

Democracy's Future: The Relationship of Instructional Methods and Curriculum  
Structure to Immigrant Adolescents' Sociopolitical Integration in Europe

by

Gwynne Ellen Morrissey

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Jeffrey E. Mirel, Chair  
Professor Ronald F. Inglehart  
Professor Valerie E. Lee  
Assistant Professor Lori D. Hill

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## **Dedication**

For my grandparents

Kathleen, Jack, Hazel, and John

And for Pat Natalie

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## **Abstract**

Though much research has focused on sociopolitical integration of immigrants in the United States, less exists on integration of young immigrants in Europe, at least for an international audience of English or French speakers. Given the ongoing process of globalization and increasing flows of immigration into and throughout Europe, it is essential that scholars come to understand better how immigrant youth are socialized into the cultural and political views that support democracy, especially those that emphasize liberty and human autonomy. In particular it is important for political and educational leaders to understand how instruction and national-level decisions about curriculum are related to immigrants' outcomes, as these are prime targets of policy reform.

This study makes use of data from thirteen European countries included in CIVED 1999, an international data set collected by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, to study adolescents' civic knowledge, civic participation, patriotism and three so-called 'self-expression values' (the social attitudes that best predict democracy): attitudes toward women's, immigrants', and ethnic minorities' rights. At the school level, the relationships of relatively more discussion-based versus traditional lecture-style teaching methods are explored in two-level hierarchical linear models. At the national level, countries' systems of designing and disseminating curriculum—most centralized to most decentralized—are explored in

relation to these outcomes using three-level hierarchical linear models.

Analyses suggest that immigrant youth do not necessarily fit the stereotypes that native Europeans sometimes assign to immigrant groups (e.g., they tend to be equally supportive of women's rights and just as likely to participate in civic-related activities). Additionally, at the school level, a classroom climate open to discussion is not the silver bullet for increasing adolescents' tolerance of out-groups that other studies have found it to be, though this is likely because there is little information on the content of discussions and the skill with which teachers guide them. Finally, confirming findings of recent comparative studies, a centrally controlled system for designing and disseminating curriculum appears to be strongly positively related to higher overall levels of all six civic outcomes, and to smaller disparities between immigrant and native students on *nearly* all outcomes.

More concerted efforts are needed to study and improve civic education teachers' skills in leading discussions (as well as their content knowledge), and to understand the value of a centralized system for curriculum control. Findings suggest that a more open classroom, combined with a strong lecture component might have the greatest success in encouraging democratic student attitudes. In addition, while difficult, shifting the locus of power over curriculum design to the central government appears to be important. Finally, we need more purposeful sampling of minority groups in large-scale international surveys so that scholars could make stronger claims about how those groups fare in various educational systems.

## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

As forces of globalization have changed the nature of politics and trade, they have also led to increased immigration around the world. In the decades after the fall of communism, levels of immigration have risen and the demographics of immigrant groups have diversified. These population changes have dramatically affected both new and established democracies of Europe. Bringing their cultural norms and values, skills, language, religious beliefs, and political attitudes, many of which set them apart from the European societies that 'receive' them, immigrants often face difficulties when trying to integrate into society. Yet despite the continued economic need for immigrants "to keep the ratio of workers to pensioners steady" in welfare states, cultural changes and continuing immigration flows into Europe have given rise to nativist, anti-immigration, xenophobic movements that deepen the divide between the socially advantaged and disadvantaged (Collins, 2011; "Europe's need for immigrants: A continent on the move," 2000). This is a compelling problem for policymakers who hope to better integrate immigrants into the nation's social fabric and political value system, and reduce disparities in social advantage.

Particularly interesting sites for studying immigrant integration are schools, into which immigrants' children have flooded in alongside native students. The knowledge

sharing and socialization elements of schools have great potential to aid immigrant youth in the processes of integrating into their new country's government and civil society, as well as the new society's cultural and political values. Educational and political leaders hope that these children will grow up to be contributing members of society, so it is of great interest to educational researchers *and* political scientists whether and how immigrant children are integrated into democratic societies; i.e., whether and how they take up or reject receiving countries' values and attitudes. This dissertation investigates immigrants' *sociopolitical* integration and the role that progressive educational methods and national curriculum policies play in that process: in part it is about the skills required for life in a political democracy, and in part it is about the attitudes, or cultural values, that engender a more tolerant social democracy.

As a means of measuring the degree of immigrants' sociopolitical integration at the still-impressionable age of 14, the democratic-oriented qualities I study are students' civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, and four 'attitudes': three of tolerance (of women's, immigrants', and ethnic minorities' rights), one of identity (affinity for the nation, or patriotism). This dissertation is a bridge between educational and political science research: while individuals' characteristics are important considerations in studying these qualities, I argue that educational contexts—particularly the use of discussion-based teaching methods—and features of the national context—especially the national system for regulating curriculum—are related to these outcomes. I contend that policy makers interested in improving immigrants' sociopolitical integration could take action at high levels based on this study's findings.

I am interested in democracy primarily because, despite its flaws, it is the most



inclusive, humane system of governance yet devised. Because it offers the greatest freedom of self-determination of any political system, and until there exists an even better system, I am wholeheartedly invested in its establishment and consolidation. I focus on European democracies for three reasons. First, literature on immigrant students' civic integration in that region is modest (at least for an international audience, i.e., who read English or French). Second, the push and pull factors producing such high numbers of migrants to the region are not expected to diminish in the near future. Third, the European Union—of which most European countries are members—has changed politically, demographically, and territorially in the last decade. As its internal borders become blurrier, findings about countries whose experiences with immigrant integration are more successful than others might be able to serve as role models for fellow member-states.

### **1.1 Democracy and Immigration**

Democracy, the political system of nearly every country in the European region, is founded on the ideal of citizens' regular and informed participation in political and civic conversations and events. Functionally, it is meant to give a country's citizens the opportunity—through meaningful elections, and a free press, and so forth—to express their opinions about how the country should be run. Though the structures of government differ across contemporary European democracies, each strives to bring citizens into political conversations and ensure that they are capable of thinking and

acting in the simultaneous interests of themselves, their communities, their countries, and the democratic way of life.<sup>1</sup>

This is an ideal, though. Globalization is a process by which traditional understandings of national borders and sovereignty are broken down by *supranational* economic systems and increased linkages between societies. In the face of it, nation-states tend to focus on national material gain while, as Martin Carnoy writes, “much less attention is given to the promotion of ‘equal treatment’ among various ethnic groups living within national boundaries or among regions” (1999; McGinn, 1997). Indeed, though the white, historically Christian European population is demographically on the decline, immigrants who could keep the population steady tend to face serious obstacles to integration in their adopted countries (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010; “Europe's need for immigrants: A continent on the move,” 2000). Often because of culture clashes, religion, skin color, or foreign origin, immigrants encounter xenophobia and racism. Warranted or not, natives also tend to express concern that immigrants are threatening their job security (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999; European Commission, 1997).

Intolerant attitudes negatively impact immigrants’ rates of employment and intermarriage, educational attainment, quality of education, living conditions, and degree of civic participation, all indicators of how well they are integrated into society (Spencer, 2003). Immigration is a great challenge to countries whose status as nation-states with a

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<sup>1</sup> I do not dwell on the various existing structures of European democracies in this study. Suffice it to say that most European democracies are parliamentary in structure, with separate people acting as head of government and head of state. Where a prime minister is the head of government in such systems, either a president or a monarch may be the head of state, with limited political power and a more ceremonial presence. The prime minister and his or her cabinet of ministers are the executive branch, accountable to and representative of the legislative branch of government. This is in contrast to the presidential system of government exemplified by the United States, where the president—as the executive branch—may not represent the political makeup of Congress—the legislative branch—and thus need not reflect Congress’s political views (Stepan & Skach, 1993).

dominant ethnic and/or cultural identity is, ostensibly, threatened by the presence of oppositional values among new groups (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Where intolerant attitudes toward other ethnic groups brew, they can (or can be perceived to) threaten the values of political democracy or society's view and expectations of their political leaders.

## **1.2 Pro-Democratic Cultural Views and Preparedness for Citizenship**

### **1.2.1 Cultural Views that Support Democracy**

Half of this study is devoted to adolescents' cultural views on women's, immigrants', and ethnic minorities' rights. Among adults of voting age, these views at the societal level are strongly predictive of democratic governance (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Largely because European societies are generally materially comfortable, unconcerned with food shortages, they have developed very strong, liberal cultural views of women's social and economic roles, as well as on the place of minority groups in society. Immigrants from countries not as materially secure tend to have less liberal, more traditional views of rights and roles of women and other traditionally marginalized groups. Those countries tend to be less or not at all democratic, which means that immigrants arrive with different cultural values *and* different understandings of the political process. This is precisely the clash of cultures that causes European policymakers so much distress. Immigrants are clearly a non-negligible and increasing portion of society in modern Europe. Their cultural values add diversity to society's overall values, which has ramifications for how democratic countries actually work (Klaussen, 2009).

### **1.2.2 Patriotism, Civic Knowledge, and Civic Participation**

In addition to the three democratic attitudes toward women's, immigrants', and ethnic minorities' rights, I am concerned with three other characteristics that indicate students' preparedness for and commitment to citizenship, which are often studied in relation to schools. First is an individual's feeling of pride in or loyalty to the nation, or patriotism. Feelings like these are not necessarily desirable in a democracy if they take on an air of "chauvinistic nationalism" that is prejudiced against outsiders (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004a, p. 168). However, patriotism in the sense of loyalty to the principles of democracy or, as phrased by educational theorist Lawrence Blum, the "best traditions of [the] nation" can be advantageous to democracy by engendering a commitment to service and actions that support democratic goals, also known as civic participation (2007, p. 63). To understand what the "best traditions" of one's nation are requires a certain breadth and depth of knowledge of the nation in light of democracy's objectives and structures. Scholars of civic education Joseph Kahne and Ellen Middaugh relate patriotism implicitly to this civic knowledge: "[If] one's love of country is based in part of recognition of the desirability of life in a democratic society, such patriotic commitments can help citizens identify with the nation's democratic ideals" (2006, p. 602).

As such, adolescents' patriotism is linked to two other qualities important to democracy's maintenance: knowledge about the political and civic realms and participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities. Each of these is valuable to democratic society at large, but also to an individual's experience in a democracy. In an ideal participatory democracy, citizens have access to various kinds of political and civic information that they can evaluate, and then act on in their own and their communities'

interests. First, the effective evaluation of information depends in many cases on civic and political knowledge: what laws govern behavior, who runs what institution, how citizens can air grievances, what the rights and responsibilities of citizens are. Second, civic participation—acting in one’s own and others’ interests—of some kind is a fundamental expectation in democracies. Without citizen participation in public life, democracies risk losing the sense of ‘rule by, of, and for the people’ to a sense of rule by, of, and for *some* people. Therefore, while much emphasis is on voting, it also includes volunteerism, campaigning, and advocacy, whether the latter is through petitions or protests. When it comes to adolescents’ preparation for this part of citizenship, researchers have repeatedly found that greater civic knowledge and volunteer efforts or membership in civic-oriented groups are associated with a greater likelihood of voting as adults (McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Yates & Youniss, 1998).

### **1.3 The Role of Schools in Adolescents’ Civic Development**

While media consumption and interaction with knowledgeable, civically active people may increase people’s civic knowledge, likelihood of participation, and even tolerance for out-groups, young people’s most structured source of civic knowledge and experience tends to be the school: the classes they take, the instructors they interact with, and the peers they socialize with. Schools are uniquely positioned, furthermore, to reach entire generations of people, and thus have the potential to teach democratic philosophies, actions, and structures in such a way that all future voters have them in common. To many early proponents of public education, the main purpose of public schools is to prepare students for citizenship (Jefferson, 1786/1939; Mann, 1845/1957). In particular,

schools ideally provide immigrant youth with invaluable opportunities to learn about and acclimate to the ‘host’ society. Researchers have found strong relationships between coursework in civics or history and civic knowledge. In turn, greater civic knowledge—for that matter, greater academic achievement and educational attainment overall—is associated with more tolerant attitudes toward people of other ethnicities and greater civic participation (Flanagan, Cumsille, Gill, & Gallay, 2007; Hjerm, 2005; Nie & Hillygus, 2001; Sotelo, 1997).

However, though each country provides schooling for its native and foreign-born youth, scholars and politicians in Europe and the US have noted a serious problem: educational outcomes for native and immigrant youth tend to be quite different (Faist, 1995; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006, 2007; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008; Willms, 2006, p. 57). Beyond that, immigrants’ experiences with schooling overall tend to be negative. Immigrant students may have difficulty with the language of the school, be placed in classes that are less academically rigorous (a process known as ‘tracking’), be taught by teachers with low expectations and rigid teacher-centered methods, and they tend to leave school earlier (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010; Rumbaut, 2004; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009). Most studies address immigrants’ achievement in academic subjects like math and science and find them to be less knowledgeable than their non-immigrant peers. If immigrants’ civic outcomes—knowledge in particular—follow those patterns, then they are not as knowledgeable of the political system they now live under and thus are less well integrated into their peer group and less prepared for citizenship as adults.

It is well known that certain individual characteristics are strongly related to civic-oriented qualities, though because of a dearth of research, less is known about whether those characteristics operate differently for immigrant students than for natives, as they do for overall academic achievement. In addition, while much research exists on the relationship of academic achievement to structures of schooling and instructional methods, little research has been done on the relationships of these characteristics with immigrants' civic outcomes in Europe. In some research, scholars have found student attitudes, inclination to participate in civic activities, and knowledge to be highly sensitive to teaching methods and the kind and quality of discourse in the classroom (Flanagan et al., 2007). Particularly effective is an experiential approach, according to American civic education scholar Carole Hahn: discussions of controversial topics like immigration policy, welfare policy, and abortion; student-driven projects on the environment or local issues; and role-playing or attending actual panel discussions or debates on political issues (1998).

In addition to the content of civic education classrooms, their general tone is important, as well. However, it is unclear whether this is so for all students. Multiple studies have shown that an atmosphere of respectful curiosity, where comments are not offered as—or received with—judgments of what is good or bad, tends to result in students learning more, having richer conversations about political or social topics, being more tolerant of traditional out-groups (such as ethnic minorities), and increasingly believing in their own political self-efficacy (Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & Thalhammer, 1992; Hahn, 1991, 1998; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).

At a higher level, one concerning national policies on school curriculum, Jan Janmaat and Nathalie Mons found that a country's system for designing and disseminating curriculum is related both to students' tolerance of immigrants and their feelings of patriotism. More interestingly, these researchers show that the site of curriculum control—e.g., central government, regional government, local schools—also is related to how similar ethnic minority students' attitudes are to majority attitudes. Attitudes of native students toward immigrants are more positive and inclusive in countries with more centralized control of curriculum than in countries with highly disparate curricula. Furthermore, ethnic minority students' patriotism is much closer to majority students' patriotism in more centrally controlled countries (2011).

In this study I consider the relationships of students' civic outcomes with several features of schools, but am primarily interested in various kinds of instruction: a) more discussion-based, with much student-directed, student-oriented classwork; and b) more lecture- or textbook-based, with traditional note-taking and memorization of facts. At the national level, this study explores the relationship of 'territorial differentiation' (systems of curriculum control) with patriotism, civic knowledge and behavior, and three pro-democratic attitudes as an extension of Janmaat and Mons' work.


#### **1.4 Theoretical Model and Research Questions**

The model shown in Figure 1-1 was created by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA; the creators of the CIVED data that I use—see section 1.5) and represents the various contextual factors that influence how students develop civic knowledge, citizenship, and social or civic values both in and out



of school. Accordingly, this model situates students at the center of these contexts.

Surrounding the student are the five types of “social actors” with whom students are most closely in contact: family members, school personnel, community leaders, youth organizations, and peers. The larger of the two circles represents the environment of societal discourse around goals and values, which informs how those social actors act and present information to students. Finally, at the octagonal perimeter, there are national institutions, values, symbols, and societal structures informing the public discourse (Lehmann, 2004).



**Figure 1-1. Theoretical model created by IEA to guide the development of CIVED 1999, the survey whose data I use.**

Note. From “IEA Civic Education Study technical report,” by W. Schulz & H. Sibberns (Eds.), 2004, Amsterdam, p. 11. Copyright 2004 by IEA. Reprinted with permission.

In my study, the qualities of students I explore—my six dependent variables—are civic knowledge, participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities, patriotism, and attitudes toward the rights of women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities. I investigate hypotheses about immigrant adolescents' sociopolitical integration into their European societies as a function of a) individual characteristics, b) features of schools, and c) features of the national context. In particular, I ask the following questions about immigrants and their native-born peers in Europe:

**Research question 1:** What are European adolescents' overall levels of civic knowledge, civic participation, patriotism, and self-expression values (attitudes toward rights for traditionally marginalized groups—women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities)? To what extent do immigrants and native-born adolescents differ on these civic outcomes?

- To what extent are overall levels and immigrant/native differences associated with the amount of time students have lived in the country and their home language?
- To what extent are overall civic outcomes associated with adolescents' civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, and perceptions of an open classroom climate?

**Research question 2:** To what extent are European adolescents' overall civic outcomes related to their educational environments, and to differences between immigrants and native students on these outcomes?

Specifically, how are the following characteristics of schools related to these civic outcomes?

- instructional methods (discussion-based vs. traditional lecture/note-taking)

- ethnic heterogeneity (the relative size of the immigrant population)
- average family educational resources

**Research question 3:** To what extent are characteristics of the countries in which adolescents reside related to overall civic outcomes, as well as differences in civic knowledge, participation, and self-expression values between immigrant and native students? Specifically, how are the following characteristics related to students' attitudes and behaviors?

- system of curricular control (centralized to decentralized)
- relative affluence
- relative degree of income inequality

I have broken up these questions according to the 'level' at which the independent variables (predictors) of interest are measured: first students, then schools, then countries. The structure of the questions also mirrors the structure of the data and analytical techniques that I use to answer them.

For example, the student at the center of Figure 1-1, with unique demographic characteristics and an identity as a student and civic actor, provides the information for addressing research question 1, with special emphasis on the differences between immigrants and native-born students. Moving outward from there to the inner circle of 'social actors,' I address research question 2 with information about peers' perspectives on the educational environment and socioeconomic situation. Finally, for research question 3, I study several characteristics along the octagonal perimeter, where high-level contextual features influence everything inside the model. The analysis at this level allows me to examine primarily educational values (as represented by the national system

for designing and disseminating curriculum), but also socioeconomic stratification (for this study's purposes, income inequality) and economic process/values (as proxied for with Gross National Income).

The research questions and techniques I use to answer them can provide researchers with information about whether European countries generally have similar civic-related immigrant integration and tolerance issues in schools, or whether certain countries are better positioned than others for successful integration. As civic education scholars Hoskins, Barber, Van Nijlen, and Villalba put it recently, international data collection “enhance[s] monitoring capacities for policy making” (2011, p. 82). Unequal or impoverished economic circumstances are difficult, but not intractable problems. Decisions about responsibility for school curriculum are politically charged in many countries, where people hold strong beliefs about the rights of localities or regions over the rights of a central government. But these decisions are similarly are not so entrenched that changing them is unthinkable (as Americans are seeing in current discussions about Common Core Standards). Likewise, where characteristics of schools are related to students' preparedness for citizenship, it may be that schools' demographic compositions or teacher education for more effective civic instruction can be valuable policy levers.

### **1.5 Data: CIVED 1999**

To address these research questions, I use data from over 33,000 students in the Civics Study (CIVED) of 1999, sponsored by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), which surveyed student achievement in

and attitudes about civics in 28 countries around the world. This dataset has great advantages, including much larger sample sizes and ‘representativeness’—both of Europe and of students in individual countries—than would be feasible in any study a researcher could conduct on his or her own. Today, the data from CIVED are twelve years old and represent the “world” prior to September 11, 2001. From one perspective, this is problematic because the world has changed dramatically since the millennium: immigration flows and the politics of immigration and integration are quite different, as are modes of communication and information-sharing. However, IEA followed up on the CIVED study in 2008-2009 with the International Civics and Citizenship Study (ICCS), which surveyed contemporary adolescents on the same topics and will intentionally serve as a source of comparison to CIVED for national policymakers interested in the development of democratic citizens. (The ICCS data have not yet been released to the public, making CIVED the best international data on civics available to date.)

There are a few limitations to these data, most important of which is that they are not longitudinal. Without information from multiple time points researchers can make no comments about change or learning over time, nor can they make any inferences that a certain characteristic  $x$  actually caused a certain outcome  $y$  to happen. Cognizant of this limitation, I must ask readers—and take pains myself—to take my findings as suggestive, not conclusive, and certainly not causal.

Another limitation is a matter of theoretical interest vs. practical capacity. I am theoretically interested in immigrants’ civic preparedness and pro-democratic attitudes in immigration countries across Europe. Practically, however, I am limited to exploring just thirteen European countries, and these do not necessarily include all countries that readily

spring to mind when one thinks of Europe's immigration problems. Neither France nor the Netherlands chose to participate in CIVED, so despite their prominent domestic debates about integration and immigration policy, I am unable to comment on the status of immigrant adolescents' civic knowledge and attitudes in those nations. Also, though twenty-two European countries did participate in CIVED, I had to exclude nine of them from this study. Some had insufficient numbers of immigrant students in their samples. Others, like Cyprus or Estonia in the recent past, due to problematic definitions of what territory or name constituted their country, the question 'were you born in this country?' could be difficult to interpret for some students in those countries. Despite those challenges, the use of just thirteen countries in this study does allow me to investigate portions of several salient regions of the European continent, though it is not a statistically representative, complete picture of that continent and its adolescent students' experiences. These two drawbacks aside, the data and this study lay an important foundation for understanding the relationship of educational features to civic preparedness.

In order to address my research questions based on multilevel data (students 'nested' in schools nested in countries), I select hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) methods to analyze the relationships between students, school, and country characteristics and students' civic outcomes.

## **1.6 Summary**

This international, comparative study contributes to our understanding of the expanding features of schools, particularly in the area of instructional methods as related

to adolescents' pro-democratic attitudes and preparedness for democratic citizenship. It is especially useful for shedding light on how immigrant students differ from their native-born peers in preparedness and offers some suggestive findings on how the educational environment is associated with that difference. In political science, this dissertation extends understandings of societies' pro-democratic cultural values to encompass parallel understandings among young, school-age people whose values are still highly influenced by peers. The study is especially important in light of ongoing conversations about immigrant integration on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, as data will soon be available on adolescents' civic attitudes in the late 2000s, interesting studies can soon be done of the changes in immigrants' attitudes of tolerance and civic preparedness since the millennium.

Since CIVED was administered in mid-1999, several elements of the world's immigration "story" have changed. The data represent a pre-2001 world, when terrorism was mainly a local problem and ex-Communist countries—still reeling from the collapse of the Soviet empire—had not yet joined NATO or the European Union. At that time, the integration approach known as 'multiculturalism,' which granted immigrants all the benefits of citizenship without the expectation that they would come to share the host country's values, meant that Arabs and Muslims generally did not face widespread suspicion. However, the attack on the Pentagon and the destruction of the Twin Towers of New York City's World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, brought to light a radicalization of at least a small—but increasingly important—minority of Muslims concerned with getting revenge on western societies, whose people and governments they perceive to be violent, godless, imperialist oppressors. These dramatic attacks caused

visible backlash in western countries against Muslims, immigrants, and immigration. Simultaneously, Muslims and immigrants in these western countries became more vocal and defensive about western societies' assumptions about immigrant assimilation. As some political parties in these countries have pronounced the failure of assimilation efforts, and immigrants have felt rejected and disrespected, some have clung to their cultural traditions harder, becoming more extreme and, in some cases, violent (consider the subway bombers in London, riots in France, and honor killings in Germany, among others; Lalwani, 2008; Lim, 2005).

These are the drawbacks to official multiculturalism in Europe: what was intended as a means of recognizing differences has effectively entrenched these differences—particularly religious ones between historically Christian and Islamic people—and made them appear irreconcilable. Indeed some researchers think they are irreconcilable.<sup>2</sup> Whether these political and greater social problems have altered young immigrants' views of their own possibilities and the democratic system in host countries is of great interest, but not well researched.

My study builds on a few quite recent studies of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Europe using CIVED data, and provides pan-European insights into how local and national educational contexts are associated with students' readiness for and integration into democratic citizenship and life in increasingly diverse societies. It contributes to the literature in two major ways:

- Its new, wider focus on self-expression values expands how we think about immigration and education specifically for democracy.

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<sup>2</sup> See Paul M. Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn's (2007) *When Ways of Life Collide*, and Christopher Caldwell's (2009) *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*.



- It provides a great baseline for studying shifts or trends in immigrant and native-born adolescents' attitudes and behavior before and after the millennium, if paired with findings from IEA's more recent civic education study.

The push and pull factors producing such high numbers of migrants are not expected to diminish in the near future. Debates about civic education and the role and expectations of immigrants in receiving countries have become much more consequential in the last decade. If countries and schools can learn now what elements of education policy—especially instruction or curriculum regulation—are best or least conducive to democratic thought or action in ethnically diverse societies, then they may be better prepared to meet the needs of all European youth.

### **1.7 Outline of the Dissertation**

Chapter 1 of this dissertation has introduced the main topic of immigrants in European democracies, and raised questions regarding their preparedness for citizenship in those democracies. Chapter 2 follows with much greater depth on democracy's nature and intent, especially as it relates to schools. Chapter 3 reviews literature on the causes and terminology of immigration and its various consequences for societies; the prospects for adult immigrants' political integration; and immigrants' academic achievement and special needs in schools. I then provide an overview of what is known about immigrant students' experiences of civic education in particular, as well as their degree of pro-democratic attitudes (self-expression values). After pointing out some of the holes in this literature base, I pose my research questions with some general hypotheses.

With Chapter 4 I re-introduce IEA's theoretical model and how it is reflected in

my research questions; describe the CIVED data and my analytical sampling methods and measures; and walk through descriptive and hierarchical linear modeling analytical processes. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 respectively present results from within-school models (research question 1), between-school models (research question 2), and between-country models (research question 3). Chapter 8 offers concluding remarks on the contribution of this dissertation to understandings of immigrants' sociopolitical integration in adolescence. It focuses on instructional methods and national curriculum policy, because those findings are the most important contributors to greater understandings of educational policy issues in immigrant integration. Other school and national characteristics are discussed in chapters 6 and 7.

Appendices include a) supplementary information on democracy and immigrants' schooling experiences; b) detailed data tables; and c) technical notes providing detailed information on analytic techniques.

## Chapter 2

### Democracy and Its Connection to Schools

As I discussed in Chapter 1, democracy is the system of governance most concerned with individual freedom and choice, and nearly all European nations' political systems are democratic. To bring their citizens into the national conversation about politics, democratic governments encourage or mandate some form of *civic education*, whether in schools or through youth organizations. How schools and other organizations enact civic education is not necessarily uniform across countries, or even within them. The democratic values and governmental structures of individual countries determine whether central organizations prescribe the outline and content of academic learning for the nation's schools, or whether schools are responsible for adapting that curriculum or designing their own. In other words, the types of opportunities students have to learn about and practice citizenship can vary greatly across countries.

Furthermore, contemporary European democracies have embraced varying philosophies of social and economic equality, ranging from high taxation that redistributes wealth and income across all strata of society to low taxation and regulation that emphasizes individuals' abilities to change their economic circumstances. Economic policies—which affect democratic societies' affluence and income distributions—derive from an overall interpretation of democratic values and the role of government in the

lives of people. As researchers interested in globalization, sociology, and comparative education have found, the effects of economic policies are not limited to monetary resources, but often include educational, health, and other social outcomes for students (Condrón, 2011; Marks, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).

This chapter begins with a more detailed review of democracy's fundamental tenets, as well as the variations that obtain in democracy's political and economic structures. I offer some commentary and a hypothesis on the ramifications of the latter for schools and society, based on the theoretical framework that places students' civic learning in the context of national economic policies and values. I then move to a description of the role of schools in democracies, the role of democracy in schools, and the common approaches to prescribing curriculum for and instructing all young people about their roles as citizens. I also offer a hypothesis on how systems of curricular control relate to what I anticipate is already a gap in civic knowledge and democratic attitudes between immigrants and native-born students.

## **2.1 Democracy and Related Characteristics**

As this study's focus is on the knowledge, behaviors, and attitudes that support and strengthen democracy, I find it important to illustrate the 'world view' that democracy promotes and how it is enacted in the contemporary world. Because there are various interpretations of 'democracy,' it is instructive to note its etymology. The word's roots are Greek, in which *demos* means '[common] people' and *kratia* means 'rule, strength, authority, or power' ("Democracy," n.d.). Today, the 'common people' suggests the great mass of individuals who constitute a nation's citizenry, and are the

source of local and national decision-making. It is not solely the social elite who decide, and each citizen has something in common with each other citizen—the ability to participate in decision-making—which connotes individualism and equality.<sup>3</sup>

Political scientists Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl point out that there are many types of democracy, “and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects. The specific form democracy takes is contingent upon a country’s socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched state structures and policy practices,” both of which depend on its history (1991, p. 76). To constitute liberal, ideal democratic governance, whether in a direct democracy—like that exemplified by New England town meetings— or representative democracy—with elected representatives—elections and voting must be free and fair, meaning that citizens cannot be forced to pay to vote, nor may they be coerced to vote a certain way. Governing bodies make decisions based on ‘majority rule’ in voting results, which means that the largest number of votes one way or another decides the question. As consolation, voters in the minority expect that the majority will not unduly infringe on the minority’s rights in enacting its decisions and will allow the minority to effect change in the future through elections (Diamond, 1999; Schmitter & Karl, 1991).

Furthermore, electoral democracy is essentially accompanied by rule of law—not rule by decree or governmental whim. The rule of law is upheld by an independent judicial body, and individuals’ freedom of association, belief, and expression, either through speech or the press are protected (Freedom House, n.d.). Since elections are infrequent, these freedoms are means through which “citizens can seek to influence

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<sup>3</sup> In ancient Athens neither women nor slaves were citizens and therefore they could not participate in governance. The notion of ‘citizen’ today has become vastly more inclusive.

public policy through a wide variety of other intermediaries” in the periods between elections. As Schmitter and Karl (1991) explain: “Modern democracy, in other words, offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and values—associational as well as partisan, functional as well as territorial, collective as well as individual. All are integral to its practice” (p. 78). To secure these freedoms, democratic governments take responsibility for respecting individuals’ liberty and humanity, as well as protecting minority rights (Diamond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Rawls, 1993).<sup>4</sup> These are the moral principles that lead to a view of democracy as a way of life, not just governance, and they constitute some of the universal aspects of democracy that students are expected to know about (Kelly, 1995).

With this understanding of what democracy entails, it should also be understood that while it does not necessarily treat all people equally, all people are expected to have equal *access* to the processes that result in governmental action. Ideally, democracy is a form of either directly elected or representative governance that also protects the civil liberties of citizens (Cunningham, 2002; Perry, 1944). It would be a bold claim that an ideal democracy exists in the contemporary world; one can easily argue that even long-established democracies stand to benefit from regular critical review and improvement. However, those of western Europe—with a longer history of democratic rule—most closely resemble the ideal of political rights and wide-ranging civil liberties. Eastern Europe has had many fewer years of recent experience with democracy and while a number of its constituent countries practice western-like democracy, not all do.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Appendix A, Section 1 (page 230), for a more detailed explanation of various interpretations of democracy’s fundamental values.

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix A, Section 2 (page 236) for an explanation of how countries ‘rank’ on a continuum of *free* to *unfree*.

### 2.1.1 Cultural Values and their Relation to Democracy

Political leaders in affluent Western democracies have watched as globalization and increased immigration have coincided with a continuous decline in trust in government (Kamens, 2010). However, attitudes of trust in government officials, or even in democracy, are not necessarily the attitudes or orientations about which democratic governments should worry. In fact, trust in national institutions and leaders is just as likely to support democracy as authoritarianism. There are other attitudes and social values that matter more for the maintenance—or consolidation—of democracy both individually and at the level of society.

Over time, with greater material security, European societies have developed a relatively strong orientation toward so-called ‘self-expression’ values of choice and individuality. With the World Values Survey, a prominent study of modernization and cultural change, political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have shown these self-expression values to be strongly supportive—even predictive—of a more democratic society:

When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there isn't enough to go around, foreigners are perceived as dangerous outsiders who may take away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual norms, emphasizing absolute rules and old familiar norms, in an attempt to maximize predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins to be taken for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly acceptable—indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated but becomes *positively* valued because it is interesting and stimulating. (italics in original; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 54)

Whereas Europe typifies the latter value system, in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, from which many of Europe's recent immigrants have come, material security—and thus survival—is not as sure as in Europe. Cultural values in those regions tend far more

toward what Inglehart and Welzel refer to as ‘survival’ values. It is telling that countries in those regions are less likely to be democratic in name, and even less likely to be democratic in practice. Self-expression values, then—the “most crucial component of a democratic civic culture”—are those that “reflect an emancipative and humanistic ethos, emphasizing human autonomy and choice.” Through this emphasis on the rights of others to express themselves and have freedom of choice, it becomes acceptable to grant equal rights to women, homosexuals, foreigners, and other out-groups including immigrants (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 54, 258). In my study, I investigate adolescents’ attitudes toward women’s, immigrants’, and ethnic minorities’ rights as indicators of how closely they identify with self-expression values.

### **2.1.2 Economic Characteristics of European Democracies**

**National affluence.** As findings from the World Values Survey (WVS) showed, a nation’s relative level of affluence is positively associated with its citizens’ embrace of more inclusive, democratic, self-expression values. (In part, this seems to be because national wealth is generally related to the number of years of uninterrupted democracy a country has experienced, though the correlation is not perfect; e.g., Germany is wealthier but has experienced fewer years of uninterrupted democracy than Belgium). WVS researchers Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel explain it this way: “Individual security increases empathy, making people more aware of long-term risks. The rise of self-expression values fuels *humanistic* risk perceptions” (2005, p. 33). This more humanistic worldview in wealthier countries, held at the societal level, may in turn influence young people’s attitudes towards traditional out-groups like immigrants, ethnic



minorities, and women. (However, when it comes to civic participation, some civic education researchers have found that it is in the more recently established democracies, with far lower national affluence, where students anticipate higher levels of civic participation; Hoskins et al., 2011).

**Income inequality.** Another feature of the national context related to civic orientations is the degree of inequality between citizens at the low and high ends of the economic spectrum, especially since this difference may represent some degree of difference in social classes' tendency toward self-expression values. Economic policies for growth and development have consequences for public and private sector industries and services, including education and health, and for how people from various points on the social spectrum get access to those services. Driven by different philosophies on the relationship of the state to the individual, economic policies that result in more or less inequality in a country's income distribution (the difference between the incomes of wealthy and poor people) have been shown to have differential influences on native and immigrant people, including school-age children (Koopmans, 2010; Schneeweis, 2009).

Through regulation of industries and relatively high taxation, one form of capitalist economic policies seeks to redistribute wealth across the social spectrum, while also maintaining high standards of living. American sociologist Lane Kenworthy refers to this as 'egalitarian capitalism,' and across Europe variations of it have resulted in varying degrees of income inequality. Kenworthy argues that redistributing wealth to reduce income inequality is desirable because it is fair. Arguably a large part of a person's economic success can be attributed to lucky life circumstances, rather than personal choices. Thus he advocates for conscious actions to help those whose quality of

life was *not* their choice. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, British social epidemiologists, show that, beyond narrowing the gap between social classes' educational and health outcomes and thus engendering national social cohesion, countries with narrower income distributions tend to have lower overall homicide and imprisonment rates, lower rates of mental illness and obesity, and greater likelihood of social mobility (2009, 2011).

Educationally, other cross-national studies have shown that greater income inequality depresses math, reading, and science achievement overall, and indeed results in larger percentages of low-achieving students and smaller percentages of high-achieving students (Chiu, 2010; Chiu & Khoo, 2005; Chudgar & Luschei, 2009; Condron, 2011; Marks, 2005). Taken together, all of this evidence suggests that a commitment to reducing economic disparities between rich and poor has wide-ranging societal implications, among which may be levels of civic knowledge (an academic subject) and patriotism, an indicator of how strongly one feels one's country represents democratic ideals of equality.

## **2.2 Preparing Young People for Citizenship**

Recall that this dissertation explores the relationship of the school context to young people's pro-democratic attitudes and preparedness for citizenship. Since the time of Thomas Jefferson, the creation and consolidation of a democratic society has been seen as heavily dependent on civic and citizenship education, particularly in schools (e.g., Jefferson, 1786/1939). As the American public school advocate Horace Mann argued in 1845, the primary responsibility of schooling was to prepare schoolchildren—immigrant

and American-born—for democratic citizenship:

The great moral attribute of self-government cannot be born and matured in a day; and if school children are not trained to it, we only prepare ourselves for disappointment, if we expect it from grown men. Every body acknowledges the justness of the declaration, that a foreign people, born and bred and dwarfed under the despotisms of the Old World, cannot be transformed into the full stature of American citizens, merely by a voyage across the Atlantic, or by subscribing the oath of naturalization. (1845/1957, p. 58)

Nearly sixty years later, philosopher and educator John Dewey agreed:

It is said that one ward in the city of Chicago has forty different languages represented in it. It is a well-known fact that some of the largest Irish, German, and Bohemian cities in the world are located in America, not in their own countries. The power of the public schools to assimilate different races to our own institutions, thru the education given to the younger generation, is doubtless one of the most remarkable exhibitions of vitality that the world has ever seen. (1902, pp. 375, 377)

Each of these men believed educating these students—many of them immigrants—in schools would greatly benefit the country’s government, and the individuals would know and understand their civic rights and responsibilities.

What follows is a review of literature on political socialization, that lifelong process through which all people develop a political identity, active or not. With this overarching understanding of the various sources of political learning available to a citizen of a democracy, I describe my operating theory about the difference between *civics* and *citizenship* in political socialization, then discuss the various methods schools and community organizations have developed for educating students in, and giving them experience with, civics and citizenship.

### **2.2.1 Political Socialization**

In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba remarked in their seminal work on

civic culture that the features of “universal suffrage, the political party, the elective legislature...are also part of the totalitarian participation pattern, in a formal if not functional sense” (1963, p. 5). The most salient example at the time, the USSR, referred to itself as democratic because it held elections in which all could vote, but because political opponents of state Communism were silenced, those elections were fundamentally farcical and undemocratic. To allow only one party access to power is to create a political culture of submission and passivity.

What makes the difference, then, between totalitarians’ democratic farce and real democracy? In part, the answer is democratic political socialization, a term that refers to the lifelong process of developing *people* into *citizens*. At different points in life, family and friends, school experiences like civic education, and media sources influence this process, which is essential in the creation of a political and civic culture. Without political socialization, the structures of democracy cannot be sustained: a committed democratic citizenry must continually create and reinvigorate a civic culture. To do this, it must demand—through votes, protests, petitions, and political campaigns—that no political party has an unbreakable hold on the executive or legislative branches and that journalists are free to investigate political situations and politicians, and can report on these without concern for retribution. Citizens must also ensure that elections are free and fair, and hold their elected representatives to account at election time. Without these and other elements, contemporary democracies would cease to exist.

An awareness- and engagement-oriented civic identity is more likely to develop in those who have greater access to political and civic experiences *and* who come to place value on those experiences, while a detached, passive civic identity might develop

in those who have minimal access *or* place little value on the experiences they *do* have (Niemi & Junn, 1998).<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, researchers have found that knowledge of the political and civic system is also associated with social tolerance, or a willingness to accept and even protect the rights of minority or out-groups, a finding that is crucial to my study's hypotheses (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Flanagan & Faison, 2001; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Each of these identities and characteristics is a result of socialization, though an active identity is the goal—the ideal—of *democratic* political socialization (Almond & Verba, 1963). Intentional and unintentional experiences—school-based education about government, politics, and civic responsibilities; television viewing and newspaper reading; (overheard) political discussions with family, friends, and campaign representatives; voting, campaigning, and other civic events—*can* provide more complete information about the processes and actors in the political system, if people pay attention and give credence to these experiences.

Democratic society's goal for citizens is that they know enough—and seek more and better information if they don't know enough—about government, politicians, and civic issues in order to vote and act in their and their community's best interests. This reasoning is what drove Jefferson, Mann, Dewey and contemporary scholars to their shared belief that democracy is “incompatible with widespread ignorance,” and has spurred on efforts to promote formal civic education in schools and youth organizations (Niemi & Junn, 1998, p. 9).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Of course, as the world has seen in northern Africa since the start of 2011, a combination of economic circumstances, feelings of connectedness to others in the same circumstances, and beliefs that government has not done what it could to improve those circumstances can give rise to a strong—if temporary—active civic identity, leading to extraordinary grassroots movements for democracy.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the challenges of assessing school-based learning of citizenship skills and civic orientations, see Appendix A, Section 3 (page 237).

### 2.2.2 Civics vs. Citizenship

I have used the terms *civics* and *citizenship*, but they are conceived of in somewhat different ways across classrooms and academic disciplines, so the aim of this section is to lay out what I believe the differences are from an educational perspective, describe how each can be formulated and enacted in school settings, and to set the terminology for this study's purposes.

Democratic societies have long charged schools with instructing children in the structures and processes of government as well as the skills and responsibilities of citizenship. In this educational process, scholars and curriculum developers agree that there are at least four components: (1) citizenship and governmental knowledge, (2) cognitive skills and (3) participatory skills for exercising citizenship, and (4) the dispositions to exercise citizenship in the first place (Kerr, 1999a; Michigan Department of Education, 2007; National Assessment Governing Board, 2006; Patrick, 1999). Educators often use 'civic education' or 'citizenship education' as interchangeable references to the context for learning (about) each of these components, though I differentiate between the two. Civic education is based on civic knowledge or civic literacy—more simply, *civics*—which, when interpreted as grounded in facts, tends to be characterized by more conventional forms of teacher-centered instruction *about* citizenship. Citizenship education, however, is aimed at and possibly conducted through participation and developing skills and attitudes for *citizenship* itself, which is briefly defined as engagement in the political and civic realms.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Of course, in the legal context, the term citizenship takes on another meaning: legal citizenship grants a person certain political rights in a country or locality. Without it, a person usually cannot vote, though he or she may be able to engage in other activities associated with good citizenship, including community service and protest activities.

A definition from the Australian national Department of Education clarifies the relationship between *civics* and *citizenship*:


Civics is the more defined of the two. It is the study of ... democracy, its history, traditions, structures and processes; our democratic culture ... the ways ... society is managed, by whom and to what end. Even these simple definitions indicate contested areas which will be encountered in the teaching and learning of Civics.

On the other hand, Citizenship is the development of the skills, attitudes, beliefs and values that will predispose students to participate, to become and remain engaged and involved in that society/culture/democracy. A rich and complex set of understandings, based on civics knowledge and attitudes or values, plus the opportunity to experience, to practise civic competencies, is required for effective citizenship education. Without civic knowledge and a disposition to engage, a person cannot effectively practise citizenship. (Mellor, n.d.)

In this definition, citizenship depends on civic knowledge (see Figure 2-1), and is not limited to attitudes and skills for successful living in *democracy*, but also in *society*. Civic engagement may be characterized by different levels of interpersonal involvement and risk, according to educational psychologist Helen Haste (2004). Charitable giving, for example, is most often a private transaction, whereas campaigning and signing petitions are public, relatively low-effort activities. Most public and most effortful (i.e., requiring much disruption of one's usual routine) are protest activities, with high costs in terms of time and potential risk for punishment (Haste, 2004, p. 426).

To encourage students toward the ideal of active citizenship—which in Haste's view would also be public—schools can provide opportunities to learn how to identify, evaluate, and act on those interests. Further, schools can—and some would say *must*—foster a sense of responsibility and the skills for sustaining democracy through their teachers' and administrators' habits of inquiry and participation in the creation of civic and political conditions. Citizenship is this latter practice—believing and doing—while civics is the information or set of understandings that contributes to effective practice—

knowing and knowing how to do. In the sense of engagement and belonging to the greater citizenry, citizenship is also best considered as a process, even an “ongoing struggle,” not a one-time achievement that is subsequently static (Bénéï, 2005; Osler, 2005, p. 198).



**Figure 2-1. The relationship between civics and citizenship.**

These ideas go by different names depending on the scholarly or social context. In the schooling context, some scholars refer only to citizenship, and tacitly assume civics—or civic knowledge—as one element of it, while others refer only to civic education, though they have skill-based objectives for citizenship. In the political science context, these ideas can have entirely different names: “The two conditions necessary for democracy are political engagement and democratic enlightenment” (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996, p. 14). These terms align with my civics/citizenship differentiation: democratic enlightenment is equivalent to civic knowledge, while political engagement equates to citizenship.<sup>9</sup> Nie et al. write that democratic enlightenment “signifies the

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<sup>9</sup> Political science values civic engagement—not just running for political office or voting—as well, including participation in voluntary associations and community networks, as these contribute to the



understanding of democratic rule through knowledge and acceptance of the norms and procedures of democracy.” Political engagement, they write, entails action: it “signifies the capability of citizens to engage in self-rule and encompasses behaviors and cognitions necessary for identifying political preferences, understanding politics, and pursuing interests” (1996, p. 11).

For the purposes of this study, I refer to the school-based context for learning civics and citizenship as *civic education*. This term is an economical way to refer to all the possible civics-, politics-, and citizenship-related elements of a formal education for civic engagement, and happens to be the term most often used by educators and scholars of education.

### **2.2.3 Political Socialization of Young Children and Adolescents**

To some, students at the end of secondary school are more obvious targets for research on political socialization and civic attitudes because those students are about to become members of the voting public. However, many political scientists, developmental psychologists, and I find it similarly worthwhile to study early adolescents’ (around age 14) attitudes and knowledge, despite their greater distance from traditional political options. Firstly, education scholars and political scientists find that even young children identify with certain national or political values. Serene Koh (2010) finds that elementary-age children hold political identities that are related to who they are as young people, not necessarily in relation to who they anticipate they will be as adults. These “basic orientations acquired during childhood” may affect adult beliefs about

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resolution of social problems and increased political participation through trust and cooperation (Diamond, 1999, p. 19).

political and civic issues, however (Flanagan et al., 2007; Searing, Schwartz, & Lind, 1973, p. 415).

Older children—adolescents—continue to develop their political and civic beliefs. Erik Erikson, a developmental psychologist, suggested in the late 1960s that adolescents' development of a political identity is made possible through their natural tendencies:

[Adolescents] insistently test each other's capacity for sustaining loyalties in the midst of inevitable conflicts of values.

The readiness for such testing helps to explain...the appeal of simple and cruel totalitarian doctrines among the youth of such countries and classes as have lost or are losing their group identities—feudal, agrarian, tribal, or national. The democracies are faced with the job of willing these grim youths by convincingly demonstrating to them—by living it—that a democratic identity can be strong and yet tolerant, judicious and still determined. (1968, p. 133)

Adolescent political identities are likely to be predictive of their adult attitudes, with some room for change based on salient events in their lives after adolescence (Galston, 2001; Hahn, 1998; Hjerm, 2005; Morduchowicz, Catterberg, Niemi, & Bell, 1996; Palonsky, 1987; Sapiro, 2004). As civic education scholar Britt Wilkenfeld writes, because “development is cumulative and experiences build on each other, group differences in civic engagement at 14 ... would be indicative of early inequities in civic engagement. These differences would likely be exacerbated over time” (Wilkenfeld, 2009, p. 12). Supporting this theory is a study of black American adolescents by Miranda Yates and James Youniss (1998) in which they found that students who a) enrolled in a service course that brought them in contact with the homeless on a weekly basis and b) performed other voluntary community service while in high school internalized the importance of community service and were still regular volunteers in adulthood.

Structurally speaking, compulsory education ends at age 14 or 15 in many countries around the world, so if organizations wish to understand how students of all

kinds experience civic education and what their civic-oriented knowledge, values, and skills are, it is important to study students younger than or at that age (Baxter, 2008; Lehmann, 2004, p. 10).<sup>10</sup>

#### **2.2.4 The School's Role in Civic Education and Development of Pro-Democratic Attitudes**

Schools, particularly those sponsored by public agencies like the national or local government, are the only countrywide institutions that have ready access to entire generations of citizens. Since the nation-building projects of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century West, it has been common for governments and societies wishing to consolidate their democratic system to teach the knowledge and skills students will need to be *good* citizens. Initially civic education was very much “bound up with the legitimacy of the nation-state,” concerned with creating national allegiance and feelings of belonging—at the expense of non-nationals—through national symbols and lore (Keating, Ortloff, & Philippou, 2009). However, in contemporary times, as Slovak scholar Silvia Matusová has written, “In democratic political systems children in school learn how to make decisions autonomously, how to lead, how to tolerate different opinions, to collaborate with and respect the rights of others—these are some of the most important values and attitudes promoted by democratic societies” (1997, p. 65). Indeed they are the values that one hopes adolescents identify as the ‘best traditions’ of their countries, a desirable form of patriotism that goes beyond national allegiance.

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<sup>10</sup> Of note, too, is the US’s experience with high school seniors taking its National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). These students are about to leave the mandatory education system and, like the CIVED study, are not required to complete the assessment, do not take it seriously, and have little motivation to do their best. Several researchers have called for the National Assessment Governing Board (NAGB) either to scrap the assessment of this age group or dramatically alter its administration (Brophy & Ames, 2005; Ravitch, 2010).

Of course civic education's wide-ranging, ambitious aims lead to diverse incarnations across countries and schools. Both the settings and the instructional methods vary, and some are more effective than others. The settings for this instruction vary from classrooms devoted to civic instruction, history, or government; schools where civic education is "declared a cross-curricular principle" that guides all school activities, in which students experience democratic discussions, tolerance of minority opinions, and possibly student government (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004a, p. 7); or youth or civic organizations' activities and events that occur outside of school hours. Because this study is focused on students in schools, in the following sections, I first present the literature on students' own characteristics that are related to their civic outcomes and, often, experiences in schools. I then review relationships of particular features of the civic education classroom to students' civic outcomes. Many researchers have used the same data set I use—CIVED—to inform their understanding of how these features of educational contexts are related to preparedness for citizenship and pro-democratic attitudes, and I highlight these CIVED-based studies as the foundation of my own.

**Student characteristics.** Because schools are believed to be most influential on knowledge and civic engagement, most contemporary studies of civic preparedness are concerned with students' civic knowledge and either their current participation in extracurricular activities (like volunteering or student government) or their intention to vote once they are of age. Researchers have found gender to be generally unrelated to civic knowledge, but in CIVED, researchers found that in some countries more girls anticipated voting than boys, though in other countries there were no gender differences (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Attitudes toward traditional out-groups are sites of

differences between girls and boys, however. Vera Husfeldt, a European scholar of education, finds that girls in CIVED are more supportive of immigrants' rights than boys, while she and her colleagues find girls also to be far more supportive of ethnic minorities' rights (Husfeldt, 2004; Husfeldt, Barber, & Torney-Purta, 2005; Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008). Just in general, females are more likely to be concerned with social justice and human rights than males, a finding not unique to CIVED. Several other researchers have found adolescent girls to be more tolerant than boys of rights for feminists, homosexuals, and racists (Haste & Hogan, 2006; Sotelo, 1999).

Another significant predictor of students' civic knowledge and participation is their socioeconomic status (SES): their educational resources (access to books and expectations for their education), and their parents' educational attainment and income. CIVED-based studies have found that students from low SES backgrounds tend to have lower civic knowledge, just as they tend to achieve less highly on other academic subjects, and are less likely to participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities, just as low-income, poorly educated adults are less likely to vote (students: Baldi, Perie, Skidmore, Greenberg, Hahn, & Nelson, 2001; adults: Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996). Nie and Hillygus (2001) found that American students' verbal abilities, as measured by the SAT, influence civic participation, including voting. Finally, some studies have found students of low SES to be more xenophobic than those of higher SES because they perceive a greater economic threat from foreigners (Hjerm, 2005; Kracke, Oepke, Wild, & Noack, 1998), while others have found no difference between more and less affluent students (Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008).

**Inside the civic education classroom.** Just as labels for civic knowledge and citizenship differ between education and political science, so does the source of this content for school-aged youth: they may take part in classes as diversely named as social studies, moral education, values education, politics, and history, all of which may contain the material I associate with civic knowledge and citizenship. As English scholar of civic education David Kerr noted, “The range of terms and subject connections underlines the breadth and complexity of the issues addressed within this area. This breadth and complexity is both a strength and a weakness” (1999b, p. 2). He points out that a lack of focus can make the subject unappealing for teachers, giving it “low status and low priority,” though the fact that the knowledge and skills under its purview are easily related to most other academic work is empowering (p. 10).

Based on large-scale assessments and surveys of students’ civic knowledge and participation, scholars in political science and civic education have gotten mixed results about the effect of formal, course-based civic education on these outcomes. The results of some studies support a popular belief that civic education courses—at least in high school—have little or no effect on students’ civic knowledge (Hutchens & Eveland, 2009). One of the original sources of this belief, a 1968 study by American political scientists Kenneth Langton and M. Kent Jennings, concluded with this:

Our findings certainly do not support the thinking of those who look to the civics curriculum in American high schools as even a minor source of political socialization. When we investigated the student sample as a whole we found not one case out of the ten examined in which the civics curriculum was significantly associated with students’ political orientations. (p. 865)

Notably, however, a larger collection of studies conducted since then refute these findings, suggesting that civic education can indeed improve students’ civic knowledge

and, sometimes, “democratize” their political attitudes (Hahn, 1998). Some of the programs investigated in these studies seem to be particularly successful in countries with a recent authoritarian past, such as South Africa, Argentina, and Poland (Finkel & Ernst, 2005; McDevitt & Kiouisis, 2006; Morduchowicz et al., 1996; Nie & Hillygus, 2001; Niemi & Junn, 1998; Slomczynski & Shabad, 1998). These studies were mostly conducted on a relatively small scale, typically at the classroom or school level, rather than a regional level, which allowed the authors to factor in details of the pedagogical methods of civics-related courses, not just their names and how many of them students take.

***Instructional methods.*** Methods of instruction in civics may include lecture, debate, experience with community service or political organizations, or participation in mock hearings or conventions. Student attitudes, inclination to participate in civic activities, and knowledge are highly sensitive to the choice of teaching methods, teachers’ views of the value of civic education, and indeed to the kind and quality of discourse in the classroom (Flanagan et al., 2007; Flanagan & Faison, 2001). As Carole Hahn, CIVED’s US research coordinator, found in her own longitudinal study of five western countries’ approaches to civic education, the teaching methods that are most effective in exciting students about the political and civic arenas in and out of school are those that engage them in experiential learning: discussions of controversial topics like immigration policy, welfare policy, and abortion; student-driven projects on the environment or local issues; and role-playing or attending actual panel discussions or debates on political issues (1998). Additionally, discussion of controversial issues has been found to be associated with greater student trust in peers and school staff

(Bickmore, 1993; Hahn, 1991, p. 472; D. E. Hess, 2009; McDevitt & Kioussis, 2006). In her discussion of the value of controversial issues in the social studies classroom, Hahn writes: “[S]etting off some subjects as taboo for investigation is a totalitarian practice inconsistent with democratic ideals; and it is only through resolving problems contained in controversial issues that meaningful, lasting learning will occur” (1991, p. 470). A number of other studies support Hahn’s findings, including previous studies using CIVED data (Losito & Mintrop, 2001; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). However, there is one element of a classroom environment that most supports the success of controversial discussions, improves civic knowledge and debating skills, and increases students’ tolerance of different opinions: an open classroom climate.

***Open classroom climate.*** An open environment is one in which students feel safe to counter or question the teacher’s and peers’ statements, and where comments are not ‘value-laden,’ assigning good or bad qualities to opinions (Hahn, 1991). Flanagan, Cumsille, Gill, and Gallay (2007) contend that, to the extent that children feel they can influence adults in educational settings, such as teachers who encourage open, safe discussion, they may believe that capability extends to governmental functioning, which may explain why an open classroom climate is associated with more positive attitudes toward minority rights and stronger beliefs in one’s own political efficacy (Avery et al., 1992; Hahn, 1991, 1998; Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).

Judith Torney-Purta and Britt Wilkenfeld used CIVED data in the US to study the relationship of various teaching methods with several civic outcomes (2009). They operationalized an open classroom climate as one that is discourse-based, where teachers and students share their own opinions, and discuss and respect others’. Additionally, they



operationalized a more traditional, lecture-based classroom environment as one that is focused on facts and dates, teacher lecture, and use of the textbook. They created four groups of students from these measures: students experiencing a) civic education with both a lecture and interactive focus, b) civic education with a predominant interactive focus, c) civic education with a predominant lecture focus, and d) civic education with neither focus. The researchers found that students in groups (a) and (b) were consistently more knowledgeable, more tolerant, and more concerned with social responsibility than their peers in groups (c) and (d).

***Effects of civics courses and civic knowledge on other desirable civic outcomes.***

Multiple scholars now agree that taking any civics classes *at all* in high school, the recency of seniors' civics courses, and critical discussion of current events tend to influence students' political knowledge. However, not all of these inputs influence learning or attitudes uniformly across demographic groups. For example, it seems that in the US, black, Latino, and white students are differentially affected by course-taking and course content. Political scientists Richard Niemi and Jane Junn found in the late 1990s that Black and Latino students tend to learn more in classes where current events are discussed frequently, but the amount and recency of civics courses significantly, positively affect only white students (1998). Findings such as these leave questions about how other socially disadvantaged groups, such as immigrants, benefit differentially from civic education, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3.

Several studies, though not all, have found strong support for a relationship between controversial discussions, knowledge, and higher levels of tolerance for feminists and lower levels of xenophobia. Spanish researcher María José Sotelo, for

example, studied adolescents in urban, suburban, and rural areas around Madrid. She found that knowledge in general (higher ‘cognitive moral reasoning’) and, to some extent, support for democratic norms, are each associated with greater tolerance of feminists, but also that those who had experience with classroom debates were similarly tolerant:

Those adolescents who are used to debating their ideas are more willing to accept different opinions. So, an increased number of discussions of controversial issues within an open and supportive environment seems to be an efficient way of improving attitudes towards minority groups including feminists. (Sotelo, 1997, p. 526)

Greater civic knowledge was related to lower levels of xenophobia among Swedish adolescents, according to Mikael Hjerm (2005), but in the CIVED study, whose data I also use, researchers found that civic knowledge is *not* always positively correlated with pro-democratic attitudes toward immigrants’ and women’s rights (Malak-Minkiewicz, 2005).

Researchers have noted that highly educated people tend to be less satisfied with their country’s current course (interpreted by some as less patriotic) because they know much about democracy’s ideal practices and see a large gap between reality and the ideal (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996). Other scholars have found an association of greater civic knowledge with greater civic participation among US adolescents (Anderson, Jenkins, Leming, MacDonald, Mullis, Turner, & Wooster, 1990). Of course, the direction of the latter association is uncertain: greater civic participation may lead to greater civic knowledge through firsthand experience of civic processes, but greater civic knowledge may pique someone’s interest in civic participation.

### **2.2.5 Service Learning, Community Service, and Political Activities as Civic Education**

There are many opportunities outside of academic schoolwork for adolescents to gain hands-on experience with civic and political projects and activism. Whether run by community or youth organizations that are unaffiliated with schools, or by school faculty during extracurricular time, these activities are purely optional and less common than school-based civic education experiences. Greater voluntary extracurricular participation is associated with a higher likelihood of civic involvement after a student leaves school and higher levels of political efficacy, which is why I investigate adolescents' participation in my study (Beck & Jennings, 1982; Hanks, 1981; Patrick & Hoge, 1991; Quintelier, 2008; Smith, 1999; Stoll, 2001; Stolle & Rochon, 1998).

However, not all extracurricular activities are equally influential on future civic involvement. Sociologist Michael Hanks (1981) was the first to identify differential influences of instrumental versus expressive extracurricular activities for adolescents, and other scholars have refined his findings. Instrumental groups—those that are externally oriented, whose activities are means to an end—include school newspaper, honorary clubs, academic clubs, and student council, as well as scouting, cultural, or religious groups. Expressive groups—those that are more internally oriented, whose activities are ends in themselves—include sports teams, hobby clubs, and performing arts groups (these definitions were first laid out by Hanks, 1981, and refined by the work of; Stolle & Rochon, 1998).

Precisely because instrumental groups are task-oriented, focusing on objectives outside the group, and interested in influencing “the creation or maintenance of a desired

condition,” participation in such groups is highly positively associated with later political and civic involvement.<sup>11</sup> Conversely, while involvement in expressive groups for entertainment and self-esteem purposes has positive associations with development of an interpersonal identity and even academic achievement and attainment, it has little, if any, lasting influence on political involvement (Feltz & Weiss, 1984; Hanks, 1981; Lindsay, 1984; Otto & Alwin, 1977; Stoll, 2001).

Political activities, though more limited for adolescents than for those who can vote, are also associated with higher tolerance of minority groups, which is why I hypothesize an association between extracurricular participation and more inclusive attitudes among European adolescents. Results from Sotelo’s study of Spanish adolescents suggested that political experience is associated with higher tolerance for feminists’ rights, even where political experience may range from campaigning for a candidate, wearing a campaign button, talking with friends about politics, running for school office, talking with family about political issues, joining a political club, or debating a political issue in class (1997, p. 521).

Political participation—or just the anticipation of it—has been found to be strongly associated with decreased xenophobia. Mikael Hjerm (2005) finds that Swedish adolescents who are more inclined to vote as adults, join a political party, participate in peaceful protests, and run for office are also less xenophobic. However, while service-

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<sup>11</sup> Of course, the fact of being on a school’s student council does not guarantee that students will get meaningful experience with community service. Participation on a student council’s planning committee for the school dance is quite a different experience from participating in a student group’s organization of and service at a soup kitchen for homeless community members (Reinders & Youniss, 2006). Students using their social skills to address social problems are likely to get more out of their experience and develop a greater sense of personal efficacy than those who use their social skills purely for their own and their peers’ entertainment, as reported by Miranda Yates and James Youniss in their 1998 study of black, urban adolescents who participated in a yearlong service-learning course in high school, and most of whom continued to be active in their communities as middle-aged adults.

learning and community service experiences can influence students' development into active citizens, educators must contend with the fact that socioeconomic status is positively associated with participation, as well as political interest and feelings of political efficacy, meaning that students of lower SES are less likely to feel that their opinion is important or worth expressing through participation (Hahn, 1998; Patrick & Hoge, 1991).

### **2.3 'Curriculum': Its Meaning and the Spectrum of Its Control**

Recall that in this study I am interested in school-level *and* national-level influences on students' civic attitudes and knowledge. One of these influences is the curriculum. At the country level, I focus on the system for designing and controlling curriculum. The choice of system is related to a country's historical politics, demographics, and social values, and can look quite different across countries because of the plurality of meanings the word 'curriculum' takes on.

At its most basic, educators and policymakers agree that 'curriculum' is a course of study—the 'what' of teaching (as opposed to the 'how'). Different interpretations arise in its level of detail or prescriptiveness. At one end of the spectrum it means big ideas or standards, "broad ... learning goals, usually for certain grades" (Marshall, 2004, p. 43). At the opposite end, it means detailed daily lesson plans, including teaching methods and assessments, whether designed by the teachers who will use them or a commercial entity. In between these, one finds teachers and researchers using 'curriculum' to mean a grade-by-grade plan for the skills and content that must be taught, specific learning expectations for each grade, a textbook, or teaching methods for

particular subjects or learning expectations (Gewert, 2011; Marshall, 2004; Prideaux, 2003). In my study I address only the ‘formal’ or ‘intended’ curriculum, not the notions of ‘hidden,’ ‘latent,’ or ‘unintended’ curriculum. Because I am studying national-level curriculum policy in relation to student outcomes, I address only the question of whether national agencies create documents that outline or prescribe academic content in the form of school subjects.<sup>12</sup> This limited focus is interesting despite the commonly noted loose relationship between intended and implemented curriculum. As comparative education scholar Aaron Benavot has written:

In a world in which education is predominantly a creature of the nation-state, official policies themselves reflect commitments widely understood to carry authoritative intent. At a minimum they affect, both directly and indirectly, the formal organization of schooling. They distribute the content of instruction throughout the days and years of the schooling cycle according to relatively explicit and reasoned goals. They indicate what types of classes will be offered to students and what general topics are to be taught in each type of class. ... [O]fficial curricular timetables may directly determine the subject matter taught in local schools. (1992, p. 35)

A typology created by French researcher Nathalie Mons, discussed in Janmaat and Mons (2011), identifies countries as falling into one of five categories of systems for central, regional, or local control of curriculum. Essentially it describes the division of power and activities across these levels on issues of “curriculum design, textbook choice, and modes of assessment” (p. 63). In democracies that, for reasons of diversity or political history, place great importance on limited central government, the tendency in education is to give local schools or communities more power over the curriculum than

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<sup>12</sup> Though it is outside the scope of this study, another aspect of national curriculum policy is whether schools are expected to ‘track’ students according to ability. Tracking ostensibly places students of differing abilities into course trajectories with different foci and, often, academic rigor, and to some societies is a desirable form of social efficiency. It is also well documented as a process that maintains the status quo and reduces social mobility, most often by placing students of low socioeconomic status (which immigrants frequently are) in the lowest, most vocationally oriented tracks (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Green, Preston, & Janmaat, 2006; Kahne & Middaugh, 2008; Oakes, 1985). For a lengthier discussion of the implications of tracking for immigrant students, see Appendix B.

the national government. In a *federal* model, as in Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland (and the US), regional entities such as states or cantons are responsible for curriculum. These countries do this to honor the autonomy of historically close-knit and independent cultural or linguistic communities, and to avoid the political challenges of creating common expectations that could appease such diverse communities. On the opposite end of this typology, countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Norway (and, perhaps more famously, France) have *centralized* models, wherein curriculum design, textbook choice, and assessment are solely the responsibility of the state. Greece, for example, has a historically more homogeneous society than its northern neighbors, takes the opposite approach, indeed the most directive in all of Europe:

[C]urricula, syllabi, the content of textbooks and pedagogical guidelines are uniquely the responsibility of the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs and its consulting agency, the Pedagogic Institute. In Greek schools, only one textbook is used per subject taught, and textbooks are published by the state. (Makrinioti & Solomon, 1999, p. 292)

This arrangement effectively denies any need for adaptation of content to local or individual circumstances, but has the potential to expose all students in the country to the same content, regardless of socioeconomic status or skill, which is why I find it important to study how this national characteristic plays out in students' civic preparedness and attitudes. Additionally, highly centralized, prescriptive curricula like Greece's tend to present national values in a very particular way, establishing a sanctioned national understanding of what is 'right,' which can build unity and a sense of national identity (Janmaat & Mons, 2011; Kerr, 1999a). Not all central systems are as uniform as Greece's. Norway and Portugal's central governments are both *prescriptive* and *descriptive*, but communities are permitted to adapt at least some portion of the national

curriculum to address local circumstances.

Most European countries fall somewhere between the federal and centralized extremes. In *decentralized* models, as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, local schools and communities are entirely responsible. *School autonomy* models, as in England, Hungary, and Sweden, are characterized by some national-level regulation of curriculum objectives, but strong school autonomy in curriculum design, and strong central control of assessment. In *collaboration* models, as in Denmark, central authorities determine the curriculum framework and assessment, giving only minor leeway to schools.

Each of these shared arrangements offers some national consistency as well as local autonomy, a compromise between several levels of government. Generally, on international reading and mathematics achievement tests like the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), those countries whose students score highest have some national involvement in curriculum, whether defined just as broad standards or as articulated (grade by grade) learning expectations (Mons, 2007, as cited in Janmaat & Mons, 2011). A report written through a partnership between the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, the agency that sponsors PISA) and CTB/McGraw-Hill, a North American publisher of educational assessments, suggests that these high-performing countries' standards are not simply national, but rigorous, "premised, in detail, on the proposition that it is possible for all students to achieve at high levels and necessary that they do so":

Whatever the approach, such standards shape high-performing education systems by establishing rigorous, focused and coherent content at all grade levels; reducing overlap in curricula across grades; reducing variation in implemented curricula across classrooms; facilitating co-ordination of various policy drivers,



ranging from curricula to teacher training; and reducing inequity in curricula across socio-economic groups. (Paine & Schleicher, 2011, p. 5)

## **2.4 Conclusion**

Across democratic countries, political structures, national and local educational policies, teaching methods, and economic circumstances vary widely. Each of these features of a democracy has potential influences on students moving through the educational system, particularly with respect to the development of their identities as citizens. Some of these features are more obvious or palatable levers for reform than others, such as the teaching methods that are most effective for inculcating inquisitive civic-mindedness in adolescents. With this chapter I have laid the groundwork for the theme of the study: schooling and democracy. However, up until now, I have ignored the question of immigrant students' characteristics that contribute to the difficulty of their sociopolitical integration. There are a number of reasons to believe that the civic-related experiences and outcomes of immigrants differ from those of their native-born peers, including the factors that lead to immigration; previous experiences with schooling, citizenship, and social attitudes; linguistic and cultural differences; and the social and political atmosphere that greets them on their arrival. Determining the characteristics of schools and nations that contribute to immigrants' social integration and development into citizens of an adopted country is essential, given that the flow of migrants into Europe is unlikely to be curtailed soon. As the children of today's immigrants will take civic cues from their parents, Europe cannot afford to ignore the political and civic habits and attitudes of its growing minority groups.

### Chapter 3

#### Immigration and Its Consequences for Education and Citizenship

Immigrants and their children constitute a unique segment of contemporary societies that is both economically necessary and culturally difficult to weave into the ‘social fabric.’ Recognizing that immigrants are permanent fixtures in all European countries, each liberal democracy must consider how to ‘incorporate’ them into civil and political society without alienating them and while still asserting a strong conception of what it means to be a citizen of that country—a national identity. The means of integrating immigrants is not obvious, and on a number of fronts, countries have arguably experienced more failures than successes. In all efforts, however, schools have been instrumental because, as I discussed in Chapter 2, they are positioned to be a part of *every* child’s life, regardless of citizenship status or ethnicity, and as such are poised to influence the next generation of civic actors and voters. Instruction in academic subjects such as science, literature, and history are just as much a part of schools’ mission to produce thoughtful democratic citizens as civic education. Thus many scholars are concerned with how immigrant children in modern democracies actually move through schooling, what opportunities they have to learn, which educational methods work for them, and how well they do, both in achievement and attainment.

We know already that immigrant students’ achievement levels in all traditionally

tested academic subjects are generally lower than their native-born peers', and they often encounter classroom environments that do not or cannot meet their linguistic, academic, or social needs (Alba & Silberman, 2009; Crul & Schneider, 2009; Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Scholars know significantly less about immigrant students' experiences with civic education and their overall democratic attitudes, however. There are few studies on this topic that are published for an English- or French-speaking international audience, though there are more about the United States than about other countries or regions. It would be inaccurate even to say that findings about immigrant adolescents in Europe are mixed, as the few studies that exist do not have the same focus. For example, there are individual studies that suggest that immigrants have less civic knowledge, benefit more from an open classroom climate, are not as supportive of women's rights as native students, yet are just as committed to community participation. My study contributes to this literature by addressing several civic-oriented characteristics and pro-democratic attitudes with large sample sizes (higher power) and controls for characteristics that make immigrants' experiences in the host country distinct from natives' experiences.

In this chapter I first present a brief overview of immigration, how contemporary democracies deal with this phenomenon, and how immigrants themselves act in the civic realm and respond to the policies that affect them. I then move to research on immigrant students' educational experiences and how those experiences influence their adult lives. Based on lingering questions in these two bodies of literature, I narrow my focus in a third section to what is known about immigrant students' civic attitudes and experiences

with civic education. I conclude the chapter by restating my research questions and offering some hypotheses based on the reviewed literature.

### **3.1 Migration, Immigrants, and Integration**

‘Migration,’ as distinguished from ‘travel,’ is the act of moving to a new country with the intention to live there, and with the expectation of greater economic, educational, or general life opportunities. The term ‘immigrant’ applies to any person, at any stage of life (government or military employees excepted), who lives and—often—works in a country that is not his or her birth country (this same person is referred to as an ‘emigrant’ in his or her birth country). It applies equally to infants whose experiences in the new country tend to be radically different from the experiences of their parents or even older siblings. Numerous factors contribute to immigrants’ reception and experiences in the host country: legal status, anticipated length of stay, and whether they are simply moving to a new country in order to improve the quality of their lives, or whether they are refugees or asylum-seekers (‘asylees’). Whereas ‘immigrant’ tends to imply voluntary movement in the absence of danger, ‘refugee’ implies movement because of war, political or religious violence, or threats to personal safety, and ‘asylum-seeker’ refers to a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because of fears of persecution for political, religious, gender, or racial reasons (Russell, 2002). These groups’ post-entry experiences with the host country’s culture, bureaucracy, and economy may be somewhat similar, though illegal status—anticipated or not—generally complicates newcomers’ relationship with the host society and legal system.

### 3.1.1 Theories of the Social Consequences of Ethnic Diversity

Immigrant populations inevitably diversify their host societies' cultural and religious makeup, which can be a challenging process for the whole of society. Immigration flows that are growing are especially worrisome for societies that already have problems of social cohesion. Social scientists have developed two opposing theories about interethnic relations—Conflict and Contact—that label, respectively, deleterious and beneficial effects of increased ethnic heterogeneity on democracy and the “social fabric.” Though ostensibly in direct contradiction to one another, most contemporary studies find evidence of both in the same multiethnic situation. The Conflict hypothesis suggests that ethnic heterogeneity breaks down people's ability to live and work together by encouraging ethnic stereotyping and antagonism (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003; Valenty & Sylvia, 2004). The Contact hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that ethnic heterogeneity supports democracy by *increasing* social and political tolerance and acceptance, as well as interethnic trust, and reducing perceptions of group threat (Allport, 1954/1979; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Putnam, 2007). In my study I investigate whether and how each of these theories operates in schools, identifying whether large proportions of immigrant students in a school tend to increase the gap between immigrants' and natives' views of rights for immigrants and ethnic minorities.

**Conflict theory.** In the Conflict theory, prejudice against a non-native ethnic group has to do with the host society's ‘threshold of tolerance,’ an abstract, ‘acceptable’ number of immigrants in the community beyond which immigration is seen as a problem. The work of American sociologist Lincoln Quillian (1995) supports the Conflict theory,

in which he finds that perceived ‘group threat’—modeled as a function of economic conditions and the size of minority groups relative to the majority group—explains large amounts of variance in country’s levels of anti-immigrant and racial prejudice.

Moreover, the *number* of immigrants explains as much as 40 percent of the variance in European people’s perceptions of immigration as a problem, according to American political scientist Gallya Lahav’s study of public opinion’s relation to immigration policy in Europe (2004). However, she finds an even stronger explanation of prejudice in the *types* of immigrants or ethnic minorities in a community or country, with prejudice higher in places where non-white, non-Christian immigrants (i.e., those not from the EU) predominate.

In the summer of 1993, renowned political scientist and scholar of democracy Samuel Huntington published a controversial article in *Foreign Affairs* arguing strongly for the Conflict theory. He hypothesized that not ideology or economic differences, but cultural differences—“fault lines between civilizations”—would define the coming years of global politics (p. 22). Asserting that westerners tend to associate the ‘nation state’ with action in the global arena, he corrected this with a reminder that that has only recently been true. In fact, *civilizations* have been actors on the global scene far longer. Moreover, because civilizations encompass many elements of a person’s closely-held identity, including geography, religion, language, customs, and history, they are associated with strong emotion (he gives primacy to religion). Huntington argued that culture clashes will occur between civilizations for several reasons, among them:

- precisely because cultural differences have evolved over centuries and are “far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies,”

- with interactions between citizens of different civilizations increasing, “civilization consciousness” is increasing, as well, possibly exacerbating any sense of difference or animosity,
- modernization separates people from “longstanding local identities,” including the nation state, and religion moves into that gap, giving rise to “fundamentalist” movements, and
- “cultural characteristics are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones,” such that in prior conflicts, people had to answer “Which side are you on?” and now must answer “What are you?” (pp. 25-27).

Ultimately, Huntington warned, the world is primed for conflicts between ethnic and religious groups. In Europe in particular, where western Christianity meets Orthodox Christianity and Islam along a fairly distinct geographical line, the “Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe” (p. 31).

**Contact theory.** In contrast to Huntington’s pessimistic view of interethnic relations, the Contact theory is supported by evidence of long- and short-term multiethnic experiences, and suggests a more positive result from the same situation of high numbers of ethnic minorities. An example of a long-term multiethnic experience is that of the US, a country long understood as having been built by immigrants. Putnam (2007) found that, despite US citizens’ knowledge of the country’s immigrant history, it has taken a long time for ethnic groups’ proximity and interactions to build toward national interethnic acceptance and trust (recall from Chapter 1 the importance of interpersonal

trust for democracy's consolidation).

This theory holds that higher numbers of minorities increase the likelihood of face-to-face interethnic contact on a regular basis, which in turn *improves* individuals' attitudes towards other ethnic groups (studies do not tend to find improvement in group attitudes; Forbes, 1997). Even in Germany and the Netherlands, where prominent political discussions are now occurring about the sustainability of immigration, researchers have found that, while a higher percentage of 'foreigners' in a geographic area does relate positively to perceived group threat, it also makes it more likely that natives see, work with, live near, and socialize with foreigners, which is related to *lower* levels of natives' prejudice against them (in Germany, this effect is somewhat weaker as the percentage increases, but is nonetheless significant; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006). Furthermore, West Germans have been found to be less prejudiced than their East German counterparts, and they happen to live in the part of the country with a much larger foreign population (Wagner, van Dick, Pettigrew, & Christ, 2003). In Norway, sociologist Christopher Bratt (2002) found that adolescents' friendships with minority students had positive relationships with attitudes toward those friends' minority groups (though not necessarily with other minority groups).

### **3.1.2 Models of Immigrant Integration**

Contact and Conflict theories, especially in relation to one another, provide a compelling frame for discussing the relationships between host societies and immigrants, or the integration process. "In a sense, immigration and integration are two sides of the



same coin: the former involves the entry of foreigners into a country, while the latter has to do with what happens when they stay” (Howard, 2007, p. 238). The challenges are on both side of the integration process:

- immigrants seem to pose a threat to the host country’s sense of national identity and group prerogatives (Quillian, 1995); and for that reason, among others,
- the host country’s cultural boundaries are often difficult for immigrants to penetrate.

Immigrants’ life trajectories are not interchangeable solely by virtue of being immigrants, however. True, immigrants tend to be poor, in disproportionate need of public services, and from a different culture (in Europe, often a non-Christian one), but as Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut write:

Immigrants, even those of the same nationality, are frequently divided by social class, the timing of their arrival, and their generation. . . . Depending on the timing of their arrival and context of reception, immigrants can find themselves confronting diametrically different situations, and hence the course of their assimilation can lead to a number of different outcomes. (2001, p. 45)

Immigrants who arrive with higher levels of education or skills and are met positively by the government and the receiving population have greater likelihoods of successful integration and economic success for themselves and their children (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003).

Official reactions to these inflows of people depend on a country’s understandings about immigration and nationhood, which Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (2003) categorize as one of three “models of integration”: differential exclusion, assimilationist,

or multicultural.<sup>13</sup> Each model represents a different degree of tolerance for ethnic, racial, or cultural difference, which often has a legal corollary.

**Table 3-1. History of immigration and models of integration by European region and country.**

Region (Immigration since...)	Country	Model of Integration	Types of Immigrants
<i>Western</i> (1950s)	Belgium	Assimilation	<b>Historically:</b> ‘Guest workers’, especially Italians, Poles, Turks, and Moroccans <b>1990s:</b> Moroccans, Turks
	England	Assimilation/Multiculturalism	<b>Historically:</b> Former colonials, ‘guest worker’ Poles <b>1990s:</b> Middle Easterners and North Africans
	Germany	Differential exclusion (pre-2000)	<b>Historically:</b> ‘Guest workers’, especially Turks <b>1990s:</b> Turks and Eastern Europeans
	Switzerland	Assimilation/Differential exclusion <sup>14</sup>	<b>Historically:</b> Southern Europeans <b>1990s:</b> Balkan citizens, refugees
<i>Scandinavia</i> (1950s and 1960s)	Denmark	Multiculturalism	<b>Historically:</b> Nordic citizens, Turks, Yugoslavs, Pakistanis <b>1990s:</b> Iraqis, Palestinians, Somalians
	Norway	Multiculturalism	<b>Historically:</b> Turks, Vietnamese refugees, Pakistanis, Swedes <b>1990s:</b> East Africans, Latin Americans, South Asians, and Middle Easterners
	Sweden	Multiculturalism	<b>Historically:</b> Norwegians and Finns, Southern Europeans <b>1990s:</b> Iraqis, Iranians, and Yugoslavs, Turks and Moroccans
<i>Southern</i> (1980s)	Greece	Assimilation	Asians, North Africans, Eastern Europeans, Middle Easterners
	Italy	Assimilation	Asians, North Africans, Eastern Europeans, Middle Easterners
	Portugal	Assimilation	Former colonials, North Africans, Asians, Eastern Europeans
<i>Central</i> (1990s and later)	Czech Republic	Assimilation	Eastern Europeans and Slovaks
	Hungary	Assimilation	Ethnic Hungarians and other Eastern Europeans
	Slovakia	Assimilation	Eastern Europeans

<sup>13</sup> Sociologist Christian Joppke (2007) poses a counterargument: he suggests that nation states’ policies on immigrant integration are far less divergent from one another—more assimilationist than anything else—than is generally supposed.

<sup>14</sup> Switzerland has the most stringent naturalization laws in Europe, such that it has an enormous foreign-born population but very few naturalized citizens who are foreign-born (Fibbi, Lerch, & Wanner, 2007).

Though my study is not positioned to comment directly on these approaches' influences on classroom dynamics, there may be indications in my findings that countries' overall approaches have influenced how immigrants experience civic education.

Note in Table 3-1 that geographic regions tend to have similar immigration histories and models of integration. Whereas the economies of northwestern Europe were healthy enough after World War II to require additional labor, the countries from which they recruited were in poorer southern and eastern Europe. It was not until many decades later that southern European economies developed enough that citizens were able to find jobs there and did not need to emigrate north. Furthermore, it was not until the 1990s that southern European countries really paid attention to the fact that immigrants from northern and eastern Africa, as well as many Middle Easterners, had taken up residence in their countries, rather than using southern countries merely as a stopping point on their way to northern Europe.

**Table 3-2. Stocks and inflows of foreign-born to selected European countries in 1999.**

Country	Percent foreign-born, 1999	Inflow of foreign-born, 1999 (thousands)
Belgium	10.2	57.8
England†	7.6	239.5
Germany	12.4	673.9
Switzerland	21.6	85.8
Denmark	5.6	20.3
Norway	6.6	32.2
Sweden	11.1	34.6
Greece	10.3*	--
Italy	2.5*	268.0
Portugal	5.1	10.5
Czech Republic	4.4	6.8
Hungary	2.8	20.2
Slovakia	2.2*	5.9

Source: OECD, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/885342748216>

and <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/885301511372>

† Data for the whole United Kingdom

\* Data from 2001, the earliest time point available

-- Data not available

Up until 1998, Greece didn't even have a legalization policy for immigrants (Castles & Miller, 2003, p. 84). You can see in Table 3-2 that there are large differences in the size of the foreign-born population across regions, as well as dramatic variations in the number of people entering each country at the end of the '90s. Especially in western Europe, these are the kinds of numbers that make frequent contact with immigrants highly likely.

**Differential exclusion.** Historically the most well known example of differential exclusion is Germany, in that its government and much of society saw immigrants as ethnic minorities who were inherently different from, and must remain permanently outside of, the dominant group, because homogeneity was essential to the nation. Differential exclusion accepts immigrants “only within strict functional and temporal limits,” which is to say that immigrants are welcome as individuals, but only temporarily (Castles, 2004, p. 23). The focus on ‘German blood’ as the prerequisite for citizenship, rather than on linguistic facility or allegiance to German political or cultural values, gave rise to an odd problem of integration following the fall of the USSR. On the one hand, if they had no evidence of German ancestry, even second and third generation descendants of immigrants (mainly Turks) had no hope of gaining legal German citizenship prior to the year 2000. On the other, *Aussiedler*—ethnic Germans who had lived for generations in Soviet territories—were given permission to “return” to Germany, though most did not speak German and were unfamiliar with western culture’s quotidian practices.

These people who looked different, sounded different, and acted differently, were yet labeled as “countrymen” whose German ancestry was all that was necessary to make them good, legal German citizens (Ignatieff, 1994; von Koppenfels, 2009). But as

Michael Ignatieff explains in his 1994 book on nationalism, this *ethnic nationalist* view of citizenship—in which a society defines itself as a nation of peoples with common ancestry, culture, and values—cannot obtain in a democracy: “Common ethnicity, by itself, does not create social cohesion or community, and when it fails to do so, as it must, nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled toward maintaining unity by force rather than by consent” (p. 8).

Ethnic nationalism involves an element of *ethnic essentialism*, as Ignatieff puts it, which works against those people who take up residence in an ethnic nationalist country but do not share its people’s ancestry, culture, or set of values. Immigrants in such countries are then put at structural disadvantages, socioeconomically and politically. Ignatieff offers a straightforward illustration of ethnic essentialist philosophy, describing the view of a right-leaning, rural politician. On the topic of why Turks born in Germany who worked and paid taxes their whole lives couldn’t become citizens, this politician remarked, “We are Germans. They are Turks.” From this perspective, being of a certain ethnicity “defines the limits of what [a person] can possibly know, understand, or sympathize with” (1994, p. 97). Interestingly, just its early experiences with *Aussiedler* were enough to change the German government’s approach to integration and citizenship. It has since restricted *Aussiedler* return migration and set up a much more formal introduction to German society for returnees, as their integration was not as smooth as anticipated. Additionally the legal citizenship requirements for other ethnic groups have expanded dramatically, moving Germany towards a more *civic nationalist* perspective and an attempt at a multicultural approach to integration (Joppke, 2007).

While Germany is better known, Switzerland may be the more interesting site of

differential exclusion, as it also has some element of assimilation. Switzerland has very stringent requirements for naturalization that persist into the 21<sup>st</sup> century (residency of at least twelve years, language fluency, effort to integrate into the labor market). As recently as 2004 Swiss voters rejected a policy that would ease the naturalization process for second and even third generation immigrants. Though voters in the last twenty years have also repeatedly rejected moves to substantially curb immigration, the changing demographics of the immigrant population in the country (from southern European guest workers to Muslim refugees) have set some citizens on edge, enough to ban [new] minarets from the country completely in 2009 (Cumming-Bruce & Erlanger, 2009).

**Assimilationism.** From a civic nationalist perspective, as Michael Ignatieff defines it, legitimate citizenship is not based on a national phenotype or religious heritage, but rather a belief that a nation is “a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values” (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 6; Mirel, 2010). This perspective informs Castles and Miller’s two other, more inclusive models of integration, though perhaps more so in official documents than in practice. The first of these is the assimilationist model, perhaps the best known exemplar of which is contemporary France, which welcomes immigrants into civil society to the extent that they are willing to surrender their culture, language, and social practices, and adopt—at least publicly—those of the dominant group. In assimilationist countries, the “role of the state is to create conditions favourable to this process, through insistence on use of the dominant language and attendance at normal schools for migrant children” (Castles & Miller, 2003, p. 250).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Here, ‘normal’ is meant as ‘regular,’ not as ‘teacher education.’

One of the major difficulties with this approach in historically Christian France is the predominance of Islam among recent waves of immigrants. Islam is a religion whose various interpretations result in different modes of dress, cultural habits, and, often, value systems from those of predominantly secular Europeans. Ostensibly, fair-skinned Europeans consider religion akin to a choice—one that could be made differently—and thus they see Muslims’ failure to adopt Christian values as problematic. As Samuel Huntington predicted, the differences between these two cultures has caused repeated problems between native French and first- through third-generation immigrants. These problems are not limited to local discrimination, but indeed in some instances are instigated by the government. In one illustrative example, beginning in the 1980s, debates occurred frequently about the relationship of Islam and the republican philosophy of *laïcité*, the separation of church and state in which the emphasis is on keeping the church out of state and individual affairs. These debates came to a head with the 2004 banning of the headscarf for Muslim schoolgirls, which is well detailed in Joan Scott’s 2007 book, *Politics of the Veil*. Studying the history and implications of the all-encompassing ban on “conspicuous signs of religious affiliation in public schools,” Scott describes the effective takeaway message this way: “it was either Islam or the republic” (p. 35).

As sociologist Stephen Castles and political scientist Mark Miller have written, “political inclusion of minorities and cultural pluralism can threaten national identity, especially in countries in which it has been constructed in exclusionary forms. If ideas of belonging to a nation have been based on myths of ethnic purity or of cultural superiority, then they really are threatened by the growth of ethnic diversity” (2003, p. 288). France

claims that its ‘universalist’ approach to identity—one in which the nation’s unity rests on “seeing each person only as an individual”—ensures that, to the republic, all French citizens are only French, with no other public communal identities (only private ones; Scott, 2007, p. 83). Yet clearly the publicly visible signs of the Islamic faith—without which Muslims could not be true to their faith—identified them as having a communal identity, and an objectionable one to the dominant group (Joppke, 2008). Oddly, government officials by the time of the headscarf ban saw no difficulty with their decision. Writes Joan Scott: “In the impeccable logic of former minister of education Bayrou: ‘The school is designed to integrate; therefore it must exclude.’ This was another way of saying that Muslims could never be French” (2007, p. 103).

While I have ascribed the ‘assimilation’ model of integration to southern Europe, one might call it assimilation by default, because immigrants were officially ignored there for several decades (Cangiano & Strozza, 2008; Lahav, 2004; Tsoukala, 1999). Italians’ realization that there was an economic need for immigrants in the 1990s led them to institute quota systems for regulating how many newcomers were allowed in. The country’s previous experience as a stopping point for north Africans on the way to northern Europe gave them a sense of where its borders were least secure and the likely numbers of arrivals, should immigrants have some economic incentive (Cangiano & Strozza, 2008, p. 156). These quotas, in addition to large flows across the Mediterranean of aspiring immigrants from places of unrest—Kurdish portions of Turkey and Iraq, Albania, and then-Yugoslavia—and from central Europe resulted in great difficulties with integration, because so many immigrants essentially ended up with illegal status (“Italy, Albania take measures to control illegal immigration,” 1995). In the last six



months, the country's proximity to northern Africa has once again made it a reluctant host to refugees from Libya's civil war, whom it has threatened to expel to other European countries (Squires, 2011).

In central Europe, immigration only became an issue once the USSR had fallen apart. Central European countries were then working toward membership in the EU, which made them attractive to people in eastern Europe and the Middle East who would have freedom of movement within the EU, were they to become citizens of a central European country (see, for example, "Millions want to come," 1998). These countries have not been exceptionally kind to or tolerant of immigrants, but neither have they enacted purely ethnicity-based citizenship laws. Whereas most of Czech Republic and Slovakia's immigrants tend to be, respectively, Slovak and Czech, because of the countries' former union, Hungary's immigrant population tends to be ethnically Hungarian and those immigrants are the ones who tend to acquire citizenship (Drbohlav, 2005; Juhász, 2003).

Recall that the process of integration is a two-way street: in countries concerned with assimilation, the challenge to immigrant or out-groups is whether to respond by assimilating. The obvious options are—at least in the public eye—to reduce conflict by assimilating or to reaffirm ethnic solidarity by retaining cultural, religious, and other traditions or markers, which may induce conflict (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). A number of European countries have deemed their assimilative approaches to be failures, evidenced by unequal treatment and life chances for minorities. To some, this is an argument for yet another model that perceives immigrants as an ethnic *community* to be celebrated—exemplifying the Contact theory—rather than an ethnic *minority* to be dealt

with—exemplifying the Conflict theory (Angenendt, Barrett, Laurence, Peach, Smith, & Winter, 2007; Castles & Miller, 2003). Castles and Miller (2003) claim that assimilationist policies in many countries—which themselves grew out of differential exclusion models—have evolved into somewhat more flexible integration models, wherein assimilation may be important in some sectors, while multiculturalism (described next) prevails in others, like education.

**Multiculturalism.** The second of Castles and Miller’s more inclusive integration methods is the multicultural model, which ideally allows immigrants many rights without the expectation that they give up their culture, language, or social practices, though they are expected to adopt common political and civic values and become competent in the dominant language. Multicultural education scholar James Banks believes that this is the ideal, returning to the idea of the two-way integration process. He sees this model as the one that most benefits the host society’s democracy, too:

Citizens should be able to maintain attachment to their cultural communities as well as participate effectively in the shared national culture. Cultural and ethnic communities need to be respected and given legitimacy not only because they provide safe spaces for ethnic, cultural, and language groups on the margins of society, but also because they serve as a conscience for the nation-state. These communities take action to force the nation to live up to its democratic ideals when they are most seriously violated. (2001, p. 7)

In practice, though, a state commitment to ensuring equality of opportunity and cultural preservation may or may not accompany a multicultural orientation toward acceptance and, generally, does not result in greater immigrant integration socially or economically. Christian Joppke writes that what some states have termed multiculturalism is actually “state neutrality”—openness to all religions without preference for or particular attention to any—and civic integration, focused on language

proficiency and skills for living in the host society (2008). While Sweden, Norway, and Denmark's multicultural policies have been to take responsibility for social justice for immigrant minorities, the United States is forever debating whether and how to do so (Castles & Miller, 2003, p. 252).

This model may well be perceived as the most just and humane, but in practice it has not worked out as politicians expected it to, i.e., with highly integrated immigrants. Germany's experiences, for example, following 2000 (the year that non-ethnic Germans gained access to German citizenship) have resulted in high level politicians proclaiming that multiculturalism has failed, that it is time to stop all immigration, and that immigrants do not want to be integrated (Dempsey, 2010a, 2010b). Similarly, in the Scandinavian welfare states, policies for redistribution of wealth and protection of those at society's margins have led to resentment on natives' part and actually greater difficulty for low-skilled workers to break into the labor market, reducing their chances of integration (Andersen, Larsen, & Møller, 2009; Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999). Best economic, social, and educational practices seemingly do not yet exist across the board and countries whose official integration practices were designed for equality, to be multicultural and tolerance-building, have backfired, leaving both immigrants and native people deeply dissatisfied (Angenendt et al., 2007; Caldwell, 2005; Ladd, Fiske, & Ruijs, 2010; New York Times, 2010). This is painfully obvious in the very recent murders in Oslo, Norway, perpetrated by a man who hated the multiculturalism that he felt had set Europe up for domination by conservative Islam (Erlanger & Shane, 2011).

The side effects of efforts at multiculturalism in Europe range across the public sphere. Dutch beliefs about freedom of choice in schooling have led to hugely

segregated urban schools, as native Dutch parents try to send their children to schools with lower proportions of “black”—immigrant or second generation—students because the quality of education is better (Ladd, Fiske, & Ruijs, 2010). Political rhetoric in Germany, at least officially tolerant in the early 2000s, has become more ethnicized and anti-immigrant. Race riots in northern England in the early 2000s turned public and political rhetoric away from multiculturalism, back toward assimilation (“Race 'segregation' caused riots,” 2001). In what used to be politically and ethnically homogeneous Sweden, “there is evidence of profound exhaustion with immigration,” for it has brought diversity, the lack of which had previously given a tolerant sheen to Sweden’s international image (Caldwell, 2005). Michael Ignatieff would argue that racism is at play in these complaints: “European racism is a form of white ethnic nationalism—indeed, it is a revolt against civic nationalism itself, against the very idea of a nation based in citizenship rather than ethnicity” (1994, p. 8). He might say that, for all the talk of accepting and respecting multiple cultures, groups that are different are referred to as separate and lesser, not integrated equals.

Dutch researcher Ruud Koopmans comes at this question from a different perspective, wherein he places the responsibility for the failure of multiculturalism at the intersection of the generous welfare state, easy access to equal rights, and weak incentives for intercultural contact. Using the European poster child for multiculturalism, the Netherlands, he claims that it is the fundamental tenet of multiculturalism—that all people have equal rights to practice their religion and hold to their cultural beliefs without judgment—that sets up countries to forego their own interest in maximizing access to the labor market in order to make ethnic minorities feel welcomed and respected. On top of

that, when, for example, a Muslim woman is declared unemployable because she wears a full face covering and clients would be unable to look her in the eye, a generous welfare state—one that does not base standards of living on employment—has just sentenced itself to subsidizing that woman’s subsistence for the rest of her life. As Koopmans writes, “That this is a choice she is willing to make is, in turn, related to the level of benefits in the Netherlands, which does not (in combination with other forms of aid for low incomes such as rent subsidies) condemn one to abject poverty” (2010, p. 5).

Overall, his study shows that in countries where multiculturalism was (at least at first) most strongly embraced, cultural rights were very generous, meaning that there were cultural provisions in public institutions (tolerance of the Muslim headscarf in schools, for example), allowances for non-Christian religious practices outside of public institutions, and special political representation rights. In countries with lower income inequality *and* generous social benefits that disincentivize work, investments in employability like language learning, or interactions with non-co-ethnics, immigrants are least integrated into the fabric of society. Though he concedes that multiculturalism may have had positive effects on political participation, Koopmans suggests that a less generous welfare state, or one that hitches citizenship to national language proficiency and independent economic status, is more likely to result in better socioeconomically integrated immigrant populations (2010).

### **3.1.3 Immigrants’ Political Integration**

Modern nation-states are aware that the sustainability of a national identity is at risk where globalization is at work. Diverse populations that move often and have

multinational affiliations may undermine the state's link between nationality and citizenship (Castles, 2004). While this can be difficult for countries to accept, immigrants are highly likely to have multinational affiliations and multiple identities associated with those affiliations. As Castles and Miller write, those immigrants with multilayered sociocultural identities "frequently develop a consciousness of their transcultural position, which is reflected not only in their artistic and cultural work, but also in social and political action" (2003, p. 289). Multiple identities obtain, moreover, regardless of legal status, and are very much affected by the culture of the host country, including national institutions and native people's attitudes towards newcomers. This is the source of my interest in immigrant students' attitudes toward their host country. Interestingly, interviews with adult immigrants in the US suggest their loyalty to and respect for the host country is as strong as, if not stronger than, that of native-born people (Bittle & Rochkind, 2009; Mirel, 2010). In France, Neto (1995) found a strong association between satisfaction with life in the host country and feelings of integration among Portuguese adolescents, while in Germany, Dita Vogel (2006) has found mostly positive views of Europe as an immigrant-receiving region among young, non-EU immigrant adults.

If many immigrants are happy with their new countries, why be concerned with whether they and their descendants are integrated politically in democracies, especially if they do not constitute a large proportion of the total citizenry? The answer lies in the question itself: democracy is a form of governance by the people, and as such, since immigrants constitute some percentage of the people, the government ought to represent the interests of those people. Leave out of this discussion, then, the question of whether

democratic governments ought to invite immigrants in or allow them to stay, and focus on the problem of incorporating into political and civil society people whose linguistic skills and cultural norms may otherwise inhibit their social integration.

A number of researchers find that participation in political and civic activities is not particularly low in immigrant groups. This is not to say that immigrants are necessarily any more likely to be involved in politics or civic volunteerism, but rather that, given the opportunity to participate, there are few within-community differences between immigrants and natives in their participation. Knowing that European countries are conscious of immigrants' multinational affiliations, Ukrainian economist Mariya Aleksynska studied whether it was the culture of civic participation in the *host* country or the country of *origin* that had a greater effect on first-generation immigrants' civic participation. Using 2002-2005 data from the European Social Survey, she found that civic participation levels in the host country had a stronger influence on immigrants' participation than did participation levels in the country of origin. In other words, high participation in the host country was significantly influential on immigrants, resulting in high levels of their participation, as well. Aleksynska argues that "It is by observing what natives do, that immigrants tend to do the same" (2007, p. 28). This is a compelling finding that I explore in this study of adolescents, as well.

Jennifer Hochschild and John Mollenkopf agree in part with the above findings, remarking that "many demographic traits associated with political activity among native-born people are also associated with immigrants' political activity. Such traits include race, gender, education, homeownership, occupation, language ability, marital status, and age" (2009, p. 18). But they also remind readers that discrimination—actual or

perceived—tends to inhibit political action. Since first-generation immigrants are less likely to be comfortable with the host society's language and customs, they are more likely to be on the receiving end of discriminatory remarks and practices. In the introduction to their book on immigrants' political incorporation on both sides of the Atlantic, Mollenkopf and Hochschild claim that the first-generation experience should not be taken as representative of an immigrant group's political or civic assimilation, a point I am conscious of in my study of first-generation school-age immigrants:

By definition, most adult members of the first generation spent their formative years outside the host country and resocialization as an adult can be difficult and painful. Their children, the immigrant 1.5 and second generations, have much greater potential for incorporation. The trajectory of immigrant assimilation therefore depends on whether the children in the second generation can close their parents' gaps in achievement and participation and fully join their host societies, adding their own flavors, or whether they will also be blocked from opportunities and will turn into angry, alienated, and troublesome ethnic or racial minorities. (2009, p. 10)

**The general political and social context.** All discussion of how immigrants are socialized into the political and civic environment must be considered in light of a general decline in trust of national institutions and politicians, as well as a decrease in feelings of national unity among native citizens (Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). Recall from Chapter 1, however, that findings from the World Values Survey suggest that trust in national institutions and characters is far less important for the maintenance and consolidation of democracy than self-expression values. Indeed, though other researchers have found ethnic minority youth and adults in the US to trust government less (Flanagan et al., 2007), this lower level of trust is not a strong indicator of how supportive they are of democratic ideals. More likely it is related to their treatment or perceived treatment by governmental agencies or policies.



Altogether, this makes a study of immigrant adolescents' attitudes toward ethnic minorities', immigrants', and women's rights important because it will shed light on some of the attitudes most essential for the consolidation of democracy across societies. If immigrants in Western democracies hold different values regarding these traditionally marginalized groups' rights and opportunities, then to some extent, schools and the rest of society have potential to influence those values toward more pro-democratic ends.

### **3.2 Immigrants in Schools**

As a state-mandated institution, schools have nearly universal access to the population during an influential developmental stage. Furthermore, as I noted in Chapter 2, schools are in a position to be valuable institutions for bringing immigrant students into contact with the general population, national history, and the nation's sociocultural, democratic values. How immigrants experience education depends heavily, however, on their own characteristics, the national model of integration, and local circumstances, all of which I review. In most countries, educational policy is—at least officially—inclined toward a civic nationalist approach to immigrants' children (national identity by commitment to civic values), regardless of the society's view on adult immigrants.<sup>16</sup> Just as Horace Mann believed, political and educational leaders of most societies claim that education can make newcomers into good citizens. Unfortunately, most findings on immigrant students' school experiences are not positive.

In 2003, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) conducted a comparative, international study, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), whose results suggested that immigrant children are underserved

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<sup>16</sup> See Appendix B for greater detail on the meaning of 'civic nationalism.'

educationally in most subject areas, including science, mathematics, and literacy. Particularly salient is that their lower achievement is more pronounced in western Europe than in countries founded on immigration, i.e., former British territories like the US, Australia, and Canada (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006; Schnepf, 2007). Subsequent administrations of the PISA also suggest that immigrants are more likely to drop out and tend to repeat school years more often (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010, p. 33). This is problematic because it is well known that lower school achievement and educational attainment have negative consequences for immigrants' socioeconomic, cultural, civic, and political integration as adults (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Faist, 1995; Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006).<sup>17</sup> Seemingly the only positive findings in the PISA study were that there is no association between the number of immigrant students nationwide and the performance differences between immigrants and native-born students (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009), and that immigrant students have more or similarly positive attitudes toward school (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006).

**Student characteristics affecting educational outcomes.** Immigrant students' outcomes are consistently highly correlated with their socioeconomic status (including their parents' level of education and immigrant status), age at migration, and native language (DeFeyter & Winsler, 2010; Rumbaut, 2004; Schnepf, 2007). Recall from Chapter 2 that both socioeconomic status and verbal ability are positively associated with

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<sup>17</sup> Researchers find high dropout rates among certain groups of immigrant students in Europe, especially Turks (Joppke, 2007). Reasons for dropout include low academic achievement, a desire to work instead, family need, or cultural reasons, and they often vary by immigrant group. For example, while Turkish girls may do well in school, they are more likely than Moroccan girls to drop out in order to marry (Crul & Schneider, 2009).

greater civic knowledge and participation (Hahn, 1998; Nie & Hillygus, 2001; Patrick & Hoge, 1991). These findings do not bode well for the experiences and civic behaviors of immigrant students in any country, as immigrants are typically at the low end of the socioeconomic spectrum, and also tend to be non-native speakers of the host country's language.

A student's age at migration is clearly related to her time in the new country, which in turn affects her exposure to the dominant national culture. The ability to learn the host country's language is also wrapped up in a student's age at migration, as those who arrive earlier in life have the neurological capacity to learn the language better (Birdsong, 1999). Speaking a language other than that of the host country's dominant group is problematic precisely because the dominant group's language is typically the language of instruction and success in that country. Without the ability to communicate with those in power, immigrants remain without power. Each of these facts is an important consideration in my study, as it is likely that these elements affect an immigrant student's acquisition of civic knowledge and enculturation into pro-democratic attitudes.

Proficiency in the school language is a strong determinant of academic achievement *and* social integration (Schnepf, 2007; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008). In homes where parents do not speak the school language, students only get practice in the school language *at school*, which, in a secondary analysis of the 2003 PISA data, Gayle Christensen and Petra Stanat (2007) found puts immigrant students even further behind their native-born peers in school. Of course, as youth are wont to learn the school language quickly in order to communicate with peers, "[s]chool-

age children usually ... become fluent in the new language faster than their parents,” the problem with this being that “difficulties may arise in communicating with their parents, whose affective language is different than theirs. ... [T]he mother tongue is a vital link to the norms of the immigrant’s homeland, and an inadequate mastery of it represents a disruption of relationships with the original culture and parents” (Coll & Magnuson, 1997, pp. 106, 111). If students are able to learn the host country’s language without losing their parents’ language, most researchers see that multilingualism as an asset in the long term, allowing students to learn better, be better integrated into society, and thus have more economic opportunities in an increasingly globalized world (Mancilla-Martinez & Kieffer, 2010). Consequently, those students who speak a non-school language at home *sometimes* may in fact be in a better position academically and even civically than those who speak only their parents’ or the school’s language at home.

**School characteristics related to achievement and integration.** The schools immigrant students attend can have large influences on their integration into society and their academic achievement. I present just a few here that I am able to take into consideration in this study.<sup>18</sup> First, the socioeconomic composition of the school: lower overall SES tends to entail fewer material resources and, often, lower-quality human resources (i.e., worse teachers; Willms, 2006). While poor students tend not to do as well in school as more affluent students generally, results from PISA 2000 and 2002 showed that there is a compounding problem for immigrants: there is a stronger effect of being of low socioeconomic status (SES) and attending a low SES school than of being of high

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<sup>18</sup> There are many other school characteristics that researchers have found to be consequential for immigrants’ academic achievement and social integration, but which I cannot address in my study. See Appendix B, Section 2, for the research on residential segregation, differential funding schemes for schools, language policies, and educational tracking systems.

SES and attending a high SES school. This is to say that where immigrants—most often of low socioeconomic status—already score lower than native students on mathematics, reading, and science assessments, their scores drop even lower if their schools are composed primarily of other students with low socioeconomic status (Willms, 2006, p. 49).

In more ethnically homogeneous schools (either with few native or few immigrant students)—a common occurrence resulting from residential segregation—immigrants then have fewer interactions with native peers, which, according to Contact theory, reduces immigrants' exposure to majority culture and thus their likelihood of positive social integration. Additionally, it reduces native students' exposure to ethnic minorities and, thus, the likelihood that they develop tolerant social attitudes toward members of those minorities (Hjerm, 2005).

Beyond the effect of ethnic heterogeneity, since James S. Coleman and colleagues' report in 1966 on the equality of educational opportunity in America, we have known that the characteristics of students' peers have *some* influence on their academic outcomes (not as much as individual characteristics like SES), and numerous studies since then have reinforced the finding that placement in classes with high-achieving or socially advantaged peers is particularly valuable for students from disadvantaged social backgrounds and with low achievement (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Mood, Weinfeld, & York, 1966, pp. 302-304; Schneeweis, 2009).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> The Coleman report found that primarily it is students' own socioeconomic background that is most strongly related to academic achievement, but out of all the school-based characteristics he and his colleagues considered, peers' characteristics were most strongly related.

### **3.3 Civic Education Experiences and Pro-Democratic Attitudes of Immigrant Adolescents**

I have laid out the characteristics of immigrants and their schools that are related to overall achievement and integration, many of which I hypothesize are similarly related to their civic knowledge, participation, and pro-democratic attitudes. Now, though, it is important to present more specific findings on exactly those outcomes for immigrant adolescents, especially in the context of civic education. There are not many studies written for an international audience (i.e., that reads English or French) of civic education for immigrants or of adolescent immigrants' developing social attitudes in Europe. While there are numerous studies of the 'integration' or 'adaptation' of immigrants in European schools, these focus on social integration and cultural or ethnic identity, rather than on civic attitudes (Sabatier, 2008; Strohmeier & Schmitt-Rodermund, 2008). There is a large amount of work on immigrant students' experiences with civic education and general political socialization in the United States and Canada, though. These studies find that immigrant students trust the government less and are less patriotic, know less about the civic and political realms, and have fewer traditional citizenship-oriented skills than their native counterparts, though they participate in community service slightly more often (Callahan, Muller, & Schiller, 2008; Flanagan et al., 2007; Levinson, 2007). This said, while many characteristics are shared between immigrants to North American and European countries (linguistic and cultural differences from the dominant group, primarily, and parents with lower educational levels), we should not expect that the civic education experiences and attitudes of immigrants in European countries are the same as those of immigrants to North American countries founded on immigration.

Since much of the research that does exist on immigrants' civic education

experiences and political attitudes in Europe (and elsewhere, for that matter) is based on CIVED data (the same data I use), I highlight those studies in this review, giving particular attention to those whose methods or hypotheses I extend in this study. The analyses that exist offer a number of salient findings, though they are limited in scope. In the first Europe-only report on the data, Judith Torney-Purta, Chair of the IEA International Steering Committee, noted only this: “[being] an immigrant also appears to be a salient identity for many of these students. In those countries with large enough numbers of immigrants to compute a stable attitude estimate, those born outside the country had more positive attitudes to immigrants and their rights than those born in the country” (2002, p. 138). Subsequent studies have elaborated on this rather intuitive finding, but there is still much more to be learned from these data about how immigrant students perceive their host countries and democracy.

In addition to CIVED-based studies, there are several others that address immigrant youths’ sociopolitical integration or knowledge using qualitative or economic data. These perspectives are useful complements to those derived from educational survey data. I first discuss the characteristics of immigrants themselves (primarily just immigrant status) that are related to pro-democratic attitudes, then review how the educational environment influences those attitudes and civic knowledge, and finally present studies on the influence of the national context for education and integration.

### **3.3.1 Immigrant Status, Civic Knowledge and Participation, and Pro-Democratic Attitudes**

In Sweden, using nationally representative survey data (though not CIVED data), Mikael Hjerm found that immigrant students are less knowledgeable about civics, but

also less xenophobic than native-born students, a somewhat intuitive finding if one considers their experience on the other side of xenophobia (2005). In Belgium, Ellen Quintelier investigated the political participation of immigrant adolescents, to see whether the pattern reflects that of adult immigrants. Using survey data from 15- and 16-year-olds in Dutch- and French-speaking Belgium, Ellen Quintelier (2009) found that these young people are no less likely to participate in civic and political activities than adult immigrants, and in fact that citizenship status has no effect on this likelihood. Interestingly, strong identification with co-ethnics, viewing ethnic-group-oriented television programs, and religion are unrelated to this outcome, though the die-hard characteristics of gender, native language ('mother tongue'), and socioeconomic status do predict differential rates of participation (girls participate more, those who don't speak the dominant regional language at home participate less, and those of low SES participate less).

Supporting these findings, Tijana Prokic and Jaap Dronkers used CIVED data in eleven western countries (ten European) and found no difference between immigrants' and native students' participation in school- or community-based groups (2010). They do find consistently strong negative attitudes towards the host country from all immigrant students, and fairly consistently negative attitudes toward women's economic and political rights, though this finding was dependent on the country of residence. However, across their analyses, they find no significant differences in attitudes between immigrants who speak the school language at home and those who don't, nor between second-generation students who were born in the country and first-generation students who arrived before or after age 6.



### **3.3.2 Educational Environment and Immigrants' Civic Knowledge and Values**

**Ethnic heterogeneity.** Contributing to the literature on Conflict vs. Contact theory, two studies based on Swedish data examine the influence of ethnic heterogeneity on immigrants' and natives' tolerance of out-groups. Hjerm's 2005 study suggested that the 'density' of immigrants in a school was not significantly associated with native students' level of xenophobia, which fails to support the Contact theory. That is to say, greater opportunities to 'mix' with students of other ethnic groups and cultures do not decrease the risk of prejudice. In contrast, and using CIVED data, Andrej Kokkonen, Peter Esaiasson, and Mikael Gilljam found more mixed results for the effect of ethnic heterogeneity (2008). The researchers determined that in schools with ethnically diverse student populations, students tend to know less about civics and democracy than students in more ethnically homogeneous schools, but supported Hjerm's findings with no correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and tolerance towards immigrants' rights. They did find that immigrant students in ethnically heterogeneous schools tend to have higher confidence in their own rights (as immigrants) in a democracy than those in less heterogeneous schools. Additionally, students in ethnically heterogeneous classrooms seem to be more trusting of Swedish governmental institutions than those in ethnically homogeneous classrooms.

**Instructional methods.** Returning to Chapter 2's review of the characteristics of civics classrooms that are positively related to student outcomes, I suggest that teaching methods may be especially important determinants of minority students' civic outcomes, whose 'otherness' may otherwise distance them from feelings of rights, respect, and civic responsibilities (Flanagan & Faison, 2001; Koh, 2010). Students of different

demographic backgrounds do not necessarily have similar opportunities to experience open, discussion-based classes, though. Using US CIVED data, Torney-Purta and Wilkenfeld found that black and immigrant students are less likely to experience an interactive civic education (2009, p. 18). Another American scholar, Fernando Reimers, used the same data, looking specifically at the experiences of first- and second-generation Latino immigrants (born abroad and born in the US, respectively). His results showed that regardless of their immigrant status, Latinos experience differential instruction in civic principles and have differential exposure to extracurricular opportunities to build skills in civic participation and responsible civic thinking. However, while he finds that the gap in civic knowledge between immigrant and US-born Latino students is large, the relationship between civic instruction and civic knowledge is greater for immigrants. This suggests that schools “can add greater civic value to those who have been first socialized in other political cultures” (2005, p. 2).

Constance Flanagan and her colleagues support this finding, but extend it to all US minority groups (2007). These researchers found that an open classroom climate built up students’ sense of community and increased the likelihood that students identified their teachers’ practices as fair and respectful. Through these pathways, the patterns of influence on white and ethnic minority students were the same. Moreover, the models Flanagan et al. used explained somewhat more variance in minority students’ attitudes about a) America as a just country and b) their responsibility for acting to improve society, suggesting that an open classroom climate is indeed an even more important factor in minority students’ attitude development (p. 428).

**Controversial discussions.** Recall from Chapter 2 that several scholars have

identified ‘controversial discussions’ as experiences in civics that are especially salient for young people (Hahn, 1991, 1998; D. E. Hess, 2009). I have found just one Europe-based study that includes immigrants’ experiences with controversial discussions. Frans Doppen’s brief case study of teachers’ approaches to discussion of recent political assassinations only superficially touches on immigrant experiences in an urban school in the Netherlands (2007). He focuses on discussions of the assassinations of conservative politician Pim Fortuyn and filmmaker Theo van Gogh. The study also examines teachers’ views on how the civic education curriculum has or should have been changed in light of those murders.<sup>20</sup> In interviews, teachers remarked on the degree to which their immigrant or immigrant-background students (primarily Muslim) benefited or not from these discussions, especially given the ethnically heterogeneous makeup of the school. Teachers had mixed views of the value of discussing such violent events, especially in light of Muslim student discomfort with being associated with the violence. One teacher was particularly negative about it because of some Muslim students’ hostile response (described by Doppen as “a riot”) to her presentation of the topic (p. 112). Doppen does not include descriptions of these classes and the teachers’ framing of the discussion, so how much these data can actually say about immigrant students’ experiences with civic education is limited.

### **3.3.3 National Characteristics and Immigrants’ Civic Knowledge and Values**

**Size of the immigrant population.** Prokic and Dronkers were interested in whether the size of the immigrant population in a country made a difference in

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<sup>20</sup> While Van Gogh was killed by a Moroccan Muslim fundamentalist, Fortuyn—whose anti-immigrant views were very outspoken—was assassinated by a native, non-Muslim Dutch activist. Both of these public figures were associated with anti-Muslim sentiments.

adolescents' civic attitudes, and while they found that certain countries had smaller immigrant/native differences in attitudes toward immigrants, they found no relationship between those attitudes and their indicator for the size of the immigrant population in these countries.<sup>21</sup> That finding supports previous studies of other areas of academic achievement and integration. Recall that Holdaway, Crul, and Roberts found no association between the number of immigrant students in a country and performance differences between native and immigrant students on reading and mathematics assessments (2009).

**Language policies.** In studying educational policies concerning citizenship and democratic education in the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, Norwegian comparativist Heidi Biseth speculates on the implications of those policies for immigrant students (2009). These societies are increasingly diverse, with large numbers of immigrants, and she gives some thought to how education legislation and regulations might affect immigrants. Policies for instruction in the school language (immigrants' second language) explicitly relate linguistic competency to competency in civic participation. But in multilingual Europe, schools do not offer instruction only in the dominant language: they tend to offer other European languages, as well, most often French, German, and Spanish, which are decidedly not the languages of most immigrants to those countries. The absence of instruction in prominent immigrant languages is a subtle message to immigrant students that their languages are not valued, which may further alienate them from the civil sphere (p. 249).<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Measured according to the number of immigrant students in each country's CIVED sample.

<sup>22</sup> Biseth also notes that Norwegian schools are required to have student councils, and expresses concern that immigrant students may be less involved in these school-sponsored opportunities for democratic

**National curriculum.** A very recent (2011) study focused on social cohesion and harmony makes use of CIVED data in conversation with a data set—compiled by French researcher Nathalie Mons—that documents educational policies and system characteristics in OECD and some developing countries. The study is meant, in part, to determine whether a national curriculum is associated with smaller disparities between schools and between ethnic minority and ethnic majority students in tolerance of immigrants and patriotism. What Jan Janmaat and Ms. Mons find is a compelling story of the damage that “territorial differentiation” (decentralized curriculum, assessment, and teacher education control) can do to a sense of national unity and to ethnic tolerance in increasingly diverse countries.

In particular Janmaat and Mons find that greater central control of curriculum and assessment is associated with smaller disparities between majority and minority students in ethnic tolerance, suggesting that minority students are integrated enough with majority students that the *latter* are just as supportive of immigrants’ rights.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, they find that countries with greater central control have smaller disparities in patriotic attitudes because there is great uniformity in the representation of a national identity. They claim that this centralization results in low disparities between students by “preventing segregation and maintaining a commonality of values across schools” (Janmaat & Mons, 2011, p. 77).

Thus, even in countries where civics and citizenship are not unique academic subjects, but instead are expected to be “woven” through the rest of the social, historical,

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practice than native students because of lesser comfort with the school language and, thus, less knowledge of such opportunities (2009, p. 251).

<sup>23</sup> These researchers operationalize status as an ethnic minority as speaking a non-school language at home sometimes or always.

and economic curriculum, an otherwise national curriculum could conceivably result in immigrants having attitudes similar to those of their native-born peers, since the content to which they are exposed is the same. Of course, while these researchers find no association of ethnic diversity with patriotism, those European countries with stronger national curricula also tend to be more racially and ethnically homogeneous (consider Greece and Norway), which could affect majority students' attitudes toward immigrants and vice versa, especially given that students in classes with greater ethnic diversity have significantly lower levels of minority tolerance (2011, pp. 70, 73).

**National affluence.** Austrian economist Nicole Schneeweis (2009) finds that a nation's relative level of affluence is negatively associated with immigrant students' mathematics and science achievement. These findings present an interesting frame for the part of my study that addresses national affluence's association with civic attitudes. If indeed immigrant students achieve at lower academic levels in relatively wealthier countries, then they may experience disaffection with the school system and native peers who achieve higher, drop out of school and turn toward their ethnic group, away from the dominant group or culture, which may lead to less inclusive civic attitudes.

**Economic inequality.** In Chapter 2 I hypothesized a relationship between economic inequality and civic attitudes for the general populace. Here I expand that hypothesis to have an 'immigrant component.' First, one viewpoint comes from CIVED researchers Hoskins, Barber, Van Nijlen, and Villalba, who suggest (but do not empirically study) that in countries with greater income equality, it is likely that immigrants' and native people's civic attitudes are more similar, since even immigrants at the lower end of the income scale might have material situations and social benefits

that are similar to native people's situations (2011). Recall that sociologist Lane Kenworthy agrees, hypothesizing, "A society with less dispersion between those at the bottom and those at the top may be characterized by greater social harmony and solidarity" (p. 120). Indeed these hypotheses are supported by Wilkinson and Pickett's recent (2011) findings that citizens of countries with lower income inequality also express higher levels of social trust, and by Schneeweis's findings that higher income inequality is associated with lower immigrant achievement in math and science (2009).

However, Dutch researcher Ruud Koopmans provides some jarring evidence that contradicts these theories and findings. He looks at immigrant integration in countries with various degrees of income inequality, but *also* various degrees of social benefits, from the fairly austere Portugal to the highly generous welfare state of the Netherlands. Koopmans' argument, explained in greater detail in Appendix B.1.3, is that immigrants are least integrated into the fabric of society in countries with low income inequality *and* generous social benefits that disincentivize work, investments in employability like language learning, or interactions with non-co-ethnics. Though he concedes that such social benefits may have had positive effects on political participation, Koopmans suggests that a less generous welfare state, or one that hitches citizenship to national language proficiency and independent economic status, is more likely to result in better socioeconomically integrated immigrant populations (2010). He finds that immigrants are better integrated—more language proficient, more likely to be employed and thus interacting with native people—in countries like Portugal, where economic inequality is higher and state-offered social benefits are fewer (2010). Given Koopmans', Kenworthy's, and Schneeweis' findings, it is likely that income inequality has a

moderating effect on differences in civic attitudes between immigrant students and their native-born peers. It is not clear what that effect is, though I hypothesize that Koopmans' theory is more applicable to the pro-democratic attitudes I study in this dissertation.

### **3.4 Gaps in the Literature and Research Questions**

In this chapter I have shown that, while we know much about immigrants and their general schooling experiences, we know significantly less about their opportunities in Europe to learn about democracy and develop its concomitant social and political attitudes. A number of studies using the CIVED data set have begun to flesh out where immigrant students are on the spectra of democratic attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors, but there is much more to be done with these data, especially with country- and classroom-level information, to determine whether civics and citizenship attitudes are yet more subject areas in which European countries need to address immigrant children's less desirable levels of 'achievement.'

As an example, though Prokic and Dronkers' CIVED-based study examines individual and national characteristics' relationships to several civic outcomes, there are several drawbacks to their design. 1) They do not include school characteristics. 2) When they analyze national-level characteristics, they look at each country separately, which prevents them from making direct statistical cross-national comparisons.

The other study whose design most resembles mine, but which I extend considerably, is Janmaat and Mons' investigation of the relationship of a national curriculum with differences in ethnic groups' patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants. The theoretical frame for these questions is the importance of social cohesion in



increasingly diverse countries. I argue that my perspective—the maintenance of democracy—has a different thrust than social cohesion, which is mainly adherence to a “common overarching national identity” (2011, p. 57).

Accordingly, I now pose several questions whose answers I believe will contribute to filling the gaps and resolving some of the conflicting findings in the literature. I look first at students’ overall civic knowledge and participation, patriotism, and several self-expression values: their attitudes toward women’s, immigrants’, and ethnic minorities’ rights. Along with overall ‘levels’ of these civic outcomes, I am interested in disparities between immigrants and native-born students, and the characteristics of students themselves that are associated with those differences. I also explore how progressive educational methods in schools and national systems for controlling curriculum moderate overall levels and immigrant/native disparities.

I have phrased these questions with the immigrant/native disparity in mind, and posed them according to the ‘site’ at which the independent variables (predictors) of interest are measured: first students themselves, then schools, then countries. The structure of the questions also mirrors the structure of the data and analytical techniques that I use to answer them. Along with each question I have briefly noted some hypotheses, all of which get more complete treatment in results chapters.

### **3.4.1 Research Question 1: Student Characteristics**

What are European adolescents’ overall levels of civic knowledge, civic participation, patriotism, and self-expression values (attitudes toward rights for traditionally marginalized groups—women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities)? To what

extent do immigrants and native-born adolescents differ on these civic outcomes?

- Demographics: To what extent are overall levels and any immigrant/native differences associated with ...
  - the amount of time students have lived in the country?
  - their home language?
- Civic-related characteristics: To what extent are overall civic outcomes associated with ...
  - their civic knowledge?
  - extracurricular participation?
  - perceptions of an open classroom climate?

On attitudes toward ethnic minorities' and immigrants' rights, I am interested in the level of support from immigrant students, which I predict to be higher than native students' because of in-group solidarity. However, the more interesting focus here is in fact *native-born* students' attitudes toward immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights, and how those attitudes are moderated by other characteristics. Since native students are the majority of society, their opinions and values have somewhat greater weight in the political and cultural sphere, and their degree of tolerance for minority rights is thus very important.

Otherwise, based on the literature on immigrants' academic outcomes and their life circumstances, their knowledge and interpretive skills in civics are likely to be lesser than their native peers', as is their affective connection to their host country. Without being able to say for certain that the immigrants I study are indeed from non-western cultures, I hypothesize that immigrants' attitudes toward women's rights are less positive

because of more traditional gender roles in those cultures, though their participation in civic-oriented groups may be similar. Based on other studies of immigrants' characteristics, I hypothesize that immigrants whose home language matches that of the school and who have been in the host country longer are more similar to their native peers. Finally it is likely that, overall, students with greater civic knowledge, who are more active in extracurricular activities, and perceive a more open classroom climate are less xenophobic and thus have cultural values more characterized by self-expression than survival.

### **3.4.2 Research Question 2: Schools**

To what extent are European adolescents' overall civic outcomes related to their educational environments, and to differences between immigrants and native students on these outcomes?

Specifically, how are the following characteristics related to these civic outcomes?

- instructional methods (discussion-based vs. traditional lecture/note-taking)
- ethnic heterogeneity (the immigrant population)
- average family educational resources (average and range of books in students' homes)

Finding that the relationship between immigrant status and civic outcomes is weaker in certain educational contexts would be somewhat encouraging because it would suggest that immigrant students are not uniformly destined to be civic outsiders. Rather, immigrants' educational contexts help to weave them into the 'social fabric.' The most

salient feature of schools to policymakers is instructional methods. Reimers (2005) and Torney-Purta and Wilkenfeld (2009) found differences between US black, Latino, and white students' civic knowledge and attitudes based on whether they were taught by teachers who used open, discussion-based, student-oriented methods. It is likely that, similarly, smaller knowledge and value disparities are found between immigrants and native students in such open classrooms in Europe.

I consider school averages of families' educational resources as proxies, albeit weak ones, for the socioeconomic composition of schools, which has been cited repeatedly in studies as an indicator of the quality of material and intellectual resources to which students have access. I also consider the range within schools of students' number of books at home as a proxy for socioeconomic inequality. That and the proportion of immigrants in a school are signs of social class and interethnic mixing which, if one extends the Contact and Conflict theories, may either enhance or reduce social cohesion and tolerance.

### **3.4.3 Research Question 3: National Characteristics**

To what extent are characteristics of the countries in which adolescents reside related to overall civic outcomes, as well as differences in civic knowledge, participation, and self-expression values between immigrant and native students?

Specifically, how are the following national characteristics related to students' civic outcomes?

- system of curricular control (most centralized to most decentralized)
- relative affluence

- relative degree of income inequality

Based on the work of Janmaat and Mons (2011), we know that in countries with more centralized curricular control, levels of patriotism and support for immigrants' rights are more similar between ethnic minority students and their ethnic majority peers. I hypothesize that my data will support these findings and extend them to other self-expression values, though the focus is on immigrants—not ethnic minorities in general. Previous studies have shown that national affluence is negatively related both to adolescents' overall civic participation and academic achievement. Though there are two schools of thought on the relationship of economic inequality to social cohesion and thus immigrant integration (Kenworthy, 2004; Koopmans, 2010), I hypothesize that in nations with greater income inequality, there are smaller immigrant/native disparities in civic knowledge, values, and behavior.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Data and Methods**

The previous chapters have detailed what researchers know about the influence of civic education and other forms of political socialization on adolescents' civic knowledge and behaviors, and pro-democratic attitudes; how immigrant students' personal characteristics and teachers' expectations influence their school experiences and some of their democratic inclinations; and the educational systems, and history and status of immigrants in contemporary Europe. Based on this literature, I have posed several questions whose answers will contribute to an increasingly rich picture of how immigrant adolescents' characteristics and environments influence their civic values and practices in different European countries. With this chapter I describe the design for a study that begins to answer these questions and improves on the existing research in three ways. First, it uses multilevel analytical techniques to answer two multilevel questions: how do characteristics of school and national contexts relate to the civic outcomes of adolescents—especially immigrants—within those contexts? Second, it complements individual, country-by-country analyses of school features with a larger analysis of countries' combined data that allows me to make cross-national comparisons and contribute to the development of an overarching, international theory of how national-level characteristics are related to the civic-related qualities of students. Third, it


investigates the relationship of national and school characteristics with several self-expression values that have not previously been explored in European adolescent populations.

#### **4.1 Theoretical Model**

You will recall from Chapter 1 that the theoretical model displayed in Figure 4-1 was created by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) expressly for designing the CIVED 1999 survey, which I discuss in greater detail beginning on page 99. I take several of its features into consideration in my study.

In my study, the qualities of students I am looking to measure—my six dependent variables or civic outcomes—are civic knowledge, participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities, patriotism, and attitudes toward the rights of women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities. The student at the center of the theoretical model has unique demographic characteristics and an identity as a student and civic actor that provide the information for addressing research question 1. In particular, RQ 1 puts special emphasis on the differences between immigrants and native-born students. Moving outward from there to the inner circle of ‘social actors,’ I address research question 2 with information about the educational environment: teachers’ instructional methods, ethnic heterogeneity, and socioeconomic composition in schools. Finally, for research question 3, I move to the octagonal perimeter, where high-level contextual features influence everything inside the model. Here I look at national socioeconomic stratification (for this study’s purposes, income inequality), economic process (as proxied

for with Gross National Income, which to some degree reflects industrial development), and educational values (as represented by the national system for designing and disseminating curriculum).



**Figure 4-1. Theoretical model for IEA’s study.**

Note. From “IEA Civic Education Study technical report,” by W. Schulz & H. Sibberns (Eds.), 2004, Amsterdam, p. 11. Copyright 2004 by IEA. Reprinted with permission.

Within research questions I specify the characteristics of individuals, schools, and countries in which I am most interested. Variables that operationalize each of these characteristics, including that for immigrant status, are required to address these questions. In addition, I include statistical controls for three potentially confounding variables at the individual level: gender, age, and number of books in the home (a proxy for socioeconomic status). I control for gender because of literature suggesting that girls



are more likely to express interest in community-oriented activities (Flanagan et al., 2007; Husfeldt, Barber, & Torney-Purta, 2005; Metz, McLellan, & Youniss, 2003) and tend to be more tolerant of marginalized groups and their rights (Sotelo, 1997). I control for age for three reasons: 1) it is related to how much experience one has with the world, and may influence a student's attitudes or knowledge just by maturation; 2) it can reflect grade retention (being held back); and 3) older students tend to be more tolerant of more extreme activist's rights, like abortion advocates' protests (Sotelo, 1997).

I control for the number of books in students' homes—as a proxy for socioeconomic status—because study after study finds a strong association between socioeconomic status (SES) and civic participation, knowledge, and social tolerance.<sup>24</sup> Among adults and adolescents, more affluent and educated people tend to participate more, and indeed, as Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Grady found in their 1990s study of American adults, parental education (a common indicator of SES) has a significant effect on political information and involvement in high school activities, largely because parents with more education tend to be more involved in and knowledgeable about politics and civic issues themselves (1995).

#### **4.2 Student Data Source: CIVED 1999**

To address my questions, I primarily make use of data from the IEA's Civic Education (CIVED) study of 1999, a large-scale, nationally representative survey of adolescent achievement in and attitudes about civics.

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<sup>24</sup> I discuss the limitation of this proxy measure in greater detail shortly.

#### 4.2.1 Strengths of the Data

These data are the best available on this topic to date.<sup>25</sup> CIVED is similar to IEA's better known Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and Progress in International Reading and Literacy Study (PIRLS), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Though the following was said of PISA, it is applicable to each of these other studies, as well. They are all:

policy-oriented, designed and guided by an international steering committee to provide regular data pertaining to the most pressing policy issues confronting educational administrators and policymakers around the world. They include considerable information on the family and school factors that contribute to school performance in each country. (Willms, 2006, p. 8)

This study was conducted in over 100 schools in each of 28 countries (over 20 of them in Europe), so the students included represent a wide swath of European adolescents: the sample sizes are very large and they come from many different countries in that region. Furthermore, the content of questions included in the survey covers a wide array of topics: knowledge of democratic ideals and processes, opinions about citizens' and government's roles, students' current and anticipated types of civic participation, characteristics of and experiences in school-based civic education, and characteristics of their everyday lives and selves that are related to developing an orientation toward active citizenship. Finally, the study included information from teachers and principals on their training, experience, and perceptions of civic education's use and status in their schools.

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<sup>25</sup> IEA collected more recent data between 2008 and 2009 that are not yet publicly available.

#### 4.2.2 Limitations of the Data

However, there are design and sampling characteristics of CIVED that should give all researchers and readers pause. In addition to the data being now 12 years old and thus no longer representative of Europe's contemporary immigration situation, one major shortcoming is that the data are cross-sectional: they represent only a 'snapshot' of the world, based on a sample of a population of students at one particular time. Because of this, there is no information about students' opinions or knowledge prior to testing, which means researchers cannot assess actual *learning* or change over time, nor can they make causal inferences ( $x$  caused  $y$ ). It is longitudinal data, collected at multiple time points, that allows researchers to study students' development over time. This is unfortunate because change over time is arguably the more valuable and interesting finding when studying educational systems and societies. CIVED data should therefore be considered *suggestive*—not conclusive—about countries' situations of civic education, knowledge, participation, and self-expression values for immigrants, a typically underserved population.

In addition, I am forced to define an 'immigrant' as a student who was born outside the country where he or she attends school. This definition is imperfect, as it does not take into account students' nationality or legal status. In many countries, too, students were not asked about their ethnicity, so it is practically impossible to corroborate students' immigrant status. However, numerous researchers using the same or similar data have used this definition, among them the chief coordinator of the CIVED study, Judith Torney-Purta.<sup>26</sup> Typically there is very little discussion of this limitation in

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<sup>26</sup> See, for example, Torney-Purta, Barber, and Wilkenfeld (2006) and Reimers (2005) who used CIVED data. Other, far more well-known surveys such as the IEA-sponsored TIMSS and PIRLS, or OECD's

published work using these data, without which researchers appear to implicitly suggest that their data absolutely represent actual immigrants. I make no such claim.

Finally, as I discussed in Chapter 1, there are several countries in Europe that participated in the CIVED survey, but whose immigrant populations are very small or whose definitions of ‘country’ are frequently debated. I excluded those countries from this study for reasons I discuss in section 4.4. These exclusions reduce the degree to which my study represents adolescents’ civic outcomes *across* Europe, though the countries that remain have very strong data for explaining their own national situations.

#### **4.2.3 History, Administration, and Content of the CIVED Survey**

The first iteration of this assessment was administered to students in the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States in 1971 (Torney, Oppenheim, & Farnen, 1975).<sup>27</sup> After decades without a follow-up study, the collapse of the USSR and other worldwide political changes spurred the IEA to approve the development of the CIVED study in 1994. The after-effects of the USSR’s dissolution in 1989 were key to the participation of eleven formerly Communist countries, ten of which are now members of the European Union.<sup>28</sup> Many schoolteachers in these nations had taught under the Communist system, as well, and their pedagogy in many cases was difficult to change. Believing that schools were an important element in democratic nation-building, politicians and policy makers

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PISA, confirm immigrant status by asking students also to identify where their parents were born, which allows for a more refined definition of ‘immigrant.’

<sup>27</sup> Iranian data were not included in international analyses (p. 17).

<sup>28</sup> Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The Russian Federation, or Russia, is the successor state to the Soviet Union, and is not an EU member state.

wanted information about the influence of the current teaching corps or new teaching methods and materials at a national level. Understanding youths' knowledge, beliefs, and practices was essential for moving forward with democratic transition and consolidation.

Countries wishing to participate in CIVED had to fund a portion of the assessment's development and administration, and appoint national representatives—typically university professors and researchers with expertise in civic and political education—to work with other nations' representatives in designing the assessment. France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Ireland chose not to participate in the study. It was essential to have international cooperation between participants in the design: all concepts of democracy and governance needed to be presented in universal ways, rather than in idiosyncratic national terms (for example, the study had to refer to freedom of the press, not the First Amendment). The study examined “how students view their citizenship identity and how their views are influenced by the political, educational, and social context in the countries in which they live” (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Husfeldt, & Nikolova, 2002, p. 12). IEA offered to administer the study to both 14- and 17-18-year-olds, but countries could choose whether to study one or both populations.<sup>29</sup>

To employ their theoretical model for each country involved in the study, CIVED had two phases. Phase 1 is a set of national case studies that investigated the country-level elements around the perimeter of the model, and described public discourse about civic goals and values. Based on a collective review of these national descriptions, national project representatives voted for three ‘domains’ as the most important to study

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<sup>29</sup> Of the European countries included in my study, only Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland surveyed the 17- and 18-year-old population (in Switzerland, only its German-speaking cantons; for information about other countries' participation, see Sibberns & Foy, 2004).

in Phase II. These domains represent the civic-related knowledge and values of students that the researchers wished to measure. Elements of each are reflected in my study:

I. Democracy: What does democracy mean and what are its associated institutions and practices?

II. National identity, regional and international relationships: How can the sense of national identity or national loyalty among young people be described and how does it relate to their orientation to other countries and to regional and international organizations?

III. Social cohesion and diversity: What do issues of social cohesion and diversity mean to young people and how do they view discrimination? (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004a, p. 18)

Next in the process, framework writers read the case studies from Phase I to flesh out the three domains.<sup>30</sup> As noted in the study's technical report, they:

[D]eveloped general statements about what young people might be expected to know and believe about the three domains, and they elaborated on and illustrated these with quotations from the national case studies. This material formed the *Content Guidelines for the International Test and Survey*.... (Husfeldt & Torney-Purta, 2004, p. 18)

The *Content Guidelines* constitute the assessment framework for Phase 2, the *International Test and Survey*. One of the International Coordinators, Rainer Lehmann, described it as a “comparative empirical study, consisting of a test of civic knowledge and a survey of civic-related concepts and attitudes as well as reports on current or expected civic activities” (2004, p. 7). The test of knowledge and a portion of the attitudes survey relate to Domain I: Democracy (and its associated institutions and practices). None of the knowledge test, but some portions of the survey, relate to Domains II and III (see Table 4-1 for an overview of topics in each part of the assessment). Note, therefore, that content in each domain provides information about at least one of the civic outcomes on which I focus. Domain I provides information about

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<sup>30</sup> Official documents for CIVED do not report who these framework writers were, though one can reasonably assume they were experts in social studies, history, or civic education, whether secondary teachers or university professors or researchers.

students' civic knowledge and civic participation, Domain II provides information on students' attitudes toward the country in which they live (patriotism, or national loyalty), and Domain III provides information on students' attitudes toward human and civil rights, such as those for women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities.

The framework, and thus the test and survey together, reflect the central portion of the theoretical model (the individual student and the five "carriers of goals into action" in his or her immediate environment). Because the assessment was uniform across countries, the test and survey pose democratic values and concepts in universal ways, so as not to bias responses toward a particular democratic context (Torney-Purta, 2000, p. 149). Items therefore do not refer to specific legislation or real-world political parties. Instead, they ask about the democratic ideas that underlie legislation or the ways political parties promote their platforms.

**Table 4-1. Content of the test and survey portions of CIVED 1999.**

<b>Multiple Choice Test</b>	
<u>Knowledge</u>	<u>Cognitive skills</u>
Democratic structures	Fact vs. opinion
Democratic values	Interpreting political cartoons
Democratic institutions	Interpreting campaign ads
<b>Survey</b>	
<u>Demographics</u>	<u>Attitudes and habits (Likert-scale items)</u>
Gender	Situations good and bad for democracy
Age	An adult who is a good citizen...
Immigrant status	Government's responsibilities
Number of people in the home	Trust in institutions
Number of parents in the home	Country's international policy and standing
Newspaper readership	Opportunities that certain groups <i>really do</i> vs. <i>should</i> have
Number of books in the home	in this country
Educational aspirations	Attitudes toward immigrants
Parents' educational attainment	Views on politics and this country's political system
Participation in voluntary organizations	Students' participation in school life
	What students have learned in school
	Expected political action as a young person and as an adult
	Classroom climate

In its final form, the test portion of Phase 2 was a norm-referenced multiple-

choice test of 38 items that assessed students’ “understanding of democratic principles and their skills in interpreting political material, such as party leaflets and political cartoons” (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 1999, p. 5.2; Torney-Purta, 2000, p. 148). The survey portion—where questions had no right answers—asked about “their concepts of good citizenship, attitudes about trust in the government, opinions about the political rights of ethnic groups and women, and expected civic participation” (Torney-Purta, 2000, p. 149). See Table 4-1 for an overview of the unique content of the test and survey portions (and see Appendix D for five released items from the knowledge and skills test portion).

### **4.3 CIVED Sampling Methods and Data Structure**

The original sample of students, teachers, and principals resulted from a two-stage stratified cluster sample design, conducted in all 22 participating European countries.<sup>31</sup> In the first stage, national research coordinators identified strata—or groups—that represented important characteristics of the country or its school system, including geographical region, public/private status, or degree of urbanization, among others. Based on these strata, they selected samples of schools. Schools could be excluded for being geographically remote, extremely small in size, for offering a curriculum different from the mainstream, or for serving only students in the excluded-students categories (see next paragraph).<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> French-speaking Belgium, Bulgaria, Greek Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England (not the UK), Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland.

<sup>32</sup> See Appendix D in the CIVED Technical Report for countries’ unique stratification choices (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004a, pp. 187-233).



The second stage was a single, intact class of 14-year-olds from each sampled school.<sup>33</sup> (The grade level in which one would find students of this age varies across countries. In North America, it's eighth grade, while in England it's Year 10, and in Norway it's Year 9.) The choice to sample only one classroom from each school makes data collection easier, but it creates theoretical and statistical difficulties. There is no obvious reason to assume that the students or the teacher in one class are representative of the students or teachers in an entire school, especially given the common practice of tracking students of different (perceived) abilities into more or less academically rigorous coursework. Furthermore, there is no information available about why the sampled classrooms were chosen within each school. The study's technical report suggests that civic education classes coincided with homeroom in "most educational systems," but there is no information about whether the sampled class was volunteered by their teacher, chosen by the principal, or represents the high-achieving students (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004a, p. 44). Any of these reasons might change our understanding of the population to which we can generalize findings.

Statistically, because only one classroom was sampled per school, these levels of information—as represented by teachers and principals—are confounded, i.e., they are statistically indistinguishable and must be considered as one level of clustering, even though conceptually and educationally they represent two levels. Through the rest of this dissertation, for brevity's sake, I refer to this level of clustering as schools.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Of course it is exceedingly rare to find a class that has only 14-year-olds in it; the average age is 14, however.

<sup>34</sup> To get information on school-based "social actors" and the school structures that influence students' civic knowledge and experiences, in each school included in the sample, IEA administered a questionnaire to several teachers who taught students in the tested class that asked about their own education, beliefs about what a good citizen needs to know and do, as well as their teaching methods. At the school level,

The subject of the sampled class was ideally civic education, if available; otherwise it was history, social studies, or government (Sibberns & Foy, 2004). Countries were allowed to exclude certain types of students from the sample, as well as schools, but had to ensure that the excluded population was less than five percent of the national population of 14-year-olds (or eighth-graders). It is most likely that students who met exclusion criteria did not take the test in the first place; in most systems, these students would not be in regular classrooms, anyway. Students could be excluded if they were:

- *Mentally disabled, but educable*: includes students “emotionally or mentally unable to follow even the general instructions of the...test”;
- *Functionally disabled*: includes students permanently physically disabled such that they could not perform the test; or
- *Non-native speakers of the language of the test*: “These were students who could not speak or read the language of the test. Typically, a student who had received less than one year of instruction in the language of the test was excluded” (Sibberns & Foy, 2004, p. 43).

This last criterion is likely to affect the number of immigrants included in the original sample to some degree, making that sub-group less representative. Limiting as this is, I repeat that these data were *not* meant to represent all immigrants. It is possible that students who had received less than one year of instruction in the language of the test (usually the dominant language in the country) were also likely to have been in the country for less than a year. Therefore, it could be that they had limited exposure to civic

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principals filled out a questionnaire about student, teacher, and school demographics, as well as course offerings and requirements. Because there are large amounts of missing data in these files, I do not use their information because missing data reduces my sample size.

education in that short time, and, possibly, to democracy in the host country, which could make their views and understandings non-representative of immigrant students on the whole, anyway. However, it is plausible that this restricted representation of immigrants means that my findings represent a ‘lower bound’ of real-world relationships (meaning that actual findings for immigrants on the whole could be stronger).

Another challenge to studying immigrant students in this particular data set is that they represent no more than 20 percent of the population in any country included in my study, and more often they represent less than 10 percent. While the original data are meant to be nationally representative, IEA did not oversample underrepresented groups. Oversampling for a larger sample size would increase the confidence researchers can have in these findings for immigrants, since with small samples, one cannot be sure they accurately represent the real-world population. These already small sample sizes become even smaller with the creation of a more tightly focused analytic sample.

#### **4.4 Analytic Sample: Countries**

Before I describe the students in my study, I explain why I have excluded nine countries. Twenty-two European countries participated in the CIVED 1999 survey, including many post-Communist countries. To address the questions I pose and to make this study useful to those who use it as a baseline for studies of later data, it was important that I include those countries in which immigration is substantial and whose definition of “country” is widely accepted. This is because the definition of an immigrant is based on the response to the question, “Were you born in this country?” These criteria exclude the Baltic countries, Finland, and the far eastern European countries like Bulgaria

and Romania, whose populations of immigrants are quite low (my cutoff point was 1.5 percent immigrant students). Cyprus is also excluded because Turks and Greeks contest its status. This poses possible interpretation problems for the question that identifies immigrant students (i.e., ‘Were you born in this country?’).

Had I followed on OECD’s convention of reporting on immigrant students’ PISA performance, I would have chosen only to include those countries with a minimum of three percent immigrant students in the sample and data for at least 100 immigrant students. However, these more stringent criteria would exclude even more countries from my study. The countries that would be removed are in regions with a shorter history of immigration—southern and central Europe, and have different characteristics from their northern neighbors. Since it is precisely those national differences that I am interested in with research question 3, and because my aim is to make some broad claims about immigrant students’ experiences *across Europe*, to render the total sample even less representative of Europe could be counterproductive.

The countries that I retain are those that I discussed more completely in the previous chapters: French-speaking Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland. Appendix C provides a detailed description of the original data in each of these countries. Here I offer the most salient characteristics of these data. In all countries together, immigrants are just 7.2 percent of the sample, though this percentage ranges from just under 2 percent in central Europe to as high as 19 percent in western Europe. Immigrants are far more likely to speak a non-school language at home and tend to be less patriotic and knowledgeable about civics than native students (remember, though, that reporting

these superficial descriptive statistics does not imply that we know whether these differences are actually significant). Oppositely, they tend to be more supportive of immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights. Data are missing from many variables, but typically no more so for immigrants than for natives.

#### **4.5 Analytic Samples: Students and Classrooms**

Within these 13 countries, I restricted my analytic sample to those students that had the most complete and statistically powerful information. I included students who had known (non-missing) data on all important measures, including controls:

- gender
- age
- immigrant status
- number of books in the home (proxy for socioeconomic status)
- frequency of speaking the school language at home
- perception of an open classroom climate
- all outcome variables (civic knowledge, civic participation, patriotism, and attitudes toward rights and opportunities for women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities)

In addition, I only selected immigrant students who had data on their age at arrival in the receiving country. These initial student samples were nested in initial samples of schools that also had to meet certain criteria. To be included, a school had to have at least five students who met all of the above criteria for inclusion, which consequently also reduced the size of the student sample. For a broad overview of this

sample, see Table 4-2.

**Table 4-2. Descriptive characteristics of students: Pooled data (all 13 countries). N=33,534**

<b>Student Characteristics</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Immigrant <sup>a</sup>	0.07		0	1
Female <sup>a</sup>	0.52		0	1
Under-age ( $\leq 12$ years)	0.001		0	1
Target age (13-15 years)	0.97		0	1
Over-age ( $\geq 16$ years)	0.029		0	1
Books: Few <sup>a</sup>	0.27		0	1
Books: Average <sup>a</sup>	0.23		0	1
Books: Many <sup>a</sup>	0.28		0	1
School language at home: Never <sup>a</sup>	0.01		0	1
School language at home: Sometimes <sup>a</sup>	0.07		0	1
School language at home: Always <sup>a</sup>	0.92		0	1
Time in country	13.73	1.75	0	19
Perception of open classroom climate	0.02	0.99	-3.7	2.66
Civic knowledge and skills	0.01	0.5	-1.6	1.54
Extracurricular participation <sup>a</sup>	0.69		0	1
Immigrants' rights	0.02	0.99	-2.84	2.04
Minorities' rights	0.02	0.99	-2.98	1.94
Women's rights	2.06	0.85	1	3
Low	0.34		0	1
Medium	0.27		0	1
High	0.39		0	1
Patriotism	0.02	1.0	-3.29	1.92

<sup>a</sup> Dichotomous variable where the mean indicates the proportion represented in the sample of 33,534 students.

All the criteria for inclusion reduce the original sample by 20% for a total of 33,534 students. Immigrants make up about 7 percent of all students in the sample, and girls are 52 percent. Though the study was meant to include students around age 14 (in eighth grade), the age range is actually 10 to 19 years. Students who are young for their grade (under-age) make up less than one percent of the sample, while students who are old for their grade (over-age) make up nearly three percent (and, as you will see later, are concentrated in just a few countries). Just one percent of students speak a non-school language at home all the time, while seven percent speak one at least sometimes. I

discuss civic outcomes for the total sample in section 4.6 and in Chapter 5 break down descriptive information for native-born and immigrant students by country.

#### 4.6 Measures

I use continuous, dichotomous, and ordinal measures for this study. Continuous measures are those for which, technically, any value is possible. For these variables, a normal distribution (shaped like a bell curve) is preferred. A dichotomous—or dummy—variable has just two possible values, typically 0 and 1; ordinal measures have at least three possible values, with higher numbers representing higher values on that measure, though the intervals between the numbers may not be equal (think low, medium, high). For each continuous dependent variable and for a few continuous independent variables I describe how the variable was derived (if applicable), how it is measured, its distribution, and its reliability.<sup>35</sup>

Reliability, represented most often with Cronbach's alpha ( $\alpha$ ), ranges from zero to one and measures 'internal consistency' of composite variables (made up of information from more than one original variable). Essentially it indicates how well a set of items describe the same underlying concept (Nunnally, 1978). Alpha increases as the correlations among items increase. Researchers prefer a higher than lower value (greater than .7 is widely considered satisfactory, according to Bland & Altman, 1997; Cronbach, 1951). Reliability can also be measured in hierarchical linear models (HLM), though its interpretation there is slightly different. I explain this in greater detail in section 4.7.2 on multilevel analysis, but for the moment it suffices to say that reliability in HLM—

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<sup>35</sup> The reliability values I report come from countries' original, full samples, as reported by IEA.

lambda ( $\lambda$ )—also ranges from zero to one with higher values being more favorable.

However, in HLM it is interpreted as an indicator of how easy it is to distinguish between schools within a country: the closer reliability is to 1, the more likely it is that researchers can identify differences in, say, overall civic knowledge between schools.

I include the original variable names in all caps so that future researchers could easily replicate or expand on this work.

#### **4.6.1 Dependent Variables: Six Civic Outcomes**

**Civic knowledge & skills (TOTCGMLE).** This dependent variable is a scale created by IEA that measures how much students know about democracy and civil society and how strong their skills are in interpreting political communications like campaign ads. This composite measure was created with Item Response Theory methods that consider the difficulty, appropriateness, and comparability across countries of the 38 multiple-choice items that made up the test portion of the assessment (see Appendix D for example items). Although the test was not particularly difficult, its items did have reasonable ability to differentiate between students who knew more and less about civics. Items that were too difficult or too easy were removed from the final scale score in individual countries.<sup>36</sup> For more information about how IEA made item-inclusion decisions, see the CIVED technical report chapter on the scaling process for cognitive items (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004b).

A higher score indicates greater content knowledge and interpretative skills (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004b, pp. 90-91). To make students' scores comparable across

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<sup>36</sup> One item was excluded in French Belgium, England, Portugal, and Sweden; two in Denmark, and three in Greece (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004b, p. 83).



countries, the international mean on this scale was originally standardized across all 28 participating countries to be 100, with a standard deviation of 20. I re-standardized this variable across my thirteen countries for a mean of 0, standard deviation of 1. The variable is close to normally distributed in every country and internationally, with a slight positive skew, meaning the distribution has a longer ‘tail’ on the right side than on the left (true across all countries). As most cognition-related scales are, this variable is highly reliable in most countries ( $>0.7$  in 11 of 13 countries). In the absence of IEA-provided reliability information, here I report this measure’s reliability in HLM:  $\lambda$  ranges from .434 in Denmark to .934 in Czech Republic (remember that  $\lambda$  is mostly an indicator of how different schools are on an outcome, so in Denmark, students’ civic knowledge is not very different between schools, whereas in Czech Republic, it very much is).

Though students’ mean score on the civic knowledge and skills measure is similar in my sample to the original sample mean, the standard deviation has been reduced from 1.0 to 0.5 (see Table 4-2). Essentially this means that my inclusion criteria removed the highest- and lowest-scoring students from the sample, nearly halving the overall differences between students. I have kept the measure this way in the model so that results are comparable to the overall sample in future studies.

**Extracurricular civic participation or community service.** This dichotomous (0 or 1) variable represents whether students are currently active in any civically oriented youth organizations that are sponsored by their school or community. Of items that asked about student participation in 15 types of youth organizations, I selected 11 items

that reflected participation in organizations with a civic orientation.<sup>37</sup> There are many missing data, such that an attempt to represent students' *amount* of participation—as opposed to participating in such activities *at all*—would require removing hundreds of students from the sample because they answered some, but not all, items.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, I exclude students who are missing data on *all* 11 items, and measure participation with a dummy variable: either students participate in at least one of these organizations or they do not. In my sample, civic-oriented extracurricular participation is high at nearly 70 percent.

**Attitude measures.** Each attitude variable is based on a composite scale (meaning it is a continuous variable) created by IEA. The bases for these scales are factor analyses of several 4-category Likert-type items from the survey portion of the assessment.<sup>39</sup> A factor analysis is a way of identifying how items 'cluster' around a theme or underlying, 'latent' variable. As Wolfram Schulz, Associate International Coordinator, wrote in the Technical Report, each scale was developed using the same process:

- Analysis of: missing values, the distribution of item responses, exploratory principal component analyses;<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Based on participation in any of the following civically oriented organizations: student council/government (BSGAS01), youth organization affiliated with a political party or union (BSGAS02), group that prepares school newspaper (BSGAS03), environmental organization (BSGAS04), U.N. or UNESCO club (BSGAS05), human rights organization (BSGAS07), group conducting activities to help the community (BSGAS08), charity collecting money for a social cause (BSGAS09), Boy or Girl Scouts/Guides (BSGAS10), cultural association based on ethnicity (BSGAS11), and an organization sponsored by a religious group (BSGAS15).

<sup>38</sup> I investigated the possibility that missing data might actually mean students didn't participate in those activities, but curiously, students often answered "yes" for some items, "no" for others, *and* left others blank.

<sup>39</sup> Possible responses to these Likert items were ordinal: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

<sup>40</sup> Exploratory principal components analysis is a form of factor analysis that allows researchers to see how items in a set are correlated with others.

- Confirmatory factor analyses based on international (200 students per country) and national data;<sup>41</sup>
- Analysis of Item Response Theory (IRT) models for scales based on an international sample (200 students per country);<sup>42</sup>
- Computation of comparative item statistics—item fit and scale reliabilities—across countries; and
- Country-by-country item calibration that resulted in excluding items with poor scaling properties in particular countries. (Schulz, 2004, p. 93)<sup>43</sup>

Each scale was standardized originally so the international mean would be 10, with a standard deviation of 2. To make my analyses more interpretable, I standardized all but one across the thirteen countries in my study, giving them an international mean of 0, standard deviation of 1.

*Attitude toward women's rights (WOMRTMLE).* This scale is based on items from the previous set on marginalized social groups, made up of six items about rights women *should* have:

- Women should run for public office and take part in the government just as men do;
- Women should have the same rights as men in every way;
- Women should stay out of politics (reversed item);
- When jobs are scarce, men [should] have more right to a job than women (reversed);<sup>44</sup>
- Men and women should get equal pay when they are in the same jobs; and
- Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women (reversed).

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<sup>41</sup> Confirmatory factor analyses allow researchers to specify how many factors they wish to create from specific items, based on results from an exploratory analysis.

<sup>42</sup> Item Response Theory is a means of using students' patterns of responses to items to determine both item difficulties and students' proficiency.

<sup>43</sup> This chapter of the Technical Report provides much more information on the methods used for factor analyses and IRT models.

<sup>44</sup> This item was excluded from the scale in Belgium and Germany (Schulz, 2004, p. 123).

Higher scores indicate more positive attitudes toward rights and opportunities for women.

The original measure's  $\alpha$  reliability ranges from .66 to .84, with an international mean of .78 for this sample. However, this scale is highly negatively skewed (a long tail to the left of the value with the highest frequency), which means that the overwhelming majority of students have highly positive attitudes toward women's rights, and few students have highly negative attitudes. This is an encouraging finding in the data (but sensible, too, since half the students are female), though it makes statistical analyses difficult because an extremely skewed distribution of scores violates the assumption (implicit in statistical analyses) that variables are normally distributed, i.e., in a bell shape. I tried several options for transforming this variable into one with a more normal distribution, but none worked. Because of this, I created a three-category measure to capture the lower third, middle third, and upper third of this distribution. In my sample, 34 percent of students fall into the least supportive category and 39 percent fall into the most supportive category.

*Attitude toward immigrants' rights (IMMIGMLE).* This variable is based on eight items—only five were retained for the scale—measuring attitudes towards immigrants and their rights and opportunities:

- Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own language;
- Immigrants' children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have;
- Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the opportunity to vote in elections;
- Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own customs and lifestyle; and
- Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in a country has.

A higher score indicates a more positive, inclusive, tolerant attitude toward

immigrants and their rights. Across countries, this variable's reliability ranges from .67 to .90 with an international mean of .82 for this sample. The distribution of scores on this measure are fairly normal overall, with slight rises in both tails (again, transformations did not make the distribution more normal). Within countries, the distribution tends to be similar to the overall distribution, with some right-hand tails higher than others (in Greece, for example). Students' average score on this measure is only slightly higher than in the original sample (.02, compared to .00).

*Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights (MINORMLE).* This variable is based on four items that measure attitudes toward ethnic minorities and their rights. The scale relies on four items:

- All ethnic groups should have equal chances to get a good education in this country;
- All ethnic groups should have equal chances to get good jobs in this country;
- Schools should teach students to respect members of all ethnic groups; and
- Members of all ethnic groups should be encouraged to run in elections for political office.

Higher scores indicate a more positive, inclusive, tolerant attitude toward rights for ethnic minorities. This variable's reliability ranges from .61 to .86 across countries, with an international mean of .76 for this sample. The distribution of scores on this measure is close to a normal distribution with a slightly higher, denser tail on the right than the left (generally true in individual countries, as well as overall). Practically speaking, that is a positive finding in itself because it suggests that there are more students who have highly tolerant attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights than those with highly intolerant attitudes. Transformations did not help this distribution's shape. On this measure, too, students' average scores are not much higher than in the original sample (.02 compared to

.00).

*Attitude toward the nation, or patriotism (PATRIMLE).* One of two factors identified in an analysis of twelve items that measured students' attitudes toward their nation (the other of these factors is 'protective feelings toward the nation'), this scale consists of four items measuring "the importance of national symbols and emotional affection towards the country," or patriotism:

- The flag of this country is important to me;
- I have great love for this country;
- This country should be proud of what it has achieved; and
- I would prefer to live permanently in another country (a reversed item).<sup>45</sup>

Higher scores on this scale indicate more positive, patriotic attitudes about the nation.

The variable's reliability ranges from .56 to .77 across countries, with an international mean of .67 for this sample. The distribution of scores on this measure is slightly left skewed, which I tried to fix with transformations, but none helped (individual countries vary in their respective degrees of left skew—in Greece, for example, the distribution is entirely left skewed, as the greatest frequency is at the positive extreme). Students' average levels of patriotism are not much different from those in the original sample (.02 compared to .00).

#### **4.6.2 Independent Variables: Student Characteristics**

**Immigrant status (BSGBRN1).** The primary independent variable is derived from students' answer to the question, "Were you born in [country of test]?" The data are not ideal, in that there are no verifying questions that would determine whether students' parents are immigrants, or whether those who answer "yes" are children of

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<sup>45</sup> This item was not included in Sweden's scale because of unreliability (Schulz, 2004, p. 123).

foreign diplomats, nor was there a question about legal national citizenship. I also have no way of knowing whether students immigrated as refugees or because their parents were seeking new economic opportunities. However, as I have previously noted, papers by the coordinator of the IEA CIVED 1999 study (Judith Torney-Purta) and other prominent researchers in the field have used this definition of an immigrant, and I follow their convention.

**Length of time in host country (BSGBRN2).** Students who were born outside of the country where the test took place were asked to note at what age they came to the country. I subtracted their age at arrival from their current age to derive a measure of how long immigrant students had been in the host country. Native-born students were assigned a number equivalent to their age in years. The measure overall has a dramatic negative skew because of the immigrants who have been in the country only a short time. For immigrants alone, the measure is still negatively skewed, but is more dense. I did not attempt to transform or standardize this variable, as I believe a year is an easily interpreted unit.

**Language of the home (BSGLANG).** This is an ordinal measure of how frequently students speak the language of the school at home (never, sometimes, or always). This is the variable that previous researchers have used to define ‘ethnic minority’ students. I examine the interaction of home language with immigrant status to determine whether there are different ‘effects’ of speaking a non-school language at home for immigrant and native-born students. To use it as a predictor, I created three dichotomous variables, one for each category.

**Civic knowledge and skills (TOTCGMLE).** This variable, also a dependent

variable, is described in section 4.6.1. I use it as an independent variable in analyses of each of the other five dependent variables.

**Extracurricular participation.** This variable, too, was previously described on page 115, used as an independent variable in analyses of each of the other five dependent variables.

**Perception of an open classroom climate (CCLIMMLE).** This independent variable is another composite scale created by IEA. It is the result of a factor analysis of six items on students' perceptions of their history/civics/social studies/economics teachers' teaching style (six other items make up a complementary factor, *lecturing style*, which I discuss in the Independent Variables: School Characteristics section on page 17).

The six items are:

- Students feel free to disagree openly with their teachers about political and social issues during class;
- Students are encouraged to make up their own minds about issues;
- Teachers respect our opinions and encourage us to express them during class;
- Students feel free to express opinions in class even when their opinions are different from most of the other students;
- Teachers encouraged us to discuss political or social issues about which people have different opinions; and
- Teachers present several sides an issue when explaining it in class.

A higher score on this measure indicates that students perceive a more open classroom climate. Across countries, this variable's reliability ranges from .71 to .82 with an international mean of .77 for this sample (Schulz, 2004, p. 122). The distribution of scores on this measure is quite normal, with only a slight negative skew (true across individual countries, as well). Students' scores are only slightly higher in this sample than in the original sample (.02 compared to .00).

**Control variables.** It is important to control for variables that, while not of



primary interest, may be related to knowledge, behavior, or attitudes and thus confound findings.

***Female (GENDER).*** A dummy variable where female=1, male=0.

***Age (AGEYEAR).*** Because students in the target grade are approximately 14, it is reasonable to expect most students to be between 13 and 15 years old. However, since the age range in some countries goes from 10 to 19 years, suggesting that a number of students are held back, I created three dummy variables: under-age ( $\leq 12$  years), target age (13-15 years), and over-age ( $\geq 16$  years).

***Number of books in the home (BSGBOOK).*** **This measure is a weak proxy for socioeconomic status.** It is not an ideal proxy; it would clearly be made stronger by the inclusion of parental education levels or family income. However, the latter data are not available and the former are missing at very high rates. Several other researchers of the CIVED study have proxied for SES using this measure, including Jan Janmaat and Nathalie Mons (2011), Tijana Prokic and Jaap Dronkers (2010), and Judith Torney-Purta, Rainer Lehmann, Hans Oswald, and Wolfram Schulz (2001). As the former note, “The number of books in the home can be interpreted as a proxy for the emphasis placed on education, the resources available to acquire and support literacy and, more generally speaking, the academic support a student finds in his or her family” (2001, p. 65).

Responses to this measure included: none, 1-10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-200, more than 200. The distribution of number of books in the home is negatively skewed, but in the upper four categories, frequencies are high and quite similar; in real-world terms, that’s a good thing because it means there are relatively few students who own very few books. I calculated the 33<sup>rd</sup> and 66<sup>th</sup> percentiles of this measure across all countries to

create a three-category measure: few books in the home (lower third of the distribution), average books in the home (middle third), and many books in the home (upper third). Effectively this labeled students who had between 0 and 50 books as having few books, 51-100 books as average, and 101 to more than 200 as many. From this measure I created three indicator variables for use as independent variables.

#### **4.6.3 Independent Variables: School Characteristics**

School-level data are aggregates of original student data (discussed in 4.6.2), which more accurately represent the school even if individual students have been dropped from the analysis. Ideally I would use measures from the teacher and principal surveys for the school level, but there are three problems with that approach: one theoretical, two practical. The theoretical issue is that there is more to be said about a group than just the aggregate of individual characteristics can say (Bidwell & Kasarda, 1975). Consider the different understandings one can have of interpersonal trust: researchers can ask people how trustworthy other people are and aggregate that measure to the group level, or they could measure how many lost wallets are returned to their owners with nothing missing from them. Practically speaking, only one class per school was sampled, while several (between one and three) teachers in each school were surveyed. It is not possible to determine which teacher was responsible for teaching civics. Furthermore, in both teacher and principal surveys, there are large amounts of missing data. Therefore, while the students in the sampled class may not be representative of the rest of the school, nor necessarily of individual students' classmates in all other classes, aggregated data are the best choice for the situation.

**Average number of books in students' homes.** This variable is a proxy for school socioeconomic composition and is based on the original measure for number of books in a student's home (as is the student-level version of this measure, as you'll recall from section 4.6.2). For two-level models (discussed in 4.7.2), I standardized that measure *within countries*, aggregated it by school, then standardized it again, for a country mean of 0, standard deviation of 1. For three-level models, I standardized the scale across the thirteen countries I study, for an international mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This measure is quite normally distributed overall, with only a hint of negative skew. Within countries, the skew tends to be right or left-skewed.

**Range of number of books in students' homes.** This variable is a proxy for socioeconomic inequality and is based on the internationally standardized measure of number of books in the home. For two-level models, within countries, I calculated the standard deviation of that measure by school, then standardized *it*, again for ease of interpretation (so schools with values higher than 0 have higher than average 'inequality'). For three-level models, I performed this same procedure, but with data from all thirteen countries. Overall and within countries, this variable is quite normal in its distribution.

**Proportion of immigrants.** This variable is a proxy for intercultural contact and ethnic heterogeneity. It is based on the number of immigrants in a class divided by the total number of students in the class. Because it is highly positively skewed (large numbers of classrooms with small numbers of immigrants), I created a dichotomous variable. For two-level models (within countries), schools in my sample with a proportion of immigrants higher than the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile in the individual country were

coded as having a high immigrant proportion. For three-level models (using combined data from all thirteen countries), schools in my sample with a proportion of immigrants higher than or equal to the international median (50<sup>th</sup> percentile=8.3%) are equal to 1, and schools with a lower proportion of immigrants are equal to 0.

**Instructional methods.** To test the different relationships of an open classroom climate and a traditional, teacher-centered climate with civic outcomes, I created a composite measure of ‘traditional’ or lecture-style instructional methods:

- Teachers place great importance on learning facts or dates when presenting history of political events;
- Teachers require students to memorize dates or definitions;
- Memorizing dates and facts is the best way to get a good grade from teachers in these classes;
- Teachers lecture and the students take notes; and
- Students work on material from the textbook.

Response options to these items were *never*, *rarely*, *sometimes*, and *often*. Cronbach’s alpha is .57 for this composite scale.<sup>46</sup>

Using school aggregates of this ‘traditional methods’ measure and the measure of open classroom climate (CCLIMMLE), I created four dummy variables to capture the combinations of each of these, as Torney-Purta and Wilkenfeld did in their CIVED-based study of US students (2009): 1) high classroom openness and high traditional teaching methods, 2) high classroom openness and low traditional teaching methods, 3) high traditional teaching methods and low classroom openness, and 4) low traditional teaching methods and low classroom openness. For two-level models, I created these dummy

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<sup>46</sup> As I mentioned in section 4.6, this reliability value is relatively low. There are several reasons to use the factor anyway: there isn’t yet strong consensus on how best to factor ordinal items like these with relatively few categories that measure agreement rather than objective values (Holgado-Tello, Chacón-Moscoso, Barbero-García, & Vila-Abad, 2010; Kampen & Swyngedouw, 2000); this is an exploratory study in which I see value in the theoretical correlations between these items; and the use of this factor has precedent in Judith Torney-Purta and Britt Wilkenfeld’s (2009) work.

variables within countries, so that a highly open and highly traditional classroom may not be as highly open and traditional in one country as in another, but the data refer to the country's unique range. For three-level models, I created these dummy variables across all thirteen countries, so there may be more highly open, highly traditional classrooms in one country than in another because on an international spectrum, one country's methods are more intensive than another's.

#### **4.6.4 Independent Variables: National Characteristics**

**Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.** GNI per capita is an internationally comparable measure that represents the average income of a country's citizens.

Essentially it is a measure of affluence. It is a dollar value based on a country's final (gross) national income in a year, divided by its population size. The values for this variable are based on World Bank data for the year 1999, though they are calculated in current international purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, which means that one international dollar has as much purchasing power as one US dollar has in the United States. As an independent variable, I divide its value by 1,000 so its association with outcomes is more interpretable. The measure in this sample has 9 unique values across 13 observations and the data are not normally distributed, but are about evenly spread across their range from 10.25 in Slovakia to 32.08 in Switzerland.

**Gini coefficient.** This is a measure of income inequality within a country ranging from 0 to 1. 0 represents perfect equality—each 'share' of the population gets the same share of income. 1 represents perfect inequality—all income goes to the share of the population with the highest income. Therefore, lower values represent greater equality.

As a point of reference, the average for all 20 European, OECD-member countries that have data for “around 2000” is 0.29, ranging from 0.23 in Denmark to 0.37 in the United Kingdom.<sup>47</sup> This range is much smaller than the range for the world in general. I multiplied all Gini coefficients by 100 to make results more easily interpretable. Again, because there are nine unique values for 13 observations at this level, it would be misleading to call these data normally distributed, but there are tails on either side, so they approximate a normal distribution.

**Curricular control.** This variable is based on Nathalie Mons’ typology, discussed in Chapter 2. In my study, I combine countries with so-called ‘collaboration’ and ‘centralized’ models of responsibility for curriculum into one dummy variable, complemented by dummy variables for school autonomy, decentralized, and federal models. Collaboration/centralized systems are most dependent on national-level decisions, while federal systems are least dependent on national-level decisions.

## 4.7 Analyses

In this study I conduct descriptive and multivariate, multilevel analyses.

### 4.7.1 Descriptive Analyses

Descriptive information provides an illustration of how students ‘look’ overall on several measures. It helps researchers to know at the outset how groups of participants differ. In this study, descriptive statistics calculate and compare immigrants’ and native students’ means on all demographic and civic-oriented measures. For continuous

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<sup>47</sup> The Gini coefficient is not measured separately for member countries of the United Kingdom, so I use the whole UK’s value for England.


measures, I used *t*-tests to determine whether mean differences were significant, and for categorical measures, I used  $\chi^2$  tests (see Appendix D for details).

All descriptive analyses of student data use weights because these students are part of a probability sample—they have different likelihoods of being selected for the study, so one student does not necessarily represent the same number of students in the overall population as another student. Appropriate sampling weights are essential for getting accurate estimates of survey values. To appropriately weight student data, I created a normalized version of IEA’s “total weight” (TOTWGT), which represents the inverse of a student’s joint probability of being selected given that his or her class and school were selected (Sibberns, 2004). In each country I normalized this weight by dividing it by the mean, giving it a mean of 1. This allows the sum of students’ weights to equal the operant sample size, so that statistical tests still take into account unequal probabilities of selection, but are based on the analytic sample’s data, not the original sample’s. Results from descriptive analyses for students are discussed in Chapter 5.

Descriptive information on schools was weighted using a normalized version of the IEA-assigned school weight (SCHWGT). In each country in the sample, I divided school weights by their mean, again in order to make sure that estimates reflected the analytic sample data *and* schools’ different probabilities of selection. Results from descriptive analyses of school data are discussed in Chapter 6. Descriptive information on countries (Chapter 7) was unweighted, although these countries were not selected at random and do not represent a larger sample of countries.

### 4.7.2 Multilevel Analyses

First, a quick illustration of the purpose of multilevel analyses. Figure 4-2 shows standardized average civic knowledge scores for native-born and immigrant students in the thirteen countries in this study. You can see that these overall scores are different by country: Belgian adolescents score well below the mean (0 on the y-axis), no matter what their immigrant status, while Czech students score well above the mean.



**Figure 4-2. Differences in civic knowledge (standard score) between immigrants and native students in 13 European countries.**

On the face of it, too, looking only at whether a young person was born in or outside of the country, there are some large differences in scores within countries. Immigrants score much lower than their native peers in the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, for example. But this difference is not the same across countries.



In Czech Republic, immigrants appear to be *more* knowledgeable about civics than their native peers, though the difference is not so drastic as in Denmark. This picture provides a useful way to think about the questions that I ask in this study: to what extent do overall levels of civic outcomes differ between countries (e.g., the difference between Belgian and Czech students)? To what extent does a gap exist between immigrants' and native students' outcomes (the difference between Danish natives and immigrants)? And to what extent does that gap differ between countries (the size and direction of the gap in Denmark versus the size and direction of the gap in Czech Republic)?

It is too simplistic, though, to look at overall civic outcomes and immigrant/native gaps without considering other characteristics of those students and their environments. What is it about Belgian students that makes them know less about civics than their peers in Czech Republic? It seems unlikely that it is just “Belgian-ness” that makes this so—what are the features of Belgium as a nation and of its schools that are related to these low scores? What is it about immigrants in Czech Republic that makes them know more than native-born peers? Is that difference really significant?

To investigate questions like mine about student- *and* school-level relationships with student outcomes in these “nested” data (students in schools in countries), researchers must take that complex sample design into account. Therefore I use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) techniques for all three of my research questions. In all hierarchical analyses, I weight school data instead of student data, because the latter is partially based on the former (schools were selected before students). School data are weighted in two-level models with country-specific normalized weights (so those weights refer just to individual countries' sample sizes). In three-level models, where all

countries' data are combined, I weight school data with a normalized weight for the whole combined sample (the mean is still 1, but the sum of the school weights is equal to the combined sample size). Country data in three-level models are unweighted.

For multilevel modeling, I used HLM v. 6.08 to build two-level models (students in schools) that are separate by country and three-level models (students nested in schools nested in countries) that combine all countries' data. Multilevel techniques in HLM can do many things for researchers working with survey data, but two major functions are:

- the ability to 'partition' variance in civic outcomes into within-school, between-school, and between-country components, and
- more accurate estimation of outcomes and of effects on outcomes because variance at multiple levels is taken into account at the same time.

First, to partition variance means to show how much variance in civic outcomes happens within schools (students have different outcomes based on individual characteristics), between schools (students have different outcomes based on school characteristics), and between countries (students have different outcomes based on national characteristics). With the results of this partitioning, a researcher can say, for example, that a large amount of the difference between different students' civic knowledge is due to school characteristics, particularly some kind of teaching method. With that information policymakers can consider ways to make changes in schools—through teacher education reform or professional development—so that students' civic knowledge is more similar across schools. Closing the achievement gap is a common goal in educational studies, and finding out how features of students and their environment are related to that achievement is a big part of that process.

Second, HLM is able to calculate more accurate standard errors of estimates precisely because it takes into account the different variances in and effects of characteristics found at each level in nested data *at the same time*. Whereas OLS regression assumes that individuals are entirely independent of one another and might put school-level information into the same equation as individual-level data, HLM recognizes that students in the same school have some characteristics in common and are more like one another than students in other schools, even if those schools are similar. Considering variance and effects at the proper level improves estimation (Arnold, 1992).

**The first step: A Fully Unconditional Model.** All multilevel analyses began with a ‘fully unconditional model’ wherein no independent variables were included at any level (see Appendix D for examples of the equations and interpretations of their parameters). To answer RQs 1 and 2, I used two-level models, separate for each country. To address RQ 3, I used three-level models with all countries’ data combined. This model does two things on its own: 1) it partitions the variation of an outcome into components that are attributable to students, schools themselves, and, in a three-level model, countries; 2) it gives reliability information. Reliability ( $\lambda$ , as you’ll recall) is a function of the within-school sample size and how much variance exists between schools. As such, it is an indicator of how likely it is that one can identify differences in means between schools. It should be considered in combination with the variance components, because together they show researchers the likelihood of *explaining* any differences between schools. Reliability in HLM decreases with successive models if they include variables that explain variance between schools. This is because more of the outcome is being explained, so it becomes increasingly difficult to identify differences between

schools.

With the variance components for each level that HLM provides, researchers can calculate the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs), which measure how similar students outcomes are within a given school, and thus the *proportion* of variance (0 to 1) in the outcome that occurs between schools.<sup>48</sup> If the ICC is high, that means much of the difference in outcomes occurs between schools.<sup>49</sup>

**Student characteristics: Within-school models.** RQ 1 concerns overall levels of adolescents' civic outcomes as well as the difference, or 'gap,' in civic outcomes between immigrants and native students. I am interested in determining whether there is a gap in the first place, and if so, which group's average score is higher. To address this question I built within-school models that deal with characteristics of individual students within schools. First iterations of this model assumed three things (using patriotism as the outcome): 1) overall adolescent patriotism differs between schools and 2) there is a gap between immigrants' and native students' patriotism, and 3) the size of that gap differs between schools. For example, adolescents in School A might be overall much more patriotic than students in School B, but it also might be that in School A, immigrants are two times less patriotic than native students, and in School B immigrants are only one and a half times less patriotic.

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<sup>48</sup> ICCs for dichotomous and ordinal outcomes are calculated differently than for continuous outcomes because the within-school variance is a constant (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). See Appendix D for how each of these is calculated.

<sup>49</sup> ICCs can be calculated for countries in three-level models, as well, and interpreted similarly (West, Welch, & Galecki, 2007, p. 162). In my study country ICCs—essentially correlations—are, as correlations go, quite low. However, as Greg Duncan and Steve Raudenbush discussed in a study of contextual effects, low ICCs at the third level can translate into appreciable effect sizes (d). Country ICCs run from .01 to .04 and .12, which respectively translate into small (d=.20), medium (d=.40), and large (d=.70) effect sizes (Duncan & Raudenbush, 1999, p. 33).

HLM provides information about the existence of any immigrant/native gap, as well as about any significant difference in patriotism overall or the patriotism gap that occurs between schools. As an example, the software might show a coefficient for immigrant status that is negative and significant, which means that immigrants are less patriotic than native-born students on average. If the initial analysis also shows that the between-school variance in the gap between immigrants and native students is nonsignificant, I would know that immigrants are less patriotic no matter what school they attend, and I would adjust the model accordingly. (Please refer to Appendix D for an example and interpretation of the equations that constitute the between-school model.)

Once I determined whether overall outcomes and the gap between immigrants' and native students' vary, I added covariates and controls to the within-school model according to RQs 1a and 1b. Because I wished to focus only on immigrant status's relationship with outcomes, I assumed that the effects of covariates and controls were the same across schools.

***Testing interactions.*** To address the differential effects of various demographic variables for immigrant and native students, I created within-school models that included interaction terms of immigrant status with number of books in the home, age, gender, language of the home, and time in the host country. An interaction of immigrant status with gender allowed me to see whether, for example, immigrant girls are more similar to immigrant boys on patriotism than native girls are to native boys. With age, I could see whether being old for one's grade has a more negative relationship with civic knowledge for immigrants than for native students. Similarly, with language of the home, I could determine whether being a multilingual immigrant had a more positive relationship with

civic knowledge than being a multilingual native student.

Initially I tested all of these interactions, but those that did not improve the model's fit (according to HLM's general linear hypothesis testing function) were discarded (which left some that are non-significant, but which nonetheless improve the model's fit). I present and discuss these results in Appendix E.

***Centering independent variables.*** In initial models, when I was testing to see whether the size of the difference in immigrants' and natives' outcomes changed between schools, I 'group-mean centered' it, which involves subtracting each student's school mean from his or her score. This is because I wish to look at group differences in the relationship between immigrant status and the outcome. If the immigrant/native gap did not change in size between schools, I adjusted the model by grand-mean centered it, meaning I subtracted the country's overall mean from each student's score to make the mean of the variable equal to zero, which enhances interpretability. Grand-mean centering effectively makes it possible to refer to a score for a student who is 'average' on all predictors. All other student-level measures were grand-mean centered because, as you'll recall, I assumed that there was no difference between schools in those measures' relationship with the outcome.

**Moderating effects of school characteristics: Between-school models.**

Consider RQ 2, now, which looks at the moderating effects that school characteristics might have on overall outcomes and the gap between immigrants' and native students' outcomes. This is where it may be possible to explain away some of the differences that exist between schools. Interested readers may turn to Appendix D for an example of the equations that constitute this model. Assume for a moment that average levels of

patriotism are different between schools within a country, and that immigrants are less patriotic than native students. If I were to test whether ethnic heterogeneity had any relationship with overall levels of patriotism and found the coefficient to be significant and negative, I would interpret that to mean that in schools with higher proportions of immigrants, overall levels of patriotism are lower than in schools with lower proportions of immigrants.

If I find the coefficient for ethnic heterogeneity to be significant and positively related to the immigrant/native gap in patriotism, then I would interpret it to mean, broadly, that in schools with more immigrants, the gap in patriotism between immigrants and native students is *smaller* than in schools with fewer immigrants (because a positive number added to a negative number brings it closer to 0, reducing its ‘negativeness’).

I only investigated school characteristics’ relationship with the immigrant gap in countries where I knew between-school differences in that gap were significant. In some of those countries, the immigrant gap overall was non-significant. While other scholars may have chosen not to investigate school ‘effects’ in relation to non-significant immigrant gaps, I suggest that precisely because I am interested in how the immigrant gap differs across schools, it is important to explore school characteristics even when the overall gap is not significant.

**Moderating effects of national characteristics: Between-country models.** I turn now to RQ 3, which looks at the potentially moderating effects of national characteristics on overall outcomes and the immigrant gaps I investigated in the within- and between-school models. These models have three levels because they combine student and school data into one large set, rather than analyzing countries separately.

Because of the combined data, the variance in outcomes is greater across countries and schools, which makes finding significant between-school differences more likely, even when they did not obviously appear in two-level results. On each outcome I first tested whether there were significant between-school or between-country differences in the immigrant gap *without* other modifying variables. If one was non-significant, I did not model variables at that level on the immigrant gap. The only outcome for which this was true is attitudes toward women's rights. All other outcomes had significant differences between schools and countries in the immigrant gap.

Assuming that immigrants are overall less patriotic than native students, if I were to find the coefficient for income inequality to be significant and positive, I would interpret it to mean, broadly, that in countries with greater income inequality, immigrants feel less negative about the country they live in.

It is especially important to note here that I have potentially large statistical problems based on using just 13 countries as my level-3 units. So few countries at this highest level of the model means initially just twelve degrees of freedom (thus, low power), and even fewer degrees of freedom available for estimating relationships when I add national characteristics to the model. Low power makes it very difficult to find results.

#### **4.8 Presentation of Results**

In the chapters that follow, I first present results and discussion for research question 1, students within schools. This is followed by results and discussion for research question 2, the between-school models, then results and discussion for research



question 3, the between-country models. Discussion of findings in chapters 6 and 7 build on the results from prior chapters' analyses.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Results: Overall Civic Outcomes and the ‘Immigrant Gap’**

As stated in Chapter 3, research question (RQ) 1 is related to European adolescents’ civic knowledge, civic participation, and self-expression values, and the extent to which immigrants and native-born adolescents differ in these outcomes. Additionally, RQs 1a and 1b ask the extent to which immigrants’ length of residence in the host country and use of the school language at home are related to their civic outcomes, and how adolescents’ civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, and perception of an open classroom climate are associated with overall civic outcomes. With these questions in mind, I begin this chapter by describing the student data and my hypotheses. I then share results from within-school models and discuss the patterns in these results.

#### **5.1 Descriptive Information on Students**

I provide an overview of the sample here, but detailed tables of descriptive information on students in each country are available in Tables 5-2 to 5-5. After removing students who did not meet criteria for inclusion (see Chapter 4), just over 80 percent of the students remain ( $n=33,534$ ; see Table 4-2). Sample sizes within countries range from 1,513 in Belgium to 3,364 in Italy. Immigrants make up between 1.8 percent

of the sample (in Czech Republic and Slovakia) and 20.9 percent (Germany).<sup>50</sup> The patterns of difference between immigrants and native students in each country closely reflect the original data.

For statistical power and reliability, HLM is sensitive to the number of students in each school, referred to as  $n_j$ . In this sample, across countries, you see in Table 5-1 that the number of students per school ranges from as few as 5 to as many as 47, but that the mean only ranges from 13.7 in Denmark to 23.7 in Greece.

**Table 5-1. Student sample size, and mean and range of the number of students per school ( $n_j$ ) for thirteen countries.**

Country	Student Sample Size	Mean $n_j$	Range $n_j$
Belgium	1513	15.9	5-24
Czech Republic	3236	23.3	6-32
Denmark	2185	13.7	5-24
England	2440	21.2	7-29
Germany	2639	18.7	5-30
Greece	3256	23.7	7-31
Hungary	2346	18.3	5-31
Italy	3364	20.7	7-29
Norway	2517	18.4	6-47
Portugal	2306	17.4	5-31
Slovakia	3249	23.4	9-34
Sweden	1903	16.0	5-32
Switzerland	2580	18.5	5-41
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>33534</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>5-47</b>

### 5.1.1 Demographics, Home Language, Years in the Country

In most countries immigrants are significantly older than their native-born classmates, a possible indicator of having been held back at least once. In countries with larger immigrant populations (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden), native students have significantly more books in their homes than do immigrants. In nearly every country, far greater proportions of immigrants speak a non-school language at home at least sometimes. Consequently, significantly greater proportions of native students speak the

<sup>50</sup> Where immigrant sample sizes are quite small, standard errors for estimates of their scores tend to be larger.

school language at home all the time (greater than 90%, except in Italy). It is notable that immigrant status does not map perfectly onto speaking a non-school language at home. These students who were born in the country of the test but speak a non-school language may be second-generation immigrants. Finally, the average number of years immigrants have lived in their host country varies across countries, from fewer than eight years in Greece and Portugal to just over eleven years in Germany.

### **5.1.2 Civic Knowledge, Participation, and Perceived Classroom Climate**

On average, native students seem to perceive a more open civics classroom climate. In most countries, too, native students tend to have significantly greater civic knowledge than their immigrant peers, though never more than a fifth of a standard deviation. Extracurricular participation is far more common in the Nordic countries, as high as 94% in Norway, with practically no differences between immigrants' and native students' participation (only in Italy, where nearly 60% of immigrants participate, and just 46% of natives do). Slovakia has the least involved student population, with just 30% of native students participating. In all other countries, participation levels are between 50 and 90%.

### **5.1.3 Self-Expression Values and Patriotism**

There is a pleasing finding already in these preliminary analyses: there are practically no significant differences between immigrants' and native students' attitudes toward women's rights (only in Germany). There are certainly cross-national differences in attitudes toward women's rights, with much more positive attitudes in western and

Nordic Europe, slightly less positive attitudes in southern Europe (only between 22 and 36% of students are highly supportive of women's rights), and even less positive attitudes in central Europe (only between 17 and 30% are highly supportive).

In most of these countries, immigrants have significantly more positive views of immigrants' rights (as high as a standard deviation). In several countries, though, native students' views are comparable to their immigrant peers' views. This pattern mostly holds for adolescents' attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights, but generally immigrants are more supportive of immigrants' rights than of ethnic minorities' rights in general. Finally, as predicted, in nearly every country immigrants tend to be significantly less patriotic than their native-born classmates, as much as two-thirds of a standard deviation less so. Greek adolescents are the most patriotic of all these students, likely because of the extreme involvement of the state in curriculum and textbook design, which results in an overwhelmingly negative portrayal of Greece's neighboring countries, reinforcing a strong Greek ethnic identity (Flouris & Pasiadis, 2003, p. 79).

## **5.2 Hypotheses**

### **5.2.1 RQ 1: Main Effect of Immigrant Status on Civic Outcomes**

Most studies tend to find negative academic outcomes for immigrants, and a number of studies find that young immigrant adults engage differently in the civic sphere than their native-born peers. Civic knowledge, as an academic subject, has been found to be similarly difficult for this group (Hjerm, 2005; Reimers, 2005). As other studies have shown, because of in-group solidarity and a stronger connection to their parents' homeland than their current country, I hypothesize that immigrant students' attitudes are

significantly more positive than natives' toward immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights, while their attitudes toward the host country—patriotism—are less positive. Additionally, I hypothesize that immigrants' attitudes toward women's rights are less positive because of more traditional gender roles in non-western cultures; but that their participation in civic-oriented groups is similar (Prokic & Dronkers, 2010).

### **5.2.2 RQ 1a: Home Language and Years in the Country**

Previous studies of immigrant students' encounters with language barriers tell a story of immense difficulties with social integration for those who arrive as older children, and family difficulties when a child develops greater facility in the host country's language than in the parents' language (Christensen & Stanat, 2007; Coll & Magnuson, 1997). Additionally, the students who have lived in the host country longer have had greater exposure to the language, culture, and politics of that country. Thus, I predict that the civic values, knowledge, and participation of immigrant students who have been in the country longer, and who speak the school language at home more frequently are more similar to native-born students' attitudes because of greater familiarity with the host country's culture.

### **5.2.3 RQ 1b: Civic Knowledge, Participation, and Perceived Classroom Climate**

Researchers have found that civic knowledge, gleaned from schooling and political experience, is associated with a higher tolerance for feminists' rights (Sotelo, 1997), lower levels of xenophobia (Hjerm, 2005), and greater civic participation (Anderson et al., 1990). Additionally, civic or political participation is strongly

associated with more democratic attitudes and greater civic knowledge in numerous studies. Mikael Hjerm (2005) finds that adolescents who are more willing to vote, participate in protests, and run for office are also less xenophobic.<sup>51</sup> Finally, as Carole Hahn has found repeatedly, the ability to speak one's mind about difficult issues seems to be a liberating quality of effective civic education classrooms. Researchers have found such an open classroom climate to be associated with greater interpersonal trust, civic knowledge, and more inclusive attitudes toward marginalized groups (Flanagan et al., 2007; Hahn, 1991, 1998).

Given the findings of Hahn (1998), Flanagan and Faison (2001), Sotelo (1997), and Hjerm (2005), I hypothesize that a) a student's perception that his/her teachers and peers are open to discussion of controversial topics and b) his/her participation in extracurricular activities are associated with greater patriotism, civic knowledge, and openness to rights for marginalized groups. Furthermore, I predict that civic knowledge is positively related to extracurricular participation and civic values, and negatively related to feelings of patriotism, as those who know more about how the country is *supposed* to be run are that much more likely to be disappointed by reality (as suggested by Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996, in relation to adults).

### **5.3 Civic Outcomes: Fully Unconditional Models**

Recall that the first step in running a multilevel analysis is the Fully Unconditional Model, which gives four vital pieces of information: how much variation

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<sup>51</sup> Note that I am using the phrase 'associated with,' rather than terms like 'influence' or 'cause,' because in these studies, the research design did not allow for causal claims. Civic participation may increase knowledge or vice versa; with current studies it isn't easy to know what the direction of that relationship is, or whether a change in one *causes* a change in the other or is merely coincidental.

in an outcome occurs between students and between schools, what proportion of the variance is attributable to schools (the ICC), and how reliable the outcome is. From Table 5-6 (page 161) we see that differences between schools explain the most variation in civic knowledge (the ICC row: between 6 and 41%) and the least variation in patriotism and attitudes toward women's rights. Civic knowledge is also the most consistently reliable outcome, while in some countries extracurricular participation is the least reliable (largely because there is little variation in this outcome to begin with in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). Many outcomes' ICCs are quite low, but in combination with reliability information, they suggest that there is significant variation between schools, giving me confidence that my models will help to explain those differences.

#### **5.4 Research Question 1: Within-School Model Results**

With descriptive information in mind, recall that my first research question concerns the extent to which immigrants and native students differ in their civic outcomes based on individual characteristics. In the following sections I first focus on the main effect of immigrant status for individual outcomes, then provide a broad overview of the relationship of home language, civic knowledge and participation, and perception of an open classroom climate to outcomes overall. In Appendix E I provide much more comprehensive interpretation of how each demographic variable is related to different outcomes for immigrant and native students (interactions). Recall that, because HLM involves so many controls and constraints, it is standard practice to interpret findings as significant at the  $p < .10$  level (Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).



### 5.4.1 Civic Knowledge and Skills

Beginning with civic knowledge and skills, in Table 5-7 we see first that, overall, adolescents in western Europe tend to know less than their peers elsewhere in Europe, a noteworthy finding in itself, especially since this is not typical of these countries in international assessments (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001). We also see that, controlling for all other characteristics, in only four countries do immigrant students know significantly less than their native peers: Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Portugal. This gap in knowledge and skills ranges from a twentieth of a standard deviation in Germany ( $\gamma = -0.056, p < .01$ ) to nearly a third of a standard deviation in Portugal ( $\gamma = -.299, p < .001$ ). It seems that other demographic and civic-related characteristics are more strongly associated with civic knowledge than immigrant status, a promising finding.

### 5.4.2 Extracurricular Participation

First, keep in mind that this variable does not include sports, drama, or music; I am focused only on students' participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities. Second, results for this dichotomous outcome are displayed as odds ratios (abbreviated OR). An OR greater than 1.0 indicates greater odds of a student 'scoring' a 1, or in this instance, participating in civic-oriented activities. An OR less than 1.0 indicates lower odds (a.k.a. lower *likelihood*) of participation in those activities.

We see in Table 5-8, reminiscent of the descriptive data, that Norwegian adolescents are the most likely to participate in extracurricular activities (OR = 21.107,  $p < .001$ ), and Slovak adolescents are least likely (OR = .458,  $p < .001$ ). Each of these is

sensible, given the state of civil society in each country: Norway's is highly active, while Slovakia's at this point in time was still recovering from decades of communist prohibition of civil groups (Glenn, 1995, p. 179). Across these countries, there are only a few instances of significant differences in immigrants' and natives' participation rates (Denmark, Italy, Portugal). In each of these three countries, immigrants are much more likely to participate in civic-related activities than their native peers ( $p < .10$ ).

### **5.4.3 Attitudes toward Women's Rights and Opportunities**

Before discussing these results, I wish to be clear about the interpretation for ordinal outcomes like this. It is somewhat counter-intuitive, especially because results for dichotomous outcomes are interpreted oppositely. Ordinal outcomes' results are odds ratios (OR) that represent probabilities of a student falling into a *lower* category versus a higher one. On this measure, a 'lower' category could be the 'low' category versus both the 'middle' and 'high' categories, or it could be the 'low' or 'middle' categories versus the 'high' category.

Analyses of students' attitudes toward women's rights (Table 5-9) show that adolescents in Hungary and Slovakia are, on average, the most likely to fall into a lower (less supportive) category out of these 13 countries (Hungary OR = .760; Slovakia OR = .782). This may be because of women's relatively unequal employment situation and social role under communism, which actually only worsened once capitalism took hold in central Europe (Mertus, 1998). Generally immigrant status is unrelated to this measure, though there are exceptions in Norway, where immigrants are actually more likely than native students to be supportive of women's rights (Norway OR = .749,  $p < .05$ ), and in

Portugal, where immigrants are significantly more likely to be *unsupportive* of women's rights (OR = 2.226,  $p < .05$ ). Note that an OR of .749 indicates that immigrants in Norway are about 25 percent less likely to fall into a lower category. Immigrants' lack of a consistent relationship with attitudes toward women's rights and opportunities contradicts, to some degree, a common perception among European natives that immigrants' cultural values around the role and rights of women are illiberal (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

#### **5.4.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants' Rights and Opportunities**

Results for this outcome (Table 5-10) are particularly interesting because, in part, it measures immigrant students' beliefs about what their own rights and opportunities should be. At first glance, we see that average adolescent support for immigrants' rights and opportunities varies by country: Norwegian, Swedish, and Greek adolescents are more supportive than are Swiss, Danish, and Hungarian adolescents, for example. Perhaps most interesting about this finding is that—at least in Norway—it does not reflect other studies' findings that native Norwegian students generally know very little “about the culture and lifestyles of immigrant groups such as the Vietnamese, the Chileans, the Turks, and the Moroccans” (Stiles & Eriksen, 2003, p. 209).

In seven of thirteen countries, immigrants are significantly more supportive of rights for immigrants, mostly in western and Nordic countries. It is certainly surprising that this is not true across the board, as one would think that immigrant status in any country would give someone cause to be supportive of one's own rights. In the Nordic countries, this may reflect exactly the multiculturalist perspective officials have been

promoting there: immigrants have taken on a sense of their rights because they have been given extraordinary rights. The same may go for the predominantly ethnic Hungarians who are immigrants to Hungary: they are the group that tends to get citizenship most easily and thus may feel more entitled to rights in that country. However, I suspect that different forces are at work in the views of immigrants to Italy: there, though they were clearly needed in the economy at this point in time (1999) and were given occasional easy access to citizenship, they were either given no socializing attention or regarded as a threatening nuisance, a rather schizophrenic approach. Immigrants could understandably desire their rights more strongly in such a country, though the fact that neither Greek nor Portuguese immigrants have similar feelings is odd, since southern European immigration approaches and experiences have been quite similar (Pastore, 2004). These are particularly interesting findings because in Chapter 6 I can pay special attention to school features' relationship with the immigrant/native gap in these countries, hoping to explain some of the variation.

#### **5.4.5 Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities' Rights and Opportunities**

For this outcome (Table 5-11) we see no consistent patterns across regions in attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights to respect and opportunities for education, employment, and political office. In only four countries—England, Switzerland, Denmark, and Italy—are immigrants significantly different in their attitudes from native students, and in only the latter three of those are they more supportive. It is unclear what is driving this finding in these countries, particularly what would make immigrants' attitudes toward ethnic minorities different from their attitudes toward other immigrants

in Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Hungary (the countries where immigrants are also more supportive of immigrants' rights)—perhaps this is a matter of solidarity with other first-generation immigrants without a larger understanding that ethnic minorities tend to be descendants of immigrants. It may be that immigrant groups feel especially different from one another in these countries, as there is wide diversity of immigration flows into them: e.g., East Africans, South Asians, and Middle Easterners meeting Turks and Pakistanis in Norway; Asians, North Africans, and eastern Europeans in Italy (see Table 3-1).

On this outcome, the immigrant/native gap is significantly different between schools in Italy, but in no other country. This means that in all other countries, the difference between immigrants' and natives' attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights is similar no matter what the school context, but in Italy, school features are related to either a bigger or smaller difference.

#### **5.4.6 Patriotism**

I urge readers to consider my previous discussions of 'best traditions' patriotism, and keep in mind that CIVED's construct of patriotism may or may not do justice to that loftier idea of national loyalty. I will discuss this comparison in greater detail in Chapter 8, in light of this study's results.

Of particular note in the results for patriotism (Table 5-12) are the very high levels of patriotism in Greece and Portugal, followed by increasingly low levels in central, Nordic, and western Europe, especially Belgium. Greece and Portugal's high levels might be well explained by their relatively recent democratic transition; as recently

as the mid-1970s, Greek and Portuguese citizens were ruled by authoritarian military regimes. The mark of those regimes seems still to be imprinted in Portuguese textbooks that laud a national identity without much reference to controversial events in the country's past (Menezes, Xavier, Cibebe, Amaro, & Campos, 1999). In Greece, there are few parts of society that operate independent of the state, despite it not being a 'welfare state' like Sweden (Makrinioti & Solomon, 1999). Belgium, oppositely, is fundamentally split into different linguistic 'communities' that have little tolerance or respect for one another, essentially rendering it, as historian Tony Judt wrote, not one "or even two states but an uneven quilt of overlapping and duplicating authorities" (2005, p. 711). As such, the nation of Belgium is barely regarded as worthy of allegiance by its citizens.

However, whereas descriptive information would have us believe that immigrants are uniformly less patriotic, these findings suggest differently. In only seven countries, mainly in western and Nordic Europe, are immigrants significantly less patriotic toward the host country. It is these countries that have the longest history of immigration and also the most strained relationships with their immigrant populations, which makes immigrants' lesser affection for those countries understandable.

As you will see in the Random Effects portion of Table 5-12 in several countries the size and, possibly, direction of the difference between immigrants' and native students' patriotism changes in different kinds of schools (Belgium, England, Germany, Denmark, Italy, and Hungary). With between-school models in Chapter 6 I attempt to explain some of that variation in the immigrant/native patriotism gap.

## 5.5 Research Questions 1a and 1b: The Roles of Other Student-Level Variables

The differential relationships of these other demographic and civic-related variables with immigrants' and native students' civic outcomes are quite complex. So as not to distract from the main theme of this study—immigrants—I have included a thorough discussion of those different relationships in Appendix E. Here I look at how those variables are related to outcomes *overall*, for this study's adolescents *in general*.

### 5.5.1 RQ 1a: Demographics

**Home language.** Where students' home language is different from the school language—i.e., students are multilingual—generally patriotism and civic knowledge and skills are lower, but support of immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights is greater. These findings are understandable if indeed this measure is an indicator of ethnic minority status, or having an immigration background (self, parents, or grandparents who were immigrants). If that is so, then it is sensible that a group identity would lead them to be more supportive of minorities' rights and to have strong ties to an ancestral homeland that impedes somewhat their feelings of patriotism for their current country.

**Time in the country.** Students who have lived in the country longer tend to be less knowledgeable about civics and have less positive views of immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights, but these same students tend to have greater odds of civic participation. Perhaps being a longer-term resident in the country (native or immigrant) engenders apathy toward academic subjects that are outside the usual reading, writing, and arithmetic. Too, longer residence certainly entails greater possible exposure to negative political or social rhetoric related to minority groups.

### **5.5.2 RQ 1b: Civic Knowledge, Participation, and Classroom Climate**

I have found that students' civic-related characteristics—their perception of an open classroom climate, civic knowledge, and extracurricular participation—are significantly related to nearly all civic outcomes. Anywhere students perceive a classroom climate that is more open to discussion, they tend to have greater civic knowledge and skills, stronger patriotism, and more inclusive attitudes toward rights for marginalized groups. Civic knowledge, too, tends to be strongly related to positive attitudes toward marginalized groups, but as expected, is negatively related to patriotism, confirming other studies' findings (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996).

In countries with relatively larger immigrant populations (i.e., western and Nordic Europe), students who participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities appear to be more knowledgeable about civics. In five of this study's countries, students who participate more are also more patriotic, but there are few consistent relationships between participation and self-expression values.

## **5.6 Discussion**

Overall it seems that immigrants are not much different from native students in their civic knowledge and interpretive skills, extracurricular participation or support for ethnic minorities' or women's rights, though they are more supportive of immigrants' rights in more than half of this study's countries. The Nordic countries, Switzerland, and southern European Italy and Portugal stand out somewhat because immigrant adolescents in those nations have *several* significantly different civic outcomes from their native peers. These differences tend to reflect more negatively on the native students, rather



than on immigrants, though. There are not obvious regional patterns, but it is interesting that the central European countries have so few significant differences. Whether this is because of low sample size, or because immigrants are relatively rare in those countries and are thus more easily ‘absorbed’ into society, is unclear.

Regarding immigrants’ occasionally lower levels of patriotism, it may be that in these countries they see themselves as treated differently by the ethnic majority in their countries both socially and politically. Furthermore it is likely that they and their parents have strong emotional and social ties to the country of origin still. Especially in the cases of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, each of which is known for its multiculturalist approach to integration, the fact that immigrants are so much less patriotic than their native peers gives some support to Koopmans’ theory that a stronger multicultural bent leads to less integrated immigrants.

This said, it is rare that immigrant status has one constant, main effect for all immigrants; more often, these students’ outcomes vary by other demographic features. These interesting differential relationships with immigrant status get full treatment in Appendix E.

### **5.6.1 Variation Between Schools**

In addition to learning how several individual characteristics are related to civic outcomes, HLM provides information about how these findings may differ between schools. At the bottom of Tables 5-5 through 5-10, in the Random Effects panel, notice that the variance components for mean outcome levels are statistically significant in nearly all cases. This means that, though my findings may be true of the ‘average’

school, there are significant differences in overall levels between schools, suggesting that elements of the school environment are somehow related to different outcomes.

Additionally, the gap between immigrants' and natives' patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights appears to differ significantly between schools in a few countries. Evidently features of the school environment also make those gaps larger or smaller.

With these findings in mind on students' preparedness for citizenship and life in a social democracy, I build the next set of models to address research question 2 on how school characteristics are related to students' civic outcomes and to the differences between immigrants and native students.

**Table 5-2. Western Europe: Weighted means and standard errors for the analytic sample.**

	Belgium n=1513		England n=2440		Germany n=2639		Switzerland n=2580	
	Native	Imm	Native	Imm	Native	Imm	Native	Imm
Unweighted sample size	1381	132	2311	129	2091	548	2176	404
Weighted percentage of n	91.3	8.7	94.7	5.3	79.1	20.9	84.4	15.6
% Female	51.3	44.4	51.3	46.2	51.6	50.6	51.6	50.0
Age	13.48 (0.02)	13.88*** (0.09)	14.22 (0.01)	14.24 (0.04)	14.29 (0.02)	14.47** (0.05)	14.38 (0.02)	14.74*** (0.04)
Books: %								
Few	30.4	46.7	32.2	31.0	29.3	42.3***	32.1	58.0**
Average	27.8	13.3	30.4	30.0	29.7	29.2	33.3	24.0
Many	41.8	40.0	37.4	39.0	41.0***	28.5	34.6**	18.0
School language at home: %								
Never	1.0	10.5	0.2	3.1	0.3	3.5	1.0	10.3
Sometimes	6.6	21.1	2.5	23.1	2.8	22.1	8.0	43.1
Always	92.3**	68.4	97.3***	73.8	96.9***	74.4	91.1***	46.6
Time in country	--	8.69 (0.43)	--	8.35 (0.44)	--	11.03 (0.18)	--	8.80 (0.20)
Perception of open classroom climate	-0.37 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.09)	0.16* (0.02)	0.05 (0.05)	0.16† (0.02)	0.07 (0.05)
<b><i>Civic Characteristics</i></b>								
Civic knowledge	-0.18 (0.02)	-0.18 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.01)	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.16 (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.27 (0.02)
% Participating in extracurriculars	73.8	77.8	79.1	76.2	59.3	59.2	68.2	57.6
Patriotism	-0.64** (0.03)	-1.01 (0.11)	-0.19*** (0.02)	-0.61 (0.07)	-0.40** (0.03)	-0.57 (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.02)	-0.56 (0.05)
Attitude toward immigrants' rights	0.03 (0.03)	0.21 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.02)	0.09† (0.10)	-0.36 (0.03)	-0.05*** (0.06)	-0.37 (0.02)	0.34*** (0.05)
Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights	0.09 (0.03)	0.13 (0.13)	0.30 (0.02)	0.26 (0.10)	-0.32 (0.03)	-0.02*** (0.06)	-0.32 (0.02)	0.34*** (0.06)
Attitude toward women's rights: %								
Low	41.5	42.1	23.7	31.0	30.3	36.3**	27.6	32.8
Middle	20.5	21.1	23.6	22.5	22.2	23.6	27.0	25.9
High	37.9	36.8	52.7	46.5	47.5**	40.1	45.4	41.4

**Table 5-3. Nordic Europe: Weighted means and standard errors for the analytic sample.**

	Denmark n=2185		Norway n=2517		Sweden n=1903	
	Native	Imm	Native	Imm	Native	Imm
Unweighted sample size	2016	169	2347	170	1625	278
Weighted percentage of n	92.3	7.7	93.6	6.4	89.2	10.8
% Female	48.2	50.0	51.7	50.0	50.0	51.5
Age	14.32 (0.01)	14.42† (0.05)	14.29 (0.01)	14.41** (0.04)	13.82 (0.01)	13.96** (0.05)
Books: %						
Few	25.4	45.5	20.9	40.0	21.5	53.6**
Average	28.5	27.3	27.9	30.0	30.7	21.4
Many	46.2	27.3	51.2	30.0	47.8**	25.0
School language at home: %						
Never	0.6	7.1	0.6	8.3	1.5	15.2
Sometimes	1.2	28.6	2.3	41.7	4.4	39.4
Always	98.2***	64.3	97.1***	50.0	94.1***	45.5
Time in country	--	9.37 (0.30)	--	9.05 (0.33)	--	9.27 (0.32)
Perception of open classroom climate	-0.06 (0.02)	-0.11 (0.08)	0.29† (0.02)	0.16 (0.07)	0.11 (0.03)	0.02 (0.06)
<i>Civic Characteristics</i>						
Civic knowledge	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.23 (0.04)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.21 (0.04)	-0.04*** (0.02)	-0.28 (0.05)
% Participating in extracurriculars	89.1	85.7	93.7	83.3	83.3	81.8
Patriotism	0.01*** (0.02)	-0.41 (0.08)	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.35 (0.07)	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.80 (0.09)
Attitude toward immigrants' rights	-0.20 (0.02)	0.52*** (0.08)	0.19 (0.02)	0.76*** (0.09)	0.36 (0.04)	1.09*** (0.10)
Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights	-0.19 (0.02)	0.26*** (0.08)	0.17 (0.02)	0.31† (0.08)	0.08 (0.03)	0.21 (0.08)
Attitude toward women's rights: %						
Low	23.6	28.6	22.9	27.3	29.3	43.8
Middle	21.8	21.4	21.7	27.3	27.4	25.0
High	54.5	50.0	55.4	45.5	43.3	31.3

**Table 5-4. Southern Europe: Weighted means and standard errors for the analytic sample.**

	Greece n=3256		Italy n=3364		Portugal n=2306	
	Native	Imm	Native	Imm	Native	Imm
Unweighted sample size	3073	183	3292	72	2166	140
Weighted percentage of n	94.4	5.6	97.8	2.2	94.0	6.0
% Female	52.1	57.6	51.4	46.3	51.5	55.6
Age	14.12 (0.01)	14.65*** (0.06)	14.44 (0.01)	15.27*** (0.17)	13.87 (0.02)	14.09* (0.08)
Books: %						
Few	49.4	60.0	54.4	51.1	64.2	62.5
Average	32.4	26.7	28.7	26.7	23.1	29.2
Many	18.3	13.3	16.9	22.2	12.7	8.3
School language at home: %						
Never	0.0	3.0	2.9	14.5	0.2	3.7
Sometimes	0.2	21.2	19.4	23.6	1.6	18.5
Always	99.8***	75.8	77.7***	61.8	98.1***	77.8
Time in country	--	7.69 (0.29)	--	9.19 (0.48)	--	7.87 (0.34)
Perception of open classroom climate	0.21 (0.02)	0.11 (0.07)	0.13† (0.02)	-0.11 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.02)	-0.24 (0.07)
<i><b>Civic Characteristics</b></i>						
Civic knowledge	0.12*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04** (0.01)	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.17 (0.01)	-0.19 (0.03)
% Participating in extracurriculars	89.0	82.4	45.7	59.3*	71.2	74.1
Patriotism	0.84*** (0.02)	0.17 (0.08)	-0.12† (0.02)	-0.32 (0.10)	0.48*** (0.02)	0.17 (0.07)
Attitude toward immigrants' rights	0.30 (0.02)	0.62*** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.01)	0.17† (0.12)	0.16 (0.02)	0.46*** (0.08)
Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights	0.15 (0.02)	0.27* (0.06)	-0.06 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.29 (0.02)	0.33 (0.08)
Attitude toward women's rights: %						
Low	38.5	39.4	37.7	43.6	33.7	32.1
Middle	25.5	24.2	29.0	34.5	31.6	32.1
High	36.0	36.4	33.2	21.8	34.7	35.7

**Table 5-5. Central Europe: Weighted means and standard errors for the analytic sample.**

	Czech Republic n=3236		Hungary n=2346		Slovakia n=3249	
	Native	Imm	Native	Imm	Native	Imm
Unweighted sample size	3178	58	2272	74	3187	62
Weighted percentage of n	98.2	1.8	96.8	3.2	98.2	1.8
% Female	51.4	50.0	51.0	53.8	52.0	66.7
Age	13.89 (0.01)	13.96 (0.11)	13.91 (0.01)	14.07* (0.07)	13.74 (0.01)	13.78 (0.09)
Books: %						
Few	19.7	25.0	21.3	36.4	32.2	40.0
Average	41.0	50.0	26.2	18.2	39.7	40.0
Many	39.4	25.0	52.5	45.5	28.1	20.0
School language at home: %						
Never	0.2	10.0	0.0	7.7	2.0	16.7
Sometimes	0.9	20.0	0.5	0.0	7.7	0.0
Always	98.9***	70.0	99.5***	92.3	90.3*	83.3
Time in country	--	9.73 (0.79)	--	9.13 (0.43)	--	10.8 (0.53)
Perception of open classroom climate	-0.31 (0.02)	0.07* (0.15)	-0.35 (0.02)	-0.45 (0.13)	0.02† (0.02)	-0.20 (0.13)
<b>Civic Characteristics</b>						
Civic knowledge	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.01)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.04 (0.01)	0.00 (0.07)
% Participating in extracurriculars	64.0	50.0	72.0	71.4	30.1	42.9
Patriotism	0.20*** (0.02)	-0.25 (0.12)	0.11 (0.02)	0.08 (0.11)	0.32*** (0.02)	-0.09 (0.12)
Attitude toward immigrants' rights	0.02 (0.02)	0.24 (0.21)	-0.22 (0.02)	0.24*** (0.11)	-0.10 (0.02)	-0.13 (0.09)
Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights	0.02 (0.02)	0.19 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.10)	-0.07 (0.02)	0.09 (0.13)
Attitude toward women's rights: %						
Low	38.4	50.0	44.6	50.0	46.6	50.0
Middle	31.3	30.0	26.5	21.4	32.7	33.3
High	30.3	20.0	29.0	28.6	20.7	16.7

Table 5-6. Fully Unconditional Models: Civic outcomes by country.

	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>Civic knowledge/skills</b>													
Between-schl variance ( $\tau_i$ )	.070***	.046***	.078***	.068***	.016***	.024***	.055***	.049***	.092***	.046***	.123***	.061***	.082***
Level-1 error ( $\sigma^2$ )	.135	.182	.134	.124	.261	.274	.225	.249	.153	.127	.175	.159	.137
Reliability ( $\lambda$ )	.869	.828	.895	.897	.434	.565	.768	.814	.919	.834	.934	.849	.927
ICC	.340	.202	.368	.356	.059	.080	.198	.164	.376	.263	.413	.277	.374
<b>Civic participation</b>													
Between-schl variance ( $\tau_i$ )	.473***	.169***	.374***	.308***	.107	.005	.350***	.172**	.299***	.270***	.157***	.235***	.484***
Level-1 error ( $\sigma^2$ )													
Reliability ( $\lambda$ )	.534	.346	.576	.523	.117	.004	.384	.288	.580	.441	.423	.413	.672
ICC	.126	.049	.102	.086	.031	.001	.096	.050	.083	.076	.046	.067	.128
<b>Women's rights</b>													
Between-schl variance ( $\tau_i$ )	.522***	.116***	.292***	.290***	.033†	.073*	.259***	.171	.534***	.249***	.251***	.131***	.192***
Level-1 error ( $\sigma^2$ )													
Reliability ( $\lambda$ )	.655	.385	.564	.572	.101	.233	.506	.528	.753	.518	.603	.371	.541
ICC	.137	.034	.082	.081	.010	.022	.073	.049	.148	.070	.071	.038	.055
<b>Immigrants' rights</b>													
Between-schl variance ( $\tau_i$ )	.121***	.146***	.182***	.161***	.121***	.075***	.223***	.020***	.066***	.008**	.020***	.028***	.046***
Level-1 error ( $\sigma^2$ )	1.053	1.018	.905	.990	.993	1.270	1.128	.890	.620	.629	.599	.598	.625
Reliability ( $\lambda$ )	.606	.733	.752	.723	.594	.473	.727	.343	.671	.174	.414	.424	.614
ICC	.103	.125	.167	.140	.108	.056	.165	.022	.096	.013	.032	.045	.069
<b>Minorities' rights</b>													
Between-schl variance ( $\tau_i$ )	.159***	.061***	.192***	.169***	.067***	.030***	.052***	.014**	.083***	.045***	.054***	.029***	.056***
Level-1 error ( $\sigma^2$ )	1.119	1.021	1.107	1.039	1.001	.951	.973	.786	.724	.791	.727	.682	.759
Reliability ( $\lambda$ )	.654	.539	.725	.723	.450	.327	.430	.286	.689	.458	.606	.400	.613
ICC	.125	.056	.148	.140	.063	.031	.051	.017	.103	.054	.069	.041	.069
<b>Patriotism</b>													
Between-schl variance ( $\tau_i$ )	.069***	.039***	.143***	.097***	.035***	.044***	.075***	.049***	.038***	.050***	.027***	.026***	.125***
Level-1 error ( $\sigma^2$ )	.846	.852	.876	.876	.768	.812	1.077	.871	.668	.677	.622	.665	.776
Reliability ( $\lambda$ )	.523	.475	.713	.642	.357	.454	.492	.559	.525	.522	.479	.375	.775
ICC	.075	.044	.140	.100	.043	.052	.065	.053	.054	.069	.042	.037	.139

Table 5-7. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills: Within-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	Belgium	England	Germany	Switzerland	Denmark	Norway	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Czech Republic	Hungary	Slovakia
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean civic knldg/skills	-.199***	-.083**	-.111***	-.113***	-.023†	.074**	-.048*	.115***	.041†	-.177***	.167***	-.040†	.127***
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	-.021	.068	-.056**	-.047	-.019	-.091	-.085†	-.093	-.244*	-.299***	-.023	.033	.063
Female <sup>b</sup>	-.006	-.046	-.107***	-.077***	-.121***	-.166*	-.079**	.031	-.024	-.048**	-.104***	-.049**	-.050*
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	.187†		-.084	-.027									
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	-.051		-.069*	-.067*	-.048	-.182†	-.171	-.205***	.014	.000	.240**	-.353***	-.253
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	-.057*	-.175***	-.068***	-.089***	-.167***	-.133**	-.089**	-.148***	-.097***	-.110***	-.147***	-.164***	-.118***
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	.109***	.171***	.090**	.077***	.079**	.165***	.161***	.127**	.045†	.108**	.134***	.144***	.065**
Time in country	-.008	.015†	-.009†	-.004	.021*	.012	-.009	-.010	-.026†	-.048***	-.022†	-.006	-.001
Language: Never <sup>e</sup>	-.163**	-.351†	-.109	-.064	-.242*	-.098	-.239***	-.364**	-.232***	-.030	-.486**	-.173	-.161**
Language: Sometimes <sup>e</sup>	-.189***	-.121**	-.068	-.105***	-.143*	-.213***	-.174***	-.056	-.169***	-.067	.024	-.208*	-.109*
Open climate	.075***	.073***	.055***	.033***	.127***	.107***	.099***	.075***	.072***	.053**	.077***	.055***	.058***
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	.041†	.099***	.060**	.032*	-.009	.176†	.073*	.179***	.008	.011	-.018	.023	.013
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean knldg/skills, $\tau_{00}$	.048***	.026***	.063***	.052***	.010***	.016***	.035***	.036***	.061***	.029***	.096***	.041***	.067***
Level-1 error	.125	.163	.125	.118	.231	.243	.204	.231	.142	.121	.165	.146	.131

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always <sup>f</sup> No extracurricular participation

†  $p < 0.1$  \*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



Table 5-8. Extracurricular participation: Within-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	Belgium	England	Germany	Switzerland	Denmark	Norway	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Czech Republic	Hungary	Slovakia
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean participation	3.076***	4.919***	1.294**	1.915***	8.466***	21.107***	5.936***	8.334***	.826**	2.740***	2.018***	2.863***	.458***
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	1.230	1.461	1.218	1.383	2.559†	1.096	1.329	.913	2.076†	1.936†	.686	.826	1.322
Female <sup>b</sup>	1.122	1.976***	1.404**	1.499***	1.138	2.745***	1.137	1.506*	1.238*	1.107	1.575***	1.221†	1.752***
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	3.224		2.740*										
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.777		.752	1.058		2.594		.642†	1.155	.929	1.431	1.078	
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	.807	.884	.756*	.642***	.653*	.276**	.962	1.007	.860	.591***	.717*	.801	.858
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	2.009***	1.675**	1.705***	.950	1.473*	.893	1.938**	1.129	1.772**	1.052	1.610***	1.104	1.264*
Time in country	1.077	1.100*	1.066†	1.072*	1.152*	1.082	1.034	1.015	.968	1.067	1.045	.935	1.068
Language: Never <sup>c</sup>	1.513	2.179	1.158	.872	.920	2.178	1.254	.448	.718	.627	.302		.740
Language: Sometimes <sup>c</sup>	1.404	2.505*	1.030	.854	.563	.934	1.062	.588	1.140	.942	1.297	1.211	1.050
Open climate	1.091	1.217**	1.046	1.043	1.123	1.160	1.098	1.015	1.034	1.144	1.179**	1.164*	1.080
Civic knowledge	1.372†	1.988***	1.555**	1.355**	.957	2.085	1.353	2.201***	1.124	1.124	.908	1.067	1.073
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean participation, $\tau_{00}$	.450***	.100*	.381***	.285***	.070	.001	.309***	.184**	.266***	.261***	.150***	.238***	.488***

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All estimates are in the form of odds ratios. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always

†  $p < 0.1$  \*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 5-9. Attitude toward women's rights: Within-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	Belgium	England	Germany	Switzerland	Denmark	Norway	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Czech Republic	Hungary	Slovakia
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean odds of less positive attitude	.565***	.228***	.415***	.291***	.243***	.203***	.312***	.544***	.525***	.429***	.449***	.760***	.782***
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	1.237	1.298	1.005	.973	.626	.749*	1.318	.818	.724	2.226*	1.592	1.566	1.668
Female <sup>b</sup>	.246***	.170***	.218***	.177***	.196***	.138***	.230***	.136***	.216***	.463***	.282***	.212***	.401***
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	.602		1.861										
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.528		1.030	1.221	.416	.414	1.353	1.301	1.125	.784	.463	1.077	1.108
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	1.400†	1.252	.927	1.101	1.149	1.220	1.200	1.145	1.214*	1.163†	.905	1.348	1.344**
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	.962	1.191	1.007	.881	.798†	.818*	.966	.959	.817	1.052	1.018	.702***	.910
Time in country	1.043	.964	.963†	.995	.914*	.977	1.041	1.006	1.045	1.145**	.934	1.036	1.038
Language: Never <sup>e</sup>	.969	3.770*	1.058	1.532	.183**	1.277	1.360	2.618*	1.933**	.652	.938	1.304	1.220
Language: Sometimes <sup>e</sup>	1.106	1.354	1.017	.788	.894	.808	.812	1.458	1.230†	1.005	.855	.450	1.288
Open climate	.770**	.736***	.738***	.798***	.756***	.713**	.787***	.788***	.844**	.699***	.793***	.859**	.810***
Civic knowledge	.232***	.396***	.389***	.295***	.316***	.321***	.202***	.172***	.203***	.195***	.419***	.295***	.336***
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	.713**	.893	.831†	.904	.798	.690	1.003	.955	.959	.987	.865	.841	.947
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean attitude, $\tau_{00}$	.218***	.105***	.152***	.229***	.009	.095**	.156***	.120***	.090***	.070**	.166***	.150***	.115***

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All estimates are in the form of odds ratios. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup>Native <sup>b</sup>Male <sup>c</sup>Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup>Average # of books <sup>e</sup>School language at home always <sup>f</sup>No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table 5-10. Attitude toward immigrants' rights: Within-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean attitude	.086†	-.004	-.331***	-.218***	-.101**	.202***	.621***	.315***	-.045*	.194***	.060**	-.219***	-.058*
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	-.096	.083	.105†	.371***	.345*	.583*	.239*	.196	.347†	.048	-.202	.338*	-.038
Female <sup>b</sup>	.216**	.302***	.217***	.387***	.462***	.489***	.323***	.204***	.239***	.048	.253***	.156**	.149***
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	.152		-.157	-.623									
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.373		.030	-.128	.148	.504*	-.667	.172	.052	-.013	.024	.058	.635
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	.020	-.049	-.040	.037	.038	.079	.100	.004	-.056	.073†	-.036	.153*	.019
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	-.081	.004	-.027	.029	.046	.210**	.104†	-.021	-.006	.004	.014	.034	.007
Time in country	-.052**	.008	-.017	-.022†	-.010	.008	-.049*	-.024	-.013	-.036*	-.010	-.034†	.002
Language: Never <sup>c</sup>	.391	.868	.534	.176	.482*	-.291	.252†	.092	.050	.625**	.307	.340	.309**
Language: Sometimes <sup>c</sup>	.399**	.448*	.725***	.647***	.790***	.674**	.435***	-.072	.034	.079	.383	.068	.051
Open climate	.109**	.090*	.186***	.039*	.137***	.209***	.251***	.187***	.155***	.181***	.087***	.094***	.162***
Civic knowledge	.300***	.187**	.308***	.377***	.421***	.313***	.298***	.342***	.328***	.265***	.181***	.138**	.146**
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	-.022	-.001	-.096*	-.026	.083	.262*	.092	-.011	.065*	.024	.093**	.032	-.029
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean attitude, $\tau_{00}$	.093***	.171***	.121***	.133***	.095***	.036***	.145***	.018***	.030***	.008*	.018***	.028**	.042***
Immigrant gap, $\tau_{11}$					.375***			.129*	.465***			.403***	
Level-1 error	1.009	.966	.818	.860	.811	1.092	.985	.795	.559	.590	.559	.559	.592

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always <sup>f</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

**Table 5-11. Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights: Within-school results by region and country.**

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean attitude	.149**	.311***	-.325***	-.179***	-.144***	.158***	.189***	.147***	-.054*	.321***	.080*	-.236***	-.024
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	-.062	-.311†	.117	.505***	.684***	.162	.027	.114	.310†	-.084	-.237	.162	-.139
Female <sup>b</sup>	.392***	.377***	.267***	.454***	.424***	.466***	.183***	.205***	.230***	.167***	.313***	.197***	.178***
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	.073		-.170	-1.748									
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.538†		.025	-.130	.115	.092	.118	-.058	-.108	.123	-.180	-.070	.162
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	.008	-.119*	.011	.055	-.046	.013	.124*	.087*	-.137**	-.030	.028	.209***	-.110**
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	-.113	-.028	.051	.105*	-.028	.165**	.124*	-.030	-.006	-.121†	.016	.127**	.045
Time in country	-.036†	-.031†	-.030*	.002	.063**	-.036	-.012	-.018	.004	-.034*	.017	-.001	-.032
Language: Never <sup>c</sup>	-.024	.142	.381	.275*	.503*	-.269	.024	-.808***	.052	.694**	.338	.131	.222†
Language: Sometimes <sup>c</sup>	.141	.251*	.472**	.466***	.586***	.130	.218**	-.106	-.010	-.054	.277	-.250	.059
Open climate	.152***	.184***	.200***	.075***	.123***	.209***	.225***	.170***	.142***	.176***	.138***	.155***	.165***
Civic knowledge	.474***	.563***	.354***	.396***	.416***	.391***	.544***	.272***	.394***	.502***	.252***	.091*	.230***
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	.053	.108†	-.043	-.050	.073	.366**	.144*	.047	.096**	.034	.045	.071	.060
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean attitude, $\tau_{00}$	.087***	.023***	.108***	.153***	.042***	.015**	.018*	.011**	.032***	.015**	.040***	.030***	.040***
Immigrant gap, $\tau_{11}$									.419**				
Level-1 error	1.035	.864	1.027	.908	.871	.768	.833	.717	.653	.738	.667	.638	.714

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always <sup>f</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table 5-12. Patriotism: Within-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean patriotism	-.672***	-.208***	-.399***	-.290***	-.028	.050	-.397***	.802***	-.089***	.495***	.147***	.112***	.186***
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	-.155	-.481†	-.129	-.221*	-.264†	-.235†	-.234*	-.571***	-.295	-.179	-.019	.041	-.305*
Female <sup>b</sup>	-.019	-.288***	-.435***	-.210***	-.113*	-.252***	-.315***	.133**	-.216***	-.171***	-.113**	-.082*	-.178**
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	-.341**		-.161	.556									
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.468†		-.006	.106	.044	.032	1.622	-.035	-.050	-.074	-.138	.022	-.735**
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	-.083	.028	.065	-.047	-.076	-.033	.194**	.025	.033	-.034	.016	.012	.025
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	-.094	-.177**	-.101†	-.081†	-.023	.017	-.030	-.118	-.051	-.087	.075*	-.005	-.127**
Time in country	.019	-.025	-.007	-.017	.007	.002	.007	-.014	-.015	.022	.013	.013	-.005
Language: Never <sup>c</sup>	-.350	-.856**	-.872**	-.431**	-.004	-.134	-.598***	-.669†	-.029	-.108	-.613**	-.160	-.156
Language: Sometimes <sup>c</sup>	-.389**	-.629***	-.349**	-.388***	-.635***	-.544***	-.381***	-.632**	.094*	-.341**	-.302†	-.277	-.119
Open climate	.101**	.119***	.030	.115***	.078**	.162***	.120***	.225***	.118***	.169***	.105***	.126***	.084**
Civic knowledge	.051	-.071	-.329***	-.179**	-.159**	-.199***	-.161**	.038	-.033	-.045	-.201***	.088*	-.260***
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	.114†	.144*	.069	-.032	.087	.167	-.155*	.077	-.004	.090*	.053	.090†	.092*
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean patriotism, $\tau_{00}$	.050***	.032***	.098***	.072***	.032**	.034***	.064***	.033***	.027***	.044***	.025***	.024***	.089***
Immigrant gap, $\tau_{11}$	.218*	.376***	.129***		.549***				.540***			.263*	
Level-1 error	.807	.790	.807	.842	.701	.766	1.018	.796	.642	.650	.605	.639	.762

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always <sup>f</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

## **Chapter 6**

### **Results: Moderating Effects of Schools**

The findings from within-school models suggest interesting differences between immigrants and native students in several civic outcomes. In all countries, overall levels of these outcomes differ depending on school characteristics. Also in some countries, immigrant/native disparities differ between schools. Thus, with this chapter, I respond to research question 2, aimed at identifying how some characteristics of schools are associated with civic outcomes generally and also with the differences between immigrants and native students on those outcomes. The HLM analyses to answer this question are the between-school models.

Primarily RQ 2 is concerned with the moderating effects that instructional methods (discussion-based vs. traditional lecture/note-taking) have with civic outcomes, but also with the relationships of a school's degree of ethnic heterogeneity (proportion of immigrant students) and socioeconomic composition (average and range of number of books students own). Finding that the relationship between immigrant status and civic outcomes is weaker in certain schools—particularly those characterized by different instructional methods—would be encouraging because it would suggest that immigrant students are not uniformly destined to be civic outsiders. Rather, immigrants' educational contexts help to weave them into the 'social fabric,' including them in youth

civil society. As in Chapter 5, this chapter first describes school-level data, then presents my hypotheses about school features' relationships with outcomes, explains results for each outcome, and summarizes these findings with a discussion of the patterns across countries and outcomes.

## 6.1 Descriptive Information on Schools

Criteria for inclusion in the student sample resulted in students from 1,891 schools across 13 countries (see Table 6-2 on page 191).<sup>52</sup> Recall that in this sample, a school with a relatively high proportion of immigrants has greater than the median proportion in the individual country.<sup>53</sup> Note that, viewed as regions, western European countries have higher proportions of high-immigrant groups than—in order—Nordic, southern, and central European countries.

Looking across countries, average book ownership in schools is highest in central Europe, followed by the Nordic countries, western, and southern Europe (based on standard scores created using all thirteen countries' data at once, purely for comparison's sake). Portuguese schools have the lowest average number of books per student, while Czech schools have the highest. Average 'inequality' (a standardized score representing the range of the number of books students own in a school) is lowest overall in central Europe, and highest in Belgium.

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<sup>52</sup> HLM is sensitive to the number of schools within each country. In this sample, the mean number of schools is 147.6, while the range is 105-173 schools per country.

<sup>53</sup> I include in Table 6-2 the proportions of immigrants based on the international median (7.4 percent), as well, as a means of understanding how these countries compare to each other. There are far more schools with high proportions of immigrants in western Europe, followed by the Nordic, southern, and central European countries. In Germany almost 90 percent of schools have a high proportion of immigrants, whereas in Czech Republic, fewer than 17 percent do.

There are large differences between countries in how students characterize their classroom climate (in terms of traditional instruction or an open, discussion-based climate).<sup>54</sup> In some, highly open climates accompanied by highly traditional instruction seem to dominate (e.g., Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), while in others, a combination of little discussion and little traditional instruction is most prevalent (e.g., Belgium, England, Norway, and Sweden).

**Table 6-1. Descriptive characteristics of schools: Pooled data (all 13 countries). N=1,891**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
High proportion immigrants <sup>a</sup>	0.51			
Average books	-0.04	1.00	-3.25	2.21
Range of books	0.03	1.00	-3.59	3.60
<i>Instructional methods</i>				
Low openness/ Low traditional <sup>a</sup>	0.28			
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>a</sup>	0.23			
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>a</sup>	0.24			
High openness/ High traditional <sup>a</sup>	0.25			

<sup>a</sup> Dichotomous variable where the mean indicates the proportion represented in the sample of 1,891 schools.

A grand overview, Table 6-1, shows that roughly half of the schools across these thirteen countries have high proportions of immigrants, 28 percent are characterized by a less open climate *and* little traditional instructional methods in civics, while in a fourth of

<sup>54</sup> I also include in Table 6-2—for comparative purposes—the percentages of schools in each country that would fall into each category of instructional methods combinations based on all thirteen countries' data taken together (so there's a cross-national understanding of what constitutes high openness/high traditional, etc.). More than 50 percent of Belgian, Danish, and Portuguese schools are characterized by civic instruction that is not very open *and* has little lecture or note-taking, suggesting that students in those schools get very little civic instruction. Oppositely, more than 50 percent of students in Greece characterize their instruction as being both highly open and highly traditional, suggesting an equal mix of instructional methods. Compared to other countries, Belgian, Portuguese, and Hungarian adolescents experience the least open classroom climate in the sample.



schools, students characterize their instruction as highly open with much traditional instruction.

## **6.2 Hypotheses**

### **6.2.1 Instructional Methods**

The characteristic of schools with the most obvious policy implications is method of instruction. Where teachers use more interactive, student-oriented instruction, students have higher civic knowledge and participation. Based on several studies' findings on differences between ethnic minorities/immigrants and native students (Reimers, 2005; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009), I expect that in classrooms characterized as having a more 'open' (interactive, student-oriented) climate, there are smaller differences between immigrants' and natives' civic knowledge, values, and participation. Indeed, if such classrooms foster a respect for discussion and other's opinions, this could also be indirectly associated with greater overall levels of patriotism (Flanagan et al., 2007). Of course, as noted in Willms (2006), in cross-sectional data, outcomes are really "cumulative effects of all factors that bear on a child's...development from birth," which makes it hard to say that data about students' classes in just one year of their schooling has much to do with their outcomes, unless one assumes that teachers in a school or school district tend to have similar pedagogical inclinations (p. 55).

### **6.2.2 Other School Characteristics**

**Ethnic heterogeneity.** Investigating the relationship of proportion of immigrants to overall levels of civic outcomes and disparities between immigrants and natives is an

attempt at finding evidence either of the Contact or Conflict theories. I predict that immigrant/native differences in attitudes toward marginalized groups will be smaller in high-immigrant-population schools because of more frequent contact with multiple cultures. Mikael Hjerm (2005) supports this with his finding that native Swedish students who attended an “immigrant-dense” school tended to have a lower likelihood of xenophobia. One can reasonably expect immigrant students to have more positive attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities solely by being a member of those groups. In addition, I hypothesize that immigrant students in schools with larger immigrant populations may have lower civic knowledge than immigrant peers in low-immigrant-population schools. Likely this would be due to lesser access to good teachers and resources, as well as linguistic or cultural difficulties with the expectations of schools, which may proxy for low social integration (Kokkonen, Esaiasson, and Gilljam’s 2008 study using CIVED’s Swedish data found this to be true).

**Socioeconomic composition.** Remember that in this study, the number of books in students’ homes proxies for socioeconomic status, in the absence of a more complete measure. Socioeconomic composition is important to any study of schooling systems “because it is directly relevant to issues concerning the manner in which students are allocated to schools, classrooms and instructional groups” (Willms, 2006, p. 46). It has been documented internationally that higher SES students attend schools with smaller class sizes and better physical resources and teachers (Buruma, 2011; Rothstein, 2004; Willms, 2006). In schools with high-SES peers, students stand to benefit from peers’ *parents’* intellectual and social capital as well as more strongly qualified teachers who tend to use more effective teaching methods (Chiu, 2010; Rowan, Correnti, & Miller,

2002). Thus I hypothesize that in schools where the average number of books in students' homes is higher, immigrant students are more similar to their native-born peers on civic outcomes.

Socioeconomic diversity, on the other hand, indicated by a wider distribution of the number of books within a school, may intensify differences between immigrants and native students in values, for reasons similar to those of national income inequality: lesser social cohesion and greater differences in material security.

### **6.3 Research Question 2: Between-School Model Results**

Results from the within-school models showed that the size of the gap between immigrant and native students varies between schools in some countries on three civic outcomes: patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights. These findings suggest that characteristics of schools are associated with significantly larger or smaller gaps between these groups on those outcomes. Within-school models for the remaining three outcomes—civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, and attitudes toward women's rights—showed that differences between immigrant and native-born students are constant across schools in all countries, which means that regardless of educational context, the gap (or lack thereof) in scores between immigrants and native students is always the same. On all outcomes, overall scores vary between schools, which means that features of those contexts are associated with differences in students' overall mean scores.

For every outcome, I investigate the relationships of school features with the average, overall student score, focusing on the role of instructional methods. I also study


those relationships in countries with a significant variance across schools in the immigrant/native ‘gap.’ These are essentially cross-level interactions of school with student characteristics. I begin by reviewing results for those outcomes whose ‘immigrant gaps’ are constant across schools. Note that all tables show just the results for schools’ relationships with the overall score and the immigrant/native gap. Other individual-level characteristics are not shown, as they were discussed in Chapter 5.

### 6.3.1 Civic Knowledge and Interpretive Skills

**Instructional methods.** Beginning with students’ civic knowledge and skills, I refer to Table 6-3. There are no consistent patterns across countries, but in western and southern Europe the trend seems to be that highly open classrooms are related to higher civic knowledge and skills scores, compared to students in schools with little traditional instruction *and* little discussion, which is anything but an average kind of school (e.g., students in Belgian schools with any instruction that is highly discussion-based increase their scores about .13 or .14 of a standard deviation:  $\gamma = .127$  and  $.136$ ,  $p < .05$ ; see Figure 6-1). Students in schools with a less open climate for discussion generally score lower than students in schools with highly open classrooms. Scores increase from between .07 and .17 of a standard deviation across these countries.

**Other school characteristics.** Ethnic heterogeneity is negatively related in the Czech Republic and Hungary, and very weakly positively related in Norway, but has no significant relationship with average civic knowledge in any other country. This means that students in high-immigrant Czech or Hungarian schools tend to be less knowledgeable than peers in low-immigrant schools, while students in high-immigrant

Norwegian schools tend to know somewhat more than peers in low-immigrant schools. Taking account of all student characteristics and all other school characteristics, higher average book ownership among students in a school is related to a significantly higher score in civic knowledge and skills in 12 of 13 countries (Denmark is the exception). Oppositely, as expected, a greater range of students' number of books is related to a



slight decrease in student scores in nine countries (including Denmark).

**Figure 6-1. The relationship of instructional methods to civic knowledge and interpretive skills in Belgium.**

Recall from Chapter 5 that these between-school models are meant to help explain the differences in overall outcomes that exist between schools. The change in the between-school variance components indicates the extent to which these models explain differences between schools in civic knowledge and skills scores for European

adolescents.<sup>55</sup> Table 6-9 provides an overview of these variance components and the percent variance explained by the between-school model for each country's overall civic outcome. Across countries these models explain between 30 and 69 percent of the differences that exist in students' overall civic knowledge and skills between schools.<sup>56</sup>

### 6.3.2 Extracurricular Participation

As Table 6-4 suggests, the features of schools that I include in my study have very little to do with average participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities. In just three countries—Sweden, Greece, and Hungary—students in highly open classrooms that have a complementary emphasis on traditional instruction have significantly higher odds of participation than their peers in any other kind of classroom. Of course, in these countries, average participation is already exceedingly high, anyway, so these differences, while significant, are not large. Additionally, students in more ethnically heterogeneous schools tend to participate more in Belgium, Greece, and Slovakia (Belgian OR = 1.514,  $p < .10$ ; Greek OR = 1.411, Slovak OR = 1.399,  $p < .05$ ).

With just these few findings, it is not surprising that these models explain a very low proportion of the variance that exists between schools in students' rate of extracurricular participation. They explain only 1.4 percent of between-school variance in Denmark, but as much as 32 percent in England (see Table 6-9).<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> If  $\tau_{\text{WITHIN}}$  = between-school variance component of the overall mean in the within-school model and  $\tau_{\text{BETWEEN}}$  = between-school variance component of the intercept in the between-school model, then:

$$\text{Proportion of between-school variance explained} = (\tau_{\text{WITHIN}} - \tau_{\text{BETWEEN}}) / \tau_{\text{WITHIN}}$$

<sup>56</sup> Allow for some rounding error, as the variance components HLM provides go to the hundred-thousandths place (five decimal points) and I have listed only three, through the thousandths place.

<sup>57</sup> You will note that in several countries, the between-school variance component from the between-school model is larger than that from the within-school model and in these instances I have left the variance explained blank. There are several possible causes of a negative value for explained variance: 1) The

### 6.3.3 Attitudes toward Women's Rights and Opportunities

Recall that with this ordinal outcome (Table 6-5), results can only be interpreted as they relate to the probability of students falling into a lower category versus a higher one. There are few significant findings: between-school results for attitudes toward women's rights suggest that instructional methods are highly salient in just four countries. All else being equal, in Norway, Italy, and Portugal, students in schools that are characterized by highly discussion-based teaching tend to have lower odds of falling into a less supportive category than students in schools characterized by little discussion and little traditional instruction (see Figure 6-2 for Norway's example; lower bars indicate greater support for women's rights). This means they are even more likely to have more tolerant attitudes than students in schools with little discussion. Interestingly, the opposite is true for Swiss schools with those characteristics ( $OR = 1.512, p < .05$ ).

With such limited findings, these models generally explain only a small amount of the difference that exists between schools in students' attitudes. Variance explained ranges from just 2 percent in Italy to an astounding 57 percent in Norway.

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interaction terms included in the within-school model explain variance that is unaccounted for in the between-school model (since that model focuses on the main effect of immigrant status). 2) These models are complex and anomalies are more likely in complex models. I have not included aggregates of all individual characteristics at the school level to conserve degrees of freedom, though this occasionally fixes problems of negative variance explained (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p. 152).




Figure 6-2. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' attitudes toward women's rights in Norway.

### 6.3.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants' Rights and Opportunities

Recall from Chapter 5 that—on this and the next two outcomes—there are several countries in which the size of the gap between immigrant and native students significantly varies across schools. In some of those instances, those gaps are not significant overall, but because I am interested in investigating the relationship of various instructional methods with students' outcomes, I believe it is worthwhile to look at those individual relationships with the immigrant gap.

**Instructional methods.** In Table 6-6, we see that results for instructional methods are mixed. In five countries, students in schools characterized by at least some highly discussion-based instruction are more tolerant of immigrants' rights, though English and Swiss adolescents are less tolerant if they experience highly open classrooms



(for example, England high openness/low traditional  $\gamma = -.347, p < .05$  [see Figure 6-3]; Switzerland high openness/low traditional  $\gamma = -.409, p < .001$ ).




Figure 6-3. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' attitudes toward immigrants' rights in England.

Interestingly, in Hungary, instruction has little to do with *average* attitudes, but is highly salient for immigrant students: as shown in Figure 6-4, these students already have significantly more positive attitudes toward immigrants' rights if they attend schools with little discussion and little traditional instruction, but their attitudes are substantially more positive if they attend a school with highly open classrooms (either high openness/low traditional  $\gamma = .699, p < .05$  or high openness/high traditional  $\gamma = .494, p < .10$ ).




Figure 6-4. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' attitudes toward immigrants' rights in Hungary.

**Other school characteristics.** Mostly in western and Nordic Europe we see instances of students in high-immigrant schools being significantly more supportive of immigrants' rights than students in low-immigrant schools (as much as a third of a standard deviation more in Sweden;  $\gamma = .315, p < .01$ ), lending support to Contact theory in those regions. This tends not to be true of schools in southern and central Europe, however. In five of six countries with a significant relationship between school average book ownership and attitudes toward immigrants' rights, it is clear that in schools with higher average book ownership, average attitudes are less positive (e.g., Belgium  $\gamma = -.173, p < .01$ ). In Greece and Italy circumstances are somewhat different for immigrant students: in those countries, attitudes toward immigrants' rights increase significantly for

immigrants in schools with higher average book ownership (Greece  $\gamma = .289, p < .01$ ).

In Greece and Italy these models explain practically none of the variance between schools on *overall* attitudes toward immigrants' rights (allowing for rounding error; see footnote 56). But in other countries, these features of schools are clearly important in describing how adolescents experience the world. In Norway and Portugal these models explain more than 45 percent of the between-school variance in the overall outcome (see Table 6-9). The inclusion of these school variables helps to explain all of the variance between schools in the size of the Greek immigrant/native gap, but very little of the Italian gap. This is an interesting finding in itself, that such considerations are highly meaningful in one country, but leave much to be explained in another.

### **6.3.5 Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities' Rights and Opportunities**

**Instructional methods.** The effects of school contexts on student attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights are not exactly the same as those on attitudes toward immigrants' rights, an interesting finding in itself, since ethnic minority groups tend to include people with immigrant backgrounds (Table 6-7). Findings are again inconsistent for instructional methods. In six countries, a highly open, discussion-based classroom climate is related to more supportive attitudes (as in Belgium:  $\gamma = .304, p < .05$  and  $\gamma = .232, p < .10$ ). In two others, such a climate for discussion is related to *less* support for ethnic minorities (as in Switzerland, shown in Figure 6-5:  $\gamma = -.391, p < .001$  and  $\gamma = -.374, p < .001$ ).

**Other school characteristics.** Whereas students in high-immigrant schools in western and Nordic Europe tend to be significantly more tolerant of rights for ethnic minorities, the opposite is true of such students in the Czech Republic. In Belgium and Hungary, students attending schools with higher average book ownership are less supportive of ethnic minorities' rights. This is also true of immigrants in Italy, the only country where the difference between immigrants' and natives' attitudes toward ethnic minorities varies across schools. There, immigrants' support of rights for ethnic minorities is significantly weaker if they attend schools with little traditional instruction and little discussion, but that also have higher than average book ownership.




Figure 6-5. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights in Switzerland.

These models explain as much as a third of the variance that exists between schools in Swedish students' attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights (38.9%), but

practically no between-school variance is explained in Denmark, Hungary, or Slovakia. As in attitudes toward immigrants' rights, there is still much between-school variation to be explained in the gap between Italian immigrants' and native students' attitudes.

### 6.3.6 Patriotism

**Instructional methods.** Instruction has no clear pattern of relationship with students' patriotism. In Belgium (least patriotic), Greece (most patriotic), and Portugal, a highly open climate for discussion accompanied by much traditional instruction appears to be significantly related to greater average patriotism. Generally, immigrants in schools with little traditional instruction *and* little discussion have significantly more negative views of their host country. However, a *highly* open climate with little traditional instruction also has a negative relationship with immigrants' patriotism in Denmark ( $\gamma = -$




Figure 6-6. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' patriotism in Portugal.

.480,  $p < .10$ ) and Italy ( $\gamma = -.789, p < .05$ ). For the sake of comparison, consider the relationship of instruction to patriotism in two quite different countries: Portugal (Figure 6-6) and Denmark (Figure 6-7). Whereas in Portugal there are no significant differences between immigrants' and native students' patriotism, regardless of the type of school students attend, it is clear that in Denmark, instruction is quite significant.

**Other school characteristics.** Taking account of all other characteristics, in more than half of these countries, students in schools with higher average book ownership tend to be less patriotic. In Italy this is a particularly negative situation for immigrant students, who are already significantly less patriotic than their native peers. Immigrants' attachment to the host country is almost two times weaker if they attend schools with peers who have higher than average access to books ( $\gamma = -.328, p < .01$ ).




Figure 6-7. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' patriotism in Denmark.

In England, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, these models explain only a small amount of the between-school differences that exist in students' overall levels of patriotism (less than 5 percent in each case), while in Belgium, Greece, and Slovakia, the models explain more than 20 percent and as high as 50 percent (see Table 6-9). In countries where the difference between immigrants' and native students' patriotism varies between schools, these models explain either very little (Germany) or about half (England and Italy) of the between-school variance in that gap, which means there is still much variation to be explained with features of schools that are not included in my models (see Table 6-10).

## **6.4 Discussion**

In studying the moderating effect of the educational environment on students' civic outcomes, there are very few uniform findings. However, having presented results for individual outcomes, here I streamline discussion of those outcomes according to the independent variables I considered in RQ 2.

### **6.4.1 Instructional Methods**

Of greatest interest are the relationships of various instructional methods to these outcomes, as instruction can be easily affected by policy changes and professional development. In western and southern European countries we see that a strong focus on discussion has a significant, positive relationship with students' civic knowledge, while in western and Nordic Europe, the same focus tends to be related to greater support for ethnic minorities' rights and opportunities. Students in those classrooms are more

knowledgeable and more pro-minorities' rights than students in classrooms with little discussion and little traditional instruction. (To be sure, it is unclear what the latter type of classroom actually looks like, as its label connotes very few opportunities for students to learn anything at all.) These methods tend to have the same effects for immigrants as for native students, which is another positive finding. It is interesting that these findings do not hold across all regions; perhaps because western and southern countries' levels of knowledge are comparably lower than Nordic and central countries', open classrooms have the greatest opportunity to improve outcomes in those regions.

However, in England and Switzerland, a strong emphasis on discussion is *negatively* related to overall attitudes toward immigrants. While I don't wish to overemphasize unexpected findings in just two countries, previous research does tend to show that more open classrooms engender more tolerant attitudes (Avery et al., 1992; Hahn, 1998; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009). However, negative consequences of an open classroom are not unheard of, as Carole Hahn has pointed out. In her review of literature on open classrooms, she presented several studies that found negative relationships with students' trust and tolerance, suggesting that in environments where "frank expressions of negative feelings" are permitted, they reinforce each other, essentially breeding more negative attitudes (1991, p. 473). As educational sociologist Valerie Lee put it, "There are ways to promote tolerance without letting a thousand flowers bloom, because some of them are poison ivy" (personal communication, June 27, 2011). While this is an important point, I believe there is somewhat more explanation required here and suggest two points for consideration.

First, remember that these students are adolescents at the very beginning of



secondary school. They are at an age where they are quite likely to take on the beliefs of their parents or peers as if they were their own, to repeat what they hear at home as their own opinions, without much concern for evidence or reason (Beck & Jennings, 1991). Second, and compounding the potential negative effects of the first point, productive discussions are actually quite difficult to lead (D. Hess & Gatti, 2010). Given these two points, it is interesting that there are *just* two countries in which open classrooms are related to more negative attitudes.

We know that in the late 1990s there were strong feelings about immigration in both England and Switzerland, just as there were in every other western European country. Commonwealth immigrants to England had been arriving since the end of World War II and native-born English people and politicians had great difficulty over those decades accepting and dealing with their arrival and attempts to integrate. At least since the 1960s, with Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech, immigration has been a hot topic in the United Kingdom. The Swiss experienced dramatic surges in immigrant numbers in the late 1990s, largely refugees from Kosovo, but also Iraqi Kurds and Congolese, who radically changed the perceived purpose of immigration to the country, as well as the demographic make-up of newcomers. In each country there were difficult political debates about immigration questions, and it is feasible that these debates were the topic of conversations in the home and at school (Afonso, 2004; Thränhardt, 1995).

From CIVED we actually have no information about how well teachers guide the discussions their students claim to engage in. We cannot actually know whether teachers are able to structure the class environment for productive debates of the kind that support democracy. What these results suggest is that in English and Swiss schools, there tends

not to be much structure in these discussions: everyone has an opinion, and overly nationalistic, negative ones about immigrants or ethnic minorities may be given just as much credibility as positive ones (in the interest of ‘respect’). Of course, too, it is possible that the measure of instructional methods I have created is not very strong and thus my findings may be unreliable.

#### **6.4.2 Other School Characteristics**

**Ethnic heterogeneity.** This measure—operationalized as high versus low proportions of immigrants in a school—has only a couple of significant relationships with civic outcomes, but they are compelling. It is related to more positive attitudes toward immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, a generally logical finding, except that this relationship is concentrated in western and Nordic Europe. With ethnic heterogeneity as a proxy for intercultural contact, Contact theory would suggest that in more heterogeneous schools, students have increased interactions with students from other cultures and ethnicities, which leads to greater understanding and tolerance of those groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Perhaps immigrants at this point in time were not yet seen societally as a threat to southern and central Europeans’ ways of life, and thus greater or lesser contact with immigrants was a negligible aspect of those students’ lives. Future studies would do well to use data on students’ countries of origin (not generally available in CIVED), as those data indicate the cultures from which immigrant students come, which could help build some understanding of how diverse ethnic groups are within schools as well as whether these relationships differ across those groups.

**Average number of books in students’ homes.** We see that students overall—

native and immigrant—tend to have significantly greater civic knowledge when they attend schools with higher average book ownership, but in several countries those same students are less tolerant of immigrants’ rights, including Belgium, England, Switzerland, Norway, Portugal, and the Czech Republic. The first point confirms other CIVED-based studies’ findings and, if one considers the school average of books in students’ homes as a proxy for socioeconomic composition, it is not particularly surprising because higher SES schools typically have more resources and better teachers (Baldi et al., 2001). One possible explanation is that, since adolescents in schools with higher average book ownership also have greater civic knowledge, they are also more conscious of how rights for minorities might have social and political ramifications for *them*, and therefore feel less supportive.

In Greece and Italy, in schools with higher ‘book averages,’ too, there tends to be a wider gap between immigrants and native students in attitudes toward immigrants’ rights, such that immigrants in those schools are more supportive. It seems likely that in those schools with higher average book ownership, immigrants may feel particularly different from their native peers (especially if they do not themselves have great access to books at home), or experience native peers’ rejection, and thus cling harder to their social group. This turn toward the ethnic group might enhance their support for immigrants’ rights. Why this is only true in two southern European countries is unclear, however.

This set of between-school models has given insight into how school characteristics are related to students’ preparedness for citizenship and social democracy, though certainly school characteristics appear to have much less to do with immigrants’ sociopolitical integration than I had expected. Just looking at effects’ significance across

countries in Tables 6-3 to 6-8, one can see clear differences between nations in these relationships. In Chapter 7, the final analyses address these national differences in response to research question 3. The addition of national characteristics to models for students' civic outcomes will begin to help us understand what underlies international variation in *overall* outcomes and how features of the national environment might be related to *immigrants'* outcomes.

Table 6-2. Descriptive information for schools.

	Belgium	England	Germany	Switzerland	Denmark	Norway	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Czech Republic	Hungary	Slovakia
N	105	122	158	151	173	150	133	142	171	149	148	144	145
% High proportion of immigrants	<b>50.2</b> 75.2	<b>52.9</b> 53.3	<b>48.7</b> 88.6	<b>46.7</b> 82.8	<b>46.6</b> 65.9	<b>47.1</b> 51.3	<b>43.7</b> 58.6	<b>48.7</b> 48.6	<b>41.6</b> 31.0	<b>42.1</b> 45.0	<b>33.6</b> 16.9	<b>41.3</b> 29.2	<b>33.9</b> 17.9
Average book ownership <sup>a</sup>	-0.02 (0.97)	-0.00 (0.78)	0.07 (0.96)	-0.06 (0.87)	0.30 (0.61)	0.61 (0.59)	0.29 (0.85)	-0.65 (0.67)	-0.81 (0.88)	-1.30 (0.94)	0.70 (0.64)	0.53 (0.88)	0.27 (0.82)
Range of book ownership <sup>a</sup>	0.57 (1.03)	0.39 (0.90)	0.07 (1.00)	0.02 (0.94)	0.52 (0.95)	0.03 (0.81)	0.11 (0.95)	0.19 (0.86)	0.20 (0.76)	-0.12 (0.97)	-0.85 (0.82)	-0.29 (1.13)	-0.50 (0.83)
<i>Instructional Methods: %</i>													
Low openness/ Low traditional	<b>36.2</b> 56.3	<b>38.1</b> 49.9	<b>25.0</b> 18.5	<b>23.1</b> 38.2	<b>27.2</b> 56.7	<b>33.1</b> 15.4	<b>30.0</b> 21.2	<b>29.1</b> 13.9	<b>27.7</b> 28.9	<b>26.8</b> 51.6	<b>26.8</b> 30.9	<b>24.8</b> 1.9	<b>18.4</b> 10.1
Low openness/ High traditional	<b>15.0</b> 27.7	<b>17.5</b> 15.6	<b>21.3</b> 16.9	<b>29.2</b> 2.9	<b>22.7</b> 3.6	<b>20.3</b> 14.7	<b>25.6</b> 14.7	<b>21.9</b> 10.0	<b>22.8</b> 11.7	<b>22.0</b> 23.6	<b>18.5</b> 29.3	<b>23.3</b> 84.1	<b>28.8</b> 35.9
High openness/ Low traditional	<b>17.1</b> 8.3	<b>17.7</b> 17.2	<b>26.1</b> 23.9	<b>27.2</b> 52.5	<b>22.0</b> 37.2	<b>21.2</b> 25.4	<b>21.3</b> 33.7	<b>18.2</b> 18.3	<b>25.2</b> 36.1	<b>18.3</b> 19.1	<b>21.6</b> 9.0	<b>18.2</b> 0.0	<b>29.5</b> 11.4
High openness/ High traditional	<b>31.8</b> 7.6	<b>26.7</b> 17.3	<b>27.6</b> 40.7	<b>20.6</b> 6.5	<b>28.0</b> 2.4	<b>25.4</b> 44.5	<b>23.2</b> 30.4	<b>30.9</b> 57.8	<b>24.3</b> 23.4	<b>32.8</b> 5.8	<b>33.1</b> 30.8	<b>33.7</b> 14.0	<b>23.3</b> 42.6

Notes: Numbers in **bold** are within-country descriptive data; regular text indicates cross-national descriptive data

<sup>a</sup> Within countries, all means are 0 and standard deviations are 1, and thus descriptive information is not listed for these two variables. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 6-3. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills: Between-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
<i>Mean knowledge/skills</i>	-.197***	-.081***	-.130***	-.124***	-.029*	.061***	-.045*	.109***	.051**	-.192***	.160***	-.037*	.104***
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>	-.028	.033	.023	-.050	.009	.060†	-.054	-.034	-.046	-.016	-.102*	-.048†	.066
School Avg. Books	.093***	.121***	.201***	.126***	.028	.076**	.092***	.136***	.169***	.127***	.184***	.127***	.156***
School Book Range	-.040†	-.029	-.009	-.052**	-.042*	.002	-.038†	-.021†	-.055***	-.044*	-.084***	-.051*	-.019
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.031	-.031	.068	.029	.012	.010	.081†	.025	.071	-.019	.009	-.010	.057
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.127*	.037	.045	.077†	.034	-.006	.016	.172***	.079†	-.007	-.030	-.040	.054
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.136*	.002	.116*	.076†	.030	.106†	.069	.004	.165**	.084*	.113	.035	.081
<i>Immigrant gap</i> <sup>c</sup>	-.015	.058	-.056*	-.042	-.021	-.102	-.076	-.087	-.232†	-.278***	-.027	.039	.047
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean knldg/skills, $\tau_{00}$	.030***	.009***	.026***	.025***	.007**	.009***	.022***	.016***	.023***	.009***	.031***	.016***	.038***
Level-1 error	.125	.163	.125	.118	.231	.243	.205	.230	.142	.121	.165	.146	.131

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup>Low percent immigrants <sup>b</sup>Low openness & little traditional instruction <sup>c</sup>Native

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table 6-4. Extracurricular participation: Between-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
<i>Mean odds of participation</i>	3.072***	4.967***	1.328**	1.912***	8.466***	21.417***	6.134***	8.672***	.825**	2.742***	2.018***	2.808***	.445***
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>	1.514†	1.132	1.107	.913	1.055	1.172	1.207	1.411*	.882	.986	.934	1.105	1.399*
School Avg. Books	1.061	1.018	.892	1.039	1.034	.927	1.173	.914	1.118†	1.015	1.060	.789†	1.037
School Book Range	.937	.757**	1.099	1.003	.994	1.086	1.248†	.872*	1.080	.904	1.003	.923	.947
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	1.045	.916	1.201	.740	.767	.624*	1.146	1.276	1.233	.582*	.830	1.212	1.072
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	1.635	1.213	1.251	.813	1.007	1.045	.934	1.160	1.142	.889	.817	1.007	1.173
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	1.337	.949	.697	.837	.953	.800	1.817†	1.391†	1.354	.929	.857	1.473†	.589†
<i>Immigrant gap</i> <sup>c</sup>	1.173	1.377	1.186*	1.409	2.548†	1.124	1.170	.833	2.182†	1.933†	.690	.794	1.228
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean participation, $\tau_{00}$	.404***	.068†	.339***	.293***	.069	.003	.296***	.156**	.255***	.232***	.155***	.227***	.441***

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All estimates are in the form of odds ratios. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Low percent immigrants <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction <sup>c</sup> Native

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table 6-5. Attitude toward women's rights: Between-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
<i>Mean odds of less positive attitude</i>	.562***	.226***	.420***	.296***	.241***	.189***	.310***	.543***	.528***	.430***	.438***	.752***	.771***
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>	.853	1.034	.995	1.024	.991	.839	.956	1.015	1.022	1.070	1.174	.838	.936
School Avg. Books	1.010	1.089	.968	.910	1.021	1.203†	.848*	.960	.877*	1.066	.942	.860	1.084
School Book Range	1.009	1.006	.942	1.032	.981	1.043	1.015	.991	.978	1.073	.974	.776**	1.042
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.895	.908	.843	1.108	1.079	.819	1.050	1.222	1.019	.990	.635*	.892	1.047
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.882	1.021	.713	1.281	.883	.662*	1.286	.794	.829†	.852	.889	.812	1.164
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.773	.862	.761	1.512*	1.022	.682*	.911	.967	.924	.791†	.947	1.048	.986
<i>Immigrant gap<sup>c</sup></i>	1.262	1.263	1.007	.982	.608†	.806	1.339	.814	.702	2.175*	1.546*	1.714	1.682
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean attitude, $\tau_{00}$	.250***	.116***	.154***	.218***	.025	.041	.142***	.117***	.088**	.074**	.150***	.137***	.118***

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All estimates are in the form of odds ratios. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Low percent immigrants <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction <sup>c</sup> Native

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001



Table 6-6. Attitude toward immigrants' rights: Between-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
<i>Mean attitude</i>	.097*	-.035	-.340***	-.228***	-.101**	.233***	.641***	.317***	-.044*	.201***	.065**	-.218***	-.061*
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>	.130	.217*	.119	.136†	.150*	.182**	.315**	.004	.038	.073†	-.019	.072	.026
School Avg. Books	-.173**	-.107*	-.008	.072*	.015	-.086*	.004	-.014	-.031	-.060**	-.051†	.051	.010
School Book Range	-.101†	-.014	-.034	.004	.033	-.024	.018	.003	.000	-.023	-.033	.098*	-.005
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.196	-.202†	-.025	.023	.014	.173*	.220*	-.069	.118†	-.103*	.115*	.029	.074
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.210	-.347*	.169	-.409***	.032	.136†	.224†	-.086	.042	.046	-.101	.013	-.018
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.260*	-.311*	.070	-.335**	.013	.048	.256*	.003	.117†	.138*	.000	.006	.031
<i>Immigrant gap</i> <sup>c</sup>	-.107	.080	.089	.343**	.362*	.528*	.188†	.216	.348	.009	-.194	.395*	-.045
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>					.140			.030					
School Avg. Books					-.030			.289**	.249*			-.160	
School Book Range					.059			-.148	-.175			.025	
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>					.085			-.439†	.331			.319	
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>					.020			-.247	.341			.699*	
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>					-.050			-.035	-.032			.494†	
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean attitude, $\tau_{00}$	.070***	.145***	.117***	.093***	.097***	.019*	.117***	.018***	.029***	.004	.013***	.026***	.043***
Immigrant gap, $\tau_{11}$					.414***			.090	.407***			.466***	
Level-1 error	1.008	.966	.818	.860	.810	1.091	.984	.794	.558	.589	.558	.558	.593

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Low percent immigrants <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction <sup>c</sup> Native

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table 6-7. Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights: Between-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
<i>Mean attitude</i>	.154**	.307***	-.335***	-.198***	-.145***	.170***	.194***	.151***	-.053*	.312***	.093***	-.234***	-.033
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>	.041	.155*	.216**	.120†	.075	.090*	.108†	-.052	.014	-.068	-.184**	.044	.021
School Avg. Books	-.127*	.004	-.009	.125**	.004	-.035	.026	-.032	.018	.003	.002	-.070*	.028
School Book Range	-.064	-.015	-.002	.015	-.011	-.016	-.024	-.004	.004	-.028	-.051†	.012	-.015
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.276†	.012	-.007	.085	.036	.033	.078	-.027	.089	-.016	.161*	.031	.101
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.304*	-.086	.252*	-.391***	.172*	.129*	-.001	-.017	.006	.002	-.209**	-.011	.026
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.232†	.064	.160	-.374***	.091	.007	.187**	.052	.148*	.095	-.119	-.011	.085
<i>Immigrant gap</i> <sup>c</sup>	-.056	-.354*	.086	.481***	.668***	.132	-.022	-.132	.402*	-.055	-.202	.141	-.151
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>													
School Avg. Books									.055				
School Book Range									-.286†				
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>									.058				
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>									.378				
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>									-.028				
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean attitude, $\tau_{00}$	.075***	.018**	.097***	.101***	.041***	.012*	.011	.010**	.030***	.016**	.024***	.030***	.039***
Immigrant gap, $\tau_{11}$									.385**				
Level-1 error	1.034	.864	1.026	.908	.871	.768	.834	.717	.653	.737	.667	.637	.714

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Low percent immigrants <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction <sup>c</sup> Native

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table 6-8. Patriotism: Between-school results by region and country.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
<i>Mean patriotism</i>	-.682***	-.205***	-.384***	-.280***	-.032	.040	-.405***	.812***	-.086***	.495***	.150***	.109***	.226***
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>	-.119†	-.082	-.103	-.096	-.061	-.098†	-.126†	-.064	-.005	-.016	.041	.050	.025
School Avg. Books	.016	.004	-.086†	-.114**	-.012	.005	-.099*	-.073†	-.051†	-.075*	-.057	-.041	-.214***
School Book Range	-.006	-.003	.002	-.071*	-.053†	-.015	.000	-.011	-.003	-.024	-.025	.018	.034
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.152	.056	.004	.080	-.043	-.109	-.028	-.090	.041	.111	.138*	.159†	-.110†
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.286**	-.040	-.062	.123	.011	-.038	-.009	.066	.066	.085	.032	.104	-.051
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.283**	-.019	.017	.128	.060	-.161†	.005	.146*	.077	.186†	.049	.082	-.077
<i>Immigrant gap</i> <sup>c</sup>	-.115	-.384*	-.147	-.209*	-.216	-.204	-.225*	-.550***	-.353†	-.183	-.027	.054	-.278†
High Imm. % <sup>a</sup>	-.138	.195	-.021		-.309								
School Avg. Books	.020	-.416**	.088		-.068				-.328**			.014	
School Book Range	.080	.057	.019		-.002				.103			.248	
Low openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.388	.004	.391*		-.110				-.367			-.396	
High openness/ Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.088	.586	.170		-.480†				-.789*			-.233	
High openness/ High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.219	-.151	.105		.027				-.548			-.059	
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean patriotism, $\tau_{00}$	.040***	.032***	.096***	.064***	.031**	.029***	.065***	.024***	.027***	.038***	.023***	.024***	.044***
Immigrant gap, $\tau_{11}$	.255*	.186*	.129***		.577***				.275*			.281**	
Level-1 error	.803	.789	.805	.842	.700	.766	1.017	.795	.642	.651	.605	.638	.761

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Low percent immigrants <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction <sup>c</sup> Native

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

**Table 6-9. Between-school variance explained: Overall civic outcomes by country.**

	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>Civic knowledge/skills</b>													
Within-school $\tau_{00}$	.048***	.026***	.063***	.052***	.010***	.016***	.035***	.036***	.061***	.029***	.096***	.041***	.067***
Between-school $\tau_{00}$	.030***	.009***	.026***	.025***	.007**	.009***	.022***	.016***	.023***	.009***	.031***	.016***	.038***
% Variance explained	37.5	65.4	58.7	51.9	30.0	43.8	37.1	55.6	62.3	69.0	67.7	61.0	43.3
<b>Extracurricular participation</b>													
Within-school $\tau_{00}$	.450***	.100*	.381***	.285***	.070	.001	.309***	.184**	.266***	.261***	.150***	.238***	.488***
Between-school $\tau_{00}$	.404***	.068†	.339***	.293***	.069	.003	.296***	.156**	.255***	.232***	.155***	.227***	.441***
% Variance explained	10.2	32.0	11.0	--	1.4	--	4.2	15.2	4.1	11.1	--	4.6	9.6
<b>Women's rights</b>													
Within-school $\tau_{00}$	.218***	.105***	.152***	.229***	.009	.095**	.156***	.120***	.090***	.070**	.166***	.150***	.115***
Between-school $\tau_{00}$	.250***	.116***	.154***	.218***	.025	.041	.142***	.117***	.088**	.074**	.150***	.137***	.118***
% Variance explained	--	--	--	4.8	--	56.8	9.0	2.5	2.2	--	9.6	8.7	--
<b>Immigrants' rights</b>													
Within-school $\tau_{00}$	.093***	.171***	.121***	.133***	.095***	.036***	.145***	.018***	.030***	.008*	.018***	.028**	.042***
Between-school $\tau_{00}$	.070***	.145***	.117***	.093***	.097***	.019*	.117***	.018***	.029***	.004	.013***	.026***	.043***
% Variance explained	24.7	15.2	3.3	30.1	--	47.2	19.3	0.0	3.3	50.0	27.8	7.1	--
<b>Ethnic minorities' rights</b>													
Within-school $\tau_{00}$	.087***	.023***	.108***	.153***	.042***	.015**	.018*	.011**	.032***	.015**	.040***	.030***	.040***
Between-school $\tau_{00}$	.075***	.018**	.097***	.101***	.041***	.012*	.011	.010**	.030***	.016**	.024***	.030***	.039***
% Variance explained	13.8	21.7	10.2	34.0	2.4	20.0	38.9	9.1	6.3	--	40.0	0.0	2.5
<b>Patriotism</b>													
Within-school $\tau_{00}$	.050***	.032***	.098***	.072***	.032**	.034***	.064***	.033***	.027***	.044***	.025***	.024***	.089***
Between-school $\tau_{00}$	.040***	.032***	.096***	.064***	.031**	.029***	.065***	.024***	.027***	.038***	.023***	.024***	.044***
% Variance explained	20.0	0.0	2.0	11.1	3.1	14.7	--	27.3	0.0	13.6	8.0	0.0	50.6

Note: Where % variance explained is marked --, this indicates that a negative value would otherwise be given. In those cases, the predictors included in the model tend not to be significant and are adding very little valuable information to HLM's analysis.

**Table 6-10. Between-school variance explained: Differences between immigrants' and native students' civic outcomes by country.**

	BEL	ENG	GER	DEN	GRC	ITA	HUN
<b>Immigrants' rights</b>							
Within-school $\tau_{11}$				.375***	.129*	.465***	.403***
Between-school $\tau_{11}$				.414***	.090	.407***	.466***
% Variance explained				--	100.0	12.5	--
<b>Ethnic minorities' rights</b>							
Within-school $\tau_{11}$						.419**	
Between-school $\tau_{11}$						.385**	
% Variance explained						8.1	
<b>Patriotism</b>							
Within-school $\tau_{11}$	.218*	.376***	.129***	.549***		.540***	.263*
Between-school $\tau_{11}$	.255*	.186*	.129***	.577***		.275*	.281**
% Variance explained	--	50.5	0.0	--		49.1	--

*Note:* Where % variance explained is marked --, this indicates that a negative value would otherwise be given. In those cases, the predictors included in the model tend not to be significant and are adding very little valuable information to HLM's analysis.

## Chapter 7

### Results: Moderating Effects of National Contexts

By this point, we know several things about adolescents' civic outcomes in Europe. We know from Chapters 5 and 6 that European adolescents' overall levels of civic knowledge, participation, and pro-democratic attitudes tend to differ between schools within countries, but also *across* countries. Also, immigrant students' cultural values and knowledge of civics differ from native students' in some ways, though rarely in every country. This chapter represents a step further, a higher-level approach to understanding adolescents' civic attitudes in Europe that takes account of national characteristics. In response to research question 3, I ask to what extent system of controlling school curriculum, national affluence, and economic inequality moderate overall civic outcomes and immigrant/native disparities. Findings on the system of curricular control are likely to be the most compelling for educational policymakers, as a nation's relative wealth and its distribution across social classes are far more challenging political and cultural issues. In this chapter I describe my hypotheses related to each of these national characteristics, discuss the national data, present results for each outcome's between-country model, and summarize these findings' patterns.

## **7.1 Hypotheses**

### **7.1.1 National Affluence**

It is likely that the relationships of national affluence and economic inequality with overall outcomes and the immigrant gap are not uniform across outcomes. In Bryony Hoskins and colleagues' recent study using CIVED, they find that adolescents in poorer European countries—which also happen to be the youngest democracies—have stronger inclinations toward civic participation than adolescents in wealthier, more established democracies (2011). However, Nicole Schneeweis (2009) found that national affluence was negatively related to academic achievement, which for immigrants might also lead to disengagement from school, a turn toward co-ethnics, and then possibly less inclusive attitudes toward other groups, including women.

### **7.1.2 Income Inequality**

Regarding income inequality, there are two possible hypotheses. The first is based on Schneeweis's finding that higher degrees of income inequality in a country are associated with lower levels of immigrants' academic achievement and Lane Kenworthy's (2004) hypothesis that people in more equitable countries feel greater social solidarity. It is possible that income inequality—in which immigrants are typically at the losing end and because of which schools are typically not the same across communities—exacerbates an already negative relationship between immigrant status and civic knowledge and patriotism. It may also widen the gap between immigrants and native students' attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants, essentially associated with less inclusive attitudes on native students' part.

However, I find an alternative hypothesis more compelling, based on Ruud Koopmans' (2010) findings related to welfare states and immigrants' social integration. He notes that in countries with greater income inequality and a less generous welfare state, immigrants rely heavily on income from employment, and thus have many incentives to improve their language proficiency and job skills, which in turn help to integrate them into the rest of society. I would argue that parents' experiences with integration in this case 'trickle down' to their adolescent children. Essentially I predict a positive relationship (philosophically, not statistically) of income inequality with immigrant/native disparities in civic outcomes *even for adolescents still in school*.

### **7.1.3 National Curriculum**

Finally, from the work of Janmaat and Mons (2011) using CIVED data, we know that ethnic minorities' level of patriotism is closer to that of ethnic majority students in countries with more centralized curricular control (recall that they define ethnic minority students as those who speak a non-school language at home sometimes or always). Conversely, their study shows that in these same countries, majority students' beliefs in immigrants' rights are more similar to those of ethnic minority students (which are quite supportive). I hypothesize that these findings will be borne out similarly in my study, and extended to other self-expression values.

## **7.2 Descriptive Information on Countries**

Table 7-1 gives information on national affluence (Gross National Income—GNI—per capita), income inequality (Gini coefficient), and the model of curriculum



control for each country in the study. Here we see that affluence does not perfectly correlate with equality. Western and Nordic Europe are wealthier than southern Europe, but southern European countries are far more unequal than nearly all their northern neighbors, topped only by England, the only English-speaking country in the sample (English-speaking countries tend to have very high levels of income inequality; Förster & Mira d'Ercole, 2005, p. 10).<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, note that central Europe, which contains the most recent democracies, is poorer than southern European countries, but more equal economically.

**Table 7-1. National affluence (GNI per capita), income inequality (Gini coefficient), and system for controlling curriculum in selected European countries, by region and country.**

Region	Country	GNI per capita, 1999 <sup>a</sup>	Gini coefficient, “around” year 2000 <sup>b</sup>	Curricular Control <sup>c</sup>
<i>Western</i>	Belgium	25,820	.29	Federal
	England	24,140	.37	School Autonomy
	Germany	24,870	.27	Federal
	Switzerland	32,080	.28	Federal
<i>Nordic</i>	Denmark	26,710	.23	Collaboration
	Norway	29,560	.26	Centralized
	Sweden	25,740	.24	School Autonomy
<i>Southern</i>	Greece	17,160	.34	Centralized
	Italy	24,090	.34	Centralized
	Portugal	16,530	.36	Centralized
<i>Central</i>	Czech Republic	13,970	.26	Decentralized
	Hungary	10,370	.29	School Autonomy
	Slovakia	10,250	.27 <sup>d</sup>	Decentralized

<sup>a</sup> In current international dollars. GNI data from the World Bank’s International Comparison Program database: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?page=2>

<sup>b</sup> Gini coefficient data from the OECD: <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=26067>

<sup>c</sup> Curricular control information from Janmaat & Mons (2011).

<sup>d</sup> Slovakia became a member of OECD in late 2000, and thus did not provide data to OECD prior; this data point comes from the mid-2000s.

Recall that categories describing curricular control derive from Nathalie Mons’ study and are described in greater detail in section 2.3. By virtue of political structure,

<sup>58</sup> I am able to differentiate countries within the UK on the curricular control variable, so this measure does represent England alone.

three of the four western European countries have a federal model in place for controlling curriculum, meaning regional entities, rather than the central government, have control. The southern countries are characterized by strong central control of curriculum, while the post-Soviet societies tend to be more decentralized (recall that in a school autonomy model schools have some freedom in content and methods, but the national government creates the guidelines and high-stakes assessments that measure student learning).

### **7.3 Research Question 3: Between-Country Model Results**

Between-school models in Chapter 6 suggest that there are differences between countries in students' overall civic outcomes *and* in the size of the immigrant/native gap in several outcomes. Including national characteristics in my models may help to explain that between-country variation. I began between-country models by assuming that there were significant differences between countries in both overall outcomes and the immigrant/native gap. When HLM showed that those differences were non-significant, I adjusted the models accordingly.

Additionally, in combining these countries' data, I chose to model each outcome's overall level and immigrant/native gap with cross-level interactions with school characteristics. By combining countries' data, I increased the variance in each outcome, which made interactions of school-level variables with the immigrant gap more likely to be statistically significant. Recall, too, from chapter 4 that before running these three-level analyses, I ran 'unconditional' models that included just immigrant status at each level and no other modifying variables to determine whether there was significant between-school and between-country variance in the immigrant/native gap at each of

those levels. If there was not, I did not include modifying variables on the immigrant gap at those levels. Otherwise, modifying variables were included and, in some cases (as I will show), explained all the variance in that gap away!

I model economic factors separately from curriculum factors to conserve power in the analyses. With only thirteen countries providing information, degrees of freedom are very low to begin with ( $df=12$ ) and each individual measure included in the model takes up another degree. Note, too, that school and individual characteristics are included in all of these models to show what the aggregate, Europe-wide findings look like for the ‘average European adolescent.’ Estimates at the individual and school levels likely have little meaning, but it is useful to control for those characteristics since we have already looked at their unique relationships with civic outcomes by individual countries.

### **7.3.1 Civic Knowledge and Interpretive Skills**

**National economic indicators.** Column 2 of Table 7-2 gives results for the effects of national affluence (GNI) and income inequality (Gini coefficient). National affluence has no relationship with adolescents’ overall civic knowledge and skills, or with the difference between immigrants’ and natives’ scores. Income inequality appears to be related to a very slightly *higher* score in civic knowledge overall ( $\gamma = .015, p < .10$ ). With just one significant predictor, this national-level model does not explain much between-country variance in students’ overall outcomes (in fact, as you see in Table 7-6, which gives information on how much between-country variance is explained by these models, the variance explained would be negative because these predictors add nothing but ‘noise’ to HLM’s ability to estimate effects). However, despite these predictors being

unrelated to the immigrant/native gap in civic knowledge, they help to explain nearly half of the between-country differences in that gap.<sup>59</sup>

**System for curricular control.** Here is our first look at the second main topic of this study, and the results are intriguing. The national system for controlling curriculum has a large and significant relationship with students' overall civic knowledge (see Table 7-4). Recall that federal, school autonomy, and decentralized systems are quite different from collaboration and centralized systems, in that the latter give either zero or very little control to schools, communities, or geographic regions. Curriculum in collaboration and centralized systems is highly driven by a central authority. Since all the estimates for less centralized systems are negative and significant, these results suggest that all students—native and immigrant—in those more centralized systems are *more* knowledgeable and skilled in civics than their peers in *any* system that is less centrally controlled. Students in less centrally controlled systems know anywhere from 13 to 25 percent of a standard deviation less than peers in countries with collaboration or centralized systems (federal  $\gamma = -.250, p < .001$ ; school autonomy  $\gamma = -.252, p < .01$ ; decentralized  $\gamma = -.133, p < .10$ ).

System of curriculum control has a significant, but opposite relationship with the gap between immigrants' and native students' civic knowledge and skills. These effects must be considered in light of the effects on overall outcomes, of course, which means immigrants in less centralized systems are already at a disadvantage, but the model shows that this disadvantage is not compounded for immigrants in less centralized systems.

Surprisingly, immigrant students in decentralized systems score the highest compared to

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<sup>59</sup>  $\tau_{B-S}$  = between-country variance component of the overall mean in the between-school model, and  $\tau_{B-C}$  = between-country variance component of the overall mean in the between-country model:

$$\text{Proportion of between-school variance explained} = (\tau_{B-S} - \tau_{B-C}) / \tau_{B-S}$$

immigrants in collaboration or centralized systems ( $\gamma = .182, p < .001$ ). See Figure 7-1 for an illustration of how immigrants and native students compare to one another and across systems of curricular control.

As shown in Table 7-6, this model explains just over half of the variance between countries in students' average civic knowledge and skills, and in fact removes all the variation between countries in the gap between immigrants and native students.

### **7.3.2 Extracurricular Participation**

**National economic indicators.** Note first in Table 7-2 that immigrants appear to be—internationally—over 50 percent more likely to participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities than native students ( $OR = 1.513, p < .01$ ). National affluence has no relationship with either overall levels of participation or with the difference in immigrants' and natives' participation, but income inequality does appear to be weakly related to a greater likelihood of immigrant participation ( $OR = 1.043, p < .10$ ). With so few relationships between these indicators and extracurricular participation, this model explains practically none of the between-country variance in overall participation, but quite a lot of the country differences in the immigrant/native gap (78.5%).




Figure 7-1. Differences in immigrants' and native students' civic knowledge and skills by system of curricular control.

**System for curricular control.** Table 7-4 shows that whether curriculum is centrally, regionally, or locally controlled has no relationship with students' overall levels of participation, but immigrants overall are significantly more likely to participate. Interestingly, the effect of immigrant status is less strong in federal and decentralized systems, compared to centralized systems. Participation rates of immigrants in countries with federal or decentralized systems are more similar to their native peers' rates than in centralized systems (federal OR = .662,  $p < .05$ ; decentralized OR = .380,  $p < .01$ ). However, in federal countries, immigrants are still more likely to participate, while in decentralized countries, immigrants are *less* likely to participate (see Figure 7-2). These variables explain just a third of the between-country variance in overall participation (so they are more useful to the model than economic indicators), but explain all of the country differences in the immigrant/native gap in participation.




Figure 7-2. The relationship of system of curricular control with differences in immigrants' and native students' extracurricular participation.

### 7.3.3 Attitudes toward Women's Rights and Opportunities

Preliminary models showed that there are no significant between-school or between-country differences in the immigrant/native gap on this outcome, so I did not model school or country characteristics on that gap. Essentially, this means that I look at how school and country characteristics are related to *all* students' overall attitudes toward women's rights.

**National economic indicators.** In Table 7-2, we see that for every thousand-dollar increase in Gross National Income per capita, the odds of students falling into a lower (less tolerant) category decrease on the measure of attitudes toward women's rights (odds ratio = 0.946,  $p < .01$ ). That is, in wealthier countries, students are somewhat more likely to be supportive of women's rights. Income inequality has no relationship with students' attitudes on this measure. These economic indicators explain just 26 percent of

the between-country variance in students' overall attitudes toward women's rights and opportunities.

**System for curricular control.** As seen in Table 7-4, a country's system for controlling curriculum is unrelated to students' overall attitudes toward women's rights. (This model results in a negative value for explained variance.)

#### **7.3.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants' Rights and Opportunities**

**National economic indicators.** Table 7-3 shows that there are no relationships of national economic indicators with students' attitudes toward immigrants' rights.

**System for curricular control.** We see in Table 7-5 that the national system for controlling curriculum is not uniformly related to students' average tolerance of rights for immigrants. In federal systems, though, students' overall attitudes toward immigrants' rights are lower by more than a third of a standard deviation ( $\gamma = -.367, p < .01$ ), compared to students in collaboration or centralized systems. Immigrants are generally more supportive than natives of immigrants' rights, but in countries with decentralized systems, they are nearly half a standard deviation less supportive than their immigrant peers in other countries ( $\gamma = -.461, p < .05$ ). Altogether, this model's national-level indicators help to explain 56.8 percent of the between-country variance in students' overall attitudes toward immigrants' rights and 56.3 percent of that variance in the gap between immigrants' and natives' attitudes.

#### **7.3.5 Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities' Rights and Opportunities**


**National economic indicators.** According to Table 7-3, greater income



inequality in a country relates to a somewhat higher level of tolerance of ethnic minorities' rights among students overall ( $\gamma = .039, p < .01$ ). Both economic indicators have a significant relationship with the gap between immigrants' and natives' support for ethnic minorities' rights. While every thousand dollar increase in GNI per capita increases the effect of immigrant status by .016 standard deviations ( $p < .10$ ), every one hundredth of a point increase in the Gini coefficient (remember that it is a proportion with values falling between 0 and 1) changes the effect of immigrant status by -0.026 ( $p < .10$ ). These are weak but significant effects.

You can see in Figure 7-3 what the effect of income inequality actually looks like: in countries with about average inequality (for this sample, .29; in this graph, .77), immigrants and native students have equivalent attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights ( $\gamma = .015, n.s.$ ), but the change in attitudes is much different for immigrants and natives along the inequality spectrum. In countries with greater equality (to the left of center), immigrants are significantly more supportive than native students, but in countries with greater inequality (to the right of center), their support is greater than their international immigrant peers', but below that of their in-country native peers.

With economic indicators in the model, about 41 percent of the between-country variance is explained in students' average attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights, while about 57 percent of the between-country variance is explained in the gap between immigrants and native students.



**Figure 7-3.** The relationship of national income inequality to differences in immigrants' and native students' attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights.

**System for curricular control.** In Table 7-5, similar to findings on attitudes toward immigrants' rights, we learn that adolescents in countries with federal systems are significantly less positive about rights for ethnic minorities than adolescents in countries with centralized systems. This effect is similarly large, as well ( $\gamma = -.318, p < .05$ ). Students in Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland are overall nearly a third of a standard deviation less supportive of rights for ethnic minorities than their peers in countries with collaboration or centralized systems (Denmark, Norway, southern Europe). The inclusion of these indicators explains about half of the between-country variance in students' overall attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights (50.4%).




Figure 7-4. The relationship of system of curricular control to differences in immigrants' and native students' attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights.

Furthermore, we see illustrated in Figure 7-4 that there is a significant change in the effect of being an immigrant in countries with school autonomy (England, Sweden, Hungary) and decentralized systems (Czech Republic and Slovakia). In those nations, immigrants are significantly different from their native peers and, oddly, *less* supportive of ethnic minorities' rights (school autonomy  $\gamma = -.253$ , decentralized  $\gamma = -.342$ ; ,  $p < .10$ ). The inclusion of these indicators explains about 71 percent of the variance that exists between countries in the 'immigrant gap' on attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights and opportunities.

### 7.3.6 Patriotism

**National economic indicators.** We see in Table 7-3 that national affluence has a significant negative relationship with students' overall patriotism, meaning that

adolescents in wealthier countries are less patriotic. Income inequality, though, is only related to the gap between immigrants' and native students' patriotism. A one-hundredth of a point increase in the Gini coefficient is related to a gap that is wider by one hundredth of a standard deviation ( $\gamma = -.016, p < .10$ ): immigrant students are already significantly less patriotic than native students in countries with average inequality (in this sample, Gini = .29), but in less equal countries are even less patriotic. These variables together explain just over half (56.1%) of the variance between countries in students' overall patriotism, and just over a third (34.3%) of that variance in the immigrant/native patriotism gap.

**System for curricular control.** In Table 7-5 we see that students in countries with federal systems of curriculum control are much less patriotic than students in more centralized systems ( $\gamma = -.524, p < .01$ ). However, while immigrants in centralized systems are significantly less patriotic than their native peers ( $\gamma = -.273, p < .001$ ), the patriotism 'gap' between immigrants and native students is much smaller in federal and decentralized systems. See Figure 7-5 for an illustration of this: the distance between the highest point on native students' bar and the lowest point on immigrant students' bar in this graph of the collaboration/centralized systems represents the patriotism 'gap' in those countries (Denmark, Norway, southern Europe). But the distance between the lowest points on natives' and immigrants' bars in the federal systems is smaller, representing a smaller gap in patriotism between native and immigrant students. Essentially this means that, all else being equal, in Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, immigrants' patriotism is much more similar to their native peers' patriotism than in other countries (federal  $\gamma = .251, p < .001$ ; decentralized  $\gamma = .237, p < .10$ ). These

systems ‘close the gap’ in patriotism somewhat.

With this model I have explained about two thirds (65.9%) of the variation between countries in students’ overall patriotism, and *all* of that variation in the difference between immigrants and native students.




Figure 7-5. The relationship of system of curricular control to differences between immigrants' and native students' patriotism.

## 7.4 Discussion

As I did in Chapter 6, here I synthesize results by focusing on independent variables and their patterns of effects.

### 7.4.1 National Affluence & Income Inequality

These models statistically confirmed comparative results from Chapter 6, that in wealthier countries (western and Nordic Europe) students tend to be less patriotic. In addition, those same students tend to be more supportive of women’s rights overall, and

indeed immigrants in those regions are more similar to their native peers in those views.

Economic inequality is another story, though. It is related—weakly, but significantly—to higher scores on civic knowledge for *all* students, regardless of immigrant status, which contradicts Schneeweis’s findings that immigrants in highly unequal societies underachieve academically (2009). It is interesting that there is such a dramatic change in native adolescents’ support for ethnic minorities’ rights as one looks from northern European welfare states (most equal) to southern Europe and England (least equal), but the change for immigrants is less dramatic. Moreover, it is notable that attitudes toward ethnic minorities are not very positive in welfare states. Keeping in mind which nations these are (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) is helpful, since in the 1990s they were strongly concerned with the recent influx of refugees from Africa and the Middle East, whose presence increased the range of cultural diversity of the host societies. Interestingly, these are also the countries in my sample where multiculturalism (tolerance of and support for all cultures) as a model of integration was most favored by political officials, yet this ethos seems not to have ‘trickled down’ to adolescents.

Finally, in more unequal countries, immigrant students are significantly less patriotic than their peers elsewhere. This could be precisely because of the inequality they see in those countries, which they may not see as matching the democratic ideal. Indeed they may already have seen inequality at work in their parents’ lives, disenfranchising those already in the weakest social position.

There do not appear to be other major ‘perks’ of income inequality, but the finding on ethnic minorities’ rights partially supports Koopmans’ belief that immigrants are better integrated into unequal societies (fewer social benefits) because they are forced

to participate in the labor market and interact with nationals to develop their employment skills: perhaps in these countries there is some sort of ‘trickle-down’ effect for children—native or immigrant—whose parents interact with one another. Particularly for native students, it seems that ethnic minorities were not viewed as much of a threat in more unequal countries, a positive finding. In the contemporary political climate in Europe, it might be feasible to consider restricting social benefits in traditional ‘welfare states’ to encourage immigrants to participate more in the labor market and thus enhance inter-ethnic feelings of acceptance.

#### **7.4.2 System of Curricular Control**

When it comes to control of curriculum, there are common relationships with students’ civic knowledge and values. Overall, students in less centralized systems are less knowledgeable about civics and less patriotic, which supports Janmaat and Mons’ (2011) findings, but those students also tend to be less supportive of immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, which is different from their findings (they found no relationship between curricular control and overall attitudes toward immigrants’ rights).

There are mixed results for relationships with disparities between immigrants and native students. In some less centralized systems (i.e., those that are labeled ‘federal,’ ‘school autonomy,’ or ‘decentralized’ in Table 7-1), where educational policy is less dependent on national-level decisions, there are smaller disparities in civic knowledge and patriotism, but greater disparities in attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights (immigrants are less supportive). They are not uniform relationships, but the findings extend and at least partially support Janmaat and Mons’ work. Those researchers posit

the following as a reason for such findings:

Federal systems are likely to produce greater disparities, particularly across regions, than unitary systems, because sub-state authorities have much more autonomy regarding curriculum matters in the former. This sub-state autonomy is likely to yield a great variety of curriculum guidelines, subject matter, learning materials, and teaching practices across schools within the country, which may produce large values disparities in general. To the extent that the residential patterns of social, ethnic, and religious groups coincide with territorial administrative units, a federal structure may well yield larger disparities across social, ethnic, and religious groups. (2011, p. 59)

However, the smaller patriotism gap between immigrants and natives in federal and decentralized systems contradicts Janmaat and Mons' findings. Though they suggest that the "kind of patriotism promoted in nonfederal countries is not ethnocentric and exclusionary," my findings suggest that this is not universally true (2011, p. 77). There are several reasons for the contradictions between my work and that of Janmaat and Mons. First, they focused on differences between 'ethnic minorities'—defined as those who never or only sometimes speak the language of the school at home—and the ethnic 'majority' that speaks the school language at home always. Since my study is of immigrants, I have defined my two groups as either having been born in the country or outside of it. A quick review of the descriptive data shows that their definition of ethnic minority is not synonymous with my definition of immigrant in the CIVED data—there are percentages of the immigrant population that always speak the school language at home and there are percentages of the native population that *don't* always speak the school language at home. Second, they use *all* students in each of 20 countries that extend beyond Europe (including Australia, the US, and Chile), rather than just students in 13 European countries. Thus they have somewhat greater power at the national level and greater diversity of information in their study.



### **7.4.3 School- and Individual-Level Effects**

Just a cursory glance at Tables 7-2 through 7-5 shows that many school features and individual characteristics are highly significant in combined international models. These between-country models are useful for taking a high-level view of national characteristics' relationships with civic outcomes, but the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 provided nuanced information about how different features of schools and individuals are associated with knowledge, values, and behavior that this chapter's analyses could not possibly provide.

## **7.5 Conclusion**

With this chapter I have extended the analyses from Chapters 5 and 6 to statistically confirm and explain differences between countries on all civic outcomes. I have shown that the wealth and income inequality of a country are significantly related to adolescents' civic knowledge, patriotism, and attitudes toward ethnic minorities. More interesting for policymakers are the findings on systems of curricular control. There is, to some extent, a 'winner' among these models: a more centralized system is consistently associated with higher civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, patriotism, *and* stronger self-expression values. There are clearly trade-offs in each of these systems for officials concerned with immigrants' sociopolitical integration, though, since even federal systems appear to have smaller disparities between immigrants and native students on patriotism. Of course, all of these models have limited scope: there are still unexplained differences between countries in overall levels and in immigrant/native disparities on attitudes toward immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights. Nevertheless,

these findings are intriguing and important.

In the final chapter, I link these findings closer to the within- and between-school results to tell a more complete story of how young Europeans' cultural values and preparedness for citizenship shake out across countries and how first-generation immigrants compare.

**Table 7-2. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills, extracurricular participation, and attitude toward women's rights: Between-country results for economic indicators.**

	Civic Knowledge & Skills	Extracurricular Participation	Women's Rights
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>			
<i>Mean outcome</i>	-.050	2.167**	.410***
<i>COUNTRY MEASURES</i>			
NAT'L AFFLUENCE (GNI)	-.002	1.006	.946**
INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI)	.015†	1.043	.975
<i>School characteristics</i>			
High Immigrant % <sup>a</sup>	-.020†	1.118*	1.036
School Avg. Books	.173***	.994	.959*
School Book Range	-.039***	1.018	.935***
Low openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.067***	1.007	.853**
High openness/Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.054***	1.139*	.841***
High openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.102***	.883*	.811***
<i>Immigrant gap</i> <sup>c</sup>	-.052*	1.451*	1.033
<i>COUNTRY MEASURES</i>			
NAT'L AFFLUENCE (GNI)	-.004	1.014	
INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI)	-.006	1.043†	
<i>School characteristics</i>			
High Immigrant % <sup>a</sup>	.014	.638†	
School Avg. Books	-.011	.943	
School Book Range	-.017†	.948	
Low openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.038	1.095	
High openness/Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.056**	.838	
High openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.053*	.712*	
Female <sup>d</sup>	-.069***	1.460***	.217***
Under-age <sup>e</sup>	-.038	2.815***	.963
Over-age <sup>e</sup>	-.062***	.881*	1.032
Books: Few <sup>f</sup>	-.093***	.764***	1.117***
Books: Many <sup>f</sup>	.098***	1.470***	.965
Time in country	-.008***	1.053***	.992
Language: Never <sup>g</sup>	-.156***	.923	1.423**
Language: Sometimes <sup>g</sup>	-.112***	1.074	1.071
Open climate	.064***	1.084***	.792***
Civic knowledge & skills		1.356***	.319***
Extracurricular participation <sup>h</sup>	.041***		.885***
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>			
Country mean outcome, $\tau_{000}$	.012***	.596***	.077***
Country immigrant gap, $\tau_{111}$	.002**	.023*	
School mean outcome, $\tau_{00}$	.023***	.322***	.138***
School immigrant gap, $\tau_{11}$	--	1.016**	
Level-1 error	.152		

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. Immigrant status is group-centered in the extracurricular participation model. All other variables are centered around their grand mean. Estimates for extracurricular participation and attitude toward women's rights are in the form of odds ratios. -- indicates that all variance has been explained by the included variables at that level.

**Reference groups:** <sup>a</sup> Low immigrant proportion <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction  
<sup>c</sup> Native <sup>d</sup> Male <sup>e</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>f</sup> Average # of books <sup>g</sup> School language at home always  
<sup>h</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

**Table 7-3. Attitudes toward immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights, and patriotism: Between-country results for economic indicators.**

	Immigrants' rights	Minorities' rights	Patriotism
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>			
<i>Mean outcome</i>	-.080	-.065	-.086
<i>COUNTRY MEASURES</i>			
NAT'L AFFLUENCE (GNI)	-.012	-.006	-.032**
INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI)	.015	.039**	.013
<i>School characteristics</i>			
High Immigrant % <sup>a</sup>	.090***	.073***	-.060**
School Avg. Books	-.016	.009	-.093
School Book Range	-.004	-.001	-.012
Low openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.051†	-.011	.041
High openness/Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.059*	-.039	.032
High openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.072**	.002	.064**
<i>Immigrant gap<sup>c</sup></i>			
<i>COUNTRY MEASURES</i>			
NAT'L AFFLUENCE (GNI)	.013	.016†	.007
INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI)	-.012	-.026†	-.016†
<i>School characteristics</i>			
High Immigrant % <sup>a</sup>	-.058	-.093	.020
School Avg. Books	-.004	-.016	-.047†
School Book Range	.027	.038	.013
Low openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.030	-.060	.117
High openness/Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.121†	.052	-.130*
High openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.077	-.023	.094
Female <sup>d</sup>	.259***	.301***	-.223***
Under-age <sup>e</sup>	-.175†	-.176†	-.071
Over-age <sup>e</sup>	.041	.014	-.016
Books: Few <sup>f</sup>	-.005	-.008	.007
Books: Many <sup>f</sup>	.005	.035**	-.055***
Time in country	-.028***	-.032***	-.002
Language: Never <sup>g</sup>	.258***	.192***	-.385***
Language: Sometimes <sup>g</sup>	.388***	.247***	-.242***
Open climate	.139***	.162***	.096***
Civic knowledge & skills	.286***	.364***	-.116***
Extracurricular participation <sup>h</sup>	-.008	.028*	.049***
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>			
Country mean outcome, $\tau_{000}$	.042***	.030***	.046***
Country immigrant gap, $\tau_{111}$	.016***	.023***	.006*
School mean outcome, $\tau_{00}$	.095***	.075***	.061***
School immigrant gap, $\tau_{10}$	.159***	.136***	.237***
Level-1 error	.765	.832	.761

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. Immigrant status is centered around its group mean. All other variables are centered around their grand mean.

**Reference groups:** <sup>a</sup> Low immigrant proportion <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction  
<sup>c</sup> Native <sup>d</sup> Male <sup>e</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>f</sup> Average # of books <sup>g</sup> School language at home always  
<sup>h</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

**Table 7-4. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills, extracurricular participation, and attitude toward women's rights: Between-country results for systems of curricular control.**

	Civic Knowledge & Skills	Extracurricular Participation	Women's Rights
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>			
<i>Mean outcome</i>	-.004	2.432**	.415***
<i>COUNTRY MEASURES<sup>^</sup></i>			
FEDERAL	-.250***	.468	.741
SCHOOL AUTONOMY	-.252**	1.310	.727
DECENTRALIZED	-.133†	.378	1.702
<i>School characteristics</i>			
High Immigrant % <sup>a</sup>	-.019†	1.122*	1.035
School Avg. Books	.173***	.995	.961*
School Book Range	-.039***	1.017	.935***
Low openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.067***	1.005	.861**
High openness/Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.054***	1.137*	.840***
High openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.101***	.881*	.812***
<i>Immigrant gap<sup>c</sup></i>	-.073***	1.655***	1.031
<i>COUNTRY MEASURES<sup>^</sup></i>			
FEDERAL	.111***	.662*	
SCHOOL AUTONOMY	.080**	.763	
DECENTRALIZED	.182***	.380**	
<i>School characteristics</i>			
High Immigrant % <sup>a</sup>	.008	.610†	
School Avg. Books	-.015†	.948	
School Book Range	-.017†	.926	
Low openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.017	1.017	
High openness/Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.057*	.832	
High openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.043*	.671*	
Female <sup>d</sup>	-.069***	1.459***	.217***
Under-age <sup>e</sup>	-.039	2.848***	.961
Over-age <sup>e</sup>	-.062***	.880*	1.035
Books: Few <sup>f</sup>	-.093***	.764***	1.117***
Books: Many <sup>f</sup>	.098***	1.470***	.966
Time in country	-.008***	1.055***	.992
Language: Never <sup>g</sup>	-.159***	.921	1.423**
Language: Sometimes <sup>g</sup>	-.113***	1.076	1.068
Open climate	.063***	1.085***	.792***
Civic knowledge & skills		1.358***	.318***
Extracurricular participation <sup>h</sup>	.042***		.887***
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>			
Country mean outcome, $\tau_{000}$	.005***	.392***	.134***
Country immigrant gap, $\tau_{111}$	--	--	
School mean outcome, $\tau_{00}$	.023***	.323***	.137***
School immigrant gap, $\tau_{10}$	--	1.210**	
Level-1 error	.152		

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. Immigrant status is group-centered in the extracurricular participation model. All other variables are centered around their grand mean. Estimates for extracurricular participation and attitude toward women's rights are in the form of odds ratios. -- indicates that all variance has been explained by the included variables at that level. **Reference groups:** <sup>^</sup> Collaboration & centralized systems <sup>a</sup> Low immigrant proportion <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction <sup>c</sup> Native <sup>d</sup> Male <sup>e</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>f</sup> Average # of books <sup>g</sup> School language at home always <sup>h</sup> No extracurricular participation  
† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

**Table 7-5. Attitudes toward immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights, and patriotism: Between-country results for systems of curricular control.**

	Immigrants' rights	Minorities' rights	Patriotism
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>			
<i>Mean outcome</i>	-.023	-.001	-.015
<i>COUNTRY MEASURES<sup>^</sup></i>			
FEDERAL	-.367**	-.318*	-.524**
SCHOOL AUTONOMY	-.001	.119	-.274
DECENTRALIZED	-.034	-.032	.054
<i>School characteristics</i>			
High Immigrant % <sup>a</sup>	.093***	.076***	-.058**
School Avg. Books	-.016	.009	-.093***
School Book Range	-.004	-.001	-.012
Low openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.052†	-.015	.044†
High openness/Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.058*	-.039	.031
High openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	-.071**	.001	.066**
<i>Immigrant gap<sup>c</sup></i>			
<i>COUNTRY MEASURES<sup>^</sup></i>			
FEDERAL	-.002	.149	.251***
SCHOOL AUTONOMY	-.102	-.253†	.115
DECENTRALIZED	-.461*	-.342†	.237†
<i>School characteristics</i>			
High Immigrant % <sup>a</sup>	-.070	-.098	.042
School Avg. Books	.007	-.005	-.041
School Book Range	.024	.038	.021
Low openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.021	-.065	.123
High openness/Low traditional <sup>b</sup>	.116†	.050	-.124†
High openness/High traditional <sup>b</sup>	.072	-.031	.094
Female <sup>d</sup>	.259***	.301***	-.223
Under-age <sup>e</sup>	-.172†	-.173	-.069
Over-age <sup>e</sup>	.041	.014	-.017
Books: Few <sup>f</sup>	-.005	-.008	.006
Books: Many <sup>f</sup>	.005	.035**	-.055***
Time in country	-.028***	-.032***	-.001
Language: Never <sup>g</sup>	.261***	.193***	-.385***
Language: Sometimes <sup>g</sup>	.388***	.248***	-.244***
Open climate	.139***	.162***	.096***
Civic knowledge & skills	.286***	.364***	-.117***
Extracurricular participation <sup>h</sup>	-.009	.027*	.050***
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>			
Country mean outcome, $\tau_{000}$	.021***	.025***	.036***
Country immigrant gap, $\tau_{111}$	.015***	.015***	--
School mean outcome, $\tau_{00}$	.095***	.075***	.061***
School immigrant gap, $\tau_{11}$	.158***	.134***	.238***
Level-1 error	.765	.832	.761

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. Immigrant status is centered around its group mean. All other variables are centered around their grand mean. -- indicates that all variance has been explained by the included variables at that level.

**Reference groups:** <sup>^</sup> Collaboration & centralized systems <sup>a</sup> Low immigrant proportion <sup>b</sup> Low openness & little traditional instruction <sup>c</sup> Native <sup>d</sup> Male <sup>e</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>f</sup> Average # of books <sup>g</sup> School language at home always <sup>h</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

**Table 7-6. Between-country variance explained, by civic outcome.**

		Original $\tau$	National economic indicators $\tau$	% Variance explained	Curricular control $\tau$	% Variance explained
<b>Civic knowledge and skills</b>	Overall	.00973***	.01171***	--	.00460***	52.7
	Imm. gap	.00278***	.00158**	43.2		100.0
<b>Extracurricular participation</b>	Overall	.59621***	.59611***	0.02	.39189***	34.3
	Imm. gap	.10906***	.02342*	78.5		100.0
<b>Attitudes toward women's rights</b>	Overall	.10383***	.07696***	25.9	.13361***	--
	Imm. gap					
<b>Attitudes toward immigrants' rights</b>	Overall	.04988***	.04248***	14.8	.02155***	56.8
	Imm. gap	.03333***	.01636***	50.9	.01457***	56.3
<b>Attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights</b>	Overall	.04996***	.02965***	40.7	.02479***	50.4
	Imm. gap	.05278***	.02252***	57.3	.01547***	70.7
<b>Patriotism</b>	Overall	.10500***	.04612***	56.1	.03579***	65.9
	Imm. gap	.00913**	.00600*	34.3		100.0

*Note:* Where % variance explained is marked --, this indicates that a negative value would otherwise be given. In those cases, the predictors included in the model tend not to be significant and are adding very little valuable information to HLM's analysis.

## **Chapter 8**

### **Conclusion**

This study began with a series of questions about European adolescents' preparedness for democratic citizenship and their tendency for pro-democratic, self-expression values. While I have derived a variety of findings from these questions (see results and discussion sections in chapters 5, 6, and 7), the three most relevant to policy in the educational enterprise are: 1) what are adolescents' degrees of preparedness for citizenship and their views on rights for traditionally marginalized groups (self-expression values), and how do immigrants differ from native students on these outcomes; 2) how are discussion-based instructional methods related to different degrees of preparedness and more or less tolerant views of out-groups; and 3) how does the national system for regulating curriculum explain between-country differences in adolescents' preparedness and self-expression values? This concluding chapter focuses on these three questions.

In this dissertation I have shown that there are actually relatively few commonalities across European democracies in how instruction and adolescents' personal characteristics relate to their civic outcomes. I found that, though it has quite different relationships with each civic outcome across countries, immigrant status is nearly always an important factor. Instructional methods—teacher- vs. student-



centered—have both anticipated and unanticipated relationships with these outcomes. Finally, I found national educational systems’ means of designing and disseminating curriculum to be significantly related to several outcomes, though often in unexpected ways. All of these are complex relationships, none of which are universally beneficial or detrimental. This could be both a comfort and a frustration for educators or policymakers interested in developing a more democratic culture amongst immigrants as well as native adolescents. It is disappointing that more, or stronger, patterns of relationships do not exist between educational characteristics and immigrant/native gaps, since the study focused so strongly on immigrants, but such is the nature of educational research.

The findings did not entirely confirm previous research on these topics or studies using these data. Indeed, I recognize that the restriction of this study to just 13 European countries, just students in the middle grades, and students who had complete data on all the variables of interest, somewhat limits the generalizability of the study’s results. Though the data are not perfect, they are powerfully suggestive and represent a useful contribution to a burgeoning literature on how young immigrants are—and might better be—integrated into society and the political/civic realm. What’s more, through this work I have extended civic education scholarship to meet political science scholarship in two ways: a) by bringing qualities of intermediary institutions—schools—to bear on society-level attitudes, and b) by recognizing that the environments of lower secondary schools and their political education practices operate in a national political and cultural context. In this concluding chapter I revisit the work that was foundational to mine, how I have begun to fill a gap in that work, strengths and limitations of the data and my results, potential implications for policy, and some suggestions for future research.

## 8.1 Conventional Wisdom: Immigrants, Integration, and Schools

Political science and education together have determined the elements of democracy that are most valuable and how schools can be involved in citizens' development. In political science, Inglehart and Welzel gave a frame to one half of this study, laying the groundwork for understanding how adult orientations to self-expression values relate to democracy, finding that strong commitments to rights and freedoms for all people can *cause* societies to become [more] democratic (2005). Before that, Almond and Verba (1963) and Diamond (1999) recognized the importance of civic participation for the health of a democracy, and Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996) identified education as an essential element in the intergenerational development of knowledgeable, thoughtful democratic citizens.<sup>60</sup> Accordingly, I designed this study around these factors, many of which previous research has explored.

Perhaps because the educational enterprise is seen as best equipped for these particular elements of civic preparation, civic education research has focused primarily on conventional ideas of civic preparedness: what students *know*, how they *participate* (or intend to) in civic-related activities, and their sense of national identity, or *patriotism*. But while these are important, they are not the primary drivers of democracy. Each of those elements can just as easily support undemocratic modes of governance and interaction. For this reason and two others—because education literature has looked so extensively at these outcomes for all students, including ethnic minorities and immigrants, and because my findings largely confirm this literature—in this concluding chapter I am most concerned with the study's findings on adolescents' self-expression

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<sup>60</sup> Of course this education has to have a purposefully democratic orientation. One must consider that the rise of the Nazis in the early 1930s occurred in one of the most highly educated environments in history.

values, as these are the cultural orientations that other research has found to be most significantly predictive of sustained democracy. I do give a synopsis of findings on schools' three more conventional civic-related goals.

### **8.1.1 Immigrants' Civic Outcomes**

**Civic knowledge and participation.** As a set of facts about democracy's ideals and processes, civic knowledge is comparable to other academic subjects in the literature on differences between immigrants and native students: immigrants tend to be less knowledgeable, and for reasons including less exposure to school and content, language barriers, and socioeconomic status (DeFeyter & Winsler, 2010; Reimers, 2005; Schnepf, 2007; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008). Yet most studies find that immigrants are no less likely to participate in civic-oriented extracurricular or political activities (Prokic & Dronkers, 2010). In some cases, their even greater participation may be a response to perceived discrimination which fuels strong feelings of ethnic identity, or perhaps more often, because of strong family religious commitments that entail community service of some kind (Stepick & Stepick, 2002).

**Patriotism.** All nations seek to cultivate patriotism, so it is not unique to democracies, but I presented in the introductory chapter an argument that patriotism—loyalty to or affinity for one's nation of residence—can be either a positive or negative trait in citizens. To the extent that a sentimental attachment to a personified 'nation' is exclusive, nationalistic, or derogatory toward other nations or cultures, patriotism *can* be a negative, even destructive force in a society, encouraging discrimination at the least and violence at the worst. But patriotism could also be defined as a solid understanding of

and high regard for the nation's democratic ideals (e.g., liberty, equal opportunities, well-being) and most admirable experiences that live up to those ideals ('best traditions').

Under that definition, as Lawrence Blum writes, "The best traditions patriot feels a sense of shared fate with her fellow nationals ... and hopes that this national community will be able to live up to its best traditions" (2007, p. 64). According to this notion, people can still be patriotic even when they find national policies to be contradictory to these best traditions and are disappointed in their country on some matters.

As important as it is to be able to think critically about national policy, instilling in young people a fondness for the country in which they live is a goal in many, if not all, countries. As education scholar William Damon writes, this is appropriate: "The capacity for constructive criticism is an essential requirement for civic engagement in a democratic society; but in the course of intellectual development, this capacity must build upon a prior sympathetic understanding of that which is being criticized" (2001).

However, what research exists on minorities' patriotism for adolescents is quite limited: Janmaat and Mons (2011) found that large differences exist between ethnic minority and ethnic majority students beyond their socioeconomic background. Prokic and Dronkers (2010) found that similarly large differences exist between immigrant and native students typically regardless of how long immigrants have lived in the country, though speaking the language of the host country is related to a somewhat stronger attachment to that country for some immigrants.

**Self-expression values.** In studying immigrants' cultural views, scholars have found much greater support amongst the foreign-born for immigrants' rights, a somewhat predictable finding (Hjerm, 2005; Prokic & Dronkers, 2010). Much research has shown,

though, that immigrant students in Europe are far less tolerant of rights for women (Lalwani, 2008; Prokic & Dronkers, 2010).

### **8.1.2 National Educational Policy and Instruction**

This study has primarily focused on the education-related factors associated with students' civic outcomes. Many researchers before me have noted that even in Europe schools are often expected to be—but realistically cannot be—the solution to societal dysfunction and social conflict (Eurydice, 2005). Because adolescents spend so much time there, schools are certainly not without influence, but educational environments exist within and because of family, community, regional, and national environments. National policies may enable or restrict adult immigrants' integration, which affects their children's opportunities for integration, but schooling is a salient—if not the *most* salient—factor in young immigrants' integration into their peer group (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Therefore, in considering adolescents' preparedness for conventional citizenship and furthering democracy, it is essential to look at both immediate educational environments *and* qualities of the national political and policy environment that are related to students' lives and outcomes.

**Centralized vs. decentralized control of curriculum.** Nathalie Mons' international study found greater equality in academic achievement among students in countries with more centralized educational systems than with regionally controlled (federal) systems (Mons, 2007). In a study that followed on this finding, Janmaat and Mons used CIVED data to study disparities in ethnic minorities' and ethnic majorities' patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants' rights based on whether their countries had

more or less centrally controlled systems for curriculum design and dissemination (2011). They found that across countries there are large gaps between minority students' and their majority peers' affection for the nation, though the gaps are somewhat smaller in non-federal educational systems (2011). These scholars argue that a stronger central regulation of curriculum results in students' development of a closer tie to their nation than to any sub-national entity like a province or community, which fosters a stronger national identity and "cultural homogeneity" by not allowing regions to indulge too disparate cultural traditions or inter-group hostilities. They believe that the "patriotism promoted in nonfederal countries is not ethnocentric and exclusionary," which makes it easier for ethnic minorities to identify with their nation (p. 77). They found also that in nonfederal systems, majority students' tolerance of immigrants and their rights is stronger (thus, more equivalent to minority students').

**Instructional methods.** Much civic education research has focused on the classroom climate and teaching methods that best engender inclinations for civic participation, develop skills for debate and critical reasoning, and open students' minds to other opinions. Generally what researchers find is that in classrooms where respectful discussion and debate are valued and where relevant, controversial contemporary issues provide at least some of the content, students are more engaged in politics and more likely to participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities (Flanagan et al., 2007; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009). More importantly, though, and with only a few documented exceptions, students in these classrooms generally are more tolerant of the political rights of socially marginal groups (Avery et al., 1992; Hahn, 1991, 1998). One US study suggests that, unfortunately, immigrant students have lesser access to

classrooms characterized by such pro-democratic climates, though they are even more positively influenced by them (Reimers, 2005).

### **8.1.3 The Unknowns**

The gaps in comparative research on students' civic outcomes in Europe have, until now, been in what is known about young immigrants' sociopolitical attitudes. We know far more about young immigrants' conventional preparation for citizenship. Most research on instructional methods' relationship to the immigrant/native gap is limited to the US: scholars should come to know better what European adolescents' opportunities to learn are, and the national and educational structures within which they might learn. Are there particular attitudes that we should be particularly concerned about, or any that are clearly unproblematic? Where immigrant status has a negative relationship with desirable values and attitudes, what are educators' options, and how might nations help immigrants integrate?

## **8.2 Confirmations of and Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom**

### **8.2.1 Preparedness for Citizenship**

At the individual level, predictably, the most common salient 'predictors' of students' preparedness for citizenship (entailing civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, and patriotism) are immigrant status, gender, and home language (as a proxy for ethnic identity). Generally this study's findings on student-level relationships with these outcomes confirm those of previous studies. Where my study adds to the discussion is in differences between immigrants' and natives' civic preparedness.

Overall levels of civic knowledge and interpretive skills clearly range widely, and it is only in four countries—two in the northwest and two in southern Europe—where immigrants face significant challenges in mastering political ideas and reasoning skills. Results on extracurricular participation suggest that European countries have little to worry about on this point: there are practically no differences between immigrants and native students and, outside of central Europe, where civil society was still gaining a foothold at this point in time, generally students are likely to participate.

My strong belief about immigrants' levels of patriotism, which are generally weaker than native students', is that several elements of in- and out-of-school experiences shape their attitudes. Within schools, it is likely that they, like their native peers, are generally subject to the 'national narrative' that emphasizes reasons to be proud and respectful of the country, without much attention to mismatches between national ideals and policies that seem to contradict those ideals (Koh, 2010). Yet immigrants' experiences in society outside of school are different from those of native students, and not always positive (Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008). They are more likely than their native peers to see the consequences of national immigration policies and hear their parents talk about the difficulties of the adult immigrant experience. In addition, those who arrived at an older age are more likely to have memories of their childhood in the country of origin, while all immigrants are likely to have parents who still have contacts in and strong cultural attachments to the sending country.

I therefore believe that immigrants' lesser patriotism can be well explained by both a stronger familial attachment to the country of origin *and* the recognition of mismatches between what the host country says its sociopolitical values are and the de



facto situation of first-generation immigrants. As other studies of immigrant patriotism have shown, immigrants have logical, politically based reasons for appreciating their host country, but are less sentimental in their attachment to it than native-born people, suggesting a ‘best traditions’ patriotism in immigrants (Lee & Hébert, 2006).

**Discussion-based instructional methods.** Whether teachers emphasize more or less discussion versus lecture-style instruction appears to have no consistent relationship with patriotism, but students’ civic knowledge is higher when teachers emphasize more discussion (true in seven of thirteen countries).

**National context.** This study found weak evidence of higher overall civic knowledge among adolescents in more economically unequal countries, which contradicts findings from studies of other academic subjects, but somewhat predictably, it showed that immigrants in more unequal countries are even less patriotic than their peers in equal countries. Reduced levels of patriotism tend to be concentrated in the older (wealthier) democracies. Those countries have a more solid foundation as sovereign, united countries and students may take the nation for granted in ways that students in younger democracies, recently under authoritarian rule, do not. This may not actually be such a problem for most countries if students are more thoughtful about their nation and its ideals and politics, rather than just emotionally attached. Of course, in the federal states of Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland, there are extremely strong distinctions between regions based either on culture or language (in Belgium: French/Dutch, in Germany: east/west, in Switzerland: German/French/Italian/Romansh), that make a strong national affection somewhat more difficult to fathom.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Romansh is a Romance (Latin-derived) language and should not be confused with Romani, the Indic (India-derived) language of the historically itinerant Roma people of central and eastern Europe.

***Curriculum regulation.*** There is strong evidence in this study supporting Mons' finding that achievement is higher in more centrally controlled educational systems: overall, adolescents in less centralized systems are less knowledgeable about and skilled in civics, though in those same systems, immigrants' knowledge is more comparable to their native peers than in centralized systems. The study supports Janmaat and Mons' theory that overall patriotism (affection for the *nation*) is lower in federally organized systems, likely because students have a stronger affection for their region or state than for the national identity (consider the language-based communities of Belgium). It contradicts their finding on minority/majority disparities, however: my study suggests that immigrants' affection for their adopted nation in federal *and* decentralized (exclusively local control) systems is *more* comparable to their native peers' than in centralized systems. Perhaps regional- and local-level authorities are actually more in tune with the ethnic communities under their purview and design curricula to be inclusive of those communities, essentially doing a great service to the nation by being responsive to constituents at a sub-national level.

### **8.2.2 Self-Expression Values**

This study also showed that at the individual level, the most common salient predictors of students' tendency for self-expression values are immigrant status, gender, home language, and civic knowledge. Interestingly, though, in a number of countries immigrants did not have the anticipated negative views on women's rights, nor universally more positive views on immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights that I had predicted and which Europeans tend to use as stereotypes. Overall, women's rights are

fairly well supported among native students and immigrants, though at this moment in history, Slovak and Hungarian adolescents were significantly less tolerant on this issue than their peers in any other country (a curious finding, given the strong national similarities between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, though their levels of affluence may be at play here; Czech people were more well off than their Slovak—and Hungarian—counterparts).

**Instructional methods.** A more open classroom climate is clearly related to more support for immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights in several countries, though in only a few is it related to more positive overall tolerance of rights for women. Additionally, in Switzerland, an open classroom is related to decreased tolerance on all three self-expression values, a surprising finding that contradicts much research on the value of discussion in civics classes. As I discussed in Chapter 6, these findings may make some sense, if one considers the possibility that those discussions are run by Swiss teachers who are willing to respect and thereby give credibility to all opinions, without regard for evidence that supports them. It may be that controversial discussions in which students voice negative opinions about certain groups may encourage other negative opinions that are unproductive contributions to democratic debate.

To more succinctly answer RQ 2, instructional methods do not have a uniform relationship with self-expression values, but in certain areas of the European continent, they appear to be especially valuable.

**National context.** A country's relative wealth is undeniably related to students' embrace of rights for women: in general, adolescents are more supportive of women's rights in wealthier countries, but immigrants too tend to be more supportive in those

countries. Economic inequality is more strongly related to views of ethnic minorities' rights, such that adolescents in more unequal countries are significantly more supportive. In a sense, these findings also support Koopmans' findings on immigrants' greater integration in more unequal countries (like the southern European ones), as immigrants in nations with higher income inequality prove, in my study, to be more comparable to natives in their attitudes toward ethnic minorities.

***Curriculum regulation.*** With my study I confirmed Janmaat and Mons' results on tolerance of immigrants' rights: in countries with non-centrally organized educational systems, immigrants' views on women's, immigrants', *and* ethnic minorities' rights tend to be less supportive than native students'. More concisely, greater central control of curriculum is related to more pro-democratic views on rights for marginalized groups.

At the greatest extreme are Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland (federal systems), where adolescents are generally less supportive of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Each of these democracies has a particularly difficult problem of social and political integration, both from the perspective of bringing native students around to having tolerant attitudes, but also of encouraging comparable attitudes in newcomers. Belgians are already wary of those who don't share their language, Germans still appear to be committed to homogeneity and sameness (Luchtenberg, 2004, p. 258), while the Swiss assign naturalization powers to cantons rather than the federal government and have among the strictest admission and naturalization laws on the continent, seemingly in defiance of the reality of great immigration to that country (Fibbi, Lerch, & Wanner, 2007).

### 8.3 Limitations

Primary among the issues that limit the generalizability of my results is the age of the CIVED data. It is now more than a decade since the data were collected, during which time international relations, global travel, immigration flows, and borders of the European Union have changed significantly. It is unlikely that this study's findings exactly match those we would find on immigrants' sociopolitical integration today. However, they certainly provide valuable insight into how immigrants to Europe experienced their lives in democracies before 9/11, the Iraq war, and the Arab Spring. In the cases of southern and central Europe, the data describe young people's preparedness for democratic citizenship in countries that were still adjusting to democracy and the arrival of immigrants, rather than a constant flow of emigrants. As I shall suggest as a direction for future research, the illustration of the world that CIVED provides is invaluable for those who wonder how these events of the adult world may have affected the lives of the next generation of young immigrants and native students in the intervening twelve years.

Of course the ideal data set for studying immigrants' experiences, cultural attitudes, and civic activities would result from sampling specifically for immigrant representation, i.e., to oversample where necessary so sample sizes are comparable to native students and estimates of relationships are more precise. Ideally survey administrators would also sample from more than one classroom per school so researchers could investigate how the methods of different teachers in the same school might have differential relationships with their students' outcomes, independent of school-level factors (the practice of sampling just one classroom per school is a common

flaw in international comparative surveys).

Another drawback in interpreting this study is that, in most countries I examined, there are no data on students' ethnicity. In a few countries, ethnicity information was collected, but none was shared publicly, so to get it requires personal communication with national research coordinators (many of whom are difficult to track down twelve years later).<sup>62</sup> In most countries, though, this question was not asked of students. Having no knowledge of students' ethnicity, we also have no knowledge of immigrant students' countries of origin, an unquestionably important piece of information that would give researchers considerable understanding of immigrants' cultural background. Where one comes from has an important relationship with one's worldview as well as one's experience as an immigrant in other cultures. Information on ethnicity would also be helpful for authenticating other researchers' definition of 'ethnic minorities' as those students who speak a non-school language at home.

These are serious limitations, but none undercut the significance of this study's results for better understanding immigrants' sociopolitical integration. These findings are enormously useful for scholars interested in adolescents' civic development throughout Europe in this particular time period (1999, pre-millennium, pre-9/11), as well as for looking at change over time, when the CIVED data are used in combination with more recent data.

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<sup>62</sup> I managed to make contact with eleven of the twenty-two European national research coordinators for CIVED. Six of them (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Norway, Portugal) told me the question about ethnicity was not asked; one (Finland) shared information about how many students were in each ethnic group, but did not share what the coding in the data set represented; one (Poland) said information on ethnicity was for statistical purposes only and was "without meaning;" one (Slovenia) shared what ethnicities were represented, but did not share coding information; and England and Greece shared their ethnicity data codes. The rest did not respond to my queries.

## 8.4 Education Policy Implications

In this study I have been concerned with the preparedness of adolescents in Europe for citizenship in a political and social democracy. As I have shown, there are numerous elements of individuals, their schools, and countries that surround and, likely, feed into that preparatory process. There do not appear to be any silver bullets, though, that are clearly related to universally ‘better’ civic outcomes. On self-expression values, I find mainly in western and Nordic Europe that students in schools with a relatively strong focus on discussion and a respectful climate tend to have more positive, inclusive views of rights for immigrants and ethnic minorities. In these countries, teacher education institutions and professional development organizations would do well to instruct more teachers in these discussion-based practices to increase the number of children benefiting from them.

Discussion-oriented methods are *negatively* associated with minority-related outcomes for students in England, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic. It is unclear why this would be, so I turn to the case studies conducted on each of these countries’ civic and citizenship education situations, conducted as Phase I of CIVED. It is clear that around this time in England, there was much discussion politically and educationally about national identity and the rapidly changing demographics of the country because of immigrants. Britain did not have national civic or citizenship education requirements at this time, though teachers identified the “promotion of greater harmony between different social groups” as a primary aim of citizenship education. Yet most (90 percent) new teachers did not feel confident about “teaching about social class and ethnic groups” (Kerr, 1999c, p. 215). Additionally, as Carole Hahn found in her early-‘90s study of five

countries' classrooms, English classrooms—even when their content included controversial topics or subjects of debate—involved note-taking, regurgitating facts, and listening to a teacher's interpretation of an event (1998). The takeaway message seemed to be, "Form an opinion, don't express it."

Concurrently in Switzerland, researchers identified "problems of linguistic minorities...[as] a constant feature in the media," and though much pedagogical theory in the country suggested tying civic and citizenship education to more participatory, action-oriented methods, this rarely happened (Reichenbach, 1999, p. 572). In the Czech Republic, teachers were expected to inform students about various ethnic groups, but there were no guidelines for developing critical thinking skills related to the potential social and political problems that result from ethnic heterogeneity (Moree, Klaassen, & Veugelers, 2008). Each of the western European case studies strongly suggests that public sentiment about (and possibly against) immigrants and ethnic minorities was quite strong at this point in time and all case studies point to teachers being ill-equipped to handle productive discussions about these or related topics, so students were likely given license—through teacher neutrality—to express negative views of different groups. While England's National Curriculum has come to include elements of civic and citizenship education in the intervening decade, and Czech curriculum guidelines have since become more explicit about what multicultural education is (one that provokes critical thought), one must hope that teacher education institutions there and in Switzerland are attending to the skills of their teachers in guiding discussions that a) do not let negative opinions slide without evidence that supports them, and b) encourage playing devil's advocate, if students believe in only one side of an argument (D. E. Hess,



2009; Roby, 1998).

Curriculum-related and economic findings should be viewed cautiously, as merely speculative, because of low power and relatively small variation in national characteristics. However, a more centrally controlled system for curriculum does seem to be the most advantageous system for strong self-expression values *and* high civic knowledge, participation, and patriotism. Remember that the countries in this study that exemplify collaboration or centralized models are Denmark, Norway, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. While these countries do not have as long a history with immigration as other countries in Europe, it seems that many other nations could do well to consider instituting national regulations over curriculum. The federal system appears to be the least positive for most of these outcomes, such that students overall in Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland are least knowledgeable, least pro-immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights, and least patriotic, though in some ways their young immigrant populations are better integrated than those in other countries (see the discussion of civic knowledge and patriotism in section 7.4.2). However, it is debatable whether greater similarity between groups is desirable, if the average attitude is so negative to begin with.

### **8.5 Future Research**

All the limitations I have pointed out suggest avenues for future research and, indeed, data collection in the first place. Beginning with the data set itself, remember the IEA ran a follow-up study to CIVED in 2009 called the International Civics and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS). When those data become publicly available (later this year), researchers interested in the immigrant experience should use them to conduct

a comparative study with pre-2000 CIVED data as a baseline. Together, findings from these data sets shed light on democracy's altered profile for contemporary youth; analysts will be able to see how countries and schools have or have not changed since then in serving the civic needs of immigrant students and national needs to integrate immigrants into democratic societies. For the purposes of such a study, ICCS's data collection is in many ways an improvement over that collected in CIVED. For example, ICCS ascertained students' immigrant status by having them report on whether they *and* their parents were born in the country of the test (Kerr, Sturman, Schulz, & Burge, 2010). In doing so they made it easier to comment on the first- *and* second-generation immigrant populations' sociopolitical integration.

Second, future large-scale survey research in Europe ought to include more serious consideration of ethnicity or country of origin. A few CIVED participant countries asked about ethnicity, but these countries' coding systems were difficult to come by (not included in general codebooks), and a majority of the European countries I studied did not ask about ethnicity anyway. As I discussed previously, immigrant students' country of origin is a non-negligible fact in studying their integration into society, as it may have much to do with how the host country's population receives them. Some smaller-scale studies have begun a process of comparing the experiences of Turkish immigrant youth in Germany to those of their peers in the Netherlands (Crul & Schneider, 2009), but with globalization, sending countries' immigrant diasporas have broadened their geographical scope. Across countries, immigrants of the same origin may have different experiences based on national political decisions and economic situations.

Additionally, given wide-ranging associations of instructional methods in civics and other social studies classes with adolescent students' self-expression values (views on women's, immigrants', and ethnic minorities' rights), it is important to understand better what these sorts of methods actually look like in action. It is urgent, it seems to me, that researchers design more on-the-ground, qualitative studies similar to Carole Hahn's 1998 effort to explain how school and classroom environments engender different political attitudes. Research on instruction must more intensively involve observation of and commentary from teachers in civic education. These efforts might include recording teachers' political views or civic inclinations and their willingness (or permission) to share them. They could shed light on what the difference really is between a) classrooms with great openness to discussion as well as a strong emphasis on traditional, fact-based instruction, and b) classrooms with great openness to discussion but little emphasis on traditional instruction. Perhaps even more importantly, such studies could determine to what extent the topics of classroom discussions are controversial or mundane, and whether students are expected to provide evidence for their arguments.

All told, this dissertation has contributed to a greater understanding of the situation of young immigrants' sociopolitical integration in Europe, and has suggested that educators and teacher educators look more closely at how discussions of civic-related topics are conducted in schools. Additionally, it has identified more centralized educational systems as having the strongest relationship to desirable democratic values and civic outcomes. Each of these findings presents policy options for European officials, though I imagine instructional methods reform being more palatable than the curriculum regulation reform to citizens in more decentralized countries. I have clearly

left much room for further investigation. It is my hope that such studies are conducted in the future by educationists and political scientists alike, as both fields are concerned with the longevity and progression of democracy as a way of life.

## **Appendix A**

### **On Democracy**

#### **A.1 Aggregative vs. Integrative Democracy**

The emphases scholars and policymakers place on and the orientations they take to these fundamental democratic values vary. In a discussion of popular empowerment in contemporary democracies, Danish researcher Eva Sørensen categorizes these orientations to democracy's purposes as *aggregative* or *integrative*. In the *aggregative* category, she places those systems that distribute political power in certain, equal allotments and resolves conflicts. Scholars of this orientation believe democracy's purpose is to make political institutions better so they can address the needs of pluralist society *on the whole*. They think of individual freedom and collective governance as being potentially at odds with one another:

They assume that 'man' steps into society with exogenously given preferences which change little in the policy process, with the result that society is regarded as nothing more than a gathering of atomized individuals. Hence, democracy becomes competition between conflicting views and interests organized in a relatively static one-way process of preference aggregation. (1997, p. 555)

The *integrative* category, on the other hand, is more concerned with the ability of democratic institutions to create citizens. There are two ways of conceptualizing 'citizens' here. The first, as John Stuart Mill argued, is as those people who can put the good of society before their own personal interests in democratic decision-making. The

second is that of participatory democracy: citizens are those who have “social resources and intellectual capacities” for democratic participation (Sørensen, 1997, p. 555). What these concepts of citizenship have in common is a belief that individuals benefit from the same things that are good for society’s governance precisely because individuals make up society; whatever happens in the society at large happens to or affects them. This interpretation is foundational to the philosophy of grassroots and participatory democracy, for whose supporters democracy is more than just a means of conflict regulation.

## **A.2 Countries’ Adherence to Democratic Values**

There are numerous countries that claim their system of governance is democratic because it is based on elections, but which lack certain fundamental elements of a democratic electoral or legislative system. Because there are a number of fundamental elements to a democratic system, it is possible to identify how ‘free’ a democracy is, as a matter of degrees. For example, Freedom House, a democratic advocacy and monitoring organization, surveys the international landscape annually, identifying countries along a ‘free’ to ‘unfree’ continuum. Freedom House uses a number of criteria to determine whether a country is an electoral democracy, and rates countries’ promotion of political rights and protection of civil liberties on scales of 1-7 (1 being completely free). It then assigns a holistic label of *free*, *partly free*, and *not free*. In 1998 and 1999, as now, all *western* European countries were labeled *free*, with the most favorable marks for ensuring political rights and civil liberties. *Eastern* European countries, however, just before the millennium ran the gamut from *free* (Lithuania) to *partly free* (Macedonia) to

*not free* (Belarus). While their marks for political rights and civil liberties tend not to have changed much since 2000, most eastern European countries (except for Belarus) had come a considerable way from authoritarianism in the decade after the fall of Communism (Freedom House, 2010).

### **A.3 Assessing Civic Knowledge and Skills**

Interestingly, there is a mismatch in what various interest groups (e.g., the US's National Assessment Governing Board and political scientists) generally accept as valid civic knowledge for adults and for students. Large-scale surveys of US adult civic behaviors and knowledge rarely involve questions about the intricate details of the Constitution or historical figures in American democracy, the very topics that are the hallmarks of civics-related assessments for students (Niemi & Junn, 1998). Instead these surveys tend to inquire about elements of civic engagement that have provided researchers with comprehensive, nationally representative information about adults' political practices and beliefs. Topics and actual questions include:

- voting habits, e.g., Do you expect to vote in the national elections this coming November?;
- contemporary political knowledge, e.g., What is [your preferred Presidential candidate]'s religion?;
- political activities, e.g., Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like that in support of a particular candidate?;
- media consumption, e.g., How much attention do you pay to news on national news shows about the campaign for President?;

- political opinions, e.g., Should the government in Washington see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs or is this not the federal government's business?; and
- community service, e.g., During the past 12 months, have you worked with other people to deal with some issue facing your community? (American National Election Studies, n.d.)

Understanding of *students'* civic behaviors and knowledge, however, tends to be limited (again, in the US) to results from large-scale assessments that prioritize historical or procedural knowledge about government.

These conventional assessments require students to answer questions about historical documents or events that influenced the nation's government, governmental procedures, and democratic values. Examples of such questions, taken from the 2008 Social Studies Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) assessment, include:

- Describe ways the Constitution delegates congressional powers.
- How can the legislative branch of the United States government check the power of the President?
- A senator is caught driving 30 miles per hour over the speed limit and given a speeding ticket. Which core democratic value does this represent? (Michigan Department of Education, 2008)

While knowing the answer to these and similar questions is certainly useful in debates and for understanding why legislation moves as it does through governmental bodies, I contend that that knowledge does not in itself indicate that a student is more democratically oriented than another, which is often the take-away message in media coverage of these assessments (see, for example, Cooper, 1999; Hedges, 1999).

Some large-scale assessments have made an effort to collect more comprehensive



information about students' civic awareness and preparedness by requiring a persuasive essay in which students must make a case for or against an issue. This example also comes from the MEAP:

Should the United States Congress pass a law that requires political candidates to release a list of all organizations that contribute over \$100? You may either support or oppose a law requiring political candidates to release a list of these contributors. Write a letter to your congressional representative. (Michigan Department of Education, 2003)

Such a question allows a student to demonstrate his or her skill at constructing a logical argument with facts and reason, but still does not get at his or her actual proclivity for involvement or opinions about pressing, contemporary political matters. Some schools or individual teachers evaluate students' civic preparation and knowledge via participatory activities, such as a live debate with classmates or a public hearing on a topic of community concern. But there are very few large-scale indicators of what school-age students *know how to do* and *actually do* in the way of citizenship. Good examples of the rare efforts to understand these elements are the CIVED study—which I discuss in much greater detail in Chapter 4—and its follow-up, the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS).

## **Appendix B**

### **Structural Determinants of Immigrants' School Success**

There are a number of structural characteristics that contribute to immigrant students' lower achievement and poor 'incorporation' in receiving countries. Primary among them are residential segregation, language policies that fail to account for theories of second language acquisition, differential funding schemes for schools that serve immigrants, and educational tracking systems that disproportionately assign immigrant students to lower academic tracks (Alba & Silberman, 2009; Crul & Schneider, 2009; Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

Residential segregation is the result of factors from the host country and immigrants' sides. Immigrants may desire to live near co-ethnics who look like them, sound like them, and have similar cultural beliefs and practices. Simultaneously, the host country may have relegated immigrants to certain geographic regions through the kinds of jobs it made available to first-generation immigrants—which also affect immigrants' socioeconomic status and potential for upward social mobility—and any resultant discriminatory policies that kept the 'other' from encroaching on territory where natives live (Angenendt et al., 2007; Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009; Oliver & Wong, 2003). Such practices are disturbing, but they are so systemic as to be overwhelming to a

government interested in promoting social harmony. More concrete policy levers might include differential spending for schools that serve immigrants, ethnic minorities, and the poor, or instructional language policies that make allowances for students who arrive at various ages and thus need different supports in the second language acquisition process.

Funding for schools serving ethnic minorities is meant to provide teachers with greater access to resources, to hire staff to assist students with second-language-related learning needs, or pay for outreach programs to immigrant and minority parents, and it tends to be significantly higher than funding for schools with predominantly native students (Joppke, 2007). Differential funding schemes are not common to all European countries, however, with southern European countries having much weaker ‘welfare states’ than their northern neighbors, and thus offering very little financial compensation to schools that serve needy populations (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009; Marques, Valente Rosa, & Lopes Martins, 2007). Numerous studies suggest, too, that additional money does not, in fact, solve the problem of unequal resource allocation by raising immigrants’ achievement enough to close the gap between them and their native-born peers (Schneeweis, 2009; Willms, 2006).

A main problem with the residential segregation that often defines school populations is that it is symptomatic of a more all-encompassing national approach to integration that smacks of intolerance and, in the case of language policies, denies science. Results from the 2000 and 2002 PISA showed that countries’ language support programs were related to the size of performance differences between immigrants and native-born students (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009). A monolingual, immersion approach to teaching immigrant students a second language is at odds with best practices

for language learning, though “this consensus among psycholinguists and language educators has certainly not convinced all decision makers” in immigrant-receiving countries (McAndrew, 2009, p. 1530). Second language acquisition and fluency are not solely matters of will. Depending on their age, students are more successful learning a second language in school if they have an advanced understanding of their native language and are familiar with its written system. Without appropriate educational supports and linguistic experience, a student cannot reasonably be expected to learn a second language. Yet this is where ethnic prejudice tends to take over in educational policy. A review of Scandinavian countries’ language instruction policies shows that an immigrant secondary student’s mother tongue gets practically no school-based support, even if the student cannot read or write in that language (Biseth, 2009). Schools or countries often place greater emphasis on immigrants learning the country’s native language for national identity purposes, without regard for best practice in second language instruction. As Alba and Nee write:

Perhaps most telling for acculturation in general and the prospects for resistance to it is linguistic assimilation. Language is crucial here in at least two respects. Many aspects of ethnic culture are embedded in the mother tongue and thus are diminished, if not lost, as fluency wanes. In addition, communication in a mother tongue marks a largely impenetrable social boundary which includes all who share the same ethnic origin and can speak its language and excludes everyone else. (2003, p. 72)

Another problematic element of the educational system that can have negative impacts on immigrant students’ language acquisition is the age at which schooling begins. In countries like France and Belgium where universal schooling begins quite early—when students are still learning their parents’ language—they are also exposed to the new country’s language. But in countries where schooling starts at age 5 or 6, as in

Germany and the Netherlands, immigrant students have already lost out on that crucial developmental time for the host country's language (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003). Further, there are large cross-national differences in how many 'contact hours' students get with teachers and peers throughout their schooling trajectory (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009). In Germany, for example, students only attend school for half the day and thus have that much less time to learn from teachers or be exposed to the host country language (they also tend to do more homework than students in other countries). Nicole Schneeweis's (2009) study of educational institutions' influences on immigrants' math and science achievement shows unequivocally that the number of hours spent in school is statistically significantly related to immigrants' achievement.

Cross-national differences between immigrants' and native students' academic achievement are also related to the timing and rigidity of academic tracking. While tracking is meant to be a socially efficient means of educating a workforce, some countries' placement exams in vocational, general academic, or university preparatory tracks occur as early as age 10 (Germany, Austria), meaning that newcomer students have less time to "pull themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position" than in countries where placements occur later, as in Belgium at age 14 (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003, p. 979). Thus, research across Europe has shown that immigrants are consistently placed in lower academic tracks, though in countries with later placement exams, there are lower percentages of immigrants in lower tracks. In Germany and Austria, the proportions are incredibly high: two thirds and three quarters of students with an immigrant background are placed in the lower vocational school once they reach secondary school age (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003). In Europe it tends to be very difficult

to move from a lower track to a higher one (while not easy in the US, it is *easier*), which means that the system practically destines people for dramatically different life opportunities. Recognizing this in the late 1990s, France reformed its tracking policy so that professional or technical curricula as rigorous as academic curricula are available to secondary students who are not interested in or qualified for a traditional university degree, though immigrant students are still less likely to obtain one of these professional or technical degrees, making employment and movement to the middle class that much more challenging (Alba & Silberman, 2009).

The consequences of placing large numbers of immigrants in a lower academic track only begin with social segregation. After that, Jan Janmaat and Nathalie Mons write, ethnic groups in those lower tracks may see segregation as involuntary and insurmountable, which would lead them to express alienation from the dominant group. Additionally, intragroup solidarity that is produced by alienation from mainstream society “engenders different life worlds” that entail different values and attitudes (2011, p. 59). Finally, reinforcing each of these is the very likely lower quality of civics curriculum and instruction available to students in lower tracks. Janmaat and Mons’ research supports these hypotheses, with less rigid tracking associated with increased tolerance of immigrants’ rights.

Many other studies find that immigrants—in most cases, certain types, especially those that are non-white or non-Christian—tend to be underrepresented in higher education and in knowledge-economy jobs. For example, in Germany Turkish immigrant students are far less likely than native-born peers to get scores high enough in their fifth-grade testing year to be placed on the academic, university-preparatory *gymnasium* track,

and among those who are placed in a vocational track, in the first year after graduation they are more likely to be working in apprenticeships than participating in extra vocational schooling (Faist, 1995). However, as previously noted, not all immigrants fit the same mold: Moroccan students in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands are better represented in higher education than Turkish students (Crul & Schneider, 2009).

Immigrant students' generally lower attainment and achievement—in many cases a result of placement in lower academic tracks and separation from high-achieving students who could otherwise exert positive peer pressure—perpetuates their negative reputation in schools. This reputation has both led to and been the result of negative stereotyping by teachers (Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008, p. 137). As sociologist Ana Bravo-Moreno writes, educational institutions “can play an active role in perpetuating prevailing hegemonic societal attitudes through their socialization processes” (2009, p. 421). Where negative associations with immigrants prevail, it affects both the quality of education and native and/or affluent families' decisions about where to educate their children. Dutch and Spanish parents specifically aim to put their children in schools with fewer poor, minority, or immigrant students because the quality of education is better in more homogeneous (white) schools (Calero, 2005; Ladd, Fiske, & Ruijs, 2010). More pointedly, Italian researchers have found that some Italian families are willing to go out of their way to enroll their children in schools with small populations of foreign pupils, because they believe that these pupils' inadequate Italian language proficiency would hold up their children's development (Gobbo, Ricucci, & Galloni, 2009, p. 9).

## Appendix C

### Original CIVED Data

#### C.1 Descriptive Information

Table C-1 gives descriptive information on all independent and dependent variables in each country's original sample so I can discuss the representativeness of my analytic samples. Countries are broken into geographic groups, and include an indication of how many data are missing from each variable. Altogether there are 41,725 students, 2,997 of whom are immigrants (about 7.2 percent). Note that the immigrant group is dramatically smaller than the native group in every country, though it ranges from just under 2 percent in Czech Republic and Slovakia to 19 percent in Germany. Immigrants are significantly older than their native peers in most countries (not in central Europe or England).<sup>63</sup> Additionally, in western and northern Europe, native students tend to have more books in their home than immigrant students, though in southern and central Europe, there are no differences between those groups.

In most countries—Slovakia and Hungary are the only exceptions—higher proportions of immigrants never or only sometimes speak the school language at home, while far more native students always speak the school language at home. There is no

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<sup>63</sup> In Germany—which asked students only for their birth year, not their birth date—I randomly assigned students the numbers 1-12 for birth month, then subtracted their birth month and year from the test month and year to derive age. The age range in a number of countries is as wide as 10-19 years old; because immigrants tend to be somewhat older than their native peers and their sample sizes are already small, I do not want to reduce their sample size further to just 14-year-olds. 13- to 15-year-olds are all conceivably still in middle school or early high school, and are just bumping up against the age at which students leave school in large numbers (Lehmann, 2004, p. 10).



international trend in students' perceptions of an open classroom climate except for similar amounts of missing data between native and immigrant groups within countries. Where there are significant differences between immigrants and native students, native students do tend to perceive greater openness.

Interestingly, only in Sweden and each central European country do immigrants have as much civic knowledge as native students; in all other countries, natives score higher on civic knowledge than their immigrant peers. There are no international patterns of extracurricular participation across all countries or even by region, though there are several instances of native students being significantly more active in civic-oriented activities than immigrant students.

Finally, on civic attitudes, we see native students in nearly every country having significantly more patriotic views of the country in which they live, whereas immigrants in a majority of countries favor significantly more inclusive attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants, a somewhat intuitive finding. However, in England, Belgium, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, native students' attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants are not significantly different from immigrants' attitudes, suggesting either greater levels of immigrant integration or more progressive values on native students' part. Though there are no uniform international patterns of attitudes toward women's rights, where there are significant differences—as in Germany, Sweden, and Italy—a higher proportion of native students hold highly positive attitudes toward women's rights while higher proportions of immigrant students rank low.

## C.2 Missing Data

Nearly every country is missing data on a number of valuable independent variables, though there is no uniform pattern. For example, for political reasons, Germany did not include stratification codes that would allow analysts to explicitly account for different representation of certain school types. For various undisclosed reasons, most countries did not ask students to identify their ethnicity or nationality (which makes it impossible to address hypotheses about differential attitudes of students from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds). Generally, student data are not missing country-wide; more often, they are missing because students did not answer items or did not answer completely, or because some school administrators chose not to administer certain items. Students tend to be missing far more data on the number of books in their home (the proxy for socioeconomic status) than any other variable. Missing data patterns in civic attitudes tend only to be slight, with immigrants in western and northern countries missing slightly more data than native students, while the opposite is true in central Europe.

Table C-1. Means and standard deviations for original data: Western Europe.

	Belgium, n=2076			England, n=3043			Germany, n=3700			Switzerland, n=3104		
	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss
Unweighted sample size	1869	198	9	2812	172	59	2931	692	77	2566	512	26
Weighted percentage of total n	89.5	9.9	0.5	92.4	5.6	1.9	78.6	19.0	2.4	82.8	16.3	0.8
% Female	49.5*	40.7		50.0	45.7		50.4	50.3		50.4	51.2	
(% Missing)	0.1	0.0		8.9	1.7		0.2	1.5		0.3	0.2	
Age	13.52 (0.02)	13.98*** (0.08)		14.21 (0.01)	14.23 (0.04)		14.30 (.02)	14.50*** (.05)		14.40 (0.02)	14.80*** (0.04)	
(% Missing)	1.4	3.5		3.3	7.6		2.8	2.2		1.0	1.8	
Few	26.1	38.9**		27.1	29.7		24.9	39.6***		24.4	50.0***	
Average	21.9	16.7		23.3	20.9		24.7	22.7		25.8	21.3	
Books	33.3**	28.8		27.2	29.7		30.6***	23.6		26.8***	15.4	
(% Missing)	18.7	15.7		22.3	19.8		19.8	14.2		23.1***	13.3	
Never	0.9	8.4***		2.6	2.2		0.3	3.5***		1.2	9.0***	
Sometimes	6.8	23.1***		2.5	23.4***		2.5	24.2***		7.8	44.8***	
Always	84.4***	66.7		95.2***	73.6		81.6***	69.7		87.0***	45.3	
(% Missing)	7.9	1.8		2.1	0.7		15.6	2.5		4.3	0.9	
Time in country	--	8.40 (0.38)		--	8.40 (0.39)		--	10.84 (0.18)		--	8.73 (0.18)	
(% Missing)	--	3.5		--	7.6		--	2.2		--	1.8	
Perception of an open classroom climate	-0.40 (0.03)	-0.37 (0.13)		-0.04 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.08)		.14* (.02)	.03 (.04)		0.16† (0.02)	0.07 (0.05)	
(% Missing)	10.7	17.2		10.3	12.2		2.0	3.9		2.1	1.2	

NOTES: 'Miss' represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status. Weighted percentages use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.

Table C-1, cont. Means and standard deviations for original data: Western Europe.

	Belgium			England			Germany			Switzerland		
	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss
<i>Civic Outcomes</i>												
Civic knowledge	-0.22† (0.01)	-0.31 (0.05)		-0.11† (0.01)	-0.18 (0.04)		-.08*** (1.0)	-0.20 (0.02)		-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.30 (0.02)	
(% Missing)	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
% Participating in extracurriculars	67.5	62.9		77.3	73.0		53.9	53.4		63.7***	51.8	
(% Missing)	8.5	15.3		0.0	0.0		8.5	9.4		5.9	10.1	
Country (Patriotism)	-0.64*** (0.03)	-1.07 (0.08)		-0.19*** (0.02)	-0.62 (0.06)		-0.37*** (0.02)	-0.60 (0.04)		-0.26*** (0.02)	-0.59 (0.04)	
(% Missing)	2.8	6.1		6.0	8.7		1.0	2.6		0.7	1.0	
Ethnic minorities' rights	0.08 (0.03)	0.07 (0.10)		0.27 (0.02)	0.23 (0.09)		-0.37 (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.05)		-0.34 (0.02)	0.34*** (0.05)	
(% Missing)	2.8	8.6		7.9	10.5		1.2	1.7		1.2	1.6	
Immigrants' rights	0.02 (0.03)	0.15 (0.10)		-0.11 (0.02)	0.07† (0.10)		-0.41 (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.05)		-0.38 (0.02)	0.35*** (0.05)	
(% Missing)	4.6	9.6		8.7	12.8		1.0	1.9		1.0	1.8	
Attitudes towards...  Women's rights	Low	42.0	44.8	23.5	29.7†		32.3	37.1*		34.4	39.0	
	Middle	19.9	16.7	21.8	19.6		22.1	22.2		19.9	19.6	
	High	38.1	38.6	54.6	50.6		45.6*	40.7		44.7	41.5	
	(% Missing)	2.8	7.6	7.0	10.5		0.8	1.6		0.5	1.2	

NOTES: 'Miss' represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status. Weighted percentages use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.

**Table C-1, cont. Means and standard deviations for original data: Nordic countries.**

	Denmark, n=3094			Norway, n=3264			Sweden, n=2964			
	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	
Unweighted sample size	2876	218	0	3061	203	0	2599	365	0	
Weighted percentage of total n	93.0	7.0	0.0	94.1	5.9	0.0	91.7	8.3	0.0	
% Female	50.0	50.6		50.7	49.0		51.2	54.2		
(% Missing)	0.0	0.9		0.1	1.2		0.1	0.4		
Age	14.33 (0.01)	14.44* (0.04)		14.28 (0.9)	14.40** (4.0)		13.83 (0.01)	13.93* (0.05)		
(% Missing)	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		
Books	Few	21.9	36.2***	16.5	37.0***		17.7	47.4***		
	Average	22.6	23.4	20.3	19.2		21.9	19.5		
	Many	34.0***	21.6	37.4***	30.1		37.8***	17.3		
	(% Missing)	21.5	18.8	25.8	20.2		22.7	15.9		
% Speaking school language at home	Never	1.0	5.0**	0.7	39.9***		0.9	11.8***		
	Sometimes	1.2	33.4***	1.8	39.9***		3.3	39.3***		
	Always	76.1***	58.0	81.5***	46.3		64.6***	47.2		
	(% Missing)	21.2	3.6	16.0	4.6		31.2	1.6		
Time in country	--	9.10 (0.28)		--	9.15 (0.30)		--	9.28 (0.23)		
(% Missing)	--	0.0		--	0.0		--	0.0		
Perception of an open classroom climate	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.15 (0.08)		0.26* (0.02)	0.11 (0.06)		0.06 (0.03)	0.02 (0.06)		
(% Missing)	5.9	8.7		3.7	0.4		4.8	7.7		
<b>Civic Outcomes</b>										
Civic knowledge	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.27 (-0.33)		-0.02*** (0.9)	-0.25 (0.03)		-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.32 (0.03)		
(% Missing)	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		
% Participating in extracurriculars	86.0**	75.2		89.8**	82.7		78.5	73.9		
(% Missing)	2.0	7.3		3.3	5.6		6.2	10.1		
Attitudes towards...	Country (Patriotism)	0.02*** (0.02)	-0.38 (-.07)	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.38 (0.07)		-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.79 (0.08)		
	(% Missing)	1.9	2.8	1.5	2.5		2.6	4.7		
	Ethnic minorities' rights	-0.20 (0.02)	(0.22)*** (0.07)		0.15 (0.02)	0.22 (0.07)		0.04 (0.03)	0.21* (0.07)	
	(% Missing)	2.9	4.6	2.9	3.4		6.8	5.5		
	Immigrants' rights	-0.22 (0.02)	0.45*** (0.08)		0.14 (0.02)	0.67*** (0.09)		0.33 (0.03)	1.04*** (0.08)	
	(% Missing)	2.0	4.1	2.3	3.9		2.5	2.5		
	Women's rights	Low	24.2	28.1	23.7	27.5		29.2	43.0**	
		Middle	21.5	19.4	21.1	24.9		25.9	26.1	
		High	54.4	52.6	55.2*	47.6		44.9***	30.8	
		(% Missing)	1.7	3.2	2.2	3.0		2.1	2.5	

NOTES: 'Miss' represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status. Weighted percentages use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.

**Table C-1, cont. Means and standard deviations for original data: Southern European countries.**

	Greece, n=3390			Italy, n=3808			Portugal, n=3045			
	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	
Unweighted sample size	3194	196	0	3728	80	0	2889	156	0	
Weighted percentage of total n	94.2	5.8	0.0	97.8	2.2	0.0	95.0	5.0	0.0	
% Female	51.5	56.3		51.7	46.3		52.5	53.9		
(% Missing)	1.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		
Age	14.13 (0.01)	14.63*** (0.05)		14.46 (0.01)	15.25*** (0.16)		13.88 (0.02)	14.08* (0.08)		
(% Missing)	0.0	0.0		0.1	1.2		0.0	0.0		
<b>Books</b>	Few	41.5	54.1*	45.2*	40.0		57.5	57.7		
	Average	26.9	23.0	24.3	25.0		20.0	22.4		
	Many	16.0	14.3	14.4	23.8*		11.2	8.3		
	(% Missing)	15.6	8.7	16.1	11.3		11.3	11.5		
<b>% Speaking school language at home</b>	Never	0.1	3.6**	2.9	13.8**		0.25	3.0*		
	Sometimes	0.10	22.6***	18.1	26.7†		1.5	19.6***		
	Always	99.5***	73.2	71.9*	59.4		81.5	77.3		
(% Missing)	0.3	6.2	7.1	--		16.8	--			
Time in country	--	7.91 (0.28)		--	9.03 (0.47)		--	7.62 (0.33)		
(% Missing)	--	0.0		--	0.01		--	0.0		
Perception of an open classroom climate	0.20 (0.02)	0.12 (0.07)		0.12** (0.02)	-0.16 (0.14)		-0.22 (0.01)	-0.24 (0.07)		
(% Missing)	1.6	3.1		0.9	1.2		2.8	1.3		
<b>Civic Outcomes</b>										
Civic knowledge	0.09** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)		0.03*** (0.01)	-0.18 (0.06)		-0.19 (0.01)	-0.18 (0.03)		
(% Missing)	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		
% Participating in extracurriculars	88.2*	81.9		44.1	58.7*		67.0	69.3		
(% Missing)	0.4	--		2.4	--		6.2	7.2		
<b>Attitudes towards...</b>	Country (Patriotism)	0.83*** (0.02)	0.17 (0.07)	-0.13† (0.01)	-0.31 (0.10)		0.47*** (0.02)	0.11 (0.07)		
	(% Missing)	0.4	2.5	0.6	3.8		1.4	1.3		
	Ethnic minorities' rights	0.14 (0.02)	0.27** (0.06)		-0.05 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.12)		0.28 (0.02)	0.36 (0.07)	
	(% Missing)	1.3	2.0	1.4	3.8		2.0	1.9		
	Immigrants' rights	0.29 (0.02)	0.60*** (0.07)		-0.07 (0.01)	0.12 (0.12)		0.18 (0.02)	0.47*** (0.07)	
	(% Missing)	1.3	2.0	0.8	2.5		1.8	1.3		
	<b>Women's rights</b>	Low	38.7	40.8	37.6	47.8†		33.4	30.8	
		Medium	25.3	21.7	28.7	30.6		31.9	33.4	
		High	36.0	37.6	33.7**	21.7		34.7	35.7	
		(% Missing)	0.6	1.5	0.4	2.5		1.2	1.3	

NOTES: 'Miss' represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status. Weighted percentages use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.

**Table C-1, cont. Means and standard deviations for original data: Central Europe.**

	Czech Republic, n= 3607			Hungary, n=3167			Slovakia, n=3463			
	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	Native	Imm	Miss	
Unweighted sample size	3535	61	11	3064	80	23	3387	64	12	
Weighted percentage of total n	97.8	1.6	0.5	96.6	2.6	0.8	97.9	1.8	0.3	
% Female	51.1	53.2		50.0	40.6		52.2	32.2		
(% Missing)	0.1	--		0.2	1.4		--	--		
Age	13.90 (1.2)	13.94 (0.11)		13.92 (0.01)	14.06 (0.07)		13.75 (0.01)	13.8 (0.08)		
(% Missing)	0.50	1.6		0.8	0.0		0.0	0.0		
Books	Few	9.5	13.1	15.4	25.0		20.2	21.9		
	Average	23.7	31.2	20.3	12.5		27.8	23.4		
	Many	35.1	31.2	40.0	36.3		26.5	26.6		
	(% Missing)	31.7	24.6	24.3	26.3		25.4	28.1		
% Speaking school language at home	Never	0.20	14.1*	0.0	5.0*		1.9	7.6		
	Sometimes	1.0	18.7*	0.5	3.2		7.4	7.2		
	Always	88.1**	64.9	75.4	89.7***		88.2	85.2		
	(% Missing)	10.8	2.2	24.1	2.1		2.4	--		
Time in country	--	9.93 (0.76)		--	9.47 (0.43)		--	10.54 (0.58)		
(% Missing)	--	1.6		--	0.0		--	0.0		
Perception of an open classroom climate	-0.33 (0.02)	0.05** (0.15)		-0.36* (0.02)	-0.46 (0.12)		0.02 (0.02)	-0.18 (0.13)		
(% Missing)	0.7	0.0		1.2	2.5		1.1	0.0		
<b>Civic Outcomes</b>										
Civic knowledge	-0.04 (0.9)	-0.04 (7.4)		-0.06 (0.8)	-0.1 (0.06)		0.03 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.06)		
(% Missing)	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		
% Participating in extracurriculars	63.0*	45.5		70.8	73.8		23.4	41.6†		
(% Missing)	0.8	2.8		0.6	--		2.5	5.3		
Attitudes towards...	Country (Patriotism)	0.20*** (0.02)	-0.23 (0.12)		0.12 (0.15)	0.06 (0.1)		0.33*** (0.02)	-0.07 (0.11)	
	(% Missing)	0.3	0.0		0.1	0.0		0.1	0.0	
	Ethnic minorities' rights	0.01 (0.02)	0.18 (0.17)		-0.26 (0.02)	0.07* (0.09)		-0.07 (0.02)	0.1 (0.12)	
	(% Missing)	0.4	0.0		0.3	0.0		0.4	0.0	
	Immigrants' rights	0.01 (0.02)	0.20 (0.20)		-0.24 (0.02)	0.19*** (0.1)		-0.09 (0.02)	-0.1 (0.09)	
	(% Missing)	0.6	0.0		0.3	0.0		0.3	0.0	
	Women's rights	Low	38.8	46.9	45.3	49.2		47.1	47.1	
		Middle	30.7	33.3	26.8	24.7		32.2	31.6	
		High	30.5†	19.8	27.9	26.2		20.7	21.3	
		(% Missing)	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0		0.2	0.0	

NOTES: 'Miss' represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status. Weighted percentages use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.

## Appendix D

### Technical Notes on Variables and Analytic Methods

#### D.1 Civic Knowledge & Skills: Example Items from the 38-Item Test

The variable measuring students' civic knowledge and interpretative skills is based on students' scores on 38 multiple-choice items on the test portion of the CIVED survey. Five of the released items from the test that make up this score are presented here as examples of the types of questions students were asked (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Examples A, B, and C test knowledge; D and E test interpretative skill. Correct answers are followed by an asterisk.

**Example A.** Which of the following is most likely to cause a government to be called non-democratic?

- A. People are prevented from criticizing the government.\*
- B. The political parties criticize each other often.
- C. People must pay very high taxes.
- D. Every citizen has the right to a job.

**Example B.** In a democratic country [society] having many organizations for people to join is important because this provides ...

- A. a group to defend members who are arrested.



- B. many sources of taxes for the government.
- C. opportunities to express different points of view.\*
- D. a way for the government to tell people about new laws.

**Example C.** In democratic countries what is the function of having more than one political party?

- A. To represent different opinions [interests] in the national legislature [e.g. Parliament, Congress].\*
- B. To limit political corruption.
- C. To prevent political demonstrations.
- D. To encourage economic competition.

**Example D.**


**We citizens have had enough!**  
 A vote for the Silver Party means a vote for higher taxes.  
 It means an end to economic growth and a waste of our nation's resources.  
 Vote instead for economic growth and free enterprise.  
 Vote for more money left in everyone's wallet!  
 Let's not waste another 4 years!  
**VOTE FOR THE GOLD PARTY.**

This is an election leaflet which has probably been issued by ...

- A. the Silver Party.
- B. a party or group in opposition to the Silver Party.\*
- C. a group which tries to be sure elections are fair.
- D. the Silver Party and the Gold Party together.

**Example E.** What is the message or main point of this cartoon? History textbooks ...


- A. are sometimes changed to avoid mentioning problematic events from the past.\*
- B. for children must be shorter than books written for adults.
- C. are full of information that is not interesting.
- D. should be written using a computer and not a pencil.



## D.2 Gini Coefficient

This measure of income inequality within a country is defined as the area between what is called the ‘Lorenz curve’ and a 45-degree line, as a ratio of the whole triangle. The Lorenz curve “plots cumulative shares of the population, from the poorest to the richest, against the cumulative share of income that they receive” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.). The coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing perfect equality—each ‘share’ of the population gets the same share of income—and 1 representing perfect inequality—all income goes to the share of the

population with the highest income. Therefore, lower values represent greater equality. See Figure 8-1 for a graphic representation, where A is the 45-degree line and B is the Lorenz curve. If the curve matched the line, the Gini coefficient would be 0. As a point of reference, the average for all 20 European, OECD-member countries that have data for “around 2000” is 0.29, ranging from 0.23 in Denmark to 0.37 in the United Kingdom.<sup>64</sup> This range is much smaller than the range for the world in general. I multiplied all Gini coefficients by 100 to make results more easily interpretable. Again, because there are 9 unique values across only 13 observations at this level, it would be misleading to call these data normally distributed, but there are tails on either side, so they approximate a normal distribution.



**Figure 8-1. The Gini coefficient: the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line. (Source: The World Bank, <http://go.worldbank.org/3SLYUTVY00>)**

<sup>64</sup> The Gini coefficient is not measured separately for member countries of the United Kingdom, so I am forced to use the whole UK’s value for England.

## D.3 Analyses

### D.3.1 Descriptive Analyses

I tested the differences between immigrants' and native students' means on civic outcomes for statistical significance using the *-lincom-* command in StataSE v.11 software. This command takes any covariance between immigrants' and native students' means into account in testing the difference between those means, allows weighting with sampling weights, and produces a *t* statistic, so is similar to a t-test. I tested differences on categorical outcomes (e.g., number of books in the home) for statistical significance using chi-square tests.

### D.3.2 Multilevel Models and Analyses

**Fully Unconditional Models and the calculation of intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs).** The universal characteristic of Fully Unconditional Models is that there are no independent variables included at any level. However, since the model structure, assumptions, and estimates vary for continuous (e.g., patriotism), dichotomous (e.g., extracurricular participation), and ordinal (e.g., attitudes toward women's rights) outcomes, here I provide detail about each, including how to calculate the ICC for these three different types of dependent variables.

**Continuous outcomes.** Below is an example FUM for a continuous outcome such as patriotism:

$$\text{LEVEL 1 (Students):} \quad Y_{ijk} = \pi_{0jk} + e_{ijk}$$

$$\text{LEVEL 2 (Schools):} \quad \pi_{0jk} = \beta_{00k} + r_{0jk}$$

$$\text{LEVEL 3 (Countries):} \quad \beta_{00k} = \gamma_{000} + u_{00k}$$

MIXED: 
$$Y_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + u_{00k} + r_{0jk} + e_{ijk}$$

In this model,  $Y_{ijk}$  is the dependent variable of interest (patriotism),  $\pi_{0jk}$  is the mean level of patriotism in school  $j$  in country  $k$ ,  $e_{ijk}$  is the unique effect for student  $i$  on the mean in school  $j$  in country  $k$ ,  $\beta_{00k}$  is the mean level of patriotism across all schools in country  $k$ ,  $r_{0jk}$  is the unique effect of school  $j$  on the overall mean of country  $k$ ,  $\gamma_{000}$  is the overall mean level of civic knowledge across all countries, and  $u_{00k}$  is the unique effect of country  $k$  on the overall mean.

Let  $\sigma^2$  represent the variance in the outcome that exists within schools ( $e_{ijk}$ ),  $\tau_{00}$  represent variance between schools ( $r_{0jk}$ ), and  $\tau_{000}$  represent variance between countries ( $u_{00k}$ ). Then the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) for continuous outcomes are:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ICC}_{\text{school}} &= \frac{\tau_{00} + \tau_{000}}{\sigma^2 + \tau_{00} + \tau_{000}} \\ \text{ICC}_{\text{country}} &= \frac{\tau_{000}}{\sigma^2 + \tau_{00} + \tau_{000}} \end{aligned}$$

**Dichotomous outcomes.** Because extracurricular participation is dichotomous (students do or do not participate), I use HLM's Bernoulli (logistic regression) function, which calculates the log-odds of participation. While Levels 2 and 3 are built the same way as for a continuous outcome, Level 1 for a dichotomous outcome is different:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LEVEL 1: } \quad \text{Prob}(Y_{ijk}=1 \mid \pi_{jk}) &= \phi_{ijk} \\ \text{Log}[\phi_{ijk} / (1-\phi_{ijk})] &= \eta_{ijk} \\ \eta_{ijk} &= \pi_{0jk} \end{aligned}$$

In this model,  $Y_{ijk}$  is extracurricular participation,  $\pi_{jk}$  represents the mean log-odds of students' participation in extracurricular activities across schools,  $\phi_{ijk}$  is the odds of a student participating in extracurricular activities, and  $\eta_{ijk}$  is the predicted log-odds of a

student participating in extracurricular activities.

Intraclass correlation coefficients for dichotomous outcomes must be calculated differently, as well. The variance of a logistic (binary: 0 or 1) distribution at Level 1 (within schools, or between students) is constant, equivalent to  $\pi^2/3$ , so the ICCs are calculated as follows (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004, p. 60):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ICC}_{\text{school}} &= \frac{\tau_{00} + \tau_{000}}{\pi^2/3 + \tau_{00} + \tau_{000}} \\ \text{ICC}_{\text{country}} &= \frac{\tau_{000}}{\pi^2/3 + \tau_{00} + \tau_{000}} \end{aligned}$$

**Ordinal outcomes.** Because attitude toward women's rights is a three-category, ordinal variable, I use HLM's proportional odds function, which calculates the probability of scoring in a lower category versus a higher one. Output for this sort of model is in the form of cumulative log-odds of having a lower score than a higher one. Again, Levels 2 and 3 are the same as those for a continuous outcome, but Level 1 for an ordinal outcome is different, as it is based on the number of categories being modeled (three in my case: low, middle, high):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LEVEL 1: } \text{Prob}[R_{ijk} = 1 \mid \pi_{jk}] &= \phi'_{ijk(1)} = \phi_{ijk(1)} \\ \text{Prob}[R_{ijk} \leq 2 \mid \pi_{jk}] &= \phi'_{ijk(2)} = \phi_{ijk(1)} + \phi_{ijk(2)} \\ \text{Prob}[R_{ijk} \leq 3 \mid \pi_{jk}] &= 1.0 \end{aligned}$$

This model is similar to the Bernoulli model for the binary outcome, but requires calculating cumulative log-odds of a student falling into a lower category than a higher one (i.e., having a less positive attitude toward women's rights). Thus,  $R_{ijk}$  represents a student's category (1, 2, or 3) and  $\pi_{jk}$  is the mean log-odds of falling into a lower category

than a higher one across schools. Therefore, the probability that a student falls into category 1, 2, or 3—given the mean log-odds of falling into a lower category—is 1.0 (see the third line; this is a given because students must fall into one of these categories).

$\phi'_{ijk(1)}$  and  $\phi'_{ijk(2)}$  represent, respectively, functions of the odds of scoring a 1, and a 1 or 2 (i.e., lower than 3).  $\phi_{ijk(1)}$  and  $\phi_{ijk(2)}$  are the odds of scoring a 1 or a 2, respectively. ICCs for ordinal variables are calculated as for dichotomous outcomes, with  $\pi^2/3$  as the Level 1 variance.

**Main effect of immigrant status: A within-school model.** Here is an example of such a model, an equation that represents the relationships between immigrant status and patriotism (I wait until RQs 1a and 1b to include covariates or controls):

$$\text{Patriotism}_{ijk} = \pi_{0jk} + \pi_{1jk}\text{Immigrant} + e_{ijk}$$

These parameters can be interpreted this way for student  $i$  in school  $j$  in country  $k$ :

$\pi_{0jk}$  = Mean level of patriotism for students in school  $j$  and country  $k$

$\pi_{1jk}$  = Mean difference in levels of patriotism between immigrant and native-born students in school  $j$  and country  $k$

$e_{ijk}$  = Student  $i$ 's unique error term in school  $j$  and country  $k$

Note that I am, at the outset, interested in whether students' overall means or the difference in means between immigrant and native students are significantly different between schools and countries. While significant differences exist between boys and girls, and between students who are monolingual and multilingual, I limit myself to investigating just the differences between immigrants and native-born students because of my research questions.

**Moderating effects of school features on overall outcome levels and the**

**relationship between immigrant status and outcomes: A between-school model.** This between-classroom model involves a set of level 2 equations like this:

$$\pi_{0jk} = \beta_{00k} + r_{0jk}$$

$$\pi_{1jk} = \beta_{10k} + \beta_{11k}\text{School Average Books in Students' Homes} + r_{1jk}$$

where  $\beta_{00k}$  is the mean level of patriotism across all schools in country  $k$ ,  $r_{0jk}$  is the unique effect of school  $j$  in country  $k$  on the mean level of patriotism,  $\beta_{10k}$  is the overall mean difference in levels of patriotism between immigrant and native-born students,  $\beta_{11k}$  is the mean change in the difference between immigrant and native students' levels of patriotism for every one unit of change in school average number of books (in this case, that would be one standard deviation), and  $r_{1jk}$  is the unique effect of school  $j$  in country  $k$  on the mean difference in immigrant and native levels of patriotism.

**Moderating effects of national characteristics on the relationship between immigrant status and outcomes: A between-country model.** This is a three-level, between-country model that involves a set of level 3 equations like this:

$$\beta_{00k} = \gamma_{000} + u_{00k}$$

$$\beta_{10k} = \gamma_{100} + \gamma_{11k}\text{Gini} + u_{10k}$$

where  $\gamma_{000}$  is the mean level of patriotism across all thirteen countries (the grand mean),  $u_{00k}$  is the unique effect of country  $k$  on the grand mean,  $\gamma_{100}$  is the overall mean difference in levels of patriotism between immigrant and native-born students,  $\gamma_{110}$  is the mean change in the difference between immigrant and native students' levels of patriotism for every one unit of change in a country's Gini coefficient in a country (in this case, that would be one hundredth of a point), and  $u_{10k}$  is the unique effect of country  $k$  on the mean difference in immigrant and native levels of patriotism.



## Appendix E

### Within-School Interaction Effects

You will recall from Chapter 5 that numerous demographic characteristics tend to be more significantly related to civic outcomes than immigrant status. A compelling question is to what extent those characteristics are related to somewhat different outcomes for immigrant and native students. Models that answer this question include interactions of immigrant status with several demographic variables to show how characteristics have different effects for immigrants and native students.<sup>65</sup> This discussion builds on that already presented in Chapter 5.

#### E.1 Civic Knowledge and Interpretive Skills


Beginning with civic knowledge and skills, in Table E-1 we see that girls score somewhat lower than boys, though not by much more than a tenth of a standard deviation (immigrant girls score *much* lower than immigrant boys in Hungary, the only country for which this is the case,  $\gamma = -0.301, p < .05$ ). In several countries, students who are older than the target age range—i.e., older than 16 years—score lower than their younger peers, and generally this is true for students overall, not just immigrants or just natives.

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<sup>65</sup> Sometimes, even when they are not significant, interactions improve a model's 'fit,' or how well it is able to use data to estimate effects. This is why some non-significant interactions are included in within-school models. I used HLM's general linear hypothesis testing feature to determine whether interactions improved models' fit.

This is another indication that those students may have been held back at some point for low achievement.

Students with few books in their home or who don't speak the school language at home consistently score significantly lower than students with an average number of books or who always speak the school language at home. These effects are somewhat different for immigrant students in certain countries. For example, consider Sweden. Monolingual immigrants score nearly three-tenths of a standard deviation below monolingual native students ( $\gamma = -.288, p < .001$ ). Even native-born students, if they never speak the school language at home, score nearly four tenths of a standard deviation lower than monolingual native students ( $\gamma = -.388, p < .001$ ). However, this model shows that *immigrants* who never speak the school language at home know *more* about civics than natives who never speak the school language at home ( $\gamma = .454, p < .05$ ). See Figure E-1 for an illustration of this phenomenon.



**Figure E-1. The relationship of home language to differences in immigrants' and native students' civic knowledge and interpretive skills in Sweden.**


## **E.2 Extracurricular Participation**

We see in Table E-2 that girls are generally more participatory than boys, but home language is generally not associated with extracurricular participation (exceptions: England and Hungary, where occasional non-school language speakers are more likely to participate). The longer a student has lived in the country, generally the more likely he or she is to be involved in extracurricular activities, except in southern and central Europe.

## **E.3 Attitudes toward Women's Rights and Opportunities**

Analyses of students' attitudes toward women's rights (Table E-3) show that in all countries, regardless of immigrant status, girls are much more likely to be highly

supportive (54 to 83 percent less likely to fall into a lower category), an expected finding (for an example of this in Hungary, see Figure E-2; note that the difference between immigrant boys and immigrant girls is the same as the difference between native boys and native girls). Norwegian immigrant girls, however, are actually much less likely to be supportive than native Norwegian girls (OR = 2.742,  $p < .05$ ).



**Figure E-2. The relationship of gender with Hungarian adolescents' attitudes toward women's rights: The same, regardless of immigrant status.**


Findings vary regarding language of the home, though. In Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden, being multilingual increases the likelihood of strong support for women's rights (odds ratios less than 1), but in Greece, Italy, and Czech Republic, multilingualism decreases that likelihood (odds ratios greater than 1). These effects are different for natives and immigrants in some countries, though. In Sweden, for example, a native student who sometimes speaks a non-school language at home is more likely to be supportive of women's rights (OR = .630,  $p < .05$ ), but an immigrant student is less likely

to be so (interaction OR = 2.007,  $p < .05$ ).

#### **E.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants' Rights and Opportunities**

Table E-4 shows that girls do tend, overall, to be more supportive of immigrants' rights, but in Norway, for example, the 'effect' of being a girl is not as strong for immigrant girls as native girls (interaction  $\gamma = -.542$ ,  $p < .01$ ), while in Czech Republic, the effect of being a girl is positively compounded for immigrant girls (interaction  $\gamma = .431$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Effectively, controlling for other characteristics: in Norway, immigrant girls are about as supportive of immigrants' rights as immigrant boys, but in Czech Republic, immigrant girls are much more supportive of immigrants' rights than their male peers.

In western and Nordic Europe, occasionally speaking a non-school language at home is significantly positively associated with support for immigrants' rights, though this relationship is frequently different for immigrants than for natives. In several countries, native students who are occasional speakers of a non-school language are actually *more* pro-immigrants' rights than immigrant students who are occasional speakers of a non-school language (note the effects for language sometimes and the interaction of immigrant status and language sometimes in western and Nordic Europe). Figure E-3 helps clarify this situation, as it shows the relationship of home language to differences in immigrants' and native students' attitudes toward immigrants' rights in Switzerland. 'Sometimes' multilinguals are more supportive of immigrants' rights in both groups, but the 'sometimes' immigrant multilinguals are less supportive than their 'sometimes' native peers.



**Figure E-3. The relationship of home language with differences in immigrants' and native students' attitudes toward immigrants' rights in Switzerland.**

### **E.5 Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities' Rights and Opportunities**

For this outcome (Table E-5), we see similar patterns to those for attitudes toward immigrants' rights. Again girls are universally significantly more supportive of ethnic minorities' right to respect and opportunities for education, employment, and political office. In countries where the effect of being female is different for natives and immigrants (Germany, Denmark, Norway), immigrant girls are still more supportive than immigrant boys, but the gap between those groups is not as large as the gap between native girls and native boys.

Language of the home is not consistently related to this attitude. More often in western and Nordic Europe, multilingualism is associated with greater support for ethnic


minorities' rights, though these effects are frequently different for immigrants than for native students (the effect of being multilingual is not as strong for immigrants as for natives).

### **E.6 Patriotism**

Table E-6 shows that in Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden, though girls tend to be significantly less patriotic than boys, in several countries there is not quite so large a difference between immigrant girls' and immigrant boys' patriotism (England and Sweden, for example). Though *multilingual* native students are much less patriotic than *monolingual* natives, multilingual immigrants are more patriotic than their native peers (see Figure E-4 for the Norwegian example). In other cases, multilingual immigrants are even less patriotic than their native peers, possibly reflecting a stronger attachment to the familial homeland.

### **E.7 Discussion**

Since I have just described results by outcome, in this discussion I summarize the findings according to independent variables. It is rare that immigrant status has one constant, main effect for all immigrants; more often, these students' outcomes vary by gender, home language, and number of books in the home (proxying, as you'll recall, for socioeconomic status).



**Figure E-4. The relationship of home language with differences in Norwegian adolescents' patriotism.**

**Gender and books in the home.** While these variables were included as statistical controls, there are several interesting relationships with each that I believe are worth commenting on.

**Gender.** Across countries, gender has a fairly consistent relationship with outcomes. Girls tend to have less civic knowledge and skills, are less patriotic, but participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities more. Other research has shown that each of these outcomes tend to be somewhat different for boys and girls generally (girls know either as much or somewhat less and participate more), and this is true of immigrant and minority youth, as well (Flanagan & Faison, 2001).

Girls are also significantly more supportive of rights for all three traditionally marginalized groups. This confirms previous studies' findings. Work on young people's sociopolitical attitudes has found strong gender differences: girls tend to be much more



tolerant (understandably) of rights and economic opportunities for women, and they are also more supportive of rights for and tolerance of ethnic minorities and immigrants (Husfeldt, 2004; Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008). This seems to be because females in general are more likely to be concerned with social justice and human rights than males. For example, other researchers have found adolescent girls to be more tolerant than boys of rights for feminists, homosexuals, and even racists.

There is no sense that immigrant girls are consistently different from immigrant boys across outcomes or countries, though. Rather, in a few instances, the ‘effect’ of being a girl is compounded for immigrants, as in Germany on women’s rights, or is weakened for immigrants, as in Norway on women’s rights (e.g., girls tend to be much more supportive of women’s rights, but immigrant girls in Germany are even more so, while immigrant girls in Norway are less so). A weakening of the overall effect is more prevalent, and especially on patriotism. In western and Nordic Europe, controlling for all else, while native girls are significantly different from native boys in their affection for their country, immigrant girls tend to be more like immigrant boys, i.e. have more similar degrees of patriotism. It seems that in those regions, with longer histories of immigration and more prominent problems with immigrant integration, immigrant students’ experiences may really be most defined by being immigrants.

*Number of books in the home.* In some studies, students of lower SES appear to be significantly less supportive of rights for marginalized groups, perhaps because they feel their and their families’ security is threatened by outsiders (Hjerm, 2005). Other studies have not shown socioeconomic status to be significantly related to xenophobia (Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008). In my study, number of books (considered

as a weak proxy for socioeconomic status) has the most consistent relationship with civic knowledge and skills, and extracurricular participation. In both instances, across countries there are strong patterns: having more books is related to greater civic knowledge and to a higher likelihood of civic participation. Generally these effects are not different for natives and immigrants, but where they are, there are inconsistent findings: the effect of number of books may be compounded or weakened for immigrants. On other outcomes there tend not to be obvious patterns of relationships, either. One exception is women's rights, where, in a few countries, students with more books are more likely to be highly supportive of women's rights. Supporting this finding is that in another few countries, students with fewer books than average are significantly less supportive. This may speak to the idea that those who have greater material security are more open to rights for those at society's margins, while those with fewer resources feel more threatened by people at the margins.

**Home language.** The measure of how frequently students speak the school language at home has been used by several other researchers as an indicator of native-born students' ethnic minority status, or having an immigration background (parents or grandparents who were immigrants). Additionally, if immigrants are monolingual in the school language, they and their families are likely to be particularly well integrated into the host society. These interpretations, if true, are very helpful in making sense of these findings. Where students' home language is different from the school language, i.e., are multilingual, generally patriotism and civic knowledge and skills are lower, but support of immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights is greater. Regarding immigrants' and native-born multilingual students' lower levels of patriotism, it may be that they see

themselves as treated differently by the ethnic majority in their countries both socially and politically. Furthermore it is likely that they and their parents have strong emotional and social ties to the country of origin still.

In some cases, as I showed, multilingualism is more beneficial for immigrants' civic knowledge than for natives' civic knowledge. This may be related to the very likely reason that immigrants' families immigrated in the first place: greater economic opportunities and a 'better future' for their children. In immigrant families, there tend to be great pressures on students to achieve highly in school because parents see academic achievement as the ticket to that better future. Immigrant adolescents who speak a non-school language at home with some frequency are likely to be well attached to and respectful of their parents' wishes, and thus strive harder for academic achievement (Coll & Magnuson, 1997; Fuligni, 1997).

Astoundingly, though, in western and Nordic Europe, multilingualism has an unexpectedly less positive relationship with *immigrants'* attitudes toward immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights. This means that in countries in those regions, with better established minority communities, multilingual natives are more pro-rights for minorities than multilingual immigrants. Perhaps this is an indication that these multilingual immigrant students, with the ability to operate in two cultures' languages, are wrestling to some extent with assimilation. Their ability to code-switch linguistically may extend to cultural code-switching, so when they see that native students tend to be less supportive of rights for minorities, they claim to be less supportive, as well, to fit in better. Perhaps, too, multilingual native students feel confident in and comfortable with both cultures, and have developed pride in their parents' background, without feeling that they have to

reject it.

**Length of residence in the country.** Students who have lived in the country longer tend to be less knowledgeable about civics and have less positive views of immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights, but these same students tend to have greater odds of civic participation. Generally these findings apply to all students regardless of immigrant status, but in a few countries, immigrants who have been in residence longer are more knowledgeable. The findings do suggest greater integration with the native population, though.

In summary, these relationships are quite changeable across countries and outcomes, such that gender generally makes no difference for immigrants' and natives' civic knowledge or participation, but in several northern and western European countries creates different relationships with patriotism. Several other patterns are identifiable by geographic region. In Nordic and western Europe and Greece, immigrants who frequently speak both the school and home language are significantly *less* supportive of immigrants' and ethnic minorities' rights. This striking finding suggests that immigrants in these countries may perceive that integration requires a certain denigration of and intolerance toward minorities (though this is not borne out necessarily by findings on native students' attitudes). It would appear that these students have overcompensated, strongly rejecting that which most defines them. Perceiving that who they are is not acceptable to mainstream society, their attitudes may be in some ways akin to those of aggressively anti-gay rights American politicians who eventually come out of the closet.

In those same regions, immigrants' access to books at home is also strongly negatively related to their attitudes toward immigrants' rights (fewer books = stronger

support of immigrants' rights; a statistically negative relationship, not philosophically), opposite of native students, whose attitudes are unrelated to their access to books.

Despite having fewer educational resources, perhaps these immigrants cling to the idea of social mobility in their host country and are thus strongly in favor of pro-immigrant policies.

These findings on the interaction between immigrant status and demographic variables show clearly that immigrants cannot be perceived as a universal demographic 'block' that experiences schools and views democracy in one common way (which supports previous studies' comments on the lack of solidarity among immigrant populations (Klopp, 2002, p. 8). Rather, immigrants differ from one another in numerous ways, dependent on their country of residence. Future research should certainly include a better measure of immigrants' countries of origin, which would add a valuable dimension to understandings of immigrants' diverse experiences.

Table E-1. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	Belgium	England	Germany	Switzerland	Denmark	Norway	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Czech Republic	Hungary	Slovakia
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean civic knldg/skills	-.197***	-.083**	-.111***	-.114***	-.023†	.074**	-.047*	.113***	.041†	-.175***	.169***	-.040†	.127***
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	-.663*	.088	-.056**	-.521*	-.030	-.091	-.288***	-2.176***	-.244*	-1.307***	-1.224***	-.593*	.160*
Female <sup>b</sup>	-.008	-.047	-.107***	-.079***	-.120***	-.166*	-.078**	.024	-.024	-.055**	-.108***	-.043*	-.049*
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	.137		-.084	-.031									
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.001		-.069***	-.035	-.097	-.182†	-.304	-.046	.014	.147**	.352***	-.291***	-.244
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	-.054*	-.174***	-.068***	-.088***	-.171***	-.133**	-.119**	-.144***	-.097***	-.108***	-.138***	-.158***	-.111***
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	.108***	.172***	.090**	.074***	.080**	.165***	.155***	.122**	.045†	.111**	.127***	.145***	.067**
Time in country	-.050**	.015*	-.009†	-.034*	.029**	.012	.005	-.144***	-.026†	-.107***	-.075***	-.039*	-.007
Language: Never <sup>e</sup>	-.150*	-.679***	-.109	-.060	-.370**	-.098	-.388***	-.187	-.232***	-.030	-.320**	.003	-.152**
Language: Sometimes <sup>e</sup>	-.188***	-.079	-.068	-.106***	-.223**	-.213***	-.291***	.225***	-.169***	-.044	.084	-.203*	-.098*
Open climate	.074***	.073***	.055***	.034***	.127***	.107***	.099***	.076***	.072***	.054***	.078***	.056***	.058***
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	.046*	.098***	.060**	.031*	-.011	.176†	.068*	.172***	.008	.013	-.021	.025	.013
<b>Interactions</b>													
Imm x Female												-.301*	
Imm x Over-age									-.388***				
Imm x Few books						.178*					-.089	.067**	-.339**
Imm x Many books						.053					.491**		-.088
Imm x Time in ctry	.050*			.034*				.158***		.087***	.086***		
Imm x Lang. never		.759*			.359†		.454**	-.440†					-.012
Imm x Lang. some		-.120			.194		.396***	-.337**					-.246*
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>													
Mean knldg/skills	.046***	.026***	.063***	.051***	.009***	.016***	.033***	.036***	.061***	.026***	.094***	.040***	.067***
Level-1 error	.125	.163	.125	.118	.231	.243	.201	.228	.142	.119	.163	.145	.131

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always <sup>f</sup> No extracurricular participation

†  $p < 0.1$  \*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table E-2. Extracurricular participation: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	Belgium	England	Germany	Switzerland	Denmark	Norway	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Czech Republic	Hungary	Slovakia
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean participation	3.098***	4.943***	1.294**	1.915***	8.466***	21.107***	5.936***	8.432***	.827**	2.740***	2.015***	2.879***	.458***
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	142.758**	2.150	1.218	1.383	2.559†	1.096	1.329	.002*	1.812	1.936†	.558	.874	1.322
Female <sup>b</sup>	1.139	2.079***	1.404**	1.499***	1.138	2.745***	1.137	1.455*	1.233†	1.107	1.561***	1.225†	1.752***
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	4.736†		2.740*										
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.514		.752	1.058		2.594		1.923	.981	.929	1.699	1.037	
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	.784	.886	.756*	.642***	.653*	.276**	.962	.920	.861	.591***	.737*	.802	.858
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	2.027***	1.674**	1.705***	.950	1.473*	.893	1.938**	.966	1.784**	1.052	1.583***	1.096	1.264*
Time in country	1.475**	1.095*	1.066†	1.072*	1.152*	1.082	1.034	.721	1.002	1.067	1.033	.912	1.068
Language: Never <sup>e</sup>	1.418	2.339	1.158	.872	.920	2.178	1.254	.324	.703	.627	.403		.740
Language: Sometimes <sup>e</sup>	1.390	2.296*	1.030	.854	.563	.934	1.062		1.145	.942	1.427	5.570*	1.050
Open climate	1.102	1.217**	1.046	1.043	1.123	1.160	1.098	1.014	1.035	1.144	1.182**	1.167*	1.080
Civic knowledge	1.438*	1.994***	1.555**	1.355**	.957	2.085	1.353	2.186***	1.127	1.124	.896	1.071	1.073
<b>Interactions</b>													
Imm x Female		.410†											
Imm x Over-age								.187*	3.761†				
Imm x Few books								3.698*			.077*		
Imm x Many books								10.486*			2.997		
Imm x Time in ctry	.690**							1.496†					
Imm x Lang. never													
Imm x Lang. some												.011**	
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>													
Mean participation	.464***	.103*	.381***	.285***	.070	.001	.309***	.189**	.266***	.261***	.151***	.242***	.488***

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All estimates are in the form of odds ratios. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup>Native <sup>b</sup>Male <sup>c</sup>Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup>Average # of books <sup>e</sup>School language at home always

†  $p < 0.1$  \*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table E-3. Attitude toward women's rights and opportunities: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	Belgium	England	Germany	Switzerland	Denmark	Norway	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Czech Republic	Hungary	Slovakia
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean odds of less positive attitude	.563***	.227***	.416***	.290***	.243***	.202***	.310***	.541***	.523***	.429***	.449***	.760***	.782***
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	.914	1.537	1.226	1.164	.605†	.435*	1.326	.848	1.412	2.226*	.866	1.566	1.668
Female <sup>b</sup>	.243***	.169***	.231***	.176***	.197***	.128***	.253***	.134***	.215***	.463***	.281***	.212***	.401***
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	.607		1.611										
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.583		1.124	1.219	.479	.452	.970	1.381	1.224	.784	.557	1.077	1.108
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	1.409†	1.203	.925	1.102	1.148	1.188	.918	1.142	1.206†	1.163†	.893	1.348	1.344**
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	.966	1.252	1.010	.955	.799†	.813*	.961	.936	.822	1.052	.987	.702***	.910
Time in country	1.049	.982	.950†	.998	.911*	.977	1.109*	.991	1.029	1.145**	.956	1.036	1.038
Language: Never <sup>e</sup>	.861	5.700*	1.038	1.570	.167**	1.504	1.629	2.335	1.794*	.652	11.943†	1.304	1.220
Language: Sometimes <sup>e</sup>	.780	1.182	1.071	.767†	.892	.848	.630*	25.404*	1.320*	1.005	.575	.450	1.288
Open climate	.775**	.733***	.736***	.796***	.755***	.712***	.785***	.796***	.833**	.699***	.792***	.859**	.810***
Civic knowledge	.228***	.401***	.389***	.292***	.317***	.315***	.186***	.170***	.202***	.195***	.414***	.295***	.336***
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	.714**	.897	.826†	.901	.795	.672†	.992	.945	.966	.987	.853	.841	.947
<b>Interactions</b>													
Imm x Female			.711†			2.742*	.322***						
Imm x Under-age			.054**										
Imm x Over-age			.747										
Imm x Few books		2.437		.921			4.771***				4.254		
Imm x Many books		.311†		.435*			.924				5.581*		
Imm x Time in ctry													
Imm x Lang. never	1.728					.735	1.224	1.136			.020*		
Imm x Lang. some	4.297**					2.007*	.031*	.136*			3.736		
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>													
Mean attitude	.220***	.115***	.153***	.235***	.018	.099**	.178***	.120***	.082***	.070**	.162***	.150***	.115***

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All estimates are in the form of odds ratios. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup>Native <sup>b</sup>Male <sup>c</sup>Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup>Average # of books <sup>e</sup>School language at home always <sup>f</sup>No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001



Table E-4. Attitude toward immigrants' rights and opportunities: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean attitude	.087†	-.003	-.332***	-.218***	-.113***	.202***	.620***	.315***	-.045*	.195***	.061**	-.219***	-.058*
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	.243	.029	.134*	.415***	-.949**	2.990***	-1.132	.269	.347†	.208	-.408*	.338*	-.038
Female <sup>b</sup>	.216**	.295***	.220***	.381***	.456***	.522***	.316***	.221***	.239***	.045	.246***	.156**	.149***
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	.172		-.184	-.701									
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.280		.054	-.116	.129	1.976	-.491	.140	.052	-.009	.030	.058	.635
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	.056	-.037	-.040	-.013	-.019	.017	.097	.008	-.056	.084†	-.033	.153*	.019
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	-.074	-.022	-.024	.007	.045	.195***	.108*	-.015	-.006	.022	.013	.034	.007
Time in country	-.045*	-.008	-.029*	-.024†	-.051*	.145**	-.152*	-.033†	-.013	-.035*	-.005	-.034†	.002
Language: Never <sup>c</sup>	-.007	1.444*	.942	-.002	.233	-.395	.052	.360	.050	.293	.242	.340	.309**
Language: Sometimes <sup>c</sup>	.585***	.673***	1.026***	.865***	.703**	.831***	.592***	-.815†	.034	.060	.382	.068	.051
Open climate	.107**	.091*	.184***	.041*	.139***	.207***	.250***	.186***	.155***	.178***	.087***	.094***	.162***
Civic knowledge	.314***	.182**	.307***	.381***	.415***	.314***	.314***	.340***	.328***	.263***	.182***	.138**	.146**
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	-.025	-.0002	-.096*	-.024	.071	.265**	.090	-.006	.065*	.023	.092*	.032	-.029
<b>Interactions</b>													
Imm x Female						-.542**		-.338*			.431*		
Imm x Few books	-.418†	-.244		.260*	.496**	.718**				-.238†			
Imm x Many books	-.223	.583*		.112	-.059	.240				-.711**			
Imm x Time in ctry					.097***	-.162**	.111†						
Imm x Lang. never	.789†	-1.827	-.750	.185	.659†	-.159	.346	-.748		.892*			
Imm x Lang. some	-.645*	-.525†	-.519*	-.610***	.144	-.655**	-.442**	.952*		.141			
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>													
Mean attitude	.094***	.168***	.118***	.136***	.068***	.039***	.138***	.018***	.030***	.009*	.018***	.028**	.042***
Immigrant gap					.319**				.465***			.403***	
Level-1 error	1.000	.960	.816	.851	.812	1.078	.982	.799	.559	.588	.558	.559	.592

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always <sup>f</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table E-5. Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights and opportunities: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean attitude	.149**	.312***	-.324***	-.179***	-.145***	.157***	.188***	.149***	-.054*	.320***	.080*	-.236***	-.024
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	.068	-.454**	.302**	.526***	.895***	.293	.106	.131	.310†	-.166	-.117	.162	-.139
Female <sup>b</sup>	.394***	.377***	.324***	.449***	.455***	.486***	.181***	.205***	.230***	.167***	.315***	.197***	.178***
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	.069		-.203	-1.792†									
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	.483†		.052	-.119	.057	-.095	.148	.090	-.108	.115	-.236	-.070	.162
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	.008	-.121†	.011	-.0002	-.046	-.040	.119*	.087*	-.137**	-.029	.023	.209***	-.110**
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	-.118	-.052	.057	.090†	-.026	.147*	.120*	-.029	-.006	-.130†	.022	.127**	.045
Time in country	-.035†	-.034*	-.044**	.001	.064**	-.040	-.022	-.019	.004	-.030*	.020	-.001	-.032
Language: Never <sup>c</sup>	-.221	.052	.995	.155	.461*	-.413**	.255	-.546***	.052	.415	.271	.131	.222†
Language: Sometimes <sup>c</sup>	.314†	.277*	.754**	.638***	.585***	.382	.273**	-.563***	-.010	-.332**	.273	-.250	.059
Open climate	.150***	.184***	.199***	.076***	.124***	.209***	.222***	.169***	.142***	.175***	.137***	.155***	.165***
Civic knowledge	.482***	.559***	.358***	.400***	.417***	.397***	.558***	.276***	.394***	.503***	.257***	.091*	.230***
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	.052	.107†	-.047	-.049	.068	.358**	.146*	.048	.096**	.033	.048	.071	.060
<b>Interactions</b>													
Imm x Female			-.278*		-.391†	-.377*							
Imm x Over-age								-.417†					
Imm x Few books		.003		.278*		.591*					.218		
Imm x Many books		.506*		.054		.261					-.413*		
Imm x Lang. never	.299		-1.078	.109		.027	-.571*	-.594†		.693			
Imm x Lang. some	-.670*		-.501*	-.495***		-.760*	-.220	.597**		.751**			
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN...</b>													
Mean attitude	.088***	.024***	.103***	.156***	.041***	.015**	.018*	.011**	.032***	.015**	.039***	.030***	.040***
Immigrant gap									.419**				
Level-1 error	1.030	.861	1.023	.903	.869	.760	.831	.716	.653	.736	.667	.638	.714

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always <sup>f</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table E-5. Patriotism: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects.

	Western Europe				Nordic Europe			Southern Europe			Central Europe		
	BEL	ENG	GER	SWI	DEN	NOR	SWE	GRC	ITA	POR	CZE	HUN	SVK
<b>FIXED EFFECTS</b>													
Mean patriotism	-.673***	-.205***	-.400***	-.290***	-.026	.050	-.397***	.802***	-.087***	.495***	.147***	.112***	.186***
Immigrant gap <sup>a</sup>	-.188	.621	-.233*	-.445***	.070	-.156	-.550**	-.571***	-.102	-.179	-.019	-.072	-.305*
Female <sup>b</sup>	-.015	-.303***	-.471***	-.250***	-.112*	-.249***	-.367***	.133**	-.216***	-.171***	-.113**	-.082*	-.178**
Under-age <sup>c</sup>	-.291		-.157	.785									
Over-age <sup>c</sup>	-.017		-.007	.097	.127	.091	1.352	-.035	-.132	-.074	-.138	.024	-.735**
Books: Few <sup>d</sup>	-.081	.022	.066	-.049	-.078	-.0001	.190**	.025	.031	-.034	.016	-.023	.025
Books: Many <sup>d</sup>	-.093	-.170*	-.101†	-.079†	-.023	.034	-.034	-.118	-.038	-.087	.075*	-.004	-.127**
Time in country	.024	.062†	-.006	-.015	.026	.008	.006	-.014	.006	.022	.013	.008	-.005
Language: Never <sup>c</sup>	-.330†	-.871*	-.873**	-.181	.263	-.167	-.378†	-.669†	.018	-.108	-.613**	.200	-.156
Language: Sometimes <sup>c</sup>	-.376***	-.886***	-.352**	-.520***	-.875***	-.710***	-.483***	-.632**	.102*	-.341**	-.302†	.097	-.119
Open climate	.098***	.122***	.030	.114***	.079**	.161***	.120***	.225***	.119***	.169***	.105***	.127***	.084**
Civic knowledge	.057	-.064	-.332***	-.180***	-.158**	-.201***	-.167**	.038	-.031	-.045	-.201***	.095*	-.260***
Extracurriculars <sup>f</sup>	.114*	.154*	.069	-.035	.089	.177	-.153*	.077	-.006	.090*	.053	.089*	.092*
<b>Interactions</b>													
Imm x Female		.343*	.192†	.271**			.395**						
Imm x Under-age	-.589												
Imm x Over-age	1.157*								.790*				
Imm x Few books						-.335†			-.135			.728**	
Imm x Many books						-.246			-.522*			-.165	
Imm x Time in ctry		.062†			-.031*								
Imm x Lang. never				-.362	-.611†	.208	-.308		-.769*			-.453	
Imm x Lang. some				.366**	.475	.468†	.343*		-.161			-.1768**	
<b>RANDOM EFFECTS</b>													
Mean patriotism	.049***	.024***	.099***	.073***	.031**	.033***	.063***	.033***	.028***	.044***	.025***	.024***	.089***
Immigrant gap	.228*	.230*	.116**		.493***				.271*			.204*	
Level-1 error	.804	.788	.806	.837	.700	.765	1.013	.796	.642	.650	.605	.636	.762

Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the immigrant gap has a random effect. In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.

Reference groups: <sup>a</sup> Native <sup>b</sup> Male <sup>c</sup> Target age (13-15 years) <sup>d</sup> Average # of books <sup>e</sup> School language at home always <sup>f</sup> No extracurricular participation

† p < 0.1 \* p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 \*\*\* p < 0.001

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