

## **Democracies, Dictatorships and Counterinsurgency: Does Regime Type Really Matter?**

by  
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“Khrushchev was right in 1960. He said that democracies were soft and could not fight against wars of national liberation.”<sup>1</sup>

Thomas Schelling, 1981

### **INTRODUCTION**

Thomas Schelling's pessimistic appraisal is shared by many analysts of small wars and counterinsurgency. Richard Gabriel, comparing America's experience in Vietnam with Israel's in Lebanon, suggests that both are “classic examples . . . of a democratic society's inability to sustain a military effort for political goals in the absence of a strong argument rooted in national security concern.”<sup>2</sup> As Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, Caspar Weinberger responded to such concerns by developing a “doctrine” that practically ruled out American participation in future counterinsurgency wars.

If democracies cannot fight counterinsurgent wars effectively, it is best that they know it so that involvement in such wars can be avoided. On the other hand, some analysts suggest that a democratic society could actually have unique advantages in such a war. Still other writers contend that democracies and authoritarian regimes have been equally unsuccessful at counterinsurgency.<sup>3</sup> The analysis presented here seeks to test the accuracy of widely held beliefs about the importance of the domestic regime type to the outcome of counterinsurgent wars.

### **CONFLICTING VIEWS**

Scholars of counterinsurgency advance several reasons why democracies might be uniquely vulnerable to defeat in small wars. One of these relates to the costs of war and their effects on policy. Guerrilla forces may win a war in one of two ways; by transforming themselves into conventional forces and defeating the enemy in the field (like Mao Zedong's forces in China in the late 1940s), or by protracting the conflict long enough to exhaust their adversary's political, as opposed to military, capability to fight on.<sup>4</sup> Against a democracy the second approach is held to be especially promising, since the human and economic costs of the war are openly discussed, while in an authoritarian regime people “may not even know what the costs are.”<sup>5</sup> Even if casualties and other war costs are known to be heavy the nondemocratic regime may care less, since it would take a coup or revolution to turn the government out.

There is substantial evidence that public opinion in democracies does indeed turn against war, and especially limited wars, as casualties and costs rise.<sup>6</sup> What is less certain is its impact on government policies. The same studies that

show the erosion of popular support for the Vietnam war in the United States show that Presidents Johnson and Nixon were consistently able to rally public opinion to support their actions, whether they involved escalation or withdrawal.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the influence of public opinion on foreign policy varies from one democracy to another, with the United States being described by one scholar as “pluralist” and France as a presidential “monarchy” where foreign affairs is concerned.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps democracies with more open policy-making are the most disadvantaged.

Democratic governments must also face the challenge of antiwar movements. Such movements may arise during conventional wars (as in the United States during the Civil War and World War I), but are more likely to occur during counterinsurgent wars, because the nation’s survival is clearly not at stake.<sup>9</sup> The impact of such movements, which always involve a minority of the population, may be more significant than that of general public opinion. Alistair Horne states flatly that the French war in Algeria was “virtually won on the ground” by 1961 but lost “in France itself, where protest had risen to unacceptable levels.”<sup>10</sup> Sam Sarkesian calls antiwar protest over Vietnam “crucial” to the American defeat.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, one study based on interviews with former Johnson and Nixon administration aides suggests that the antiwar movement imposed some “constraints” on escalation but did not decisively affect policy.<sup>12</sup> It is even possible that an antiwar movement may increase public support for a war by inducing a patriotic backlash.<sup>13</sup>

A third reason suggested for democratic failures in counterinsurgency is an alleged unwillingness of democracies to “play rough.” Sarkesian notes that “American military men and women are (and were) expected to perform within the context of democratic rules and norms, with all the moral and ethical implications these suggest. Unfortunately, guerrilla war, insurgency, revolution and counter-revolution hardly adhere to such simplistic, liberal-democratic notions.”<sup>14</sup> Applying the same reasoning to Israel’s difficulties in Lebanon, Richard Gabriel asserts that “low-intensity guerrilla wars require ... terror, destruction of civilian homes, ruthless interrogations and even executions,” which make it impossible for a democratic army to “retain a strong sense of national support.”<sup>15</sup> The suggestion here is that “nice guys finish last” in counterinsurgent warfare, and that democracies are inherently prone to being too benevolent. The record tends to support the view that democratic governments choose less harsh counterinsurgency tactics, though there are clear exceptions and lapses.<sup>16</sup> However, a host of authorities contend that such tactics are in fact the kind best calculated to win in counterinsurgency warfare. The literature on counterinsurgency is filled with admonitions that winning the support of the population in a country is much more important than winning battles.<sup>17</sup> Sir Robert Thompson spoke for many guerrilla warfare specialists when he wrote:

There is a very strong temptation in dealing with both terrorism and with guerrilla actions for government forces to act outside the law. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law

forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law.<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, observers as far back as the American Revolution have noted the disastrous effects upon armies when civilians are alienated and driven to side with hostile guerrillas.<sup>19</sup> Democracies, with military accountability to civilian authority, are usually better able to limit the counterproductive overuse of force in counterinsurgent warfare, and so may have a *better* chance of success than nondemocratic regimes.

The literature thus presents contradictory positions; democracy is viewed as both an asset and a liability for a state fighting a guerrilla war. A third position is possible, of course; that the domestic regime of a state has no bearing on its success or failure in counterinsurgency. While as recently as 1987 David Isby could write that “[i]t may be that the Soviets are in fact satisfied with the way the war is going in Afghanistan,”<sup>20</sup> their subsequent withdrawal indicates that authoritarian regimes are far from immune to defeat in guerrilla wars. Perhaps such wars are inherently difficult, and often unwinnable for all modern states.

#### **AN EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE: TEN COUNTRIES, TWENTY-FIVE WARS**

To test the validity of these assumptions about the centrality of regime type to the outcome of counterinsurgency wars, the present analysis examines the experience of ten nations that have fought counterinsurgent wars since 1945. Since it is impossible to study all cases of counterinsurgent warfare the states that have fought the most and largest wars were selected. Five are democracies: the United States, Great Britain, France, Israel and India. They range from those with a relatively pluralistic approach to foreign policy (United States) to those that concentrate power in the executive (Great Britain and France). The five nondemocracies selected were the Soviet Union, China, Portugal (pre-1974), Cuba and South Africa. The last is a middle case, a “whites only” democracy with serious limits on freedom of speech and reporting during the time of the Namibian war. The democracies fought sixteen counterinsurgent wars since 1945, the dictatorships nine. The analysis excludes all conventional conflicts, as well as shows of force and demonstrations that did not lead to combat, such as the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958. Also excluded are conflicts still in progress, such as the “troubles” in Northern Ireland and the Palestinian *intifada*.

The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 are based upon a reading of the extensive literature available on these conflicts. All have had books, parts of books or articles written about them, though there is wide disparity in the availability of source material. Following a reading of the literature wars were coded as successful, unsuccessful or partially successful, depending on whether the goals sought by the nation involved *at the beginning of the conflict* were achieved. For example, if the British goal in Malaya or Kenya had been to hold those countries as permanent parts of the British empire, the wars would have to be counted failures. However, the literature clearly indicates that the goal was independence under a regime prepared to maintain economic and other ties with

Britain and, in the case of Malaya, thwarting a communist takeover; by this standard the wars were successful.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, the case of Cyprus presents a more difficult problem, since the British failed to suppress the EOKA guerrillas but did prevent *enosis* (union with Greece) and maintained military bases on the island. This war was coded as partially successful. By some standards the Soviet effort in Afghanistan could be judged a partial success, since the government there did not fall from power until recently. However, in view of the heavy costs incurred and the debilitating effect of the war on Soviet foreign policy generally this war has to count as a failure. The tables also present such data as is available on the human and economic costs of the wars incurred by the counterinsurgent power.

### **EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE: MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE?**

The outcome of the counterinsurgent wars listed below hardly appear to show the democracies at any disadvantage. In fact, the percentage of successes achieved by the democracies (6 of 16, or 37.5%) is slightly *higher* than that achieved by the authoritarian regimes (3 of 9, or 33%). Each had one partial success. Victory in counterinsurgent wars seem to have been elusive for both democracies and nondemocracies, but no more so for the democracies. A second look, however, reveals that differences do appear in the behavior of the two types of regimes. For the democracies, the successful small wars were *very* small, with exceptionally low casualties. For the five successes and one partial success for which casualty data are available, killed in action averaged 639. For the seven failures by democracies, killed in action averaged 14,508, over twenty-one times as high. Financial costs for the failed wars also exceeded those of the successes by a substantial margin. Indeed, the only successful war that cost over \$ 1 billion (US) was the Malayan Emergency of 1948-60. Malaya, however, was the site of important British economic interests, (indeed, half of the war costs were paid by the Malayan government) and the British had the support of the Malay majority against the Chinese communist insurgents.<sup>22</sup>

It might seem self-evident that high-cost wars not involving the nation's survival would be prone to failure. This pattern does not hold true, however, for the authoritarian governments. Their three successful small wars (Baltic States, Ukraine and Tibet) produced higher numbers killed in action than any of the democracies' small wars except the two Vietnam wars and Algeria; yet the Soviets and Chinese persisted to victory. Even in defeat, authoritarian regimes showed uncommon tolerance for suffering. Portugal's spending on its African wars reached 6% of GNP by 1968<sup>23</sup>, twice the percentage being spent by the United States in Vietnam at the same time. Proportionate to population, Portuguese losses were five times as great.<sup>24</sup> Yet, only the overthrow of the dictatorship in April 1974 brought an end to the war. By contrast, democratic Israel, with a third of Portugal's population and more direct security interests at stake, experienced massive popular dissent as a result of losing 600 men in Lebanon.<sup>25</sup>

Another difference between the democracies and the dictatorships is that the authoritarian great powers did better than the small powers (three victories out of four for the Soviet Union and China, versus only one partial success out of five for Cuba, Portugal and South Africa). Obviously, the ability of a small

nation to bear costs is more limited, whatever its political system. Democracy may indeed be a disadvantage when the size of the counterinsurgent country is controlled for. However, all the democracies fighting small wars, except Israel, were large states, making any such conclusion doubtful.

The willingness of authoritarian regimes to fight on despite heavy costs itself carries a cost. While persistence may bring success, it may also excited discontent and war weariness sufficient to destabilize the regime. The clearest case of this is Portugal, where disillusioned veterans of the African wars led the 1974 coup. War costs may not have affected the decisions of the leadership, but they clearly undermined loyalty to the regime.<sup>26</sup> While the collapse of the Soviet Union had many causes, especially economic, disgust with the “bleeding wound” of Afghanistan arguably played a major role in advancing the case for reform.<sup>27</sup> The closest a democracy has come to destabilization over a counterinsurgent war is the Algerian case, in which a seizure of power by the military twice appeared imminent.<sup>28</sup> In the end, a new republic rather than a dictatorship was the result. Democracies may be less able to incur costs, but freedom of expression and relative tolerance for antiwar dissent may also prevent them from self-destructing over small wars.

### **DOES HARSHNESS OR BENEVOLENCE PAY? SOVIET VERSUS BRITISH TACTICS**

The literature confirms the assumption that nondemocratic regimes are free to use much harsher tactics in dealing with insurgency than are democratic regimes. There could even be said to be a Soviet model of counterinsurgency that relies on the depopulation of the hostile countryside rather than on winning the “hearts and minds.” In the Baltic States after World War II the Soviets broke nationalist resistance by deporting 665,000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians — 11 % of the population — to Siberia.<sup>29</sup> This effectively deprived the guerrillas of the food and supplies needed to sustain the struggle.<sup>30</sup> Apparently, the Soviets also attempted to depopulate much of Afghanistan, though some observers dispute this claim.<sup>31</sup> The Soviet lack of success may be partially accounted for by the flow of American aid to the *mujaheddin* forces, which the Baltic nationalists did not enjoy.

Other authoritarian regimes appear to have followed the Soviet model closely. The Chinese are said to have employed even harsher tactics against the Tibetan rebels, including “the obliteration of entire villages” and “crucifixion, dismemberment, beheading, burying, burning and scalding alive” civilians who supported the guerrillas.<sup>32</sup> The Portuguese reacted to the beginning of insurgency in Angola in 1961 with a repressive campaign that resulted in the massacre of over 50,000 Africans.<sup>33</sup> The record of the democracies in counterinsurgency is certainly morally checkered; however, there is only one case in which a democratic state resorted to similar measures, that being the French in Madagascar in 1947-48.<sup>34</sup>

Do the abhorrent tactics adopted by dictatorships work? Sometimes they do, as in the Baltics; sometimes they do not, as in Afghanistan. However, the experience of Great Britain suggests that the benevolent approach may

indeed work best. The British account for four of the six successes won by democracies and are the only one of the ten countries to have a consistent “winning record” in counterinsurgency.

Drawing on the experience of decades of imperial policing, British counterinsurgency tactics have consistently emphasized the “hearts and minds” approach over military considerations.<sup>35</sup> In Malaya, this required substantial restraint in the use of firepower, as Major General Richard Clutterbuck explained:

Inhabited villages were never shelled, strafed or bombed in Malaya. It can be argued that such attacks are justified if troops entering the village are likely to be fired upon, or even as a punishment for harboring communist guerrillas . . . Fortunately, however, such arguments never prevailed in Malaya; if they had, I am quite sure that any villages so attacked would never have cooperated with the government again.”<sup>36</sup>

A similar approach underlay other British successes. In Kenya, land reforms and movement toward independence drew African support away from the “Mau Mau” movement.<sup>37</sup> In Borneo, commandos of the Special Air Service (SAS) won the allegiance of North Borneo tribes with medical care and other benefits, and trained them as scouts for use against Indonesian infiltrators. Consequently, according to one historian, “the enemy was never in a position to swim like a fish in the friendly pool of an indigenous population” and was “soon rounded up by ground forces, aided by the local population.”<sup>38</sup> In Oman, the British had to engineer a change of government to carry out their strategy; they replaced the reactionary sultan with his son, whose economic development efforts brought Oman its first paved roads, hospitals and modern education.<sup>39</sup> As a result, many guerrillas deserted the opposition to join the sultan’s forces. The British record is not spotless, however; there are documented cases of torture and abuse by security forces in Kenya, Palestine and Northern Ireland.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, on the whole, they seem to have demonstrated that the benevolent approach to counterinsurgency, which is more attractive to democracies, can also be effective.

This raises the question of why other democracies have not done as well. One answer may be that democratic accountability may sometimes push governments in the opposite direction. For example, in Vietnam the American commanders put great stress on minimizing casualties. While this was a legacy from practices in past conventional wars,<sup>41</sup> it was also a valid consideration in Vietnam, given that a democratic people have a low tolerance for casualties. However, the concern for saving American lives led to excessive use of firepower, which “alienated the population and provided the enemy with an excellent source of propaganda.”<sup>42</sup> The Americans did a great deal to promote economic development and social reform in South Vietnam, often over the objections of South Vietnamese leaders. These efforts did ultimately weaken the Viet Cong, though analysts disagree on how much.<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, much of the good was cancelled by the inappropriate military strategy.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, following the British model of exercising greater restraint in using

firepower might have led to higher casualties and even more rapid disillusionment with the war. This is especially likely, since the Americans had to face large enemy regular units not present in any of the British counterinsurgency campaigns.<sup>45</sup>

Another problem with winning “hearts and minds” is that it may simply be impossible if the population is too strongly predisposed to hostility. This helps to explain the British failure in Palestine and the partial success in Cyprus. The British could hardly hope to win over the Jews of Palestine or the Greek Cypriots, no matter how conciliatory their policies, because both groups were committed to a nationalist ideology that clashed with British goals for their countries.<sup>46</sup> (For similar reasons, the Israelis today cannot hope to win support among Palestinians with a negotiated compromise solution, since anything less than total independence is unacceptable to most Palestinians.) To some degree a similar dilemma may have existed for both the French and the Americans in Vietnam, since Vietnamese of varying political persuasions were so hostile to foreign domination. In such cases a harsh approach may be the only alternative to giving up.

## CONCLUSIONS

If a state’s form of government does not strongly influence success or failure in counterinsurgent war, then what does? No single factor is decisive, but international support for the insurgents seems to be a powerful influence.<sup>47</sup> It is doubtful that either the Vietnamese communists or the Afghan resistance could have prevailed against a superpower without the help of the other superpower. It is equally doubtful that the British could have maintained their low-key, benevolent approach to counterinsurgency in Malaya if Malayan communists had been reinforced by a regular army from a “North Malaya.”

Having a cause that can rally broad segments of the population is important to both government and insurgents. Insurgencies that spring from a minority group in the population, like the ones in Malaya and Kenya, are far easier to deal with than those which incorporate a nationalist appeal, as in Algeria and Vietnam.<sup>48</sup> The counterinsurgent’s economic strength can be a crucial factor: general economic problems, rather than the cost of the conflict, led to Britain’s withdrawal from Aden after only 57 killed.<sup>49</sup> Factors such as terrain and the quality of leadership on both sides can be as important in counterinsurgent war as in other conflicts. Taken together, such factors appear to dwarf regime type in importance.

The major difference in the behavior of democracies and nondemocracies seems to be the ability of the latter to accept heavier costs, at least human costs, in a guerrilla war. The propensity of democracies to liquidate costly commitments need not, however, be seen as a weakness. Instead, it may reflect the strength of a regime that is held to account by its people for mistakes. A great nation is unlikely to be destroyed by defeat in a small war; it may, however, be demoralized by struggling endlessly in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-style quagmire.

**TABLE 1**  
**DEMOCRACIES IN COUNTERINSURGENT**  
**WARS SINCE 1945**

WAR	NATION	OUTCOME	COSTS
1. Palestine 1945-48	Britain	Failure	338 KIA £80 million
2. Indochina 1946-54	France	Failure	20,685 KIA* \$7.5 billion
3. Madagascar 1947-48	France	Success	550 KIA
4. Malaya 1948-60	Britain	Success	1983 KIA \$4.4 billion
5. Kenya 1952-56	Britain	Success	590 KIA £55 million
6. Algeria 1954-62	France	Failure	20,386 KIA F55 billion
7. Cyprus 1955-59	Britain	Partial Success	393 KIA £90 million
8. Vietnam 1961-72	United States	Failure	58,022 KIA \$140 billion
9. Borneo 1963-67	Britain	Success	59 KIA £256 million
10. Aden 1963-67	Britain	Failure	57 KIA
11. West Bank- Gaza 1967- 70	Israel	Success	245 KIA
12. Chad 1969-78	France	Failure	NA
13. Oman	Britain	Success	12 KIA
14. Lebanon 1982-85	Israel	Failure	604 KIA
15. Lebanon 1982-83	United States	Failure	267 KIA
16. Sri Lanka 1987-90	India	Failure	1,200 KIA

\*Figures on killed in action are for intervening country nationals only.

Unless otherwise indicated, data on losses and war costs from Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (New York: Doubleday, 1975). For Malaya see N.J. Ryan, *The Making of Modern Malaya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 198. For Algeria see Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York: Viking/Penguin, 1977). For Israel in Lebanon see Avner Yariv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 273. For the US in Lebanon see Michael Petit, *Peacekeepers at War* (Winchester, MA: Faber and Faber, 1986), pp. 216-25. For Borneo see James H. Wyllie, *The Influence of British Arms* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 68-9. For Israel on the West Bank and Gaza see Bard O'Neil, *Armed Struggle in Palestine* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978), p. 101. For Sri Lanka see Lisa Beyer, "Goodbye-And Good Riddance" *Time*, 135, no 14 (2 April 1990), p. 32.



**TABLE 2**  
**AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN**  
**COUNTERINSURGENT WARS SINCE 1945**

	<b>WAR</b>	<b>NATION</b>	<b>OUTCOME</b>	<b>COST</b>
1.	Baltic States 1945-52	Soviet Union	Success	20,000 KIA (low est.)
2.	Ukraine 1945-52	Soviet Union	Success	NA
3.	Tibet 1956-72	China	Success	40,000 KIA (low est.)
4.	Angola 1961-75	Portugal	Failure	
5.	Mozambique 1964-75	Portugal	Failure	Combined total 13,000 KIA 6% of GNP (1968)
6.	Guinea-Bissau 1963-75	Portugal	Failure	
7.	Namibia 1966-89	South Africa	Failure	NA
8.	Angola 1976-90	Cuba	Partial Success	NA
9.	Afghanistan 1979-89	Soviet Union	Failure	13,310 KIA

For Portugal see Ian F.W. Beckett, "The Portuguese Army" in John Pimlott, ed., *Armed Forces and Modern Counterinsurgency* (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), pp. 150-51. For the Soviet Union in the Baltic States, see Romauld J. Misionas and Rein Taagapera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 84-90. For the Soviet Union in Afghanistan see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War* Vol. 3 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), p. 130. For China in Tibet see John Avedon, *In Exile from the Land of the Snows* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 48.

Endnotes

1. In Thomas Schelling, Samuel Huntington, Richard Neustadt and Stanley Hoffman, "Vietnam Reappraised," *International Security*, 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981), p. 26.
2. Richard Gabriel, *Operation Peace For Galilee* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), p. 222.
3. Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 22-32.
4. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Power, Strategy and Security: A World Politics Reader* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 129.
5. Sir Robert Thompson, "Regular Armies and Insurgency," in Ronald Haycock, ed., *Regular Armies and Insurgency* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 10.
6. See John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), pp. 42-65; and Timothy Y.C. Cotton, "War and American Democracy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30, no. 4, (December 1981), pp. 616-35.
7. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, pp. 69-74.
8. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics*, 43, no. 4, (July 1991), pp. 479-512.
9. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," p. 137-40.
10. Alistair Horne, "The French Army and the Algerian War," in Haycock, *Regular Armies and Insurgency*, p. 81.
11. Sam Sarkesian, "The American Response to Low-Intensity Conflict," in David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds., *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict* (London: Brassey's, 1989), p. 40.
12. Melvin Small, *Johnson, Nixon and the Doves* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988). See also Sam Brown, "The Defeat of the Antiwar Movement" in Anthony Lake, ed., *The Vietnam Legacy: The War and American Society* (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 120-27.
13. For the argument that this may have happened in Vietnam see Charles De Benedetti and Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam War* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), pp. 238-40.
14. Sarkesian, "American Response to Low-Intensity Conflict," p. 44.
15. Gabriel, *Operation Peace For Galilee*, p. 223.
16. See, for example, Horne, "French Army in Algerian War," in Haycock, *Regular Armies and Insurgency*, pp. 71-9.
17. For a summary and critique of the literature on this point see D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), especially pp. 104-32.
18. Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgencies* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 52.
19. Loyalist Americans frequently complained of how British Army conduct alienated Americans from the crown and built support for the revolutionaries. See Wallace Brown, *The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution* (New York: William Morrow, 1969), pp. 118-20.
20. David C. Isby, "Soviet Strategy and Tactics in Low-Intensity Conflict," in Richard H. Schultz, Uri Ra'an, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., William J. Olson and Igor Lukes, eds., *Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency; U.S.-Soviet Policy in the Third World* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 336.

21. See Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960* (London: Frederick Muller, 1975), p. 37; and Robert B. Edgerton, *Mau Mau: An African Crucible* (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 241, 236-7.
22. See Short, *Communist Insurrection*, pp. 345-6; and C.J. Bartlett, *The Long Retreat: British Defense Policy 1945-70* (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 88.
23. Ian F.W. Beckett, "The Portuguese Army: The Campaign in Mozambique," in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Armed Forces and Modern Counterinsurgency* (New York: St.Martin's, 1985), pp. 150-51.
24. Beckett, "Portuguese Army," p. 142.
25. Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 273-84.
26. Beckett, "Portuguese Army," p. 142.
27. For a sense of the Afghan war's effect on the Soviet people see Artyom Borovik, *The Hidden War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), especially pp. 101-288.
28. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 273-98 and 436-60.
29. I. Joseph Vizulis, *Nations Under Duress: The Baltic States* (Port Washington, NY: National University Publications, 1985), pp. 106-7.
30. Romauld J. Misonas and Rein Taagupera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 89-90.
31. For contrasting views see Jan Goodwin, *Caught in the Crossfire* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987); and Matt Urban, *War in Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), pp. 110-11.
32. John Avedon, *In Exile From The Land of the Snows* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 48.
33. Beckett, "Portuguese Army," p. 144. See also Allen and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism To Revolution 1900-1982* (Boulder: Westview, 1983), pp. 100-5.
34. Maren Corell, *Madagascar: Politics, Economics and Society* (New York: Frances Pinter, 1987), p. 26.
35. For more on the evolution of British counterinsurgency doctrine see B.C. Denning, "Modern Problems in Guerrilla Warfare," *Army Quarterly and Defense Journal*, 13 (January 1927), pp. 347-54; and Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency 1919-60* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
36. Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: Counter-insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 161.
37. Carl G. Rosberg and John Nottingham, *The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1966), pp. 303-19. See also Bartlett, *Long Retreat*, pp. 89-90.
38. Bartlett, *Long Retreat*, pp. 187. See also Gregory Blaxland, *The Regiments Depart: A History of the British Army 1945-1970* (London: William Kimber, 1971), pp. 375-410.
39. James H. Wyllie, *The Influence of British Arms: An Analysis of British Military Intervention Since 1956* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 93. See also John Townsend, *Oman: The Making of a Modern State* (New York: St. Martin's, 1977), pp. 106-9.
40. See Edgerton, *Mau Mau*, pp. 173-202; and David A. Charters, "From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British Adaptation to Low Intensity Operations," in Charters and Tugwell, *Armies in Low Intensity Conflict*, pp. 222-3.

41. Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), p. 5.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 198. See also Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 255 and 267-73.
43. For the view that American counterinsurgency won the guerrilla war before the conventional war was lost, see William Colby and James McCarger, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen Year Involvement In Vietnam* (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), pp. 293-313. For a different view see Robert W. Chandler, *War of Ideas: The U.S Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), pp. 211-57. For a contemporary assessment which depicts the Viet Cong as only temporarily hurt, see Allan E. Goodman, Randolph Harris, and John C. Wood, "South Vietnam and the Politics of Self-Support," *Asian Survey*, 11, no. 1 (January 1971), pp. 1-25.
44. Krepinevich, *Army in Vietnam*, pp. 222-33. See also Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era*, pp. 276-7.
45. On this point see Eric Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), pp. 333-4.
46. For this explanation of British failure see Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla War* (New York: Walker, 1967), p. 143 on Cyprus; and Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), pp. 113-20 on Palestine.
47. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 858.
48. Shy and Collier, "Revolutionary War," p. 857.
49. Phillip Darby, *British Defense Policy East of Suez, 1947-68* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).