it was this moral autonomy that provided the basis for freedom... The term 'community of ends' referred to the idea that the individual human being is an end in her or himself, and that this provides the organizing principle of civil society. ...*Universal civil society* is indeed the *telos* of human development but it is attained not through some prearranged rational plan nor through instinct but rather an *antagonistic process of learning through experience*, through the conflict between *man as a private being guided by selfish interests* and *man as a rational moral being*, which is expressed in public discord [emphasis added].⁸¹⁸

If Kant's normative account of civil society rests on human rationality, Critical Rationalism as a theory of rational action can lead us to a normative concept of global civil society. Like Kant, from a critical rationalist perspective, individuals are rational moral beings who have access to critical reason, hence they can form a universal civil society through the creation of a cultural solidarity based on their mutual recognition

⁸¹⁸ Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, (2003), p.26.

of an ideal type globality. Open-minded intellectuals and social movements, who respect the principles of openness to critical criticism, can establish this global civil sphere. Such an intellectual movement can translate their analyses of the causes of liberal globality's unsocial sociability into a practical frame of action for the transformation of existing unjust global order into a global governance accountable to the world's population.

9.3.2 A Critical Rationalist's Global Collective Action Frame Against 'Liberal Globalisation'

To address the question of how civil society's organisations can perform as global agents of a dialogic globalisation, I propose a *critical rationalist collective action frame* that develops a counterhegemony framework against neo-liberal globalisation with the aim of creating an open global society. In the context of this collective action frame, we can better realise how open-minded intellectuals work with global social movements to transform liberal globality into a global society of free and equal citizens. Jackie Smith leads us to view such an action frame as a struggle between capitalist and democratic visions of globalisation:

This struggle [of visions] might be seen in terms of a global society versus a world economic system. A global society is a community of citizens and states organized around a shared human identity and common norms that promote cooperation and social cohesion. Advocates of a world economy are not necessarily opposed to such a vision of global society, but in their view the most efficient way to allocate the world's resources is through markets. Global markets are seen as the key to the prosperity that will bring peace to the human community. Thus, while advocates of global society seek to socialize states and other actors in ways that place human rights norms at the center of policy. Those advocating a world economy want to subordinate societies and state to market forces.⁸¹⁹

Smith, among others, has conceptualised such competing visions or ideal types of global order in the context of the global action frames to realise the ideal types. She reminds us that, "scholars have therefore focused considerable attention on 'framing conflict,' since social change efforts typically begin when social movements mobilize people around ideas of the necessary and possibility for change. Movement organizers must convince large numbers of people that things they take for granted as normal, natural, or the result of their own personal failings are in fact the result of systematic and changeable conditions."⁸²⁰ Smith also addresses the role of the ideal types in the development of the collective action frame: "the ideal type also helps analysts assess

⁸¹⁹ Jackie Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy*, (2008), pp.4-5.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.19.

the potentials of and limitations on social movements. Its key advantage, however, is its emphasis on the ways interactions among diverse actors—including those within elite groups—shape trajectories of social conflict.”⁸²¹ Like Smith, Benford and Snow argue that the concept of *framing processes* is analytically useful for addressing the question of how the development and spread of mobilising ideas are integral to social movement dynamics.⁸²²

Benford and Snow indicate that for movement activists framing is ‘*meaning work*’. This meaning construction is an active and contentious process where actors are engaged in producing and disseminating meanings that differs from and may in fact challenge existing socio-political conditions.⁸²³ As such, when social movement’s participants ‘frame’ a particular social condition, they frame, or assign meaning to and interpret events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential believers and voters. In *Framing Collective Action Against Neoliberalism*, Jeffrey Ayres rightly argues that the *framing process* “provides a useful conceptual guide for understanding the ongoing struggle to produce and disseminate mobilizing ideas critical of neoliberal globalisation. So-called collective action frames result from this meaning production and serve several crucial functions for [social] movements.”⁸²⁴ Open-minded intellectuals, as potential members of a global epistemic community, are responsible for uncovering the unsocial sociability of liberal globality and to introduce the potentials of the ideal type of open global society to overcome such an unsocial sociability. As argued in chapter 7, the term ‘*unsocial sociability*’ of liberal globality refers to the *utilitarian principle of the liberal model of globality* on which basis individuals’ social relations shape just because of their usefulness to each other as ‘*means*’ rather than as ‘*the end*’ in themselves. In this way, the cultural discourse of open global society can spread mobilising ideas, which are integral to those global

⁸²¹ Ibid., p.22.

⁸²² See David Snow et al. "Frame Alignment Processes, Mictomobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review*," 51 (1986), pp.464-481., and David Snow and Robert Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," pp.197-217 in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriest, and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research across Cultures*, International Social Movement Research vol. I. (Greenwick, CT:JAI Press: 1988), p.198.

⁸²³ See Robert Benford and David Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: an Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology*, (2000), pp.614-616.

⁸²⁴ Jeffrey M. Ayres, "Framing Collective Action Against Neoliberalism: The Case of the 'Anti-Globalization's Movements,'" *Journal of World-Systems Research*, X (1) (2004), p.14.

social movement dynamics against liberal globality that aim to dialogically transform the unsocial sociability of liberal globality into a humane global order.

Referring to Benford and Snow, Ayres points out, *collective action frames* are “constructed as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements and urge others to act in concert to affect change.”⁸²⁵ As Ayres argues, collective action frames provide *diagnostic attribution*, which is concerned with *problem identification*, and *prognostic attribution*, which is concerned with *problem resolution*.

A critical rationalist collective action frame against neo-liberal globality produces meanings and critical analyses of liberal globality’s problematic situation in terms of its unsocial sociability, i.e., the lack of a ‘bottom-up’ global consensus on the very liberal model of globality; unaccountability of global governance to the world’s population; and uneven distribution of globalisation’s costs and benefits. It also provides a diagnostic attribution, implying that the contradictions of liberal globality should be ultimately traced to the unsocial sociability of *liberal model* of social organisation, as argued in chapter 5. More importantly, such a critical rationalist action frame provides global social movements with a *problem resolution* in terms of the ideal type of an open global society of free and equal citizens-- as an alternative form of a humane globality. In this sense, the formation of the critical rationalist global collective action frame can integrate the ideal type of open global society into the very functions of global civil society.

As Benford and Snow argue, when faced with what are interpreted as unjust social conditions, activists then develop social movement specific and related collective action frames to highlight the unjust character of the conditions, which are no longer tolerable.⁸²⁶ In the current literature of global protest against neo-liberal globalisation we can see the emergence of such a collective action frame. For instance, Barry Gills argues about the tension between neoliberal economic globalisation—that seeks to expand global capital and market—and movements of social resistance –that seek to

⁸²⁵ Benford and Snow (2000), p.613. Also see Ayres (2004), p.14.

⁸²⁶ See David Snow and Robert Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," p.137 in Morris and Mueller (eds.), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, (1992).

protect and redefine community and solidarity.⁸²⁷ In *Global Activism*, Ruth Reitan discusses regarding the emergence of cross-border networks of global actors in forms of social movements and non-governmental organisations, which aim to fight against unjust conditions that have been created by neo-liberal globalisation.⁸²⁸

Jackie Smith argues that, “social movement actors are seeking to generate new ideas for confronting growing array of [global] problems that require transnational attention. Their focused attention to problems such as human rights violations, poverty and social exclusion, or environmental degradation generates intensive efforts by social movement activists to come up with new ideas about how to improve these conditions.”⁸²⁹ The idea of open global society provides global social movements with both diagnostic and prognostic analyses of the contemporary liberal globality that its outcomes are manifested in global problems such as human rights violations, world poverty and income inequality, and environmental degradation.

Ayres provides us with a detailed analysis of how the collective action frame can be used to develop a diagnostic framing that identifies neo-liberal globalisation as a global social organisational problem, and its consequences for contemporary global crises. Ayres’s analysis can be used to develop a critical rationalist collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation on the basis of the ideal type of open global society. In the context of this global collective action frame, we can explore how open-minded intellectuals provide ideational inputs for a critical rationalist vision of global social movements who aim to transform the existing global order into an open global society of free and equal citizens through a dialogic globalisation.

While a transnational alliances of civil society actors “have long been at work trying to shape a vision of world order that is not defined by the needs of capital, but rather that responds to broader concerns for human well-being”⁸³⁰, global activists by the late 1990s developed an increasingly transnationally accepted master collective action frame to challenge the prevailing neoliberal orthodoxy as it existed in such global institutions as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The construction of such an anti-neoliberal globalisation

⁸²⁷ See Barry K. Gills, (ed.) *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance*, (London, Macmillan: 2000).

⁸²⁸ See Ruth Reitan, *Global Activism*, (London, Routledge: 2007).

⁸²⁹ Jackie Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy* (2008), pp.90-91.

⁸³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.105.

collective action frame involved a long-term process of diagnosing global problems, originated in neo-liberal globalisation. In addition, such a collective action frame has been faced with the challenges of a set of powerful and wealthy interests in those states, corporations and other social actors supportive of the neoliberal model of globality and the diversity of different regions, states, languages, cultures, and popular experiences affected by neo-liberal globalisation.

Ayres recognises that while various movements and region-specific collective action frames were emerging throughout the 1980s and 1990s in different regions and parts of the world, it would require the development of a more inclusive master frame to bind disparate actors into a *global* protest movement against neoliberal globality.⁸³¹ The ideal type of open global society leads us to a possibility of shaping such global action frame through a rational dialogue among intellectual movements who have different cultural identities and political interests. In a sense, the first step towards a rational dialogue among civilisations is a dialogue among intellectuals over a global collective action frame for overcoming global crises. From an epistemological view, respecting the principles of critical rationality makes a global consensus over certain aspects of such a global action frame possible.

During past decades, a global process of diagnostic framing has been shaped that recognises neo-liberal form of globalisation as problematic. As Ayres writes:

...by the mid-1990s, a number of regional protest campaigns were being shaped by collective actions frames that implicated neoliberal policies and institutions for the mounting inequalities and dislocations of the post-Bretton Woods era. In fact, the record of neoliberalism around the world was less than auspicious and made it easier for activists to assign blame: the total external debt of developing countries had skyrocketed, the gap between the richest, and poorest states had grown demonstrably, poverty had increased in many developing states, and the average per capita income growth rate was significantly lower across the developing south than has been the case in the roughly twenty years before the onset of debt crisis and the policy generalization of the neoliberal model.⁸³²

Due to the emergence of such global crises, neoliberal globalisation's performance has received more widespread criticism. In this way, more space opened up for civil society networking, collective bargaining and political lobbying across the world, in particular across a number of developing states had made transition to electoral democracies during the previous decades. Ayres argues that neo-liberal globalisation's

⁸³¹ Ayres, "Framing Collective Action Against Neoliberalism," (2004), pp.14-15.

⁸³² Ibid., p .17., Also see: Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, (New York, NY:WW.Norton: 2002).

records have paved the way for the emergence of an inclusive global master collective action frame for a variety of perceived injustices: “from environmental degradation, the shifting of jobs to low wages productions sites, human rights abuses in sweatshops, and still growing poverty and persistent indebtedness across the developed world.”⁸³³ Global protests are not against the globalisation of economics itself, but against those global liberal policies, focused on promoting economic liberalisation, without a concern with the social and environmental consequences. Ayres leads us to the action frame’s shortcomings:

while the anti-neoliberal ‘injustice frame’ performed reasonably well in crafting a transnationally shared diagnosis of neoliberalism’s faults, movement activists were having more difficulty undertaking prognostic framing. That is, proposing and agreeing upon plans for attacking neoliberal policies and institutions, as well as in encouraging new movement recruits to literally take to the streets to oppose neoliberal policies, was proving to be a far more difficult task. ... Civil society groups and activists shared a strong sense of what they felt was “wrong” with neoliberalism; what remained unresolved was the *development of collectively shared and agreed upon solutions and strategic* responses to those problems (emphasis added).⁸³⁴

The ideal type of open global society proposes an alternative humane globality -- as introduced in detail in chapter 4—implying that any global consensus over a collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation should recognise deep-seated epistemic roots of neo-liberal globality’s faults in liberal social philosophy, which has reflected in contemporary globalisation’s unsocial sociability. But such a recognition needs a global dialogue.

A major step towards a critical rationalist action frame against liberal globalisation is the achievement of a global consensus on the origins of globalisation’s social crises. It requires to rethink about the insufficiencies of liberal model of globality. As Robert Cox notes, “in today’s context, the challenge is to bridge the differences among the variety of groups disadvantaged by globalization so as to bring about a common understanding of the nature and the consequences of globalization, and to devise a common strategy towards subordinating the world economy to a regime of social equity.”⁸³⁵ Cox’s recognises the difficulties of arriving at such a common understanding and strategy, for now this study’s core ambition is to present an ideal type of overcoming such a challenge through a rational dialogue.

⁸³³ Ayres, (2004), p .20.

⁸³⁴ Ibid., pp.23-24. Also see: Jan Aart Scholte, "The Future of Civil Society Opposition to Neoliberal Global Economic Governance," *Canada Watch*, 9 (1-2), (2001), pp.59-64.

⁸³⁵ Cox, "Civil society at the turn of the millenium," (1999), p.26.

9.4 Major Steps and Essential Conditions for Remaking Global Civil Society

This section proposes a *possible scenario* regarding major steps for making the existing global civil society work for a dialogic globalisation through the development of a global collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation based on the ideal type of open global society. Sub-section 9.4.1 argues about the scenario's three major steps for shaping the collective action frame and sub-section 9.4.2 discusses essential conditions for realising the steps due to the existing possibilities and limitations of global civil society. In this line of reasoning, in section 9.4.3, I refer to an example of a global dialogue among intellectuals and activists regarding global democracy in the context of the Building Global Democracy (BGD) project.

9.4.1 Three Major Steps for Remaking Global Civil Society

As argued, a critical rationalist approach to global civil society implies that a *global network of intellectuals*-- who respect the principles of critical rationality-- can shape a *global epistemic community* for advocating an alternative global social order that aims to mitigate injustice of the existing liberal globality. Recalling chapter 5, the ideal type of open global society introduces the *openness to rational criticism* as the ethics of such an alternative global order. The mechanism of dialogue of civilisations can work for the emergence of such a global network of intellectuals. Such a network of open-minded intellectuals, who are interested in a humane global order, can shape a *global epistemic space* for a mutual understanding of the world's problems and their potential solutions.

The above overall picture leads us to explore the three major steps for making global civil society work for realising a new global collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation. Jackie Smith reminds us the importance of having an alternative vision of globality, when we talk about a global action frame against neo-liberal globality in this way: "any attempt to fundamentally challenge the neoliberal global vision must create different possibilities for people to make a living while supporting a different worldview. ...Neoliberal advocates seek to organize the world around economic competition, and most people everywhere find few alternatives to engaging somehow in this competition. But those challenging neoliberalism are asking whether efforts to promote global economic competition are ultimately self-defeating, since many of the problems the world faces require cooperation and

compromise.”⁸³⁶ Having a clear alternative of globality leads global activists to realise the reason why they must change the existing global disorder, and what would be the outcomes of such a global social change.

The First Step: As argued earlier, one of the main functions of a collective action frame is to show how the development and spread of mobilising ideas are integral to social movement dynamics. Keeping this in mind, the formation of a global epistemic community, or a global network of intellectuals, who validate the ideal type of open global society as an alternative model of globality, is the first step for remaking global civil society. In this fundamental step, open-minded intellectuals of world civilisations can join to discuss the nature of contemporary globalisation and its problems. This global epistemic community produces cognitive inputs for shaping a new global social movement. If the key challenge of existing global collective action frame is to achieve a common understanding of globalisation’s contradictions and potential solutions, a rational dialogue among open-minded intellectual movements could be a reasonable solution.

The Second Step: the second step to form a global collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation is the creation of a systematic link between such a global epistemic community and global social movements. As Smith argues, “social change efforts typically begin when social movements mobilize people around ideas of the necessity and possibility for change.”⁸³⁷ If the global epistemic community can arrive at a more or less common reading of globalisation’s problems and its prognostic solution, global social movements who seek diagnostic and prognostic ideas, can base their emancipatory efforts on such shared understanding. Against this perspective, the second step for remaking global civil society for a dialogic globalisation refers to a global cognitive process through which the global epistemic community persuades global social movements on the origins of liberal globality’s unsocial sociability and its dialogic solutions. If global social movements recognise the validity of such diagnostic and prognostic analyses, they have entered to a systematic epistemic-institutional connection with the social networks of intellectuals. Creating such a systematic link between a global network of open-minded intellectuals and global

⁸³⁶ Smith, *Social Movements for Global democracy* (2008), p.201.

⁸³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.19.

social movements turns the ideational capacity of global epistemic community into a global political force to overcome the existing global disorder.

The Third Step: Global social movements who employ an alternative ideal type of world order to justify their protests against injustice of contemporary globalisation need to mobilise ordinary peoples for a global collective action. The third step of remaking global civil society for a dialogic globalisation refers to the creation of a systematic link between global social movements and prospective global citizens. As Smith points out, “the global political arena is far removed from the experiences of most of the world’s people, and the challenge for those seeking to advance a local vision to rival the neoliberal network is to connect their vision to people’s everyday practice.”⁸³⁸ Having said that, an active involvement of people in global collective action against neo-liberal globality should be one of the core objectives of remaking global civil society. Ayres points out “civil society groups during the late 1990s had found it increasingly easier to develop shared and ultimately transnational understandings of the experiences and problems fostered on different regions by neoliberal economic policies.”⁸³⁹ However, the creation of a global cognitive process through which global social movements can translate such a shared understanding to people around the globe needs many more innovations and efforts.

9.4.2 The Major Essential Conditions for Remaking Global Civil Society

Viewed from the critical rationalist normative concept of global civil society and the aforementioned major steps, this sub-section argues regarding the essential conditions for an ideal type function of global civil society. To this end, we need to address the existing major potentials and limitations of global civil society to work for a dialogic globalisation.

If we look at the three major steps for remaking global civil society, we realise that the formation of a global epistemic community of open-minded intellectuals requires some essential conditions. While there are different social networks of intellectuals, and globalisation research centers-- which are interested in an alternative humane globalisation-- it does not seem that one of them has yet constructed a global network

⁸³⁸ Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy* (2008), p.200. Also see: Jan Aart Scholte, “The Future of Civil Society Opposition to Neoliberal Global Economic Governance,” *Canada Watch*, 9 (1-2), pp.59-64.

⁸³⁹ Ayres, "Framing Collective Action Against Neoliberalism," (2004), pp.26-27.

of intellectuals who are specifically committed to the principles of critical rationalism. The Open Society Foundation is perhaps the most important international network, which is specifically committed to the motto of critical rationality,⁸⁴⁰ as Karl Popper defines it. However, it basically focused upon nationally oriented initiatives for the transition from the closed to the open societies around the globe without a special mission for the transformation of a closed world society into an open global society.

One of the most important networks of globalisation scholars has emerged in the last decade as the Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), which includes global thinkers from four corners of the globe.⁸⁴¹ The first ideas for the creation of a network of globalisation research centers and scholars were spawned in 2002. The proposition was made that researching the topic of globalisation and its various dimensions is beyond the capacity of any one university or research center to take on and address comprehensively. It was agreed that a coalition of university research centres from all over the world would be able to pool their expertise in globalisation. The GSN as a network of global research centres, rather than researchers, has some potentials for the formation of a global epistemic community that respects a rational dialogue amongst intellectuals over the nature of globalisation and alternative world order. However, it does not specify any emancipatory task for an intellectual leadership of global social movements towards a humane globalisation.

In 2001, United Nations' Initiative for Inter-Civilisational Dialogue was an important opportunity for the creation of a global epistemic community of open-minded thinkers who argue for an alternative global order through rational dialogue amongst world civilisations. In the year 2000, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami called for a global dialogue of civilisations as an effective solution for overcoming global problems. That call was taken up by Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the year 2001 was proclaimed the International Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations. But the idea of dialogue among civilisations has not led to a global epistemic community, involving in a sustained discourse regarding a rational dialogue amongst civilisations.

It seems that existing global networks of intellectuals do not meet the requirements of a global epistemic community that respects the principles of critical rationality (like

⁸⁴⁰ Regarding The Open Society Foundations' visions and missions see: <http://www.soros.org>.

⁸⁴¹ On Globalisation Studies Network (GSN) see: <http://gsnetwork.igloogroupa.org>.

Open Society Foundation), and it has a global emancipatory mission (like Initiative for Inter-Civilisational Dialogue), and finally it mobilises scholars and intellectuals who are interested in globalisation (like the Globalisation Studies Network). As such, one essential condition for the emergence of such a global epistemic community is the formation of a global network of intellectuals who respect the principles of critical rationality; who validate the formation of a multi-civilisational open global society, and who believe that rational dialogue of civilisations is a sophisticated way to create a global society of free and equal persons.

The second major essential condition for the emergence of the global collective action frame is the formation of a new global social movement, which turns the ideational capacity of global epistemic community into a global political force. Smith rightly points out:

The WSF is a self-consciously global project, attempting to bring people from diverse countries and cultural traditions together to consider alternative visions of how the world might be organized and to take action to realize these visions. It is essentially a global public meeting, which serves three crucial functions to help construct a foundation for a more democratic global order. Specifically, it contributes to the *development of global identities*, the *cultivation of shared understandings of the world's problems* and their appropriate solutions, and *the building of capacities for citizens' groups to challenge existing global power relations* (emphasis added).⁸⁴²

However, while the World Social Forum (WSF) is the most important global space for intellectuals and social movements to cooperate against neo-liberal globality, it has not yet realised promised functions to develop a global shared understanding of globalisation's problems and an alternative vision of global order. As Ayres argues, "differences of opinion, illustrative of the limits of anti-neoliberal prognostic framing, starkly emerged in setting such as the World Social Forum...Questions that confronted activists included: what are to most effective tactics for challenging neoliberal policies; more consultative and collaborative engagement in neoliberal summitry by NGOs, or grassroots mobilization and contentious protest."⁸⁴³ The absence of a globally shared anti-neoliberal prognostic action frame is one of the most important weaknesses of the existing global social movements who are interested in a radical institutional reform in the global power relations.

⁸⁴² Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy* (2008), p.206.

⁸⁴³ Ayres (2004), p.27.

Nevertheless, the World Social Forum is still the most important global space for linking intellectuals with social movements. The WSF, held first in Brazil, and in 2004 in Mumbai, India, continues to draw large numbers of people and represents a crucial forum for developing a more widely accepted global prognostic frame against neo-liberal globality.⁸⁴⁴ In this sense, the WSF remains the most important global space for linking open-minded thinkers with global social movements. However, an essential condition for making the WSF work for the development of a critical rationalist global collective action frame is an integration of cultural dialogue among world civilisations in the WSF's self-consciously global project, serving to construct the foundation for a democratic global society. In a word, the WSF could be improved as a space between global governance and peoples in which global social movements use mobilising ideas of alternative global order for organising peoples against the unsocial sociability of contemporary globalisation.⁸⁴⁵

The third major essential condition is the emergence of a certain level of a sense of global citizenship. In a word, we should not view ordinary people as merely passive actors who must be activated by global social movements and intellectuals. Due to their access to critical rationality, prospective global citizens can also play their own contributions in a dialogic globalisation in terms of showing a more active sense of global citizenship. As Scholte argues, "given that most citizens across the world feel some degree of concern about negative implications of existing forms of globalization, the potential constituency for the movement is huge. On the other hand, a prevailing climate of political passivity and cynicism inhibits their limited political energy to local and national politics."⁸⁴⁶ But, without the emergence of a certain level of an active participation of people in global politics, global social movements cannot mobilise them to create the global collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation. In Scholte's words, "to yield its fruits transborder civic activity needs to have adequate capacities in terms of human, material and ideational resources. In many cases to date these means have been lacking. Next to governance institutions and the market, civil society has run a very poor third in terms of supporting staff,

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid., p.28.

⁸⁴⁵ See John Clark, *Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical Globalization* (Bloomfield, Kumarian Press: 2003).

⁸⁴⁶ Scholte, "The Future of Civil Society Opposition to Neoliberal Global Economic Governance," (2002), p.59.

funds, equipment and symbolic capital.”⁸⁴⁷ As such, a critical rationalist remaking of global civil society requires its own human and material resources.

In sum, the essential conditions for remaking global civil society include:⁸⁴⁸ firstly, the creation of a global epistemic community of open-minded intellectuals who are committed to the principles of critical rationalism as their discursive ethics to achieve shared understandings of globalisation’s problems and solutions. Secondly, the formation of a global social movement that aims to translate the ideal of open global society into a global place of action for protesting against neo-liberal globality. Thirdly, a certain level of the awareness and feeling of global citizenship amongst ordinary peoples across the globe to make them ready for taking alternative vision of globality as a serious solution for their own global problems.

9.4.3 Building Global Democracy Programme: A Global Dialogic Network

In this final part of chapter 9, I briefly refer to an actual case of a world-wide dialogue among intellectuals, researchers, activists and practitioners regarding global democracy. In 2008, a global project entitled ‘Building Global Democracy’ (BGD) was initiated with the aim of advancing “knowledge and action for greater public participation and control in the governance of global affairs. The initiative explores how ‘rule by and for the people’—a core attribute of human livelihood and a good society—can operate when addressing global challenges of the present age.”⁸⁴⁹ The BGD program can be viewed as a major international action-oriented research project. More specific objectives of the project are: (a) to increase the attention to problems of global democracy; (b) to elaborate the very notion of global democracy; (c) to record and assess past efforts to advance global democracy; (d) to contribute viable visions and proposals for global democracy; (e) to advance the capacities to promote global democracy; (f) to foster participant-researcher exchange on global democracy; and (g) to further advocacy networks for democratisations of global governance.⁸⁵⁰

The BGD programme rests on a fivefold diagnosis of the principal shortfalls of democracy in current global governance. Firstly, ideas of democracy have not been

⁸⁴⁷ Scholte, “Global Civil Society: Changing the World?” (1999), p.28.

⁸⁴⁸ For a review of the required capacities of global civil society for functioning more effective roles in global politics see: Scholte, “Global Civil Society: Changing the World?”(1999), pp.28-32.

⁸⁴⁹ See: “Building Global Democracy: Programme Prospectus, 2008-2012,” p.3.

www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid.

adequately reformulated to address the altered global circumstances, as a *conceptual problem*. Secondly, the learning processes for empowering citizenship in global politics have not been sufficiently developed, as a *pedagogical challenge*. Thirdly, the agencies of global governance suffer from acute accountability deficits, as an *institutional problem*. Fourthly, highly unequal distributions of world resource create large discrepancies in people's possibilities for engagement in global politics, as an *economic obstacle*. Finally, numerous collective identities lack due recognition and voice in contemporary global governance, as a *cultural problem*. In order to address these respective challenges the BGD programme comprises five projects:

The first project, entitled 'Conceptualizing Global Democracy', explores how democracy can be (re) envisioned to be meaningful for a more global world, ...The second project, 'Citizen Learning for Global Democracy', examines how affected people ... can become more empowered through greater knowledge of global relations and their governance. The third project, 'Including the Excluded in Global Policymaking', considers how governance institutions in global affairs can be made more accessible and responsive to heretofore sidelined constituencies. The fourth project, 'Structural Redistribution for Global Democracy', assesses how alternative allocations of world resources can help currently subordinated stakeholders to obtain due participation and control in the governance of global affairs. The Fifth project, 'Intercultural Constructions of Global Democracy', investigates how increased legitimacy in the governance of global affairs can be achieved with greater recognition of, and more effective communication and negotiation among, the diverse life-worlds that inhabit global domains.⁸⁵¹

The BGD programme aims to make the five action-oriented research projects a *global dialogic context* within which intellectuals, researcher, activists and policy-makers exchange their views on global democracy and use the shared findings in their efforts for building global democracy. The five projects can mutually reinforce each other to realise the above objectives. For instance, increasing conceptual clarity on global democracy can pave the way for an improvement in the attention, among academic and practitioners, to the challenges of democratising global governance. In addition, such a conceptual clarity may facilitate an intercultural construction of global democracy through paving the ways for the emergence of a globally shared account of democracy itself. Similarly, a structural redistribution of the world's resources can provide some pre-conditions for increasing people's awareness of the importance of global democracy for their own well-being.

⁸⁵¹ Ibid., pp.3-4.

From the perspective of the thesis' central argument, the BGD program can be regarded as an example of a world-wide dialogue among researchers and practitioners in relation to different aspects of global democracy. Although, it is hard to view such type of global dialogue as an *inter-civilisation dialogue* on global democracy, it provides an *inter-regional scale* of such a global dialogue due to the fact that the main sub-units of the project's researchers-practitioners are defined based on the world's major geographical regions, namely North America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Western Europe. Nevertheless, it is a sample of the possibility of dialogue among a wide range of researchers, intellectuals, policy-makers and activists across the world. However, a key point is that the BGD project's methodology aims to interlink "theory and practice, researchers and practitioners, intellectual labours and political struggles. Past explorations of global democracy have tended to be either highly abstract academic treatises or loosely formulated activist pamphlets. ... A more meaningful and effective exercise in building global democracy would overcome this researcher-practitioner divide. A mutual learning exercise [through dialogue] between academic and policy circles has advantages including: (a) 'reality checks' for researchers; (b) practitioners stake in the research ... and (c) capacity building for practitioners..."⁸⁵² Against these premises, the BGD's projects use the various international workshops and case studies in order to involve researchers and practitioners in a global dialogue regarding different challenges of building global democracy.

While the final results of the BDG's projects will be published over the next few years as book series, available information from the sub-projects' workshops and case studies shows that the dialogue among researchers, intellectuals, practitioners, and policy-makers has led to some shared understandings and policy advice among them. For instance, on 6-8 December 2009, the project convened a dialogue of diversities on the question of what does it mean to speak of global democracy in Cairo, Egypt. Core to the discussions were 40 researchers and practitioners from 29 countries spread across all world regions. The workshop's major results were as follows: (1) in today's more global world some political decisions must be global. For those actions to be legitimate and effective, it is important that all concerned participate in and hold

⁸⁵² Ibid., p.15.

control over the process; (2) currently predominant forms of globalisation are severely undemocratic; (3) the ideas of democracy inherited from nation-state contexts do not seem to provide a sufficient basis for conceptions of global democracy; (4) the problem of conceptualising global democracy needs to remain directly linked to processes of achieving it; (5) democracy as a key value for a good society is deeply interconnected with other core values such as justice, peace, diversity, human development, and ecological sustainability; (6) a universal consensus on conceptions of global democracy is neither available nor desirable. However, the principles, institutions and practices of global democracy cannot be contested, sometimes very deeply, and (7) listening is key to the communication and negotiation of diversities around global democracy.⁸⁵³ The above results imply some significant progresses among participants regarding certain features of global democracy, which can be viewed as the outcomes of such a dialogue-- as indicated by the term ‘shared findings on the concept of global democracy’.

Viewed from the perspective of the thesis’ critical rationalist account of global democracy as a global learning process, it seems that the case studies of the project of Conceptualising Global Democracy support the key role of dialogue in clarifying meaning of global democracy. For instance, in her case study, Nadia Mostafa writes: “Reconceptualisation of global democracy beyond Western notions is needed. If global democracy is to be truly global, then theoretical mapping of the idea cannot be limited to Western literature and Western experiences. Otherwise, there is a unilateral hegemony, which is itself highly undemocratic. Conceptualisation of global democracy must therefore include non-Western others, including Muslim thought.”⁸⁵⁴ In the same line of analysis, Edgardo Lander argues that, “veritable global democracy is not possible when, as at present, one societal order is prescribed for and imposed upon the whole of the planet’s population. ...Yet there is also worldwide resistance against so-called free trade; against agribusiness and the model of accumulation of dispossession that has characterised neoliberal globalisation ...these movements constitute some of the most dynamic expressions of struggles for another possible world, bringing together local, national, regional and global struggles for a new plural

⁸⁵³ See Summary Results, “A Cairo Conversation on Conceptualising Global Democracy,” pp.1-2. www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org.

⁸⁵⁴ See Nadia Mostafa, “Beyond Western Paradigms of International Relations, Towards an Islamic Perspective on Global Democracy,” p.14., in Summaries of Comissined Papers (2010), www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org.

democratic society.”⁸⁵⁵ By the same reasoning, Melissa Williams points out, “the rise of a more global world has stimulated new democratic imaginaries: different ideas of what democracy could be. ...disagreement reigns about the *location* of the governance that should be rendered more democratic as well as the *modality* of political action that should be adopted to enhance global democracy.”⁸⁵⁶

Viewed from a Chinese’s perspective, Xu Jiajun, Ma Ben and Peng Zongchao define their account of global democracy in this way: “on the normative side, it emphasizes the significance of cross-cultural exchange, rather than taking for granted the validity of any preordained democratic principle, Western or otherwise. Such dialogue might reveal, for instance, that neither ‘liberal democracy’ nor ‘authoritative democracy’ deserves priority over the other...On the institutional side, the concept of global democracy developed here highlights the necessity of institutional innovations and refuses to accept the legitimacy of any fixed arrangement, ...On the substantive side, the touchstone of global democracy should be how globalization can yield equitable and sustainable development.”⁸⁵⁷ These case studies reinforce each other in shaping a globally shared account of a multi-civilisational conception of global democracy. Viewed from a critical rationalist approach to global democracy, a further progress can be emerged in such a global dialogue among researchers and practitioners, if they discuss regarding the need for a micro-foundation for such a plural account of global democracy. It implies that without a globally shared account of the equality of human beings, the institutional features of global democracy cannot be systematically conceptualised. Global democracy as rule by, and for the people requires a common understanding of the very idea of the people itself. The critical rationalist account of global democracy introduces a foundation for this common understanding as rational unity of humankind in Popper’s term or what this thesis termed as people’s potential access to critical rationality.

⁸⁵⁵ Edgardo Lander, “The Decolonisation of Global Democracy,” pp.9-10., in Summaries of Committed Papers (2010), www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org.

⁸⁵⁶ Melissa S. Williams, “Linking Fates Together: Democratic Imaginaries and Global Public Space,” p.20., in ., in Summaries of Committed Papers (2010), www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org.

⁸⁵⁷ Xu Jiajun, Ma Ben and Peng Zongchao, “Cooperative-Harmonious Global Democracy from the Perspective of Chinese Culture,” pp.23-24, in Summaries of Committed Papers (2010), www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org.

Chapter 10

Contributions of Critical Rationalism to Macrosociology of Globalisation

This concluding chapter pursues three aims: Section 10.1 concludes the thesis' methodological and analytical contributions to the macrosociology of globalisation. Section 10.2 sums up major research findings. Section 10.3 introduces general themes of a research programme for building open global society.

10.1 Methodological and Analytical Contributions

Chapter 2 argued that Critical Rationalism—as a conjectural theory of human knowledge and rationality—contributes to the thesis' research methodology. Chapter 5 used Critical Rationalism to offer an analytical framework for the macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. This section highlights the thesis' key methodological and analytical contributions to macrosociology of globalisation.

The thesis discussed an integration of Critical Rationalism in the methodology of macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. To this end, it proposed a cultural turn in exploring globalisation as a macro-societal institutional change. In this cultural turn, the role of epistemic impetus or ideational factors in the formation of more global world was emphasised. While contemporary approaches to globalisation are mainly focused upon the economic, political, and technological causes of globalisation, the function of ideational factors in the context of globalisation's cultural mechanisms has received less systematic interest. A contribution of the thesis to the methodology of macrosociology of globalisation is to show how critical rationalism can be employed,

in the context of a hermeneutic method, in order to enable us to explore the ideational forces of global social changes. In a sense, the thesis leads us to see the interplay between global liberalism, as a globalising social philosophy, and the formation of a post-national political economy-- as a type of global macro-institutional change.

A key innovative contribution of the thesis to the methodology of macrosociology of globalisation is using Critical Rationalism as a theory of rational action in order to propose a new micro-foundation for such a macrosociological analysis. Habermas' normative analysis of globalisation has used Communicative Rationality to provide a normative critique of existing liberal globalisation. However, it does not introduce a systematic application of Communicative Rationality as the micro-foundation of his sociological analyses of contemporary globalisation. The thesis attempts to employ Critical Rationalism--as a theory of rational action-- to explore ideational motor forces of liberal globalisation. It also applies Critical Rationalism as an epistemological theory of a rational dialogue of civilisations with the aim of introducing a dialogic form of globalisation.

In a purely methodological sense, the thesis contributes to an application of Critical Rationalism for the construction of a new logic for critical social sciences. Inspired by Popper and Adorno's methodologies, the thesis argues for a critical rationalist methodology of a critical social theory. It discusses that if Critical Rationalism is to be used as a theory of rational action, the contradictions of the existing social order can be attributed to a 'closedness' of the members of society to rational criticism. In addition, Critical Rationalism can be utilised as a methodological base for exploring how openness to rational criticism acts as *self-liberation through social learning* for a transition from the closed to the open society. In this way, the thesis introduces systematic linkages amongst (a) Popper's conjectural theory of knowledge, (b) a critical rationalist theory of action, and (c) a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. Such links help the thesis to identify three major tasks for macrosociology of globalisation: (a) analysing the existing forms of globalisation, (b) criticising unsocial sociability of contemporary globalisation, and (c) advocating a dialogic form of globalisation.

From an analytical perspective, the thesis contributes to the development of a new theoretical framework for macrosociology of globalisation. It does so by introducing the ideal type of an open global society, and by offering the critical rationalist models

of human action and social organisation. The ideal type of open global society plays the key role in realising the three major tasks of macrosociology of globalisation. It provides the thesis with a *normative standard* from which the *deviations* of the existing forms of globality can be explored. The thesis discusses if contemporary liberal globalisation suffers from global societal deficits, the ultimate ideational source of such deficits can be traced to the flawed foundation of the existing liberal model of social organisation. The thesis' three-fold pattern of social organisation--namely the Hobbesian, the Lockean and the Kantian patterns-- can be regarded as a contribution to the development of the ideal type of open global society.

The thesis situates Critical Rationalism between two major epistemologies; that is, Uncritical Rationalism (Absolutism) and Critical Irrationalism (Relativism). Upon this categorisation, the thesis finds an epistemological logic to argue for the possibility of a *critical rationalist model of inter-civilisational dialogue*. In addition, the shift from viewing Critical Rationalism, as an *irrational faith* in reason to a *theory of rationality*, has played a crucial role in the development of the ideal type of open global society. Critical Rationalism, as a meta-civilisational theory of rationality, leads the thesis to explore the essential principles of a rational dialogue among world civilisations. It argues that the first principle of a rational dialogue of civilisations is that they use valid deductive arguments in their global dialogue. The second principle of such a rational dialogue is looking for 'falsifier' evidence, as the mechanism of the growth of rationality through learning from mutual criticism. The third principle is respecting the possibility of the approximation to the truth through a rational dialogue. As such, despite Absolutism and Relativism, Critical Rationalism leads to realise the epistemic possibility of a rational dialogue among civilisations of peoples.

The thesis recognises an important link between *epistemology* and *social theory*, and uses this critical link to argue for a new micro-foundation for the development of a new macrosociology of globalisation. An important analytical achievement of the thesis is introducing a critical rationalist model of human action that may advance Habermas' communicative action model. In this way, the thesis provides a new analytical framework for the macrosociology of globalisation based on a new analysis of the origins of action's goals. This leads the thesis to a critical rationalist model of social learning as motor forces of global social changes. The model provides the analytical model for exploring globalisation as a set of global learning process.

10.2 Major Findings of the Macrosociology of Dialogic Globalisation

The thesis developed its macrosociology of dialogic globalisation in three major steps. The first step was the description of contemporary globalisation as the development of a liberal form of globality. The second step was criticising liberal globality due to its unsocial sociability. The third step was introducing an alternative ideal type of globality (open global society) and a dialogic globalisation. This section highlights the key findings of these three major steps toward a critical rationalist macrosociology of globalisation.

In order to explain the reasons why contemporary globalisation can be analysed as the transformation of the Westphalian world order into a liberal globality, the thesis took an epistemic-institutional approach to the globalisation concept. It argued that increasing global interconnectivity could be explained in the context of a global qualitative institutional change from the Westphalian order towards a post-national political economy, in which national obstacles for the expansion of transnational connectivity have been systematically reduced. In this sense, global interconnectivity finds a new institutional meaning. Using the critical rationalist analytical framework, the thesis argued that liberal globalisation can be described as a global learning process, containing three cultural, political, and economic sub-learning processes. The macrosociology of globalisation addresses the interplay amongst these three sub-learning processes due to the key role of the liberalism-- as a social philosophy: A philosophy that rests on a relativist epistemology and a utilitarian ethics, in which human action-goals are subjective, and there is not an inter-subjective criterion to identify the rationality of action-goals. If action-goals are determined purely subjectively and a rational agreement over competing conceptions of the good (the ultimate goals of action) is not possible, the best way of social ordering of liberal (wo)men is to allow them free to opt and act as they wish.

Along with this line of analysis, the thesis introduced the globalisation of liberal social philosophy, as a global epistemic shift from the logic of the struggle for political power to the logic of competition for economic interests. This top-down global epistemic shift refers to an inter-bloc cultural learning regarding the model of social ordering of peoples. If contemporary globalisation indicates a big reduction in the nation state's control of national political economy and an opening of borders to the transnational exchanges, and if the military-political sector is losing dominance as

the defining process of world politics, such a liberalisation of politics and economy cannot be analysed without recognising a cultural or epistemic turn in global social philosophy, i.e. from the Hobbesian model to the Lockean one.

The thesis offers a cultural history of the emergence of Western liberal democracy and its expansion to the Western bloc of liberal democracies in order to show that such a global epistemic shift, or cultural learning, started in the West, but became globalised through inter-bloc learning and institutional reforms, when the Eastern bloc realized the relative advantages of the liberal model of social order in comparison with its own the former Communist model. One key contribution of the thesis' macrosociology to Globalisation Studies refers to an explanation of how such relative advantage of liberal social philosophy—i.e. an ideational motor force—affected the collapse of the Cold War political order, and accordingly paved the way for the formation of a post national market. In this way, an interplay between a global expansion of the liberal ideal type of social organisation and the emergence of post-national political economy *was* analytically unmasked by the thesis' macrosociology of globalisation.

The thesis discussed when early modern Europeans accepted liberal accounts of human nature and social organisation, a deep-seated epistemic shift occurred from the individual as the subject of a monarchy's rule towards the individual as possessor of the equal property rights and self-governance. Such a *micro-epistemic shift* in the conception of the person itself led to a resulting *macro-institutional change* from the institution of monarchy to liberal democracy as one set of modern social institutions market economy and constitutional state. In this sense, the ideas of liberal thinkers, such as John Locke and David Hume, among others, provided epistemic inputs for liberal social movements who were involved in a social transformation from monarchies to liberal democracies.

Liberal ideas and values also helped the Western liberal democracies to shape a liberal bloc of nation-state despite all of their internal differences and diversities, in order to faces the challenge of its international competitor, i.e. the Soviet bloc. Liberal logic convinced liberal democracies to view each other as *useful means* to form a new Western- bloc of liberal democratic states for dealing with such an emerging international threat. The relative advantages of a liberal model of social organisation, because of its more ideational consistency compared with the Eastern rival, led to its

practical success in an inter-bloc competition. When political leadership of the Soviet Union faced its domestic and international crises in the 1980s, it practically realised such an ideational advantage. In this sense, an inter-bloc learning about the cultural model of social organisation, reflected in corresponding institutional reforms, resulted in the collapse of the Cold War political system.

The thesis argues that the emergence of liberal global governance was not merely a result of the West's political win. It originated from a global epistemic shift, due to inter-bloc cultural learning that justified the need for superseding the Hobbesian logic by the Lockean model. In this sense, the thesis introduces liberal globalisation as an epistemic-institutional transition from the centrality of the struggle for political power to a competition for economic interests. The collapse of the Cold War already originated from a type of *global epistemic refutation* of the Hobbesian model of social organization. The Soviet Union's political leadership in fact learned from critiques of the Soviet's model of social organisation.

The end of the Cold War led to the emergence of multi-centric global governance in which nation-state actors no longer play the main role in the political organisation of the world. This political transformation from the Westphalian system into a post-national constellation paved the way for the formation of a transnational market in which the main units of economic action are private sectors rather than nation-states. Hence, the cultural and political sub-processes of liberal globalisation provided the required institutional preconditions for the emergence of a post-national economy in which the Lockean philosophy i.e. competition for economic interests finds its ultimate manifestation.

Using the normative ideal type of open global society, the thesis contributes to a new normative critique of contemporary globalisation. The unsocial sociability of liberal globality should be traced in the liberal model of social order in which human beings are viewed, as useful means for each other rather ends in themselves. The modern liberal (wo) man is forced to collaborate with others yet s/he is thinking only about subjective ends of her/himself for which there is not an inter-subjective or objective yardstick. As competitors, they are not obliged to do 'good' to each other. As Rousseau argues, none of the great human passions can emerge in such a society because self-love is a unique passion of modern liberal (wo) man. As Habermas reminds us, in such an individualistic liberal society, persons can do and permit what

they will according to their own preferences and value orientations within the limits of legally permissible action. However, they are not required to take into account any mutual interest for each other. The legally requisite respect for private liberties, that all competitors are entitled to, is something very different from the equal respect for the human worth of each individual. In contrast to this liberal social philosophy, Critical Rationalism leads to the social philosophy of an open society according to which individuals can agree upon a certain common goals because their action-goals are not determined *entirely subjective and arbitrary* that could be regarded as a *moral anarchy*. But the action-goals can be identified through an *inter-subjective consensus that is always open to rational criticism*.

To an extent liberal globalisation advocates such a utilitarian mentality as the essence of a global competition for economic interests, where there is not a bottom-up global consensus on this ideal type of social organisation. An important cultural shortfall of liberal globality is the lack of a global consensus on its model of social philosophy; hence it imposes such a model of global organisation unilaterally. Liberal globality has not created a global governance accountable to the world's population. Hence, it suffers from a shortage of global political legitimacy. Its cultural and political deficiencies have made liberal form of globality a highly uneven distribution of globalisation's costs and benefits. In sum, the thesis' normative critique of liberal globality leads us to realise an inter-linkage among the cultural, political, and economic causes of 'unsocial sociability' of contemporary globalisation.

In addition to its normative critique of liberal globality, the macrosociology of dialogic globalisation introduces an alternative 'humane globalisation' through which the unsocial sociability of liberal globality could be dialogically overcome. To this end, the thesis introduces the five layers of an ideal type global social learning process. It uses a critical rationalist logic of learning from mutual openness to rational criticism to address epistemic and institutional possibilities of altering liberal globality into a just and democratic global order.

The thesis proposes the philosophical layer of such a normative global social learning as the most fundamental epistemic driving force of the transformation from liberal globality into an open global society. It argues that if civilisations of peoples activate their potential access to critical rationality, they can enter to a rational dialogue over their competing systems of rationale. Critical Rationalism, as a meta-

civilisational theory of rationality, implies that if civilisations of peoples respect the principles of rational dialogue, they would lead to a global standard of rationality.

The thesis shows that such a philosophical layer of global (inter-civilisational) learning is necessary for the emergence of a *globally shared conception of human equality* based on humans' equal access to critical rationality. Without such a globally shared account of human being as the end in themselves, in Kant's terms, the unsocial sociability of liberal globality cannot be overcome. In other words, as long as civilisations of peoples do not arrive at certain shared understanding of the equality of human beings, democratic global institutions, which must protect such equality, will not find a cultural justification. The modern shape of an inter-civilisational dialogue must go beyond its previous forms in order to create a globally shared account of the individual's nature and rights, on which basis global institutions of democracy and justice can be dialogically established.

The thesis then introduces other layers of such an ideal type global social learning. Recognising the five layers of social learning as *prescriptive explanations*, it argues for a logical consistency of the analytical model of global learning. The thesis attempts to advocate one set of potential and normatively justified layers of global social learning at the core of its critical rationalist model of dialogic globalisation. The thesis recognises the normative nature of its proposed model of dialogic global learning, but it argues that such a normative model has been constructed based on the rational and objective premise of humans' access to critical rationality, which is rooted in the reality of the limits of human rationality. Hence, the thesis' normative model of global social learning rests upon epistemology of critical rationalism and the possibility of the growth of human rationality via an inter-subjective openness to rational criticism. As such, the thesis has not constructed its analytical and normative model of inter-civilisational dialogue based on a subjective or an arbitrary criterion. To the contrary, it has formulated based on an inter-subjective standard of human rationality that takes its own paradigm from sciences. Popper's philosophy of sciences, or his theory of knowledge, is employed to construct the thesis' analytical model of rational dialogue among world civilisations—as the mechanism of a global social change from contemporary unjust global order towards an open global society. In sum, the thesis' key contribution to Globalisation Studies refers to a systematic integration of Popper's theory of knowledge in the macrosociology of globalisation.

10.3 Towards a ‘Scientific Research Programme’ For ‘Building Open Global Society’

Chapter 9 discussed the Building Global Democracy (BGD) Programme as an action-oriented international programme, including the five research projects. This section aims to use the insights of the thesis’ macrosociology of dialogic globalisation in order to introduce general themes of a ‘*scientific research programme*’ for building open global society.

The BGD programme justifies the need for a global research on global democracy in this way: “in contrast to the many major research programmes that have developed across the world concerning global economic welfare, global security threats and global ecological changes—similar large systematic efforts have not attended to issues of global democracy. Amidst worries about competition, violence and environmental crisis in contemporary globalization, democracy easily gets lost in the research and policy shuffle. The Building Global Democracy programme is meant as one initiative to right this imbalance.”⁸⁵⁸ I shall argue that there is another important imbalance in the global research agenda; that is, the lack of a systematic programme for a large-scale effort to scientifically investigate the question of how a global society of free and equal citizens can be built. In a word, we require a research programme to explore interrelated cultural, political, and economic dynamics of globalisation in the context of a global macrosociological research programme. It is worthy of note that building global democracy or justice cannot be realised without the construction of an inter-cultural infrastructure for a democratic and just global order. The ideal type of open global society introduced the systematic links between global democracy and cultural dialogue of civilisations on the one side, and global democracy and a just world economy on the other side. Without such a macrosociological research, how can we explore interface among global democracy, global dialogue and global justice?

In order to introduce the general themes of such a scientific macrosociological programme, that can be called as Building Open Global Society Programme, I first recall that the thesis has attempted to offer an analytical model for exploring systematic links amongst the cultural, political, and economic sub-processes of a macrosociological process of dialogic globalisation. However, this section discusses such an *analytical model* should be advanced to a well-developed *macrosociological*

⁸⁵⁸ See “Building Global Democracy: Programme Prospectus, 2008-2012,” p.10.
www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org.

theory of globalisation. The thesis introduced a micro-macro link between a *critical rationalist model of human action* and a *critical rationalist model of social learning* to address the interactions amongst aforementioned sub-processes. In order to formulate a critical rationalist-based macrosociological theory of globalisation, those models of human action and social learning must be developed to a *theory of action* and a *theory social learning*.

To advance the thesis' critical rationalist *model* of human action to a *theory* of rational action, a more comprehensive inquiry into competing theories of human action is required. The thesis used the three-fold model of human action, namely the Hobbesian, the Lockean, and the Kantian models. These models can be expanded, for instance, by including Anthony Giddens' Structuration-Action theory⁸⁵⁹ and Hans Joas' Creative Action theory, among others.⁸⁶⁰ By analogy, the critical rationalist *model* of social learning can be developed to a *theory* of social learning by further inquiries into the sociological theories of learning and social changes.⁸⁶¹

Given the necessity of these general theoretical researches, we need to explore how one set of theoretical, empirical and comparative investigations in epistemology, action theory, cultural theory, civilisational studies, political philosophy, social justice and sociological theory must be systematically interlinked in order to develop a scientific research programme for building an open global society. Such a macrosociological research programme would be a truly inter-disciplinary research programme.

In order to outline some potential themes of such a research programme, I begin with what Jeffery Alexander has called Strong Programme in Cultural Sociology.⁸⁶² As I shall discuss, this programme that can be linked with what S.N. Eisenstadt terms a scientific project of a *civilisational turn* in sociological theory, which has a close tie with Donald Nielsen's call for an integration of the competing systems of rationale into the very fabric of a comparative macrosociology of world civilisations. Recognising these relationships, I will then situate these interlinked areas of research

⁸⁵⁹ See Anthony Giddens, *The Constitutions of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration*, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1984).

⁸⁶⁰ See Hans Joas, *The Creativity of Action* (1996).

⁸⁶¹ See P. Sztompka, *The Sociology of Social Change*, (Oxford, Blackwell: 1993).

⁸⁶² For more information on this programme see: Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, <http://ccs.research.yale.edu>.

in Bjorn Wittrock's argument for the existence of the full potential of a research on the interplay between the cultural crystallisations and macro- institutions trajectories. Finally, I shall discuss that all of these intrwoven research areas can be systematically connected with our Popperian-informed epistemology of Critical Rationalism. In addition, as an applied research, the programme of building an open global society should response to the question of how such theoretical explorations can be applied for shaping a global collective action frame against existing unjust global order.

In his Strong Programme in Cultural Sociology, Alexander leads us to see the importance of a *radical cultural turn* in sociological theory:

Cultural sociology can be as hardheaded and critical as materialistic sociology. Cultural sociology makes collective emotions and ideas central to its methods and theories precisely because it is such subjective and internal feelings that so often seem to rule the world. Socially constructed subjectivity forms the will of collectivities; shapes the rules of organizations; defines the moral substance of law, and provides the meaning and motivation for technologies, economies, and military machines. ... We would like to suggest that *a strong program* also might be emerging in the sociological study of culture. Such an initiative argues for a sharp analytical uncoupling of culture from social structure, which is what we mean by *cultural autonomy*... As compared to the sociology of culture, cultural sociology depends on establishing this autonomy, and *it is only via such a strong program that sociologists can illuminate the powerful role that culture plays in shaping social life* (emphasis added).⁸⁶³

As Baert and da Silva remark, Alexander argues for a radical *cultural refounding* of sociological theory.⁸⁶⁴ The importance of this radical cultural refounding of our research programme for building an open global society is that it provides us with a new sociological theory, according to which we can investigate an *independent explanatory role* of the cultural dialogue among civilisations in the rise of one set of globally constructed subjectivities about the equality of human beings and a people-centric model of social ordering of such equal persons. These subjectivities can in turn shape the rules of global organisations, the moral substance of global law and the meaning and motivation for global democracy and global justice. Having said that, a major theme of the research programme for building an open global society could be addressing the question of how such subjectivities can be constructed globally--as an independent force for the creation of a global cultural solidarity.

⁸⁶³ Jeffery C. Alexander, *The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology* (2003), p.13.

⁸⁶⁴ See Baert and da Silva, *Social Theory in Twentieth Century*, (2010), p.83.

For Alexander, the strong programme in cultural sociology defines *culture* as *webs of significance* that guide *action*. However, he argues that we need a new *cultural theory* to explain the precise mechanisms through which webs of meaning influence human action. In a word, the cultural sociology must employ a theory of culture that has built the cultural autonomy into the fabric of the webs of meaning. This paves the way for a macrosociological theory that explains how an institutional manifestation of the webs of meaning shapes the rules of social organisations that guide action.⁸⁶⁵ Alexander calls for a Structural Hermeneutics approach to the cultural sociology. The approach employs a hermeneutically reconstruction of the webs of meaning and analyses the culture as the webs of meaning that is underpinned by signs and symbols that are in patterned relationships, i.e., the structural patterns that can be translated into formal models applicable across cultural boundaries.

Against this background, the programme of building an open global society requires an investigation of how a cultural exchange of the webs of meaning among world civilizations, in particular regarding their radically different conceptions of human nature and models of social order can take shape. More importantly, how such an inter-civilisational dialogue can construct a global collective subjectivity, which is principally capable of shaping the rules of global organisation.

The development of a strong cultural sociology of open global society needs to explore how the civilisational units of contemporary world order can be investigated due to their potential for a rational exchange of their webs of meaning in order to build a globally shared web of meaning on the human nature and social organisation. Hence, the programme needs to investigate how world civilisations have historically produced and interchanged their webs of meaning and what are possibilities for improving this exchange for the creation of a global cultural solidarity.

This leads us to the second important theme of our programme: the question of how civilisational studies can be integrated in the cultural sociology of globalisation. As Johann Arnason argues, Eisenstadt's civilisational theory has paved the way for an application of Alexander's programme of cultural sociology at an inter-civilisational scale.⁸⁶⁶ According to him, "S.N. Eisenstadt's work represents the most systematic attempt to theorize the civilizational dimension of the social-historical world. In this

⁸⁶⁵ Alexander, op. cit., pp.21-23.

⁸⁶⁶ See Johann P. Arnason, "The Cultural Turn and the Civilizational Approach," (2010), pp.67-82.

case, civilizational perspectives are crucial to a comprehensive restructuring of sociological theory...⁸⁶⁷ As argued in chapter 8, Eisenstadt's theoretical project of a civilisational turn in macrosociological theory emphasises that, "central analytical core of the concept of civilization ... is the combination of ontological or cosmological visions of transmundane and mundane reality, with the definition, construction and regulation of the major arenas of social life and interaction."⁸⁶⁸ This account of civilisation leads us to explore how a rational exchange of the webs of meaning regarding civilisations' world-views of the human nature and social organisation may lead to a new socially constructed global subjectivity, which provides the required moral substance for realising global democracy and justice at the core of global social organisation.

Our scientific research programme calls for a comparative historical research on actual variations in the operation of reason and rationale systems across civilisations in order to explore how competing accounts of rationality themselves have played a key epistemic function in the formation of civilisational world-views and webs of meaning. As Donald Nielsen remarks, "we still lack a full historical and sociological analysis of the ideas and institutions connected with the various notions themselves of reason, rationale, rationalization... ." ⁸⁶⁹ Viewed from this perspective, the third major theme of the programme can be an exploration of the question of how competing systems of rationale have affected the nature of the existing cultural dialogue among world civilisations and what are reasonable potentials for the emergence of a globally shared standard of rationality and rational dialogue. Similar to the Building Global Democracy programme, conducting regional and civilisational case studies regarding this theme would be an effective way for addressing the above question.

The fourth theme of our research programme can be defined based on the need for an investigation of how cultural crystallisations across civilisations have shaped their macro-societal institutional trajectories. A global application of this investigation may lead the research programme to new causal explanation of the interplay between the

⁸⁶⁷ Johann P. Arnason, "Civilizational analysis, social theory and comparative history," p.231 in Gerard Delanty, *The Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory*, (London, Routledge: 2005). Also see: S.N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, vols 1 and 2, (Leiden, Brill: 2003),

⁸⁶⁸ Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, vol.1 (2003), p.34.

⁸⁶⁹ Donald Nielsen, "A Theory of Communicative Action or a Sociology of Civilizations? A Critique of Jurgen Habermas," (1987), pp.163 and 165.

cultural dialogue among civilisations and building global democracy and social justice. Wittrock discusses the full potential of research on an interplay between cultural crystallisations and the emergence of macro-institutional trajectories across world civilisations. He suggests “the term cultural crystallization to denote periods of fundamental reconceptualisations of positions on these phenomenological dimensions, leading to basic reconfigurations or reassertions of macro-institutional practices.”⁸⁷⁰ On a global scale, our research programme should explore how a new fundamental reconceptualisation of positions about the equality of human beings-- which should be constructed through a rational dialogue of civilisations-- can affect the emergence of the global institutions of democracy and justice. If world civilisations do not change their different accounts of rationality, human nature and social organisation, can they arrive at a socially constructed subjectivity concerning a set of people-centric global institutions?

The Building Open Global Society programme should explore the potentials of the interplay between an inter-civilisational reconceptualisation of positions regarding human rationality, the equality of persons and a people-centric social organisation on the one hand and a fundamental institutional transition from the existing liberal global governance towards the social institutions of open global society on the other hand. The mechanisms of the interplay between cultural reconfiguration and institutional change can be investigated in the context of the five layers of a critical rationalist ideal type of global social learning. The functions of each layer and their interactions must be subjected to deeper investigations by the research programme.

Critical Rationalism, as a meta-civilisational theory of rationality provides our research programme with a new micro-foundation for the formulation of a cultural sociology of open global society. However, the programme requires exploring how a critical rationalist theory of human action can be systematically integrated into the very fabric of a theory of global culture, which aims to build the autonomy of global culture as motors of global social change towards an open global society. This also leads the research programme to rethinking the key role of *human agency* in micro (global citizenship level) and macro (global social movement level) in the context of the notions of human’s access to critical rationality and self-liberation through inter-subjective learning from rational criticism.

⁸⁷⁰ See Wittrock, "History and Sociology," (2009), pp.104-105.

As James Farr persuasively argues, “for Popper, understanding—that is, objective understanding—is essentially a matter of problem-solving by conjecture and refutation. The rational reconstruction of problem-solving takes on this dialectical and admittedly oversimplified schema: P1—TT—EE—p2. ...Popper claims that problem-solving by conjecture and refutation is ‘*an explanatory theory of human action* [or human agency]... In this way, Popper forges a systematic and highly suggestive link between the *theories of science, human action, and interpretive understanding*” (emphasis added).⁸⁷¹ As such, the fifth major theme of the research programme could be an investigation of how Critical Rationalism, as a conjectural theory of rationality, can operate as an explanatory theory of human agency on the micro and the macro levels. As noted in chapter 5, David Harper has systematically employed Popper’s conjectural theory of knowledge in order to show economic actors, in particular economic entrepreneurs, operate as the key agency of the market process.⁸⁷² However, we need also a critical rationalist theory of entrepreneurship, as David Harper argues, in order to explore how global elites and global social movements can play the key agency roles in shaping the processes of an open global society formation. This thesis has attempted to internalise Popper’s theory of knowledge in an analytical model of human agency through a self-liberation social learning. However, it can be advanced to a knowledge-based theory of human agency for addressing the potential agency roles of global social movements and the prospective global citizens in the formation of a just and free global society.

As argued in chapter 9, one of the greatest challenges of the existing collective action frames against neo-liberal form of globalisation originates from the lack of a globally constructed subjective consensus upon such collective action frames. Hence, another major theme of our research programme can be defined as a response to the following questions: ‘how can intellectuals use the normative capacity of the ideal type of a just and free global society to pave the way for the emergence of a global solidarity among people?’ and ‘how can global social movements translate such a global cultural solidarity into practical meanings and motivations for the prospective global citizens to effectively mobilise their critical rationalist agencies for building an open global society of free and equal persons?’

⁸⁷¹ See James Farr, "Popper's Hermeneutics," (1983), p.163.

⁸⁷² See Harper, *Entrepreneurship and Market Process* (1996), and Harper, *Foundations of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development*, (2003)

As Robert Fine remarks, “Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right is widely viewed as the philosophical origin of modern cosmopolitan thought.”⁸⁷³ Kant referred to his own time as an ‘age of enlightenment,’ he did not claim that his time was an enlightened age, but rather that enlightenment was the intellectual project of his age— its social imaginary.⁸⁷⁴ Fine writes:

The age of cosmopolitanism may be understood analogously: *more a philosophical perspective for viewing the potentialities of our age and acting ethically within it*, than an objective characterisation of the age itself. It might be helpful to say ... that the cosmopolitan outlook expresses a new ‘*imaginary community*’ in the minds of men and women that does have actually existing references but whose *virtual existence transcends* anything yet established in fact (emphasis added).⁸⁷⁵

The ideal type of open global society presents a Kantian-inspired cosmopolitan outlook, as a ‘global imaginary community’, for viewing the potentialities of our access to critical rationality and their capabilities for realising a cosmopolitan society of free and equal citizens. This thesis introduced an important interplay between ‘ideas’ like the idea of an imaginary community of free and equal peoples who have access to critical rationality and the potentialities of a global fundamental organisational change from the competition for power and interests towards a rational dialogue, human solidarity, and social cooperation as individuals who regards each other as ‘ends’ in themselves. The thesis argued that without a substantive epistemological and moral shift from the existing utilitarian and subjective accounts of rationality towards an inter-subjective global rationality, we cannot transform legal, political, and economic institutions of liberal globality. However, we need much more theoretical and applied research to clearly spell out such epistemological and moral shifts and their implications for building an open global society.

The thesis’s macrosociology of globalisation is an effort to explain how Critical Rationalism, as a meta-civilisational theory of human rationality, can contribute to the emergence of a multi-civilisational global society of free and equal citizens through a rational (open to criticism) dialogue among civilisations. The proposed scientific research programme shows how Critical Rationalism’s contributions to Globalisation Studies can be advanced through new set of systematic scientific efforts.

⁸⁷³ Robert Fine, “Kant’s Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel’s Critique,” *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 29 (6) (2003), p.609.

⁸⁷⁴ See Kant, *Political Writing* (1991).

⁸⁷⁵ Robert Fine, “Cosmopolitanism: A Social Science Research Agenda,” p, 246 in Delanty, *The Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory* (2005).

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