

## Demystifying Legal Reasoning

Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common-law reasoning, when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practice special forms of reasoning is false.

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#### CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi

Cambridge University Press 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521703956

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First published 2008

Printed in the United States of America

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Alexander, Larry, 1943—
Demystifying legal reasoning / Larry Alexander, Emily Sherwin.
p. cm. – (Cambridge introductions to philosophy and law)
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN 978-0-521-87898-2 (hardback) – ISBN 978-0-521-70395-6 (pbk.)
1. Law – Methodology. 2. Logic. 3. Reasoning. I. Sherwin, Emily, 1955— II. Title
III. Series.

K213.A429 2008 340′.1–dc22 2007045107

ISBN 978-0-521-87898-2 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-70395-6 paperback

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