

Defense mechanisms and psychic processes in social exclusion: Clinical considerations

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Abstract

Following a post-Kleinian psychoanalytic perspective, this article offers some thoughts on social exclusion, based on the analysis of certain individual and collective defenses. Drawing from G. Di Chiara's concept of psychosocial syndromes, social exclusion is explained primarily as the result of the mechanisms of inferiorization, exclusion and marginalization of those who are disadvantaged by and opposed to the logic of those collective pathologies most prevalent in a given model of society. Linked together, the logic of these syndromes in our society is especially one that promises a model of social adaptation strongly based on competition. These mechanisms, triggered by very strong anxieties, repeat themselves in the dynamics of different conditions, according to the prototypical model of pathological narcissism and true racism.

Keywords: *social exclusion; post-Kleinian psychoanalysis; defense mechanisms; psychosocial syndromes; racism.*

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Introduction

In this paper I will discuss, albeit quickly and briefly, some clinical considerations on the theme of social exclusion. This is in contrast to that of integration and healthier social affective sharing. I will attempt to essentially outline a condensed profile of a psychoanalytic model of social exclusion, based on the analyses of some individual and collective defense processes and mechanisms. There is no doubt that many aspects of social exclusion are being rethought, revisited and revised today in light of the profound transformations in society over the last several decades. Such transformations, in the context of the western world's progressively changing policy framework, have altered the character of society and exacerbated some of its malignant and hateful components.

The trend of governmental policies in many western countries is indeed to provide less protection for the rights of large populations with minorities in particular being penalized. At the same time, we know that the current trend of greater social inequality may have increased the level of hardship for those who are suffering and in distress from a disadvantaged position. This is especially true now that we are in the era of globalization and a new economic crisis that is primarily hitting Europe, creating new poverty, inequalities, and social turbulence at different levels whose outcome is still unpredictable. Yet, many of the assumptions and determinants of social crisis are the same as they were a few years or even a few decades ago and have now been revealed and expanded in more evident, pervasive, and amplified forms.

I agree with Debieux Rosa and Moutian (2013) that the various aspects of social exclusion can be portrayed as a mechanism intrinsic to the logic of the neoliberal economics model. As in the game of Monopoly, the global market is a winner-takes-all system for who ever wins in stages bringing about the failure of all his opponents and competitors. From a certain point of view, social exclusion is automatically produced by the very logic of unconditional, unprincipled

economic competition. However, from a different perspective, it is the additional presence of specific individual and collective mechanisms that constitute both the phenomenon's a deadly reinforcement and its deep roots.

Theoretical approach

The point of view that I am offering does not neglect the debate on the social determinants of social exclusion. It supports the brunt of non-recognized rights, unequal wealth and resource distribution, power dynamics, and the other structural, social, economic, and cultural factors of large populations underlying social inequalities. Nevertheless, the main emphasis is rightly placed on the profound affective determinants of the processes of sharing and social exclusion. These determinants are based in large part on their roots in the nature of intimate affective relationships, and on the quality of the emotional experiences that are substantiated within them.

One undeniable strong point of psychoanalysis in dealing with these themes and content is that it enables a more penetrating understanding of many social phenomena, starting from an accurate explanation of the affective roots hidden within the dynamics of deep emotionality, in the individual's inner world and in the origins within the family of its intimate affective relationships. In particular, I refer to the point of view of the psychoanalytic object relations theory, above all in Klein and Bion's matrix, according a position already well stated and applied to the social sciences by Michael Rustin (1991).

Through the evolution of thought by authors such as Melanie Klein, Wilfred Bion, and Donald Meltzer, the post-Kleinian perspective accentuates the importance attributed by psychoanalysis to the question of mental pain.

This focus stems from a particular vision of the psychoanalytic process, according to which therapy's goal is essentially to help the patient get in touch with their own pain,

contained in the deepest layers of the psychic reality. In this way, it becomes possible for the patient to increase his or her ability to tolerate mental pain (Bion, 1963), making it imaginable and processable, as opposed to a tendency to deny and reject it. This second avenue is generally carried out according to escape routes among which the simplest and most automatic for individuals and social groups can be to specifically inflict pain and induce suffering in others (Meltzer, 1978).

A corollary of these concepts, which lets the discussion be extended to the larger social field, is located in some hidden, intrinsic motives of the processes of socialization and human relationships. As D. Meltzer and M. Harris (1983) argue, individuals may enter into a mutual relationship to help each other confront suffering and to make it more bearable and subdued. Conversely, they may enter into a relationship to receive reinforcement and support for the inherent temptation to elude, eject, or remove suffering.

On both a conscious and an unconscious level, individuals can choose to build relationships and join a group to promote their drive toward development and growth, with the risk and suffering that this change can bring with it. Alternatively, they can instead interact and form social links to find the footing to preserve one's pathological defense mechanisms and maintain the *status quo* (Meltzer, 1973). This signifies a condition that, because of its stability, can provide security and protection from the anxiety of the unknown and the emotional destabilization triggered by change, although at the cost of blocking personal and collective development.

In the first case, the road to accepting the suffering is that of authenticity and truth regarding one's emotional experiences, even painful ones. In the second, the most likely road is one of comparatively moderate denial, up to self-deception, falsehoods, and lies to protect and defend against the emotional turbulence that can be elicited by the impact of these painful truths (Bion, 1970; Meltzer, 1986).

Psychosocial syndromes and social exclusion

The adoption of a psychoanalytic point of view inevitably leads to a pessimistic note regarding the possibilities of social growth, when facing a comprehensive analysis of the very powerful defenses opposing change within the individual and the structure of social relations.

Influenced by the historical works of Jacques (1955) and Menzies (1960), Giuseppe Di Chiara (1999) developed in rigorous psychoanalytic terms this very *psychosocial syndrome* concept the central element in the entire discourse presented here.

Such a concept identifies the condition chosen by many individuals, networking with each other, or assumed automatically and unconsciously within a certain time frame, to defend themselves from psychic pain by using the same strategies and roughly similar disturbed mechanisms. In this way the foundations are laid for the formation of true, collective pathologies that can draw additional nourishment from interaction and interconnection with the social, economic, political, and cultural structure of large communities (Fromm, 1941).

Social injustice, racism, pathological investment in power and tyranny, the social and political effects of ideology as well as populism and conformity, individualism, and hedonism are all understandable as psychosocial syndromes or their consequences collective from psychic pain in which large groups and masses of people eventually participate.

One essential characteristic of civilization's discontents (Freud, 1929) lies in the fact that the burden of some of these syndromes appears to have increased in today's society conditioning the emotional and social lives of individuals and groups at different and pervasive levels and making it more difficult to rebel against pathological pressures.

One fundamental component intrinsic to all psychosocial syndromes is the existence of automatic and effective collective

mechanisms that are oriented to exclude those opposing their own logic. The deepest fears of rebelling generated in the individual are found in a climate of strong, implicit social pressures that trigger persecutory tendencies and powerful anxieties on a profound level. The individual who rebels knows that he or she is then excluded, left out, socially marginalized and condemned to isolation and loneliness.

Naturally, collective pathological defenses are not equally pervasive in all cultures and all models of society. Not are the mechanisms always the same or equally widespread. Paradoxically, however, certain very strong forces in our democratic or post-democratic globalized and advanced capitalist society (Crouch, 2003) should not be underestimated. As more approval, repetition, serial reproduction, and erasing of differences are always sought by the processes of industrial rationalization.

The awareness and understanding of psychosocial syndromes are a prelude to a more critical and conscious approach toward the concept of social adaptation. The contribution to the formation of a healthy society or, conversely, an acquiescent and compliant adaptation, or, even worse, a perverse adaptation to a disturbed society are opposite components in a central conflict around which the individual plays a great part of their game. Normality, in this sense, does not mean standardizing a social pathology (Di Chiara, 1999).

Marginalization and integration

One basic concept discussed here is that an essential parameter and indicator of true social integration lie in the possibility of authentic affective sharing. Ideally, what constitutes the essence of the normal process should be substantiated by ability to interact with others sharing symbolic and emotional experiences. This is essentially the basis and

prerequisite of the conditions for having a sense of belonging to a group, a community, a society, which are created from the repeated cycles of sharing. The individual may be bound to this by those feelings of love and gratitude that can be reciprocated equally (Klein, 1957; Grinberg, Grinberg, 1984).

On the other hand, it can be assumed that social marginalization as a pathological counterpart to the process of healthy integration is essentially due to a failure in the ability to share. This can lead to a hurried closing-down and isolation, to the individual's or group's experience and feeling of exclusion and estrangement in confronting another larger group or society.

In this context, a healthy process of social integration assumes the interior fulfillment of an analogous process of psychic integration, according to the logic of the mechanism originally described by M. Klein (1932, 1935, 1946). Integration, at both a psychic and a social level, assumes a prevalence of love over hatred, the transition from a paranoid, essentially egoistic mental state to a depressive state based on the preoccupation with and the interest in the Other (Klein, 1946; Meltzer, 1986).

Because this transitional process is genuinely fulfilled in this encounter with diversity¹, the individual must pass through an experience of catastrophic change each time, in the terms indicated by W.R. Bion (1966). This is activated by fear of the unknown, of new experiences, and of perturbation in terms of the desire provoked by contact with diversity that calls into question the unconscious and profound re-emergence of unresolved grief and of unrecognized losses, which must be accepted and processed in order for this anxiety to be successfully overcome (Grinberg, 1971).

As this process is the de facto basis of each experience of change and of authentic mental growth, there is opposition to equally serious

¹ How can we define diversity from a psychoanalytic perspective? According to Bion as well as Freud, perhaps the simplest way is to subjectively and symbolically consider diversity as the consequence of

experiencing the new and the Other, having contact with the object, the drives, wishes, anguishes, and defenses that it can trigger.

defense mechanisms and which attacks their premises.

As many have argued, racism is the result of a series of fundamental mechanisms, in their most severely pathological role, as a defense and a rejection of the experience of encounter diversity (Thanopoulos, 1995). Here, in particular, the focus is directed at the fact that, even before social pathology, racism is rooted in an individual's state of mind (Meltzer, 1973; Rustin, 1991), characterized by a basic intolerance toward diversity.

When this state of mind is encased within a personality structure, it can give rise to the true individual pathology of a clearly identifiable racist. However, there is evidence that milder forms of this condition can also be present at certain times in a larger number of people. Under specific circumstances, the mind regresses to a way of functioning in which it feels most threatened by contact with diversity. According to this framework of the mechanisms outlined here, one common denominator clearly binds the various forms and types of well-known serious and widespread social exclusion and marginalization.

There is a common logic to the inherent processes that involve the dynamics of bullying in childhood and particularly in groups of adolescents, of workplace mobbing, and of prejudice against women, disabled people, homosexuals, and all disadvantaged groups. To some extent, these processes are at work in all human relationships, starting from the intimate, emotional, and dyadic relationships of couple and families. They have always been fundamental to the activation of a profound, catastrophic anguish along with the use of locking mechanisms and the rejection of diversity on the prototypical model of racism itself.

Racism in this light can be read as a result of the most severe pathological defense mechanisms activated by contact with diversity, when it elicits an unpleasant and poorly tolerated emotional turbulence. The diversity experience produces envy and beyond that – at a profound level – curiosity and desire for what is new in a form that is as

intense as it is denied (Thanopoulos, 1995; Pontalis, 1988). Paradoxically, envy has a painful experience of exclusion at its base, which generates an unconscious inversion of roles. As a seriously malicious feeling, envy (Kernberg, 1995) flows into hatred in addition to a sadistic drive for retaliation and revenge, against the object that has triggered such emotional turbulence.

As an example and pertinent reference, many of those mechanisms in workplace mobbing similar to the dynamics of racism may almost always be observed in action. In a bionian sense, the truth in these mechanisms is not only feared, but also strongly attacked by reinforcing the envious components intended to compete with it. In this way, stupidity and obscurantism are preferred in order to maintain power. A group that works in a narcissistic or paranoid sense (Kernberg, 1998) – even more so in working groups where leadership is entrusted to this kind of person – can feed a deep-rooted anxiety toward a new idea (Bion, 1966), a new wind of change. This idea can be embodied by one or more members of the group in that particular work environment. The act of punishing, ostracizing, segregating, or humiliating them is a way to both impede change and to obtain vindictive revenge.

Also playing an important role of reinforcement in this context is ideology understood as that which constitutes a higher order of false moral principles and rules of conduct, as well as collective myths to which a group adheres in an uncritical and distorted manner. In this way, anyone able to embody an ideal alternative, a legacy of different more creative ideas, clashes even more with the group's ideological substratum.

Analogously, there are always very similar characteristics underlying the dynamic in the functioning of adolescent groups from which a phenomenon such as bullying is taken and which are relatively independent from the social and cultural membership and other traits characterizing individual differences. The group member who has been excluded, mocked, humiliated, and offended is always the most fragile; yet he or she is also almost

always the one bearing the implicit message of a creative sense of change. As a consequence, the group unconsciously fears and ferociously attacks this member.

Behind this trend, the dynamic therefore complies with a more general racism that, within the microcosm of the adolescent community, reproduces in miniature all of its distinctive characteristics. The member who has been excluded, beaten, and abused can be the weakest, the most fragile, and the most unfortunate. As a result, he or she is attacked by the group for not coming experiencing these dangerous, depressive feelings.

The harassed, excluded member may actually be the most helpless, sometimes seemingly more naïve, but also the one who, behind the masochistic position taken, similarly embodies a way of functioning that should be avoided by the group. In as much as it is oriented toward a narcissistic, maniacal, or paranoid state.

We usually assume that the frequently and dramatically painful phenomenon of bullying, in childhood and adolescence, may be greatly reduced if not a conclusively brought to a close in adulthood a point of view more illusory than real.

The acts themselves of real bullying, those involving physical contact or derision, continue a significant presence – sometimes at a level endemic in the culture – in military groups or sports clubs. In the general population, they are thought to be limited to a certain type of youth association, to the most violent minorities, like those living in townships and slums. Such acts find a conduit of strong expression in the violent groups of organized supporters. However, they can also be found in pubs, certain nightclubs, and gyms. From time to time, they may return in isolated acts, similar to so-called pranks, or in certain specific situations, such as those typical of a group of friends celebrating a bachelor party. Lastly, we have the case in which they allow themselves to engage in mockery and violence during a game of amateur football.

Nevertheless, the dynamics of humiliation, expressed through revenge and atonement for

their wrongdoings, return strongly in all human relationships: within a family's intimately emotional internal bonds, in the life of couples, and in parent-children relations. Moreover, they are found to a certain degree work relationship, and at varying levels in all social relationships in which the need to be recognized, admired, or valued comes into play, over and above the need to seduce, bully, humiliate, dominate, and belittle others. In some ways, we all currently live in a society of chronic bullying. In such, those who, in one way or another, are considered different tend to unconsciously trigger dangerous feelings of alarm, which are increasingly reflected automatically in a form of interaction based on the relational strategy of control using scorn, mocking, and teasing. All of this seems to be reflected in the acting-out of an implicit message that seems to say «Even if you have certain qualities that I envy or that have some effect on me, you let yourself be made a fool, and so you can in this way recognize your limits, your inferiority. In any case, I win».

Living constantly immersed in this social and relational climate can be very stressful. One wonders if, in these cases, it would not be truly more humane to let it go, accept suffering, or rather stop trusting the many people we encounter. Alternatively, one could look for other social micro and macrocosms more suitable for sincere human relationships, in which one can live.

Another consideration regarding diversity is that the majority imposes its own rules, regardless of being right or wrong. A population's prevalent character traits are often the result of an articulated set of social, cultural, and psychological factors, that are passed on through education and all relational experiences (Greenspan, 1997). The formation of these traits consists of mutual identification between individuals of a large population as well as of the common and widespread choice to defend themselves in a particular way from certain specific anxieties. It is commonly accepted that the majority's way of thinking as well as their opinions, and beliefs are a fundamental barometer for

judging social behavior. We so often deny that the majority is actually an expression of the prevailing pathological trends rather than of normal or healthy ones. The expression of specific personality traits at an individual level is essentially accepted or socially encouraged, depending on how they are present in a country's general population.

For example, certain types of schizoid and autistic personality traits are more tolerated in northern European countries, where those traits are perhaps found more in the population as a consequence of a more general presence of obsessive traits. Conversely, these autistic and schizoid traits are less well tolerated among Italians and are an object of derision from the first peer-group experiences in childhood and adolescent. However, Italian society more readily accepts certain traits typical of such more concrete character pathologies, as impulsivity, rudeness, and histrionic traits. This sometimes expresses a more convoluted less linear way of thinking, that is vulgar and more ambivalent as regards respecting rules in the most disturbed results. Therefore, these traits are judged more negatively in northern European countries, while their spontaneous, fun, creative, and ingenious aspects are more socially encouraged in Italy and other Latin countries. Even in this case, they are the majority and their way of thinking dictates the rules and the barometer of judgment.

Paranoid or depressive cultures and tolerance of diversity

As G. Di Chiara (1999) argued, the culture of a group, a community, or a society is also the product and result of acting-out collective tendencies in common problems of coping, conflict, and anxiety that are gradually perceived as being more pressing at a given juncture or historical period. Independent from certain personality traits, cultures exist in this context that are more paranoid or maniacal, and cultures that are more depressive or reparative (Jacques, 1955). Moreover, the individual or collective position or mental state of a depressive type is

not a condition in which a true defensive tendency predominates. A mechanism like reparation, which is healthy for coping with anxiety, has the potential for mental and social growth and is not merely implied defensive tendencies. In the words of D. Meltzer and M. Harris (1983), a depressive position and reparation are a way to modulate or mitigate the anguish, not merely to avoid it. In this sense, we do not know, as Antonino Ferro (2002) said, if human beings and our civilization will be more fully able in the future to take the path of *rêverie*, of the symbolization and mentalization of anguish. On the other hand, it is possible that the escape routes for anguish will increasingly prevail in our species.

Once more, according to Di Chiara (1999), one element not to be overlooked is that communities are characterized by their varying abilities to integrate and tolerate diversity. This attitude also depends on their level of functioning and the degree of their members' psychic integration. As R. Tagliacozzo stated in his important essay (Tagliacozzo, 1995), tolerance, as a prerequisite for true social integration, reflects the character of a depressive state of mind in the terms of M. Klein. It is this depressive mental state that, giving a voice to the painful, suffering, and needy parts, one can come to understand others so as to integrate the ambivalence tolerate diversity. In addition, it is possible in this mental state to take a forward-looking position, of social responsibility open to the complexity of life, the human character, and society, starting from the awareness of a common universal experience of suffering (Rustin, 1991).

Conversely, in a community or a social group in which the splitting and negation of painful components are prevalent, there will be a group that is less open to or less tolerant of diversity. Isolation and self-idealization of its own omnipotent aspects and the defense of their privileges are dominant in such a group leading to a splitting of the undesirable aspects of the Self and their project on on to other individuals or social groups. The group will hold a position of aversion towards them,

choosing a path of either fight-flight (Bion, 1961) or of devaluation and disparagement. This is largely the direction that will lead the group to act out strategies of marginalization and inferiorization and to cause pain to the disadvantaged individual or group. In spite of themselves, they become both the object and the receptacle (Williams, 1997) of such malicious affective impulses.

The concept of the outsider

In my earlier work (Fratini, 2008), I mentioned Anna Dartington's original contribution (Dartington, 1998) inspired by Colin Wilson's essay (1956). It focused on the role of the *outsider* in community and social groups with the outsider as someone who puts him- or herself in a position of marginality with respect to the group and from whose vantage point, aspects of the group's falsehoods, contradictions, and conformities can be captured.

In this regard, I have also referred to the Bob Dylan of the early 1960s as an example of a young thinker and artist who was not only non-conformist, but had a particular capacity for critical analysis, intuition, and prophetic premonition. Bob Dylan's story is representative of a young man in his early twenties from a small town in the Midwestern United States. Although he probably utilized a certain degree of manic defenses, Dylan was sometimes in close contact with a depressive state of creative inspiration, resulting in an incredible number of beautiful ballads over the period of a few months.

These ballads revealed Dylan's pain and despair toward a world and an advanced capitalist society, which were moving away from the desirable path that today seems far away, unexpected, or even inconceivable. Through the meaning of those songs, Dylan expressed a critique of capitalist society in sea of cynicism that still seems very relevant, incisive, and insightful. In this sense, Dylan shares similarities with the "exceptional individual" described by W.R. Bion (1970), e.g., an individual with a particular gift for foreboding and elaborate thinking, an

anticipatory feeling of prophecy, and the good of the community.

Similarly, *The Catcher in the Rye* by J.D. Salinger (1951) – perhaps an inspiration for some of Dylan's personality characteristics – is another important example of the outsider. Like the marginalized, the outsider stands on the edge or the outer limits of a group. However, one element distinguishes them significantly. Unlike the marginalized, the outsider is able to be more in touch with reality because they are in contact with the truth and the authenticity of their own emotions, including their painful components. A key characteristic of the outsider is a remarkable mental and emotional autonomy (Meltzer, 1986) that underlies critical and creative thinking. This is in stark contrast to the widespread dependence on approval and admiration of others that increasingly defines our society. The outsider draws the energy and strength for mental autonomy from a paradoxical fact that, even in a state of solitude, he is not alone unto himself, by virtue of the solidity of his internal bonds with his primary love objects.

Nevertheless, even an outsider can eventually become an outcast. There is an aspect that arouses displeasure and makes us reflect on Salinger's biography: He, like Holden Caulfield, his protagonist in *The Catcher in the Rye*, fantasized about living the rest of his life as an outcast, losing himself in growing isolation, accompanied by an apparently paranoid outlook, ultimately leading him to the brink of a psychic breakdown. Salinger assumed a position of extreme protest against a world of false social conventions, marginalizing himself from everyone and everything in a state of discipline and strict social isolation.

If the outsider does not find a constructive social outlet for this assumed position, and if the individual defending the truth does not encounter others with whom to share it, that individual's contact with reality and with good feelings is reduced over the long term. Failing in this condition of psychic integration, the individual goes down the road to marginalization. As previously stated, the

marginalized can in many cases be someone who is deliberately at the outer edge of a social group whose reasons he or she does not understand and whose set of values he or she opposes, thus weakening his or her position of psychic integration. As D.W. Winnicott (1958) indicated, they lose the capacity to be alone, and abandon themselves to the stray, resentful aspects of the Self.

Narcissism and social exclusion

The entire discourse of social adaptation inevitably leads to a consideration of pathological narcissism as the fundamental individual and collective syndrome of our time, giving a particular impression to all social relationships and modes of interaction and sharing within mass society.

Regarding this subject, narcissistic pathology is also the leading cause of marginalization and social inferiorization. Not only because the mechanisms that push and actively operate in that direction are by definition narcissistic, but also because adaptation to a narcissistic society inevitably tends to exclude those who oppose the logic of competition and come out defeated and overwhelmed, relegated to the group's margins as a powerless loser. In this sense, narcissism seems to impose a new form of tyranny even if within a democratic context. Yet is this even a true democracy? Here, the majority appears especially as a band of uncertain and fragile souls who climb on to the bandwagon and obey the dictates of a social order marked by the tyranny of those who are stronger. They are able to establish rules and laws on the basis of which the seal of emulation and imitation is affixed, adhering to the conformist canons of pathological narcissism.

To borrow a significant expression from Christopher Lasch (1979), the culture of narcissism has already been constructed in the new models of familial relationships. As such, parents tend to manifest an early idealization and over-protection of their children and to defend a difficulty in loving them (Kernberg, 1995) in the sense of understanding their

deepest emotional needs. Such an internal dynamic has a fundamental turning point in adolescence, which is in relation to the unconscious choice to rebel against the psychosocial syndrome of our time, or to subscribe relatively automatically and deliberately to the ensemble of collective pathologies based today on mania and pathological narcissism. These are the pre-packaged and cheap experiences that our society seems to offer to a now massive extent, specifically for the consumption of adolescent mental states and the many aspects theoretically postponable, if not indefinitely, until adulthood.

One of the most negative aspects of pathological narcissism is that it suggests a model of social integration strongly based on competition. Therefore, there tends to be disadvantaged segments of the population that do not excel and there are minorities that are unequipped or refuse to compete. Those who are not winners can choose to rebel or surrender themselves to that same belief, with a further problem in our society being that an ever-growing majority chooses the second path. These people then appear destined to become imitators, impersonators, loyal subjects of the consumer system (Bauman, 1997). They do not seem to desire anything other than one day realizing the fantasy of becoming rich, successful, and triumphant, on the top rung of the ladder instead of in the dust, and making others pay for the anger and humiliation that they are suffering in the present.

The drama and the most serious consequence of a narcissistic society are that, in trying to delay a collective mental state based on mania, it attacks depressive feelings more than anything else. These deeply painful, but true feelings are the basis of vitality, creativity, and symbolic thought because they form the basis and foundation of true affective relations and of deep bonds with other human beings. These feelings generate love, genuine desire, and libidinal attributes, rather than merely hatred, sadism, and envy after the exaltation of the Self (Kernberg, 1975).

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