

# Deanononymisation of Clients in Bitcoin P2P Network

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## ABSTRACT

Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be changed frequently in order to increase transaction unlinkability.

We present an efficient method to deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link user pseudonyms to the IP addresses where the transactions are generated. Our techniques work for the most common and the most challenging scenario when users are behind NATs or firewalls of their ISPs. They allow to link transactions of a user behind a NAT and to distinguish connections and transactions of different users behind the same NAT. We also show that a natural countermeasure of using Tor or other anonymity services can be cut-off by abusing anti-DoS countermeasures of the Bitcoin network. Our attacks require only a few machines and have been experimentally verified. The estimated success rate is between 11% and 60% depending on how stealthy an attacker wants to be. We propose several countermeasures to mitigate these new attacks.

## Categories and Subject Descriptors

C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—*Security and protection*; K.4.4 [Computers And Society]: Electronic Commerce—*Cybercash, digital cash*; K.4.1 [Computers And Society]: Public Policy Issues—*Privacy*

## Keywords

Bitcoin; Anonymity; P2P; Tor

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Digital currency based on cryptography is not a new idea [6] but till recently it did not attract much attention. It changed

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rapidly with introduction of Bitcoin [12]. Bitcoin is a decentralized digital currency which does not rely on a trusted issuing entity but rather on a peer-to-peer network with peers minting Bitcoins by brute-forcing double SHA-256 hash function. To make the money generation process computationally hard, the Bitcoin protocol requires the minters to present the hash value of a data block with new portion of Bitcoins and new transactions to have a certain number of zeros (an instance of the *Proof-of-Work* concept).

Bitcoin is now accepted as a currency by many companies from online retailer Overstock to exotic Virgin Galactic. One of its main advantages over bank transfers is its decentralized architecture and absence of intermediaries. This prevents shutting it down or seizing by a government. Bitcoin money transfers are non-refundable, reasonably fast<sup>1</sup> and allow to send money to any part of the world. The Bitcoin peer network consists of homogeneous nodes and provides peer discovery and reputation mechanisms to achieve stability. The number of Bitcoin peers is estimated to be about 100,000 nowadays. The vast majority of these peers (we call them *clients*), about 90%, are located behind NAT and do not allow any incoming connections, whereas they choose 8 outgoing connections to *servers* (Bitcoin peers with public IP).

In a Bitcoin transaction, the address of money sender(s) or receiver(s) is a hash of his public key. We call such address a *pseudonym* to avoid confusion with the IP address of the host where transactions are generated, and the latter will be called just *address* throughout the text. In the current Bitcoin protocol the entire transaction history is publicly available so anyone can see how Bitcoins travel from one pseudonym to another and potentially link different pseudonyms of the same user together. A theoretical possibility of such attack was already mentioned in the original Bitcoin paper [12]. Since then several papers [11, 15] showed that it is indeed possible by analysing the transaction graph to cluster pseudonyms to different users. Combined with some other sources (e.g. forum posts), the clusters (and thus the users) can sometimes be mapped to real identities [14, 11]. Even so, these methods are not generic, and the problem of how to tie a Bitcoin address to an actual identity remained unsolved.

Evidently, studying the entire IP traffic of the Bitcoin peers would reveal the origins of each transaction and disclose the identities of many users, but how much can be

<sup>1</sup>The network sees a transaction immediately, but the receiver has to wait for 1-2 hours to be sure that there is no double-spending.

achieved by an ordinary attacker with a few machines and no access to clients behind NAT has been unclear.

Lerner [10] and Koshy et al. [9] were the first who attempted an attack in this direction. A vulnerability which allowed to link IP addresses of clients to their Bitcoin wallets' addresses was reported by Lerner [10]. The vulnerability exploited a protection against "penny-flooding" which prevents a transaction with very low fees and big size to be forwarded or even stored by a Bitcoin peer. The protection tested if a transaction was from a wallet owned by the user, and if it was the case, then the protection was skipped. This allowed an attacker to test if a peer possessed a Bitcoin address by sending him specifically crafted transactions. The vulnerability required that the attacker had a connection to a peer (thus targeting either Bitcoin servers or clients which established connections to the attacker). This vulnerability was fixed since version 0.7.2.

Koshy et al. [9] managed to deanonymize 1162 addresses over the period of 5 months. Their approach, however, is limited to the transactions that expose anomalous behaviour like transactions relayed only once or transaction that were relayed multiple times by the same IP. Secondly, the proposed method only allows to get IP addresses of servers, which constitute only 10% of the network, and not of the clients. Finally, their paper does not discuss the case when a Bitcoin peer protects himself by proxying his transactions through the Tor anonymity network.

### *Our contributions.*

In this paper we describe a generic method to deanonymize a significant fraction of Bitcoin users and correlate their pseudonyms with public IP addresses. The method explicitly targets the clients (i.e. peers behind NAT or firewalls) and can differentiate the nodes with the same public IP. Furthermore, our method also handles the case when the clients use anonymity services like Tor. If a client uses two different pseudonyms during a single session, and even if they are unrelated in the transaction graph so that the linkage would be totally unachievable via the transaction graph analysis [11], our method is likely to catch it and glue the pseudonyms together. The method is generic and might be used in other P2P networks.

The crucial idea is that each client can be uniquely identified by a set of nodes he connects to (*entry nodes*). We show that this set can be learned at the time of connection and then used to identify the origin of a transaction.

Our attack requires only a few machines that establish a certain number of connections by Bitcoin protocol and log the incoming traffic. In a concrete example, an attacker with a few GB of storage and no more than 50 connections to each Bitcoin server can disclose the sender's IP address in 11%<sup>2</sup> of all transactions generated in the Bitcoin network. If the attacker tolerates one false positive per identification, the success rate grows to 35%. If he also allows a slight DoS of the network, he may achieve deanonymization rates up to 60% without false positives, which has been confirmed by the experiments in the Bitcoin test network. We estimate the cost of the attack on the full Bitcoin network to be under 1500 EUR per month.

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<sup>2</sup>The actual fraction of deanonymized transactions depends on how stealthy an attacker wants to be.

The computational power needed to disclose the sender of a single transaction is negligible and is far smaller than the amount of work needed to process the transaction graph in [14, 11]. For the best of our knowledge this is the first attack which targets Bitcoin peers behind NAT. Our attack does not assume any anomaly in the behaviour of peers or in the traffic and would work even if Bitcoin would encrypt the connection. It might be applicable to other digital currencies derived from Bitcoin.

As another interesting though unrelated to deanonymisation idea we look at how to decrease block mining difficulty by creating an alternative blockchain reality. This becomes important since Bitcoin by design is not adaptive to rapid drops in hash power of miners and might become necessary in case of many miners quit mining. This is not just a hypothetical case, since Bitcoin exchange rate can fall suddenly and rapidly, making block mining unprofitable.

### *Roadmap.*

Our paper is structured as follows:

- We give necessary background of how Bitcoin works and the rules its peers follow to broadcast their addresses and transactions.
- As a first step towards deanonymization, we show how to prohibit Bitcoin clients from using the Tor anonymity network by exploiting Bitcoin anti-DoS protection mechanism (Section 3).
- We show how to learn the connections of the Bitcoin clients in Section 4.
- We finally show how to identify the sender of a transaction (i.e. deanonymize him) in Section 5. We recover the public IP address of the sender and further differentiate clients sharing the same public IP.
- We discuss how to choose parameters of the attack and its success rate and explain our experiments on the test network. We also propose countermeasures to mitigate the attack.
- As an extra result, we outline a strategy to lower the difficulty of the system by adding a properly selected value to the list of checkpoints nodes hard-coded in the client code. It can be used by the entire community if the mining becomes unbearable and non-profitable, or by malicious administrators who want to ruin the system (Section 9).

*Ethical considerations.* All vulnerabilities described in this paper were reported to Bitcoin core developers. When possible we carried out experiments in the Bitcoin test network. To protect user privacy, we restricted from performing a full-scale deanonymization in the real network. However, gathering some statistics required us conducting experiments on the main network, which did not cause disruption or exposure of the main network.

## **2. BACKGROUND**

In this section we provide a basic overview of the Bitcoin system. Originating from a proof-of-concept source code and an accompanying it white paper [12], the Bitcoin protocol never had been fully documented, and is de-facto the

functionality of the primary Bitcoin client, `bitcoind` [2]. In the following text we provide only the details of the protocol that are crucial to our research. These details are accumulated from the source code of `bitcoind` and to a large extent are explained in the informal wiki documentation [3].

### Block chain.

Bitcoin operates on a list of blocks, the *block chain*. Each block contains a header and transaction data<sup>3</sup>. The 80-byte header `Head` contains the 256-bit hash of the previous block  $H_{i-1}$ , the timestamp (in seconds)  $T_i$ , the 32-bit nonce  $N_i$  (used to generate blocks), the hash  $TX_i$  of the transaction data, and the difficulty parameter  $d_i$ . To be valid, the double-hash of the block header must be smaller (as an integer) than a certain value, which is a linear function of the difficulty parameter:

$$H_i = \text{SHA-256}(\text{SHA-256}(H_{i-1}||T_i||TX_i||d_i||N_i)) < f(d_i).$$

Currently it must be smaller than  $2^{192}$ , i.e. have its 64 most significant bits equal to zero.

The Bitcoin miners first collect all transactions not yet included into a block. Then they generate the header fields and exhaustively try different nonces, timestamps, and other parameters in order to obtain a valid block. They are rewarded by 25 BTC (about \$14,000 by current market rate), which is the very first transaction in the attached transaction list. Whenever a block is created, a miner broadcasts it to the network, so that each node attaches it into its internal block chain.

Payers and payees of the system are identified in the blockchain by their Bitcoin addresses, or *pseudonyms*. A pseudonym is the base58-encoding of the hash of the corresponding public key. Whenever a payer wants to transfer his coins to another user, he generates a transaction and signs it with his private key. Signed transactions are then added to the blockchain by miners. By checking the signature, other Bitcoin participants can verify the new ownership of the coins.

### Bitcoin P2P network

Peers of the Bitcoin network connect to each other over an unencrypted TCP channel. There is no authentication functionality in the network, so each node just keeps a list of IP addresses associated with its connections.




Figure 1: Bitcoin network

<sup>3</sup>All these conditions are strictly enforced, and a block not conforming to them is discarded immediately.

To avoid denial-of-service attacks, the Bitcoin protocol minimizes the amount of information forwarded by peers. Valid blocks and transactions are relayed whereas invalid blocks are discarded. Moreover, Bitcoin implements a reputation-based protocol with each node keeping a penalty score for every connection. Whenever a malformed message is sent to the node, the latter increases the penalty score of the connection and bans the “misbehaving” IP address for 24 hours when the penalty reaches the value of 100.

Though official `bitcoind` software does not explicitly divide its functionality between clients and servers, Bitcoin peers can be grouped into those which can accept incoming connections (servers) and those which can’t (clients), i.e. peers behind NAT or firewall, etc. At the time of writing there were about 8,000 reachable servers while the estimated number of clients was about 100,000.

By default Bitcoin peers (both clients and servers) try to maintain 8 outgoing connections. In addition, Bitcoin servers can accept up to 117 incoming connections (thus having up to 125 connections in total). If any of the 8 outgoing connections drop, a Bitcoin peer tries to replace them with new connections. If none of the 8 outgoing connections drop, the peer will stay connected to them until it is restarted. In case of a client, we call the 8 nodes to which it establishes connections *entry nodes* (see Fig. 1). A Bitcoin server accepts any number of connections from a single IP address as long as the threshold for the total number of connections is not reached.

### Address propagation.

The Bitcoin protocol implements an address propagation mechanism to help peers to discover other peers in the P2P network. Each Bitcoin peer maintains a list of addresses of other peers in the network and each address is given a timestamp which determines its freshness. Peers can request addresses from this list from each other using `GETADDR` messages and unsolicitedly advertise addresses known to them using `ADDR` messages<sup>4</sup>. Whenever a Bitcoin node receives an `ADDR` message it decides individually for each address in the message if to forward it to its neighbours. It first checks if (1) the total number of addresses in the corresponding `ADDR` message does not exceed 10, and (2) the attached timestamp is no older than 10 minutes. If either of these two checks fails, the address is not forwarded; otherwise the address is scheduled for forwarding<sup>5</sup> to two of the node’s neighbours in case the address is reachable and to one neighbour only if it is non-reachable. An address is considered *reachable* by a node if the node has a network interface associated with same address family. Otherwise the address is marked as *unreachable*. According to the current reference implementation Bitcoin nodes recognize three types of addresses: IPv4, IPv6, and OnionCat addresses [13]. Limiting the number of neighbours to which an address is forwarded reduces the total amount of traffic in the Bitcoin P2P network.

In order to choose neighbours to which to forward an address, a Bitcoin node does the following. For each of its neighbours it computes a hash of a value composed of the

<sup>4</sup>One `ADDR` message can contain any number of address, however messages containing more than 1000 addresses are rejected on the remote side.

<sup>5</sup>By scheduling a transmission we mean that the node puts the corresponding message to the outgoing queue but does not yet make the actual transmission.

following items: address to be forwarded, a secret salt, current day, and the memory address of the data structure describing the neighbour. The exact expression for the hashed value is of little importance for our attacks. The only thing which we need to emphasize is that the hash stays the same for 24 hours. The peer then sorts the list of its neighbours based on the computed hashes and chooses the first entry or two first entries (which depends on the reachability of the address). In the rest of the paper we call such nodes *responsible nodes* for the address.

The actual transmission of the scheduled ADDR messages does not happen immediately. Every 100 milliseconds one neighbour is randomly selected from the list of all peer's neighbours and the queue for outgoing ADDR messages is flushed for this node only. We call the node chosen at the beginning of a 100 milliseconds round *trickle node* and the procedure as a whole as *trickling*.

Consider an example on Fig. 2. Assume that node  $n_0$  gets an ADDR message with one address  $A_0$  from node  $n_3$  and that node  $n_0$  schedules to forward it to nodes  $n_1$  and  $n_2$  (i.e. these nodes are *responsible nodes* for address  $A_0$ ). In round 1 node  $n_1$  is chosen as a trickle node and the address is forwarded to this node while the delivery to  $n_2$  is still pending. After 100 milliseconds in round 2  $n_3$  is chosen as the trickle node thus no actual transmission happens at this stage. After another 100 milliseconds in round 3  $n_2$  is chosen as the trickle node and address  $A_0$  is finally sent to it. Choosing a trickle node causes random delays at each hop during an address propagation.




Figure 2: Trickling of ADDR messages

Finally for each connection, a Bitcoin peer remembers addresses that were forwarded over this connection. Before a peer forwards an address, it first checks if the same address was already sent over the connection. This history is cleared every 24 hours. An important note is that the history of sent addresses is kept per connection and not per IP, i.e. if a Bitcoin peer reconnects, its history will be cleared. The total number of addresses a Bitcoin peer can store is limited by 20480. Whenever new addresses arrive at a peer they replace old ones (according to specific rules which are outside of the scope of this paper). In addition when a peer

receives a GETADDR messages it sends back 23% of the number of addresses it stores but not more than 2500 addresses.

### Peer discovery.

After the startup a Bitcoin peer discovers its own IP addresses, which includes not only its network interfaces addresses but also the IP address as it is seen from the Internet (in the majority of cases for NAT users it resolves to an IP address of the peer's ISP). In order to discover the latter, the peer issues a GET request to two hard-coded web-sites which reply with the address. For each address obtained by the discover procedure, the peer assigns a score. Local interfaces initially get score 1, the external IP address gets score of 4 (in case the external IP address coincides with one of the local addresses the scores are summed). When a client establishes an outgoing connection to a remote peer, they first exchange VERSION messages and the client advertises its address with the highest score. The remote peer then uses the addresses propagation algorithm described above. The client repeats the same procedure for the remaining 7 outgoing connections.

### Transaction propagation.

Forwarding a transaction from one peer to another involves several steps. First the sender transmits an INVENTORY message with the hash of the transactions. Second, the receiver runs several checks on the transaction and if the checks pass, it requests the actual transaction by sending a GETDATA message. The sender then transmits the transaction in a TRANSACTION message. When the receiver gets the transaction he advertises it to its peers in an INVENTORY message.

When a client generates a transaction he schedules<sup>6</sup> it for forwarding to all of its neighbours. It then computes a hash of a value composed of the transaction hash and a secret salt. If the computed hash has two last bits set to zero the transaction is forwarded<sup>7</sup> immediately to all the 8 entry nodes. Otherwise a queue of a neighbour for outgoing transactions is flushed when the neighbour becomes the trickle node (the same as with ADDR messages). Obviously  $\frac{1}{4}$  of all transaction are forwarded immediately in average.

When a transaction is received it is scheduled for the delivery to all peer's neighbours as described above. As with ADDR messages, a Bitcoin peer maintains history of forwarded transactions for each connection. If a transaction was already sent over a connection it will not be resent again. A Bitcoin peer keeps all received transaction in a memory pool. If the peer received a transaction with the same hash as one in the pool or in a block in the main block chain, the received transaction is rejected.

## 3. DISCONNECTING FROM TOR

In this section we explain the first phase of our attack. We show how to prohibit the Bitcoin servers to accept connections via Tor and other anonymity services. This results in clients using their actual IP addresses when connecting to other peers and thus being exposed to the main phase of our attack, which correlates pseudonyms with IP addresses.

<sup>6</sup>By scheduling we mean that the node puts the transaction into the outgoing queue of the corresponding connection.

<sup>7</sup>More precisely the peer sends an INVENTORY message with the hash of the transaction.

This phase is quite noticeable, so a stealthy attacker may want to skip it and deanonymize only non-Tor users.

In the further text we discuss Tor, but the same method applies to other anonymity services with minor modifications. Briefly, the Tor network [7] is a set of relays (5397 for the time of writing) with the list of all Tor relays publicly available on-line. Whenever a user wants to establish a connection to a service through Tor, he chooses a chain of three Tor relays. The final node in the chain is called Tor Exit node and the service sees the connection as it was originated from this Tor Exit node.

To separate Tor from Bitcoin, we exploit the Bitcoin built-in DoS protection. Whenever a peer receives a malformed message, it increases the penalty score of the IP address from which the message came (if a client uses Tor, then the message will obviously come from one of the Tor exit nodes). When this score exceeds 100, the sender’s IP is banned for 24 hours. According to the `bitcoin` implementation, there are many ways to generate a message which would cause penalty of 100 and an immediate ban, e.g. one can send a block with empty transactions list<sup>8</sup> (the size of such a message is 81 bytes). It means that if a client proxied its connection over a Tor relay and sent a malformed message, the IP address of this relay will be banned.

This allows to separate any target server from the entire Tor network. For that we connect to the target through as many Tor nodes as possible. For the time of writing there were 1008 Tor exit nodes. Thus the attack requires establishing 1008 connections and sending a few MBytes in data. This can be repeated for all Bitcoin servers, thus prohibiting all Tor connections for 24 hours at the cost of a million connections and less than 1 GByte of traffic. In case an IP address of a specific Bitcoin node can be spoofed, it can be banned as well.

As a proof of concept we used the described method to isolate our Bitcoin node from a set of Tor exit relays.

## 4. LEARNING TOPOLOGY

Suppose that we have ruled out the case that the Bitcoin users, which we deanonymize, use Tor. Now we target clients, i.e. nodes that do not accept incoming connections, but have 8 outgoing connections to *entry nodes*. In this section we show how to learn these entry nodes.

The method is based on the fact that whenever a client  $C$  establishes a connection to one of its entry nodes, it advertises its address  $C_a$  as it is seen from the Internet (see section 2). If the attacker is already connected to an entry node, with some probability (which depends on the number of the attacker’s connections) the address  $C_a$  will be forwarded to him. This suggests the following strategy:

1. Connect to  $W$  Bitcoin servers, where  $W$  is close to the total number of servers.
2. For each advertised  $C_a$ , log the set  $E'$  of servers that forwarded  $C_a$  to attacker’s machines and designate it as the entry node subset  $E'_{C_a}$ .

There are two problems with this method. First, the entry node might send the client’s address to some non-attacker’s

<sup>8</sup>We validated this for Bitcoin core client version 0.8.6. For bitcoin clients with version older than 0.9.0 one can send a loose coinbase transaction.

peer. Second a client does not connect to all his entry nodes simultaneously, but there is a time gap between connections. In both cases, the advertised address reaches attacker’s machines via peers that are not entry nodes, which yields false (noisy) entries in  $E'_{C_a}$ .

### *Noise reduction technique.*

Our strategy of filtering noise assumes that either the client’s IP was already used in the Bitcoin network, which is quite common for the clients behind NAT or the client’s public IP is contained in a known list of IP addresses (e.g. within an IP range of a major ISP) which an attacker can use. If an attacker knows  $C_a$ , he restricts its propagation using the following fact:

- If the address had already been sent from  $A$  to  $B$ , it will not be forwarded over this connection again;

This suggests broadcasting  $C_a$  (or all the addresses under investigation) to all servers we are connected to. We suggest repeating this procedure every 10 minutes (see details below), though there could be other options. The adversary expects that when the client reconnects, the entry nodes will forward  $C_a$  to him, and even if they don’t, the address propagation will stop before it reaches the adversary via a non-entry node.

Eventually the attacker obtains the fraction  $p_{addr}$  of client’s entry nodes. The exact value of  $p_{addr}$  depends on the number of attacker’s connections, and it is computed for some parameters in Section 8.1. For instance, if an attacker establishes 35 connections to each potential entry node, which all had 90 connections beforehand, then he identifies 4 entry nodes out of 8 on average.

Here are some details. When the attacker advertises the  $C_a$ , each Bitcoin server chooses two *responsible nodes* to forward the address. The attacker then establishes a number of connections to each server in the network hoping that her nodes will replace some of the responsible nodes for address  $C_a$ . When client  $C$  connects to one of its entry nodes  $e1$ , it advertises its address. If one of attacker’s nodes replaced one of the responsible nodes, then the attacker will learn that client  $C$  might be connected to node  $e1$ . If the responsible nodes did not change address  $C_a$  will not be propagated further in the network.

Since the attacker advertised  $C_a$  to node  $e1$ , responsible nodes of  $e1$  might be replaced by some non-attacker nodes and the attack might fail. In Section 8 we show that the probability of this event is actually quite low given that the attacker re-sends its list of addresses frequently enough.

## 5. DEANONYMIZATION

We have prohibited Bitcoin servers from accepting Tor connections and showed how to find the entry nodes of clients. Now we describe the main phase of the deanonymization attack.

The main phase consists of four steps:

1. Getting the list  $S$  of servers. This list is regularly refreshed.
2. Composing a list  $C$  of Bitcoin clients for deanonymization.
3. Learning entry nodes of clients from  $C$  when they connect to the network.

- Listening to servers from  $S$  and mapping transactions to entry nodes and then to clients.

Eventually we create a list  $\mathbf{I} = \{(IP, Id, PK)\}$ , where  $IP$  is the IP address of a peer or its ISP,  $Id$  distinguishes clients sharing the same IP, and  $PK$  is the pseudonym used in a transaction (hash of a public key). Let us explain the steps in detail.

### Step 1. Getting the list of servers.

This phase of the attack is rather straightforward. An attacker first collects the entire list of peers by querying all known peers with a `GETADDR` message. Each address  $P$  in the response `ADDR` message can be checked if it is online by establishing a TCP connection and sending a `VERSION` message. If it is,  $P$  is designated as a server. An attacker can initiate the procedure by querying a small set of seed nodes and continue by querying the newly received IP addresses. The adversary establishes  $m$  connections to each server (we suggest 50 for the size of the current Bitcoin network).

### Step 2. Composing the deanonymization list.

The attacker selects a set  $\mathbf{C}$  of nodes whose identities he wants to reveal. The addresses may come from various sources. The attacker might take IP ranges of major Internet service providers, or collect addresses already advertised in the Bitcoin network. Finally, she might take some entries from the list of peers she obtained at Step 1.

### Step 3. Mapping clients to their entry nodes.

Now the attacker identifies the entry nodes of the clients that are connecting to the network. Equipped with the list  $C$  of addresses, the attacker runs the procedure described in Section 4. Let us estimate how many entry nodes are needed to uniquely identify the client.

Let us denote the set of entry nodes for  $P$  by  $E_P$ . We stress that it is likely that  $E_{P_1} \neq E_{P_2}$  even if  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  share the same IP address. For each  $P$  advertising its address in the network the attacker obtains a set of  $E'_P \subseteq E_P$ . Since there are about  $8 \cdot 10^3$  possible entry nodes out of  $10^5$  total peers (servers and clients together), the collisions in  $E'_P$  are unlikely if every tuple has at least 3 entry nodes:

$$\frac{10^5 \cdot 10^5}{(8 \cdot 10^3)^3} \ll 1.$$

Therefore, 3 entry nodes uniquely identify a user, though two nodes also do this for a large percent of users.

An attacker adds  $E_P$  to its database and proceeds to Step 4.

### Step 4. Mapping transactions to entry nodes.

This step runs in parallel to steps 1-3. Now an attacker tries to correlate the transactions appearing in the network with sets  $E'_P$  obtained in step 2. The attacker listens for `INVENTORY` messages with transaction hashes received over all the connections that she established and for each transaction  $T$  she collects  $R_T$  — the first  $q$  addresses of Bitcoin servers that forwarded the `INVENTORY` message. She then compares  $E'_P$  with  $R_T$  (see details below), and the matching entries suggest pairs  $(P, T)$ . In our experiments we take  $q = 10$ .

There could be many variants for the matching procedure, and we suggest the following version.

- The attacker composes all possible 3-tuples from all sets  $E'_P$  and looks for their appearances in  $R_T$ . If there is a match, he gets a pair  $(R, T)$ ;
- If there is no match, the attacker consider 2-tuples and then 1-tuples. Several pairs  $\{(P_i, T)\}$  can be suggested at this stage, but we can filter them with later transactions.

We made several experiments and collected some statistics to estimate the success of the attack. In our experiments on the testnet we established 50 connections to each server, obtained 6 out of 8 entry nodes on average, and the 3-tuples were detected and linked to the client in 60% of transactions (Section 7). In the real network, where we can establish fewer connections on average, our pessimistic estimate is 11% (Section 8), i.e. we identify 11% of transactions.

Finally, let us consider the approach where we identify clients by 2-tuples in the top-10. As detailed in Appendix A (and briefly stated in Section 7), for 35% of transactions the right client would be identified. However, each transaction might generate several false positives.

To estimate the false positive rate, we first calculate the average number of 2-tuples among the entry nodes we catch. For  $p_{addr} = 0.34$  each 2-tuple is detected with probability 0.115, so out of 28 possible 2-tuples we detect 3.2 on average. Each top-10 suggests 45 2-tuples, and there are  $2^{25}$  2-tuples at all (all tuples are unordered). If we work with a database of  $N$  clients, each transaction suggests  $N2^{7.3-25} = N/2^{17.7}$  candidate clients. If we track all 100,000 clients, we get the false positive rate around 0.28, which is slightly smaller than the probability 0.35 to detect the right client for a transaction. In other words, for each suggested client the probability that he is the right one is about 55%.

### Remark 1.

Step 4 of the attack depends on that some entry nodes of a client are among the first to forward the `INVENTORY` message with the transaction's hash. The intuition behind it is that it takes a number of steps for a transaction to propagate to the next hop. Fig. 3 shows steps that are required for a transaction to be propagated over two hops and received at peer A. When a transaction is received by a node it first runs a number of checks and then schedules the transmission. The actual transmission will happen either immediately (for 25% of transactions) or with a random delay due to trickling (see Section 2). The time needed for an `INVENTORY` message to be forwarded to the attacker's node through node `Entry` is the sum of propagation delays of 4 messages (2x`INVENTORY`, 1x`GETDATA`, 1x`TRANSACTION`) plus the time node `Entry` needs to run 16 checks and possibly a random trickling delay. On the other hand the time needed for the same `INVENTORY` message to be forwarded to the attacker's node through peer A consists of 7 messages (3x`INVENTORY`, 2x`GETDATA`, 2x`TRANSACTION`), 32 checks, and two random delays due to trickling. Finally since the majority of connections to a peer are coming from clients, one more hop should be passed before the transaction reaches an attacker's node through a wrong server. Measurements of transaction propagation delays are given in Appendix C.

Based on this we expect that if a transaction generated by a client is forwarded to the entry nodes immediately, the entry nodes will be the first nodes to forward the transaction. In case when the transaction was sent sequentially with 100




Figure 3: Steps necessary to forward a transaction

ms between transmissions we still expect a fraction of entry nodes to be among the first 10 to forward corresponding INVENTORY message to one of the attacker’s nodes. This fraction obviously depends on the propagation delay between Bitcoin peers. The higher the propagation delay the less significant becomes delay of 100 ms in trickling. For example if the propagation delay is 300 ms between the client and each entry node it’s likely that 3 entry nodes will be among the first to forward the INVENTORY message (given that the attacker has enough connections to Bitcoin servers).

*Remark 2.*

The attack presented in this section requires from an attacker only to be able to keep a significant number of connections to Bitcoin servers without sending large amount data. In order to make the attack less detectable an attacker might decide to establish connection to a given Bitcoin server from different IP addresses, so that all connection look like they came from different unrelated clients. The same set of IP addresses can be used for different servers.

*Remark 3.*

The technique considered in the section provides unique identification of Bitcoin clients for the duration of a session, and thus if a client makes multiple transactions during one session they can be linked together with very high probability. Note that this is done even if the client uses totally unrelated public keys/Bitcoin wallets, which have no relation in the Bitcoin transaction graph and thus such linkage would be totally unachievable via transaction graph analysis [11, 15]. Moreover we can easily distinguish all the different clients even if they come from the same ISPs, hidden behind the same NAT or firewall address.

## 6. COUNTERMEASURES

### 6.1 Preventing Tor Blacklisting

It is desirable to allow the Bitcoin peers to use Tor and still to keep some blacklisting capability. We suggest making every connection time- or computation-consuming to radically increase the attack cost. For instance, any peer that initiates a connection might be required to present some proof-of-work, e.g., a hash of its IP, the timestamp, and the nonce that has a certain number of trailing zeros. If we require 32 zero bits, then to separate a single peer from the Tor network would cost about  $2^{45}$  hash computations, which takes several days on a modern PC.

One may argue that some Bitcoin pools are powerful enough to afford that many hash calls. However, the vast majority of pool’s computing power is contained in custom-built ASIC miners, which implement only a specific instance of SHA-256 and can not be reconfigured for another hash function, say, SHA-3. The exact fraction of GPU and CPU computing power is unknown, but at the time when these architectures were dominant, the total computing power was by several orders of magnitude smaller than now.

### 6.2 Blurring the Connectivity Fingerprint

As a possible countermeasure against client de-anonymization adding random delay after the transaction could be an option. This will remove linkability of transactions and will also prohibit distinguishing of different clients from the same ISP. This however will not prevent the attacker from learning the ISP of the client and is against current trend of increasing Bitcoin usability by making transactions propagate as fast as possible. One can also increase the percentage of trickled transactions from 75% to 90%, this of course will again increase transaction propagation delays. We note that trickling is essential to prevent our attacks. Without trickling the attacker would need to make only 1 connection to each peer, instead of 20-50 in the current attack. This is much less noticeable.

Another efficient counter measure is to decrease the number of outgoing connections from 8 to 4 or even 3; this however has an implication that the network becomes less connected. To model this case, we first approximated the probability distribution of having  $L$  extra nodes among the top-10 (Table 3 in Appendix A) as a binomial distribution with parameters (8, 0.56), which yields the same detection rate. Then we assumed that the probability distribution for 4 nodes is also binomial with parameters (4, 0.56). This assumption yields the detection rate 0.01 for 3-tuples and 0.1 for 2-tuples, which means that the identification of clients based on 2-tuple approach would still work with 10% chance. For 3 extra nodes we obtain the detection rate 0.001 for 3-tuples and 0.03 for 2-tuples.


If it is important to keep the present level of connectivity there is an option to introduce a connection decay mechanism, which would close connections at random based on certain decay rate which can be a function of the client transaction frequency and average transaction frequency of the network. We note that a simple simultaneous refresh of all the eight connections after each transaction, which might seem like a natural countermeasure, in practice will be easy to trace. This is because a new octet of connections would broadcast the same ISP address as did an old octet. If this happens immediately after a new transaction the link between the old and the new octet IDs would be obvious.

## 7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

As a proof of concept we implemented and tested our attack on the Bitcoin testnet. We did not perform a deanonymisation attack on real clients for ethical reasons. For our experiments we built our own Bitcoin client, which included functionality specific for our attack – sending specific Bitcoin messages upon request or establishing various numbers of parallel connections to the same Bitcoin server, etc. When imitating clients we used the main Bitcoin client. In order to periodically get the list of all running Bitcoin servers we used an open source crawler [4].

For the time of experiments (May 2014) the number of running Bitcoin servers in the testnet fluctuated between 230 and 250, while the estimated average degree of the nodes was approximately 30. In our experiments we were imitating several different users connecting to the testnet from the same ISP’s IP address and from different ISP’s at different times. As an attacker we added 50 additional connections to each Bitcoin server. For each experiment in the first phase of the attack we propagated clients’ addresses in the testnet 10 minutes before they started to send their transactions. In total we (as clients) sent 424 transactions.

In the first experiment we confirm our expectations that transactions are first forwarded by entry nodes and analyse the number of entry nodes that were among the first 10 to forward the transactions (i.e. we assume that the attacker correctly identified all entry nodes). We splitted all transactions into two sets: the first set contains 104 transactions, which were forwarded to the entry nodes immediately; the second set contains all other 320 transactions (i.e. for which trickling was used). Fig. 4 shows the number of entry nodes that were among the first 10 to forward the transaction to the attacker’s nodes for these two sets. As expected if a transaction was immediately forwarded to all entry nodes the attacker was able to “catch” three or more of them in 99% of cases. In case of transactions from the second set, the attacker was able to “catch” 3 or more entry nodes in 70% of cases. We also observed that for the majority of transactions the first two nodes to forward the transaction to the attacker were the entry nodes.



**Figure 4: Intersection of top-10 senders and entry nodes**

In the second experiment we executed all steps of the attack. In our experiment each client was successfully uniquely identified by his own set of entry nodes and on average we identified 6 entry nodes for each client. Assuming that 3 entry nodes is enough for unique identification of a client we correctly linked 59.9% of all transactions to the corresponding IP address by matching entry nodes of clients and first 10 Bitcoin servers which forwarded the transaction. We correctly glued together all transactions of the same client which were made during one session.

In a bit more conservative setting we added only 20 additional nodes in which case we successfully deanonymised 41% of our transactions.


## 8. ANALYSIS

The success rate of the attack presented above depends on a number of parameters, among which the most important is the fraction of attacker’s connections among all the connections of client’s entry nodes. The fewer the number of connections of entry nodes are, the more connections the attacker can establish and the higher chance is to deanonymise the client. In this section we analyze each step of the attack and compute success rates for some parameter sets.

### 8.1 Number of connections to servers

Both mapping client to entry nodes and mapping entry nodes to transactions depends on the number of connections the attacker can establish to the Bitcoin servers. Assuming the entry node had  $n$  connections and the attacker added  $m$  new connections, thus the total number of connections is  $N = n + m$ , the probability to receive the address at the first hop is  $p_{addr}(n, N) = 1 - \frac{n}{N} \cdot \frac{n-1}{N-1}$ . For a transaction which was not forwarded immediately to the peer’s neighbours the probability that one of attacker’s nodes is chosen as trickle node in the first round is  $p_{tx} = \frac{m}{N}$ . For  $n = 50$ ,  $m = 50$ ,  $p_{addr} = 0.75$  and  $p_{tx} = 0.50$ . For  $n = 90$ ,  $m = 35$ ,  $p_{addr} = 0.49$  and  $p_{tx} = 0.28$ . The number of connections that the adversary can establish to a server is limited by the total number of 125 connections a Bitcoin peer can have by default.

In order to see how many open connection slots Bitcoin peers have we conducted the following experiment in April 2014. For each Bitcoin server that we found we tried to establish 50 parallel connections and check the actual number of established connections<sup>9</sup>. Fig. 5 shows the distribution of number of established connections. The experiment shows



**Figure 5: Distribution of open slots**

that 60% of peers allow 50 connections or more, and 80% of Bitcoin peers allowed up to 40 connections. Note that even if sufficient number of connection cannot be established to a Bitcoin peer immediately they can be established in longer term since many Bitcoin clients will eventually disconnect and thus allow new connections (according to an example disconnection rate as shown in Fig. 7 it might take several hours, but once an attacker got the required number of connections she can keep them as long as needed). Also note

<sup>9</sup>We did not try establish more than 50 connections in order not to degrade the Bitcoin network performance.



that Bitcoin servers allow any number of connections from a single IP address.

Finally the attacker does not send much traffic over the established connections but rather listens for messages. Incoming traffic is normally free of charge if one rents a server. Thus in spite of the large number of connections that an attacker needs to establish the attack remains very cheap.

## 8.2 Estimating false positives

Assume that some of the steps of that attack fail. Then the first 10 peers to report the transaction to the attacker will be some random Bitcoin peers. If there is no 3-subset of these 10 that match some entry node set, then such a transaction is marked as unrecognized by an attacker. The probability that nodes accidentally match any set of Bitcoin entry nodes (we call this a collision) for a given transaction is

$$p_c = \binom{10}{3} \times \left(\frac{1}{N}\right)^3$$

where  $N$  is the number of Bitcoin servers in the network. Given that there are about 8000 Bitcoin servers and 100,000 Bitcoin clients, the number of incorrectly assigned transactions is negligible.

We now estimate the probability that an attacker adds a wrong entry node to the set of entry nodes of a particular client (we recall that according to the address propagation mechanism after receiving an address a peer forwards it to only two randomly chosen *responsible nodes*). For this to happen, one or more entry nodes should forward the client's address  $C_a$  over one of non-attacker's connections, whence (since the attacker periodically propagates the client's address) at least one of responsible nodes for address  $C_a$  should change on an entry node after the attacker last propagated  $C_a$ .

In order to estimate this probability we collected statistics from our Bitcoin peer for 60 days from March 10 till May 10 2014. We collected information about 61,395 connections in total. Assume that the attacker propagated  $C_a$  at time  $t_0$ , the probability that a responsible node will be different at time  $t_1 = t_0 + \Delta t$  depends on the number of new connections the entry node has at  $t_1$  and number of nodes that disconnected since  $t_0$ . Fig. 6 shows probability density function of the number of new connections (i.e. the incoming connections rate) for different values of  $\Delta t$ .

Fig. 7 shows probability density function of the number of disconnection (i.e. connection close rate) for different values of  $\Delta t$ .

We use these distributions to simulate the address propagation and calculate the probability that the client's address is forwarded by an entry node over a non-attacker's link after time  $\Delta t$  after the attacker sent this address over the network. We obtained probabilities for different number of attacker's and non-attacker's connections and for each connection setting and each  $\Delta t$  we executed 10,000 runs of the model. Fig. 8 shows the obtained probabilities. The number of attacker's connections is denoted by  $m$  and the number of non-attacker's connections by  $n$ .

As expected, the more connection a node has the less probable that the responsible nodes for an address will change after  $\Delta t$ . Another observation is that the probability of a node to forward the client's address over one of the non-attacker's connections depends on the total number of con-




Figure 6: Probability density of number new connections




Figure 7: Probability density of number lost connections


nections rather than on the fraction of attacker's connections. From Fig. 8 we conclude that resending client addresses over the Bitcoin network every 10 minutes seems to be a reasonable choice. Also note that even if a client's address was forwarded over a non-attacker's link, the further propagation of the address will likely stop at the next hop.

## 8.3 Overall success rate

The success rate  $P_c$  of the attack depends on a number of characteristics of the real network. We propose the following method to estimate it. First, we assume that the attacker establishes all possible connections to Bitcoin servers. From the data used in Figure 5, we estimate the average value  $p_{addr}^{Avg}$  of the parameter  $p_{addr}$ . We did not establish more than 50 connections to avoid overloading servers, and we take a pessimistic estimation that 50 is the maximal number of attacker's connections. This yields

$$p_{addr}^{Avg} \approx 0.34.$$

Then we assume that both the testnet and the mainnet exhibit similar local topology so the probabilities  $\mathbb{P}_3(L)$  for the number  $L$  of entry nodes being in top-10 are almost the same (Figure 4). We calculate the probabilities  $\mathbb{P}_1(R)$  for the number  $R$  of entry nodes being detected out of 8 as a



**Figure 8: Percentage addresses forwarded by entry node over non-attacker connections**

function of  $p_{addr}^{Avg}$ . Then we compute the total probability that the adversary detects at least  $M = 3$  nodes among those appeared in top-10, and we get the following estimation (details in Appendix A):

$$\mathbb{P}_{success}(3) \approx 0.11.$$

When we restrict to 2-tuples, the success rate increases to 0.35.

In the testnet we managed to achieve  $p_{addr}^{Avg} = 0.86$  and the success rate for  $M = 3$  being close to 60%. An attacker may achieve such high rates if he first saturates servers' connections and then gradually replaces the expired connections from other nodes with his own ones. However, this may cause degradation of QoS as some clients will be unable to connect to all their entry nodes.

Thus a careful attacker that follows the 3-tuple rule only and establishes 50 connections at maximum to each server can catch about 11% of transactions generated by clients. Given 70,000 transactions per day, this results in 7,700 transactions per day. This also means that a user needs to send 9 transactions in average in order to reveal his public IP address.

## 9. ALTERNATIVE REALITY

In this section we show how to create and maintain an alternative block chain while keeping the Bitcoin protocol, existing wallets and transactions untouched. This procedure can be used by the Bitcoin community if the current difficulty becomes too high and impossible to sustain. It can also be an attack vector for a malicious administrator of the Bitcoin code project.

For motivation, suppose that the mining stops being profitable so that the most powerful miners quit the network in order to stop paying large electricity costs. As a result, the total computational power drops and the network outputs blocks at a slower rate.

The Bitcoin protocol is quite reactive to the rise of the hashrate, but has large latency in the opposite case. The maximum difficulty drop is the factor of 4 and requires the 2016 blocks to be produced within at least 8 weeks. Not only it is a long recovery period, but also the network might be so slow that the necessary number of blocks might not be produced at all. Our solution creates an alternative reality

with lower difficulty and the same transaction history within a small timeframe.

### Block construction rules.

It may happen that distinct miners create blocks almost simultaneously, which is called a *fork*. In this case the network temporarily splits into two parts, which try to generate a valid block at their own end of the fork. When a new block is found by either part, a *higher difficulty principle* applies: the chain with higher total difficulty<sup>10</sup> is accepted, and the one with lower is discarded. As a result, a new block at either end of the fork yields a chain with higher difficulty, and the chain is accepted by all the peers. Due to this short term uncertainty it is recommended to wait at least 6 blocks (i.e. about 60 minutes) as a confirmation that the transaction became part of the block chain. To further fix the block chain, the administrators of bitcoin routinely hard-code hashes of some blocks into the client (currently 12 *checkpoint* blocks, on average every 25,000-th, are hard-coded) code.

The Bitcoin protocol aims to sustain a constant rate of block production. Every 2016 blocks (about two weeks) the difficulty is recalculated so that blocks are generated every 10 minutes. The exact rules are as follows:

- For block  $X_i$ ,  $i \neq 2016k$ , the difficulty is equal to that of  $X_{i-1}$ ;
- For block  $X_i$ ,  $i = 2016k$ , we extract the time  $T_2$  of block  $X_{i-1}$  and the time  $T_1$  of block  $X_{i-2016}$ . Let the time difference  $\Delta T = T_2 - T_1$  be expressed in days. Then the difficulty is multiplied by  $\frac{14}{\Delta T}$ . The protocol also enforces that the multiplier can not exceed 4 or be smaller than 0.25.

Bitcoin enforces a number of additional restrictions to discourage malicious miners to play with timestamps for their own benefit. The following two rules are important for us:


- The timestamp of  $X_i$  can not be older than the median (i.e., the middle element of the sorted array) of 11 previous timestamps.
- The difficulty  $d_i$  of  $X_i$  can not be lower than the hypothetical difficulty yielded by reducing the last checkpoint difficulty by the factor of 4 every 8 weeks, i.e. the minimal difficulty that is possible if the network slows down.

### Alternative block chain.

Alternative chain is constructed as follows. First, we select the first block  $X_i$  after the last checkpoint such that 2016 divides  $i$ :  $i = 2016k$ , i.e. the difficulty is recomputed at this point. We create an alternative block with the same transactions but the date changed to the current date, which will decrease the difficulty of the subsequent blocks by the factor of 4. The next 2015 blocks we create with arbitrary times, possibly immediately one after another, with  $X_{i+1}$  and later possibly close to  $X_{i-1}$ .

The date of block  $X_{i+2016}$  we set again to the current time so that the total difficulty would drop as much as possible.

<sup>10</sup>The real formula is complicated, but the total computational complexity of generating the chain is a good approximation.



**Figure 9: Schematic view of the alternate reality creation over 8064 blocks. Vertical axis denotes the block index, horizontal axis denotes the timestamp (in days) and the difficulty.**

The next blocks will be again older than  $X_{i+2016}$ . We repeat this procedure further and further until the resulting difficulty contradicts the difficulty of the checkpoint. If  $T_c$  is the date (in days) and  $Q_c$  is the difficulty of the last checkpoint the client has in memory,  $T$  is the date and  $Q$  is the difficulty of the processed block, than the lower bound is

$$Q \geq \frac{Q_c}{2^{\frac{T-T_c}{28}}}.$$

Currently, a new checkpoint is added every 25000 blocks, which amounts to the period of about 140 days with the current difficulty increase rate. Therefore, the difficulty may drop by the factor of  $2^{10}$  compared to the previous checkpoint.

As a result, we create an alternative reality where all the participants have the same balance. However, the new chain is not accepted by clients since it would have the smaller total difficulty compared to the original chain. To finish the switch to the new reality, a new checkpoint must be chosen on the new chain and distributed among the clients. Alternatively, high-difficulty blocks can be added to the beginning of the alternate chain to make it more difficult than the original one. Higher granularity achieved by lower difficulty at the end of the alternative chain would allow to surpass the original chain even if the last checkpoint is not set.

Let us estimate the amount of computational power needed for this operation. Suppose that we have waited for 25000 blocks after the last checkpoint. This occurred in Dec 15th, 2013 with the block 275000, with the checkpoint block 250000 generated on August 3d, i.e., 134 days before. It has difficulty smaller by the factor of 30, let us denote it by  $D$ . In turn, the difficulty in our new history can be even lower by approximately  $2^{\frac{134}{28}} \approx 30$ . To obtain that, we would have to create 2016 blocks with difficulty  $D/4$  and 2016 blocks with difficulty  $D/16$ . The other 23000 blocks must be created with difficulty  $D/30$ . This amounts to about 1400 blocks with difficulty  $D$ , or less than 50 blocks with current difficulty. This means that a mining pool with only 10% of the network computational power would need only 3 days to make this happen.

## 10. FURTHER LEARNING THE TOPOLOGY

In this section we continue learning the topology of the Bitcoin network and show how to learn server-to-server connections. Bitcoin peers share information only about other peers they know, but not about their direct connections. In this section we first provide a method to estimate a node's degree (the number of connections) and then show how to determine to which servers it is connected to.

Some of the attacks exploit the following feature of address propagation mechanism. Each forwarded address is accompanied with a timestamp. If this timestamp is older than 10 minutes, the address is not retransmitted anymore. Thus in order to avoid false positives in some attacks described below an attacker should set the timestamps of the marker addresses to values close to 10 minutes to the past.

### 10.1 Estimating number of connections

Our first method is based on the way a Bitcoin peer forwards addresses received in ADDR messages (see section 2 for more details). Suppose that a Bitcoin node A is connected to  $k$  nodes  $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_k$ . We show now how to estimate  $k$ . First, we connect our node X to peer A and send it a set of fake<sup>11</sup> marker addresses  $S = \{ip_1, ip_2, \dots, ip_n\}$  in portions of 10 addresses per ADDR message. At the same time we listen (either on the same connection or on a separate connection) for received marker addresses. As instructed by the Bitcoin protocol, node A forwards marker addresses to its peers including X. As the number of marker addresses increases the number of addresses received by X converges to  $\frac{2}{1+k}$  if marker addresses are considered reachable by A or  $\frac{1}{1+k}$  otherwise, from which we estimate  $k$ . We increase the accuracy by 1) running several listening nodes, 2) repeating the same experiment several times. We can reuse the same marker addresses: when we reconnect our listening nodes, peer A revokes their histories and allocates new data structures for this nodes. We note that all connections can be established from the same IP address.

We implemented this method and carried out several experiments. Our target nodes have 10, 30, 70, or 100 connections. For different number of connections we used different number of marker addresses and different number of listening connections (2, 3, 7, and 10 correspondingly). For each number of connections we conducted a series of experiments; Table 1 shows five random runs for each series.

### 10.2 Determining connections between servers

The method to determine connections of a Bitcoin servers is similar to the method of estimating the node's degree. It is based on sending marker addresses to a peer which should then forward them to its neighbours. The number of Bitcoin servers is estimated to be about 10% of the total number of Bitcoin peers. Note however that clients can connect to the Bitcoin network only through connecting to servers which means that all Bitcoin messages even those generated by clients should travel along at least one link between two Bitcoin servers. We first describe a probabilistic method to determine if two given peers A and B are connected which consists of two phases.

<sup>11</sup>By fake we mean that no Bitcoin nodes are running at these addresses.

Real connections ( $k$ )	Markers sent	Estimates using our formula					
		Try #1	Try #2	Try #3	Try #4	Try #5	Average
10	500	10.69	9.57	9.34	10.6	11.38	10.32
30	1000	31.92	30.88	35.47	36.26	30.48	33
70	1000	72.92	76.84	70.65	64.16	77.36	72.39
100	2000	102.63	109.12	104.27	103.28	95.66	103

**Table 1: Estimation of number of connections**

During the first phase the attacker estimates the number of connections of peer A. This number is used to compute the number of marker addresses that will be forwarded to the peer’s neighbours. In the second phase the attacker chooses a set of fake marker addresses  $S = \{ip_1, ip_2, \dots, ip_n\}$  and sends them in ADDR messages to peer A (10 addresses per message). She then sends GETADDR messages to peer B. If the number of marker addresses known to B corresponds to the number estimated in the first phase, node B is marked as a neighbour.

An attacker can enhance this method to reveal a peer’s connections by applying it to each node in the list of running Bitcoin nodes (this information is available to the attacker since running nodes advertise their addresses). This is easily parallelized since the attacker needs to send marker addresses just once. The drawbacks of the method is that it does not allow to reveal connections to nodes which don’t accept incoming connection (e.g. located behind a NAT) since an attacker cannot send GETADDR messages to such nodes.

Bitcoin network discovery protocol is designed in such a way so that newly advertised addresses should be delivered to the majority of the nodes. Thus one of the key ingredients of the method proposed in this section is how to reduce the propagation radius. This is achieved by that each forwarded address is accompanied with a timestamp. If this timestamp is older than 10 minutes, the address is not retransmitted anymore. Thus in order to avoid false positives an attacker should set the timestamps of the marker addresses to values close to 10 minutes to the past.

We implemented the method and carried out several experiments with our own Bitcoin nodes which had 59, 53, 73, and 81 connections. As a list of candidates we used 400 randomly chosen running Bitcoin nodes plus the nodes’ current connections. The results of the experiments are summarized in Table 10.2. In all our experiments we had zero false positives.

In order to estimate how probable false positives are we chose 30 random Bitcoin nodes and sent them marker addresses with timestamps set to 9 minutes 58 seconds in the past relative the nodes’ adjusted time. For each node we generated a unique set of 1000 marker addresses. At the same time we were monitoring for received addresses at two of our nodes which had 83 and 85 connections. At the end of the experiment no marker addresses arrived at our nodes which indicated that false positives are quite unlikely.

Finally in order to estimate the number of GETADDR messages sufficient to learn addresses known to a peer we adopt a finite state discrete time Markov Chain model [8]. Each state in the model represents number of addresses learned by the attacker. At each step the attacker sends a GETADDR message and gets back 2500 random addresses from the total of maximum 20480 (note that some of those addresses

Connections	Not behind NAT	Candidates	Discovered
59	25	459	25
53	22	453	22
73	8	473	8
81	17	481	17

**Table 2: Discovering Bitcoin node connections**

may already be known to the attacker from the previous requests). The chain has one absorbing state which is "all addresses are known to the attacker". By computing fundamental matrix we get the average number of transitions before the absorbing state is reached which corresponds to the number of messages the attacker needs to send. If the maximum number of addresses stored at node is 20480, it takes in average approximately 80 GETADDR messages to learn all those addresses. Indeed, the probability for a single address to not be discovered is upper bounded by  $\left(\frac{2500}{20480}\right)^{80} \approx \frac{1}{30000}$ . This estimation shows however an upper bound of the number of GETADDR messages. Our experiments showed that it is sufficient to retrieve 5 ADDR message from a peer in order to confirm that a connections exists, which significantly reduces the number of GETADDR messages.

## 11. CONCLUSION

We have presented the first method that correlates pseudonyms of Bitcoin users behind NAT with the public IP address of the host where the transaction is generated. The crucial idea of our attack is to identify each client by an octet of outgoing connections it establishes. This octet of Bitcoin peers (entry nodes) serves as a unique identifier of a client for the whole duration of a user session and will differentiate even those users who share the same NAT IP address. We showed that most of these connections can be learned if the attacker maintains connections to a majority of Bitcoin servers. Then we show that the transaction propagation rules imply that the entry nodes will be among the first that report the transaction to the attacker. As soon as the attacker receives the transaction from just 2-3 entry nodes he can with very high probability link the transaction to a specific client. Moreover a sequence of successfully mapped transactions can help the attacker to track dynamic changes in the entry node set, to keep the client identifier fresh. The cost of the deanonymisation attack on the full Bitcoin network is under 1500 EUR.

We demonstrate that the use of Tor does not rule out the attack as Tor connections can be prohibited for the entire network. Our technique is orthogonal to the transaction graph de-anonymisation techniques and can be used in combination with them. It shows that the level of network anonymity provided by Bitcoin is quite low. Several features of the Bitcoin protocol makes the attack possible. In partic-

ular, we emphasize that the stable set of only 8 entry nodes is too small, as the majority of these nodes’ connections can be captured by an attacker. A countermeasure could be to randomize and regularly rotate these nodes, and to submit transactions via another set of nodes. We suggested several other countermeasures to mitigate this problem.

We also described a number of techniques that reveal the topology of the Bitcoin network. Some of them are used for our attack, but the entire set is interesting by themselves and not only in the context of deanonymisation. For example it can be used as a tool to better understand relations between Bitcoin peers (e.g. one can check if peers of major pools keep permanent connections between each other). As another example, an adversary can find the minimal cut in the network graph and target those connections with denial-of-service attacks (an example of a memory exhaustion attack that we discovered while digging through the Bitcoin source code can be found in Appendix E). This would result in splitting the network in two parts. Our results open several directions for the future research.

Yet another feature is the lack of authentication within the network, which requires the nodes to blacklist misbehaving peers by IP. We figured out that very short messages may cause a day IP ban, which can be used to separate a given node or the entire network from anonymity services such as proxy servers or Tor. If the Bitcoin community wishes to use Tor, this part of the protocol must be reconsidered.

Finally, we showed that the routine procedure of adding a checkpoint to the client code might be exploited to construct an alternate reality. While too noticeable as an attack scenario, this idea can be a solution in the case of unforeseen and unsustainable rise of difficulty.

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## APPENDIX

### A. ESTIMATING SUCCESS RATE: DETAILS

In this section we describe a mathematical model that allows us to estimate the success rate of the deanonymization attack.

As inputs, we take the average probability  $p_{addr}$  over the network, which is estimated in Section 8.1, and the distribution of the number of entry nodes among the first 10 nodes reporting a transaction to attacker’s peers (Section 7). We extrapolate the latter probability spectrum from the test net to the main net, which assumes similar network performance and the stability of the spectrum when the attacker has more or fewer connections to servers. The correctness of the extrapolation can be tested only by mounting a full-scale attack on the network, which we chose not to perform for ethical reasons.

First, we introduce two combinatorial formulas. Suppose that there are  $N$  balls. If each ball is red with probability  $p_a$ , and green with probability  $1 - p_a$ , then the probability that there are  $R$  red balls is

$$\mathbb{P}_1(R; N) = \binom{N}{R} p_a^R (1 - p_a)^{N-R} \quad (1)$$

Now assume that there are  $R$  red balls and  $N - R$  green balls. Suppose that we select  $L$  balls at random out of  $N$ . The probability that there will be exactly  $q$  red balls among  $L$  chosen is computed as follows:

$$\mathbb{P}_2(q; L, R, N) = \frac{\binom{R}{q} \binom{N-R}{L-q}}{\binom{N}{L}}.$$

Now we get back to Bitcoin. If each entry node is detected with probability  $p_{addr}^{Avg} = 0.34$  (Section 8.3), then according to Eq. (1) we detect  $R$  entry nodes out of 8 with the following probability spectrum:

Nodes	Probability
1	0.15
2	0.27
3	0.28
4	0.18
5	0.07
6	0.02
7	0.002
8	0.0002

Based on our experiments on the Bitcoin test net (Section 7), we computed the probability to have  $L$  entry nodes among the top-10 (Table 3).

We assume that both events are independent. Then the probability that at least  $M$  out of these  $L$  nodes we have detected (i.e. it belongs to the set of  $R$  entry nodes) is

$$\mathbb{P}_{success}(M) = \sum_{q \geq M} \sum_{L \leq 8} \sum_{R \leq 8} \mathbb{P}_2(q; L, R, 8) \cdot \mathbb{P}_1(R; 8) \cdot \mathbb{P}_3(L);$$

We have made some calculations and got the following results:

L	Probability
1	0.366
2	0.243
3	0.9
4	0.02
5	0.002

$$\sum_{L \leq 8} \sum_{R \leq 8} \mathbb{P}_2(q; L, R, 8) \cdot \mathbb{P}_1(R; 8) \cdot \mathbb{P}_3(L) :$$

M	Probability
1	0.721
2	0.355
3	0.112
4	0.022
5	0.002

$$\mathbb{P}_{success}(M) :$$

Therefore, we expect to catch 3-tuples in 11% of transactions, and 2-tuples in 35% of transactions.

We applied this model to the testnet as well, and obtained that it fits our actual deanonymization results well:

Estimated $p_{addr}$	Deanonymization rate with 3-tuples	
	Actual	Predicted
0.64	41%	43%
0.86	59.9%	65.6%

## B. ATTACK COSTS

The expenses for the attack include two main components: (1) renting machines for connecting to Bitcoin servers and listening for `INVENTORY` messages; (2) periodically advertising potential client addresses in the network. Note that if an attacker rents servers, the incoming traffic for the servers is normally free of charge. Assuming that an attacker would like to stay stealthy, she would want to have 50 different IP addresses possibly from different subnetworks. Thus she might want to rent 50 different servers. Assuming monthly price per one server 25 EUR, this results in 1250 EUR per month.

When advertising potential client addresses, the attacker is interested in that the addresses propagate in the network

Nodes	Probability
1	0.02
2	0.055
3	0.1225
4	0.245
5	0.2125
6	0.2125
7	0.0925
8	0

$$\mathbb{P}_3(L) :$$


**Table 3: Probability that  $L$  entry nodes (out of 8) appear in the top-10 of those that forward the transaction to adversary’s client.**

as fast as possible. In order to achieve this the attacker might try to advertise the addresses to all servers simultaneously. Given that there are 100,000 potential clients and the attacker needs to send 10 addresses per `ADDR` message, this results in 10,000 `ADDR` messages of 325 bytes each per Bitcoin server or (given there are 8,000 Bitcoin servers) 24.2 GB in total.

If an attacker advertises the addresses every 10 minutes and she is interested in continuously deanonymising transaction during a month, it will require sending 104,544 GB of data from 50 servers. Given that 10,000 GB per server is included into the servers price and the price per additional 1,000 GB is 2 EUR, the attacker would need to pay 109 EUR per month. As a result the total cost of the attack is estimated to be less than 1500 EUR per month of continuous deanonymisation.

## C. TRANSACTION PROPAGATION DELAY


In this section we measure transaction propagation delays between our high-speed server (1 Gbit/s, Intel Core i7 3GHz) located in Germany and 6,163 other Bitcoin servers. As was described in Section 2, it takes 3 steps to forward a transaction between two Bitcoin peers. As we are not able to obtain times when a remote peer sends an `INVENTORY` message, we skipped the first step (i.e. propagation delays of `INVENTORY` messages) and measured time differences between receptions of corresponding `INVENTORY` messages and receptions of the transactions. Note however that the size of an `INVENTORY` message is 37 bytes, while the size of a transaction which transfers coins from one pseudonym to two other pseudonyms is 258 bytes. Thus the obtained results can serve as a good approximation. For each Bitcoin server we collected 70 transactions and combined them into a single dataset (thus having 431,410 data points). Fig. 10 shows probability density function of the transaction propagation delay between our node and other Bitcoin servers and Fig. 11 shows the corresponding cumulative distribution.



**Figure 10: Transaction propagation delay, density**

## D. ON STABILITY OF THE FINGERPRINT

In this section we estimate the stability of a client’s fingerprint (the set of eight first-hop connections). According




**Figure 11: Transaction propagation delay, cumulative**

to the `bitcoind` source code (version v0.9.1), there are three reasons why an entry node can be disconnected from a client:

- The client switched off the computer/closed Bitcoin application.
- No data was sent over a connection for 1.5 hours.
- An Entry node goes offline.

Given the number of transitions generated by the network[5], block generation rate, and addresses propagation, some data is normally sent to and from the entry nodes within 1.5 hours.

In order to estimate the probability of an entry node going off-line we we took data from <http://getaddr.bitnodes.io> which produces a list of running Bitcoin servers every five minutes. We analysed the data for two weeks. The probability for a node to disconnect after specific amount of time with 95% confidence interval is shown on Fig. 12.



**Figure 12: Bitcoin servers churn rate**

Fig. 12 shows that after 2.5 hours only one node would disconnect on average and only two nodes will disconnect after 10 hours. So for the typical duration of a client session the fingerprint is very stable. In our experiment, after running our Bitcoin client for about 10 hours 3 nodes out of eight have disconnected.

The second point we address in this section is regarding the usage of VPN which is a popular recommendation for preserving anonymity in Bitcoin [1]. While protecting a user’s IP, the stability of the fingerprint still allows an attacker to glue together different Bitcoin addresses of the same user. We checked the stability of the fingerprint on the Bitcoin testnet while connecting to the network:

1. via public free VPNs (vpngate.net);
2. via a non-free one (AirVPN).
3. via our own VPN server.

For cases 2 and 3, the stability of the fingerprint was the same as if no VPN was used. For case 1, connections to entry nodes were dropped from time to time (about every 20 mins for the main net and about every few minutes for the testnet due too absence of traffic) by the VPN servers. It’s likely that free VPN servers were set with small inactivity timeouts and some limits for connection durations.

## E. DENIAL OF SERVICE

In this section we analyse the security of Bitcoin networking protocol against Denial of Services attacks.

### E.1 Memory exhaustion by address flooding

Bitcoin’s peer discovery protocol has a mechanism which prevents multiple retransmissions of the same addresses: for each connection it has, a Bitcoin node maintains a history (Implemented as an instance of `std::set` C++ class) of addresses which were sent over this connection. This history is emptied once per every 24 hours and more importantly does not limit the number of elements it holds. In order to check if one can flood this container with fake addresses we conducted a simplified experiment. We set up locally two Bitcoin nodes so that when one of the nodes (the target) receives an `ADDR` message it forwards the addresses it contains to just one neighbour. Both machines had Ubuntu 12.04 installed with 2Gb of RAM and the same amount of swap memory. They were running `bitcoind` version 0.8.6.

We were sending fake addresses with the rate of 30,000 addresses per second. After approximately 45 minutes, the response delay to the user’s interactions became significant and the node was unreachable for new Bitcoin connections. We also mounted a reduced version of this attack on our own Bitcoin node in the real network. We terminated the experiment when the memory consumption increased by 100 MB.