

Open access • Posted Content • DOI:10.1101/757070

Detecting fabrication in large-scale molecular omics data — Source link 🗹

Michael Bradshaw, Samuel H. Payne

Institutions: University of Colorado Boulder, Brigham Young University

Published on: 21 Oct 2020 - bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory)

Related papers:

- Fraud detection
- · Parameters of automated fraud detection techniques during online transactions
- Detecting fraud in cellular telephone networks
- Using Analytics to Detect Possible Fraud: Tools and Techniques
- · Machine learning forensics to gauge the likelihood of fraud in emails



Detecting fabrication in large-scale

² molecular omics data

- 3 Michael S. Bradshaw¹, Samuel H. Payne²
- 4 1. Computer Science Department, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder CO 80309 USA
- 5 2. Biology Department, Brigham Young University, Provo UT 84602 USA
- 6 Contact:
- 7 michael.bradshawiii@colorado.edu

8 Abstract

9 Fraud is a pervasive problem and can occur as fabrication, falsification, plagiarism or theft. The 10 scientific community is not exempt from this universal problem and several studies have 11 recently been caught manipulating or fabricating data. Current measures to prevent and deter 12 scientific misconduct come in the form of the peer-review process and on-site clinical trial 13 auditors. As recent advances in high-throughput omics technologies have moved biology into 14 the realm of big-data, fraud detection methods must be updated for sophisticated computational 15 fraud. In the financial sector, machine learning and digit-preference are successfully used to 16 detect fraud. Drawing from these sources, we develop methods of fabrication detection in 17 biomedical research and show that machine learning can be used to detect fraud in large-scale 18 omic experiments. Using the raw data as input, the best machine learning models correctly 19 predicted fraud with 84-95% accuracy. With digit frequency as input features, the best models 20 detected fraud with 98%-100% accuracy. All of the data and analysis scripts used in this project are available at https://github.com/MSBradshaw/FakeData. 21

22 Introduction

23 Fraud is a pervasive problem and can occur as fabrication, falsification, plagiarism or theft. 24 Examples of fraud are found in virtually every field, such as: education, commerce and 25 technology. With the rise of electronic crimes, specific criminal justice and regulatory bodies 26 have been formed to detect sophisticated fraud, creating an arms-race between methods to 27 deceive and methods to detect deception. The scientific community is not exempt from the 28 universal problem of fraud, and several studies have recently been caught manipulating or 29 fabricating data [1,2] or are suspected of it [3]. More than two million scientific articles are 30 published yearly and ~2% of authors admit to data fabrication [4]. When asked if their 31 colleagues had fabricated data, positive response rates rose to 14-19% [4,5]. Some domains or locales have somewhat higher rates of data fabrication; in a recent survey of researchers at
Chinese hospitals, 7.37% of researchers admitted to fabricating data [6]. Overall, these rates of
data fabrication potentially means tens to hundreds of thousands of articles are published each
year with manipulated data.

36

37 Data in the biological sciences is particularly vulnerable to fraud given its size - which makes it 38 easier to hide data manipulation - and researcher's dependence on freely available public data. 39 Recent advances in high-throughput omics technologies have moved biology into the realm of 40 big-data. Many diseases are now characterized in populations, with thousands of individuals 41 characterized for cancer [7], diabetes [8], bone strength [9], and health care services for the 42 general populace [10]. Large-scale characterization studies are also done for cell lines and drug 43 responses [11,12]. With the rise of importance of these large datasets, it becomes imperative 44 that they remain free of errors both unintentional and intentional [13].

45

46 Current methods for ensuring the validity of research is largely limited to the peer-review 47 process which as of late has proven to be insufficient at spotting blatant duplication of images 48 [14], let alone subtleties hidden in large scale data. Data for clinical trials can be subject to 49 reviews and central monitoring [15,16]. However, the decision regarding oversight methodology 50 and frequency is not driven by empirical data, but rather is determined by clinics' usual practice 51 [17]. The emerging data deluge challenges the effectiveness of traditional auditing practices to 52 detect fraud, and several studies have suggested addressing the issue with improved 53 centralized and independent statistical monitoring [5,6,16,18]. However, these 54 recommendations are given chiefly to help ensure the safety and efficacy of the study, not data 55 integrity.

56

In 1937, physicist Frank Benford observed in a compilation of 20,000 numbers that the first digit did not follow a uniform distribution as one may anticipate [19]. This pattern holds true in most large collections of numbers, including scientific data. Comparing a distribution of first digits to a Benford distribution can be used to identify deviations from the expected frequency, often because of fraud. Recently Benford's law has been used to identify fraud in financial records of international trade [20] and money laundering [21]. It has also been used on a smaller scale to reaffirm suspicions of fraud in clinical trials [3].

64

The distinction between fraud and honest error is important to make. Fraud is the intent to cheat [5]. This is the definition used throughout this paper. An honest error might be, forgetting to include a few samples, while intentionally excluding samples would be fraud. Copying and pasting values from one table to another incorrectly is an honest error but intentionally changing the values is fraud. In these examples the results may be the same but the intent behind them differs wildly. In efforts to maintain data integrity, identifying the intent of the misconduct may be impossible, and is also a secondary consideration after suspect data has been identified.

72

73 Data fabrication is "making up data or results and recording or reporting them" [5]. This type of 74 data manipulation is free from the above ambiguity relating to the author's intent. Making up 75 data is always wrong. We explore methods of data fabrication and detection in molecular omics 76 data using supervised machine learning and Benford-like digit-frequencies. We do not attempt 77 to explain why someone may choose to fabricate their data - as other study have done [6.22]: 78 our only goal is to evaluate the utility of digit-frequencies to differentiate real from fake data. The 79 data used in this study comes from the Clinical Proteomic Tumor Analysis Consortium (CPTAC) 80 cohort for endometrial carcinoma, which contains copy number alteration (CNA) measurements 81 from 100 tumor samples. We created 50 additional fake samples for these datasets. Three 82 different methods of varying sophistication are used for fabrication: random number generation,

- 83 resampling with replacement and imputation. We show that machine learning and digit-
- 84 preference can be used to detect fraud with near perfect accuracy.

85 Methods

86 Real Data

- 87 The real data used in this publication originated from the genomic analysis of uterine
- 88 endometrial cancer. As part of the Clinical Proteomics Tumor Analysis Consortium (CPTAC),
- 100 tumor samples underwent whole genome and whole exome sequencing and subsequent
- 90 copy number analysis. We used the results of the copy number analysis *as is,* which is stored in
- 91 our GitHub repository at <u>https://github.com/MSBradshaw/FakeData</u>.

92

93 Fake Data

94 Fake data used in this study was generated using three different methods. In each method, we 95 created 50 fake samples which were combined with the 100 real samples to form a mixed 96 dataset. The first method to generate fake data was random number generation. For every gene 97 locus, we first find the maximum and minimum values observed in the original data. A new 98 sample is then fabricated by randomly picking a value within this gene specific range. The 99 second method to generate fake data was sampling with replacement. For this, we create lists 100 of all observed values across the cohort for each gene. A fake sample is created by randomly 101 sampling from these lists with replacement. The third method to generate fake data was 102 imputation. The R package missForrest [23] was repurposed for data fabrication. A fake sample 103 was generated by first creating a copy of a real sample. Then we iteratively nullified 10% of the

104 data and imputed these NAs with missForrest until every value has been imputed. See105 Supplemental Figure 1.

106

107 Machine Learning Training

108 With a mixed dataset containing 100 real samples and 50 fake samples, we proceeded to 109 create and evaluate machine learning models which predict whether a sample is real or 110 fabricated (Supplemental Figure 2). The 100 real and 50 fake samples were both randomly split 111 in half, one portion added to a training set and the other held out for testing. Using Python's 112 SciKitLearn library, we evaluated multiple machine learning models, gradient boosting (GBD), 113 Naïve Bayes, Random Forest, K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) and 114 Support Vector Machine (SVM). Training validation was done using 10-fold cross validation. We 115 note explicitly that the training routine was never able to use testing data. After all training was 116 complete, the held-out test set was then fed to each model for prediction and scoring. We used 117 simple accuracy as a metric. For each sample in the test set, ML models would predict whether 118 it was real or fabricated. Model accuracy was calculated as the number of correct predictions 119 divided by the number of total predictions. The entire process of fake data generation and ML 120 training/testing was repeated 50 times. Different random seeds were used when generating 121 each set of fake data. Thus fake samples in all 50 iterations are distinct from each other. All of 122 the data and analysis scripts used in this project are available at

- 123 <u>https://github.com/MSBradshaw/FakeData</u>.
- 124

125 Benford-Like Digit Preferences

Benford's Law or the first digit law has been instrumental at catching fraud in various financial
situations [20,21] and in small scale clinical trials [3]. The method presented here is designed
with the potential to generalize and be applied to multiple sets of data of varying types and

129 configurations (e.i. different measured variables (features) and different quantities of variables). 130 Machine learning typically cannot handle data where the features are not consistent in number 131 and type. Converting all measured variables to digit frequencies circumvents this problem. Digit 132 frequencies are calculated as the number of occurrences of a single digit (0-9) divided by the 133 total number of features. In the method described in this paper, a sample's features are all 134 converted to digit frequencies of the first and second digit after the decimal. Thus for each 135 sample the features are converted from ~17,000 copy number alterations to 20 digit 136 preferences. Using this approach, whether a sample has 100 or 17,000 features it can still be 137 trained on and classified by the same model.

138 Results

Our goal is to explore the ability of machine learning methods to identify fabricated data hidden within large datasets. Our results do not focus on the motivations to fabricate data, nor do they explore in depth the infinite methodological ways to do so. Our study focuses on whether machine learning can be trained to correctly identify fabricated data. Our general workflow is to take real data and mix in fabricated data. When training, the machine learning model is given access to the label (i.e. real or fabricated); the model is tested or evaluated by predicting the label of data which was held back from training (see Methods).

146 Fake Data

The real data used in this study comes from the Clinical Proteomic Tumor Analysis Consortium
(CPTAC) cohort for endometrial carcinoma, specifically the copy number alteration (CNA) data.
The form of this real data is a large table of floating point values. Rows represent individual
tumor samples and columns represent genes; values in the cells are thus the copy number

151 guantification for a single gene in an individual tumor sample. This real data was paired with 152 fabricated data and used as an input to machine learning classification models (see Methods). 153 Three different methods of data fabrication were used in this study: random number generation, 154 resampling with replacement, and imputation (Supplemental Figure 1). The three methods 155 represent three realistic ways that an unscrupulous scientist might create novel data. Each 156 method has benefits and disadvantages, with imputation being both the most sophisticated and 157 also the most computationally intense and complex. As seen in Figure 1, the random data 158 clusters far from the real data. Both the resampled and imputed data cluster tightly with the real data in a PCA plot, with the imputed data also generating a few reasonable outlier samples. 159



160



generation is clearly distinct from all other data. Fabricated data created via resampling or
imputation appears to cluster very closely with the real data.

165

166 To look further into the fabricated data, we examined whether fake data preserved correlative 167 relationships present in the original data (Supplemental Figure 3). This is exemplified by two 168 pairs of genes. PLEKHN1 and HES4 are adjacent genes found on chromosome 1p36 separated 169 by ~30,000 bp. Because they are so closely located on the chromosome, it is expected that 170 most copy number events like large scale duplications and deletions would include both genes. 171 As expected, their CNA data has a Spearman correlation coefficient of 1.0 in the original data, a 172 perfect correlation. The second pair of genes, *DFFB* and *OR4F5*, are also on chromosome 1, 173 but are separated by 3.8 Mbp. As somewhat closely located genes, we would expect a modest 174 correlation between CNA measurements, but not as highly correlated as the adjacent gene pair. 175 Consistent with this expectation, their CNA data has a Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.27. 176 Depending on the method of fabrication, fake data for these two gene pairs may preserve these 177 correlative relationships. When we look at the random and resampled data for these two genes, 178 all correlation is lost (Supplemental Figure 3 C, D, E and F). Imputation, however, produces data that closely matches the original correlations, *PLEKHN1* and *HES4* $R^2 = 0.97$; *DFFB* and 179 $OR4F5 R^2 = 0.32$ (Supplemental Figure 3 G and H). 180

181 Machine learning with quantitative data

We tested six different methods for machine learning to create a model capable of detecting
fabricated data: Gradient Boosting (GBC), Naïve Bayes, Random Forest, K-Nearest Neighbor
(KNN), Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) and Support Vector Machine (SVM). Models were given as
features the quantitative data table containing copy number data on 75 labeled samples, 50 real
and 25 fake. In the copy number data, each sample had measurements for ~17,000 genes,

187 meaning that each sample had ~17,000 features. After training, the model was asked to classify 188 held-out testing data containing 75 samples, 50 real and 25 fake. The classification task 189 considers each sample separately, meaning that the declaration of real or fake is made only 190 from data of a single sample. We evaluated the model on simple accuracy, whether the 191 predicted label was correct or incorrect. To ensure that our results represent robust 192 performance, model training and evaluation was performed 50 times; each time a completely 193 new set of 25 fabricated samples were made (see Methods). Reported results represent the 194 average accuracy of these 50 trials. We note that two methods, SVM and MLP, performed 195 poorly compared to other classification methods. Testing data consisted of 2/3 real data and 1/3 196 fake data: therefore, baseline accuracy (the accuracy achieved if the model predicting all test 197 samples as the majority class) is 66%. Both SVM and MLP had an average accuracy at or 198 below this baseline for classification of the simplest fabrication method (random), and were 199 excluded from further analysis.

200

201 The remaining four models performed relatively well on the classification task for data fabricated 202 with the random approach. The average accuracy of 50 trials was: Random Forest 94%, GBC 203 92%, Naïve Bayes 88%, and KNN 72% (Figure 2A). Mean classification accuracies were lower 204 for data created with the resampling method, with most models losing ~10% accuracy (Random 205 Forest 84%, GBC 83%, Naïve Bayes 73%, and KNN 70%). We also note that the variability in 206 model performance was much higher for classification of the resampled data (Figure 2B). As the 207 resampling method uses data values from the real data, it is possible that fake samples 208 sometimes more closely resemble real samples. Imputation classification results fluctuated 209 (Random Forest 90%, GBC 89%, Naïve Bayes 66%, and KNN 56%). While Random Forest and 210 GBC both increased in accuracy compared to the resampled data, Naïve Bayes and KNN both 211 now perform at or below the baseline accuracy (Figure 2C).







223

224 Machine learning with digit preference

225 We were unsatisfied with the classification accuracy of the above models. One challenge for 226 machine learning in our data is that the number of features (~17,000) far exceeds the number of 227 samples (75). We therefore explored ways to reduce or transform the feature set, and also to 228 make the feature set more general and broadly applicable. Intrigued by the success of digit 229 frequency methods in the identification of financial fraud [21], we evaluated whether this type of 230 data representation could work for bioinformatics data as well. Therefore, all copy number data 231 was transformed into 20 features, representing the digits 0-9 in the first and second place after 232 the decimal of each gene expression value. While Benford's Law describes the frequency of the 233 first digit, genomics and proteomics data are frequently normalized or scaled and so the first 234 digit may not be as characteristic. For this reason, our method may be accurately referred to as 235 Benford's Law inspired or Benford-like. These features were tabulated for each sample to create 236 a new data representation and fed into the exact same machine learning training and testing 237 routine described above. Each of these 20 new features contain decimal values ranging from 238 0.0 to 1.0 representative of the proportional frequency that digit occurs. For example, one 239 sample's value in the feature column for the digit 1 may contain the value 0.3. This means that 240 in this sample's original data the digit 1 occurred in the first position after the decimal place 30% 241 of the time.

242

In addition to reducing the number of features, converting all features into digit frequencies
improves the model's generality. Machine learning typically cannot handle data where the
features are not consistent in number and type. Converting all measured variables to digit
frequencies circumvents this problem. For instance, if you had a data set of CNA and
transcriptomic data a machine learning model could not train and test on both of these. The

248 features in these datasets would differ in the number of features and what these features 249 represent. But once all information has been converted into digit frequencies the number and 250 type of features are standardized, enabling the model to work any number of different datasets. 251 252 In sharp contrast to the models built on the quantitative copy number data, machine learning 253 models which utilized the digit frequencies were highly accurate and showed little variability over 254 the 50 trails (Figure 3). When examining the results of the data fabricated via imputation (both 255 the most sophisticated and most realistic), the models achieved impressively high accuracy. As 256 an average accuracy for the 50 trials, both random forest and the gradient boosting models 257 achieved 100% accuracy. The naïve Bayes model was highly successful with a mean

258 classification accuracy 97%.





digit frequencies for each sample. A. Results for data fabricated with the random method, mean
classification accuracy: Random Forest 99% (+/- 1.0%), GBC 100% (+/- 0.2%), Naïve Bayes
100% (+/- 0.0%), and KNN 93% (+/- 3.4%). B. Results for data fabricated with the resampling
method, mean classification accuracy: Random Forest 98% (+/- 1.3%), GBC 94% (+/- 3.5%),
Naïve Bayes 97% (+/- 2.1%), and KNN 92% (+/- 2.8%). C. Results for data fabricated with the
imputation method, mean classification accuracy: Random Forest 100% (+/- 1.0%), GBC 100%
(+/- 0.7%), Naïve Bayes 97% (+/- 1.1%), and KNN 89% (+/- 3.8%).

270

271 Machine learning with limited data

272 With 17,000 CNA gene measurements, the digit frequencies represent a well sampled 273 distribution. Theoretically, we realize that if one had an extremely limited dataset with CNA measurements for only 10 genes, the sampling of the frequencies for the 10 digits will be poor. 274 275 To understand how much data is required for a good sampling of the digit-frequencies, we 276 iteratively downsampled our measurements from 17,000 to 10. With the gene-features 277 remaining in each downsample, the digit frequencies were re-calculated. Downsampling was 278 performed uniformly at random without replacement. For each measurement size 100 replicates 279 were run, all with different permutations of the downsamples. Results from this experiment can 280 be seen in Figure 4. The number of gene-features used to calculate digit frequencies does not 281 appear to make a difference at n > 500. In the 100 gene-feature trial, both Naive Bayes and 282 KNN have a significant drop in performance, while the Random Forest and Gradient Boosting 283 model remained relatively unaffected down to approximately 40 features. Surprisingly, these top 284 performing models (GBC and Random Forest) do not drop below 95% accuracy until they have 285 less than 20 gene-features.

286

287 One hesitation for using machine learning with smaller datasets (i.e. fewer gene-features per 288 data point) is the perceived susceptibility to large variation in performance. As noted, these 289 downsampling experiments were performed 100 times, and error bars representing the standard 290 error are shown in Figure 4. We note that even for the smallest datasets, performance does not 291 noticeably vary between the 100 trials. In fact the standard error for small datasets (e.g. 20 or 292 30 gene-features) is lower than when there were thousands. Thus we believe that the digit-293 frequency based models will perform well on both large-scale omics data and also on smaller 294 'targeted' data acquisition paradigms like multiplexed PCR or MRM proteomics.





Number of Measurements



GBC and Random Forest do suffer in accuracy as the number measurements used to generate
 features lowers but remain above 95% accurate until less than 20 measurements are included.

303 Discussion

304 We present here a proof of concept method for detecting fabrication in biomedical data. Just as 305 has been previously shown in the financial sector, digit frequencies are a powerful data 306 representation when used in combination with machine learning to predict the authenticity of 307 data. Although the data used herein is copy number variation from a cancer cohort, we believe 308 that the Benford-like digit frequency method can be generalized to any tabular numeric data. 309 While multiple methods of fabrication were used, we acknowledge there are more subtle or 310 sophisticated methods. We believe that fraud detection methods, like the models presented 311 herein, could be refined and generalized for broad use in monitoring and oversight. 312 313 There is an increasing call for improved oversight and review of scientific data[5,6,16,18], and 314 various regulatory bodies or funding agencies could enforce scientific integrity through the 315 application of these or similar methods. For example, the government bodies charged with 316 evaluating the efficacy of new medicine could employ such techniques to screen large datasets 317 that are submitted as evidence for the approval of new drugs. For fundamental research, 318 publishers could mandate the submission of all data to fraud monitoring. Although journals 319 commonly use software tools to detect plagiarism in the written text, a generalized 320 computational tool focused on data could make data fraud detection equally simple.

321 Acknowledgments

- 322 This work was supported by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) CPTAC award [U24
- 323 CA210972].
- 324

325 References

- Burton F. The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome and mosquitoes. Med J Aust.
 1989;151: 539–540.
- 328 2. Kupferschmidt K. Tide of lies. Science. 2018;361: 636–641.
- 329 3. Al-Marzouki S, Evans S, Marshall T, Roberts I. Are these data real? Statistical methods for
 330 the detection of data fabrication in clinical trials. BMJ. 2005;331: 267–270.
- 4. Fanelli D. How many scientists fabricate and falsify research? A systematic review and
 meta-analysis of survey data. PLoS One. 2009;4: e5738.
- 5. George SL, Buyse M. Data fraud in clinical trials. Clin Investig . 2015;5: 161–173.
- 334 6. Yu L, Miao M, Liu W, Zhang B, Zhang P. Scientific Misconduct and Associated Factors: A
- 335 Survey of Researchers in Three Chinese Tertiary Hospitals. Account Res. 2020.
- 336 doi:10.1080/08989621.2020.1809386
- 337 7. Blum A, Wang P, Zenklusen JC. SnapShot: TCGA-Analyzed Tumors. Cell. 2018;173: 530.
- 338 8. TEDDY Study Group. The Environmental Determinants of Diabetes in the Young (TEDDY)
 339 study: study design. Pediatr Diabetes. 2007;8: 286–298.
- 340 9. Orwoll E, Blank JB, Barrett-Connor E, Cauley J, Cummings S, Ensrud K, et al. Design and

341	baseline characteristics of the osteoporotic fractures in men (MrOS) studya large
342	observational study of the determinants of fracture in older men. Contemp Clin Trials.
343	2005;26: 569–585.

10. Bycroft C, Freeman C, Petkova D, Band G, Elliott LT, Sharp K, et al. The UK Biobank

resource with deep phenotyping and genomic data. Nature. 2018;562: 203–209.

346 11. Barretina J, Caponigro G, Stransky N, Venkatesan K, Margolin AA, Kim S, et al. The
347 Cancer Cell Line Encyclopedia enables predictive modelling of anticancer drug sensitivity.
348 Nature. 2012;483: 603–607.

349 12. Subramanian A, Narayan R, Corsello SM, Peck DD, Natoli TE, Lu X, et al. A Next

350 Generation Connectivity Map: L1000 Platform and the First 1,000,000 Profiles. Cell.

351 2017;171: 1437–1452.e17.

- 13. Caswell J, Gans JD, Generous N, Hudson CM, Merkley E, Johnson C, et al. Defending Our
 Public Biological Databases as a Global Critical Infrastructure. Front Bioeng Biotechnol.
 2019;7: 58.
- 355 14. Bik EM, Casadevall A, Fang FC. The Prevalence of Inappropriate Image Duplication in
 356 Biomedical Research Publications. MBio. 2016;7. doi:10.1128/mBio.00809-16
- 15. Knepper D, Fenske C, Nadolny P, Bedding A, Gribkova E, Polzer J, et al. Detecting Data
 Quality Issues in Clinical Trials: Current Practices and Recommendations. Ther Innov
 Regul Sci. 2016;50: 15–21.
- Baigent C, Harrell FE, Buyse M, Emberson JR, Altman DG. Ensuring trial validity by data
 guality assurance and diversification of monitoring methods. Clin Trials. 2008;5: 49–55.
- 362 17. Morrison BW, Cochran CJ, White JG, Harley J, Kleppinger CF, Liu A, et al. Monitoring the

363 quality of conduct of clinical trials: a survey of current practices. Clin Trials. 2011;8: 342–

364 349.

- 365 18. Calis KA, Archdeacon P, Bain R, DeMets D, Donohue M, Elzarrad MK, et al.
- 366 Recommendations for data monitoring committees from the Clinical Trials Transformation
- 367 Initiative. Clin Trials. 2017;14: 342–348.
- 368 19. Benford F, Langmuir I. The Law of Anomalous Numbers. American Philosophical Society;
 369 1938.
- 20. Cerioli A, Barabesi L, Cerasa A, Menegatti M, Perrotta D. Newcomb-Benford law and the
- detection of frauds in international trade. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2019;116: 106–115.
- 372 21. Badal-Valero E, Alvarez-Jareño JA, Pavía JM. Combining Benford's Law and machine
 373 learning to detect money laundering. An actual Spanish court case. Forensic Sci Int.
 374 2018;282: 24–34.
- 375 22. George SL. Research misconduct and data fraud in clinical trials: prevalence and causal
 376 factors. Int J Clin Oncol. 2016;21: 15–21.
- 377 23. Stekhoven DJ, Bühlmann P. MissForest--non-parametric missing value imputation for
 378 mixed-type data. Bioinformatics. 2012;28: 112–118.

379 Supplemental Figures:

A								
	ond († ¹ ond († 1 onde og			3.00 ÷ -3.00	i ya shufa			
В								
		Gener 1	$e_{2} = 2 \times 1^3$					
	Same C.	18-19 ⁰ (1919 - S. A.			(100000)	11 m 11 m	
	Same and							

Duplicate People Introduce NAs

Impute NAs with missForest

- 381 Supplemental Figure 1 Methods of Data fabrication. (A) The random method of data
- 382 fabrication identifies the range of observation for a specific locus and then randomly chooses a
- number in that range. (B) The resampling method chooses values present in the original data.
- 384 (C) The imputation method iteratively nullifies and then imputes data points from a real sample.



Supplemental Figure 2 - Training and testing overview. After creating 50 fake samples using any one of the three methods of fabrication, the 100 real samples and 50 fake samples were randomly split into a train and test set of equal size and proportions (50 real and 25 fake in each set). The training sets were then used to train various machine learning models using 10-fold cross validation. Next, trained models were used to make predictions on the testing data.
Predictions were then scored with total accuracy.



- 393 Supplemental Figure 3 Data relationships in fabricated data. The correlation between pairs of
- 394 genes is evaluated to determine whether fabrication methods can replicate inter-gene patterns.
- 395 Plots on the left hand side (A,C,E, and G) display data from two correlated genes *PLEKHN1*
- and *HES4*, adjacent genes found on 1p36. Plots on the right hand side (B,D,F, and H) display
- 397 genes *DFFB* and *OR4F5* gene with marginal Spearman correlation in the real data (0.27). The
- 398 plots reveal that random and resample data have little to no correlation between related genes.
- 399 Imputation produces data with correlation values that are similar to the original data (0.97 and
- 400 0.35, respectively).