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DEMOCRACY, INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS, AND THE POSTLIBERAL CHALLENGE IN LATIN AMERICA

By DEBORAH J. YASHAR*

RECENT scholarship on third-wave democracies has come to focus on consolidation. After a decade of debates about the uncertainty of democratic transitions, scholars have become much less tentative about the prospects for democracy. Rather than study the sociopolitical processes by which social forces and states shape, support, and/or jeopardize the terms and direction of democracy, scholars have returned to an older intellectual tradition of comparing institutional differences between different governments and party systems. Accordingly, they explain the capacity to consolidate democracy largely as a function of institutional design.

This article takes issue with the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of the democratic consolidation literature. Specifically, it highlights how new political institutions, rather than securing democratic consolidation across the board, have in fact had a more checkered effect—as evidenced by the incomplete reach of the state, the survival of

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¹ This argument draws on Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," *World Development* 21 (August 1993).

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authoritarian enclaves, the uneven incorporation of social sectors, and the emergence of opposing social forces.¹ Indeed, many ostensibly consolidated democracies now find themselves being challenged by movements rallying against the failure of states to universalize democratic practices and secure political autonomy. Ethnic movements, in particular, have come increasingly to contest the foundations and contours of contemporary democratic and liberal institutions. These emergent movements have sparked fundamental political debates over territorial autonomy, legal pluralism, citizenship, representation, and multiculturalism.

These developments are particularly striking and consequential in Latin America. The regions' third-wave democracies have experienced increasing politicization of indigenous identities and organization of indigenous movements,² phenomena that appear to reverse the region's comparative historical record of weakly politicized ethnic cleavages.³ These movements are most prominent in countries with large and moderate-size indigenous populations (Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Mexico), but they have also provoked important debates and reforms in countries with small indigenous populations (Colombia, Brazil, and Chile). Indigenous movements have engaged in mass mobilizations, roadblocks, electoral campaigns, and policy negotiations. Unlike the class-based guerrilla wars of decades past, however, indigenous activists and movements do not seek to overthrow the state but rather are looking to reform democracy.

This article analyzes the politicization of ethnic cleavages as a springboard for delineating why the theoretical expectations of the democratic consolidation literature have not been realized; it then proposes how one might better theorize about democratic politics. It focuses on Latin America, the least likely case, where rural ethnic movements have come to assume increasing importance in the new de-

² See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Challenging the Nation-State in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs* 45 (Winter 1992); Richard Chase Smith, "A Search for Unity within Diversity: Peasant Unions, Ethnic Federations, and Indianist Movements in the Andean Republics," in Theodore MacDonald Jr., ed., *Native Peoples and Economic Development* (Cambridge: Cultural Survival, 1985); Donna Lee Van Cott, ed., *Indigenism: Peoples and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Deborah J. Yashar, "Indigenous Protest and Democracy in Latin America," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s—Themes and Issues* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); idem, "Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 31 (October 1998).

³ See Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), chap. 11; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Ted Robert Gurr with Barbara Harff, Monty G. Marshall, and James R. Scarritt, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

mocracies, despite a contemporary history of weakly politicized ethnic cleavages.⁴ The first section explains the increasing political salience of indigenous identities in twentieth-century Latin America by analyzing the unintended consequences of changing state-society relations. I argue that neoliberal-inspired citizenship reforms throughout the region have unintentionally challenged local autonomy, politicized ethnic identity, and catalyzed indigenous movements. The second section discusses the "postliberal challenge" that new indigenous movements pose for Latin America's third-wave democracies and for liberal state formation. Insofar as these movements demand new forms of representation, political autonomy, and multicultural recognition, they have once again engaged Latin America in a struggle over the kinds of democracies that will be built; the rights, responsibilities, and identities of citizens; and the ties that bind citizens to the state. Democratic institutions are therefore anything but consolidated. Rather, they are the subject of fundamental debates and the locus of far-reaching reforms, as evidenced by political negotiations and legislation throughout the region.

The final section discusses the implications of the prior analysis for how one studies politics in the region's new democracies. It questions the literature's conceptual focus on democratic consolidation and its analytic assumption of the power of new governmental institutions to define new interests, identities, and behavior uniformly and single-handedly. If conceptually this literature misconstrues regime endurance for consolidation, analytically it privileges governmental institutions as independent variables without explicitly evaluating alternative factors. As such it mistakenly *assumes* not only a competent and capable state but also a preconstituted society that will respond

⁴ This article restricts its focus to indigenous identities, communities, and movements in the countryside, where the majority of self-identified Indians continue to reside. Most communities and movements have developed urban and occasionally international ties through markets, migration, and the rise of participation by nongovernmental organizations. However, even in these cases of increasing urban and international penetration, the *communities* in question remain geographically *rural*. This article does *not* address the politicization of racial cleavages in Latin America. The politicization of black identities, which has emerged in a different historical context, has been largely limited to urban movements and has resulted in types of political demands that are different from those voiced by indigenous movements in Latin America. For competing views on racial cleavages and their politicization, see Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971); Pierre-Michel Fontaine, ed., *Race, Class, and Power in Brazil* (Los Angeles: University of California, 1985); Howard Winant, "Rethinking Race in Brazil," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 (February 1992), 173–92; Richard Graham, ed., *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870–1940* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); Michael Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 1945–1988* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); NACLA, "The Black Americas, 1492–1992," *Report on the Americas* 25 (February 1992); Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (London: Pluto Press, 1997); and Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

predictably to institutional change. As this article highlights, however, one cannot isolate these governmental institutions from their moorings in state and society. Indeed, we need to *analyze* democratic politics in the context of *state-society relations* by evaluating the reach of state institutions and assessing the broader social forces that surround, support, and oppose the terms of democracies' new institutions. Failing to do so, we necessarily underestimate the extent to which the third wave has initiated a new period of democratic politics in which the social, political, and institutional terms of political exchange remain qualitatively more open and more uncertain than depicted by the contemporary institutional theorizing about democratic consolidation.

CITIZENSHIP REGIMES AND THE UNEVEN REACH OF THE STATE

The contemporary round of democratization restored electoral politics to Latin America, reviving and reforming democratic rule throughout the region. These political regime changes did more than usher in new electoral institutions, however. Indeed, they oversaw a radical shift in the content of citizenship that set state-society relations along a new course. Marshall has underscored that citizenship is a differentiated bundle of rights and responsibilities that can include civil rights (freedom of organization and expression), political rights (suffrage), and social rights (the right to a minimum standard of living).⁵ The contemporary democracies in Latin America have reshuffled this trilogy of potential citizenship rights—in some places expanding who may vote and in all places restricting the social rights and responsibilities that citizenship confers on citizens and states alike. In Latin America's new democracies the changing content of citizenship has also been accompanied by a change in the primary modes of interest intermediation between state and society, such that the new regimes have significantly weakened corporatist institutions and tried to replace them with more pluralist forms.

The patterned combination of citizenship rights and the accompanying modes of interest intermediation is referred to here as "citizen-

⁵ T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963). This article does not assume, as does Marshall, that there is a natural progression of citizenship rights and/or that they are irreversible. For alternative discussions of citizenship, see Ronald Beiner, ed., *Theorizing Citizenship* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Gershon Shafir, ed., *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

ship regimes.⁶ Empirically speaking, modes of interest intermediation and citizenship rights have tended to go together, even though theoretically speaking they do not have to. These citizenship regimes have taken different forms over time. Thus, from the mid-twentieth century on, Latin American states, whether democratic or authoritarian, tended to promote corporatist citizenship regimes. They extended social rights (including subsidies, credit, health care, education, and the like) and institutionalized corporatist modes of interest intermediation for workers and peasants, in particular. In the new democracies, by contrast, states have tended to promote neoliberal citizenship regimes.⁷ The expansion of political and civil rights has tended to coincide with the decline in social rights and the promotion of liberal or pluralist modes of interest intermediation. Organized social sectors (such as workers and peasants) have lost their state assurance of a basic standard of living and similarly have lost their main institutional means of accessing and occasionally influencing the state. Although citizenship regimes have such significant consequences for state-society relations, however, they are neither equal to nor derivative of political regimes. As we will see, corporatist and neoliberal citizenship regimes developed in democratic and authoritarian regimes in Latin America (and Western Europe, for that matter).

Both corporatist and neoliberal citizenship regimes profoundly and intentionally reshaped state institutions and resources, as well as the terms of public access to them. Because of the uneven reach of the state, however, they had unintended consequences. Thus, in attempting to restructure society into class-based federations that could be controlled from above, corporatist citizenship regimes unwittingly provided autonomous spaces that could shelter rural indigenous communities from state control. And for their part, neoliberal citizen-

⁶ I borrow the phrase "citizenship regime" from Jenson and Phillips. They use the term to refer to the varying bundles of rights and responsibilities that citizenship can confer. This article expands the term to refer not only to the content of citizenship but also to its accompanying modes of interest intermediation. See Jane Jenson and Susan D. Phillips, "Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 14 (Fall 1996).

⁷ I label the latter citizenship regime as *neoliberal* for three reasons. First, I want to distinguish it from T. H. Marshall's description of earlier British liberal citizenship regimes, where civil and political rights were extended but social rights were not yet on the political agenda. The sequencing of citizenship rights that Marshall identified, while perhaps applicable to the late-nineteenth-century liberal periods in Latin America, does not apply to the contemporary Latin American context, where social rights were dismantled and civil and political rights extended. Second, I want to distinguish it from the liberal periods that marked the second half of nineteenth-century Latin American politics. Finally, I want to link the contemporary neoliberal citizenship regimes to the contemporary neoliberal reforms that have redefined Latin America's political economies and dismantled many of the social programs that were once tied to social rights.

ship regimes setting out to shatter corporatism's class-based integration and replace it with a more atomized or individuated set of state-society relations in fact challenged the indigenous local autonomy that corporatism had unknowingly fostered, failed to secure the individual rights that neoliberalism had promised, and consequently politicized ethnic cleavages throughout the region. In short corporatist and neoliberal citizenship regimes had foundational projects for state and society that were consequential but unevenly institutionalized. From the top looking down, these projects restructured society in radical ways. From the bottom looking up, however, these new projects of state formation and interest intermediation have been contested at many steps along the way. This section juxtaposes the formal goals and the unintended consequences of these two citizenship regimes.

CORPORATIST CITIZENSHIP REGIMES

At midcentury most Latin American states were experimenting with a corporatist form of citizenship regime.⁸ Latin American corporatism did not necessarily advance political rights (suffrage), for it was constitutive as much of authoritarian regimes as of democratic ones. However, it generally advanced the idea that citizens have some civil rights (the right to organize under certain circumstances) and some social rights (the right to a basic standard of living). It created and/or promoted labor and peasant associations that (1) structured and often monopolized official representation, (2) received state subsidies, and (3) were controlled by the state. As Collier notes, however, the degree to which corporatism actually structured, subsidized, and controlled these federations varied significantly from case to case and over time.⁹

As part of this mid-twentieth-century corporatist project Latin American states incorporated Indians. They sought to cast aside ethnic categories (which supported ongoing attempts at nation building) and to reconstitute Indians as national peasants.¹⁰ The states did so largely

⁸ For classic perspectives on Latin American corporatism, see James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). For a seminal comparative analysis of Latin American corporatism, see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

⁹ David Collier, "Trajectory of a Concept: 'Corporatism' in the Study of Latin American Politics," in Peter H. Smith, ed., *Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995). State commitments to class-based federations, for example, weakened under the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s.

¹⁰ Ethnicity and class are not the only axes for organizing grassroots mobilization in rural Latin America. Political parties, religious organizations, and cooperatives, for example, also competed for membership. However, from a national and comparative perspective they were generally not the most important players in redefining the rural landscape.

through land reforms that “emancipated” Indians from repressive and/or exploitative forms of labor control (thereby holding out to them the prospect of autonomous citizenship), occasionally distributed land and credit (thereby extending social rights), and incorporated them through peasant associations (thereby organizing them along corporatist lines). Land reforms in Mexico (1934), Bolivia (1953), Guatemala (the short-lived reform of 1952), Ecuador (1964 and 1973), and Peru (1968), for example, weakened landed elites’ control of the countryside, redistributed significant tracts of land, and provided incentives for Indians to register as peasant communities. This registration reorganized the countryside along state-regulated corporatist lines, with many peasant communities joining peasant federations in hopes of gaining access to land and the state. These corporatist reforms brought with them the creation and expansion of social services in the areas of agricultural support, infrastructure, education, and health. Access to land and these services was often gained through corporatist associations. In short, the state and union organizations imposed a class identity on Indians as the ticket for political incorporation and access to resources.

The registration of peasant communities and the growth of peasant federations, in particular, fostered the fiction that the state had turned Indians into peasants and stripped indigenous ethnicity of its salience. Until recently, studies of corporatism highlighted the strong reach of these corporatist institutions and their capacity to control and remake these social sectors. Latin American corporatist states presumably centralized state-society relations. Yet this enterprise was compromised by the absence of a rationalized bureaucracy, the failure to establish authority, and a lack of monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Hence, despite official statements and institutions of corporatist control, large areas of the country operated beyond the reach of the state. Authoritarian enclaves were dominated by patronage and clientelist networks. Caudillos and landlords at times deployed their own paramilitary forces, created their own political rules, displayed greater allegiance to subnational politics than to national politics, and/or deployed state institutions for their benefit.¹¹ Moreover, studies of the Amazon have long noted the failure of states to govern the Amazon—leaving large

¹¹ Jonathan Fox, “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico,” *World Politics* 46 (January 1994); idem, “Latin America’s Emerging Local Politics,” *Journal of Democracy* 5 (April 1994); Frances Hagopian, *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994); and R. Andrew Nickson, *Local Government in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

swaths of territory and significant numbers of Indians beyond the political and military control of the state.¹² In short, the uneven reach of the state undermined the centralizing program.

In this context, state efforts to build and register peasant communities had unintended consequences. Via land reform and credit programs, Indians secured the spaces in which they could institutionalize indigenous community practices at the local level.¹³ In more ways than one, the distribution of inviolable communal lands to registered peasant communities provided Indians with the physical space not only for farming but also for securing governance by traditional indigenous authorities. In this way the legal registration of communities and granting of community-based property created a legally defined, state-sanctioned geographic area that allowed for the growth and/or maintenance of politically autonomous local enclaves, indigenous culture, and political practices. Otherwise stated, land reforms masked the maintenance of indigenous autonomy and often engendered the (re)emergence of indigenous leaders, the (re)constitution of communities, and the expression of (evolving) indigenous identities at the community levels.

In Mexico, for example, the land reform accompanied the creation of a national peasant federation, the CNC, and distributed property in many forms. Of these, the distribution of *ejidos* (communally owned land) unwittingly provided the greatest latitude for local indigenous autonomy—they were community based, inalienable, and, while regulated, often beyond state control.¹⁴ In Bolivia the national revolutionary governments of the 1950s and the subsequent military governments between 1964 and 1974 also incorporated Indians into the state as peasants. As in Mexico, they depended on alliances and pacts with

¹² States did not actively seek to harness the Amazon region until the latter part of the twentieth century. Prior to that they had mapped out boundaries that de facto included Indians as members, though not necessarily citizens, of the given state. See Lucy Ruiz, ed., *Amazonía: Escenarios y conflictos* (Quito: CEDIME and Ediciones Abya Yala, 1993); Fernando Santos Granero, ed., *Globalización y cambio en la amazonía indígena* (Quito: FLACSO and Ediciones Abya Yala, 1996); Richard Chase Smith, "La política de la diversidad. COICA y las federaciones étnicas de la Amazonía," in Stefano Varese, ed., *Pueblos indios, soberanía y globalismo* (Quito: Ediciones Abya Yala, 1996).

¹³ In Eugen Weber's classic study of nation building, he illuminates how the French state turned peasants into Frenchmen. See Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976). I suggest here that Latin American efforts to turn Indians into peasants in fact created the space in which they could defend and develop a local indigenous identity.

¹⁴ Jeffrey W. Rubin, *Decentering the Regime: Ethnicity, Radicalism, and Democracy in Juchitán Mexico* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997); Neil Harvey, *The Chiapas Rebellion* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Valentina Napolitano and Xochitl Leyva Solano, eds., *Encuentros antropológicos: Politics, Identity, and Mobility in Mexican Society* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998); Fox (fn. 11); and Shannan Mattiace, "¡Zapata Vive! The Ezn, Indian Politics and the Autonomy Movement in Mexico," in George A. Collier and Lynn Stephen, special eds., *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 3, no. 1 (1997).

peasant federations, which were expected both to deliver votes to the government and to control the local communities. Contrary to the hopes of politicians and military officers, Bolivia simultaneously witnessed the defense and/or reconstitution of *ayllus* (kinship groups governed by a set of local-level indigenous authorities).¹⁵ In Ecuador the 1937 community law and later the 1964 and 1973 land reforms defined indigenous men and women as peasants and gave them access to the state insofar as they represented themselves as peasant communities and/or unions. Indeed, the number of registered peasant communities skyrocketed in the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁶ However, at the local level, many indigenous communities continued to maintain some form of indigenous practices and institutions.¹⁷

Corporatism, therefore, created a dynamic dualism, with identities shifting according to the locale: for the state, Indians assumed identities as peasants; within the community, peasants assumed their identities as Indians.¹⁸ Location therefore mattered for the expression of identity. Where the state incompletely penetrated local communities (nowhere more evident than in the Amazon), Indians sustained a certain degree of political autonomy by retaining and/or creating authority systems and customs.¹⁹ Over time the boundaries did not remain so clear. Indigenous authorities and rules shaped union politics just as union authorities and rules began to shape community dynamics.

NEOLIBERAL CITIZENSHIP REGIMES

With the transition from authoritarian rule in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Latin American reformers reestablished democratic insti-

¹⁵ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui y equipo THOA, *Ayllus y proyectos de desarrollo en el norte de Potosí* (La Paz: Ediciones Aruwiyiri, 1992); Esteban Ticona A., Gonzalo Rojas O., and Xavier Albó C., *Votos y wiphallas: Campesinos y pueblos originarios en democracia* (La Paz: Fundación Milenio and CIPCA, 1995); and Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, "Culture and Political Practice of the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia: Autonomous Forms of Modernity in the Andes," *Latin American Perspectives* 23 (Spring 1996).

¹⁶ Leon Zamosc, *Estadística de las áreas de predominio étnico de la sierra ecuatoriana: Población rural, incidadores cantonales y organizaciones de base* (Quito: Ediciones Abya Yala, 1995).

¹⁷ A similar pattern emerged following land-reform programs in Guatemala (1944–54) and Peru (1968). Given high levels of repression, however, corporatist policies and institutions were undermined and dismantled shortly after they were created. Nonetheless, the general outline of this argument remains. While states promoted national ideals, indigenous communities found ways to shelter their right to sustain and develop ethnic identities and ties.

¹⁸ This duality is captured by disciplinary differences in the social sciences. Political scientists working on this period have highlighted the centrality of class, the peasantry, and corporatist organizations, as if they displaced community autonomy and ethnic identities. Anthropologists have historically focused on the local level and, in turn, have highlighted community autonomy and ethnicity, often at the expense of broader patterns of state-society relations.

¹⁹ Corporatist citizenship regimes barely penetrated the Amazon. Amazonian Indians rarely formed part of peasant federations and states did not have the resources to control them. Consequently, Amazonian Indians had even more autonomy than Andean and Mesoamerican Indians.

tutions. The original democratic reforms left intact many of the vertical corporatist institutions and corporatist social policies just discussed. However, with the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, many states began to reassess their capacity for maintaining a corporatist citizenship regime and the desirability of doing so, with all that that entailed—social rights plus structured and hierarchical class-based federations that were to mediate between state and society. Adopting a neoliberal discourse, they advocated instead individual autonomy and responsibility, a program based on granting individual political and civil rights (but not necessarily social rights), emasculating corporatist organizations, and advocating the retreat of the state.²⁰

This shift in citizenship regimes has had significant consequences for indigenous peoples. Individual rights have been promoted at the expense of corporate organizations—peasant and labor federations—that had served as the primary (at times the only) mode of interest intermediation between state and society. These federations have lost political and social leverage throughout the region, and with this Indians have lost their formal ties to the state.²¹ The shift has also informed the adoption of stabilization and structural adjustment policies that have drastically cut back social services and goods that ostensibly were designed to secure a basic social standard of living for citizens. Most dramatically for Indians, states have privatized land markets, liberalized agricultural prices, eliminated agricultural subsidies, and diminished credit programs.²² These reforms (particularly efforts to privatize land markets and to privilege the individual over the corporate unit) echo late-nineteenth-century liberal reforms that were incontrovertibly detrimental to indigenous peoples. In both cases, the reforms threatened a communal land base that the state had once made inviolable.²³

²⁰ There is a healthy and unresolved theoretical debate about whether the core of liberal thought is based on toleration or autonomy. But it would be foolish to argue in the Latin American context that there is one coherent core, as the region's history of liberalism is undeniably syncretic.

²¹ Several states did have national indigenous institutes. However, these rarely if ever served as interlocutors between Indians and the state.

²² Catherine M. Conaghan and James M. Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Miguel Urioste Fernández de Córdova, *Fortalecer las comunidades: Una utopía subversiva, democrática . . . y posible* (La Paz: AICE/PROCOM/TIERRA, 1992); Nora Lustig, *Coping with Austerity: Poverty and Inequality in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995); Alain de Janvry et al., *The Political Feasibility of Adjustment in Ecuador and Venezuela* (Paris: OECD, 1994); Samuel A. Morley, *Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: The Impact of Adjustment and Recovery in the 1980s* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

²³ Indians resisted both sets of reforms. However, the isolated and ephemeral terms of indigenous historical resistance differ from the more organized and sustained contemporary indigenous movements. See fn. 2.

The reconfiguration of local political power, control, and administration has also occurred through decentralization programs to check the central state and to break up the concentration of administrative, fiscal, and political power. Although changes in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Venezuela have been particularly noteworthy, the new trends are evident throughout the region.²⁴ Decentralization programs, as a new type of state formation, have devolved varying degrees of power to more local units (municipalities, provinces, regions, and so on) and, in turn, have created a more localized space for agglomerating individual preferences, calculating decisions, and implementing programs. While creating a new layer of political bureaucracy, they have also created additional entry points for individuals to try to shape local and national politics. Moreover decentralization has created more possibilities for holding political leaders accountable for their (in)action. It has attempted to institutionalize a new form of democratic politics: both more liberal and more local. The geography of democracy, in other words, has shifted away from rationally sanctioned corporatist institutions and toward more pluralist and local forms of interest intermediation.

With the promise of equal rights and greater political participation, neoliberal citizenship regimes would seem to hold out great hope for democratizing politics. Yet, as the next section underscores, Latin American states have not secured these neoliberal citizenship rights—in particular, for Indians—even while they start to take away the social rights, access to the state, and indigenous local autonomy once unwittingly associated with corporatist citizenship regimes. This inability to secure neoliberal citizenship regimes is in large part a function of the weak reach and retreat of the state.

Weber argued in his classic statement: “The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”²⁵ In Latin America, however, as in most of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, this standard is still largely unmet. Many of Latin America’s central political institutions remain weak, commitment to those institutions remains questionable, and the territorial scope of those institutions remains ambiguous.²⁶

²⁴ Eliza Willis, Christopher da C.B. Garman, and Stephan Haggard, “The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America,” *Latin American Research Review* 34, no. 1 (1999).

²⁵ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.

²⁶ State formation is a process of political mapping. As Scott has argued, it requires a situation of mutual intelligibility. The state must be able to read, identify, and defend the territory it governs. Those governed should be able to identify (with) and depend on the state for basic functions. See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). See also fn 1.

This is nowhere more apparent than from the vantage of the countryside. From that perspective, it is difficult to argue that there is a single human community (as opposed to many), that the state claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, or that the territory is clearly defined. National identities, borders, and legitimacy are all in question and often in flux. Indeed, Latin America remains very much in the throes of state formation, where the identities, borders, and legitimacy of the state are highly politicized and contested processes, particularly in the countryside. It is not surprising therefore that consolidating democracy and securing neoliberal citizenship regimes under these conditions remains a tall order.

In this context ethnic cleavages have been politicized and indigenous movements—particularly those that mobilize in the countryside—have protested the ongoing violation of their political rights under democratic regimes, with significant political consequences.²⁷ As stated most boldly by CONAIE, Ecuador's largest and most prominent indigenous movement: "In Ecuador the fundamental principles of democracy—equality, liberty, fraternity, and social peace—have not been achieved."²⁸ Throughout the region indigenous leaders have made similar points. They recount the ways in which individuals' rights have been dismissed—in voting booths, courts, and schools—and argue that the state should do more to uphold and protect their individual rights.²⁹ Hence, despite a discourse of individual civil and political rights, states remain incapable of protecting them.³⁰ The state's inability to secure individual rights makes many indigenous communities even more wary of the restrictions that neoliberal citizenship regimes would place on the inalienable *community rights* and de facto *local autonomy* that they had secured during the prior corporatist citizenship regime.

²⁷ This article seeks to explain not why indigenous movements *emerge* but why indigenous identities became *politicized* and how that politicization is reflected in the postliberal challenge, a regionwide agenda for democratic reform. For an explanation of why, when, and where indigenous organizations emerge in Latin America, see Yashar (fn. 2, 1998); indigenous movements emerge only where state reforms that challenge local autonomy combine with political liberalization and preexisting networks. In some cases these movements were supported and shaped by ties to urban and international actors.

²⁸ CONAIE, *Proyecto político de la CONAIE* (Quito: CONAIE, n.d.), 6.

²⁹ Based on anonymous small-group discussions conducted by the author in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru during the course of 1997, and repeated in most 1995–97 interviews with indigenous leaders in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, and Mexico.

³⁰ Rodolfo Stavenhagen and Diego Iturralde, eds., *Entre la ley y la costumbre: El derecho consuetudinario indígena en América Latina* (Mexico City: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano; San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 1990); Jorge E. Dandler, "Indigenous Peoples and the Rule of Law in Latin America: Do They Have a Chance?" (Paper prepared for the academic workshop on the Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, November 9–11, 1996); and Ramón Torres Galarza, ed., *Derechos de los pueblos indígenas: Situación jurídica y políticas de estado* (Quito: Abya Yala, CEPLAES, CONAIE, n.d.).

THE POSTLIBERAL CHALLENGE

In this context ethnic cleavages have been politicized and indigenous movements have challenged the neoliberal shift in democratic citizenship.³¹ They have exposed the incomplete implementation of neoliberal citizenship regimes and have proposed a more complex political geography for defining units and locales of democratic representation and governance. Yes, they want more liberal politics insofar as the state would defend individual rights that in practice have been denied. Yes, they want more local power insofar as it would increase access to the state and defend local autonomy. However, they do not uniformly subscribe to the “more liberal more local” formula. Indeed, they question the state’s capacity to uphold neoliberal citizenship rights just as they challenge the universalizing assumptions of neoliberal citizenship regimes about national identity, unit representation, and state structure.³²

In this context, indigenous movements now pose a postliberal challenge, by demanding a different kind of political mapping—one that would secure individual rights but also accommodate more diverse identities, units of representation, and state structures.³³ What follows is a stylized presentation of this postliberal challenge. This section addresses the content of the postliberal demands that Indian movements have placed on the political agenda. This is only an overview, however, and not a full description of the complex and diverse indigenous demands throughout the region. It is meant to be illustrative of the highly contested terms of contemporary politics in the region.

CHALLENGING NATIONAL HOMOGENEITY

The Latin American indigenous movements that have emerged with this third wave of democratization have started to challenge the project of nation building and assimilation that was associated with nineteenth-century liberal parties and that has been inscribed in Latin

³¹ Ethnic cleavages were also politicized in Nicaragua in the 1980s, as the Miskitu demanded, struggled for, and achieved autonomy. This politicization occurred, however, during the revolutionary decade headed by the Sandinistas—a very different historical and political context from the shifting citizenship regimes in the rest of the region. See Charles R. Hale, *Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894–1987* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).

³² See Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” in Beiner (fn. 5). Young argues that liberal democracies profess to represent all individuals equally but, in fact, privilege certain dominant voices over others. She calls for a differentiated form of citizenship, one in which social groups are granted spaces for representation, participation, and voice. While indigenous peoples have not necessarily read Young, their claims in fact parallel hers when they indicate that Indians should gain additional and different rights alongside individual ones.

³³ Parallel theoretical discussions about politics in advanced industrial democracies have tended to refer to this challenge as the “multicultural” challenge.

American constitutions since then. Nineteenth-century liberals engaged in nation-building projects that sought to create national unity—a policy that legitimated the assimilation of indigenous peoples and attacks on indigenous communal lands. Building on nineteenth-century liberal ideas, Latin American constitutions during both corporatist and neoliberal citizenship regimes have codified national identities as the basis for political membership. Confronted with diverse ethnic populations, states have promoted assimilation—even while they maintained labor markets that were segmented along ethnic lines—to achieve this national ideal. Where nationals did not exist, they would forge them. In this regard, national politicians and constitutions have either assumed ethnic homogeneity or disregarded the political salience of ethnic diversity.

Contemporary indigenous movements challenge both claims. Their very presence undermines claims of ethnic universality. Indeed, data on indigenous populations highlight how unsuccessful assimilation and nation-building projects have been in the long term. Certainly indigenous populations have suffered a decline in absolute and relative terms. Indians, however, still constitute a substantial portion of the national populations in Bolivia (71.2 percent), Ecuador (37.5 percent), Guatemala (60.3 percent), Mexico (12.4 percent), and Peru (38.6 percent), with smaller percentages in the rest of the region.³⁴ Indeed, these percentages are testament to the failure of nation-building projects since the nineteenth century and to the capacity of indigenous communities to maintain indigenous community structures and identities at the local level. As discussed, these identities were nursed and developed at the local level, even during the corporatist period that attempted to convert Indians into peasant nationals.

With democratization and the turn to neoliberal citizenship regimes, indigenous movements in Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil have demanded constitutional reforms recognizing the multiethnic and plurinational composition of their countries. These demands highlight the endurance of many ethnic communities (even while the content of those identities has surely changed) despite nation-building projects. As part of this effort, indigenous movements have appealed to norms, laws, and organizations operating in the international arena.³⁵ In particular, they have lobbied Latin American states

³⁴ Yashar (fn. 2, 1996). These figures should be read with caution given the problems of data collection and measurement.

³⁵ Alison Brysk, "Acting Globally: Indian Rights and International Politics in Latin America," in Van Cott (fn. 2); idem, "Turning Weakness into Strength: The Internationalization of Indian Rights,"

to ratify the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. Convention 169 outlines the rights of indigenous peoples and the responsibilities of multiethnic states toward them. At a minimum, it calls on states to recognize ethnic heterogeneity where states had advanced nationalist aspirations of mestizo homogeneity. The following Latin American states have ratified ILO Convention 169: Mexico (1990), Bolivia (1991), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1993), Peru (1994), Paraguay (1994), Honduras (1995), Guatemala (1996), and Ecuador (1998).³⁶ Ratification provides a mechanism for advocating constitutional reforms to accommodate ethnically diverse populations; it should not necessarily be seen as a prelude to secession.³⁷

While these Latin American states have yet to live up to the terms of the convention, they are beginning to discuss constitutional amendments that recognize the multiethnic and pluricultural makeup of each country, as in Mexico (1992), Bolivia (1994), and Ecuador (1998).³⁸ These reforms are an important symbolic victory for indigenous peoples who have worked to change myths of national unity. Indeed, the constitutional recognition of ethnic heterogeneity in some Latin American states has opened up possibilities to discuss and debate other kinds of democratic institutions that can accommodate a diverse ethnic population, including discussions about consociationalism, identity-based electoral institutions, ethnic political parties, federalism, and the like.³⁹

CHALLENGING UNIT HOMOGENEITY⁴⁰

This demand for multicultural recognition is the first step toward making claims that Indian cultures cannot be reduced to individual identities and rights, as neoliberal citizenship regimes would have it, but in

Latin American Perspectives 23, no. 2 (1996); and Franke Wilmer, *The Indigenous Voice in World Politics* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Press, 1993). As these authors note, the international arena has provided a new discourse, funds, and forums that have often shaped debates about indigenous rights.

³⁶ <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/ratifce.pl?C169>. Thirteen countries have ratified Convention 169, including Denmark, Fiji, the Netherlands, and Norway.

³⁷ The call for constitutional recognition of multiethnic and plurinational populations has elicited vitriolic reactions from some politicians. Specifically, they fear that this recognition of different "peoples" will provide Indians with the leverage to appeal to UN laws that sanction the right of all peoples to self-determination and, by implication, to their own state.

³⁸ Dandler (fn. 30). In a May 1999 Guatemalan referendum the voting population (18 percent of the eligible electorate) rejected these proposed reforms.

³⁹ See Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," *World Politics* 26 (July 1974); Ian S. Lustick, "Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism," *World Politics* 50 (October 1997); and Horowitz (fn. 3).

⁴⁰ "Unit homogeneity" refers here to the unit of political representation and intermediation. It is not meant to evoke the standard meaning of the term used by methodologists.

fact rest on primary and collective sets of identities, organizations, and rights. Accordingly, indigenous movements have started to challenge the effort to homogenize and individualize the appropriate unit of political representation and intermediation.

Latin American constitutions have tended to assume unit homogeneity. As noted, whereas Latin American regimes once privileged corporatist forms of interest intermediation, they now privilege individuals as the primary unit. With the current neoliberal citizenship regimes, Latin American politicians have contended that the central political unit is and should be the individual. The individual chooses to vote, to join political parties, to participate in organizations, and to hold government accountable. In short, the individual is the foundational unit of rights and responsibilities in a polity presumed to be moving toward a more liberal democracy. Policymakers have voiced concern about equalizing treatment before a state that engaged in indiscriminate repression and torture and, to that end, advocate paying closer attention to the rule of law. In a context where dissidents were killed or jailed, indigenous people were excluded and/or repressed, and regions were controlled by local bosses, the call for a universalizing set of norms and institutions to protect individuals is an important normative step toward deepening democracy.

Given the democratizing intentions of neoliberal citizenship regimes, it is striking that indigenous men and women are cautious about the drive to promote the individual as the primary political unit of democracy. Where the dominant political discourse suggests the advance of individual rights, indigenous communities often foresee an infringement on indigenous autonomy and resources. Because indigenous communities have rarely experienced the full complement of civil and political rights associated with liberal democracy, they have little reason to believe that neoliberal citizenship regimes will necessarily fulfill their promises now. To the contrary, they see the promotion of neoliberal (versus corporatist) citizenship regimes as an infringement on social rights that once enabled them to act as autonomous communities.

Confronted with this shift in citizenship regimes, contemporary indigenous movements have brought into sharp relief the tense interplay between the contemporary celebration of the individual and indigenous community practices.⁴¹ Indigenous movements generally argue that the

⁴¹ See Enrique Mayer, "Reflexiones sobre los derechos individuales y colectivos: Los derechos étnicos," and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Los derechos indígenas: Algunos problemas conceptuales," both in Eric Hershberg and Elizabeth Jelín, eds., *Construir la democracia: Derechos humanos, ciudadanía y sociedad en América Latina* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1996).

individual should not be the only unit of representation, nor should it be privileged. They demand that the state uphold equal rights and responsibilities for Indians as individuals and in this sense are calling for the fulfillment of liberal ideals. But they argue as well that the state should recognize indigenous communities as a historically prior and autonomous sphere of political rights, jurisdiction, and autonomy. These demands range from the call for community or supracommunity autonomy to the call for designated representation in legislatures and ministries. The new Colombian constitution, for example, has allocated two seats in the national legislature for indigenous representatives.

If we look at a series of indigenous movements in Mexico (EZLN), Guatemala (COMG), Ecuador (CONAIE), Bolivia (CIDOB and CSUTCB), and Peru (AIDSESEP), we find that their strategies have differed. In some cases they have taken up arms (Mexico); in others they have organized marches for recognition (Ecuador and Bolivia); in others they have negotiated directly with the government for new laws that recognize communities (Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia); and in others they have used existing administrative laws that map out local political units to secure a de facto space in which indigenous communities can indirectly act as a political unit (Peru). But despite these differences, we find each movement demanding that the state simultaneously protect members' individual civil and political rights *and* recognize indigenous communities as a political unit. This position is forcefully articulated in several movement documents,⁴² as well as in interviews with leaders from each of the movements.⁴³ At present this issue of indigenous peoples and their political representation/participation as individuals versus communities is being hotly debated and negotiated throughout the region.⁴⁴

⁴² CONAIE (fn. 28), 11–12; COMG, *Construyendo un futuro para nuestro pasado: Derechos del pueblo maya y el proceso de paz* (Guatemala City: Editorial Cholsamaj, 1995); Servicios del Pueblo Mixe, A.C., "Autonomía, una forma concreta de ejercicio del derecho a la libre determinación y sus alcances," *Cbiapas 2* (Mexico City: Ediciones ERA, S.A. de C.V., 1996).

⁴³ These statements were made in 1997 author interviews with indigenous leaders: from Peru, with Evaristo Nukguaj and Bonifacio Cruz Alanguía; from Bolivia, with Marcial Fabricano and Román Loayza; and from Ecuador, with Luis Macas, Leonardo Viteri, César Cerdas, and Valerio Grefa. Similar statements were made in an author interview in the United States with Guatemalans Manuela Alvarado, Alberto Mazariegos, and Juanita Bazibal Tujal, May 3, 1998.

⁴⁴ For normative debates in political science on the topic of individual and group rights, see Will Kymlicka, ed., *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, eds., *Ethnicity and Group Rights* 39, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1997). Democratization studies of Latin America have generally ignored the liberal-communitarian debate that speaks to the philosophical foundations of ethnic diversity and democratic representation. These debates, however, raise the question of the central unit of political life. They have also discussed whether in fact communities should be granted special (i.e., different) rights by virtue of being a community. There have been efforts to conjoin these seemingly opposite positions, for example, by Kymlicka, "Introduction," and Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" in Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures*. The authors

CHALLENGING ADMINISTRATIVE HOMOGENEITY

Many indigenous movements have also started to challenge basic normative assumptions about the desirability of universal administrative boundaries. Rejecting state-formation projects that have sought to centralize or decentralize political institutions according to a single blueprint, indigenous movements throughout the region have demanded that the state recognize administrative boundaries that are unique to indigenous peoples. In this regard, it is not enough to promote municipalization, decentralization, and accountability as a means of increasing the representation, accountability, and transparency of local governments. To the contrary, indigenous peoples are increasingly demanding that the state recognize territorial boundaries (even, or particularly, where they cut across municipal or provincial boundaries) in which social relations are regulated by indigenous authority systems and customary law. In other words, they are arguing that a differentiated citizenship should coincide with differentiated administrative boundaries.⁴⁵

Demands for territorial autonomy are growing throughout the Amazon. Although the state historically had been weak there, it is currently seeking to penetrate more deeply into these areas, privatize land markets, and regulate social relations. In the 1991 Colombian Constituent Assembly, for example, Indians negotiated reforms that granted territorial autonomy.⁴⁶ In Ecuador OPIP placed territorial demands on the political map with the thirteen-day, two-thousand-person march from Puyo to Quito in 1992. The government eventually conceded 19 different territorial blocs that totaled 138 legally recognized communities and 1,115,000 hectares.⁴⁷ In Bolivia the main Amazonian indigenous

fail, however, to provide guidelines for how to institutionalize both individual liberal rights and communitarian rights. Because they fail to problematize sufficiently the role that the state plays in balancing these goals—particularly when communities demand a form of political autonomy that includes alternative juridical and authority systems—their normative discussion resonates only loosely with the empirical cases of democratization.

⁴⁵ Young (fn. 32) introduces the term “differentiated citizenship.” References to country-specific demands for differentiated administrative boundaries follow. For a comparative overview of the current state of legal pluralism and autonomy regimes, see Dandler (fn. 30); Donna Lee Van Cott, *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming); idem, “Explaining Ethnic Autonomy Regimes in Latin America” (Manuscript, 1999); and Michael Addison Smith, “Indigenous Law and the Nation States of the Latin American Region” (Manuscript, University of Texas, School of Law and the Mexican Center, April 20, 1999).

⁴⁶ See Bartolomé Clavero, *Derecho indígena y cultura constitucional en América* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1994), 187–89; Van Cott (fn. 45, forthcoming and 1999); and idem, “A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia and Colombia,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* (forthcoming).

⁴⁷ Two author interviews each, in Ecuador, with Leonardo Viteri, César Cerdas, and Gonzalo Ortiz Crespo between February and May 1997.

organizations have also won territorial autonomy.⁴⁸ Demands were first articulated during the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity, organized by CPIB. The president responded by issuing presidential decrees that recognized four indigenous territories. In 1996 the government finally passed a new agrarian reform that provided indigenous communities with the legal basis for appealing for territorial recognition—including the right to vast expanses of land and the political autonomy of indigenous authorities. By August 1997 the state had recognized seven distinct territories totaling 2.6 million hectares, and it was processing thirty-four more demands totaling about 20 million hectares.⁴⁹

Beyond the Amazon as well, there are now demands for state recognition of indigenous communities as politically autonomous units, challenging the hegemonic idea of administrative homogeneity. In Bolivia, in particular, there is a push to recognize, reconstitute, and/or register *ayllus* (communal kinship organizations) that dot the Andean countryside.⁵⁰ The 1997 agrarian reform law makes this recognition possible.⁵¹ In Ecuador this public discussion is incipient, as indigenous movements and nongovernmental organizations have started to engage in dialogue and initiate projects to strengthen and/or reconstitute systems of elders that have receded in importance over the years.⁵² Mexico and

⁴⁸ May–August 1997 author interviews with indigenous leaders Marcial Fabricano and Ernesto Noe of CIDOB, with researchers Zulehna Lehm and Wilder Molina at CIDDEBENI, and with lawyer Carlos Romero Bonifaz of CEJIS. See Kitula Libermann and Armando Godínez, eds., *Territorio y dignidad: Pueblos indígenas y medio ambiente en Bolivia* (La Paz: ILDIS and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1992); and Carlos Navia Ribera, *Reconocimiento, demarcación y control de territorios indígenas: situación y experiencias en Bolivia*, Working Paper no. 34 (Trinidad, Bolivia: Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el Desarrollo del Beni, July 1996); Wilder M. Molina, “El movimiento social indígena del Beni en el contexto del proceso de consolidación de la movilización intercomunal hasta la Marcha por el Territorio y la Dignidad (1987–1990)” (Manuscript, Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el Desarrollo del Beni, Trinidad, Bolivia, 1997); and Van Cott (fn. 45, forthcoming and 1999, and fn. 46).

⁴⁹ Author interviews conducted in Bolivia with Isabel Lavadenz, former national director of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, and Jorge Muñoz, researcher at UDAPSO, 1997. See also Jorge A. Muñoz and Isabel Lavadenz, “Reforming the Agrarian Reform in Bolivia” (Paper prepared for HIID/UDAPSO and presented in Cambridge, Mass., and La Paz, Bolivia, 1997).

⁵⁰ *Ayllus* often claim sovereignty over discontinuous land bases, in contrast to Western ideas of state formation that generally assume/advocate that continuous areas coincide with a single political administration.

⁵¹ Author interviews conducted in Bolivia between May and August 1997 with former Aymaran leader Constantino Lima; Carlos Mamani, María Eugenia Choque Quispe, and Ramón Conde, researcher-activists at THOA; and Ricardo Calla, former-director of TAYPI. See Sergio Molina and Iván Arias, *De la nación clandestina a la participación popular* (La Paz: Centro de Documentación e Información CEDOIN, 1996); Xavier Albó and Ayllu Sartañani, “Participación popular en tierra de ayllus,” in David Booth, ed., “Popular Participation: Democratizing the State in Rural Bolivia” (Manuscript).

⁵² Author interviews conducted in Ecuador between February and May 1997 with indigenous leaders José María Cabascango, Luis Maldonado, and Luis Macas.

Guatemala have seen separate efforts to negotiate or proclaim autonomy for the Mayan populations residing on either side of the border.⁵³

Hence, indigenous movements throughout the Americas are asserting their right to new administrative spheres that have a certain degree of political autonomy at the local level. This is more than just a call for more land, although that is certainly a core component of the demand. Rather, it is a demand that the state recognize indigenous political jurisdiction over that land, including the right of indigenous legal systems and authorities to process and adjudicate claims. In this regard, diversified state structures would coincide with some form of legal pluralism.

These calls might support federalism and/or decentralization but cannot be reduced to either one or the other.⁵⁴ Federalism and decentralization are designed to grant greater local sovereignty over local issues; federalism and decentralization assume an important degree of administrative homogeneity. Each assumes that an entire country will be defined by federal and/or municipal administrative boundaries. Each administrative unit (whether the state and/or the municipality) ideally governs with the same understanding of the dividing line between federal/national and local jurisdiction. Many indigenous organizations support this idea insofar as it provides additional entry points for participation as both electors and elected. And indeed, with decentralization, the level of indigenous participation in elections has grown; in Bolivia, for example, the number of elected indigenous officials has increased.⁵⁵

Demands for local autonomy, however, actually challenge the administrative homogeneity entailed in decentralization and federalism. Indigenous organizations assert that their collective identity—which is historically prior to the formation of each Latin American state—entitles them to special jurisdictions that crosscut, transcend, and are distinct from homogenous state administrative boundaries. They want not only more local autonomy but also more expansive jurisdiction for In-

⁵³ For examples of autonomy debates in Mexico and Guatemala, see *Ojarasca*, no. 45 (August–November 1995); Héctor Díaz-Polanco, “La rebelión de los más pequeños: Los zapatistas y la autonomía” (Manuscript); *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 3, no. 1 (1997); the 1996 Guatemalan Peace Accords; the 1995 Guatemalan *Acuerdo sobre identidad y derechos de los pueblos indígenas*; and Rachel Sieder, ed., *Guatemala after the Peace Accords* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998).

⁵⁴ For the differences between territorial autonomy, federalism, and decentralization, see Ruth Lapidot, *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 50–52.

⁵⁵ See Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, *Indígenas en el poder local* (La Paz: Talleres de Editorial Offset Boliviana, 1997); and Van Cott (fn. 45, forthcoming, and fn. 46).

dian communities—an arrangement that would not necessarily be accorded nonindigenous communities, whose local jurisdiction might be much more restrictive vis-à-vis the federal or national state. Hence, regardless of whether a country is defined by federal units, indigenous movements are demanding that the state recognize political and juridical spaces that are primarily occupied and administered by indigenous communities. These proposals would in fact result in a more multilayered conception of the polity, the state, and its citizens, one that would promote inclusion and autonomy simultaneously. These are not demands for secession but for institutional pluralism in multiethnic settings.

The postliberal agenda for local autonomy, however, is no panacea. Local autonomy could tend toward illiberal politics at the local level.⁵⁶ The recognition of local autonomy could provide traditional authorities with the means to carve out their own fiefdoms with few outside checks on the exercise of that power—thereby inhibiting the democratization of local life within indigenous communities. Moreover, traditional indigenous practices could disadvantage groups in society—limiting their voice, access to indigenous and nonindigenous resources, and individual autonomy—by charging that their concerns threatened the sanctity of local autonomy and tradition. Women in particular have historically been excluded from public political spheres, where the male head of household often speaks for the family unit, where women are often denied equal access to education and social services, and where battered women often have little legal recourse within the community. Consequently, the postliberal challenge could simultaneously increase local autonomy (a liberal good) and decrease local tolerance (an illiberal outcome).

In short, indigenous movements pose a postliberal challenge. They challenge the homogenizing assumptions that suggest that individuals unambiguously constitute the primary political unit and that administrative boundaries and jurisdictions should be uniformly defined throughout a country. And they call instead for more differentiated forms of citizenship and political boundaries, ones that grant individuals rights as citizens but that also grant collective rights and political autonomy at the local level. Finally, in calling for the constitutional recognition of pluriethnic and multicultural states, they challenge the idea that the state (democratic or otherwise) should correspond to a presumed homogeneous nation. In this regard, they challenge claims of

⁵⁶ *The Federalist Papers* raise parallel concerns about the power of factions in small pure democracies, particularly in the essays by James Madison; see *The Federalist Papers*, selected and ed. Roy P. Fairfield (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), no. 10.

ethnonational homogeneity and assert the political salience of ethnic diversity. By advocating a differentiated kind of citizenship, they are pushing to redefine democratic institutions in dramatic ways.

IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDYING DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

By problematizing the reach of the state and the response of social forces to the new democratic period, this article depicts a situation in political flux. Indigenous movements and postliberal agendas pose fundamental challenges that Latin America's democracies are beginning (or will need) to tackle. They are forcing Latin America's new regimes to confront the limited reach of prior rounds of state formation, to address the indeterminacy of the current round of democratic institution building, and to consider how new democracies might reform states more effectively to accommodate plural identities, political units, and administrative heterogeneity. Within this context states are debating constitutional reforms, decentralization, territorial autonomy, legal pluralism, and the like. These are critical, ongoing debates that highlight a contested and unfolding political process—one that in years to come could possibly redesign states, citizenship regimes, and, by extension, the ways in which democracy is practiced. Hence, while Latin American countries have largely made the transition to democracy, it would be difficult to argue that these regimes—and the states and societies that undergird them—are consolidated in any meaningful sense of the word.

It is striking then that a substantial wave of *theorizing* on contemporary Latin America has been so eager to explain democratic consolidation in third-wave democracies. The core of these recent studies has set out to explain failures versus successes in democratic consolidation and has focused increasingly and almost exclusively on contemporary governmental institutions.⁵⁷ "Institutions are in," as Ames has remarked.⁵⁸ These recent and increasingly dominant institutional studies assume that democratic institutions and their incentive structures can ensure regime consolidation. With government institutions as the primary

⁵⁷ The initial trend in democratic consolidation studies did not necessarily adopt this institutional focus. Notable examples include Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

⁵⁸ Barry Ames, "Approaches to the Study of Institutions in Latin American Politics," *Latin American Research Review* 34, no. 1 (1999), 221.

focus, these scholars have revived important theoretical discussions and empirical comparisons of constitutional design, presidentialism versus parliamentarism, and electoral models.⁵⁹ They investigate how to tinker with government institutions in order to make them more stable and enduring. To explain democratic consolidation these comparative studies have emphasized the ways in which different governmental institutions court or accommodate political conflict. The assumption is that the same institutional model should engender either democratic consolidation or breakdown across cases and across time.

The questions posed by these authors about institutional design are politically salient; the research is increasingly systematic; and the arguments are often provocative. In this regard, there have been significant advances as Latin Americanists begin to take governmental institutional design more seriously than previously and to delineate the ways in which democratic institutions have combined in enduring ways. By focusing on national political institutions, they have underscored the different types of democracy that politicians can construct. These newly constructed institutions matter not least because they provide the rules and regulations that seek to order political interaction and make politics more transparent and predictable. Governmental institutions matter, therefore, for the formal locus and direction of political interaction.

But the current institutional trend in democratic consolidation studies is conceptually and analytically too sanguine. Conceptually, the literature defines democratic consolidation in narrow, dichotomous, and largely teleological terms that misrepresent an empirical context that is much more open-ended and nuanced.⁶⁰ The concept is narrow insofar as democratic consolidation is understood as the *absence* of regime breakdown following two consecutive and democratically held elec-

⁵⁹ There are scores of volumes and articles that explore this theme. See, in particular, Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America*, vol. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," *World Politics* 46 (October 1993).

⁶⁰ Similar arguments are made by Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (April 1996); idem, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 9 (July 1998); Kurt von Mettenheim and James Malloy, "Introduction," in Mettenheim and Malloy, eds., *Deepening Democracy in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998); Ben Ross Schneider, "Democratic Consolidations: Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments," *Latin American Research Review* 30, no. 2 (1995), 216, 219, 220, 231; David Becker, "Latin America: Beyond Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 20 (April 1999), 139.

tions. However, no particular characteristics that define or identify democratic consolidation are actually delineated. This places scholars of democratic consolidation on shaky ground, since they can only identify the dependent variable by the *failure* of the given regime to function; this borders on conceptual circularity. Moreover, this concept leaves no room for ambiguity, contradiction, and contestation—as in cases where elections are held consecutively but where democratic norms, institutions, and practices are not in operation or in cases where national reforms intended to promote liberal democracy (such as decentralization) shelter illiberal and authoritarian local enclaves. Indeed, the concept's dichotomous and teleological characterization of consolidation belies a significant degree of social and political flux (evidenced by the postliberal challenge) that does not fit into this dual way of thinking about democracy or the conditions under which it is likely to endure. The concept assumes a kind of fixity and homogeneity that begs the broader questions of how institutions function, how social actors adapt to these institutions, and which conditions encourage (newly) mobilized actors to support, sidestep, and/or subvert democratic institutions. It assumes a political endpoint, much as an earlier literature on political development assumed a political terminus.⁶¹ Yet when analyzing the Latin American cases comparatively and on the ground, one is struck by how much the term “consolidation” obscures the multiple and often contradictory processes that are occurring in the region's new democracies—some of which deepen and others of which undermine democratic norms, practices, and institutions. O'Donnell's work on low-intensity citizenship and on the absence of horizontal accountability in the new democracies raises similar concerns.⁶²

This problem of conceptualizing the dependent variable, democratic consolidation, is exacerbated by the analytical privileging of certain independent variables over others. The democratic consolidation literature maintains a generally singular focus on a *narrow* set of political institutions—governmental and electoral institutions. By analyzing governmental institutions alone, these studies unsurprisingly bias their observation of the dependent variable and miss or gloss over the ways in which other independent variables, such as *states* and *social forces*, can impinge on the capacity to consolidate different aspects of democracy.

⁶¹ I thank Atul Kohli for highlighting how this plea to move away from consolidation as an analytical concept parallels Huntington's classic argument about the need to move away from teleological and homogenizing ways of conceptualizing and analyzing political development. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Change to Change,” in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings* (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1986).

⁶² See O'Donnell (fn. 1 and 60, 1998).

This narrow analytic focus on governmental institutions rests on an unstated but pervasive assumption that variation in state capacity and legitimacy does not matter for regime outcomes. It assumes that states are homogenized, capable, and national institutions and, as such, can and do provide the political infrastructure in which democratic institutions can function. As a result these scholars focus their attention on the presence and performance of governmental institutions in major cities alone, and their work consequently projects a national descriptive picture of democratic practices that is in fact only institutional and urban in scope. By definition, this kind of comparative analysis of governmental institutions glosses over the unevenly institutionalized and contested terms of the Latin American *states* that are presumed to work in the service of these new government institutions. It sidesteps the degree to which state institutions (as independent or intervening variables) differentially shape, regulate, and/or monitor social behavior outside of urban centers, as demonstrated by circumstances giving rise to the postliberal challenge. Once one acknowledges the uneven reach and contested terms of the state, however, one is obliged at least to consider how regimes can possibly “consolidate” the political institutions, practices, and norms of democracy in the absence of capable states. For as Linz and Stepan have argued in their more sociologically nuanced analysis of democratic consolidation, the unevenness and frailty of actual states cannot bode well for the future of democracy.⁶³

The increasingly narrow analytic focus of the democratic consolidation literature on governmental institutions has other drawbacks as well. It slights analysis of the ways in which these new institutions interact with, engender, and/or constrain (emerging) social forces. It tends to assume the relevant actors and how they will respond.⁶⁴ So too

⁶³ In contrast to the great majority of consolidation studies, Linz and Stepan (fn. 57) do question how varied types of states might consolidate or undermine democracy. What I call the weak reach of the state they refer to as the problem of usable bureaucracies, neither of which bodes well for democratic consolidation. They also contend, among other things, that democracies cannot consolidate where there is a “stateness” problem, which they take to mean disputes over international (rather than internal) state boundaries and national membership (who can be a citizen rather than what citizenship might entail). According to this definition, they argue, there is no stateness problem in Latin America (p. 16). Indeed, these authors conclude this because they assume away the national question in Latin America—one they find very prevalent in their other cases. Yet while national conflicts in Eastern Europe have emerged to make states and (presumed) nations coincide, in Latin America they have emerged to force states to recognize the multiethnic diversity of its citizens, as we have seen.

⁶⁴ A notable few of these institutional studies (i.e., Mainwaring and Shugart, fn. 59) do analyze social support by established political actors and urban social groups. They are concerned with the ways in which institutional arrangements enable politicians to elicit support, build coalitions, and wrestle with policy questions without centralizing power in the hands of the executive and without engendering legislative paralysis. But these studies overwhelmingly neglect to analyze whether and how these

it tends to assume preferences.⁶⁵ However, it would be hard to make the case that government institutions determine the relevant actors, define the preferences, and command social allegiance exactly as intended. Indeed, this article has highlighted how state reforms can unintentionally politicize new cleavages and mobilize new social actors who may support or resist new democratic institutions. Latin America's increasingly vocal indigenous movements and the postliberal challenge are particularly important examples of the contested terms of Latin America's new democracies.⁶⁶ The democratic consolidation literature, however, has been impervious to these developments, precisely because it assumes which actors are important, what their preferences are, and how they will behave, rather than also problematizing the (new) actors and preferences that have emerged. In assuming away ethnic cleavages, these studies have missed or perhaps underestimated the new ethnic movements that are challenging the very state institutions that underpin the presumed liberal foundations of contemporary democracy. The failure to analyze states as they interact with (new) social forces is unfortunate, for it is difficult to explain which democratic institutions can function and endure without analyzing the degree to which these institutions (and the state) determine political behavior and/or command organized

institutions incorporate and sustain social support beyond traditional forces and beyond capital areas—focusing as they do so closely on the institutions that are constructed and so little on whether these institutions will be maintained or disrupted by social actors and groups outside of the state.

⁶⁵ Arnes (fn. 58) also makes this point (p. 234).

⁶⁶ Black movements, women's movements, and poor people's movements, where they exist, have also demanded equal inclusion and greater access to state resources in Latin America's democratic regimes. Their emergence in Latin America highlights the failure of democratic institutions in many instances to incorporate social sectors that have historically been marginalized. Unlike the indigenous movements discussed in this article, however, their demands in most cases do not necessarily challenge the assumptions and terms of liberal democratic institutions and state formation as much as demand an equal footing in the regime. It is also important to note that these movements, in contrast to the region's indigenous movements, have declined in strength during the contemporary democratic regimes as political parties displace and/or absorb them on the political stage. On black movements, see fn. 4. On women's movements, see Sonia E. Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Jane S. Jaquette, ed., *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Participation and Democracy*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994); Amy Conger Lind, "Power, Gender, and Development: Popular Women's Organizations and the Politics of Needs in Ecuador," in Arturo Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez, eds., *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992); and Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., *Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). On poor people's movements, see Robert Gay, *Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: A Tale of Two Favelas* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Philip D. Oxhorn, *Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile* (University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 1995); Cathy Lisa Schneider, *Shantytown Protest in Pinochet's Chile* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); and Susan S. Stokes, *Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

social support/apathy/opposition.⁶⁷ Once we integrate state and society back into the contemporary picture, we are reminded that governmental institutions do not operate exactly as planned, nor do they necessarily operate similarly across cases.⁶⁸

This conceptual and analytical discussion suggests that the focus on “democratic consolidation” is misplaced—particularly in new democracies.⁶⁹ Rather, we should develop a new conceptual research agenda that replaces this teleological dependent variable with more conceptually and analytically nuanced studies of *democratic politics*. The dependent variable would identify the varied *scope*, *depth*, and *blend* of democratic institutional reforms, political norms, and practices.⁷⁰ The task would be to explain the variation in the existing outcomes, rather than assuming a golden democratic endpoint that regimes have or have not reached (an assumption that many contemporary consolidation studies characteristically tend to make). This more broadly conceived analysis of democratic politics would generate a dynamic and consequential set of research questions about the uneven and often contradictory

⁶⁷ Indeed, the failure to problematize how emerging social forces (particularly in the countryside) contest the process of institutionalizing democracy weakens the analytic narrative and causal arguments in democratic consolidation studies. This is because regime endurance (the dependent variable in consolidation studies) is fundamentally linked to the politics of the countryside. A substantial comparative historical literature has argued and illustrated how regime endurance requires states to secure control, if not command loyalty, of the countryside. These studies have taken institutions seriously, but they have also problematized the process of building institutions and of cultivating the social forces that could support those institutions. The failure of contemporary democratic consolidation studies to incorporate this central insight curtails the power of their arguments about the links between institutions and regime endurance. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Collier and Collier (fn. 8); Timothy R. Scully, *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Chile* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992); Evelyne Huber and Frank Safford, eds., *Agrarian Structure and Political Power: Landlord and Peasant in the Making of Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Deborah J. Yashar, *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s–1950s* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); Jonathan Fox, ed., *The Challenge of Rural Democratization: Perspectives from Latin America and the Philippines*, *Journal of Development Studies*, special issue, 26 (July 1990); and Edward L. Gibson, “The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina,” *World Politics* 49 (April 1997).

⁶⁸ It is striking that the democratic consolidation literature pays no heed to an earlier institutional literature on democratic stability in divided societies—a literature that concluded that there is no one model for all societies.

⁶⁹ For parallel arguments, see fn. 60.

⁷⁰ See Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 35 (March–June 1993). Schmitter states (p. 444): “The label *democracy* hides a continuous evolution in rules and practices and an extraordinary diversity of institutions.” While Schmitter seems unwilling to dispense with the concept of consolidation, he does call for a more disaggregated study of the new democracies—one that would analyze political democracy as a composite of partial and competing regimes. He also calls for studies of the *types* of democracies that have emerged and notes the importance of accounting for the causal role of emerging associations.

processes of democratic change. It would compel scholars to identify, analyze, and explain the diverse and at times contradictory patterns emerging in Latin America's new democracies in arenas as significant as citizenship regimes, the rule of law, decentralization, patterns of participation, and the terms of contentious politics.

If we need to reconceptualize the dependent variable to accommodate a much more dynamic and varied set of democratic outcomes, so too we need to evaluate a more expanded repertoire of independent variables in our research and our writing. Rather than assuming the *a priori* significance of government institutions, we should be required to compare the causal role of these institutions against other factors (including the state, social forces, and the economy) to ascertain if, when, and why a given variable is most important. In some cases governmental institutional design will be found to be the primary factor; in others, it will be found to be secondary or even inconsequential. This process of evaluating competing independent variables would be designed not to lead to more idiographic analyses but rather to hold scholars more accountable and to demand more rigor in their comparative explanations of which variables matter and why.

A research agenda of democratic politics would reopen an older set of questions that would include, but not be limited to, the following: How has the sequencing of democratic reforms affected their scope, depth, and institutionalization? Why have different countries experimented with different kinds of political reform (for example, decentralization) and what impact have they had on sectoral participation, accountability, and political accommodation? Why have (ethnic or other) cleavages been politicized in some new democracies but not in others? Why do states respond differently to multiethnic demands and how do we explain both the varied responses and the impact of the resulting political reforms? Why have some democratic reforms (for example, judicial reform and the institutionalization of the rule of law) been so elusive, even as others have been widely implemented? What impact, if any, has globalization had on democratic accountability and participation?

In short, rather than assuming that government institutions alone can consolidate democracy, scholars should pay closer attention to how the sequencing, pace, and institutionalization of democratic reforms actually affects the depth and scope of democratic politics. This conceptual shift in foci requires exchanging a teleological and singularly institutional approach for a more analytically nuanced one that analyzes the interplay between political change and contestation in state and so-

ciety. While this approach is perhaps more ambitious than a simple institutional approach that focuses on government institutions alone, it is sure to yield more dynamic insights about the direction and terms of politics in the region's new democracies. Otherwise stated, if we are to understand the challenges for third-wave democracies—challenges that affect both democratic quality and endurance—we cannot search for the institutional holy grail of democratic consolidation.

APPENDIX: ACRONYMS FOR INDIGENOUS AND/OR
PEASANT ORGANIZATIONS

AIDSESP	Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Peruvian indigenous organization in the Amazon)
EZLN	Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Mexican indigenous organization based in Chiapas)
CIDOB	Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia (Bolivian regional indigenous organization in the lowlands)
CNC	Confederación Nacional Campesina (Mexican national peasant organization)
COICA	Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica (Amazonian indigenous organization with participation by indigenous organizations whose countries are partially located in the Amazonian Basin)
COMG	Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala (Guatemalan national indigenous organization)
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Ecuadorian national indigenous organization)
CPIB	Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (Bolivian Amazonian indigenous organization based in the Beni)
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Bolivian national peasant organization that has incorporated indigenous demands)
OPIP	Organización de Pueblos Indígenas del Pastaza (Ecuadorian Amazonian indigenous organization based in Pastaza)
