

Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court

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Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court

Abstract

This article explores why governments commit to human rights enforcement by joining the International Criminal Court (ICC). Compared to other international institutions, the ICC has substantial authority and autonomy. Since governments traditionally guard their sovereignty carefully, it is puzzling that the ICC was not only established, but established so rapidly. Looking beyond traditional explanations for joining international institutions, this study identifies a new causal factor: a country's dependence network, which consists of the set of other states that control resources the country values. This study captures different dimensions of what states value through trade relations, security alliances, and shared memberships in international organizations. Using event history analysis on monthly data from 1998 to 2004, we find that dependence networks strongly affect whether and when a state signs and ratifies the ICC. Some types of ratification costs also influence state commitment, but many conventional explanations of state commitment receive little empirical support.

Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) represents a substantial commitment of many nations to enforce international human rights norms. The ICC has the authority to try individuals suspected of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in a wide range of states from the time the Court was established into the indefinite future. It can determine whether a case is admissible by deciding whether another state has been unwilling or unable to carry out an investigation or prosecution. Its appellate court decisions are final and cannot be overturned by states. The Court has an independent prosecutor with wide authority to bring charges against suspects. To be sure, the Court has important limitations on its power and influence. Yet in comparison to other international institutions of all stripes (not just those in human rights), the Court exercises significant authority and autonomy. The ICC also stands out for how quickly it came into existence once states initially adopted the treaty in July 1998. The statute set a very high bar for the Court to begin operating, requiring 60 ratifications. Most observers predicted that it would take many years to achieve that large number. Yet the 60th state ratified in April 2002 and the Court became a reality on July 1, 2002.

The success of the ICC is puzzling because states jealously guarding their sovereignty have traditionally been quite reluctant to commit to international institutions with the ability to enforce international norms. Why then were states willing to commit to the ICC? And what explains the differences among states in the likelihood and speed of their signing the agreement and then taking the much stronger step of ratifying?

We argue that governments support (or fail to support) international institutions because they care about the potential reactions of the international partners on whom they depend for a diverse set of goods that range from trade and security to votes and support in international organizations (IOs). We label this set of partners a “dependence network.” Each state has a distinct network because each

state relies on a different group of partners for trade, security and support in IOs; these networks also vary over time as states switch partners or as partners become more or less important. In our approach, leaders observe how other governments behave within their dependence network and alter their own actions to be more consistent with those of their partners. Leaders value approval from network partners as a way to be rewarded with other goods, such as a trade concession, or to avoid punishments, such as the withdrawal of the concession..

For any given state, a dependence network is a set of partner states with whom it regularly exchanges valued goods where those exchanges would be costly to break. We measure three dependence networks for any given state by examining that state's trade partners, alliance partners, and international organization (IO) partners along with an index that incorporates all three. We weight partners by their dyadic trade volume, overall material capabilities, or total contributions to a given IO in order to capture dependence and not just interaction. So partner states that trade more with a given state, provide more military support, or matter more in the state's chosen international organizations receive greater weights than less-important partners.¹

Network partners do not always need to use their resources to actually reward or punish others' behavior—though of course they sometimes do. In many cases, if governments care about the economic, security, and political goods their network partners provide, they can anticipate the likely reactions of their partners and behave in ways they expect their partners will approve (Centola, Willer, and Macy 2005; Posner 2000). We do not wish to imply that states are always clearly and explicitly rewarded or punished for their behavior by their network partners. Rather, we expect states to engage in “diffuse reciprocity” with their network partners where they reasonably expect some return for their behavior, but the contingency and equivalence of that return remains relatively ambiguous (Keohane 1986:4-8).

This approach differs substantially from standard explanations for international institutions. We test our explanation in this article against these alternatives. Scholars most commonly consider the *direct* benefits and costs of international institutions (those accruing to the state due to the nature of the institution) and argue that states make expected utility calculations accordingly. International human rights institutions can directly benefit states by “locking in” current behaviors for the future (Moravcsik 2000). Attention to direct costs suggests that states are less likely to commit to international institutions when it appears expensive to change domestic policies in the short run, when they fear the unintended consequences of commitment (Hawkins 2002), or when they want the flexibility to change policy in the future (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006).

We also test our argument against common contentions in the literature that state commitment behavior is driven by other kinds of connections among states (Cole 2005; Landman 2005; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). We examine a variety of possible ties in this paper, including geography, language, civilization, and colonial heritage. Finally, we include controls for domestic institutions (presidential systems) and principled commitments (voluntary contributions to war crimes tribunals).

We use an event history model to estimate the likelihood and speed of both signing and ratifying. We find that dependence networks and some kinds of commitment costs affect ICC signing and ratification, and that alternative explanations appear less helpful. In particular, two theoretically important factors that have proven empirically important in previous studies—democracy level and regional trends—both become less robust predictors when dependence networks are included in the analysis.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

We conceptualize commitment to the ICC as commitment to norm enforcement. Norms are “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Krasner 1983:2). In the

international arena, norm enforcement is largely decentralized and dependent on the actions of individual states. But norms can also be enforced by delegating authority to a third party to take action against norm violators.

The International Criminal Court exemplifies delegated enforcement authority. The court employs independent prosecutors to investigate charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, all of which are defined by the ICC's governing treaty, the 1998 Rome Statute. The court has jurisdiction over citizens of all state parties, over crimes committed on the territory of state parties, and over cases referred by the UN Security Council. The Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC is a "court of last resort," investigating and prosecuting only when national courts have failed. The Assembly of State Parties elects eighteen judges to the court, divided into three divisions – pre-trial, trial, and appeals. As of November 2010, 114 states had signed and ratified the Rome Statute, and the ICC had investigated alleged crimes in five areas, including Sudan's Darfur region, Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, and the Central African Republic. By November 2010 the ICC had indicted 16 people, of which 2 have died, 7 are fugitives, and the remaining 7 have been tried or are awaiting trial.

Of course, it is important not to overstate the ICC's authority or power. It must still rely on powerful states to bring suspects to justice and to fund its operations. The Security Council can alter the ICC's agenda by referring cases or by asking the ICC to defer cases (for a year at a time). Actions must meet the relatively strict definitions of the specified human rights abuses to qualify for ICC scrutiny. Moreover, prosecutors bring subsequent suits against individuals, not national governments. The ICC thus differs from many international human rights treaties, where committees hold states as wholes responsible for violations. Still, given that tried individuals often hold high office and can symbolize governments more broadly, ICC actions can affect states generally.² Thus, despite its

limitations, the ICC is an institution through which norm enforcement occurs. States announce an intention to commit to international norm enforcement when they sign the ICC statute. They commit to norm enforcement when they ratify the agreement.

The ICC entails real costs both to states who pay for the enforcement and to states against whom enforcement occurs or may occur. Costs of enforcement include the substantial annual upkeep of the Court and the much larger costs of arresting individual suspects and bringing them to justice. The latter costs are so high that states often do not pay them, which leads to reputational costs for failing to support the Court and international justice generally. Costs to member states (which vary by state) also involve potential alterations to security policy and practices, record keeping, and training of military personnel so that domestic policies and laws are consistent with those of the ICC and so that they can avoid prosecution.

Costs would also entail any legal fees and expenses should governments need to defend sitting office holders, not to mention the less-tangible but potentially greater costs to prestige and a state's ability to pursue its international goals if an official comes under prosecution. Most of these costs arguably involve sovereignty costs as states become restricted in the set of policy choices and practices available to them. Of course, states can always fail to comply with their commitment by refusing to cooperate with the ICC, but some evidence suggests that international treaty commitments produce compliance (Simmons and Hopkins 2005).³ The actions of the United States further raised the costs of ICC accession. The United States not only refused to ratify but threatened and sometimes punished the ratifiers. Indeed, the opposition of the world's dominant power to the statute deepens the puzzle to explain here.

By signing and ratifying the ICC, governments are telling others that certain kinds of human rights violations will be prosecuted. Such norm enforcement efforts are problematic (Coleman 1990; see also

Hechter 1987; Heckathorn 1989). The benefits of commitment to enforcement can be small and uncertain. Further, as described above, the ICC statute takes a number of actions that states typically view as costly—costs that they have historically been reluctant to bear. Why, then, have states signed and ratified the ICC statute?

DEPENDENCE NETWORKS

We argue that a state's dependence networks cause ICC accession. Sociological norms research finds that network ties matter because actors consider the likely reactions of others when making enforcement decisions.⁴ Actors do not simply calculate the costs and benefits of the enforcement action itself, but also the reactions of others to the enforcement action (Horne 2004; 2009). Actors should particularly care about the reactions of those on whom they depend. *Dependence* refers to the value that actors place on the goods they can obtain through exchange with partners—weighed against alternative sources of those goods (Emerson 1962, 1972; Molm 1997; for a review of the literature see Molm and Cook 1995). *Dependence network* refers to the set of partners on whom a given actor relies for exchange. Thus, when exchange partners control access to a good that an individual values, the individual will try to maintain good relations with those partners and behave in ways that produce positive rather than neutral or negative reactions. Accordingly, the individual will sanction norm violations by others when that person believes that dependence-network members would react favorably to such sanctions.

Experimental research provides evidence that dependence significantly increases sanctioning. Horne's (2009) experiments employed an interactive computer game where participants could earn points they later exchanged for money. A computer-generated "thief," who participants believed was another human subject, frequently stole points from group members at random. When such norm violation occurred, victims could sanction the thief, but only at a cost. When subjects depended on one

another—in that they received gains from trade—they were significantly more likely to sanction the thief and to reward other sanctioners by offering more points in exchange. Norm enforcement occurred out of self-interest, and self-interested participants calculated not just the direct benefits and costs of sanctioning, but also potential reactions from other participants (Horne 2007).

Note that for dependence to have an effect, those rewards and punishments do not need to be either clearly contingent on or of equivalent value to the sanctioning behavior being rewarded or punished. Partners need not make any explicit rewards or punishments or even any promises or threats for others who depend on them to behave in similar ways. Network partners need only anticipate possible rewards or punishments. Indeed, the experiments described above were designed so that subjects could not make explicit agreements to punish or reward each other (in actual fact they could not even communicate). Yet Horne (2007) found that dependence significantly increased both a subject's willingness to sanction norms violators and to reward such sanctioners.

In short where actors are dependent on others, they are more likely to enforce norms. This is because, in these cases, the costs of norm enforcement are offset by the benefits of maintaining good relations with the partners on whom the actor depends.

We extend these lessons on dependence networks from experiments to the international arena. We argue that governments are dependent on a network of other countries, and that governments want to appear cooperative and compliant to their partners. Each state's dependence network changes over time and differs in substance from other states' networks. In interaction with partners, states want both positive reactions and maintenance of network relations. Thus, the government will try to anticipate how its network partners might view its behavior. If partners claim that human rights matter, but do nothing, their behavior suggests that they are not truly concerned about enforcement. Thus, there is little pressure to commit to an enforcement mechanism. But if partners go beyond rhetoric by signing

or ratifying the ICC, it suggests that those they believe that commitment to the punishment of human rights violators is important. If a government is completely independent (it does not need anything from other states), then it can freely ignore the opinions of others. But if the government depends on countries that have committed to the ICC, we argue that leaders will likely conclude that their network partners will react positively to those who follow suit and likewise commit. Thus, the government will be more likely to commit to the ICC.

We argue that, for any particular government, the larger the proportion of its ties to countries that have committed to the ICC, the stronger the pressure to commit to enforcement, and the greater the likelihood that the government will both sign and ratify the agreement. We weight a country's partners by their importance—in bilateral exports and imports in the case of trade networks, in military capabilities in the case of alliances, and in the dues paid to maintain the United Nations for international organizations networks. For a given country's security network, an alliance with Greece, for example, is less important than an alliance with the United States and we weight those countries appropriately. The same is true of IO networks. For trade networks, each partner's share of a state's total trade volume provides the weights. Thus, more globally powerful states may matter less for given countries' trade networks than less powerful partners with which they trade a lot.

We thus weight each country's dependence networks by the relative importance of its partners. Dependence networks therefore vary across countries and over time. To illustrate the importance of weights in our measurement, we provide graphic representations of weighted trade partners for Chile and Australia in the year 2000 (see Figures 1 and 2). The maps illustrate not only how conventional powers like the United States or Germany are influential, but also how other countries like Argentina or New Zealand may matter for given countries. Our argument thus follows: the larger the proportion of a government's weighted network partners who accede to the ICC, the greater the positive feedback

the government will likely receive if it commits and the greater the risk of negative feedback if it fails to sign and ratify. The reverse is also true: governments with ties to countries that fail to commit to the ICC should likewise prove less likely to commit.

Our arguments clearly have something in common with the concept of interdependence, especially when that term is used in a restrictive sense to refer to “international relationships that would be costly to break” (Baldwin 1980:484). Our most important difference with this work is to conceptualize dependence as existing *within a network*. Most political science research either measures interdependence dyadically or omnidirectionally. Examples of the dyadic approach abound in the literature on international conflict, where common measures of interdependence include the ratio of bilateral trade to GDP and the real value of bilateral trade (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000:784-795; Russett and Oneal 2001:140-141). This approach is sensible where the dependent variable is dyadic conflict, but where the dependent variable is not dyadic in nature, scholars need broader measures of dependence.

Other scholars have examined state dependence on the global community at large (for example, exports as a proportion of GNP; see Domke 1988). Yet this global interdependence approach obscures the key question: upon whom is a state dependent? We argue that states are not just dependent omnidirectionally; they are dependent on particular other states, who have specific interests and preferences that matter. Countries face quite different pressures because each has a unique network on which it depends for trade, security, political support, or other goods. The point is simple: different countries face different international environments because their key partners vary. We suspect that this rich source of variance might account for behavioral divergence among countries that cannot be explained with reference to general global pressures.

In making this argument, we acknowledge that states may adopt their partners’ policies for reasons

other than implied rewards or sanctions. We argue that such “material” incentives likely play an important role in network dependence as seen in the experiments referenced above. But it may also be the case that states emulate their partners out of a logic of acculturation or socialization (see Goodman and Jinks 2004, Checkel 2005). Dependence networks may well have multiple mechanisms of influence, and both material incentives and shared ideas of appropriateness may factor in government decision-making.

MEASURING DEPENDENCE

Dependence is a structural factor that is difficult to observe directly. In the laboratory, one can manipulate dependence. In natural settings, we have to measure it by examining interactions. States that depend on one another are likely to interact more extensively; hence, we should be able to read dependence off of those interactions. Interaction does not measure dependence perfectly, of course, but we prefer it to conventional alternatives such as asking state elites what they value and on whom they depend or by reading statements from governments about which relations they value. Such self-reported data has well-known biases.

The question then becomes what kinds of interactions to measure. In sociological experiments, dependence is typically operationalized using money, with interactions involving financial exchange. This does not mean that dependence is always about material resources; scholars use money because it is likely that everyone values it—money is fungible and therefore can be exchanged for other desirable (including idiosyncratic) goods (Hechter 1994; Molm 1997). In international relations, dependence may prove less unidimensional. A government may depend on partners for natural resources (oil), people (soldiers), or political support (to help achieve a goal, provide cover at home), etc. Whatever a nation values or needs can serve as a source of dependence.

We attempt to capture different dimensions of what states value by examining a variety of possible

dependence networks or their close proxies: security alliances, trade relations, and shared memberships in international organizations. States value alliance and trade partners for obvious reasons. We argue that they value IO partners because states have foreign policy goals that require international cooperation to achieve and in practice are often achieved through IOs (see also Abbott and Snidal 1998; Pevehouse 2006). States seeking to improve education and health care in developing countries, for example, often work through regional and functional organizations and rely on other states in those organizations to support their priorities through budget contributions and political backing for their preferred rules, mandates, and staffing decisions.

We measure *Security Networks* by examining formal alliances, weighted by the relative importance of alliance partners. Again, we emphasize that each state's security network can change over time as it adds or subtracts alliance partners or those partners become more or less powerful relative to each other. The values for the variable also change as alliance partners sign or ratify the ICC. So each state possesses a unique set of dependence networks whose values vary over time as its partners change and also as its partners change their stance toward the ICC. Where State A is in an alliance to come to the defense of State B, we call this a security partnership that creates dependence. The material capabilities of security partners are measured by the Composite Index of National Capabilities from the Correlates of War project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The index includes "total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditures," and is meant to pick up features of state power beyond GDP that are more relevant to security issues. We then sum the material capabilities of security partners who have signed or ratified the ICC statute (updated monthly) and divide that by the total capabilities of all security partners. This produces the proportion of security partners who have committed to the ICC, weighted by the capabilities of those partners—where higher capabilities of ratifying partners

increase dependence. When predicting signing, we examine the signing behavior of security partners; when predicting ratifying, we use the ratifying behavior of those partners.

We use Australia to illustrate the way networks are scored. For our time period, Australia had a defensive alliance only with the United States.⁵ When the United States signed the ICC (in December 2000), Australia's *Security Network* (for Signing) moved from 0 to 1, as all defensive partners had signed. (By December 2000, Australia had already signed.) Since the US never ratified, Australia's *Security Network* (for Ratifying) has always been 0.

For *Trade Networks*, we calculate the proportion of total trade (imports and exports) that occurs with states that have signed or ratified the ICC, using this bilateral trade volume to produce a similar weighted measure of dependence on all trade partners. For Australia, the weighted proportion of trade partners who signed started at 0.07 in July 1998 and had increased to 0.28 in December 1998, when Australia signed. The primary contributors to the change in Australia's *Trade Network* were New Zealand (6% of Australia's trade), United Kingdom (6%) and Germany (5%), which signed in October, November, and December 1998, respectively. Australia's ratifying *Trade Network* started at 0 in July 1998 and slowly increased to 0.19 in September 2001. It jumped up to 0.26 in October 2001, mostly as a result of the United Kingdom's ratification (constituting at that time 5% of Australia's trade). Australia ratified in July 2002.

For *IO Networks* we examine IOs with a significant bureaucratic apparatus whose functions are either multi-purpose, security provision, or oriented to general economic welfare (see Online Appendix), weighted by the relative importance of those IO partners. This excludes less institutionalized IOs that are little more than arenas for state meetings and IOs that deal with issues of lesser importance to states such as industry-specific agreements, education and research institutions, or standard-setting organizations. In other words, we include only the most important IOs where

dependence is likely to occur. For each state, we total the number of memberships it shares with every other state in all of these IOs (where the same dyad could be counted multiple times for shared memberships in multiple IOs), weighted by the proportion of the UN's general budget contributed by each IO partner. In the absence of data on financial contributions of all states to all IOs, this weight provides a measure of the state's importance and influence in IOs generally and hence other states' dependence on them.⁶ As the over-arching IO, the United Nations enjoys the largest number of member states and thus provides a better baseline for the universe of possible ICC members than alternative IOs. As with other measures, we then calculate the proportion of weighted partners who have signed or ratified the ICC (again updated monthly). For Australia, the weighted proportion of IO partners who signed started at 0.17 in July 1998, and increased to 0.29 by November 1998. In December 1998 (when Australia signed), its *IO Network* increased to 0.40, mostly through the signing of Germany and Canada, which together constituted 11% of Australia's *IO Network*.

For all of the dependence measures, we do not expect that a state will be able to react instantaneously to the actions of its network partners. Indeed, different domestic institutions may mean that there is some variance in the reaction times, though we attempt to control for this. Thus, we lag the dependence measures, experimenting with different lag lengths. To preview, we find that a three-month lag produces the strongest results. For skeptics, this lag may seem far too short: How can governments crank up the machinery to ratify a treaty within three months, especially in some domestic systems? In our view, this critique may overlook the ways in which ratification occurs, as illustrated by our Australian case study below. When faced with the question of whether to ratify a treaty, governments do not sit idly while watching other states and then leap into action once others have acted. Rather, they make a series of small moves based on their own preferences and on information they receive from the small moves of others. These small moves include study

commissions, legislative hearings, information-gathering exercises, consultations, initial political bargains with various groups interested in the treaty, examinations of domestic legislation, and so forth. We do not observe all of these smaller steps; we only observe the final moment of ratification (or failure to ratify). States lay the groundwork for ratification (or for blocking ratification) well before ratification occurs, and it seems likely that they will observe other states' groundwork and respond accordingly, thus enabling relatively short lags in the ratification timetable.

ANALYSES

We are interested in which countries commit to the ICC, as well as their level of commitment (signing or ratifying). We use event history analysis to test factors that affect different states' commitments. Event history (also known as duration or hazard) analysis not only takes into account which countries sign or ratify (which a logit or probit model could do; see Kelley 2007), it also examines differences in how quickly countries commit. Furthermore, it takes into account the fact that countries almost never un-sign or de-ratify the treaty. Finally, event history analysis enables consideration of the fact that some countries have not yet signed or ratified, but can in the future.⁷

We examine the decision to sign and ratify separately. Although both commitments are important, ratifying is a stronger commitment, and we give greater weight to the results of those analyses. The opportunity to sign and ratify the ICC starts after it is adopted in July 1998 (in the language of event history analysis, this is when the time "at risk" begins). For countries that came into existence after 1998 (e.g. East Timor), their opportunity to sign or ratify starts when they begin to exist. It is possible for a country to ratify the treaty without signing it through accession; thus, we do not treat the ratification decision as contingent on the signing decision. In fact, after December 31, 2000, states could no longer sign the ICC as an independent action, and their only choice was to accede (ratify without signing). Thus, we end the signing period in December 2000. In addition, we end our

observation of the ratifying period in December 2004

We incorporate time-varying covariates to allow changes in the country to affect its likelihood of commitment over time. We use the month as our unit of time, as we have data available at this level, and it allows us to more finely disentangle the network variables.⁸

In event history analysis, an important concept is the hazard rate, which gives the probability of commitment given that a commitment has not yet been made. We use the discrete-time equivalent of the Cox proportional hazard model, which places no constraints on whether the hazard rate goes up or down (or both) over time. One way to do this in discrete time is to include an indicator variable for each month since the duration began. An alternative method that we use is to include cubic smoothing splines, which capture the hazard shape with fewer variables (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).⁹ We call these Duration Dependence terms.

A well-known problem in this type of analysis is the lack of data for some states or years for some variables. Rather than simply dropping those cases, we use multiple imputation to fill in the missing data.¹⁰ Following convention, we do not include microstates or small states (population less than 500,000) in this analysis.¹¹

Initial Analyses

For our initial test of dependence networks we include two important control variables that others have found to be significant predictors of human rights treaty ratification: level of democracy and regional diffusion (Simmons 2009; Landman 2005; Hathaway 2003). Democratic governments are more likely to commit to international human rights agreements either because of their principled commitment to human rights or because the costs of implementing those agreements domestically are low (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006). We use the *Polity Score* index to measure the level of democracy.

It is possible that states are influenced by others to ratify (or not) because of other kinds of

interactions or associations they have. The literatures on diffusion and on state commitment to international institutions, including human rights treaties, are both useful guides here. Much of the diffusion literature is driven by the observation that state policies and practices tend to cluster geographically (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). Studies of human rights and democracy have demonstrated that region is an important predictor of state behavior (Simmons 2009; Landman 2005; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006). For each state, we calculate *Regional Trends* as the percentage of states within its region that signed or ratified the ICC (always leaving out the commitment level of the state whose commitment we wish to explain). We do not include a variable for global trends because the Duration Dependence variables (discussed below) generally control for this.

Table 1 illustrates our initial findings. We present several specifications including different combinations of the Dependence Network variables. The first six columns are for signing, and the last six are for ratifying. As discussed earlier, we consider ratifying to be more important than signing. A positive coefficient indicates that as that independent variable increases the country is more likely to commit in general and also more likely to commit earlier. Any statement that a country is more likely to commit is also a statement that the country will commit earlier (and vice versa). We expect all of the coefficients in this table to be positive. As mentioned earlier, we were uncertain regarding the lag length for the network variables, that is, how long it would take for states to react to network partners' commitments. We examined lags from 0 to 12 months. We chose the results that had the strongest effects: 3 months for both signing and ratifying. For ratifying, the results are qualitatively similar if we add or subtract a couple of months to the lag. For signing, the results are robust for the signing index, less so for the three networks together.

The first column includes only the initial control variables (*Polity Score* and *Regional Trends*), and

as previous research had found, both are statistically significant. The second through fourth columns include one dependence network variable at a time. For signing, each dependence network variable is in the right direction, though *Security* and *IO Network* are not quite statistically significant. The coefficient looks quite large for *IO Network*, but that variable does not have a large range, so its substantive effect is smaller. For ratifying, both *Trade* and *Security* are statistically (and substantively) significant on their own. *IO Network* is the wrong sign, but not statistically different than zero.

The fifth column includes all three of the dependence network variables. For signing, the coefficients of the dependent network variables are similar to their values when included singly. *Trade* is statistically significant and *IO Network* is close to standard levels of statistical significance. Because these variables move together, we also conduct a joint significance test on the three dependence network variables—they are highly significant.¹² For ratifying, the coefficient for *Trade* is about the same, but *IO* and *Security Network* are bigger and smaller, respectively. As with signing, we find that the three dependence network variables are jointly significant.

When all three individual network variables are included, each coefficient estimates the part of a network variable that is uncorrelated with the other network variables. That is, the part of the network variables that covary is not used to estimate the coefficient. Since we expect that the dependence in one network covaries with dependence in another network, those coefficients do not include the part of the variable that most interests us.¹³ In addition, dependence is stronger when it exists in multiple domains; hence, we create a *Dependence Network Index* that is the unweighted average of these three factors. *Dependence Network Index* is statistically significant for both signing and ratifying.

Since *Trade Network* and *IO Network* for signing, and *Trade Network* for ratifying approach standard levels of statistical significance, we might interpret this as showing that trade and international organization network partners affect signing, and trade network partners affect

ratification. However, we prefer the interpretation that all three networks matter together, and since they move together, it is at times difficult to disentangle any individual effects.

The inclusion of the dependence network variables does not alter the effect of *Polity Score*. However, while *Regional Trends* is significant in some specifications for ratifying, it decreases in substantive and statistical significance for signing. The absence and variance of significance for *Regional Trends* is interesting because previous scholars found regional trends to be a “central and increasingly important dynamic of the international human rights legal regime” (Simmons 2009:110). Indeed Simmons says it is “startling to see the extent to which regional effects surface in practically every measure of commitment. . . .” to international human rights institutions. However, Simmons, while alluding to the possibility of mechanisms related to the concept, did not control for dependence networks. Our interpretation is that regional trends proxied for dependence networks, as the two variables are correlated. What appeared to be regional trends was actually dependence on a network. Finally, the duration dependence variables—months-at-risk and the cubic splines—are jointly statistically significant for both commitments. Besides controlling for a changing hazard rate, another interpretation of the duration dependence variables is that they represent and control for global trends. Since they are significant, the rate of signing and ratification is not constant, which is evidence that there are global trends in the data.

Our conclusion with these initial models is that the more network partners generally that sign or ratify the ICC statute, the more likely the country is to sign or ratify and to sign or ratify sooner.

Alternative Explanations

With our initial results in hand, we test our dependence network explanation against several alternative explanations that focus on substantive reasons for committing to the ICC and alternatives that examine other kinds of international networks. For the most part, we include the variables that

were significant in Kelley's (2007) study of ICC ratification. A full discussion of the variables is in the online appendix. We provide here only a brief summary.

We use one variable, *New Democracy*, to test Moravcsik's argument (2002: 245) that new and unstable democracies are more likely to commit to the ICC. We use a number of variables to test arguments that various kinds of direct costs reduce the likelihood of signing and ratifying (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006): *Polity Score*, *Physical Integrity Rights Index*, and *Empowerment Rights Index* all measure a state's existing commitment to democracy and human rights. *Common Law Legal System*, *GDP*, and *Forces Abroad* all test the possibility that states likely to suffer unintended consequences shy away from ICC commitments. States facing *Military Disputes* and the lack of *Political Stability* prefer not to commit to the ICC because they prefer the flexibility of violating human rights if necessary.

State identities and principled commitments may also influence commitments to the ICC. We capture these factors through *Number of NGOs*, *Voluntary Contributions*, and three network variables, *Colonial*, *Civilization*, and *Language* that focus on sociocultural ties between states. Finally, domestic institutions can influence state commitments, a possibility we test with *Presidential System*.

In Tables 2 and 3, we assess these variables through the discrete-time event history model. Table 2 displays the results for countries signing the ICC Statute; Table 3 displays the results for ratifying. We expect the coefficients of the variables to be positive, except for *Military Disputes*, *Forces Abroad*, and *Common Law Legal System* (and *Presidential System* for ratifying).

We present several specifications using different combinations of control variables and operationalizations of dependence networks. The first three columns (for both Tables 2 and 3) use the three separate dependence network variables: *Trade*, *IO*, and *Security Network*. The last three columns use the *Dependence Network Index*. The first column in Tables 2 and 3 reproduces for comparison the

results from (column 5 of) Table 1 including all three dependence networks and the control variables of *Polity Score* and *Regional Trends* (a “basic” specification). The third column in Tables 2 and 3 includes all of the control variables discussed above, along with the variables in the first column (a “full” specification). And the second column in Tables 2 and 3 are a “reduced” specification that includes variables that are statistically significant (or close to it) in a reduced or full specification. Equivalent specifications for the index variable are in the last three columns.

The coefficients of the dependence network variables, whether separately or in the index, are qualitatively similar across all three specifications. We are thus confident that our results are robust. Most of the other independent variables shown in Table 2 and 3 are neither statistically nor substantively significant. Briefly, *Empowerment Rights* (a policy change cost variable) and *Number of IGOs* (an identity variable) are statistically significant or close to it for both signing and ratifying. *Civilization* (another identity variable) is statistically significant only for signing. Other variables are statistically insignificant (e.g. *New Democracy* for lock-in logic), or the wrong sign (e.g. *GDP*). (See the appendix for a more complete discussion.) Since we have multiple measures of each category, one might suspect multicollinearity is hiding individual significance. However, a joint significance test fails to reject the hypothesis that the additional variables in the full specification have no effect.¹⁴

Substantive Significance

To assess the substantive significance of different variables, we compare the mean probability of signing or ratifying, changing one independent variable at a time (see Table 4). We use the “reduced” specification that includes the separate dependence network variables and statistically significant control variables (column 2 from Tables 2 and 3). As the mean probability changes over time, we make our comparisons at the end of the signing period (December 2000) for signing and at the end of our observation period (December 2004) for ratifying. Although some countries will have signed or

ratified much earlier, choosing an earlier time yields qualitatively similar results. Starting with a baseline case, we use the coefficients estimated from the event history models to calculate how the mean probability of commitment changes as we increase an independent variable. By comparing changes in the mean probability within a type of commitment, we can assess the relative substantive significance of the variables.

As a baseline, we set each independent variable to its median value (or 50th percentile).¹⁵ We then change each variable to its 90th percentile value one at a time and recalculate the mean probability.¹⁶ We also report the change in the mean probability and the 95% confidence interval for that change. For ease of comparison, we order the independent variables from the strongest in the hypothesized direction at the top to the strongest against the hypothesized direction at the bottom, with variables with no effect in the middle. In addition, for ease of interpretation, we convert logged values back to their original values.¹⁷

The changes in the mean probability of signing the ICC are in top half of Table 4 and of ratifying the ICC are in the bottom half of Table 4. Due to space constraints, we discuss only the ratification results. The independent variable that induces the greatest statistically significant change in the ratifying probability is *Trade Network*. Moving from a baseline country where 23% of (weighted) trade network partners have ratified the ICC to a country where 45% of (weighted) trade network partners have ratified increases the probability of ratifying from 0.44 to 0.68, or about 0.24. Moving from a baseline country which has 60 IGO memberships to a country which has 86 IGO memberships increases the probability of ratifying by 0.19. Similar to signing, a country with the largest *Empowerment Rights* has a higher probability of ratifying (0.26 more); and *Polity Score* induces a large increase of 0.22. However, for both *Empowerment Rights* and *Polity Score* the 95% confidence interval includes zero and therefore is not statistically significant. Both *Security Network* and *Regional*

Trends increase the probability of ratifying, but neither are statistically nor substantively significant. *Colonial*, *GDP*, and *IO Network* all have some substantive strength, but either are not statistically significant or in the wrong direction or both.

If we use the *Network Index* instead of its separate component parts, increasing the *Network Index* from the median to the 90th percentile has a (statistically significant) substantive effect on both signing and ratifying similar to the variables with large effects.

DISCUSSION OF MECHANISMS

We have shown that our dependence networks index has a large influence on both signing and ratifying the ICC and is robust to a variety of control mechanisms. In addition, the trade network consistently influences ratification in a robust fashion when the networks are broken out separately.

But the results leave open the question of why states are influenced by their network partners. We have built on norms research in sociology to suggest one possibility—that states may be concerned with the potential reactions of their partners. Our study cannot definitively test this explanation, however. As is often the case with large-n data, we cannot pin down the precise causal mechanisms. In this section, we lay out alternative explanations for the effects of dependence networks on commitment.

Simmons et al. (2006) organize the causal mechanisms of state-to-state influence (diffusion) into four categories: competition, learning, emulation and coercion. In the interest of space, we address the first three mechanisms only in passing. In the competition mechanism, states should respond to policies adopted by their competitors, yet our results suggest they adopt instead the policies of their trade partners. If learning is the causal mechanism, it is not clear why states are learning from trade partners rather than other partners. Further, Simmons et al. (2006:801) argue that cultural scripts prompting emulation should be strongest among states that share similar cultural heritages such as a

colonial past or language. Yet we found limited evidence for those identity-related characteristics.

Dependence networks may fit best within the mechanism of coercion. If so, however, the networks concept enriches and expands most understandings of coercion. Simmons et al. (2006:790) generally conceptualize coercion as an explicit effort by powerful states to directly influence others. They also suggest that coercion might occur because powerful states provide focal points in coordination games or because they can use hegemonic ideas.

These various mechanisms miss the possibility that dependence networks can facilitate diffuse reciprocity, a more subtle form of “coercion” (Keohane 1986:8; Leggold and Shambaugh 2002). In diffuse reciprocity, exchanges remain largely unspecified, as when states have granted most-favored-nation trading status without any conditions on other states reciprocating, but with a general belief that others will reciprocate in some fashion. Molm and Cook (1995) make a similar distinction between reciprocal and negotiated exchange. Dependence structures facilitate loose contingency and equivalency because they ensure ongoing interactions on issues of importance to states within a given network, and networks hence generate many opportunities for rewards or punishments.

States are unlikely to create *quid pro quos* with respect to ICC commitment because such efforts would either undermine the Court’s legitimacy or backfire as states resist the overt pressure (though the US has been a glaring exception; see Kelley 2007). Still, we should observe efforts from various states to broadly outline behavioral expectations and to combine those with noncontingent, vague promises and threats.

This is precisely what we observe in the EU and the Organization of American States (OAS), among others. On 11 June 2001, the EU adopted a Council Common Position on the ICC that pledged to make “every effort” to raise the issue of commitment to the ICC “in negotiations or political dialogues with third States, groups of States or relevant regional organisations. . . .”¹⁸ The EU was as

good as its word in its negotiations and dialogues with other states. In the two years after adopting its first common position, the EU issued 131 demarches to other governments directly encouraging the ratification and domestic implementation of the ICC.¹⁹ In renegotiating the Cotonou agreement granting trade preferences to 78 developing countries in 2004-05, the EU inserted language urging countries to take steps toward ratifying and implementing the ICC.²⁰ Beginning in 1999, EU-Latin American summits have repeatedly promoted ratification of the ICC.²¹ These statements occurred in the context of documents promising to increase investment, preferential trade agreements, joint ventures, protection for new democracies and other goods that Latin American governments have reason to value highly.

None of these documents promises any explicit rewards or punishments for commitment to the ICC. But they do signal EU preferences regarding the ICC, ensure that those preferences are well-known and on the agenda at high levels, and place those preferences in the context of other cooperative endeavors such as trade and investment. On balance we expect rational government decision makers to take EU preferences into account as their dependence on the EU increases.

OAS states have engaged in similar behavior in their relations with each other. Beginning in 2000, the OAS General Assembly adopted resolutions urging member states to ratify and implement the ICC.²² Canada and others followed up on these resolutions by funding meetings where experts discussed the importance of ratifying and implementing the ICC.²³ Heads of state meeting in the context of the Summits of the Americas endorsed ratification of the ICC in documents laying out a wide array of cooperative endeavors between states.²⁴

These brief examples suggest that states are engaging in diffuse reciprocity within contexts of dependence networks, sending signals about their preferences at high levels and associating those preferences with other forms of cooperation.²⁵ Likewise, states are unlikely to admit changing their

positions in the hope of receiving reciprocity from network partners. Even where dependent states anticipate rewards or fear punishment for their behavior, leaders likely will not express these views publicly for two reasons: first, they want the reputational benefits that come from appearing to support human rights norms and, second, they wish to avoid the appearance of doing the bidding of other states. Still, the subtle pressure appears both deliberate and effective.

PROBING PLAUSIBILITY – AUSTRALIA

To further explore the causal chain between dependence networks and ICC ratification, we conducted a more thorough case study of Australia. Australia exhibits important variation on the key independent variable of dependence networks because it is torn between an ICC-supporting Europe and an anti-ICC United States. In this respect, it resembles a fair number of countries in the world. In the end, as significant portions of Australia's dependence networks signed and ratified the ICC, pressure mounted on the country to follow suit. But the United States—and important ally of Australia—refused to ratify and created key counter-pressure. In the end, Australia signed and ratified, but only with explicit reservations and only after passing domestic laws that limited the reach of the ICC for the country.

Australia thus tried to split the difference between the positions of its leading network partners. Japan and the United States, both ICC skeptics, combined to account for about one-third of Australia's trade in the early 2000s. A variety of other advanced democracies including Germany, Britain, France, New Zealand and others, made up close to 30 percent of that trade. As those countries gradually ratified the ICC from 1999-2002, Australia's *Trade Network* score with ICC ratifiers rose steadily from zero to .28 in April 2002, three months before Australia ratified the ICC. Australia's only security partner is the United States, meaning its *Security Network* for ratification was always equal to zero. The *IO Network* story is similar to that of the trade network. The United States accounted for 27

percent of weighted partnerships (the United States shares 20 IOs with Australia and contributes 22 percent of the UN budget). France, Britain, Italy, Spain, Germany and Canada combined add up to roughly the same amount.

Australia's government first announced in December 1999 it would ratify the Statute²⁶ but then dragged its feet for more than a year before seeking parliamentary debate on ratification. Throughout, both sides repeatedly cited the behavior of other states with respect to the ICC and invoked the notion of dependence in some way. Almost all of the hearings and press releases from this period take the time to either list the growing number of states supporting the ICC, including the names of some of the largest and most important partners (which proved the supporters' favorite tactic) or to cite the fact that the United States was unlikely to ratify (invoked by opponents).

In the first hearing, an expert witness, Mr. David Re, argued: "Many of our major trading allies and countries we have military treaties with are in this court. We will be there with them."²⁷ In the next hearing, Mrs. De-Anne Kelly, a member of parliament, pointed out that some of the most important countries in the world were not among the 29 ratifying the statute so far.²⁸ "Let us face it, big countries that generally have very good human rights records, like the United States, have signed but have indicated that they will not ratify. The message to us is that if some of our democratic allies see a problem with the court, and see it is an inefficient and ineffective way to proceed, why should Australia rush forward? We are pretty much the juniors in the internationals here, aren't we?" When the witness responded by citing New Zealand's recent ratification, Mrs. Kelly responded that Australia's "kiwi cousins" were not a superpower in the Pacific. The witness answered back by citing France's ratification and Britain's anticipated ratification.

As time passed, it became increasingly evident that supporters were winning. US opposition then became an even more crucial issue. Careful process-tracing suggests the government held up

ratification in part out of deference to the United States. In a rather unguarded moment, one foreign ministry official testifying to the committee basically admitted as much. On September 24, 2001, a point where US opposition was clear but not yet fully hardened, the official defended US proposals for change in the ICC as constructive. In response to a question about US influence on Australia, he added: “So obviously the US are working to try to achieve their objectives in relation to the text. From the Australian perspective, we have very close working relationships with the United States on these issues. It is really a question I think of the negotiation process to see if their ideas—which I say are currently on the table—can be adopted and accepted.”²⁹ Australia, in other words, was working with the US and biding its time to see what would become of US efforts.

The reason for the delay became apparent when Australia’s prime minister led a delegation to the United States to visit the president and Congress in June 2002.³⁰ He asked for bilateral trade agreement and guarantees that Australian lamb producers would not be shut out of the US domestic market as they had been previously. In return, US officials asked him about Australia’s position on the ICC, among other issues. Arriving in the United States with a recent ratification in hand would not have been helpful to his cause, to say the least. Upon returning home, the government almost immediately ratified the ICC, but with a packet of reservations and domestic laws that sharply curtailed the ICC’s reach and importance, immediately criticized by the opposition.³¹ Australia, caught between diverging preferences in its dependence network, delayed while pressure built, avoided the immediate sanction of a key partner, and wound up splitting the baby in ways that are difficult to see from the blunt coding of ratification date. In all, the statistical results and the brief discussion of the Australia case are encouraging for our contention that dependence networks should condition international behavior.

CONCLUSION

In signing and ratifying the ICC, states are committing to the enforcement of international human rights norms. Such action is costly enough that states have traditionally avoided it. Why then have states have accepted the ICC?

We find that dependence networks are an important explanatory factor. Our most robust finding is that the index of dependence networks comprised of trade, security and IO interactions influences both signing and ratification in all model specifications. It is the only variable to reach .05 significance levels in all models across both signing and ratification. We have strong evidence that state commitments to the ICC are influenced by their network partners. When the index is broken apart, the trade network exerts the largest (statistically significant) substantive influence over ratification. Other components of the index dealing with security and IOs appear to lose significance when broken out individually (with the exception of the IO networks for signing) because they are only capturing network interactions unrelated to trade.

Another important finding is that the level of democracy and regional trends are not robust predictors of state commitment behavior with regard to the ICC. The polity score is inconsistently significant and does better for ratifying than for signing. We might expect level of democracy to matter more when the commitment itself matters more. Regional trends are rarely significant. This finding runs counter to some of the most recent and sophisticated work on international human rights institutions. Simmons (2009:110) argued that “governments appear to time their ratifications ... largely to keep in step with their regional peers.” We suspect instead that regional trends have been proxying for dependence networks in other studies. This finding casts new light on the diffusion of state behavior by suggesting it has more to do with interaction than with geography; this idea deserves further research.

The central theoretical contribution of this paper is its identification of a casual factor that affects commitment to the ICC: dependence networks. In addition to identifying dependence networks as an important factor, we suggest a possible explanation for their effects on commitment to the ICC—states that are dependent on other states care about those others’ opinions. They care about their relationships with those states and they worry about future punishments or rewards from those partners. Our explanation differs from the most common approaches to international institutions, which tend to focus on the direct costs and benefits of the institutions themselves, or on principles and appropriateness.

Our results provide reason to think that dependence networks matter, and they point to the need for future research to adjudicate between possible mechanisms. In focusing on *network* dependence, we differ substantially from the most common approaches to interdependence in international relations, which either measure dependence dyadically or by reference to one state’s dependence on all other states generally. One striking finding is that dependence networks displace regional trends as a significant predictor of state behavior. A variety of scholars employing different logics have identified regional trends as an important influence on state commitments to and compliance with international institutions, but they have not yet tested for dependence networks.

That dependence networks predict commitment to the ICC suggests that they may also be predictive elsewhere. The ICC exists in a realm apart from the traditionally dominant concerns of international security and political economy. Indeed, the ICC enforces a norm—the protection of human rights—that can arguably undermine a government’s military security. If dependence networks are predictive in the highly value-laden sphere of human rights, we might expect them to be useful in understanding other settings. Future research should test the dependence networks explanation across a range of international institutions. In sum, as scholars seek causal explanations for the multiple and

growing spheres of international cooperation, we recommend that more attention be paid to the networks on which governments depend for achieving their goals in trade, security, and international organizations.

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Figure 1: Chile's Trade Network, 2000




Figure 2: Australia's Trade Network, 2000




Table 1: Signing and Ratifying/Acceding to the International Criminal Court Statute—Basic Models

Independent Variables	Signing Coefficient (robust standard error)						Ratifying/Acceding Coefficient (robust standard error)					
	No Networks	Trade Only	IO Only	Security Only	All Networks	Network Index	No Networks	Trade Only	IO Only	Security Only	All Networks	Network Index
Trade Network (3-month lag)		1.406* (0.592)			1.316 ^{a*} (0.609)			2.382*** (0.672)			2.536 ^{b***} (0.742)	
IO Network (3-month lag)			4.892 (2.603)		4.317 ^a (2.505)			-1.069 (1.821)			-3.133 ^b (1.952)	
Security Network (3-month lag)				0.824 (0.498)	0.572 ^a (0.496)				1.910** (0.705)		0.909 ^b (0.747)	
Dependence Network Index (3-month lag)						3.039*** (0.927)						3.787*** (1.184)
Polity Score	0.062*** (0.015)	0.066*** (0.016)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.064*** (0.016)	0.069*** (0.016)	0.111*** (0.020)	0.112*** (0.022)	0.119*** (0.025)	0.112*** (0.021)	0.138*** (0.028)	0.102*** (0.021)
Regional Trends (3-month lag)	1.472** (0.535)	0.862 (0.595)	1.058 (0.567)	0.990 (0.628)	0.225 (0.669)	0.349 (0.668)	1.821* (0.770)	1.360 (0.712)	2.074* (0.862)	1.300 (0.818)	1.782* (0.800)	0.962 (0.813)
# of observations	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	9359	9359	9359	9359	9359	9359
# of sigs/ratifications	119	119	119	119	119	119	82	82	82	82	82	82
# of countries	158	158	158	158	158	158	159	159	159	159	159	159
Log-likelihood	-433.6	-430.7	-430.6	-432.0	-427.2	-428.8	-419.0	-412.1	-418.7	-415.9	-409.5	-413.6

Notes: Dependent variables are signing (columns 1-6) and ratifying/acceding to (columns 7-12) the International Criminal Court statute. Coefficients are complementary log-log regression estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Missing data is multiply imputed. Duration Dependence terms are included (and always jointly significant at $p < 0.005$), though not reported. A constant is also included and not reported.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two tails)

^aThree network variables jointly significant, $p = 0.005$

^bThree network variables jointly significant, $p = 0.001$.

Table 2: Signing the International Criminal Court Statute—Full Models

Independent Variables	Coefficient (robust standard error)					
	All Networks Basic	All Networks Reduced	All Networks Full	Network Index Basic	Network Index Reduced	Network Index Full
Trade Network (3-month lag)	1.316 ^{a*} (0.609)	0.678 ^b (0.656)	0.923 ^c (0.683)			
IO Network (3-month lag)	4.317 ^a (2.505)	6.792 ^{b**} (2.574)	6.580 ^{c**} (2.539)			
Security Network (3-month lag)	0.572 ^a (0.496)	0.437 ^b (0.593)	0.420 ^c (0.614)			
Dependence Network Index (3-month lag)				3.039*** (0.927)	2.675* (1.093)	2.934** (1.093)
Polity Score	0.064*** (0.016)	0.026 (0.027)	0.026 (0.030)	0.069*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.027)	0.022 (0.030)
Regional Trends (3-month lag)	0.225 (0.669)	-1.358 (0.736)	-1.289 (0.766)	0.349 (0.668)	-1.126 (0.722)	-1.037 (0.763)
<i>ln</i> (GDP)		-0.328*** (0.092)	-0.370*** (0.099)		-0.258*** (0.080)	-0.311*** (0.091)
<i>ln</i> (Forces Abroad)		0.078* (0.035)	0.085* (0.038)		0.079* (0.034)	0.085* (0.038)
Number of IGOs		0.024** (0.008)	0.027** (0.009)		0.020* (0.008)	0.024** (0.009)
Empowerment Rights (12-month lag)		0.085 (0.054)	0.088 (0.055)		0.101* (0.051)	0.098 (0.054)
Civilization (3-month lag)		1.314* (0.625)	1.309* (0.654)		1.348 (0.629)	1.395* (0.654)
New Democracy			0.235 (0.329)			0.218 (0.336)
Physical Rights (12-month lag)			0.011 (0.090)			0.017 (0.091)
Common Law Legal System			-0.119 (0.234)			-0.058 (0.233)
Military Disputes			-0.041 (0.069)			-0.044 (0.069)
Political Stability			-0.118 (0.202)			-0.100 (0.200)
<i>ln</i> (Voluntary Contributions)			0.097 (0.060)			0.101 (0.060)
Presidential System			0.442 (0.265)			0.456 (0.266)
Colonial (3-month lag)			-0.475 (0.479)			-0.430 (0.481)
Language (3-month lag)			-0.570 (0.567)			-0.689 (0.566)
# of observations	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724
# of signatures	119	119	119	119	119	119
# of countries	158	158	158	158	158	158
Log-likelihood	-427.2	-412.2	-407.8	-428.8	-415.4	-410.7

Notes: Dependent variable is signing the International Criminal Court statute. Coefficients are complementary log-log regression estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Missing data is multiply imputed. Duration Dependence terms are included (and always jointly significant at $p < 0.001$), though not reported. A constant is also included and not reported.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two tails).

^aThree network variables jointly significant, $p = 0.005$

^bThree network variables jointly significant, $p = 0.011$

^cThree network variables jointly significant, $p = 0.007$.

Table 3: Ratifying/Acceding to the International Criminal Court Statute—Full Models

Independent Variables	Coefficient (robust standard error)					
	All Networks Basic	All Networks Reduced	All Networks Full	Network Index Basic	Network Index Reduced	Network Index Full
Trade Network (3-month lag)	2.536 ^{d***} (0.742)	2.305 ^{e**} (0.816)	2.482 ^{f**} (0.816)			
IO Network (3-month lag)	-3.133 ^d (1.952)	-3.045 ^e (1.995)	-2.049 ^f (2.074)			
Security Network (3-month lag)	0.909 ^d (0.747)	0.891 ^e (0.853)	0.775 ^f (0.843)			
Dependence Network Index (3-month lag)				3.787 ^{***} (1.184)	3.486 [*] (1.439)	3.829 ^{**} (1.483)
Polity Score	0.138 ^{***} (0.028)	0.081 (0.046)	0.097 [*] (0.047)	0.102 ^{***} (0.021)	0.051 (0.042)	0.078 (0.042)
Regional Trends (3-month lag)	1.782 [*] (0.800)	1.224 (0.837)	0.807 (0.977)	0.962 (0.813)	0.424 (0.836)	0.481 (0.967)
<i>ln</i> (GDP)		-0.201 [*] (0.087)	-0.186 (0.109)		-0.213 [*] (0.088)	-0.210 (0.107)
Empowerment Rights (12-month lag)		0.151 (0.085)	0.138 (0.089)		0.135 (0.082)	0.123 (0.087)
Number of IGOs		0.021 [*] (0.010)	0.020 (0.010)		0.022 [*] (0.010)	0.020 [*] (0.010)
Colonial (3-month lag)		-2.110 [*] (0.950)	-2.709 ^{**} (0.971)		-2.114 [*] (0.989)	-2.683 ^{**} (0.942)
<i>ln</i> (Forces Abroad)			0.030 (0.054)			0.034 (0.054)
Military Disputes			-0.144 (0.103)			-0.138 (0.105)
Political Stability			-0.411 (0.225)			-0.390 (0.221)
<i>ln</i> (Voluntary Contributions)			0.096 (0.094)			0.119 (0.088)
Presidential System			0.174 (0.290)			0.116 (0.292)
New Democracy			-0.341 (0.414)			-0.484 (0.424)
Physical Rights (12-month lag)			0.119 (0.093)			0.118 (0.092)
Common Law Legal System			0.228 (0.289)			0.215 (0.286)
Civilization (3-month lag)			-1.070 (1.182)			-1.736 (1.170)
Language (3-month lag)			0.728 (0.462)			0.533 (0.480)
# of observations	9359	9359	9359	9359	9359	9359
# of ratifications	82	82	82	82	82	82
# of countries	159	159	159	159	159	159
Log-likelihood	-409.5	-401.7	-396.3	-413.6	-405.6	-398.5

Notes: Dependent variable is ratifying/acceding to the International Criminal Court statute. Coefficients are complementary log-log regression estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Missing data is multiply imputed. Duration Dependence terms are included (and always jointly significant at $p < 0.03$), though not reported. A constant is also included and not reported.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two tails)

^dThree network variables jointly significant, $p = 0.001$

^eThree network variables jointly significant, $p = 0.006$

^fThree network variables jointly significant, $p = 0.012$

Table 4: Change in Probability of Signing/Ratifying the International Criminal Court Statute

Independent Variable	Change in Independent Variable	Mean Probability	Change in Mean Probability	95% Confidence Interval of Change
Signing Baseline		0.58		
Number of IGOs	58 to 84	0.80	+0.21	(0.07, 0.34)
Civilization	0.21 to 0.57	0.76	+0.18	(0.01, 0.33)
Empowerment Rights Index	5 to 10	0.73	+0.15	(-0.04, 0.32)
Polity Score	1 to 10	0.67	+0.08	(-0.09, 0.25)
Security Network	0.02 to 0.37	0.66	+0.08	(-0.11, 0.28)
Trade Network	0.34 to 0.65	0.66	+0.07	(-0.06, 0.21)
IO Network	0.37 to 0.39	0.62	+0.04	(0.01, 0.07)
Regional Trends ^a	0.25 to 0.51	0.43	-0.15	(-0.29, 0.01)
Forces Abroad (in 1000s) ^a	0 to 1.1	0.77	+0.19	(0.02, 0.34)
GDP (in \$billions) ^a	34 to 457	0.32	-0.27	(-0.39, -0.13)
Ratifying Baseline		0.44		
Empowerment Rights Index	5 to 10	0.70	+0.26	(-0.02, 0.51)
Trade Network	0.23 to 0.45	0.68	+0.24	(0.08, 0.40)
Polity Score	2 to 10	0.66	+0.22	(-0.03, 0.45)
Number of IGOs	60 to 86	0.62	+0.19	(0.01, 0.36)
Security Network	0.06 to 0.20	0.49	+0.05	(-0.05, 0.15)
Regional Trends	0.22 to 0.29	0.48	+0.04	(-0.01, 0.10)
IO Network ^a	0.27 to 0.37	0.31	-0.12	(-0.28, 0.04)
GDP (in \$billions) ^a	21 to 374	0.28	-0.16	(-0.27, -0.03)
Colonial ^a	0.00 to 0.27	0.25	-0.19	(-0.33, -0.03)

Notes: Mean probability of signing the ICC Statute is calculated from the coefficients in the All Networks Reduced column of Table 2 at December 2000 (the end of the signing period). Mean probability of ratifying/acceding to the ICC Statute is calculated from the coefficients in the All Networks Reduced column of Table 3 at December 2004 (the end of the observation period). The baseline case sets each independent variable to its median value. The change in the independent variable moves from the median value (50th percentile) to the 90th percentile. For network and trend variables, the median value changes across time, and we report the average change. For ease of interpretation, we order the variables from the strongest in the hypothesized direction at the top to the strongest against the hypothesized direction at the bottom, with variables with no effect in the middle. Where the confidence interval includes zero, the variable is not statistically significant at a 0.05 level. In addition, we convert logged values back to their original values. Example: The baseline country had a mean probability of signing the ICC Statute by December 2000 of 0.58. The baseline country with 84 IGOs had a mean probability of signing of 0.80, an increase of 0.21, with a 95% confidence interval of the increase of (0.07, 0.34).

^a The effect is opposite of the hypothesized direction.

¹ Note that, for our measure of trade networks, a given partner may be important to a target state even if the partner state is not especially “powerful” in conventional terms; bilateral trade volume provides the basis for the weights.

² This suggests that under some conditions ICC action may matter less than steps taken by other international human rights bodies whose mandates cover governments and not individuals. Thus, when the ICC prosecutes low-level military personnel or bureaucrats in a target state, the target government may not pay significant attention to ICC action. However, in cases where the ICC prosecutes heads of government or ministers, we expect target states to view the prosecution as if it were targeting the government as a whole.

³ von Stein (2005) suggests that both commitment and compliance are produced by other factors; in this view, those who commit are still more likely to comply and hence commitment is a nontrivial signal of compliance preferences.

⁴ Norms researchers refer to these reactions as metanorms (Axelrod 1986).

⁵ New Zealand withdrew from the three-way security partnership in 1986. While a security partnership apparently continues to exist between Australia and New Zealand, it does not rise to the level where it would be counted as a formal network tie in our data.

⁶ UN dues are highly—though not perfectly—correlated with GDP.

⁷ We use robust standard errors, clustered by country. The results are qualitatively similar for other assumptions.

⁸ Conducting the analysis using annual observations instead of monthly observations yields somewhat weaker results for signing and qualitatively similar results for ratifying.

⁹ We use the complementary log-log function, which directly corresponds to a duration model. We used Tucker’s (1999) program to generate the cubic splines. Using dummies or time polynomials (Carter and Signorino 2010) yield qualitatively similar results.

¹⁰ We used the Amelia II program to generate the multiple imputations (Honaker et al. 2006), creating 5 datasets. We used Scheve’s (2003) MI program to analyze the multiple data sets, modifying the program to handle the complementary log-log function. The results for signing are similar without the imputation, as very little data is missing in early years. However, the results for ratifying are different without the imputation, indicating that the missing data were not “missing completely at random.”

¹¹ Given that networks are weighted by partners’ importance, dropping the microstates should not significantly bias the coefficients for our key independent variables for the remaining observations. Since microstates should be particularly responsive to dependence networks (given their small size), excluding them should work against our hypothesis. Microstates are also missing more data than other states. In all, safest practice argues against microstates’ inclusion.

¹² We conducted all joint significance tests by programming a multiple-imputation test statistic proposed by Rubin (1987:99-102).

¹³ To check our interpretation, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the three network variables. The results show that there is one factor in those three variables, and each variable loads strongly on it. When we use an index generated from the factor analysis, that index produces remarkably similar results to the specification with the network index. We thus conclude that the network index picks up an underlying dependence between partners.

¹⁴ The variables added to the basic model to get the restricted model are jointly significant. In addition, the restricted model is the “best fitting model” among presented models by the Akaike information criterion.

¹⁵ We allow the dependence network, identity, and regional scores to vary across time, choosing the mean value in each month. We also allow the duration dependence variables—months-at-risk and the cubic spline variables—to vary across time.

¹⁶ In a normal distribution, moving from the 50th percentile to the 90th percentile would be equivalent to adding 1.3 standard deviations. For the network, identity, and regional variables, we move to the 90th percentile in each month. We average the values across time to report the change noted in the table.

¹⁷ We used the Clarify program, which we augmented to include the complementary log-log function, to produce the distributions of the change in mean probability (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

¹⁸ http://www.iccnw.org/documents/EU.com_pos.6.02.pdf

¹⁹ “European Commission Support for the International Criminal Court: Report of the Conference Held in Naples 25-26-27 September 2003,” available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eidhr/pdf/icc-report-naples-25092003_en.pdf.

²⁰ Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, p. 25,

http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr_rev_en.pdf.

²¹ See, for example, the Declaration of Guadalajara at a summit between EU and Latin American heads of state in May 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/world/lac-guadal/declar/01_decl_polit_final_en.pdf.

²² OAS, AG/RES.1706 (XXX-O/00), 16 May 2000.

²³ Report of the OAS Secretariat for Legal Affairs, OEA/Ser.K/XVI, DIH/doc.4/02, 4 March 2002.

²⁴ Third Summit of the Americas: Plan of Action, 22 April 2001.

²⁵ The United States, of course, has created direct and explicit linkages penalizing states if they ratify the ICC without also signing separate agreements protecting US citizens from ICC jurisdiction. Specific reciprocity might sometimes occur in the context of more generalized diffuse reciprocity.

²⁶ Joint Media Release, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/1999/fa135_99.html

²⁷ Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 13 Feb. 2001, TR 44.

²⁸ Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 14 Mar. 2001, TR 120.

²⁹ Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 24 Sep. 2001, TR 225.

³⁰ Transcript of Prime Minister John Howard’s press conference, Willard Hotel, Washington, DC, 11 June 2002.

³¹ Transcript of Prime Minister John Howard's press conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 20 June 2002.