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TRADITION OF MIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES*

*A FIELD STUDY IN RURAL ZACATECAS, MEXICO, AND
CALIFORNIA SETTLEMENT AREAS*

by

Richard Mines

MONOGRAPH SERIES, 3

CENTER FOR U.S.-MEXICAN STUDIES
University of California, San Diego

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TO THE UNITED STATES: A FIELD STUDY IN
RURAL ZACATECAS, MEXICO, AND CALIFORNIA SETTLEMENT AREAS

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RICHARD MINES

Program in United States-Mexican Studies
University of California, San Diego

MONOGRAPHS IN U.S.-MEXICAN STUDIES, 3

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INTRODUCTION

The North Americans are credulous and we are believers; they love fairy tales and detective stories and we love myths and legends. The Mexican tells lies because he delights in fantasy, or because he wants to rise above the sordid facts of his life; the North American does not tell lies, but he substitutes social truth for the real truth, which is always disagreeable. We get drunk in order to confess; they get drunk in order to forget. They are optimists and we are nihilists -- except that our nihilism is not intellectual but instinctive, and therefore irrefutable. We are suspicious and they are trusting. We are sorrowful and sarcastic and they are happy and full of jokes. North Americans want to understand and we want to contemplate. They are activists and we are quietists; we enjoy our wounds and they enjoy their inventions. They believe in hygiene, health, work, and contentment, but perhaps they have never experienced true joy, which is an intoxication, a whirlwind. In the hubbub of a fiesta night our voices explode into brilliant lights, and life and death mingle together, while their vitality becomes a fixed smile that denies old age and death but that changes life to motionless stone.

Octavio Paz

Who can deny that there is a huge gulf between United States and Mexican culture? Nowhere in the world do two such distinct peoples have such intimate and extensive contacts. Tourism and trade between the two neighbors amount to billions of dollars a year, U.S. corporations invest hundreds of millions of dollars annually in Mexico,¹ and U.S. private citizens build hundreds of pleasure homes south of the border.

¹San Francisco Chronicle, March 4, 1980. Investment totalled \$770 million in 1979.

Still, unquestionably, the deepest and most significant binational contact is between Mexican wage labor migrants and their U.S. employers and neighbors.

Since the first extensive contacts in the 1820s, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico has been one of domination. First, North-Americans took Texas from Mexico, then two decades later the remainder of the Southwest. Despite promises to protect the rights of Mexicans in the U.S. included in the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848, Mexicans were systematically abused. Throughout the Southwest landed Mexicans were dispossessed of their property and incidents of anti-Mexican violence and hysteria have scarred Southwestern history until recent times.²

The hard times suffered by Mexicans in the U.S. have not had the long run effect of stemming cross-border migration. In the twentieth century vast numbers of Mexicans have chosen to come to the U.S. This ebb and flow of Mexicans represents the biggest binational wage-labor migration in history.

This study sought to take a close-up look at cross-border Mexican migration by collecting detailed information about one binational migratory village-based community. Five major findings have resulted from this investigation: (1) Migrants are generally poor rural or urban dwellers who depend on reciprocity networks of mutual exchange with their friends and

²Carey McWilliams, North from Mexico (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), Chapter 6.

relatives and not on public institutions for their survival. As a result, the kinship/friendship network provides the basic structure within which migrants move to and find work in the U.S. Although it is difficult for a community to create the necessary migratory infrastructure (i.e., border settlements, U.S. colonies and U.S. job contacts), once in place, this infrastructure makes cross-border movement within networks self-feeding and difficult to stop. (2) Migratory networks undergo a maturation process over time. They tend to become increasingly committed to the U.S. job market as a source of economic maintenance and social mobility. If allowed enough time, this process eventually involves the settlement of a permanent core of migrant families which raises the social cost to the receiving and sending areas. (3) Job and social mobility within these networks is a function of who you know, not what you know. Family contacts not human capital are the crucial prerequisite for success. (4) The skills, money and goods repatriated to Mexico from the U.S. tend to raise the consumptive not the productive level of the sending areas. Although living standards are raised, a process of self-generating development is not initiated. (5) The continual introduction of new, immature kin networks and the inability of some older ones to obtain good job contacts in the U.S. accentuates the dualism inherent in the U.S. job market. Enclaves of poor jobs performed mostly by temporary, undocumented workers are the result.

Before presenting the case study evidence which supports these findings, we will set forth the historical and conceptual framework within which the case study is situated.

The History of Mexican Migration

Mexico has taken part in the migratory currents of the modern world. Mining and commercial agriculture required large internal labor transfers both in the colonial and post-independence periods. However, migration took on expanded dimensions in the chaotic period of 1913 to 1929. First, the Mexican Revolution and Civil Wars of 1913 to 1920 and then the Cristero Revolution of 1926 to 1929 drove thousands from their homes and disrupted existing economic relationships and activities. Two populated areas particularly affected by the fighting, the West and Center-North,³ and another area just east of Mexico City became Mexico's core out-migration areas. Three other regions, those which have benefited most from Mexico's modernization and increasing interdependence with the U.S., have become the major in-migration areas. These regions are industrial Mexico City, The Northwest and the Northeast. In the Northwest, modern agriculture and the growing border cities of Mexicali and Tijuana have spurred population growth. In the Northeast, the booming industrial metropolis of Monterrey as well as

³ Harry Cross and James Sandos, "Rural Change and Migration in North Central Mexico, 1880-1940," unpublished paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1978. (Forthcoming from the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley.)

border cities have absorbed thousands of newcomers.

The core emigration areas of the West and North-Center have also been the principal regions of international out-migration to the job markets in the U.S. Social scientists working in the 1920s and those working in recent years concur that these two regions supply the majority of U.S. migrants.⁴ Also, among those Central Plateau towns studied by anthropologists, the propensity for international migration increases with proximity to the U.S. border.⁵ The other major source region for Mexican migration to the U.S. is the row of Mexican states which flank the southern U.S. border. But, this migration also is in large part an indirect migration from Mexico's central region, since nearly half of the adult inhabitants of border cities originated in Central Plateau states.⁶

Although the Southwest was until 1848 part of Mexico, Mexicans did not migrate across the border in large numbers

⁴Manuel Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States (New York: Arno Press, 1969), p. 7; Jorge Bustamante, "Undocumented Immigration from Mexico: Research Report," International Migration Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 160; W. Dagodag, "Source Regions and Composition of Illegal Mexican Immigration to California," International Migration Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 503; Davis S. North and Marion Houston, The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market (Washington, D.C.: Linton & Co., 1976, p. 52.

⁵Robert Shadow, "Differential Out-Migration: A Comparison of Internal and International Migration from Villa Guerrero, Jalisco," in Fernando Cámara and Robert Van Kemper, eds., Migration Across Frontiers: Mexico and the U.S. (New York: Institute for Mesoamerican Studies, State University of New York, Albany, 1979), pp. 70-71.

⁶Jean Revel-Mouroz, "Les Migrations Vers la Frontiere Mexique-Etats-Unis," Cahiers des Ameriques Latines, No. 12 (May, 1975), p. 348.

in the Nineteenth Century. The only exception was a brief episode during the 1850s. Sonoran gold seekers migrated to California where they encountered the implacable hatred and xenophobia of white English-speaking miners. Most of the Sonorans were violently driven out of the gold digs and returned to Mexico.⁷ Large-scale cross-border migration began in earnest as a result of development on both sides of the border in the early Twentieth Century. In Mexico, the violence of the 1910-1930 period which upset socially stable relations in the Mexican countryside produced both internal and international migration streams. Meanwhile, the Southwest was experiencing rapid economic development. The infrastructure needed for a modern agriculture and transportation system was being constructed. With the limitation placed on Asian immigration in force by 1906, Mexicans became greatly prized as laborers in construction, railroads and agriculture. Between 1910 and 1930, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans entered legally and illegally into the U.S. By 1930, Mexicans had begun to spread out of the Southwest and into urban industrial midwest.⁸ The year 1930 marked the end of the first large wave of Mexican migration. The depression years saw thousands of unemployed Mexicans leave voluntarily and thousands of others experienced compulsory repatriation.⁹ The

⁷W. Bean, California (San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 162.

⁸Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the U.S., 1900-1940 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), Chapter 6.

⁹Leo Grebler, Mexican Immigration to the U.S.: The Record and Its Implications (Los Angeles: Mexican-American Study Project, University of California, Los Angeles, Advance Report No. 2), p. 24.

northward flow temporarily receded but a residual population of permanent settlers was left behind.

During the 1930s the cross-border economic ties among Mexican kin networks became relatively inactive. The returned migrants had to fall back on traditional economic activities to make a living. Luckily, the Mexican government had a pro-peasant orientation during the Depression years. Many returned U.S. migrants benefited from the liberal land redistribution program which reached its peak in the 1930s.

During World War II prosperity returned to the Southwest. After the reserve of domestic unemployed was exhausted, U.S. employers again turned to Mexico. Bilateral agreements between the Mexican and U.S. governments allowed for recruitment of thousands of contract laborers to be assigned to specific U.S. employers. Throughout the Central Highlands and Northern Mexico hundreds of new, as well as old, sending areas were affected by the Bracero Program. With this impetus, the second wave of Mexican migration began. It consisted of the hundreds of thousands of Braceros recruited legally and of even larger numbers of those who either deserted their contracts or crossed the border illegally. This wave of migrants was greatly affected by the highly effective deportation action of 1954 -- Operation Wetback. This police action intimidated many Mexican migratory networks and slowed illegal immigration in the late 1960s.¹⁰ Bracero recruitment continued after Operation Wetback

¹⁰ Wayne A. Cornelius, Mexican Migration to the United States: Causes, Consequences, and U.S. Responses (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978), p. 9.

and reached its peak in the late 1950s. In 1964, the program was finally shut down by church and labor groups and the second wave of migration ended.

As the second wave was dying down, the seeds for an even larger third wave were being sown. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, many Mexicans were able to obtain permanent resident status in the U.S. In those years, it was relatively easy for an employer to regularize the status of a Bracero or undocumented worker under his employ by certifying him as a needed worker.¹¹ Although this procedure became much more difficult after passage of the 1965 Immigration Law, thousands of Mexicans had already become legal residents by that time. These legalized pioneer migrants from migratory networks, initiated or renewed by the Bracero Program, either stayed permanently in the U.S. or shuttled yearly back to their places of origin. In either case, they became the legal U.S. contacts for others in their kinship networks. In the period after 1965, the pioneers in each migratory network were able to legalize their parents, wives and children and provide safe havens and job advice for their illegal relatives.¹² Permanent ties to the U.S. job market did not occur evenly in

¹¹ Josh Reichert and Douglas Massey, "History and Trends in U.S.-Bound Migration from a Central Mexican Town," unpublished paper, Office of Population Research, Princeton University, August, 1979; and L. Zarrugh, "Gente de mi tierra: Mexican Village Migrants in a California Community," unpublished PH.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1974.

¹² Under Preference 2 of the 1965 Immigration Act, parents, children and spouses could be given legal residence. See Charles Keely, U.S. Immigration: A Policy Analysis (New York: The Population Council, 1979), p. 21.

all the sending areas where recruitment for the Bracero Program occurred. Only in those networks in which pioneer migrants obtained legal status did the habit of going to the U.S. remain widespread after Operation Wetback and the end of the Bracero program. By the final years of the 1960s, as fear of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) declined, large numbers of undocumented members of the partially legalized networks migrated to the U.S. In the 1970s, word spread to other Mexican sending areas and new migratory networks began to form. This surge of migrants since the 1960s represents the third wave of Mexican migration to the U.S.

During all three waves of migration there has been a tendency late in each wave for the migrants to begin to move out of temporary agricultural work into more settled urban employment. The deportation periods which ended the first two waves greatly stunted this process. For the first time, the third wave of migrants has become predominantly urban in character.¹³ This is due, in part, to the urbanization and industrialization of the Southwest in recent decades and in part to the more advanced state of the current wave of migration.

The current wave of migrants is extremely diverse in nature, making accurate generalizations difficult. In fact,

¹³ Cornelius, Mexican Migration to the United States, p. 22.

some of the basic characteristics of Mexican cross-border migration have been the subject of intense debate.

The majority of studies of Mexican migration report that most migrants have only a temporary commitment to the U.S.¹⁴ This assessment is correct, but it must be carefully qualified in order to accurately reflect the complexity of the phenomenon. First, it must be remembered that most serious repeating U.S. migrants, legal or illegal, experience a growing commitment to the U.S. over their life cycle. Although most migrants never settle permanently in the U.S., the trait of being weakly committed to the U.S. job market is much more common to the young or newcomer migrants than to older, experienced ones. Most legal Mexican immigrants to the U.S. entered first as undocumented workers and later regularized their status.¹⁵ Furthermore, the degree of commitment to the U.S. varies considerably among sending areas. This variation can be explained in part by the percentage of legal U.S. migrants within each community's migratory networks, in part by the degree to which the community has permanently settled migrants living in U.S. communities, and in part by the nature (rural or urban) of its U.S. job contacts. Imma-

¹⁴ See Reichert and Massey, "History and Trends in U.S.-Bound Migration"; Cornelius, Mexican Migration to the United States, p. 25; North and Houston, The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens, p. 85; and H. Riviere d'Arc, "Tepatitlan: Terre d'emigration," Cahiers des Ameriques Latines (May, 1975), p. 153.

¹⁵ Charles Hirschman, "Prior U.S. Residence Among Mexican Immigrants to the U.S.," Social Forces, June, 1978, p. 1179.

ture sending networks without large numbers of permanent resident members or urban beachhead communities in the U.S. send almost entirely temporary migrants to the U.S.¹⁶ Other communities, which have a high proportion of legal migrants but have no settlement colonies north of the border, send mostly shuttle migrants to seasonal agricultural jobs.¹⁷ Lastly, some communities are able to establish permanent-settler cores in U.S. cities where both legal and undocumented migrants stay for long periods.¹⁸ It is clear from all studies that the majority of undocumented migrants have only a temporary commitment to the U.S., although many later mature into legal, committed migrants. Also, it is evident from available studies that the length of stay each year by seasonal migrants has grown longer in the current wave of migration as compared to the previous waves. The exact degree of permanency or temporariness cannot be determined because we do not know what proportion of the sending communities have mature networks with beachhead settlements and what proportion have immature networks where shuttle migrancy is still preponderant.

On most other characteristics of the current wave of migrants it is easier to find a consensus. Most scholars agree

¹⁶ James Stuart and Michael Kearney, "Causes and Effects of Agricultural Labor Migration from the Mixteca of Oaxaca, Mexico, to California," Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican Studies, No. 28 (La Jolla, California: Program in U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1981).

¹⁷ Reichert and Massey, "History and Trends in U.S.-Bound Migration..."

¹⁸ Zarrugh, "Gente de me tierra...," and the present work.

that most Mexican migrants, especially the undocumented ones, originate in rural areas. In the core sending areas of the Central Plateau region about two-thirds of the undocumented come from small, economically stagnant villages and towns. Those from the border states originate mostly in cities.¹⁹ There is also agreement that most undocumented migrants are predominantly poorly educated, prime working-age males.²⁰ It is argued that few migrants are Mexican Indians;²¹ however new international migratory networks originating in Oaxaca belie this assertion.²² Scholars who have compared intra-Mexican with international migration have found that U.S. migrants keep much closer ties with their home town than do domestic migrants. The internal migrants often leave as a family unit and lose contact with their point of origin, whereas cross-border migrants more frequently leave their family at home.²³ Finally, on-site research has revealed a tendency for the migration habit to become highly concentrated in certain sending areas of Mexico, where whole communities fall under the influence of cross-border migration, with as many as four-fifths of their families dependent on U.S.

¹⁹Bustamante, "Undocumented Immigration from Mexico," p. 160; and Hirschman, "Prior U.S. Residence Among Mexican Immigrants," p. 1189.

²⁰Dagodag, "Source Regions and Composition of Illegal Mexican Migration..."

²¹Dagodag, "Source Regions and Composition of Illegal Mexican Migration..."

²²Stuart and Kearney, "Causes and Effects of Agricultural Labor Migration..."

²³Raymond E. Wiest, "Wage Migration and the Household in a Mexican Town," Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn, 1973), p. 186.

remittances.²⁴ This finding shows the limits of using national or regional data in assessing the impact of cross-border migration on Mexican sending areas.

It is often asserted that the current wave of Mexican migration is quite distinct from other flows of international wage migrants either into the U.S. or into Western and Northern Europe. Certainly, the differences with other labor flows are substantial. Mexico shares a longer border with the U.S. than any labor surplus country has with a country that imports its labor. Transportation from the core sending areas in Mexico to the labor markets in the Southwest is relatively easy --- thirty to forty hours by car. The proximity of the sending areas allows for a variety of sectors of the Mexican population to reach the U.S. including the rural poor. In Europe a higher percentage of the immigrants originate in urban areas and possess skills before migrating.²⁵ The non-Mexican undocumented U.S. migrants are also more skilled than the Mexicans, according to available evidence.²⁶ Only the better off would-be immigrants from Asia and Latin America apparently can afford the expenses of transportation and visa acquisition. Another difference is the higher propensity among Mexicans to

²⁴ In Las Animas 79% of the families were dependent on U.S. remittances. In the village that Josh Reichert studied, 80% were dependent on U.S. remittances.

²⁵ Saskia Sassen-Koob, "The International Circulation of Resources and Development: The Case of Migrant Labor," Development and Change, Vol. 9, No. 4 (October, 1978), pp. 509-546.

²⁶ North and Houston, "Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens...", p. 103.

visit and return home than other wage-labor migrants. As reported above, some Mexican sending areas specialize in seasonal migration. Yearly commuting is much more uncommon for non-Mexican wage migrants to the industrial West. Also, Mexicans in the U.S. have suffered the most extreme deportation campaigns among nations exporting workers. This has left the Mexicans highly mistrustful of North-American intentions -- only 15 percent of legal Mexican immigrants choose to become citizens.²⁷ Finally, the continuous immigration of Mexicans into the U.S. over several generations has rooted the relationship between the Mexican populations on both sides of the border in a unique manner. Mexican immigrant communities in the U.S. can offer a more familiar environment to incoming Mexicans than can be offered by any other foreign colony to its nationals in Western Europe or the U.S.

On the other hand, Mexican migration is similar to other cases of international wage migration in many ways. For example, the immigration of southern and eastern Europeans into North America in the late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries has many parallels with Mexican immigration of the 1970s. In the period between 1890 and 1924, one-third of the immigrants were illiterate, three quarters were men -- the vast majority

²⁷ Harry Cross and James Sandos, "Rural Development in Mexico and Recent Migration to the U.S.," unpublished paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, p. 105.

of prime working age -- and among the peasant peoples (Italian, Slavs and Magyars) the rate of return home averaged over 60 percent.²⁸ Also, the men often came first, bringing their wives and families to the U.S. afterwards.

One can also overemphasize the differences between Mexican migration and other current population movements. As the current wave of migration from Mexico matures, it has a tendency to spread from rural areas to more urban and skilled populations. In addition, a higher percentage of Mexican migrants are staying on a more permanent basis in the U.S. In the source regions for Europe and in Latin America and Asia, there is a tendency for the migratory habit to spread in the opposite direction -- from the urban areas to the countryside. Also, in Europe, the population of illegal and non-working dependents is increasing, making the European settlement areas, as in the Mexican case, socially quite similar to the sending regions. In sum, the differences between Mexican migration and other cases of international wage migration are lessening over time.

Post-World War II Structural Developments in Mexico and the United States

The Mexican economy has shown remarkable vitality since 1940 -- growth has averaged two to three percent per capita annually. The first impulse for expansion came from the agri-

²⁸Michael Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 150.

cultural sector. Propelled by generous government financing of irrigation and by Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored new seed varieties, grain production skyrocketed between 1950 and 1970; wheat production went up by eight times and corn output by two and half times. Mexico actually exported grains during the 1963 to 1970 period. Unfortunately, this apparent farming success was seriously flawed. Mexican grain could only be exported with a considerable government subsidy, since Mexican costs were above world prices. Also, growth in agricultural productivity was limited to the advanced commercial farmers -- the peasant majority continued their traditional cultivating practices. Even in the advanced-farming sector, productivity growth rates had leveled off by the early 1970s.²⁹

Mexican post-war growth was also impelled by import-substituting industrialization. Output in manufacturing grew 8.6 percent per year from 1953 to 1967 while industrial employment grew at over 6 percent during those years.³⁰ But import substitution growth faltered by the early 1970s. The limited Mexican market protected by tariff barriers was not

²⁹J. Hillman, "Recent Developments in Mexico and Their Economic Implications for the United States," statement presented to the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, January 24, 1977.

³⁰Leopoldo Solís, La realidad económica mexicana: retrovisión y perspectivas (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1970), pp. 219, 244.

adequate to sustain high growth rates in manufacturing.³¹

Even before the economic slow-down occurred, severe problems with the "Mexican Miracle" were appearing. In those areas where the Green Revolution took hold, peasant farm operators were being displaced by advanced agriculture. Most land reform recipients, both ejidatarios and small holders, within the irrigation districts could not compete for expensive inputs with powerful associations of commercial farmers. Many peasants rented or sold their land and became wage laborers. But capital-intensive modern agriculture has not created adequate employment possibilities for the displaced.³² More importantly, the vast majority of Mexico's rural dwellers were entirely by-passed by the Green Revolution. The farm modernization program ignored the needs of rain-fed peasant agriculture. The overwhelming majority of the new seeds were hybrids which require careful irrigation and exact fertilization. Furthermore, extension service personnel were concentrated in areas suitable for large-scale commercial farming.

In the 1960s, the Mexican government became convinced that Mexico had a comparative disadvantage in grain production. As a result, in 1965, it lowered prices for wheat and froze prices

³¹ Clark W. Reynolds, "Labor Market Projections for the U.S. and Mexico and Their Relevance to Current Migration Controversies," Food Research Institute Studies, Vol 17 (Food Research Institute, Stanford University), 1980.

³² The number of landless laborers in rural areas reportedly doubled during the 1970s. See Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Modernizing Mexican Agriculture (Geneva: UNRISD, 1976), p. 318 .

for corn in hopes that grain farmers would switch to fruits and vegetables, which had a higher international price. This policy has led to increased export of these crops but has also made more difficult the life of the corn-producing peasant and contributed to the need to import grain. In 1979, Mexico imported 30 percent of its grain, which is due in part to a steep decline in land planted in corn.³³ The small farmer in Mexico has been converted into a semi-proletarian who earns more from selling his labor than from self-employment.

The modernization of both Mexican industry and agriculture has been capital-intensive and limited to certain regions. Even in the advanced regions the new wealth has been poorly distributed.³⁴ Despite the fact that the per capita output of Mexico was two and a half times larger in 1975 than in 1940, the bottom 40 percent of U.S. jobs were in the service sector; in 1967 this had grown to 55 percent and by 1979, to 71 percent.³⁵ In the 1950s and 1960s the employment growth sectors were banks, hospitals, retail stores, business services and schools. In the 1970s all these sectors continued to grow, with the exception of schools. The biggest employment decline has occurred in manu-

³³David Barkin, "Internationalization of Capital and Mexican Agriculture," Working Papers, School of Social Science, University of California, Irvine, 1980, p. 3.

³⁴David Felix, "Income Inequality in Mexico," Current History, Vol. 72, No. 425 (1977).

³⁵V. Fuchs, The Service Economy (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968), p. 1; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979, p. 409.

facturing while the biggest gain took place in services. The industrial core of the economy is definitely shrinking in relative terms. U.S. production line jobs did not grow in absolute terms in the 1970s and may have actually shrunk.³⁶

In the period up to the late 1960s the economy shifted to service employment for predominantly domestic reasons. The final demand for services increased during this period as incomes rose. The income elasticity for services is thought to be higher than for products. Also, the service industries' productivity has grown at a much slower pace than output per man in manufacturing. Hence, over time, relatively more workers are needed in services.³⁷

In the period beginning with the 1970s, the domestic causes of the shift to a service economy were seconded by international factors. Foreign trade has made a steep climb in recent years. The value of exports plus imports as a percentage of the U.S. gross national product rose from 9.1 percent in 1950, to 12.3 percent in 1970, to 20.0 percent in 1978.³⁸ This increased international trade accounts for the expansion of the white collar sectors which administer foreign trade as well as increases in the service sectors which attend to the increased flow of foreign visitors.

³⁶AFL-CIO, "The National Economy, 1979," in Report to the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, 13th Convention, Washington, D.C., November, 1979; and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979, p. 410

³⁷Fuchs, The Service Economy, p.3.

³⁸U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979, p. 437.

Another related international factor that has contributed to the relative rise of service employment is the internationalization of production. Many industries have found it practical, because of breakthroughs in communication technology, to break up the production process geographically. Plants dispersed at great distances can be coordinated to produce one product.³⁹ In this way, relatively low-cost supplies of labor can be tapped in third world countries. A measure of this development is the value of products partially assembled abroad which are given special tariff privileges (under Tariff Laws 806.30 and 807.00). Such imports have increased from \$950,000 in 1966 to \$7.2 million in 1977. In 1966 only 6.4 percent of the imports were assembled in less developed countries; in 1977, 46 percent were.⁴⁰ The apparel industry is a good example of high capital mobility. In 1966, one out of twenty garments were imported into the U.S.; in 1976 one out of four were imported.⁴¹ As manufacturing jobs flee abroad, service employment has become relatively more important.

The move to a predominantly white collar and service economy has created many well-paying, secure jobs. Demand for professional, managerial and technical employees has

³⁹ P. Vuskovic, "The Internationalization of Production," NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January, 1980), p. 7.

⁴⁰ Vuskovic, "The Internationalization of Production."

⁴¹ Wall Street Journal, October 18, 1976.

risen. However, it is not at all clear that the majority of new jobs are well-paid, secure jobs with benefits.⁴² The expanding sectors of the economy, services, trade and finance, include many poor-paying, temporary jobs. In addition, poor jobs for workers in stable or declining sectors like farm workers, low-wage manufacturing workers and construction laborers are not disappearing. Although direct evidence of the maintenance of large numbers of poor jobs by the U.S. economy is not conclusive, there is ample indirect evidence. The employment rate of men over 40, who would be earning peak wages, has fallen off. The proportion of part-time and temporary work has climbed. Labor unions, which presumably protect workers' conditions, each year control a decreasing share of the labor force. Ninety-eight percent of jobs created in the U.S. over the past decade have been with small businesses.⁴³ And finally, the buying power of the non-supervisory salaried work force declined in the 1970s.⁴⁴

The tendency of the economy to create more poor, part-time jobs than good, full-time jobs in the post-war period until recently coincided with complementary demographic

⁴²One manpower economist argues that 70 percent of the private sector jobs created in the post-war period were poor jobs (Eli Ginzberg, "The Job Problem," Scientific American, Vol 237, No. 5, November, 1977).

⁴³East Bay Today (Oakland Tribune), August 14, 1980, p. A-21.

⁴⁴AFL-CIO, "The National Economy, 1979."

trends. The baby-boom of the 1940s and 1950s produced large numbers of young entrants to the work force. Women, also, greatly increased their labor force participation rate in the post-war period. Both groups were willing to accept part-time or poorly-paid jobs, partially because they saw their income as supplementary to the earnings of their husbands or fathers. Also, many blacks and rural whites were still migrating to urban areas until the late 1960s and were willing to accept the relative improvement of a poorly-paid urban job. However, these trends began to reverse themselves in the 1970s. The rate of increase of teenagers entering the labor market began to slow down in this decade. In the five-year period from 1980 to 1985, the population of young people between 16 and 19 will actually fall by 14.1 percent.⁴⁵ Also, women's labor force participation rate is no longer climbing. And those women entering the work force are generally older and more educated than those a decade earlier. Similarly, second-generation urban blacks with higher educational and aspirational levels than their fathers, are shunning the poor jobs.⁴⁶ By the late 1970s, although the economic shifts had not lessened the demand for low-wage workers, demographic, educational, and aspira-

⁴⁵ Harold Wool, The Labor Supply for Lower-Level Occupations (Washington, D.C.: Employment and Development Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 1976), p. 40.

⁴⁶ Wool, The Labor Supply for Lower-Level Occupations, p. 67.

tional changes had begun to shrink the domestic supply of such labor.

The maintenance of a high demand for low-wage labor in the U.S. and the shift to an older, better-educated domestic labor force have opened up the highly uneven and region-specific development pattern in Mexico, which has not produced adequate employment for Mexico's burgeoning population, has compelled hundreds of thousands of Mexicans to follow their kin networks across the international frontier to fill low-wage job slots.

Conceptual Framework

This study focuses on the social network structure of international wage migration. This level of analysis is intermediate between the macrostructural and individual decision-making levels. Social scientists have concentrated their efforts on discovering the laws and tendencies of human behavior at these last two levels of analysis. However, in international wage labor migration, networks also have a definite structure with distinct patterns and tendencies. Although macro-structural changes have set objective limits to the development of migratory networks, these networks in turn create objective options for the individual decision-makers within them. Below, a model describing migratory networks will be presented, followed by a review of the importance of the network structure for the other levels of

analysis.

Within migratory networks originating in rural Mexico, the basic decision-making unit is the family, which includes the parents and all unmarried children. The decisions are normally made by the father, who commands extreme loyalty from his children even into adulthood.⁴⁷ However, poor rural and urban Mexican families cannot survive easily on their own. Instead, they rely on networks of social contacts with whom they exchange favors.⁴⁸ Since these families have neither material resources nor government social insurance, they must rely on their only asset -- their social contacts. It should be remembered in this context that poor Mexicans on average have dozens of close real and fictive kin with whom they may choose to exchange favors. Although the favors are exchanged on a dyadic (one-to-one) basis, the rules governing the exchanges are supervised by the whole social network. The fear of negative rumors acts as a check on unfair treatment between families.

The system of dyadic contacts between individuals can be dispersed over wide distances. The economic and social environment of an individual or family is defined more by the location of trusted friends and relatives than by geography.

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For an explanation of the role of the father in peasant cultures see Claude Meillassoux, Mujeres, graneros, y capitales (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977), pp. 54-77.

⁴⁸

Larissa Lomnitz, Como sobreviven los marginados (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1975).

A family's strategy for survival may involve various options including, for example, agricultural work in the native village, temporary work with a relative in a Mexican city, and seasonal work obtained by network contacts in the U.S.⁴⁹ Members of international migratory networks feel comfortable about visiting friends or relatives for extended periods while they seek work. In addition, the word-of-mouth job information networks find most newcomers employment.⁵⁰

The principal motivation for the outmigration, temporary or permanent, of Mexico's poor to the U.S. is a search for economic security. The basic necessities of life in rain-fed areas of rural Mexico are dependent on highly variable rainfall. In addition, with the spread of improved communications and transportation, rural Mexicans have been exposed to the comforts of modern life. The decision makers in each family unit perceive that working with local resources cannot provide an adequate standard of comfort and security. As a consequence, if the decision maker has a job contact in the U.S., he may risk migrating or sending his son north of the border. Once the cross-border network is established, individual motivation becomes less important since all men are expected to go the U.S. if their families cannot earn a

⁴⁹ Douglas Uzzel, "Ethnography of Migration: Breaking Out of the Bi-Polar Myth," Rice University Studies, Vol 62, No. 3 (Summer, 1976).

⁵⁰ Robert Van Kemper, Migration and Adaptation" Tzintzuntzan Peasants Peasants in Mexico City (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Sage Library of Social Research, Vol 43, 1977); Lomnitz, Como sobreviven los marginados; Stuart and Kearney, "Causes and Effects of Agricultural Labor Migration"; Zarrugh, "Gente de mi tierra..."; and the present study.

a living locally.

International migratory networks originate from the efforts of male pioneers in the sending communities. Some of the early migrants, who cross the border without definite prospects, manage to secure job contacts. Those communities with successful pioneers have the potential of developing migratory networks, since the returning pioneer may help his relatives cross the border and find work. These secondary migrants, in turn, may do the same favor for others in their social network.

In the post-war period several different types of migratory networks have sprung up. Many early starting networks have matured into permanent-settler core communities. These networks are based on large settlements of legal residents in the U.S. which house and job-place an equal number of undocumented relatives and friends.⁵¹ Other networks, though they have a high proportion of experienced legal migrants, have never formed a beachhead community north of the border. Their members commute annually to seasonal agricultural jobs in the U.S.⁵² These latter networks could be called legal shuttle communities; as in the case of the permanent settler core communities, the legal shuttle communities are initiated by men who later bring their wives and working

⁵¹Zarruch, "Gente de mi tierra..."; and the present study.

⁵²Wiest, "Wage Migration and the Household in a Mexican Town"; and Reichert and Massey, "History and Trends in U.S.-Bound Migration."

age children to the U.S. Other networks, which have more recently joined the international flow, also send seasonal migrants to the U.S. but usually without legal papers. These migrants can originate in the interior of Mexico or in "launching pad" settlements that have formed in Mexican border cities.⁵³ It is likely that any network, if given enough time, will inexorably form beachhead communities in the U.S. where an increasing percentage of migrants will find steady work.

As migratory networks evolve, certain patterns and tendencies become apparent. Since migration is network-based, it tends to spread like a contagion and becomes highly localized and concentrated in both sending and receiving areas.⁵⁴ Furthermore, since some networks are successful while others, from the same sending areas, are not, there is a tendency for some networks or parts of networks to obtain semi-skilled jobs in the U.S. while other groups from the same sending area find that they have to settle for poor, temporary jobs. On the Mexican side, this bi-modal structure implies that some networks can afford to buy property and spend money freely at home while others cannot. In effect, network migration tends to differentiate Mexican migrants into two groups according to their success in the U.S. job market.

⁵³Stuart and Kearney, "Causes and Effects of Agricultural Labor Migration..."

⁵⁴J. Swanson, "The Consequences of Emigration for Economic Development: A Review of the Literature," Papers in Anthropology, University of Oklahoma, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring, 1979).

This intermediate-level model of network migration helps shed light on theoretical formulations carried out either at the macro-structural or individual decision-maker level. Underlying the individual decision-maker level models is the assumption, derived from economic theory, that migrants are rational, atomized free agents who make decisions to maximize their utility. The most common formulation at this level of analysis is the push/pull hypothesis. Migrants, under this theory, decide to migrate as a result of negative push factors in the sending areas, positive pull factors in the receiving area, and friction from obstacles in between.⁵⁵ This approach understates the important network link that holds together the chain of migration. Still, despite this defect, advocates of the push/pull hypothesis have derived several laws of migration that are substantiated by network migration analysis. Examples of these laws are: (1) Every migratory stream sets in motion a counterstream. (2) The migratory stream becomes less selective as to the quality of participants in it over time: The first migrants are the most adventurous and intelligent individuals in a given sending area, while subsequent migration tends to draw on all groups. (3) Migration tends to be bi-modal -- the better off are pulled to the receiving area by good job prospects while the poor in the sending area are pushed out by the necessity of making a

⁵⁵ Ramiro Cardona, "Toward a Model of Migration in Latin America," in Brian M. duToit and Helen Safa, eds., Migration and Urbanization: Models and Adaptive Strategies (The Hague: Mouton, 1975).

living. (4) Unless checked, the stream grows over time due to increased wage differentials and less expensive transportation.⁵⁶

In recent years, this push/pull approach has led to the formulation and testing of various empirical models using multiple correlation and regression techniques. Quantitative analyses have attempted to isolate the economic factors, quality-of-life factors, and the characteristics of the migrants themselves and to test the relative importance of these factors in determining the rate, volume and nature of migration.⁵⁷ Although the results have varied greatly among the studies, the predominance of economic factors as the cause of migration is the general finding of this work. The network model also supports the pre-eminence of economic motivations. However, in the network approach, the superiority of the destination area is dependent on a network of job and social contacts which allow the newcomer not only to find work and improve his standard of living but also to adjust emotionally to his new surroundings.

Economic theory posits that factors of production including labor will relocate where they can be used most efficiently and command the highest price.⁵⁸ Network analysis disproves this assertion as it applies to international wage migration.

⁵⁶ Everett Lee, "A Theory of Migration," Demography, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1966), pp. 47-57.

⁵⁷ Theodore Weaver and R. Sayers, Mexican Migration (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1976), Chapter 2.

⁵⁸ Michael Lipton, "Migration from Rural Areas of Poor Countries: The Impact on Rural Productivity and Income Distribution," World Development, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January, 1980).

Since migration tends to become concentrated and localized, it creates labor excesses in receiving areas and shortages in sending areas. Migration distorts sex/age pyramids in sending areas and tends to drain off efficient individuals leading to production declines. Also, the bimodal nature of network migration tends to concentrate the assets of the sending area in the hands of those successful migrants who work elsewhere and neglect their property.

Economists have made attempts to improve migration theory. "Chicago School" thinkers in the 1960s applying human capital theory asserted that an individual moves because his expected, discounted income in the destination area would be larger than if he did not move.⁵⁹ This explanation of the motivation to migrate was improved by the Harris/Todaro model. This model explains high unemployment among rural immigrants to urban areas in the Third World by analyzing more carefully the nature of the expected earnings differential. The earnings differential expected by the rural migrant to a more advanced area is a function not only of the rural/urban wage differential but also of the migrant's probability of obtaining an urban job (i.e., of the urban unemployment rate). The migrant is not only attracted by the higher urban wage but is also willing to wait in the urban area for that higher wage, even though he suffers short-term economic losses, if

⁵⁹T.W. Schultz, "Reflection on Investment in Man," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 70 (October, 1962).

he senses that he has a sufficient chance of eventually obtaining the high wage job.⁶⁰ John G. Cross has added flexibility to previous economic formulations by allowing for return migration and for learning by repeating migrants. As a result, in his model, migration is a function not only of wage differentials and unemployment but also of prior adaptation to urban areas by prospective migrants.⁶¹

All the "decision-maker" approaches explain only the motivation to migrate among individuals and ignore the essential collective nature of migration. As a consequence, they leave unanswered all questions relating to the patterns of movement, settlement and job insertion in receiving areas.

The model of network migration can also be drawn on in discussing macro-structural theories of migration. One fundamental dispute at this level of analysis is between the Marxists and the Malthusians. Malthusians argue that migration is caused by population growth in excess of increases in food production.⁶² Marxists reply that population can only be in excess relative to the productive capacity of the economy in question. For example, Holland, with one of the highest population densities in the world has no excess population due to its high productive capacity. Furthermore,

⁶⁰Michael Todaro, "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Employment in Less Developed Countries," American Economic Review (March, 1969).

⁶¹John G. Cross, "A Stochastic Learning Model of Migration," Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 5 (1978).

⁶²Lourdes Arizpe, Migración, etnicismo, y cambio económico (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1978), p. 31.

Marxists argue that capitalism promotes population movements to assure itself adequate low-cost labor.⁶³ In the present period, U.S. capitalists, especially those who cannot set prices, have felt compelled to lower their labor costs by relocating plants abroad and by importing foreign labor. The migratory networks from Mexico with their internal self-feeding recruitment system are well suited for channeling workers to needed areas.

The theoretical discussion of migration is part of a larger debate between two theories of social change -- modernization and dependency.⁶⁴ The two theories are similar in form though very different in substance. Both theories explain the spread of the influence of Western industrial society to the Third World. The modernization school asserts that as Western industrial culture spreads, outlying areas tend to become more secularized, complex, educated and democratic. The capitalist market spreads skills, integrates hinterlands, and builds infrastructure. Migration is part of this process by allowing rural areas to lessen the pressure of excess population and by allowing social and geographic mobility to those whose skills can be best utilized in urban areas. Dependency theory posits that as the capitalist mar-

⁶³ Puerto Rican Task Force, Labor Migration under Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).

⁶⁴ Alejandro Portes and Harley Browning, eds., Current Perspectives on Latin American Urbanization (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas, Austin, 1977), pp. 6-7.

ket spreads, wealth, skills, and capital tend to become concentrated in a few advanced areas while the hinterland is drained of savings, labor and ideas. The high exchange value of manufactured relative to agricultural goods further aggravates this impoverishment of the hinterland. The network model of migration is congruent with the dependency framework. The localized effect of migration, as predicted by the network model, does not lead to the spread of development but to the draining of willing labor and to redundant investment in small marginal businesses by returning or visiting migrants.⁶⁵ In addition, the receiving area retains most of the skilled workers, since the skilled tend to adjust socially in the advanced area. Finally, the majority of the wealth created by the working-age population of a given high migration area stays in the advanced area, in the hands of employers, landlords and merchants. Even the savings remitted back to rural Mexico from the U.S. are overwhelmingly invested by Mexican banks outside the sending areas.

Another important macro-structural approach is used by Michael Piore.⁶⁶ He believes that advanced industrial capitalist societies are characterized by flux and uncertainty. Although many products can be standardized and produced with high fixed costs both in capital and labor, there is also a

⁶⁵Riviere d'Arc, "Tepatitlan: terre d'emigration."

⁶⁶Piore, Birds of Passage.

large proportion of products that are new or have uncertain markets. Producers of these goods and services necessarily prefer low-capital investments and low-paid, temporary workers. Piore also argues that bottom-level jobs are necessary to motivate workers throughout the hierarchy of jobs. In his view, a man works not for pure wages but for the relative social status and consumption possibilities that the job confers. Because of the variability of the production process as well as the need for bottom-level jobs to motivate all workers, industrial economies tend to form secondary labor markets where jobs are temporary, insecure, poorly paid and lack benefits.

The model of network migration fits well into Piore's theoretical framework. The migrant streams are bi-modal, so new and less fortunate networks provide a continual source of temporary migrants. These less committed migrants are oriented toward their homeland and derive their social status not from a U.S. but from a foreign social hierarchy. Their "peace of mind" is derived from buying a piece of land or small business in their native country rather than by obtaining a secure job in the U.S. Since a large proportion of the network migrants is a rotating temporary group, the supply of new workers willing to take low-status jobs is constantly replenished. In the U.S., illegal status enforces the temporary nature of migration and allows employers to more easily manipulate their workers. In addition, since

long-term successful migrants often house, feed and give job tips to their novice relatives, the secondary labor market employer obtains an indirect subsidy from the bi-modal migratory structure itself. The low-wage employer can pay less to migrants who are supported in part by their relatively more successful kin. Network migration provides employers with a low-cost, flexible and mobile work force.

A Methodological Note

Since accurate data about Mexican migration to the U.S. are scarce, it was decided that one community of migrants should be studied in depth to obtain reliable information. I chose Las Animas, Zacatecas, a highly migratory village in the north-western region of Mexico's Central Plateau -- the core region for international labor migration. A high-migration village was selected on the assumption that the evolution the community experienced as it became increasingly migratory would shed light on the historical process that other, less mature migratory communities were undergoing. The generalizations derived from this study are limited to international migratory networks originating in the Mexican Central Plateau region in the post-World War II period.

Las Animas is part of a binational village-migrant community composed of many binational kinship/freindship networks which lead from the home village to border settle-

ments and across the frontier to colonies in California's towns and cities. Moreover, the Animeño⁶⁷ networks constitute a mature international migratory community. The community has a well-developed border colony which assures easy passage; it has nearly half of its working-age population in California at any given moment and nearly half of these are legal settlers. In addition, the home town is highly dependent on remittances from U.S. migrants. Over half of the consumable income in the village derives from cash sent from across the border.

This study describes the historical evolution of this community as reliance on migration to the U.S. has become increasingly rooted in its way of life. It is hoped that by discussing the particular historical circumstances of one binational community, certain underlying tendencies inherent in Mexican-American network migration will be revealed.

The methodology of the study is best described as quantitative economic ethnography. The first objective was to paint an accurate portrait of the evolution of one migratory community over the last four decades. The quantitative data gathered for the study could be put into perspective through a reconstruction of the community's history, obtained from hundreds of hours of conversations with four generations of community members.

⁶⁷ People from Las Animas are called Animeños.

The village was first visited for two months in July, 1977. My family and I used this period to acquaint ourselves with the community. In the fall of 1977, I visited settlement communities from this village in the U.S. with the same objective. Extensive notes were taken but no interviewing was carried out. On the basis of these preliminary observations initial categories of data were formed and put in a questionnaire form. The questionnaire concentrated on easily understandable, objective facts which the author, from his experience in the community, felt could be accurately answered by community members: questions about the destinations of migratory moves, the length of stay, the jobs held, the wages earned, the remittances sent back or received, the quantities of resources produced and invested in the village. Attitudinal questions were not stressed in the interviews.

Most of the interviewees gave detailed and often highly personal accounts of their family's life and history, despite deep initial distrust of the investigator. I was able to win the confidence of the people because of three circumstances. First, I took a keen interest in the kin relationships of the community, keeping accurate records of each interviewee's relationship to all other people in this binational sample. I memorized these records. Since Mexican villagers have a natural predilection to discuss their kin ties, a convenient area of mutual interest was established. Secondly, I became

concerned with the economic development of the village. Through my efforts, a sizeable grant was given to a local garment-making cooperative by a U.S. foundation. Thirdly, I hired a well-known and well-liked member of the community to travel to Tijuana and California with me while I carried out interviews in settlement communities on the U.S. side of the border. By the end of the two-year period of field-work, most community members had reversed their initial mistrust of my intentions.

Organization of the Study

The case study material has been organized as follows: In Chapter II various categories and analytic approaches which I have used to order the data are defined. The reader will find the rest of the monograph difficult to follow without first having mastered these definitions. Chapter III describes the home village and other Animeño settlements. The purpose is to provide an introduction to the product of four decades of migration-induced change. An outline is given of the demography and economy of each "branch" of the Animeño population and of its role in the functioning of the whole community. Chapter IV reviews the work and migration history of the village people and attempts to analyze several tendencies uncovered by this look at Animeño evolution. Chapter V describes the emergence of new classes in the community and examines the tendency of

of migratory networks to differentiate into distinct groups. In Chapter VI, the patterns of adaptation by the village economy are scrutinized. Finally, in Chapter VII the changing conditions confronting Animeños in California are analyzed.

II

THREE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS

This study relies repeatedly on three approaches to organizing and analyzing the data that require a detailed introduction. The categories of thought necessary for the use of these approaches are defined in this section.

Kind of Migrancy Analysis

Migrants are defined fundamentally by their relationship to the U.S. job market. The committed migrants (rows 3, 4, & 5 of table II-1) have chosen the U.S. job market as their lifelong place of work; the temporary ones (rows 1 & 2, table II-1) recognize that work in the village will be necessary for their survival as well.

By subdividing the two groups further, we can analyze migrant behavior in more detail. The temporary migrants are made up of two subgroups. The "2 times or less" group (see table II-1, p. 52) is composed of older migrants who never became seriously involved in the U.S. job market and of younger migrants at the beginning of their migratory life cycle. The "undocumented shuttles", almost entirely men, have a medium-term commitment to the U.S. In middle age, this group normally returns to

TABLE 11-1

DEFINITIONS OF KINDS OF U.S. MIGRANCY

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kind of Migrant	Committed or Temporary	Throughout Working Years	Shuttle or Long Stay	Wife, Child in Village	Usual Type of Work	Total Years in U.S.	Legal or Undocumented
1) 2 times or less	temporary	undecided or No	shuttle	Yes	unskilled	2 or less	undocumented
2) undocumented shuttle	temporary	No	shuttle	Yes	unskilled	15 or less	undocumented
3) beginner permanent	committed	Yes	long-stay	No	semi-skilled	3 to 6	usually undocumented
4) long-term permanent	committed	Yes	long-stay	No	semi-skilled	7 or more	usually legal
5) legal shuttle	committed	Yes	shuttle	Yes	semi-skilled	any	legal

the village. The committed migrants can be broken down into three categories: the legal shuttles have their family in the village but their work in the U.S.; the long-term permanents are those that "have their lives in the North"--their families and work are in the U.S. in general, they visit the village only for vacations; and the last committed group is the beginner permanents. This is a new group in the Animeño population made up of predominantly urban, undocumented young men and their wives (see Chapter IV, tendency 4 for more detail about this group). This group intends to stay and become long-term permanents. They also only visit the village for vacations.

Life Cycle Analysis

In order to explain the patterned movement of village Mexicans, it is useful to consider the expected norms of their life cycle. Each individual as he passes through the phases of his life is confronted with quite limited options. Each young villager must come to grips with these options as his life unfolds before him. However, these options are not static but are constantly changing as the village migrant community matures. For this reason, four sets of life-cycle goals have been posited (see chart A-1 in the appendix, p. 185). The village life cycle corresponds for Las Animas to an earlier period; the shuttle and committed migrant life cycles are still

prevalent, but increasingly the goals of the immigrant life cycle are becoming dominant.

In all four sets of life-cycle alternatives, village men face the same initial options (see appendix, chart A-1, rows 1, 2, & 3, p. 185). For example, almost all men return to the village to marry.¹ Despite differences in the kind of U.S. jobs held by shuttles and committed migrants, both try to buy houses and land in the village. The migrants who acquire 'immigrant' life-cycle goals opt instead for a house in the U.S. The 'immigrant' pattern is recent among Animeños so that many men with the immigrant goals began their migratory cycle as shuttle migrants. Gradually, they raised their goals, first to those of the committed migrant and then to those of the immigrant.

Which set of norms confront a young villager as he grows up depends upon the kin group he belongs to and his personal ambition. As the community matures, an increasing proportion hope to become immigrants.

Kin Network Analysis

For the 1,454 individuals in sample A-1454, a careful record was kept of each individual's relationship to every other individual up to a defined distance of kin tie.²

¹Two out of 143 (in sample C-143) married women not from the Nochistlán area. (See appendix C, p. 205 for explanation of sample.)

²See appendix sample A-1454 for definitions of kin tie, p. 205.

In this way, all the close relatives of each of the original 122 respondents could be traced. This procedure has made it possible to ask questions about all close members of an interviewee's kinship network. Moreover, by grouping the networks of certain types of respondents together, one can compare one kind of kin network with another and test whether kin proximity explains the advantages that some members of the community have over others.

Village, Border and U.S. Kin Groups

The village networks are composed of 67 village-based respondents and 911 of their close relatives.

The border networks are composed of 10 border-based individuals and their 141 close relatives.

The U.S. networks are made up of 45 U.S.-based interviewees and 636 of their relatives.

Sharecropper and Landowner Kin Networks

Both sharecropper and landowner kin networks are village-based. The sharecropper networks are composed of 22 interviewees who were sharecropping at the time of the interviews and 393 of their relatives.

The owner networks are made up of 22 landowner interviewees and 326 of their relatives.

III

DESCRIPTION OF BRANCHES OF THE VILLAGE-MIGRANT COMMUNITY

Since World War II, there has been an amazing diaspora of people from Las Animas. To a limited extent Animeños have migrated to Guadalajara, but mostly the migratory pathways have led to Tijuana and across the border to California. In these areas, daughter communities have sprung up where Animeños are surrounded by friends and relatives. These different 'branches' of the community are described below in order to give the reader a view of the final product of the historical evolution which is the subject of this paper.

The Home Village

Las Animas produces mainly corn, beans, and cattle. The interaction of these three products form a balanced cycle of land use for the village. Part of the tillable land is left fallow each rainy season, where cattle and work animals pasture and manure the fields. The mules and donkeys, meanwhile, are used to plow and cultivate and as beasts of burden to bring in fertilizer and take out beans, corn, and fodder from the fields. In the dry season from

December to June, the corn fodder gathered during the harvest keeps the work animals and unsold cattle alive until the June rains renew the natural pasture.

This natural economy has been supplemented by cash flows from the U.S. in recent decades, which has improved local consumption. Still, consumption levels in the village are quite modest. No families pay rent; houses are either owned or borrowed by those who occupy them. The major expenses are food, clothes, household items, and alcoholic drinks and festivals (see table III-1).

TABLE III-1
AVERAGE SUBSISTENCE LINE BUDGET FOR A FAMILY OF SEVEN
IN LAS ANIMAS, 1978-1979
(In U.S. dollars)

Number of Families	Food	Clothes, Household Items, Transportation, Entertainment etc.	Medicine	Total
7	\$806.54	\$379.12	\$278.76	\$1,464.00

SOURCE: Seven family budgets from interviews. (See explanatory note, appendix E.)

The productive land in these years of high migration is used overwhelmingly for grazing. Only about 12 percent is used for the rain-fed corn/beans cycle, and only 0.5 percent of the land, mostly planted in chile peppers, benefits from irrigation (see appendix, table A-1, p. 160). Nevertheless, despite this low proportion of cultivated

hectares, the Las Animas community clearly produces its own staples. Among the families surveyed in the village, twice as much corn was produced as consumed.¹ And even though bean production is quite variable due to pests, Las Animas is a combined net exporter of its two staple food items. Food imported into the village are: bread, vegetables, fruits, sugar, salt, canned goods, and beans in years of bad harvests.

For those who own pasture land, cattle production is relatively lucrative and requires little labor time. An animal purchased in the spring and sold at the beginning of the dry season yields an average of forty-five dollars (\$45) profit.² Still, many hectares must be controlled to make a substantial contribution to family income since on average one animal grazes on more than two hectares. Accordingly, one herdsman must have sixty-four hectares or thirty-two head of cattle to generate the \$1,454 to keep his family above the poverty line.

Chile peppers grown on irrigated land represent the other source of cash from local agriculture. One hectare can produce 2,000 kilograms of chiles, which sold at 40 pesos (\$1.75 U.S.) a kilo in 1979. But chile production requires power for pumping, fertilizer, seedlings, and enormous inputs of labor in the periods of transplanting,

¹Source: sample D-59 (see appendix C for description of samples).

²See appendix D for method of calculating farm profits.

weeding, irrigating, harvesting, drying, and sorting. Also, chile is vulnerable to pests and hailstorms which can suddenly ruin a promising investment. Nevertheless, a hectare or two of carefully shepherded chile can produce a living wage in the village.

The main economic activity in the village, the seven-month corn/beans cycle, cannot produce a living wage for a one yunta³ farm, although 96.1 percent of the cropland is devoted to it (see appendix, table A-1, p. 164). In the 1977 and 1978 crop years, considered to be excellent ones by the local people, the value of the harvests per 'yunta' were inadequate to bring a family above the poverty line. Sharecroppers made \$265, owner-producers \$355, and owner-bosses who hired sharecroppers to do the labor, \$258 per 'yunta' (see appendix, table A-2, p. 165). This net income figure includes all corn, beans, or fodder sold or consumed by the household. It is apparent that a family must control at least four 'yuntas' to make the \$1,464 necessary for minimal living standards. Few families do. In fact, only about one-third of the families in the village control enough land to make a substantial contribution to their income by working their land (see table III-2).

In addition to raising animals and growing corn, beans, and chiles, the people have other sources of local

³A yunta is about 3.5 hectares of tillable land--the amount one man is expected to take care of in a year.

TABLE III-2

VILLAGE FAMILIES WITH LOCAL INCOME FROM LAND THEY CONTROL

	Source of Income				Total
	3 hectares or more of rain-fed corn	6 hectares or more of grazing land	Both	Neither	
No. of Families	7	9	8	43	67
% of Families	10.4%	13.4%	11.9%	64.2%	100%

SOURCE: Sample E-67.

income. Men work as day laborers, aiding bricklayers, fixing fences, making bricks, tending other people's animals, and harvesting crops. Wages for day labor, about 90 pesos off-season, rose to 125 pesos a day during the corn harvest in January 1979. But few men can find fifty days of such work a year. Another income-generating activity, still practiced only by the poorest families, is the collecting of firewood in the mountains for sale in local towns. This job yielded 40 pesos a day in 1979. Together, day labor and firewood gathering only accounted for 15.7 percent of village earnings (see table III-3, col. 6).

The women and children are a constant source of help to the men in their work. Not only in shopping, food preparation, and delivering food to the fields but also in weeding, harvesting beans, removing the kernels from corn

TABLE III-3

AVERAGE VALUE OF LOCAL FAMILY PRODUCTION* AND CASH REMITTANCE, 1977 OR 1978
(In U.S. Dollars)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Number of Families	Wife, Child	Local Business	Own Labor Corn/Beans	Other's Labor Corn/Beans	Day/Labor Firewood	Other Crops	Animal, Milk	Total Local	Remittance from U.S.	Total	
59	\$20	\$148	\$224	\$60	\$125	\$33	\$218	\$827	\$875	\$1,702	
% of local earnings	2.5%	14.6%	28.1%	7.6%	15.7%	4.2%	27.3%	100%	
	% of Total Income:										
	48.6%	51.4%	100.0%								

SOURCE: Sample D-59 (also see appendix D, p. 208).

* All figures net income.

cobs, and countless other nonpaid tasks. However, their labor has very little value on the local labor market. As a consequence, local women contribute almost no cash income to the household (see table III-3, col. 2). Forty-four percent of surveyed women report having earned money outside the house; but they averaged only \$5.40 earnings a month.⁴ The principal money-making activity among women is embroidering pillow-cases, for which they are paid 8 pesos (\$.35 U.S.) for eight hours work. In the chile harvest a fast woman can earn up to 40 pesos (\$1.77 U.S.) a day, but the harvest is of short duration.

Women can earn more money when they become involved in running their husband's businesses. People with a business sense can make a decent living in Las Animas. Three women in the sample⁵ run grocery stores which net them on average between 25 pesos (\$.11 U.S.) and 60 pesos (\$2.65 U.S.) of profit a day. One woman sells clothes which she imports from the city and nets 100 pesos (\$4.40 U.S.) a day. This woman's husband is a butcher. He clears 400 pesos (\$17.70 U.S.) profit on each pig he slaughters, which gives him as much earnings in one morning's work as the farmer earned by raising the pig for six months.

Taken all together, local earnings are quite inadequate. Only about 13.6 percent of the village families had sufficient income from local earnings to bring their

⁴Sample D-59. ⁵Ibid.

families above the \$1,464 poverty line.⁶ This picture changes abruptly if we include cash remittances from the U.S. The average family income from binational sources is above the poverty line (see table III-3, col. 11). Animeños owe this favorable standard of living to cash sent home from the U.S., which amounts to over half the spendable income in the village (see table III-3, col. 10). Moreover, many apparently local activities are indirectly tied to northern earnings. Commerce is greatly stimulated both by remittances to dependents and visits by free-spending U.S. migrants, especially during the October to February festival season. Beef is slaughtered only during this period of influx of vacationing migrants--the year-round residents can only buy pork the rest of the year. Actually, most businesses are owned by shuttle migrants whose families run the business during their absence (see appendix, table A-3, p. 166).

Other sources of apparently local income are also partially dependent on U.S. remittances. Many animals are bought with northern earnings and many older corn farmers depend on their sons' remittances to pay for the harvest labor. Finally, day laborers who work in construction are frequently building houses for absent U.S. migrants who want a vacation house in the village.⁷

⁶ Sample D-59.

⁷ A house by house count in two barrios of the village revealed that 20.6 percent of the houses were unoccupied.

Despite the stimulus of U.S. earnings, most people in Las Animas are still quite poor. The average family of six lives in four rooms, of which one is usually used for storing corn.⁸ Children normally sleep several in one bed. People living at such low levels depend upon one another in time of need for survival. Reciprocity networks are, therefore, crucial in village life. Fifty of fifty-six village men who spoke freely about loans reported that they repeatedly borrowed money, usually from friends and relatives.⁹ The greatest use of the loans was for basic necessities and doctor bills; a few borrowed money for the trip north.¹⁰ Another indication of this cross-family interdependence is the borrowing of houses. In the 1975 to 1979 period, 36.6 percent of stays in Las Animas occurred in houses borrowed from friends or relatives.¹¹ These networks of people owing each other favors naturally do not end when Animeños cross the U.S. border.

The population of Las Animas, despite enormous outflows of people, has been remarkably stable in recent years. A census was taken by local school teachers in 1974 in the village. The author, helped by a local informant, painstakingly corrected this census. The improved 1974 census

⁸ Sample D-59.

⁹ Interest rates were reported from 0 percent to 3 percent a month.

¹⁰ Sample D-59.

¹¹ Sample B-125.

showed 1,373 residents in Las Animas.¹² The author, with the help of his informant, conducted his own census in January 1979 and found that the population had fallen to 1,333 individuals.¹³ A review of all 1,373 individuals in the earlier census revealed that 317 (or 23 percent) had died or definitively left the village in the intervening five years. A very high birth rate among the 125 women of childbearing age in the village during those years, coupled with the return of some older U.S. migrants, accounted for the 277 additions to the village population between 1974 and 1979. A drop of only forty people, or 2.9 percent was recorded.

Although the village of Las Animas is not losing population at a fast rate, a very high proportion of its prime-age males are absent at a given moment. Therefore the village population is heavily weighted toward children, women, and the old.¹⁴

The Border Settlement

Approximately forty men raised in Las Animas have relocated themselves and their families to Tijuana (see

¹²Shuttle U.S. migrants but not permanents were counted as residents in both censuses.

¹³Idem.


¹⁴A comparison of the percentage of women, children, and the old in the village with the percentages of these groups in the total sample show their higher concentration in the village at a 5 percent significance level (Source: table A-4).



*Men gathered in the middle
of Las Animas*



A typical sharecropper plowing his field



Many Animenos are as good with a baseball bat as with a plow



After the harvest, men tie up the fodder in stacks for use during the long dry season



*A minute percentage of the land is irrigated
by levees*



*Most land has been given over to low-intensity
cattle-raising*



Brickmaking is one of the few crafts practiced in the village



Fifteen women have formed a sewing cooperative which has survived for several years

appendix, table A-5, row 3, p. 168). Unlike movement to the U.S., Animeño men do not migrate seasonally to Tijuana. Pay is not adequate on the border to maintain two households; and more importantly, there is no legal barrier to reuniting one's family. Since whole families come, Tijuana has the same sex and age balance as the total sample (see appendix, table A-4, row 3, p. 167). Animeños are concentrated in one 'barrio' and stay in close contact with one another.

Tijuana residents prefer life on the border to life in their native village. There is more work in Tijuana. Many men clean cactus leaves which they bag and sell as a cookable vegetable to grocery stores. Others work as janitors, factory workers, or potters; most work in business for themselves or another Animeño. Several ex-villagers have become quite well-to-do as vegetable merchants. One man reports an income of \$2,000 a month. His employees, who are co-villagers, earn only \$320 a month. While the wealthy merchant just built a \$30,000 house, one of his employees lives in a nearby shantytown whose buildings have been pieced together out of cardboard and scraps of lumber and metal. But even the poorly paid cactus-cleaner stresses the advantages of Tijuana. "Work is steady here," he says, "and there are schools for the children." Another man, who earns \$438 a month as a janitor, prefers the border to either the village or the U.S. Work in the U.S though

higher paid entails separation from his family; village life, although he owns a 'yunta', is too insecure. Even in good years a yunta does not provide a living wage (see appendix, table A-3, p. 166 and table III-1). In Tijuana, he has a car, a secure job, and is on the waiting list for government housing.

TABLE III-4

AVERAGE INCOME AND CASH REMITTANCES FOR TIJUANA FAMILIES
(1978, U.S. Dollars)

	No.	Local Earnings	U.S. Remittances	Total
Includes one wealthy merchant	10	\$5,056	\$500	\$5,556
Other 9 families	9	2,848	555	3,403

SOURCE: Ten Tijuana interviews for 1978.

The shantytown of Tijuana where some Animeños live has dirt streets, small poorly constructed houses, and no sewers. But even these Tijuana residents are not trapped in poverty and dependent on U.S. migration for an adequate standard of living like their relatives in Las Animas. In 1978 less than one-fifth of Tijuana income was remitted from the U.S. (see table III-4, col. 2). Youngsters in Tijuana have options their cousins in the village do not have. They may find a year-round job, they may excel in school

and go on to the secondary level, or if all else fails they can still go to the U.S.

Though in Tijuana reliance on remittances is much less, Animeños' work is still closely tied to the U.S. Among the ten men interviewed, two migrate seasonally to the U.S., five sell vegetables imported from the U.S., and one does upholstery work for U.S. customers.

Better opportunities in Tijuana not only attract young people from the village but also retiring Animeños from the U.S. Housing is cheaper to build in Tijuana than in the village due to a shortage of bricks and workers in Las Animas. Also, men with long-term permanent children in Southern California can visit them conveniently from Tijuana. Finally, migrants used to life in U.S. cities prefer the conveniences of Tijuana over the slow-paced and difficult life of the village.

The Tijuana settlement serves another crucial function for the greater village-migrant community--it acts as a way station in the underground railroad which takes people to the U.S. Village migrants coming from the village and migrants temporarily deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) normally use the Tijuana settlement as a place to plot their border-crossing.

One old Animeño couple, perhaps the first to settle on the border, for over three decades has run a boarding house in downtown Tijuana. Throughout the year, but

especially in the late winter and early spring, dozens of undocumented Animeños assemble at this boarding house. Here they take their meals, sleep in the yard, in nearby hotels or with relatives, and wait for the smugglers. Although fear and tension are clearly present in this courtyard, where the men and some women and children wait, almost all cross over to Chula Vista within a day or two. On the other side, a smuggler's car takes them to the safety of a relative's house in either Orange or Los Angeles counties.

The Tijuana Animeño community with its formalized procedures of crossing the border provides an enormous advantage for these villagers over others that do not belong to an established migratory network. Animeños gathered in large groups cheer each other up during the nerve-shattering hours of waiting. If the crossing fails, they return to the same launching-pad house where the waiting period begins anew. This process is repeated until success is achieved. Also, deported Animeños seldom lose more than two days from their U.S. jobs. Other Mexicans, who arrive in small groups or alone in Tijuana, are much more likely to be discouraged by failure to cross successfully and return home. Also, those without U.S. contacts have a very high probability of being deported once they have crossed.

California Towns

Animeños work almost exclusively in four agricultural areas in California: Escondido, Bell Gardens, Reedley-Sanger, and Watsonville.

In Escondido near the Mexican border, all Animeños work for one farm employer, Victoriano Cáceres,¹² a native of the village. The workers live on his ranch where they irrigate, weed, and harvest vegetables. Only a few Animeños still work for Victoriano since his pay is low compared to opportunities further north. The job slots are being filled by other Mexicans who lack contacts outside the border area.

In Los Angeles County further north, only Bell Gardens offers predominantly agricultural work to Animeño migrants. A strip of nonresidential land used for power lines runs through the middle of this urban area. Small farms and nurseries lease spots along this strip where they offer hundreds of minimum-wage jobs to Mexican migrants. The farm jobs are mostly seasonal, April to November, while nursery work can last year-round. The three dozen Animeño men who work in Bell Gardens almost all live in one apartment complex where five men crowd into each two-bedroom apartment. Life in this male society is very inward-looking and routinized. As one migrant complained, "Here we go back and forth from work to the house; in the village, we have freedom."

¹²A fictitious name.

Another traditional rural location for Animeños is the Reedley-Sanger peach and grape country near Fresno. Here the men live in town under conditions similar to Bell Gardens and commute long distances to the fields. The work is predominantly seasonal, and only a few Animeños still come for the poorly paid job cycle. Their places have been taken by men from a village near Las Animas, whose people have less experience in California. In Reedley-Sanger, only two families from the village have settled permanently. On the other side of Fresno, a few miles east, another town, Mendota, attracts Animeño men. In this case, workers come strictly for the July to September melon harvest season and live in work camps. Those lucky enough to get contracts may earn five or more dollars an hour.

The last agricultural town frequented by Animeños is Watsonville. In this town a group of five or six long-term permanents live year-round where they work for the railroad or in service industries. The temporary migrants who come seasonally work in strawberry and lettuce fields on small farms and in nurseries. Recently, some single women have moved from the village to Watsonville where they work in nurseries and an apparel factory.

In all the towns there is a preponderance of males, 72.8 percent of California's Animeño town residents are males in the total sample. Also, the prime-age group,

from sixteen to fifty-four, is over-represented in California towns¹³ (see appendix, table A-4b, p. 167). Finally, among males, those without legal documents predominate in agricultural areas.

California Cities

Approximately 30 percent of the total Animeño binational community is living in U.S. cities at any given moment. They number about 800 (see appendix, table A-5, p. 168) and are concentrated in four urban areas. In each area the Animeños stay in close contact, and the greater California Animeno community gathers periodically for amateur baseball competitions.

In the urban settlements, two-thirds of the male Animeños are between sixteen and fifty-four. In fact, people of both sexes are particularly concentrated in California cities.¹⁴ In all urban areas the ratio of legal to undocumented at a given moment is approximately one to one. However, over the course of several years, a larger number of undocumented Animeños spend some time in a given urban area than the number of legal migrants, since the undocumented are part of a changing pool of workers, who come and go, while most legal city dwellers are part of an unchanging year-round stock.

¹³ Age group 16-54 in town is significantly larger than the total sample at a 10 percent significance level.

¹⁴ At a 5 percent significance level, the working age group is more concentrated in cities than the total sample (see tables A-4a,b).

In all four areas, a permanent settler core has taken root. About 150 long-term permanent men, half of whom have bought U.S. houses, have established long-term residences in urban California. These men, most of whom have wives and children living in California, averaged earnings of \$10,608 in 1977 or 1978 (see appendix, table A-6, row 4, col. 1, p. 169). Their presence is crucial for the other two-thirds of Animeño migrants who come seasonally or without documents. The settler core provides free food, protection from the INS, and excellent job placement. Although there is a tacit two-month limit during which a newcomer must find a job or go home, in the short run the hosts do not begrudge their hospitality to their co-villagers.

The most southerly urban colony is in the Santa Ana-Artesia area. Here, the undocumented work primarily in construction clean-up,¹⁵ while legal workers have found semi-skilled jobs in factories. To the north, East Los Angeles contains the largest Animeño settlement; perhaps sixty-five permanent settler families live here,¹⁶ most within a few blocks radius. The undocumented work mostly in the service industries and at entry-level factory jobs. Recently, many newcomers and some wives of legal residents are entering Los Angeles' expanding garment industry. The legal males work mostly at semi-skilled jobs in food, leather, and

¹⁵ See section VII for details.

¹⁶ Estimate obtained from Animeño residents of Los Angeles.

apparel factories. A few miles north in San Fernando another small Animeño settlement, rooted in fifteen permanent families, is found. Here both legal and undocumented work in construction, although the legal element earns twice the pay. The oldest and most concentrated community is found in South San Francisco; it is formed around forty long-term permanent families. Its undocumented component works as kitchen helpers and in light manufacturing. The legal workers have found semi-skilled jobs in food factories, metal foundries, and construction.

Branches of the Village-Migrant Community Compared

In recent decades, Animeños have poured out of their native town. Of the total binational population, 47.4 percent are out of the Las Animas area¹⁷ (see appendix, table A-4(b), row 1, p. 167). Moreover, there is an unusual penchant to go to California; 56.5 percent of prime-age males are living in California at a given moment (see appendix, table A-7, p. 170). As a consequence, although the border colony has a balance of men and women, in the village women predominate and in California men do. In addition, since the young are drawn to California, the U.S. colonies have a younger average age than either the border or the village (see appendix, table A-25, p. 184). Finally,

¹⁷ This includes twenty-nine children born in the U.S. and nineteen in Tijuana.

Animeño children are concentrated in the village and scarce in U.S. towns. On the border and in U.S. cities, they are nearly in the same proportion as the total sample. Although Las Animas has about half the total binational population, it has two-thirds of the children (see appendix, tables A-4a, b, row 1, col. 1, p. 166).

If we compare the border-based interviewees and their kin networks with the U.S.-based networks,¹⁸ we find the U.S. networks, despite the greater distance, are more oriented toward the village than the border-based ones. Since border people bring their families, they tend to have fewer relatives in the village (see appendix, table A-8 (a), (c), col. 5, row 1, p. 170). Also, no one in the border networks owns a small business in the village. Confirmed U.S. migrants own 62.5 percent of the businesses (see appendix, table A-3, p. 166). On the other hand, the border-based networks do buy land in the village. Although they do not buy as much land as the U.S.-based networks, they buy nearly as much land as the village-based ones (see appendix, table A-9, p. 172). Since they have higher earnings than those in the village, despite their absence they are able to compete in the land market. For like U.S. migrants, border people are interested in the security and status for themselves and their village relatives which owning land brings.

¹⁸See section II for definition of networks.

If we compare the village-based and the border-based networks, we find that despite its proximity to the border, the Tijuana networks have fewer people in the U.S. than networks originating in the village (see appendix, table A-8(a) & (b), rows 4 & 5, p. 170). Distance is less important in inducing migration than the availability of economic alternatives. The relatives of village-based interviewees are more likely to be in the U.S. than the relatives of border-based interviewees.

IV

MIGRATORY PATTERNS

This chapter demonstrates that various tendencies become apparent as a village-migrant community evolves to a stage of increasing reliance on the U.S. These tendencies are best understood in the particular historical context in which they take place. The first task, then, is to outline the work and migration history of the Animeño community.

Historical Context of Animeño Migration Patterns

The first wave of Animeño migration, remembered by those still alive, reached its peak in the 1920s. Animeño men during this wave went mostly to agricultural, railroad, and mining jobs. However, a large group also worked in metal foundries in South San Francisco. With the depression and anti-Mexican hysteria of the 1930s, most went back to the village. They returned to their oxen-powered corn/beans cycle and especially in bad years relied on selling wood to nearby towns (see appendix, table A-10, col. 1, p. 173).

During the war the Bracero program rekindled the thrust northward. The majority in the early years picked

cotton or thinned sugar beets in Texas and the Midwest. But soon another magnet began pulling Animeños back again to California. Two ex-villagers, who had survived the hard times of the 1930s, one a labor contractor and the other a medium-size farmer, began to recruit actively in the village. Victoriano Cáceres, first of Buena Park and later of Escondido, and Pedro Guzman¹ of Reedley visited the village and enlisted dozens of Animeños. In the peak period 1950-1954, 30.7 percent of all U.S. jobs were with these two men (see appendix, table A-11, col. 3, p. 173).

Partly because of the existence of these two exvillagers, the northward flow quickly became dominated by undocumented workers (see appendix, graph 6, p. 196). By 1948 over 80 percent of the total months worked by Animeños in the U.S. were months worked by those without papers.² Workers not only crossed the border on foot without inspection, but also deserted their Bracero contracts in large numbers. By the early 1950s, undocumented workers were not only going to Pedro and Victoriano, but many also followed their kin ties back to South San Francisco where a resident settlement community of mostly undocumented Animeños was forming.

The tide of migration toward South San Francisco and the two expatriate farm employers suffered a rude shock in 1954--the year of Operation Wetback. "I was practically

¹The names are fictitious.

²Source: Sample C-143.

the only one who stayed," reported one of the few early legal residents of South San Francisco. "They took the rest away." The growing South San Francisco Animeño community was at the take-off point in 1954, but large-scale urban settlement was pushed back a decade by the police action.

In the years following Operation Wetback, migrants were also afraid to come without papers to rural areas. The job sites of Pedro and Victoriano, where undocumented Animeño farm labor clustered, experienced a steep decline of Animeño workers during the 1955 to 1959 period (see appendix, table A-11, cols. 3 & 4, p. 173). The 1954 police intervention had recreated the situation of the early 1940s, Animeño men, who wanted U.S. work, were again limited to contract farm labor (see appendix, graph 6, p. 196).

During the years 1954 to 1956, nearly twice as many men returned to the village as went to the U.S. (see table IV-1). These three years saw a more balanced ratio of men and women in the village than at any other time in the postwar period.

It took several years after Operation Wetback for U.S. migration to regain its importance in the Animeño community. In 1953, 39.4 percent of village men sixteen years of age or more worked in the U.S. This percentage plummeted to 18.3 percent in 1956 and did not regain the earlier peak until nine years later in 1965 (see appendix, graph 2, p. 191).

TABLE IV-1
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SAMPLE THAT INITIATED STAYS

Year	Number	U.S. Stays	Stays in Las Animas
1954	74	25.6%	43.2%
1955	80	16.3	31.3
1956	82	12.2	23.2
1957	87	27.9	26.4
1958	92	27.2	42.4
1959	95	26.3	31.6
1960	96	30.2	33.3
1961	98	24.4	27.6

SOURCE: Sample C-143. (Also see appendix, graph 9a, b, p. 199). (See Appendix E for explanatory note.)

Animeño timidity about crossing the border after the police action was extreme. This shock set back for many years a feeling of security in the U.S. that eventually the Animeño community would attain. However, in the summer and fall of 1957, the village community suffered an even more severe shock: the rains did not come.³ By the late summer it was obvious that the stunted cornstalks in the fields would not produce food and fodder. The men streamed out of the village to look for a way to feed their families.

Out of eighty-seven men in the sample, during 1957, eight moved elsewhere in Mexico and twenty went to the U.S. Nearly one-third of men over fifteen years of age left the village that year. From 1956 to 1957, the number of men who went to the U.S. jumped from 12.2 percent to 27.9

³Rainfall in Guadalajara in 1957 was 622 mm, 73 percent of the average for the 1950s (Source: *World Weather Records, 1951-1965*, USDC, 1965, pp. 158, 165.)

percent (see table IV-1). The next year, 1958, most absent men returned to the village, at least for the planting season (see table IV-1). But the habit of going north had been quickly relearned. In 1958, over 27 percent again went to the U.S.

The push out of Las Animas as a result of the drought of 1957 sent men predominantly to U.S. towns (see table IV-2). The men were not pulled by the hope of settling in the U.S. but were pushed out in search of survival. In fact, during those years, the percentage of legals among U.S. migrants fell by half (see appendix, graph 5, p. 195).

TABLE IV-2

PERCENTAGE OF MEN IN U.S. TOWNS AND CITIES			
Year	Number	U.S. Towns	U.S. Cities
1956	82	12.2%	4.5%
1957	87	20.7%	3.5%
1958	92	20.2%	4.8%

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

The drought-caused push of 1957 and 1958 rekindled the flow northward among Animeño men without legal papers (see table IV-3).

Another important push factor was occurring at approximately the same time. The important lumbering trade was declining in Las Animas. Until the mid 1960s, at least

TABLE IV-3

PERCENTAGE OF NON-IMMIGRANTS* WHO WORKED IN THE U.S.
AMONG TOTAL NON-IMMIGRANT SAMPLE

Year	Total Non-Immigrants	% Non-Immigrants in the U.S.
1956	78	16.7%
1957	83	22.9%
1958	88	30.7%

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

* Braceros and Undocumented.

a quarter of men working in the village derived part of their income from readying wood for market. Pine trees were felled, sawed into planks and beams, and taken by muleteers to local towns. But in the 1960s, this trade suffered a drastic decline. In the period 1960-1964, still 30 percent of village jobs involved the lumber trade; by the 1970-1974 period, this involvement had dropped to 7.5 percent (see appendix, table A-10, p. 173). There are many reasons offered for this decline: 1) new smaller owners were less generous than their 'hacendado' predecessors, 2) poor forest practices and fires, 3) increased government taxes at the point of sale, and 4) the competition of cheaper metal planks manufactured in urban areas.⁴ As the option of work in lumber declined, work in the U.S. became more attractive as a way to supplement the corn/beans cycle.

⁴It is also clear that the availability of U.S. work disinclined people to work in wood. The lumber trade dipped somewhat during the peak migration years of 1950 to 1954 (see appendix, table A-10, p. 173).

The predominantly town-oriented character of U.S. migration during the drought-push period radically changed at the beginning of the 1960s. A phenomenon that was stunted in South San Francisco in 1954 began to flourish again--permanent settler cores began to take root. In South San Francisco and somewhat later in East Los Angeles, growing settlements offered sanctuary to newcomers.

The shift to urban areas represents a fundamental shift in migratory patterns. In the early 1960s the percentage of those with legal status among U.S. migrants rose rapidly. In 1959, 16.1 percent were legals; by 1962 the percentage had climbed to 37.1 percent (see appendix, graph 5, p. 195). The rate of shuttling back and forth to Mexico also dropped during this period. In 1960, 80 percent of U.S. migrants spent time both in Mexico and the U.S.; in 1964, only 50 percent did (see appendix, graph 4, p. 194). Moreover, these years saw a rapid shift to nonagricultural employment. In 1959, 29.9 percent of months worked occurred in nonagricultural work; by 1963 this percentage had risen to 54.7 percent (see appendix, graph 8, p. 198). In fact, the Animeño urban population was growing so quickly that by 1963 a parity had been reached between U.S. cities and towns (see appendix, graph 1a, p. 190). Animeños were spending about the same amount of time in each. Finally, the average length of stay per year in the U.S. among Animeños was growing longer. By 1962 it had reached 9.7 months per year,

only slightly less than the average stay in Mexico for adult males (see appendix, graph 3, p. 193). The binational community had passed through a watershed. Henceforth, networks originating in the village could count on secure, permanent settler cores in urban California to provide protection and guidance.

The 1960-1964 period saw Animeños shift to cities, gain footholds in urban job markets, legalize, and bring in their families. This period was one of entrenchment, not expansion. In fact, the percentage of Animeño men in the U.S. rose only one percentage point, 36.5 to 37.5 percent, during those years (see appendix, graph 2, p. 192). But once the settler colonies were established, a huge wave of Animeños flooded into California. From 1965 to 1974, a steep increase occurred; in 1974, 59.6 percent of all adult male Animeños worked in California for part of the year.

At first, this flow went mostly to towns (see appendix, graph 1a, p. 190) because another drought in 1965⁵ forced the poorer villages, more prone to obtain farm jobs,⁶ to cross the border in search of a livelihood. After 1967, however, the pathways led predominantly to the growing urban settlements. In 1968 the U.S. city population definitively surpassed the U.S. town population (see appendix, graph 1a, p. 190). By 1969, even the undocumented were

⁵In 1965, 680 mm of rain fell in Guadalajara. (USDC, 1965)

⁶See tendency 9 further on in this section for a discussion of this point.

working more months in U.S. cities than towns.⁷

Consistently, since 1942, about 10 to 15 percent of Animeño male working time has been spent in U.S. towns⁸; since 1955, about 5 to 8 percent has been spent in Tijuana. But since the formation of secure urban settlements in California in 1965, there has been an enormous shift of time spent by male Animeños from the village to U.S. cities. Time spent in the home village dropped from 65 percent in 1965 to 45 percent today, and time spent in U.S. cities rose from 15 percent in 1965 to about 35 percent today (see appendix, graph 1a & b, pp. 190, 191).

The 1970s saw the Animeño village-migrant community achieve a highly mature state. Migratory patterns have been stabilized. The percentage of shuttle migration has stabilized at about 40 percent (see appendix, graph 4, p. 194). The average age of Animeño males in the U.S. has stabilized at about thirty-six years of age (see appendix, table A-25, p. 184). In months worked, a parity has been achieved between the U.S. and Mexico--the adult male population spends about half its time in each place.⁹ In average length of stay per year, a parity has also been reached in the 1970s. Adult males average stays of ten months in both countries (see appendix, graph 3, p. 193). The

⁷Source: Sample C-143.

⁸Except for a brief period right after Operation Wetback.

⁹Source: Sample C-143.

proportion of legal among U.S. male migrants also has leveled off at about one-half (see appendix, graph 5, p. 195). On the surface, a migratory equilibrium appears to exist.

Tendencies for Patterns to Change as Evolution Occurs

Below, a number of tendencies are posited as inherent in the evolutionary process of maturing Mexican-American migratory networks. For each tendency the process of evolution will be described, using the example of Las Animas. It must be remembered that these tendencies are directions of evolution; there is no time limit within which they are realized.

TENDENCY 1

At the beginning of its cycle, a village migratory network leads to agricultural, rural, unskilled, and nonimmigrant work. As the network matures, increasingly, jobs become nonagricultural, urban, semi-skilled, and legal. [See explanatory note, appendix E.]

We can look at this process in a time series framework by looking at the combined job histories of 143 Animeno men.¹⁰ A steady shift toward nonagricultural work has occurred in this sample, so that by 1978 nearly 80 percent of months worked were in non-farm jobs (see appendix, graph 8, p. 198). The same shift occurred in place of residence in the 1970s; over 70 percent of time spent in the U.S.

¹⁰Source: Sample C-143.

has been in cities (see appendix, graph 1a, p. 190). Also, the proportion of legal migrants increased steadily; in the 1970s, over half the time spent in the U.S. was by legal Animeños (SOURCE: see Sample C-143, p. 207). Finally, by 1970, a large proportion of the work performed by Animeños was semi-skilled. The average wage in 1970 (in 1970 dollars) was already \$3.58 an hour (see appendix, table A-23, p. 182).

We can also consider tendency 1 by using a cross-sectional analysis among three generations of Animeño men. Those in the oldest age class were already adults in 1942. They participated fully in the second wave of migration before Operation Wetback overwhelmingly as agricultural workers. Approximately one-third were able to get an urban job in the years after the police action and keep a foothold in the U.S. job market. The other two-thirds spent little time in the U.S. after 1954 (see table IV-4, col. 3).

TABLE IV-4

PERCENTAGE OF USUAL WORK IN THE U.S. BY AGE CLASS

Age Class	(1) 16 to 39 (N = 259)	(2) 40 to 54 (N=120)	(3) 55 or More (N = 91)
1) Agricultural work	21.2%	43.3%	67.0%
2) Low-wage urban	38.6%	21.7%	23.1%
3) Semi-skilled urban*	40.2%	35.0%	9.9%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

* Defined as earning \$4.50 an hour or more in 1978 dollars.

The middle-aged group's migratory cycle was split in two by Operation Wetback. Some came a few times before the 1954 expulsion, but most began at the time of the 1957 drought or afterwards. These men also began at rural jobs, but the majority have been able to move into urban employment (see table IV-4, col. 2). Over half of those who work in cities have achieved semi-skilled status.

The youngest age class came in the period after the urban settler cores were rooted in 1964. Most have come directly to the cities and already half of urban workers in this group have semi-skilled work (see table IV, col. 1). The shifts described by tendency 1 occur in all age groups but are particularly visible in the youngest age groups.

TENDENCY 2:

Among the pool of adult males in a binational migratory network, the average length of stay per year in the U.S. grows longer and in Mexico shorter over time.

This phenomenon results directly from tendency 1. Since stays in cities are longer than in towns, stays at nonagricultural jobs are longer than agricultural jobs, and stays at legal jobs are longer than at undocumented jobs.¹¹ As tendency 1 takes effect, so does tendency 2. In 1973, the average stay per year in the U.S. among Animeño males passed up the average stay per year in Mexico (see appendix, graph 3, p. 193).

¹¹Source: Sample C-143.

TENDENCY 3:

The proportion of shuttle migrants among total U.S. migrants declines over time in a given migratory network.

This decline can be observed in a time series framework. The combined life histories of Animeño men show a continuous decline in shuttle migrancy (see appendix, graph 4, p. 194).

It is also useful to apply a static intergenerational analysis to this question. If we compare the three generations of migrants, first, we find that shuttling is greatly reduced among the younger groups.¹² Also, if we compare the kin networks of men interviewed in the village with those of men interviewed in the U.S. we find that in the younger age groups relatives of U.S.-based men are far less inclined to be shuttle migrants than the relatives of village-based men (see table IV-5).

TABLE IV-5

PERCENTAGE OF SHUTTLE* MIGRANTS AMONG REPEATING**
U.S. MIGRANTS BY KIN NETWORKS

Kin Network	No.	(1)		(2)		(3)	
		No.	16 to 39	No.	40 to 54	No.	55 or More
1) Village-based	142		43.0%	70	54.3%	57	78.9%
2) U.S.-based	125		30.4%	51	31.4%	29	72.4%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

* Legal and undocumented.

** This table excludes two times or less migrants.

TENDENCY 4:

As the village-migrant community matures, the road to committed status is altered. Instead of passing through an undocumented shuttle stage, migrants tend increasingly to pass through a beginner permanent stage (see appendix, chart A-2, p. 187).

This tendency is best explained by age-cohort analysis (see table IV-6). In the two older-age groups, almost all serious migrants began as and many remained undocumented shuttle migrants (see table IV-6, row 2, cols. 2 & 3).

TABLE IV-6
PERCENTAGE OF KINDS OF U.S. MIGRANCY BY AGE CLASS

<i>Kinds of Migrancy</i>	<i>Age Class</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
		16 to 39 (N=265)	40 to 54 (N=121)	55 or More (N=91)
Temporaries				
1) 2 times or less		21.1%	20.7%	19.8%
2) Undoc. shuttle		24.5%	36.4%	50.5%
Committed				
3) Beginner perm.		16.2%	2.5%	1.1%
4) Long-term perm.		32.8%	38.8%	22.0%
5) Legal shuttle		<u>5.3%</u>	<u>1.7%</u>	<u>6.6%</u>
	Totals:	99.9%	100.1%	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

¹²This finding contradicts an earlier report dated February 1, 1979. The earlier report showed more shuttling in the younger groups for two reasons: 1) the earlier report was based on interviews in the poorest and most temporary-prone barrios; and 2) it was a village-based sample and was, therefore, biased toward shuttle migrancy.

The traditional pattern was to migrate seasonally to agricultural jobs. Eventually, some of these older men were able to regularize their status, find an urban job, and remain for long periods in the U.S. However, in the youngest age cohort group, a new migrant category has established itself--the beginner permanent. Until the permanent settler cores were founded in the early 1960s, this path to committed status was not an option for Animeño migrants. The beginner permanent, instead of serving an apprenticeship period as an undocumented shuttle, now comes directly to the urban colonies, where, if he is able to find a steady job and go undetected by the INS, he may eventually achieve long-term status (see appendix, chart A-2, p. 187). This phenomenon can make a big difference for young undocumented migrants hoping to improve their life's chances. "In the old days only legal migrants could stay long enough to save money," one Animeño migrant reported, "but now the 'Sin-papeles' [undocumented] are doing it, too."

TENDENCY 5:

Legalization of status and age of first entry tend to occur at a younger age among men over time.

After the core settlements were formed in the 1960 to 1964 period, men were able to legalize their sons and younger brothers as they came of working age. In addition, some fathers of legal migrants were legalized, which has raised the average age of legalization (see table IV-7).

TABLE IV-7
 AVERAGE AGE OF LEGALIZATION AND FIRST ENTRY
 INTO THE U.S. OVER TIME

Time Period	(1)		(2)		(3)
	No.	Age at Legalization	No.	Age at First Entry	Animeño Migratory Waves
1940 - 1944	0	12	25.3	Postwar Wave
1945 - 1949	0	18	23.2	
1950 - 1954	3	23.7	14	22.7	Current Wave
1955 - 1959	1	45.0	17	19.3	
1960 - 1964	10	32.0	13	22.6	
1965 - 1969	15	30.4	17	22.7	
1970 - 1974	11	31.2	23	20.9	
1975 - 1979	6	27.0	17	21.7	

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

The age of first entry has also dropped slightly over time. In each of two postwar waves of migration, the first that lasted from 1942 to 1954, and the second that has run from 1957 to the present, Animeño families have tended to send their sons at an earlier age later in the migratory wave (see Table IV-7, cols. 2 & 3).

TENDENCY 6:

Although network migration is a male-led phenomenon, over time we find that: a) a greater percentage of total U.S. migrants are women, and b) a higher percentage of women migrate without documents.

Accounts by older Animeño migrants indicate that in the 1920s virtually no women went to the U.S. from the village. In the oldest age-cohort group in the sample, only 11.5 percent of those who crossed the border were women

(see Table IV-8). In the younger age cohorts, however, women are a growing percentage of all U.S. migrants.

TABLE IV-8

PERCENTAGE OF MEN AND WOMEN WHO WENT
ONCE OR MORE TO THE U.S.

Age Class	16 to 39 (N=375)	40 to 54 (N=156)	55 or More (N=104)
Men	70.7%	77.6%	88.5%
Women	29.4%	23.4%	11.5%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454

Animeño migration to the U.S. continues to be a male-led phenomenon. Women still come overwhelmingly to join their husband or another close male relative who has committed status in the U.S. This inclination to join a man in the U.S. has been increasing in recent years. If we compare the ratio of committed females to committed males among the three generations of migrants, we observe that over time an increasing percentage of committed males are bringing their women to the U.S. (see table IV-9). In the younger groups, there are more than half as many committed females as males. Moreover, in the youngest cohort group, many of the committed males are unmarried and may still bring village women back with them on one of their trips home.

TABLE IV-9

RATIO OF COMMITTED FEMALE TO COMMITTED MALE U.S. MIGRANTS

Age Class	16 to 39	40 to 54	55 or More
1) No. of Committed Females	80	28	11
2) No. of Committed Males	144	52	28
Ratio of 1) to 2)	.56	.54	.39

SOURCE: Sample A-1454

We noted under tendency 1 that over time the proportion of legal migrants among all U.S. migrants rises over time. Among migrants of all age classes this tendency is irrefutably in force. Nevertheless, there are two counter-tendencies to be explained. First, looking at male migrants, there is a tendency in the youngest age class to have a high percentage of undocumented. This percentage is even higher than the middle-aged groups (see table IV-10, row 1, cols. 1 & 2). However, this tendency has a short-run effect. Those individuals presently in the youngest age class will soon pass up those presently in the middle group in proportion of legal U.S. residents. The youngest group is at the beginning of its migratory cycle, and many undocumented in this group will attain legal status in the future. The undocumented in the middle-aged group, on the other hand, have, in general, given up on attaining legal status; many

TABLE IV-10

APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF UNDOCUMENTED* MIGRANTS
BY SEX BY AGE CLASS AMONG U.S. MIGRANTS

Age Class	No.	(1)		(2)		(3)	
		16 to 39	No.	40 to 54	No.	55 or More	
1) Men	265	61.9%	121	59.5%	91	71.4%	
2) Women	110	47.3%	35	27.8%	11	8.3%	

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

* Total undocumented equal sum of one-or two-timers, beginner permanents and undocumented shuttles. Percentage of undocumented calculated by dividing this sum by total number of U.S. migrants in each category.

(See table II-1 for definitions of categories.)

have returned permanently to the village. Secondly, there is a clear counter-tendency toward increased unauthorized migration among women (see table IV-10). This reverse tendency is directly related to the phenomenon of beginner permanency that we observed among men in tendency 4. Since more men are settling in the urban settler colonies before they obtain legal papers than previously, more men find it convenient to bring their wives to the U.S. without papers. Animeño women are migrating earlier in their husband's life cycle; they are coming before, instead of after, their husbands obtain legal status.

TENDENCY 7:

The use of a contract labor system induces the flow of undocumented migration from sending networks.

The Animeño migrant of the 'Bracero' period, 1942 to

1964, soon learned to prefer undocumented to contract agricultural labor. In sixteen out of twenty years, the average wage for undocumented farm work was higher than for Bracero labor among Animeños (see appendix, table A-23, p. 182). The average hours per week was always higher for the undocumented than for the Braceros who were often left idle (see table IV-11). Finally, the average length of stay, approximately eight months a year for those without papers, was much more attractive than the average stay for Braceros, about five months.¹³

TABLE IV-1
AVERAGE HOURS WORKED PER WEEK

	Number of Jobs	Average Hours
Braceros	126	38.8
Undocumented	167	46.8

SOURCE: Sample B-125.

This relative superiority of unauthorized migration induced Animeños in increasing numbers to risk deserting their Bracero contracts or walk long miles to cross the border illegally. In the period 1942-1947, Braceros predominated; but from 1948-1954, Animeños shifted mostly to unauthorized stays in the U.S. After the police intervention

¹³Source: Sample C-143.

of 1954, there was again a short period where Braceros were in the majority; but by 1961, a majority had again switched to undocumented status. After 1962, Animeños gave up entirely on the Bracero program, having perceived that entering the U.S. without papers was more in their interest (see appendix, graph 6, p. 196).

TENDENCY 8:

Migratory flows within a chain of interconnected networks tend to occur in spurts. Periods of the inflow of shuttle migrants are followed by periods of legalization and entrenchment, which are in turn followed by periods of the inflow of shuttle migrants, and so on. [See explanatory note, Appendix E.]

The early period, 1942-1954, was one of the influx of shuttle migrants. Operation Wetback stopped cross-border movement almost entirely in 1955 and 1956; only a few legals stayed in the U.S. during those years. The drought-push period of 1957-1960 witnessed an influx of shuttle migrants which can be observed by the increase of those who came (see table IV-12, row 3, col. 1; NOTE: Further parenthetical references in this paragraph are all to table IV-12), and the decline of the proportion of legals (row 3, col. 3). The next period, 1960-1964, was one of entrenchment. The proportion of shuttles declined (row 4, col. 2) while the proportion of legals rose (row 4, col. 3). Subsequently, a huge influx of shuttles occurred from 1965 to 1973. The legalization process continued at a high level during this period, so that the rate of shuttling remained level (row 5, col. 2).

TABLE IV-12

DIRECTION OF CHANGE IN THE PERCENTAGES OF THREE CATEGORIES OF MIGRANCY BY TIME PERIOD

Periods	(1) ^a Percentage Who Initiated Stays in the U.S.	(2) Percentage Who Shuttled between the U.S. & Mexico	(3) Percentage of Legals among U.S. Migrants
1) 1942-1954	increase	level	level
2) 1955-1956	decline	level	increase
3) 1957-1960	increase	level	decline
4) 1961-1964	decline	decline	increase
5) 1965-1973	increase	level	slow increase
6) 1974-1975	decline	decline	slow increase
7) 1976-1978	increase	increase	decline

SOURCE: Graphs 4, 5, 9a, and 9b.

^aSee explanatory note, Appendix E.

Then in 1974 and 1975, partially due the U.S. recession, the U.S. Animeño community experienced another entrenchment period--the percentage of those who came to the U.S. and the rate of shuttling both declined during those years (row 6, cols. 1 & 2). Finally, in recent years, a new period of influx may be starting, possibly related to the devaluation of 1976. The proportion of those who came and who shuttled during those years rose, while the proportion of legal migrants declined (see row 7).

This 'spurt' tendency may occur because shuttle migrants, who come in one period, become entrenched in the next period and then invite their relatives who cause and increase in shuttle migration in the third period.

TENDENCY 9:

Drought-push periods are characterized by the outflows of village-migrants to rural U.S. jobs.

Periods of poverty-push migration tend to force a high proportion of the poorer segment of a village community, whose opportunities are predominantly in the rural U.S., to migrate across the border. This tendency can be demonstrated by noting that two drought years, 1957 and 1965, saw big expansions in the number of Animeños who worked part of the year in U.S. towns (see table IV-13).

TABLE IV-13

PERCENTAGE OF MEN WHO WORKED IN U.S. TOWNS

Year	No.	%	Year	No.	%
1956	82	9.8%	1964	117	6.1%
1957	87	19.5%	1965	119	16.2%

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

TENDENCY 10:

Over time, network migrants tend to identify more with the immigrant life style (see appendix chart A-1, p. 185) and less with their village orientation.

The older generation remembers Operation Wetback and has been reluctant to fully trust the U.S. Only one of the 143 men in the survey is a U.S. citizen, and he was born in the U.S. Despite the fact that several had semi-skilled

jobs as far back as the late 1950s, no one bought a house in the U.S. until 1974. Since then, sixteen of the legal residents have bought homes in California. However, with one exception, all had acquired land or a house in the village prior to their purchase of a U.S. house. Especially for the older men, the adoption of an 'immigrant' outlook has been difficult. Most middle-aged and older immigrants still stress that they would like to return home. However, most of them have children who have grown up in California, which effectively bars them from long stays back in the village.

The apprehensive attitude toward the U.S. is disappearing among the younger migrants arriving in recent years. Most now go through their apprenticeship period in urban California without long stays back home. As a consequence, there is a tendency to become 'Chicanoized' in dress, taste in music and entertainment. Many are more at home in the Hispanic barrio of a California city than in their home village.

TENDENCY 11:

As a migratory network matures, an increasing proportion of U.S. remittances are used to buy assets in the village and a decreasing proportion are used for family sustenance.

At the beginning of a sending area's migratory cycle, mostly lone males migrate and earn low salaries (see tendencies 1 and 8 above). Naturally, the parents and

wives who receive their remittances use them primarily for maintaining their families. Later in the cycle, men obtain semi-skilled jobs in the U.S. and begin to make asset purchases in the village. If the man's wife and children remain in the village, they manage the assets; if the nuclear family moves to the U.S., then the migrant's parents usually manage the assets. The period after the settler cores were established in U.S. cities has seen a rapid increase in the building of village houses and the transfer in ownership in village land (see appendix, table A-18, p. 177). Out of sixty-seven families interviewed in the village, sixteen had benefited from a husband having bought with U.S. earnings an asset for himself and his family; and fourteen had benefited from a child's having bought an asset with U.S. dollars (see appendix, table R-3, p. 204). Out of forty-eight men based in the U.S., twenty-four had bought an asset in the village by 1979.¹⁴

¹⁴Source: Sample C-143.

V

CLASS DIFFERENTIATION

In this chapter we will discuss the process of class differentiation which occurs as a migratory community evolves. After recounting the history of class reformulation in the Animeño community in this century, several differentiating tendencies inherent in migratory networks will be analyzed.

Historical Context: The Emergence of
New Social Classes

At the turn of the last century, the two hundred families of Las Animas were still dominated by one family, the Castanedas, who owned almost all the land near the village. The vast majority of Animeños worked as day laborers, sharecroppers, or shepherds for the 'hacendado.' Some twenty-five families owned small plots of land or businesses which occupied at least part of their labor time. Another group, comprising five families, were foreman and managers for the elite family. These latter thirty families made up a small middle sector in the days before migration.

Most of the recruits for the migration wave of the 1920s were drawn from the middle sectors, because the trip

north in those years was expensive. Some of the migrants of those early years landed urban jobs. For example, numerous Animeños worked for Bethlehem Steel in South San Francisco in the 1920s.

Starting in the early 1930s and continuing through the 1940s, the Castañeda family slowly sold off its land. Logically, the U.S. migrants of the 1920s who had savings from U.S. earnings were the ones able to take advantage of this division of property.¹ As a consequence, the small proprietor class had already begun to expand by the early 1940s.

Due to improvements in transportation and due to the Bracero program, the postwar wave of migration was much larger than any earlier migratory wave; approximately three-fourths of the men went to the U.S. in the 1942-1954 period (see appendix, table A-12, col. 4, p. 174). However, though many went, only about one-third of these were able to survive Operation Wetback and obtain committed status in the U.S. (see tendency 1, section IV). The committed ones were made up, by and large, by those who had either job experience or network contacts in U.S. cities, retained from the earlier migratory wave of the 1920s. The successful migrants of the 1950s and 1960s were largely those with close kin ties to the pioneers of the 1920s. The middle

¹Property was quite inexpensive, about 30 pesos per hectare for prime land. Corn prices have gone up one hundred times since 1930, so that this approximates 3,000 pesos a hectare in today's prices (See table VI-4 for comparisons.)

sectors of the 'hacendado' period provided most of the migrants of the 1920s and used the proceeds to buy land in the village. Their descendants, the small proprietor class of the 1940s, provided most of the men who founded the permanent settler cores in California cities in the 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the founders of the urban settlements and many other Animeños who had joined them there began to buy houses, businesses, and land in the village. By the mid 1970s a new expanded upper class had emerged in the binational community--the committed migrant-landowner class.

Four decades of migration to the U.S. have altered the distribution between poor and good jobs in the village. There has been a marked decline in the number of poor jobs --a trend that is particularly noticeable after the establishment of permanent settler cores in 1965 (see table VI-1, row 1). The number of 'upper' class jobs increased as the 'hacienda' was split up and the proportion of landowners increased. Also, as migration sped up, the amount of cultivated land² and, as a consequence, the demand for unskilled sharecroppers and day labor declined. An additional drop in the demand for unskilled labor occurred because the wood-cutting trade suffered a near total collapse in recent decades.³ On the other hand, the earnings spent by U.S.

²See section IV, "Historical Context" subsection.

³Ibid.

TABLE V-1

PERCENTAGE OF 'UPPER' CLASS AND 'LOWER' CLASS JOBS HELD IN THE VILLAGE OVER TIME

	Time Period							
	1918 to 1944	1945 to 1949	1950 to 1954	1955 to 1959	1960 to 1964	1965 to 1969	1970 to 1974	1975 to 1979
Number of jobs*	190	167	217	237	211	221	238	247
1) 'Lower' class jobs	91.1%	80.8%	82.9%	80.2%	76.3%	62.0%	55.9%	47.0%
2) 'Upper' class jobs	8.9%	19.2%	17.1%	19.8%	23.7%	38.0%	44.1%	53.0%
3) Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample B-125.

NOTE: Lower class = sharecrop, unskilled labor, wood-cutting; upper class = landowner, business, and skilled labor.

* Number of jobs begun or ended during each time period.

migrants on housing and consumption in the village increased the demand for skilled construction labor and small businesses like restaurants. The effect of these trends has been to reduce the percentage of 'lower' class jobs from 90 percent during the 'hacienda' period to less than half today (see table V-1).

The creation of a new expanded upper class based on committed migration to the U.S. has created in its wake a new lower class. The demand for unskilled labor has not disappeared in the village; sharecroppers, unskilled construction workers, fencemakers, cowherders, and harvest laborers have been eagerly sought by the new upper class. Fortunately, for the new owning group, many men have not established more than a seasonal relationship with the U.S. job market and must still sell their labor in the village--these men make up the new lower class--the temporary-migrant-sharecropper class.

At a given moment, the two new social classes are about equal in numbers in the U.S., while in the village the lower group predominates. The upper class is easily recognized. They own property in the village, have decent jobs in the U.S., spend large sums of money on village festivals, and have children who dress well and speak English. The lower class has the opposite traits. They own little land in the village, have poor, temporary jobs in the U.S., must work to survive in the village, and have children who speak little English. Both groups rely on the U.S. job market.

For the upper group, migration has meant social mobility; for the lower group, only survival.

Observation of the village-migrant community on either side of the border reveals the class differentiation that has taken place. For most in the 'upper' class, the crucial factor is semi-skilled work status in California. Among all U.S. migrants aged sixteen to fifty-four, 38.5 percent fill a semi-skilled niche in U.S. industry (see table IV-4, cols. 1 & 2). Better jobs mean wages nearly twice as high as those with poorer jobs (see table V-2 and appendix, table A-23, p. 182). Moreover, better jobs allow some of the semi-skilled to buy houses in the U.S. Although home owners usually provide free lodging, food, and job placement at the beginning of a 'lower' class friend's stay, they may also charge high rents once the temporary migrant is receiving a steady income.

TABLE V-2

AVERAGE U.S. EARNINGS (1977 OR 1978)

No.	Legal	No.	Undocumented
43	\$9,630	47	\$5,251

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

If we turn our attention to the village, we find that three generations of migration has made possible a

comfortable life for some in Las Animas but has left the majority quite poor. Using the poverty line budget of \$1,464 a year per family as a standard (see table III-1), it is apparent that most village families are living in poverty, while a few, though not rich, are quite comfortable (see table V-3).

TABLE V-3
 DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME (LOCAL PRODUCTION
 AND U.S. REMITTANCES)
 (1977 OR 1978)

Number of Families	% of Sample	Status	Income Range (U.S. Dollars)
21	35.6%	very poor	\$ 253 to \$ 899
11	18.6%	below minimum	900 to 1,463
15	25.4%	above minimum	1,464 to 2,499
12	20.3%	comfortable	2,500 to 5,966
Total: 59	99.9%

SOURCE: Sample D-59.

The distribution of the three major assets in Las Animas--tillable land, pasture land, and large animals--is also skewed. Only fifteen village families out of sixty-seven own or manage three hectares of tilled land (see table III-2). In pasture land, the distribution is worse; six of the sixty-seven families control 77.3 percent of this type of land, while forty-four families own or manage none (see appendix, table A-13, p. 174). Equally

concentrated is the control of large animals. Twelve out of the sixty-six families who revealed this information control 92.5 percent of all cattle and work animals (see appendix, table A-14, p. 175). As noted earlier, only twenty-four (or 35.8 percent) of the sixty-seven families control either six hectares of pasture land or three of tilled land--the minimum required to make a substantial contribution to family maintenance (see table III-2). The other two-thirds of village families, mostly members of the temporary-sharecropper class, must sell their labor locally or migrate seasonally to the U.S. to survive.

Remittances from the U.S. have created and reinforced the class differentiation that has occurred in the village community. Among shuttle migrants, we find that the legal ones have earned much more and remitted a much higher percentage than undocumented migrants (see table V-4).

TABLE V-4

PERCENTAGE REMITTANCES FOR VILLAGE-BASED
MIGRANTS (ALL YEARS)

Migrant Category	No.*	Average Income	% Remitted
Legals	10	\$6,141	54.0%
Undocumented	53	\$2,843	28.6%

SOURCE: Sample E-67

* Unreliable responses were omitted.

Parents who have children working in the U.S. receive differing amounts of cash remittances from their offspring. These cash flows tend to favor some families over others. Only 43.6 percent of those families with children in the U.S. received substantial cash remittances (see table V-5).

TABLE V-5
CHILD TO PARENTS SUSTENANCE REMITTANCES:
AVERAGE PER YEAR 1976 TO 1978
(In U.S. Dollars)

Total Receiving Parents	No Cash 0 to \$49	Small Cash \$50 to \$499	Substantial Cash \$500 or more
Number: 39	7	15	17
Percentage: 100%	17.9%	38.5%	43.6%

SOURCE: Sample D-59.

In addition, some of the families have children with long-term permanent status in the U.S. These committed migrants often buy land, houses, and sometimes equipment in the village to provide income for their parents and security and prestige for themselves. Out of thirty-nine village families with working children in the U.S., fourteen had received asset remittances whose average purchase price was \$4,850 (see table VI-3).⁴ These families are differentiated by virtue of these remittances in income and status from their neighbors.

⁴For detailed account of remittance patterns, see appendix B.

The predominance of the committed migrant in the binational community is evident in the land-holding patterns. Committed migrants, most of whom live year-round in California, already own 43.7 percent of the land-holdings in the village, despite the fact that they constitute only about a third of all those twenty-one years of age or older (see table V-6).

TABLE V-6

PERCENTAGE OF LANDHOLDERS BY KIND OF MIGRANCY
(21 Years or Older, Three Hectares or More)

Kind of Migrancy	Total Number	Number of Landholders	% of All Landholders
Committed	264	55	43.7%
Temporary	237	43	34.1%
Never Left	252	28	22.2%
Total:	753	126	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

The class distinctions mentioned above are internal to the binational migrant community. To the greater U.S. society, the two groups are judged to be lower class, unskilled or working class, semi-skilled workers. To the greater Mexican society, the two groups are either landless farm laborers or small peasants. Nevertheless, within the migrants' social world, the internal class distinctions are quite meaningful.

Tendencies of Migratory Networks to Differentiate
into Distinct Social Groups

TENDENCY 1:

In village migratory networks, a division occurs in the young adult period of the male migrant's life cycle into a 'fortunate' group and an 'unfortunate' group. Young men in the 'fortunate' group attain regularized status and begin a career in the U.S. that lasts throughout their working years. Those in the 'unfortunate' groups fail to obtain a firm foothold in the U.S. job market, work only seasonally in the U.S. for one or two decades and then return to the village.⁵

Because of the long tradition of U.S. migration, young Animeños know that regularized status and a steady job in the U.S. are the path to success in their binational community. Both the 'fortunate' and 'unfortunate' have similar success objectives at the start of their migratory cycle. All begin at low-wage, low-prestige work, be it urban or rural. However, some are able to move out of this low-status work while others are not. The lives of the two groups continue along similar lines in many ways, even after this differentiation by type of job. Both groups return frequently to the village as young men, if only for visits, looking for a wife and a house. Both groups keep track of land sales in the village in hopes of someday making a purchase. But the difference in type of U.S. job soon leads to concrete distinctions in life style. Men in the 'fortunate' group become overwhelmingly U.S.-based and bring their

⁵ See tendency 2, below, for an explanation of why some are able to succeed.

families to California. If their sons stay in the village, often their status is regularized as they become old enough to work. The 'unfortunate' migrants leave their nuclear family in the village. In middle age, this latter group must return to the village to teach their sons to plant,⁶ because without guaranteed access to the U.S. job market, knowledge of the corn/beans cycle is still necessary for survival.⁷

The better job held by the U.S.-based group has led to a series of advantages relative to the village-based group. The crucial difference is the better pay obtained by the 'fortunate' group (see table V-7). In fact, in the past decade, the U.S.-based group has been almost keeping up with inflation, while the village-based migrants have suffered an enormous decline in their real wages (see table V-8).

TABLE V-7
AVERAGE EARNINGS IN THE U.S. (1977 OR 1978)
(In U.S. Dollars)

	No.	Average Earnings
Village-based*	43	\$4,837
U.S.-based*	47	\$9,636

SOURCE: Sample C-143

*Defined by location of nuclear family or parents if unmarried and under 21.

⁶Seventeen older undocumented shuttles in sample C-143 had returned to the village. The average age of return was 43.8 years.

TABLE V-8
 AVERAGE WAGES OVER TIME
 (Constant 1967 U.S. Dollars)

Year	Village-based		U.S.-based	
	No.	Average Wage	No.	Average Wage
1970	12	\$2.89	26	\$3.16
1971	15	2.59	28	3.28
1972	18	2.33	32	3.39
1973	21	2.26	34	3.45
1974	19	2.07	36	3.10
1975	15	1.79	37	3.06
1976	17	1.74	35	3.00
1977	23	2.01	35	2.99
1978	33	1.84	41	2.81

SOURCE: Sample C-143 and Economic Report of the President, 1979, p. 240.

The U.S. wage differential has given the 'fortunate' ones another advantage--greater access to village land. Despite long absences from the village, a higher percentage of U.S.-based individuals have been able to buy land and at a younger age than the village-based group (see table V-9).

By the time Animeño village-migrants move into middle age, they become resigned to one of two destinies: unskilled work in the U.S. and sharecropping in the village, or semi-skilled work in the U.S. and recreation in the village. The coexistence of these two destinies has created

⁷The fact that temporary migrants return at middle age to teach their sons to plant guarantees that in each generation the village's food supply will be maintained.

TABLE V-9

PERCENTAGE OF VILLAGE-MIGRANT LANDOWNERS AND
AVERAGE AGE AT TIME OF PURCHASE

	Village-based (N = 85)	U.S.-based (N = 48)
Percent who have bought land	24.7%	35.4%
Average age at time of purchase	37.2 yrs	33.7 yrs

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

two clear-cut social groups in the binational Animeño community.

TENDENCY 2:

Social mobility in village migratory networks depends principally on kinship ties (i.e., social class); education is not a determinant.

The indicators of success for Animeño village-migrants are committed status and decent work in the U.S. and property in the village. Below we demonstrate the relative advantage that certain kin networks have in providing success to their members. Education is the same for all groups; no one has gone beyond primary school.

This tendency is demonstrated for two categorizations of network connections: 1) the U.S.-based versus the border-based and village-based networks, and 2) the sharecropper-based versus the landowner-based networks (see chapter II for definitions).

If we compare the two village-based networks, the sharecroppers and their relatives with the landowners and their relatives, we find that to have a kin tie to a landowner is clearly an advantage.

Those who own land in the village have nearly twice as many relatives in U.S. cities.⁸ In the owner networks, a much larger percentage of the people go to the U.S. (see appendix, table A-15, row 3, p. 175) and twice as many obtain committed status⁹ (table V-10, col. 2). Among those that work in the U.S., the owner network members are less likely to be stuck in agricultural work than those in the sharecropper networks¹⁰ (see table V-10, col. 3). Finally, to be related to a landowner makes it more likely that one will be a landowner himself¹¹ (see table V-10, col. 4).

If we compare the U.S.-based networks with either the village- or border-based ones, it is apparent that kin ties to a U.S. migrant help a villager's chances for success. More than twice as many people in the U.S.-based networks are in U.S. cities at a given moment than people in the other two networks¹² (see table V-11, col. 1). The

⁸At a 5 percent significance level, a statistically significant difference was found.

⁹Idem.

¹⁰At a 10 percent significance level, a statistically significant difference was found.

¹¹At a 5 percent significance level, a statistically significant difference was found.

¹²Idem.

TABLE V-10
SHARECROPPER AND LANDOWNER NETWORKS COMPARED

Network	(1) % in U.S. Cities		(2) % with U.S. Committed Status		(3) % of U.S. Migrants Whose Usual U.S. Work is Agriculture		(4) % of Adults Who Own Land*		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	Small Plots	Large Plots	
1) Sharecropper	415	13.5%	415	14.0%	150	44.6%	223	12.1%	3.1%
2) Landowner	349	26.6%	348	28.7%	154	35.1%	206	13.1%	13.1%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

* Small plots are 3 to 11.9 hectares; large plots are 12 hectares or more.

TABLE V-11
U.S.-, VILLAGE-, BORDER-BASED NETWORKS COMPARED

Network	No.	(1)	No.	(2)	No.	(3)	No.	(4)	
		% in U.S. Cities		% with U.S. Committed Status		% of U.S. Migrants whose Usual U.S. Work is Agriculture		% of Adults who Own Land* Small Plots	Large Plots
1) U.S.-based	526	44.7%	520	46.3%	284	22.5%	365	11.5%	10.1%
2) Village-based	775	24.5%	774	25.8%	377	37.7%	556	11.9%	5.7%
3) Border-based	125	19.2%	124	24.2%	57	47.4%	89	10.7%	6.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454

* Large plots are greater than 12 hectares.

U.S.-based networks also have twice as many with committed U.S. status as the other groups¹³ (see table V-11, col. 2). Far fewer in the group related to U.S.-based interviewees do predominantly agricultural work while in the U.S.¹⁴ (see table V-11, col. 3). Lastly, despite the fact that members of U.S.-based networks spend less time in the village, they actually own more large plots than the village- or border-based networks¹⁵ (see table V-11, col. 4).

TENDENCY 3:

As a village-migrant community matures, land becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of successful U.S. migrants.

This tendency can be demonstrated by intergenerational comparisons. If we observe the acquisition of land between temporary and committed migrants, we notice that a markedly higher percentage of land holding among the committed group only becomes apparent in the oldest age class (see table V-12, col. 3). Early in a migratory community's evolution, when the differentiation between temporaries and committed migrants first appears, distinct land-buying patterns between the groups is not obvious. However, over time, the committed ones can save more money from their better-paying U.S. jobs and outbid the temporary migrants

¹³ Idem. ¹⁴ Idem.

¹⁵ At a 10 percent significance level, a statistically significant difference was found.

TABLE V-12
PERCENT VILLAGE LAND HOLDING BY KIND OF MIGRANCY
BY AGE CLASS

Kind of Migrancy	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	No.	16 to 39	No.	40 to 54	No.	55 or More
1) Temporary	101	8.0%	60	30.0%	57	29.8%
2) Committed	127	11.8%	51	35.3%	27	51.8%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

who earn less in the U.S., in the village land market.

A comparison of land-holding patterns across generations in the U.S.-, village-, and border-based kin networks demonstrates the same phenomenon--as members of the U.S.-based group get older, they take increasing advantage of their well-placed kin connections to buy land in the village (see table V-13). Over half of the older members of the U.S. networks own land in the village; less than a third do in the other two networks.¹⁶

TABLE V-13
PERCENT OF VILLAGE LAND HOLDING BY KIN NETWORK BY AGE CLASS

Network	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	No.	16 to 39	No.	40 to 54	No.	55 or More
U.S.	223	9.0%	94	36.2%	48	52.1%
Village	288	8.7%	143	27.3%	125	31.2%
Border	47	8.5%	27	25.9%	10	30.0%

¹⁶The comparison in table V-13 is more reliable than in table V-12 because it measures purchases for one's relatives as well as for oneself.

VI

THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON THE VILLAGE ECONOMY

Historical Context

The last forty years have witnessed a marked decline in area planted in corn in Las Animas. The less desirable plots near town, and even fertile plots inconveniently far from the village, have been abandoned. Among seventeen owners of land where corn has been planted in recent years, six (or 35.3 percent) complained that one or more of their good 'yuntas' lay fallow due to the scarcity of labor.¹ Looking at federal census data for the whole 'municipio'² of Nochistlán, we notice that in 1960, a year of low migration due to the aftereffects of Operation Wetback, more hectares were planted than in 1950, a relatively high migration year. By 1970, after a decade of high migration, cultivated hectares declined again (see table VI-1).³

Another phenomenon has been taking place concurrently--corn farmers are altering their production techniques

¹Source: Sample E-67.

²Equivalent to a U.S. county. Nochistlán has about 50,000 people.

³This decline occurred despite increased yields after 1955 with the introduction of chemical fertilizer.

TABLE VI-1

HECTARES OF CULTIVATED LAND
(Nochistlán, Zacatecas)

Year	Hectares
1950	18,629
1960	19,191
1970	16,035

SOURCE: *Censos Agrícola, Ganadera y Ejidal*, 1950, 1960, and 1970.

toward the use of less adult male labor. This process has not been one of substituting machines for labor, but rather one of tolerating lower production due to labor shortage. In 1978, many farmers were eliminating the labor-intensive tassle, corn-stalk, and natural pasture harvests. This resulted in a loss of efficiency in the use of this material for cattle fodder, since the animals must be brought to the fields to make use of it. One farmer even devised a method of eliminating men from the corn harvest. He hired boys and old men to cut and stack the corn stalks while green in October. Then in December he employed the same labor force to cut the dried ears off the stalks and gather them in sacks in the fields. This procedure eliminates the arduous task of harvesting the ears by tossing them into a heavy basket which male harvestors carry on their backs. As the price of harvest labor in January 1979 rose above 125

pesos (\$5.38 U.S.) a day plus food and drink, some farmers began threatening to use boxes pulled by donkeys in the rows--another procedure which can be done by young boys.

Migration has caused a severe shortage of willing labor in Las Animas. At the time of the survey in 1978 and 1979, only 33.7 percent of all men aged sixteen to fifty-four were in the village (see appendix, table A-4a, p. 166). Unfortunately, the absence of prime-age males was only part of the problem. Even those present in the village at peak harvest season chose not to work. Those with decent jobs in the U.S. saw no reason to work at less than a dollar an hour when they were earning several times as much in the U.S. Among temporary migrants of the prime age groups, only about one-half have worked two months per year in the village in four out of the last five years (see appendix, table A-16, row 2, p. 176). Many owner-producers and sharecroppers complain bitterly about this unwillingness to work; they accuse the U.S. migrants of laziness and lack of loyalty to the village.

It has become increasingly expensive to produce corn in recent years. Labor costs for both sharecroppers and owner-producers were nearly 40 percent of total costs in 1977 and 1978. Moreover, corn producers' other inputs such as fertilizer have also been rising faster than output prices (see appendix, table A-17, p. 177).

One might expect that a labor scarcity coupled with relative wealth among the U.S. employed land-owning class would lead to labor-saving and productivity-enhancing investments. Unfortunately, this has not occurred in Las Animas. The old productivity system is in place; men, using animals, do all the planting, weeding, and harvesting. The only exceptions are the initial breaking up of fallow soil, now done principally by tractor, and the milling of fodder, now occasionally done by tractor in the fields. Considering the volume of dollars remitted to the village in recent years,⁴ it is surprising that so few improvements have occurred in the productive capacity of the village. Two areas that local people agree need investment--irrigation and rural industry--have received very little attention. In fact, in recent years, the absentee landlord class made up of long-term permanent migrants have invested more money in land and vacation houses than the whole community has in productive investments (compare table VI-2 and table VI-3 below).

This preference among high-wage U.S. resident migrants for land and houses has caused an extraordinary inflation as the rate of purchasing land and constructing housing accelerated in the last decade and a half (see appendix, table A-19 and table VI-4 below). This inflation has excluded all but those with a high-wage U.S. job from

⁴Approximately \$300,000 (U.S.) a year (see appendix B).

TABLE VI-2

PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENTS DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS

Expenditures	Value
Pumps, levees, & other irrigation	\$ 9,363
Two tractors	20,000
Five pick-up trucks	15,000
Animal shelters, fences, etc.	6,859
Total:	\$51,222

SOURCE: Sample D-59.

TABLE VI-3

NON-PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT BY LONG-TERM PERMANENT CHILDREN
OF FOURTEEN FAMILIES IN THE LAST TEN YEARS

House	\$10,307
Land	57,596
	\$67,903

SOURCE: Sample D-59.

TABLE VI-4

AVERAGE PURCHASE PRICE FOR ASSETS BY TIME PERIOD
(In Pesos)

Time Period	Land		Houses	
	No. of Purchases	Avg. Price /Hectare	No. of Purchases	Avg. Price /House
1940s	2	\$ 700	8	\$ 665
1950s	5	1,100	8	2,657
1960s	8	979	12	4,391
1970-1976	14	3,474	6	6,667
1977-1978	3	17,696	5	38,000

SOURCE: Sample D-59.

the village land market.

In recent decades, Las Animas has undergone fundamental change. Most people now have steady income due to relatives in the U.S. and a large minority have conveniences like wells, stoves, and televisions. However, these improvements have not touched the basic production system of the village--the corn/beans and cattle cycle continues in its age-old pattern.

Tendencies of the Local Economy as It Reacts to
Growing U.S. Migration

TENDENCY 1:

Committed U.S. migration leads to more neglect of the village than does temporary migration.

If we compare permanent migrants with shuttle migrants, both legal and undocumented, we find that permanents are much less interested in working in the village (see table VI-5). Even if we limit our comparison to landholders, who presumably would be more likely to take time off to work on their land, we observe that very few committed migrant landowners take interest in working in the village, while most temporary migrant landowners do work their land (see table VI-6).

The influence of holding a good U.S. job on the amount one works in the village can be seen most clearly by comparing the legal with the undocumented shuttle (see table VI-7). Despite the fact that legal shuttles hold

TABLE VI-5

NUMBER OF YEARS WORKED IN LAS ANIMAS TWO MONTHS OR MORE PER YEAR OUT OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS BY KIND OF MIGRANCY

Kind of Migrancy	No.	(1)	(2)	(4)	Total
		No Years	1-3 Years	4-5 Years	
1) One or two timers	72	2.8%	16.7%	80.6%	100.1%
2) Shuttles	146	17.1%	32.9%	50.0%	100.0%
3) Permanents	189	82.5%	12.7%	4.8%	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE VI-6

NUMBER OF YEARS WORKED BY LANDOWNERS IN LAS ANIMAS 2 MONTHS OR MORE PER YEAR OUT OF THE LAST 5 YEARS BY KIND OF MIGRANCY

Kind of Migrancy	No.	(1)	(2)	(3)	Total
		No Years	1-3 Years	4-5 Years	
1) Committed	46	67.4%	15.2%	17.4%	100.0%
2) Temporary	41	4.9%	26.8%	68.3%	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE VI-7

NUMBER OF YEARS WORKED IN LAS ANIMAS TWO MONTHS OR MORE PER YEAR OUT OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS BY LEGAL AND UNDOCUMENTED SHUTTLES, BY KIND OF MIGRANCY

Kind of Migrancy	No.	(1)	(2)	(3)	Total
		No Years	1-3 Years	4-5 Years	
1) Undocumented shuttles	125	13.6%	33.6%	52.8%	100.0%
2) Legal shuttles	21	38.1%	28.6%	33.3%	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

three times as much land and twice as many businesses per capita as the undocumented (see appendix, table A-19, rows 2 & 4), they work significantly less in the village.

The temporary and shuttle migrants work more in the village because they earn less in the U.S. The low remuneration gained, even from working one's own land, relative to U.S. standards restrains most men from working in the village. Only those unable to earn enough in the U.S. are compelled by poverty to work in their native land.

TENDENCY 2:

Both types of U.S. migration (temporary and committed) lead to neglect of the village.

Both social classes increasingly tend to shun work in the village. A member of the committed-migrant-land-owner class earns only 66.7 pesos (\$2.86 U.S.) a day for labor on his own plot (see appendix, table A-2, p. 165). Even if this migrant installed irrigation, his local earnings would be inferior to his wage as a semi-skilled permanent worker in California. A member of the temporary-migrant-sharecropper class earns even less, only 44.7 pesos (\$2.05 U.S.) a day for work as a sharecropper (see appendix, table A-2, p. 165). He can earn more as an unskilled, seasonal worker in the U.S. An improved plot may appeal to him, but he cannot afford to buy any land (see table VI-4) let alone improve it. We are, therefore, faced with a paradox. There is a shortage of labor for those who have

land and a shortage of land for those who have willing labor. Those with the land and income to improve it do not hold land for income.⁵ Those interested in improving the land for income, in general do not own it nor have the semi-skilled California job needed to finance improvements. Both groups, having better California-side than village-side options, avoid work in their home town.

Neglect of the village is further aggravated by the following process. The sharecroppers and small owner-producers are forced to pay high labor costs due to the migration-induced labor shortage. Each year, a few lose money and enter the migrant stream. This heightens the labor shortage and raises labor costs, which leads to less earnings for corn farmers and even more migration. This process tends to diminish village output.

TENDENCY 3:

In a mature migratory network, long-term permanent migrants buy village land not for profit but for prestige, security, and food for their parents.

U.S. migrants rarely expatriate earnings from Mexican land to the U.S. Only one out of nineteen land-owners in the U.S. did this (see table VI-8). In fifteen out of the nineteen cases, the migrant's relatives used the return from the land. U.S. resident migrants look at asset investments primarily as a substitute for cash remittances

⁵See tendency 3, below.

TABLE VI-8
DESTINATION OF EARNINGS FROM VILLAGE LAND HOLDINGS
AMONG NINETEEN U.S. RESIDENT LANDHOLDERS

Destination	Number
Support relatives in village	12
Reinvested in village by relatives	3
Spent while owner in village	1
Left fallow	2
Rents go to U.S.	<u>1</u>
Total:	19

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

to their parents. Their land managed by their parents provides a steady supply of food and pasture. In this way, a once-only asset remittance absolves the migrant son of having to remit cash on a regular basis. Also, land in the village means security in case of a depression in the U.S. and a renewal of anti-Mexican hostility.

The investments in land in recent years in Las Animas are clearly not for profit. A full eight-hectare 'yunta' costs a minimum of 150,000 pesos in 1978 in Las Animas. Earnings from the corn/beans harvest for a landowner averaged about 6,000 pesos, or a 4 percent return (see appendix, table A-2). Also, rented land, a rare practice in Las Animas, generated about 5 percent of its value in rent. In 1978, Mexican banks were paying 16 percent interest on long-term deposits.

It is not surprising that there are few productive investments in Las Animas. Many of its landowners comprise a non-profit-seeking, absentee landlord class whose elderly fathers who manage the land have neither the money nor the interest to make long-term capital improvements.

TENDENCY 4:

A mature village-migrant community produces two contradictory tendencies with respect to land holding by its native sons living in the U.S.

a) There is a tendency for land to fall increasingly into an absentee landlord class made up of long-term permanents. (Also see tendency 3, chapter V.)

This tendency occurs because land has become increasingly expensive and only those with tenured, semi-skilled jobs normally have the means to compete in the inflated village land market (see table VI-4). Also, the proportion of permanent U.S. migrants among all Animeños is rising (see table VI-9) and one would expect more land to fall into their hands as the permanents reached the age when traditionally village migrants buy land (see appendix, chart A-1, row 7, p. 107).

TABLE VI-9

PERCENTAGE OF PERMANENTS AMONG ANIMEÑOS BY AGE CLASS

No.	(1) 16 to 39	No.	(2) 40 to 54	No.	(3) 55 or More
599	34.7%	263	29.3%	216	12.3%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

b) *There is a counter-tendency for the most recent generation of migrants in U.S. cities to become Chicanoized and lose interest in returning to the village.*

Only two out of fifty-two beginner permanents have bought land in the village (see appendix, table A-19, p. p. 178).

VII

THE ROLE OF ANIMEÑOS IN CALIFORNIA

Historical Context

The Labor Market

The life style of Animeños in rural California has undergone a transformation during the last fifteen years. Before 1965, farm-worker migrants who came predominantly without papers or as Braceros, lived overwhelmingly in male-only shacks on their bosses' land. In the 1960-1964 period, still 96.8 percent of farm jobs were done while living with one's boss. In the most recent period, 1975-1979, only 16.3 percent lived with their boss in rural areas (see appendix, table A-20, col. 3, p. 179). Animeño farm workers have shifted their residences to small agricultural towns where some live with friends or relatives, but most rent. Renters, who were practically nonexistent in rural areas before 1965 now represent 60 percent of the whole population, approximately the same as in cities (see appendix, table A-20, col. 1, p. 179). Another indication of transformed living patterns of Animeños while in the rural U.S. is the decline of the use of labor contractors.¹

¹About 90 percent of labor contractor use has been in rural areas (see table VII-2).

Between the 1960-1964 period and the 1969-1975 period, labor contractor use declined among Animeños from over half of all undocumented jobs to 13.1 percent (see appendix, table A-21, p. 180).

The home base has also changed for a sizeable share of Animeño farm laborers. A growing proportion of men who do U.S. farm jobs alternate their work time with non-farm jobs (see table VII-1). Animeño men with urban jobs migrate seasonally to rural areas. Their main destination is the July to September melon harvest of Mendota in the Central Valley. The permanent settlements in California cities have replaced the village as a starting point for these seasonal melon pickers. This type of intra-state migration to peak season piece-work agriculture attracts urban Animeños because it is well paid (\$4-\$6 an hour). Migration from the village for the whole agricultural season of April to October tends to be less lucrative for the village migrants. Periods of frequent unemployment occur from April to July when reliance on labor contractors is common. Even at peak season, many village-based migrants work at low hourly rates (\$3.15 an hour in Reedley, California in 1979) rather than at the better-paying piece-rate wages.

As the workers have become separated in living quarters from the boss and become less reliant on labor contractors for job placement, rural labor market conditions have become more similar to conditions at low-wage jobs

TABLE VII-1
 PERCENTAGE OF MEN WHO WORKED BOTH AGRICULTURAL
 AND NONAGRICULTURAL JOBS

	Year					
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Number of Men in agriculture	23	27	21	23	22	20
% who worked both	17.4%	11.1%	23.8%	4.3%	22.7%	30.0%

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

in the city. This trend is particularly true for the urban-based, legal farm worker.²

Newcomers looking for their first job or migrants returning after long stays in the village are nearly totally reliant on personal contacts to find jobs. Traditionally, these contacts resulted in an exploitative relationship with a labor contractor or boss.³ However, as permanent settler cores have formed, personal contacts increasingly became protective instead of exploitative, as the source of job advise has shifted from labor contractors to relatives and personal friends. These more trustworthy contacts multiply the options available to the novice.

City dwellers over the whole period have been able to provide nearly twice as much 'protective' advise as has

²Wages for the average legal farm worker in 1978 were \$4.24 per hour (see appendix, table A-23, p. 182).

³Many migrants complain of being underpaid, cheated, and denounced to the INS by bosses and contractors.

been available in town (see table VII-2, col. 1). However, as greater numbers of experienced workers with urban options work in agriculture, an increasing proportion of Animeño farm workers are obtaining decent conditions.

TABLE VII-2
SOURCE OF JOB TIPS BY PLACE (UNDOCUMENTED ONLY)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Number of Jobs	Relatives/ Friends	Look on Own	Labor Contractor	Total
1) City	120	80.8%	9.2%	10.0%	100.0%
2) Town	208	45.7%	12.9%	41.3%	99.9%

SOURCE: Sample B-125.

Legal workers when they shift jobs usually look on their own. Over half have found their work by themselves since the middle 1960s (see appendix, table A-21, col. 2, p. 180). Once established in a semi-skilled position on a work site, the more established migrants are often in a position to place newcomers at entry level job slots. Below we discuss four California industries and one informal economic activity where both old-timers and newcomers work.

The construction industry of Orange County has been one of the magnets attracting Animeño workers in recent years. Employment in this sector has been increasing rapidly. From 1972 to 1978 it rose 66.7 percent, while

total employment went up only 58.1 percent (Employment Development Department, Annual Planning Information, Employment Development Department, Orange Co., May 1979, p. 69). This expansion has been characterized by sharp ups and downs (Ibid., p. 14). It is also interesting to note that the construction industry is heavily unionized; 76.1 percent of its workers are in unions (Employment Development Department, Labor Market Review, October 1978, p. 15).

Animeños work exclusively in a subsector of this industry--construction clean-up. This activity is dominated by several contracting firms whose speciality is to come in after the carpenters and other skilled craftsmen have finished their work and clean up the debris. This work is done exclusively by Mexicans, most of whom have no papers. Undocumented Animeños work for several medium-sized firms and are all members of the local laborers' union.

The wages paid to construction clean-up crews in recent years has undergone some interesting fluctuations. The older Animeño workers claim that from 1969 to 1975, work in construction clean-up was plentiful and for the times relatively well paid. However, in recent years, due to a massive glut of Mexican workers, wages have fallen in this sector. Several legal Animeño workers have dropped out of the industry due to low wages and frequent unemployment. The only possible explanation for the fall of

construction clean-up wages as compared to general laborers' wages is the influx of undocumented Mexicans into clean-up work (see table VII-3). Moreover, official wages do not give an accurate picture of true wages. Although undocumented workers are paid official union scale, many bosses are only reporting 50 or 60 percent of the hours that the men are working. As a result, their real earnings are \$4.00 an hour and their real benefits are also figured on fewer hours. Another ruse being practiced in the industry is to report the hours as maintenance work, with its lower pay scale, instead of as construction labor. The undocumented men involved feel that the union is not adequately protecting their rights, but are careful not to complain for fear of losing their jobs.⁴

TABLE VII-3

OFFICIAL WAGES PAID TO CONSTRUCTION LABORERS (ORANGE COUNTY)

	Year			
	1970	1975	1977	1979
General labor	\$4.54	\$7.65	\$7.95	\$8.98
Clean-up labor	4.54	7.65	6.00	7.00

SOURCE: Laborers Union #652, AFL-CIO, Santa Ana.

The construction clean-up business in Orange County is a case where legal resident Animeños have seen their

⁴Animeño workers throughout California complain that labor unions do not protect the recent arrivals' rights.

wages depressed and their jobs displaced by the more recent arrivals.

Just north of Santa Ana, in downtown Los Angeles, Animeños have increasingly found work in the growing apparel industry. Employment in garment factories has been expanding rapidly in the 1970s. While employment in manufacturing went up by 13.3 percent between 1972 and 1978, employment in the apparel industry rose by 37 percent during those years (Wage and Salary Employment, by industry, 1972 to 1978, Employment Development Department, Sacramento, CA, 1979). Meanwhile, wages have stayed quite low. Wages in Women's and Misses' outerwear, where most Animeños work, were 53 percent of the average weekly wage of all manufacturing for Los Angeles County in 1978 (California Statistical Abstract, 1978, Sacramento, CA, pp. 27, 29).

Animeño undocumented men and wives of legal residents are working at or near minimum wage (\$2.90 in 1979) in dress shops. These small factories with less than forty employees work on a piece-rate basis with large manufacturers. The shops receive semi-finished skirts which the Mexicans pleat and stitch. Afterwards, the garments are returned to the manufacturer. Although labor discipline is tight and length of service brings only small raises, many Animeños have stayed for several years with the same employer. One legal worker, one of the first Animeños to work in the needle trades, in 1979 earned only

\$4.25 an hour for semi-skilled work after four years tenure on the job.

The California strawberry industry has always attracted many Animeño workers. This California industry also experienced a surge of growth in the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1978, California production rose by 93 percent. Meanwhile, strawberry growing in Mexico and elsewhere in the U.S. has declined (E. Feder, Strawberry Imperialism, the Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1977, p. 194). The shift to California is partially a result of an influx of low-cost Mexican labor in the 1970s.

Experienced Animeño migrants have taken on the role of middle-men for strawberry growers near Watsonville. Each Animeño manages several acres of land on a sharecrop basis for the owners. The farmer pays taxes, provides land, water, equipment, seedlings, and pays for the spraying of the plants. The sharecropper pays the field laborers' wages and buys the boxes and baskets. The earnings for the sale of the strawberries are shared equally between the farmer and sharecropper. The sharecroppers were paying extremely low wages in 1979, \$2.00 a hour for weeding and watering, and \$1.00 a box for harvesting. The labor force was principally inexperienced Indian-speaking people from immature migrant communities in Oaxaca. Despite this low-cost labor, one sharecropper complained he was making very little money.⁵

Another large user of Animeño labor is the fast-growing restaurant industry of San Mateo County. Employment in eating and drinking establishments grew 52.7 percent between 1972 and 1980, while total employment only went up 25.9 percent in San Mateo County in this time period (Annual Planning Information, Employment Development Department, San Mateo Co., May 1979, and Wage and Labor, by Industry, 1972-1978, Employment Development Department).

The large settlement of Animeños in South San Francisco regularly places newcomers in restaurant jobs. In 1979, entry level jobs were paying \$3.50 an hour. More experienced men working as cook's helpers and salad makers were earning \$4.50 an hour in 1979.

In recent years an informal economic activity has sprung up in the Animeño expatriate community--cactus leaf cleaning. This trade, which many California-resident Animeños learned in Tijuana during stays on the border, is a spreading enterprise. Three former construction workers, unwilling to tolerate worsening conditions for construction laborers, have set up small family factories in their houses. Another man has set up an illegal factory in a lean-to near Bell Gardens, California. He employes eighteen young Animeño men to cut off the thorns, chop up the leaves into cubes, and package them. The workers are paid

⁵In April 1979 the processors were paying \$3.00 a box. Our sharecroppers got half, or \$1.50. He paid \$1.00 for the harvest, which leaves \$.50 for the rest of his expenses and profit.

on a piece-rate basis and earn about \$20-\$25 a day. During Lent, a peak season for this product, the factory-owner processes and sells approximately twenty-two tons of cactus leaves a week. He nets over \$20,000 in the month and a half before Easter. He keeps no records nor pays any taxes.

The Costs and Benefits of Animeño Immigration to California

Looking at the entire period under study, the bi-national Animeño community has taken very little and given a great deal in its interaction with the U.S. Only relatively small percentages have received government benefits. Only 8.2 percent of the undocumented group have ever received unemployment insurance, despite the seasonality of their jobs (see table VII-4, col. 1). Traditionally, most migrants returned home if long periods of unemployment threatened. Even among legal workers, only 60 percent had collected unemployment insurance, and 7.5 percent disability (table VII-4, cols. 1 & 2). Lastly, only four out of ten men who had worked long years in the U.S. were collecting Social Security benefits.

The presence of Animeños has had several hidden advantages for California. In the village, young men are prepared for work in the U.S. by repeated stories of North American workplace routines. The need for punctuality is a recurrent theme of these conversations. Frequently, newcomers to the U.S. are placed in jobs and oriented to

TABLE VII-4
COST TO THE U.S. OF THE ANIMEÑO COMMUNITY

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	% Collected		% Collected		% Spent		% Collect	
	Unemployment Insurance (1 or more)		Disability (1 or more)		One Month or More in Jail		Social Security	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1) Legal	40	60.0%	40	7.5%	40	2.5%	40	10.0%
2) Undoc.	73	8.2%	73	0.0%	73	2.7%	73	0.0%

SOURCE: Sample F-122.

the tasks involved by friends and relatives (see table VII-2, col. 1). In this way, the immigrant community underwrites part of the costs of job placement and training. In addition, all legal and nearly three-quarters of the undocumented pay full payroll taxes. However, only a few of the undocumented file income tax returns (21.2 percent); as a consequence, they miss out on refunds entitled to them, since most have several dependents (see table VII-5, cols. 1 & 2). Finally, the Animeño household puts little pressure on housing space per economically active individual. About two people are living in each occupied room, and most children seventeen or over living at home are gainfully employed (see table VII-5, cols. 4 & 5).

TABLE VII-5
 BENEFITS OF THE ANIMENO COMMUNITY TO THE U.S.
 (Last Year Worked in U.S.)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) *	(5)	(6)
	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. People	Average Times Without Work More Than One Month in U.S.
Paid Medical Insurance on Job	31 74.1%	42 100.0%	42 100.0%	28 82.1%	52 1.6	42 3.3
All Taxes Deduced from Check	13 46.1%	67 73.1%	60 21.2%	0 0%	13 2.3	61 0.6
Filed Income Tax						
Percentage of Children at Home Over 16 Working						
Average People Per Room						

SOURCE: Sample F-122

NOTE: Numbers vary because some people did not answer all questions.
 * U.S. sample only.

Tendencies for the Role of Animeños in the U.S. to
Change as the Village-Migrant Community Matures

TENDENCY 1:

As the migrant community matures, costs to the receiving area increase and benefits decline.

At the early stages of penetration by a migratory network, the receiving area benefits because the costs of reproduction of the labor force, of maintenance of the worker's family, of retirement and of social costs due to the business cycle are all externalized. Almost all workers, at early stages, keep their families in the low-cost peasant area and return there when sick, unemployed, or too old to work. Moreover, since workers at the beginning of a migratory cycle are willing to work at low wages, the receiving area obtains an additional subsidy.

The Animeño network as it has matured has greatly lessened many of these benefits. Since the permanent settler cores became rooted in the early 1960s, the number of wives and children brought to the U.S. has multiplied rapidly. Fifteen years ago there were virtually no Animeño children in the U.S. But in the last fifteen years, 20 percent of all children in the binational community were born in the U.S. (see appendix, table A-12, col. 1, p. 174) and, at this moment, 25.9 percent of all children fifteen or younger are in the U.S.⁶ (see appendix, table A-4b,

⁶School attendance of those under sixteen is universal.

col. 1, p. 184). The fast increase in women migrants was already mentioned (see tendency 6, chapter IV, p. 96).

The increasing costs for the U.S. can be observed in trends discussed earlier. Shuttle migration has declined (see table IV-5), permanency in the U.S. has increased (see tendency 10, chapter IV), and the average length of stay has increased from about six months per year before 1962 to over nine months a year since then (see appendix, graph 2, p. 192). Longer stays in the U.S. and shifts to urban areas have made public services more available, especially to the legal population.

Pressure on the housing market by Animeños also has increased as the migratory networks matured. In the early period, boss-owned shacks housed most of the men; now most rent or stay with relatives (see appendix, table A-20, p. 179).

The rate of retirement in the village will probably show a steep decline in coming years. In the oldest age class, those over fifty-four, we can observe the rate of actual return to Mexico. In the total male population in the oldest age class, 13.4 percent stayed in the U.S. Looking further at those over fifty-four, we notice that though 16.5 percent of the total male population obtained permanent status, only 7.1 percent were semi-skilled workers. The percentage of those who stayed in the U.S., 13.4 percent, fell between the percentage of semi-skilled and the percentage

permanents (see appendix, table A-22, p. 179). Apparently, all the semi-skilled stayed plus some of the unskilled who had regularized their status. If we project that in the younger generations, the percentage that stay will again fall between the percentage of semi-skilled and the percentage of permanents, we can estimate rates of retirement in the U.S. for the younger groups. In the middle-age groups, slightly over 30 percent have semi-skilled status and 35 percent are permanents. In the youngest groups, the percentages are even higher; 35.1 percent are semi-skilled and 42.6 percent are permanents. Clearly, the rate of permanent return to Mexico will decline among Animeno men. Among women the percentage of the total population that will stay in the U.S. will also be higher. Almost all permanent female migrants come to the U.S. to stay with a settled man, and few return except to visit the village. The rate of permanency is almost identical with the rate of retiring in the U.S. among women. The percentage of permanents in the youngest group is now 26.2 percent (see appendix, table A-22, p. 181).

The rate of exploitation of Animeños also tends to decline over time as more migrants are integrated into a growing network of protective contacts. In recent years, for the first time undocumented Animeños have begun to be paid overtime (see table VII-6). After the entrenchment period of 1960 to 1964, real wages began to rise. From

TABLE VII-6

PERCENTAGE OF UNDOCUMENTED JOBS WHICH PAY OVERTIME, BY TIME PERIODS

1918 - 1944	1945 - 1949	1950 - 1955	1955 - 1959	1960 - 1964	1965 - 1969	1970 - 1974	1975 - 1979
No. 16 % 12.5%	No. 41 % 0%	No. 101 % 6.9%	No. 57 % 1.8%	No. 70 % 2.8%	No. 138 % 10.9%	No. 192 % 20.8%	No. 159 % 32.1%

SOURCE: Sample B-125.

1964 to 1970, real wages rose by 58 percent (see appendix, graph 7, p. 197).

TENDENCY 2:

In times of falling real wages, migratory communities, even mature ones, suffer severe reductions in real income.

The U.S. Animeño community has experienced a sharp decline in its real wages since 1973. From 1973 to 1978, real wages dropped by 21.9 percent for the whole Animeño work force (see appendix, graph 7, p. 197). This fall in real wages has not affected Animeños equally; the village-based and unskilled have borne the brunt of the loss of buying power (see table V-8 and tendency 1, chapter V).

TENDENCY 3:

As a migratory network matures, there is a tendency for all workers to shift from seasonal to year-round jobs.

In the 1970s, Animeños have shifted out of agricultural and construction work and into service and factory work (see table VII-7). Pure wage motivations do not explain these changing job patterns, since construction work is better paying than either factory or service work, and legal agriculture is better paying than service work (see appendix, table A-23, p. 182). Migrants report that the steadiness of the work is the crucial factor. Dishwashing or sewing machine work at \$3.50 an hour is preferred

TABLE VII-7
PERCENTAGE MONTHS WORKED BY INDUSTRY

	1971 (N=66)	1978 (N=83)
<u>Legal</u>		
Agriculture	13.7%	9.3%
Construction	20.5%	17.1%
Factory	20.8%	22.2%
Service	1.6%	3.1%
<u>Undocumented</u>		
Agriculture	23.4%	13.3%
Construction	13.4%	6.2%
Factory	3.9%	17.7%
Service	2.6%	11.2%
Total:	99.9%	100.1%

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

by experienced migrants to construction or farm work which is highly unpredictable though more highly paid.

VIII

CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study has traced the evolution of a binational village-migrant community during the post war period. The impacts of migration on the sending area, and changing experiences of the immigrant community in California have been laid out in detail. Certain features of the historical process that transpired in the Animeño community can be used to discuss the general nature of Mexican-United States migration. From this discussion policy implications can be derived.

Las Animas provides a concrete example of a community whose economy has been distorted by migration flows. The physical absence of most prime age males and the unwillingness to work in Mexico among many of those present in the village leads to a severe labor shortage. In addition, as many native Animeños have landed secure semi-skilled jobs in the United States, they found the money to buy land at home in absentia. Often these property holders have bought the land for security and prestige, not profit, and have made few improvements. To make matters worse, women in the village are not expected and do not engage in the plowing and harvesting of crops. With a scarcity of willing labor,

one would expect the remittances from successful migrants would be used for investment in labor-saving machinery or labor-generating industry. Unfortunately, economic opportunities for enterprising returning or visiting migrants are scarce and have been quickly glutted. For example, four tractors and several pick up trucks belong to villagers, but they are usually idle due to lack of demand for their services. Most non-sustenance remittances are, instead, channeled into conspicuous consumption and into bidding up the price of land and houses. The exodus northward has taken on such proportions that all, even the very poor, leave. The scarcity of economic opportunities and the lack of interest in village development among most successful U.S. migrants have resulted in a shift to labor-saving crops and animals and a general decline in village output.

The international migration has had one good effect -- movement to overcrowded Mexican cities has been reduced. Large remittances from the U.S. allow wives and children to survive in rural areas who would otherwise be forced to migrate to make a living. This is, however, a mixed blessing for the women, who have to carry on the difficult daily chores of raising large families without the presence of their husbands. Many must survive on small incomes (see Table V-3, p. 112).

International migratory networks with collective experience in the U.S. arouse interest in a higher standard of

living among their members. People increase their demands for health care, schools, roads, electricity, better housing, public wells and other improvements in their quality of life. These demands are often directed at the Mexican government. In Las Animas, for example, frustration with the inability of the government to help with community improvements is intense. However, Animeños have been able to make many improvements with the help of emigrant contributions. Also, talented individuals, who harbor anti-government hostilities, rarely stay in Las Animas, since their best chance for social mobility is to migrate to the U.S. International migration is a double edged sword -- it allows Mexicans to achieve higher living standards, but also makes them dependent on continual access to the U.S. for the maintenance of these standards.

In the United States, the Animeño job network does distribute jobs in accordance with a segmented labor market. Newcomers are placed in temporary, low-level jobs, while the more experienced are directed to better-paying work. One long-time California resident declared, "Why give an illegal a good job? If he gets thrown out by the 'migra', he'll just lose his union payment." The Animeño newcomers, by and large, do not directly displace domestic workers. Instead, they work in labor markets which have been down-graded by the predominance of undocumented workers. Two examples which have been described above are the construction clean-up

industry in Orange and Los Angeles Counties and the strawberry industry in Monterey County. Few legal workers care to be employed in these labor markets.

With the maturity of the Animeño migratory networks, the costs to California have risen and benefits have fallen due primarily to the larger proportion of permanent settlers in recent years. Still, the migratory community suffers disproportionately from the shocks of recession and inflation. For example, between 1973 and 1978, the U.S. salaried non-supervisory labor force experienced a 3.5 percent decline in real wages while the Animeño U.S. work force suffered a 21.9 percent real wage decline during those years. (See table V-8, p. 118, and AFL-CIO, The National Economy, 1979, p. 1).

Not all migrants to the U.S. derive long-term improvement in their status as a consequence of working in the U.S. In the Animeño networks the "prize" of a secure semi-skilled job in the U.S. is perceived as the best way of improving one's social status. However, one half or less of all migrants will ever achieve this position. Still, most of those who do not succeed, the temporary migrants, continue their seasonal migration to the U.S. in order to support their families and in hopes of some day obtaining a secure job in the U.S. The temporary migrants feel obliged to stop migrating to the U.S. when their oldest son reaches about twelve years of age. At

this time, the father's presence is needed to teach his son the cultivating skills necessary to survive in the village. In this way, a cadre of young men is trained each generation so that the village economy remains viable.

The binational Animeño community has achieved a peculiar equilibrium. The village is reproducing its population, despite large outflows; but its population is skewed toward the old, children and women. The U.S. Animeño population has stabilized in the last decade with respect to the proportion of shuttles and legals present in California. In addition, the average age of the Animeño population in the U.S. has stabilized as the return of the old and the inflow of the young balance each other. Also, the village landholding pattern of small plots has become stable despite the frequent ownership changes as one successful migrant sells his land to another. The Animeño population looks predominantly to the U.S. for its livelihood and chance for advancement. Although this orientation has resulted in production declines in the village, enough temporary migrants and non-migrants are working in Las Animas to produce a surplus of grain. The village has, in effect, become a rest, recreation and retirement center for the current successful migrants, and a reproduction center for future migrants. Although many individuals gain by this process, the village economy remains frozen in its traditional low-productivity system.

There are four possible policy options as seen from a

U.S. perspective: (1) maintain the status quo of widespread undocumented immigration, (2) institute a guest worker or temporary worker program, (3) increase the number of Mexicans allowed to legalize their status each year, or (4) slow or stop the flow of Mexican entering the United States. Knowledge of the patterns of movement, settlement and job insertion of Animeños in the U.S. contributes to an evaluation of these options.

The present system has many beneficiaries: Mexican migrants earn U.S. wages, the Mexican government is provided a safety valve for its unemployment problem, U.S. employers obtain low-cost labor, domestic workers whose jobs complement work done by undocumented immigrants maintain their employment, and U.S. consumers obtain less expensive goods and services. The current system also has its opponents. Reports of the "exploitation" of Mexican Nationals in the U.S. and of discussions by U.S. officials of denying Mexico access to the U.S. job market often appear in the Mexican press. These reports aggravate bilateral relations. On the U.S. side, environmental groups claim that population stabilization is threatened by undocumented migration; organized labor and the U.S. Department of Labor complain of the depression of U.S. wages and the displacement of U.S. workers; and many public policy-makers feel that the flagrant disobedience to U.S. laws inherent in large-scale undocumented immigration must be stopped.

One frequently proposed solution to the problem of undocumented migration is to substitute for it a guest-worker program. Certain problems with this proposal are apparent from the experience of the Animeño community. First, Animeños deserted their Bracero contracts in large numbers. Also, illegal immigration stimulated by Bracero migration soon surpassed it in numbers and length of stay. Finally, many Braceros from Las Animas were not content with temporary status in the U.S. and later became permanent residents. It is likely that a guest-worker program could not function well without strict enforcement to assure the return of the temporary workers. Civil libertarians object to such enforcement.

Increased permanent legalization of Mexicans who come to the U.S. seems more consistent with the Animeño migration and settlement patterns. Since legal entrants are normally relatives of those already in the U.S., this policy would have the positive feature of discouraging new kin networks of migrants from forming. However, it is unlikely that the U.S. could raise the legal quota for Mexicans sufficiently even to accommodate the relatives of those already living in the U.S. Again, only strict enforcement of the immigration laws would allow a program of increased legalization to serve the purpose of limiting undocumented migration.¹

¹Any program of increased permanent legalization for Mexicans should include a provision that the new permanent resident aliens cannot hold land in Mexico. This should alleviate the neglect caused by absentee landlordism.

The final policy option -- stopping or phasing out Mexican migration -- would be tenable only if fundamental restructuring of the U.S. and the Mexican economies occurred. Since many current U.S. jobs are unacceptable to domestic workers, a program to produce the goods and services rendered by foreign labor would have to be devised. This could include the upgrading of U.S. jobs through mechanization and better working conditions, the increase of imports, the creation of substitutes for the products of migrant-dependent industries, and a decline in consumption of migrant-produced goods and services. On the Mexican side, rural development and employment-oriented industrialization would be necessary to lessen the pressure to seek work north of the border. All the beneficiaries of the status quo mentioned above would suffer short to medium-term losses from such a restructuring effort. In fact, considering the current aversion to large-scale governmental interference in the economy, it is unlikely that the significant reforms necessary to decrease the pressure for cross-border migration will occur in either country. In the short term, it is easier to permit the present system to persist, even though it means inadequate job opportunities for some members of the U.S. work force and stagnation for sending areas like Las Animas.

APPENDIX A
CITED TABLES, CHARTS, AND GRAPHS

APPENDIX A
CITED TABLES, GRAPHS, AND CHARTS

TABLE A-1
CONTROL OF TYPES OF LAND
(Hectares)

	No.*	Rain-fed Use	No.*	Irrigated	No.*	Grazing Use	No.*	Total**
Landowners	21	65.0	2	1.0	14	543.0	14	609.0
Land Managers	9	51.5	3	3.5	9	324.5	9	379.5
Total:	29	116.5	5	4.5	22	867.5	36	988.5
% of Total:		11.8%		0.5%		87.8%		100.1%

SOURCE: Sample E-67.

* In each of these categories one man is both owner and manager.

** The total number does not equal the sum of numbers because some men own and manage more than one type of land.

TABLE A-2

AVERAGE VALUE OF CORN/BEAN/FODDER PRODUCTION PER YUNTA BY OWNERSHIP STATUS
(Pesos for 1977 or 1978)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Ownership Status	No.	Average Cost	Average Profit	Labor Cost as Percent of Total Cost	Average Days Worked	Average Pesos Per Day Earned	Profit as Percentage of Gross Earnings
1) Sharecroppers	22	6,556	6,041	39.2%	127	47.7p	48.0%
2) Owner-producers	18	5,224	8,335	38.0%	125	66.7p	61.5%
3) Bosses	5	5,433	5,843	51.8%

SOURCE: Fifty-nine village interviews (sample D-59).

TABLE A-3
OWNERS OF SMALL BUSINESSES BY KIND OF MIGRANCY

Kind of Migrancy	No.	%
U.S. Shuttles (legal & undocumented)	15	62.5%
1 or 2 times & never came to U.S.	8	33.3%
Permanent U.S.	<u>1</u>	<u>4.2%</u>
TOTAL:	24	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-4a
PERCENTAGE OF MEN AND WOMEN IN DIFFERENT
BRANCHES OF THE VILLAGE-MIGRANT COMMUNITY

Branch	Total Sample (All Ages)		
	No.	(1) Men	(2) Women
1) Village	727	46.9%	53.1%
2) Guadalajara	35	54.3%	45.7%
3) Tijuana	90	52.2%	47.8%
4) U.S. city	410	62.0%	38.0%
5) U.S. town	66	72.7%	27.3%
6) Other Mexico	<u>55</u>	<u>40.0%</u>	<u>60.0%</u>
Total:	1,383*	52.9%	47.9%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

* Seventy-one individuals' location was unknown at the time of the interview.

TABLE A-4b

PERCENTAGE OF MEN AND WOMEN IN DIFFERENT AGE CLASSES, BY PLACE

	(1) 1 to 15		(2) 16 to 39		(3) 40 to 54		(4) 55 or More					
	No. M	W	No. M	W	No. M	W	No. M	W*				
1) Village	205	51.2%	267	39.3%	105	44.8%	150	56.0%	44.0%			
2) Guadalajara	0	0	8	37.5	14	57.1	13	61.5	38.5			
3) Tijuana	19	56.6	47.4	34	50.0	50.0	22	54.5	45.5	15	53.3	46.7
4) U.S. city	73	49.3	50.7	229	64.2	35.8	83	68.7	31.3	25	56.0	44.0
5) U.S. town	5	100.0	0	43	69.8	30.2	15	66.7	33.3	3	100.0	0
6) Other Mexico	0	0	0	18	16.7	83.3	24	37.5	62.5	13	76.9	23.1

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

*The percentage of women in the village among people over fifty-four is affected by a shorter life span for women than for men in the village.

TABLE A-5
ESTIMATE OF TOTAL POPULATION
(January 1979)

	(1) Sample Size	(2) Estimated Total
1) Village	727	1,333
2) Guadalajara	35	64
3) Tijuana	90	165
4) U.S. city	465	752
5) U.S. town	66	121
6) Other Mexico	<u>55</u>	<u>104</u>
Total:	1,383	2,536

NOTE: Column (1) shows results of the survey of 122 male heads of households and their relatives. Column (2), row 1) shows result of village census. The ratio of row 1), column (2) to row 1), column (1) is: $\frac{1333}{727} = 1.83$. Rows 2) through 6) in column (2) are expansions of column (1) using a multiplier of 1.83.

This table underestimates those in Guadalajara and Other Mexico since no interviews were done there.

TABLE A-6
 AVERAGE U.S. EARNINGS FOR 1977 OR 1978
 (U.S. Dollars)

Age Class	Sample* Base	No.	(1)	No.	(2)
			Legal		Undoc.
1) 16 to 39	Village	6	\$ 7,063	24	\$4,418
	U.S.	14	9,637	10	7,866
2) 40 to 54	Village	1	3,840	8	5,191
	U.S.	14	11,254	3	4,520
3) 55 or more	Village	2	3,594	2	3,507
	U.S.	6	11,367	0
4) Total	Village	9	5,934	34	4,546
	U.S.	34	10,608	13	7,094

SOURCE: 143 interviews, U.S. and Mexico (Sample C-143).

* Sample base is defined by the location of the respondents nuclear family. If under twenty-one and unmarried, locations of parents is the deciding factor.

TABLE A-7
 PERCENTAGE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION BY SEX,
 BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE U.S. (AGE 16 TO 54)

Place	No.	Male	No.	Female
U.S.	253	56.5%	126	30.4%
Mexico	195	43.5%	288	69.6%
Total:	448	100.0%	414	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-8a

BORDER NETWORK/PLACE BY AGE CLASS

	1-15		16-39		40-54		55 & More		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1) Village	1	3.8	12	17.9	14	37.8	11	52.4	38	25.2
2) Tijuana	25	96.2	28	41.8	12	32.4	1	4.8	71	17.0
3) Other Mexico	0	...	1	1.5	4	10.8	6	28.6	6	4.0
4) U.S.	0	...	26	38.8	7	18.9	3	14.3	36	23.8
Total:	26	100.0	67	100.0	37	99.9	21	100.1	151	100.0

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-8b

VILLAGE NETWORK/PLACE BY AGE CLASS

	1		2		3		4		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1) Village	211	99.1	228	55.1	91	47.6	133	78.2	663	67.1
2) Tijuana	0	0	9	2.2	11	5.8	9	5.3	29	2.9
3) Other Mexico	0	0	16	3.9	23	12.1	17	10.0	56	5.6
4) U.S. town	0	0	32	7.7	13	6.8	3	1.8	48	4.9
5) U.S. city	2	.9	129	31.2	53	27.7	8	9.7	192	19.4
Total:	213	100.0	404	101.1	191	100.0	170	100.0	988	100.1

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-8c

U.S. NETWORK/PLACE BY AGE CLASS

	1-15		16-39		40-54		55 & More		Total No.	%
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
1) Village	58	37.4	114	36.2	45	33.8	51	65.4	268	39.4
2) Tijuana	0	4	1.3	5	3.8	0	9	1.3
3) Other Mexico	0	16	5.1	17	12.8	10	12.8	43	6.3
4) U.S. town	9	5.8	25	7.6	5	3.8	0	38	5.6
5) U.S. city	88	56.8	157	49.8	61	45.9	17	21.8	323	47.4
Total:	155	100.0	315	100.0	133	100.0	78	100.0	681	100.0

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-9
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IN THE VILLAGE FOR
THREE KIN NETWORKS*
(21 Years or Older)

Property	U.S. (N=365)	Village (N=556)	Border (N=84)
Nothing	55.3	54.0	73.8
Just house	20.0	23.9	9.5
Small holder	11.5	11.9	10.7
Medium holder**	10.1	6.7	6.0
Small business	3.0	3.6	0
Total:	99.9	100.1	100.0

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

* See section II for definition of networks.

** Over 12 hectares is defined as medium holder.

TABLE A-10

PERCENTAGE OF VILLAGE JOBS WHICH WERE PART- OR FULL-TIME IN WOOD

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Time Period							
	18 to 44	45 to 49	50 to 54	55 to 59	60 to 64	65 to 69	70 to 74	75 to 79
Number of jobs*	181	151	199	227	207	216	230	235
% worked in wood	39.2%	31.1%	24.6%	28.2%	30.0%	16.7%	7.5%	1.3%

SOURCE: Sample B-125.

* The number of jobs begun or ended during the time period.

TABLE A-11

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. JOBS WHERE BOSS WAS PEDRO GUZMAN OR VICTORIANO CACERES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Time Period							
	18 to 44	45 to 49	50 to 54	55 to 59	60 to 64	65 to 69	70 to 74	75 to 79
Number of jobs*	52	123	179	157	135	253	321	322
% jobs with Pedro or Victoriano	0%	15.4%	30.7%	15.3%	28.2%	28.2%	18.7%	4.7%

SOURCE: Sample B-125.

* The number of jobs begun or ended during the time period.

TABLE A-12
PERCENT OF KINDS OF MIGRANTS IN DIFFERENT AGE CLASSES

Age Class	0 to 15	16 to 39	40 to 54	55 or More
Men				
Number	156	305	143	127
Temporary	3.8%	39.7%	48.3%	50.4%
Committed	4.5%	47.2%	36.4%	22.0%
Never Came	73.1%	12.8%	14.0%	27.6%
Born in U.S.	18.6%	.3%	1.4%	0
Total:	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%
Women				
Number	146	294	120	92
Temporary	2.7%	10.2%	5.8%	1.1%
Committed	1.4%	27.2%	23.3%	12.0%
Never Came	72.6%	62.2%	70.0%	85.9%
Born in U.S.	23.3%	.3%	.8%	1.1%
Total:	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%	100.1%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-13
DISTRIBUTION OF PASTURE LAND

	Hectares: Less than One	1 to 5	6 to 20	21 to 39	40 or More	Total
Number of families	44	5	10	2	6	67
Total Hectares	0	16	115.5	65	671	867.5
Total:	0	1.8%	13.3%	7.5%	77.3%	99.9%

SOURCE: Sixty-seven village interviews. Sample E-67.

TABLE A-14
DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE ANIMALS

	Size of Herd			Total
	0 to 9	10 to 29	30 or More	
Number	4	8	4	16
Total Animals	28	150	194	313
Percentage	7.5%	40.3%	52.2%	100.0%

SOURCE: Sixty-six village interviews.

TABLE A-15
KIND OF MIGRANCY COMPARED BETWEEN TWO KIN NETWORKS

	No.	(1)	No.	(2)
		Sharecropper		Owner
1) Temporaries	108	26.0	83	23.9
2) Committed	58	14.0	100	28.7
3) Never Came	249	60.0	165	47.4
Total:	415	100.0	348	99.0

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-16

PERCENTAGE OF YEARS WORKED TWO MONTHS OR MORE IN THE VILLAGE OUT OF THE LAST FIVE (MEN ONLY)

Kind of Migrancy	No.	16 to 39			No.	40 to 54			No.	55 or More		
		No Yrs	1 to 3 Yrs	4 to 5 Yrs		No Yrs	1 to 3 Yrs	4 to 5 Yrs		No Yrs	1 to 3 Yrs	4 or 5 Yrs
1) Committed	134	76.9%	18.7%	4.5%	51	94.1%	2.0%	4.0%	23	56.5%	13.0%	30.4%
2) Temporaries	105	13.3%	35.2%	51.4%	50	8.0%	34.0%	58.0%	44	2.3%	2.3%	95.5%
Total:	239	49.0%	25.9%	25.1%	101	51.5%	17.8%	30.7%	67	20.8%	6.0%	73.1%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-17
 PRICES OF INPUTS AND OUTPUTS FOR CORN/BEANS PRODUCTION
 (In Pesos)

Year	Inputs			Outputs			
	Ferti- lizer/ kilo	Tractor /hour	Harvest Labor /Day	Corn/ kilo	Beans/ kilo	Tassles /Cart	Stalks /Cart
1978	1.5	100	125	2.80	10	500	300
1977	1.5	80	100	2.80	7	500	300
1976	.95	65	55	2.50	6	400	250

SOURCE: Local merchants.

TABLE A-18
 DATE OF PURCHASE OF VILLAGE LAND, HOUSES BY DECADE

Decade	Houses	Land (3 hectares or more)
1970s	33	21
1960s	20	11
1950s	9	6
1940s	12	1
1930s	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
Total:	77	38

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

TABLE A-19
 PERCENTAGE OF
 VILLAGE PROPERTY HELD BY KIND OF U.S. MIGRANCY
 (21 Years or Older)

	(1) Nothing	(2) Just House	(3) Small Holder*	(4) Medium Holder*	(5) Small Business	Total	
<u>Temporary Migrants</u>							
1) 2 times or less	90	57.8%	24.4%	10.0%	2.2%	5.6%	100.0%
2) Undocumented shuttles	147	34.7%	35.4%	14.3%	7.5%	8.2%	100.1%
<u>Committed Migrants</u>							
3) Beginner permanents	52	82.7%	13.5%	3.8%	0	0	100.0%
4) Legal shuttles	19	5.3%	15.8%	36.8%	26.3%	15.8%	100.0%
5) Long-term permanents	<u>188</u>	64.9%	13.3%	11.7%	9.6%	0.5%	100.0%
Total:	496	54.2%	22.0%	12.3%	7.3%	4.2%	100.0%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

* Three to 11.9 hectares.

* Twelve or more hectares.

TABLE A-20
 PERCENTAGE OF
 TYPE OF LIVING ARRANGEMENTS IN U.S. OVER TIME

Time Period	City or Town	Number of Stays	Pay Rent	Own House	Stay with Boss	Stay with Relative or Friend	Total
1918 to 1949	City Town	13 157	38.5% 5.1%	0 0	0 93.0%	61.5% 1.9%	100.0% 100.0%
1950 to 1959	City Town	46 287	52.1% 1.4%	0 0	8.7% 94.1%	39.1% 4.5%	99.9% 100.0%
1960 to 1964	City Town	36 93	72.2% 2.2%	0 0	2.8% 96.8%	25.0% 1.1%	100.0% 100.1%
1965 to 1969	City Town	84 146	54.8% 30.8%	2.4% 0.7%	6.0% 59.6%	36.9% 8.9%	100.1% 100.0%
1970 to 1974	City Town	147 150	63.3% 43.3%	3.4% 0.7%	2.7% 29.3%	30.6% 26.7%	100.0% 100.0%
1975 to 1979	City Town	180 129	60.0% 63.6%	7.2% 1.6%	1.1% 16.3%	31.7% 18.6%	100.0% 100.1%

SOURCE: Sample B-125.

TABLE A-21

SOURCES OF JOB PLACEMENT INFORMATION

Time Period	Legal Status	Number of Job Changes	Friend of Relative	Looked on Own	Labor Contractor	Total
1918 to 1949	Legal Undocumented	0 25	0 64.0%	0 36.0%	0 0	100.0
1950 to 1959	Legal Undocumented	4 96	50.0% 46.9%	50.0% 3.1%	0 50.0%	100.0
1960 to 1964	Legal Undocumented	12 67	66.7% 40.3%	25.0% 7.5%	8.3% 52.2%	100.0
1965 to 1969	Legal Undocumented	52 116	38.5% 50.0%	51.9% 7.8%	9.6% 42.2%	100.00
1970 to 1974	Legal Undocumented	76 184	35.5% 67.4%	61.8% 12.5%	2.6% 21.1%	99.9
1974 to 1979	Legal Undocumented	37 114	46.2% 67.9%	53.8% 19.0%	0 13.1%	100.0

SOURCE: Sample B-125.

TABLE A-22
ESTIMATE OF PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ANIMENO POPULATION WHO
WILL STAY PERMANENTLY IN THE U.S., BY AGE CLASS

Age Class	No.	Men		Women		
		(1) % Total Sample Who Came to U.S. Once or More	(2) % Total Sample with Semi- skilled Jobs	(3) % of Total Sample with Permanent Status	(4) % in U.S. Now	(5) Estimated Range that Will Stay Between (2)&(3)
55 or more	127	73.4%	7.1%	16.5%	13.4%	13.4%
40 to 54	143	86.0%	30.1%	35.0%	46.8%	30.1 to 35.0%
16 to 39	305	87.2%	35.1%	42.6%	58.0%	35.1 to 42.6%
		(1)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Percentage Who Came Once or More				
				(2)	(3)	(4)
				Estimated Minimum Who Will Stay (same as col.2)		
55 or more	92	14.1%		11.9%	11.9%	11.9%
40 to 54	120	25.8%		22.5%	25.8%	22.5%
16 to 39	294	33.3%		26.2%	39.7%	26.2%

SOURCE: Sample A-1454.

TABLE A-23

YEAR	AVERAGE WAGE BY INDUSTRY										OVER TIME				FAC'Y ILL	FAC'Y LEG	CONS LEGAL	CONS ILLEG	
	TOTAL	SERV LEG	SERV ILL	AGR BRACER	AGR LEGAL	AGR ILLEG	FAC'Y ILL	FAC'Y LEG	CONS LEGAL	CONS ILLEG									
1979	70	4.93	4	67	6	4.30	0	0	0	9	07	16	63	9	3.25	10	18	12	4.40
1978	79	4.90	4	83	3	3.03	0	0	0	15	98	18	23	10	4.18	9	7.54	7	5.07
1977	54	4.55	4	55	3	3.26	0	0	0	8	57	14	07	8	4.05	9	7.02	7	4.88
1976	53	4.40	4	67	3	3.13	0	0	0	8	24	14	07	8	3.94	10	6.54	6	3.32
1975	57	4.15	4	88	4	3.74	0	0	0	8	24	13	53	8	3.85	10	6.92	11	3.30
1974	51	4.37	3	93	2	2.35	0	0	0	8	81	12	33	11	3.48	10	5.74	10	4.24
1973	43	3.79	3	82	2	2.38	0	0	0	9	11	10	43	7	3.77	10	5.60	10	4.23
1972	35	3.27	3	84	2	2.64	0	0	0	9	03	9	25	2	3.57	8	5.32	8	4.56
1971	35	3.27	3	76	2	2.64	0	0	0	6	03	8	25	5	3.37	7	5.55	5	3.03
1970	35	3.27	3	69	2	2.61	0	0	0	6	58	8	18	5	4.66	7	5.05	5	3.04
1969	35	3.27	3	61	2	2.06	0	0	0	6	17	7	75	6	3.75	4	5.52	3	2.51
1968	32	3.22	3	57	1	1.58	0	0	0	10	50	7	97	4	3.83	3	4.32	3	1.96
1967	32	3.22	3	14	1	1.67	0	0	0	11	58	6	74	4	3.83	3	4.32	3	1.96
1966	32	3.22	3	14	1	1.67	0	0	0	11	17	4	74	4	3.83	3	4.32	3	1.96
1965	24	1.85	1	22	1	1.33	0	0	0	8	27	4	75	4	3.83	3	4.32	3	1.96
1964	24	1.85	1	22	1	1.33	0	0	0	8	27	4	75	4	3.83	3	4.32	3	1.96
1963	19	1.77	1	89	1	1.25	0	0	0	6	18	4	68	3	3.22	2	3.22	2	1.77
1962	12	1.66	1	94	0	0.95	0	0	0	6	40	3	55	1	2.23	1	1.90	1	1.23
1961	12	1.66	1	07	0	0.95	0	0	0	6	40	3	55	1	2.23	1	1.90	1	1.23
1960	18	1.38	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1959	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1958	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1957	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1956	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1955	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1954	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1953	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1952	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1951	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1950	15	1.40	1	00	0	0.80	0	0	0	6	57	3	30	1	1.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
1949	10	1.15	1	00	0	0.50	0	0	0	5	35	1	11	1	0.66	0	0.00	0	0.00
1948	10	1.15	1	00	0	0.50	0	0	0	5	35	1	11	1	0.66	0	0.00	0	0.00
1947	7	1.30	1	00	0	0.69	0	0	0	5	88	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1946	9	1.49	0	00	0	0.43	0	0	0	12	80	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1945	9	1.65	0	00	0	0.44	0	0	0	12	63	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1944	10	1.61	0	00	0	0.64	0	0	0	12	37	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1943	10	1.59	0	00	0	0.64	0	0	0	12	25	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1942	5	1.57	0	00	0	0.57	0	0	0	4	00	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1941	1	1.40	0	00	0	0.00	0	0	0	0	00	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1931	1	1.37	0	00	0	0.00	0	0	0	0	25	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1930	1	1.40	0	00	0	0.00	0	0	0	0	00	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1929	1	1.40	0	00	0	0.00	0	0	0	0	00	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
1928	1	1.40	0	00	0	0.00	0	0	0	0	00	0	00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

TABLE A-24
OCCUPATION OVER TIME

YEAR	TOTAL		LEGAL		ILLEGAL		BRACERO	
	#	Ave.	#	Ave.	#	Ave.	#	Ave.
1979	64	4.4	35	4.4	29	4.4	0	.0
1978	84	9.4	40	10.3	44	8.5	0	.0
1977	79	10.2	41	11.0	39	9.2	0	.0
1976	76	10.1	41	10.4	36	9.5	0	.0
1975	76	10.6	40	11.3	37	9.4	0	.0
1974	81	10.2	39	11.2	42	9.3	0	.0
1973	78	9.5	40	10.9	39	7.7	0	.0
1972	75	9.3	38	10.9	37	7.8	0	.0
1971	67	9.5	34	10.7	35	7.8	0	.0
1970	64	8.9	29	10.9	36	7.1	0	.0
1969	56	8.9	27	9.9	31	7.5	0	.0
1968	55	8.9	23	10.6	33	7.5	0	.0
1967	53	8.7	22	8.7	31	8.7	0	.0
1966	50	9.2	21	10.5	31	7.7	0	.0
1965	48	9.2	18	9.9	32	8.0	1	7.0
1964	42	9.6	14	11.1	28	8.9	0	.0
1963	38	9.1	14	10.2	25	8.0	0	.0
1962	35	9.7	13	10.7	20	9.5	2	6.0
1961	34	8.7	11	8.1	19	9.1	6	5.8
1960	35	7.5	9	9.0	16	7.0	12	5.8
1959	31	7.1	5	10.0	17	7.9	10	3.6
1958	30	6.4	4	10.0	13	8.5	14	3.0
1957	23	5.6	4	10.0	11	5.5	8	3.4
1956	15	7.6	4	10.0	7	7.1	6	4.0
1955	18	6.3	3	12.0	7	7.4	8	3.1
1954	24	6.5	3	8.0	10	6.2	6	3.5
1953	26	6.8	1	12.0	19	7.7	6	3.2
1952	25	7.3	1	12.0	14	8.0	10	5.9
1951	18	7.3	1	6.0	12	7.9	7	4.4
1950	19	5.8	0	.0	15	6.3	4	4.0
1949	20	7.0	0	.0	13	8.5	7	4.3
1948	15	6.7	0	.0	9	7.3	6	2.7
1947	12	6.8	0	.0	5	6.6	7	7.0
1946	17	4.8	0	.0	4	7.5	13	3.9
1945	11	6.9	0	.0	1	4.0	10	7.2
1944	14	5.0	0	.0	1	12.0	13	4.5
1943	7	6.6	0	.0	2	1.5	5	8.6
1942	4	6.5	0	.0	0	.0	4	6.5

SOURCE: Sample C-143

TABLE A-25
AVERAGE AGE, BY PLACE, 1942-1979

YEAR	TOTAL	LAS ANIMAS	TIJUANA	OTH MEXICO	U.S. CITY	U.S. TOWN	U.S.	MEXICO
1979	145	68 47.78	10 48.70	0 00	58 35.94	22 29.22	80 34.12	78 47.90
1978	146	85 47.06	10 47.33	0 00	63 36.38	29 36.61	88 36.45	95 47.09
1977	142	41.09	10 46.70	23 00	55 37.44	34 56	79 36.57	98 44.96
1976	140	40.66	10 44.49	23 00	50 37.70	26 37.54	76 37.66	97 43.19
1975	138	39.87	8 45.35	38 00	54 36.90	24 36.92	76 36.52	91 42.46
1974	136	78 42.28	8 44.52	37 18	57 35.52	27 37.01	81 36.52	88 42.46
1973	131	80 41.50	10 41.72	37 55	53 35.46	26 37.41	78 36.63	91 41.48
1972	127	83 39.98	9 43.84	32 12	50 35.07	25 36.44	75 35.50	94 40.26
1971	127	84 38.62	9 41.27	29 00	49 35.86	25 34.99	67 35.58	95 38.67
1970	126	89 37.74	9 40.95	27 48	42 35.40	24 36.06	64 35.58	100 37.73
1969	126	89 36.47	9 38.99	32 86	37 35.03	24 33.28	56 34.50	99 36.41
1968	120	84 37.28	8 37.86	4 20	33 33.94	24 34.44	55 34.13	95 35.84
1967	120	86 35.52	7 37.78	2 19	33 33.71	30 34.44	53 34.20	95 35.30
1966	119	87 34.55	8 36.04	3 21	32 34.02	30 33.48	50 33.78	95 34.26
1965	117	87 33.69	8 34.97	4 23	22 34.02	27 31.85	48 32.93	95 33.42
1964	112	85 33.17	8 35.12	4 25	21 33.16	21 31.45	42 32.92	91 33.17
1963	104	82 33.83	7 36.69	4 32	17 33.27	20 30.40	38 31.54	88 33.98
1962	101	81 32.03	5 36.69	4 31	16 33.25	20 30.02	35 31.87	87 33.20
1961	96	80 32.89	5 35.67	2 32	14 33.04	21 29.46	34 30.87	86 33.03
1960	95	83 32.27	5 33.87	3 37	10 35.86	25 28.18	35 30.67	89 32.48
1959	92	84 30.85	5 33.67	5 30	7 30.98	24 28.65	30 31.34	89 31.00
1958	92	82 27.87	5 33.00	4 21	6 30.68	25 28.51	30 31.21	87 30.02
1957	87	77 30.62	5 33.00	8 28	5 30.57	24 28.43	23 28.98	84 30.48
1956	82	74 30.31	4 32.75	4 32	5 30.93	18 28.33	23 28.98	79 30.50
1955	80	72 29.55	4 27.70	4 30	6 30.82	10 26.30	18 28.13	76 29.50
1954	74	66 29.64	3 30.52	3 31	8 29.12	13 31.02	24 29.68	69 29.72
1953	66	58 29.91	3 33.00	3 36	8 28.38	19 30.00	24 29.68	60 29.09
1952	64	57 29.57	1 35.00	1 35	6 32.86	18 31.63	25 30.14	59 29.81
1951	63	58 28.17	1 36.00	1 34	4 34.69	19 28.83	18 30.06	60 28.40
1950	63	60 28.25	1 34.00	1 33	4 29.50	15 28.57	19 28.88	62 27.48
1949	59	51 27.63	1 33.00	3 33	5 23.98	15 28.71	20 27.37	54 27.98
1948	54	49 27.67	1 32.00	3 30	1 25.00	14 27.77	15 27.44	52 27.98
1947	52	47 27.04	1 31.00	3 30	1 30.00	11 26.73	12 26.93	51 27.34
1946	51	46 26.04	1 30.00	3 33	1 23.00	16 27.80	17 27.09	49 26.34
1945	48	44 25.75	0 00	3 38	0 00	11 28.16	11 28.16	47 25.94
1944	43	39 25.80	0 00	3 33	0 00	11 27.93	14 28.93	42 25.92
1943	42	25.69	0 00	4 29	0 00	7 26.61	14 26.61	42 25.60
1942	38	37 25.80	2 25	2 25	0 00	4 24.54	4 24.54	38 25.78

SOURCE: Sample C-143.

CHART A-1

LIFE CYCLE GOALS IN A VILLAGE-MIGRANT COMMUNITY

Age	Kind of Life Cycle:	Village Type (1)	Shuttle Migrant Type (2)	Committed Migrant Type (3)	Immigrant Type (4)
1) 14 to 18		begin work on father's land or sell labor for their father	see column (1)	see column (1)	see column (1)
2) 18 to 25		work in village	begin migrating to the U.S.	see column (2)	see column (2)
3) 20 to 30		marry in village	see column (1)	see column (1)	see column (1)
4) 25 to 35		work in village	continue shuttle migration to the U.S.	obtain steady job in the U.S.	see column (3)
5) 30 to 40		work in village	continue shuttle migration to the U.S.	regularize U.S. status	see column (3)
6) 25 to 35		buy house in village	see column (1)	see column (1)	irrelevant
7) 35 to 50		buy land or small business in village	see column (1)	see column (1)	irrelevant

CHART A-1 -- Continued

Age	Kind of Life Cycle:	Village Type (1)	Shuttle Migrant Type (2)	Committed Migrant Type (3)	Immigrant Type (4)
8) 40 to 50	irrelevant	irrelevant	irrelevant	irrelevant	buy U.S. house
9) 35 to 50	put children to work on own or other's land	return to teach sons to work on own or someone else's land	bring children to the U.S. to work	bring children to the U.S. to live	
10) 40 to 50	irrelevant	send children to the U.S. to remit money	irrelevant	irrelevant	irrelevant
11) 40 to 50	irrelevant	irrelevant	irrelevant	children acquire U.S. orientation	
12) 55 to 65	retire in village	see column (1)	see column (1)	retire in U.S.	

CHART A-2

DIFFERENT PATHS TO COMMITTED STATUS*

STAGE 1: NEVER CAME TO U.S.

TOTAL	Progressed to higher stage	Stayed at this stage
143	134	9

STAGE 2: 1 OR 2 TIMES TO THE U.S.

TOTAL	Progressed	Stayed
134	110	24

STAGE 3:

BEGINNER PERMANENTS

TOTAL	Progressed	Stayed
23	12	11

UNDOCUMENTED SHUTTLES

TOTAL	Progressed	Stayed
87	39	48

STAGE 4:

LONG-TERM PERMANENTS

TOTAL
36

LEGAL SHUTTLES

TOTAL
15

*See explanation on following page.

Explanation of Chart A-2

This flow chart describes four stages of U.S. migrancy for Mexican villages. It is a static analysis since some of the younger members will still progress to higher stages. At each stage the migrant has an opportunity to progress to a higher stage. Stage one shows that the vast majority of Animeno men try migration to the U.S. at least once. Stage two demonstrates that most continue on to higher stages.

Stage three involves a serious commitment to the U.S. job market for the migrant. Some of the men, beginner permanents, settle in urban communities. If they can entrench themselves, they become long-term permanents. On the other hand, the undocumented shuttles, who normally return seasonally to Mexico, do not have the opportunity to work their way up to well-paying opportunities. Instead, they usually wait for legal status before they settle in the U.S., bring their families and become long-term permanents. Alternatively, the undocumented shuttles may leave their families in the village after legalizing their status and become legal shuttles. In the sample of 87 undocumented shuttles, 15 have moved up to legal shuttle status, 24 to long-term permanent status, and the rest have either returned to the village or continue shuttling without papers. Among 23 beginner permanents, 12 have evolved into long-term permanents. Out of 143 Amimeños in the total sample at this time, 51, or about one-third, have already achieved stage four.


TABLE G

NUMBER OF ANIMENO MEN IN TOTAL, MEXICAN, U.S., AND U.S. WAGE SAMPLES, BY YEAR TO BE USED WITH GRAPHS 1a TO 9b**


Year	Total Sample	Mexican Sample	U.S. Sample	U.S. Wage Sample		
				No.	Actual Wage	Wage In 1967 \$
1942	38	38	4	3	\$.57	\$1.17
1943	42	42	7	6	.59	1.14
1944	43	42	14	10	.61	1.16
1945	48	47	11	9	.65	1.21
1946	51	49	17	9	.49	.84
1947	52	51	12	7	1.30	1.94
1948	54	52	15	7	1.32	1.83
1949	59	54	20	10	1.15	1.61
1950	63	62	19	9	.79	1.10
1951	64	60	18	13	.96	1.24
1952	64	59	25	15	.92	1.16
1953	66	60	26	15	1.11	1.39
1954	74	69	24	16	1.18	1.47
1955	80	76	18	13	1.64	2.04
1956	82	79	15	12	1.36	1.67
1957	87	84	23	15	1.40	1.66
1958	92	87	30	18	1.38	1.59
1959	95	89	31	21	1.58	1.81
1960	96	89	35	22	1.65	1.86
1961	98	86	34	22	1.66	1.85
1962	101	87	35	19	1.77	1.95
1963	104	88	38	24	1.85	2.02
1964	112	91	42	28	1.81	1.95
1965	117	95	48	32	2.02	2.13
1966	119	95	50	32	2.20	2.26
1967	120	95	53	35	2.41	2.41
1968	120	95	55	37	2.69	2.58
1969	126	99	56	35	3.27	2.98
1970	127	100	64	39	3.58	3.08
1971	127	95	67	43	3.73	3.07
1972	130	94	75	51	3.79	3.02
1973	131	91	78	56	4.08	3.06
1974	136	88	81	57	4.15	2.81
1975	138	91	76	53	4.40	2.73
1976	140	97	76	54	4.55	2.67
1977	142	98	79	59	4.90	2.70
1978	142	95	84	79	4.70	2.39

SOURCE: Sample C-143.


GRAPH 1a: PERCENTAGE OF MONTHS SPENT IN U.S. CITIES
AND TOWNS, OUT OF TOTAL MONTHS SPENT IN ALL
PLACES BY YEAR*



GRAPH 1b: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MONTHS SPENT IN LAS ANIMAS AND TIJUANA, OUT OF TOTAL MONTHS SPENT IN ALL PLACES BY YEAR *




GRAPH 2: PERCENTAGE OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE TOTAL SAMPLE WHO WORKED IN THE U.S. ONE MONTH OR MORE DURING EACH YEAR *




*Total sample: see page 189

GRAPH 3 : AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY PER YEAR FOR ANIMENOS IN MEXICO* AND THE U.S.**




GRAPH 4: PERCENTAGE OF SHUTTLE MIGRANTS AMONG U.S. MIGRANTS*




*U.S. sample (see page 189 for sample size). A "shuttle migrant" is defined as a person who spent one or more months in both the U.S. and Mexico.

GRAPH 5: PERCENTAGE OF LEGAL MIGRANTS AMONG U.S. MIGRANTS*




*Number of legal migrants in the U.S. divided by total migrants in U.S. (U.S. sample; See page 189 for sample size.)

GRAPH 6: NUMBER OF BRACEROS AND UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE, 1942-1965 *




*U.S. sample. See page 189 for sample size.

GRAPH 7: AVERAGE U.S. WAGE FOR ANIMENOS* IN CONSTANT 1967 DOLLARS**




*U.S. wage sample (see page 189 for sample size).

GRAPH 8: PERCENTAGE OF MONTHS WORKED IN U.S. AGRICULTURE
OUT OF TOTAL MONTHS WORKED IN THE U.S. BY YEAR*




*Percentage worked in non-agriculture is 100 percent minus the percent listed for agriculture for a given year. Based on U.S. sample (see page 189 for sample size).

GRAPH 9a: PERCENTAGE OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE TOTAL
SAMPLE THAT INITIATED A STAY IN LAS ANIMAS EACH YEAR*



*See page 189 for sample size. See Explanatory Notes, Appendix E, for definition of "initiated stays."

GRAPH 9b: PERCENTAGE OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE TOTAL SAMPLE THAT INITIATED STAYS EACH YEAR IN THE U.S. *



*See page 189 for sample size.

APPENDIX B
REMITTANCES

There are several kinds of remittances which must be considered separately to understand the entire stream of funds entering the village from the U.S.

- a) An unmarried migrant is expected to remit cash to his parents. This obligation continues through marriage, but declines as his children are born.
- b) A husband is expected to remit to his wife and children.
- c) Both husbands and children are expected to buy assets in the village if savings permit.

Child to Family Remittances

Data gathered among parents in the village is used here since the U.S. children usually exaggerate the amount they send. It was impossible to distinguish the amount sent from each child in the interviews; therefore, remittances per family were recorded. Of the fifty-nine families who gave detailed income data, between thirty-two and thirty-five had working children in the U.S. in the years 1976 to 1978.

Table R-1 illustrates several points: 1) the average receiving family has several remitters in the U.S. (3.4 in 1978, for example); 2) those with children in the U.S. receive surprisingly little on average from each child --\$16 per month in 1978; 3) still, all together this adds

up to a sizeable contribution to family income--about \$600 (see table R-1). It must be remembered that figures in table R-1 include all children. Older children tend to remit less cash, younger unmarried children more.

TABLE R-1
 AVERAGE CASH SUSTENANCE REMITTANCES RECEIVED
 BY VILLAGE FAMILIES FROM CHILDREN
 (U.S. Dollars)

Year	(1) No. of Receiving Families	(2) Average No. of Remitting Children Per Family	(3) \$ Per Year Per Family	(4) \$ Per Child Per Year	(5) \$ Per Child Per Month
1) 1978	35	3.4	\$648.20	\$192.30	\$16.00
2) 1977	34	3.4	577.60	172.30	14.40
3) 1976	32	3.1	558.40	178.70	14.90

SOURCE: Sample D-59.

Husband to Family Remittances

Of the fifty-nine families, twenty-one had husband remitters; nine of these also had children remitters. A husband remits much more than children do to the family. In most cases, the families are heavily dependent on these cash flows (see table R-2).

TABLE R-2
 AVERAGE HUSBAND TO FAMILY SUSTENANCE REMITTANCE
 (In U.S. Dollars)

Year	(1) Number of Remitting Husbands	(2) Average Per Year	(3) Average Per Month
1) 1978	17	\$1,809.40	\$150.80
2) 1977	16	1,680.60	140.10
3) 1976	14	1,665.00	138.80

SOURCE: Sample D-59.

Asset or Security Remittances

The semi-skilled, long-term permanent or legal shuttle migrant often buys an asset in the village for security. His parents usually manage and benefit from the purchase in the short-run (see table VI-3, p. 129). The value of asset remittances by husband remitters was not separately tabulated.

Table R-3 indicates that only thirteen out of sixty-seven randomly selected village families received no kind of remittance in the last ten years. In Tijuana, three out of ten families received no help from the U.S. For the village recipients, the average yearly total of \$1,047.13 is a crucial addition to village income.

On the basis of the remittance data, it is possible to make an estimate of total remittances that entered the

TABLE R-3
 TYPES OF REMITTANCE RECIPIENT FAMILIES (TIJUANA AND LAS ANIMAS)

	1976 - 1978		1968 - 1978		No		Total
	Sustenance		Security		Remittance		
	(1)	(2)			Though	No	
	Child	Husband	Child	Husband	Migrated	Migrating	
	to	to	to	to Self	Last Ten	Last Ten	
	Family	Family	Family		Years	Years	
Village	31	25	14	16	7	6	67
Tijuana	3	4	0	0	1	2	10

SOURCE: Sample E-67 and Tijuana interviews.

village in 1978. The author's census found 262 families in the village in January 1979. If all the village families received money from the U.S. at the same rate as the fifty-nine families surveyed (22.5 percent of the total), then the village received \$274,350 in total remittances in 1978 (see table R-4).

TABLE R-4
 AVERAGE YEARLY REMITTANCES
 (In U.S. Dollars)

	1978		1968-78	
	Sustenance		Security	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	Total
	Child	Husband	Child to	
	to Family	to Family	Parents	
			(Property)	
Total per year	\$30,760	\$22,688	\$ 8,333	\$ 61,781
Avg. per family per year	\$521.35	\$384.54	\$141.23	\$1,047.13

SOURCE: Sample D-59.

APPENDIX C
SAMPLES

The first sixty-seven interviewees in the village were chosen at random. Las Animas was divided into its eight barrios, and a list of men in each barrio was made. A random sample was chosen from this list. The ten border interviewees and the sixty-six U.S. interviewees were not chosen in a random fashion, rather an attempt was made to choose a representative sample.

TABLE S-1

DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES BY LEGAL STATUS BY AGE CLASS

	Age Class			Total
	16 to 39	40 to 54	55 or More	
Legals	20	16	10	46
Undocumented	46	25	17	88
Never Came	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
Total:	68	43	32	143

TABLE S-2

LOCATION OF NUCLEAR FAMILY
OF ALL INTERVIEWEES

Location	Number
Village	85
Border	10
U.S.	<u>48</u>
Total:	143

SAMPLE A-1454

The first 122 interviewees, all male heads of households over twenty years of age, were asked to answer seven questions about themselves, their wives, their children, their siblings, and parents, and their wives' siblings and parents. This amounted to 1,454 individuals for which the following data was gathered:

- 1) the age class of the individual
- 2) the kin relationship to the interviewee
- 3) the usual work in the U.S.
- 4) the kind of migrancy
- 5) the place at the time of the interview
- 6) the property held in the village
- 7) and for males, the number of years worked two months or more in the village out of the last five years

All responses were checked by a paid informant and by constant cross-checking in the community.

A master list was kept which recorded for each of the 1,454 individuals if they appeared on any of the relatives' lists of the 122 interviewees. The kin network of each interviewee includes, then, his children and he and his wife's siblings and parents.

SAMPLE B-125

This group is made up of the first 122 interviewees plus three additional persons; all are over twenty years old and are in Sample A. Job histories of these individuals were analyzed separately.

SAMPLE C-143

This group admitted the last eighteen (18) interviewees, including several men between age sixteen and twenty-one. It is more balanced age-wise than Sample B-125 because it includes minors.

SAMPLE D-59

These were fifty-nine village families that gave a detailed accounting of their earnings, assets, and remittances.

SAMPLE E-67

These were sample D and eight other village families that gave only partial answers to income and asset questions.

SAMPLE F-122

This sample of the first 122 interviewees gave responses to questions relating to housing, social services, and life style in the U.S.

APPENDIX D
VILLAGE PRODUCTION

Value of Family Production

To determine the value generated by labor in a village setting requires a thorough understanding of the daily activities of the people.

Of the sixty-seven interviews carried out in the village, fifty-nine heads of households gave detailed data on how they make a living. However, even these could not remember the exact cost of every input. As a consequence, I established data standards which were used to calculate the costs of agricultural and animal raising activities in those cases where respondents could not recall the exact figures. The standards were based on averages of obtained data. (See table M-1.)

The cost figures (see table M-1) were only used in those rare cases when a respondent said that he did pay the cost but couldn't remember how much. The output figures (see table M-1) were used to evaluate all home-consumed parts of the corn/bean harvest.

Beef Production. Discussions with several beef producers in Las Animas lead me to the following estimates for the value added by beef production. One animal gains an average of 50 kilos per year when one includes the sickly and lost animals in the average. Live beef in January 1979

TABLE M-1
CORN/BEAN PRODUCTION

	1977	1978
Costs per Yunta (3.5 hectares)		
Feeding work animals	1,000p*	1,200p
Rent for work animals	1,000p	1,000p
Fertilizer	1,000p	1,200p
Tools	50p	50p
Pesticides	200p	200p
Transferring harvest	10p/each 70 kilos	10p/each 70 kilos
Husking corn	100p/ton	100p/ton
Tractor tilling field	1,000p	1,200p
Seed	100p	100p
String to tie up fodder	50p	50p
Harvest labor	500 pesos/ton	600 pesos/ton
Value of Harvest Output		
1 kilo corn	3p	3p
1 kilo beans	8p	10p
1 'carreta' stalks	250p	300p
1 'carreta' tassels	500p	600p

* p indicates pesos.

was selling for 20 pesos per kilo. As a consequence, gross sales equal 1,000 pesos per animal. Feed costs to get through one dry season come to 520 pesos. The wet season has no costs if the owner of the cattle possesses pasture land or carefully pastures his animals on commonly-owned land.

Total Profits: 1,000 sales
 - 520 costs
 480 pesos for each full year
 1,000 pesos for one wet season only

On many occasions owners of animals would know the sales

price they obtained for their animal, but not their costs. In these cases, I took the sales price and subtracted 520 pesos times the years of age of the animal. This same procedure also applied when donkey's horses, or mules were sold.

The cost of raising a pig for six months was estimated at 1,800 pesos or 300 pesos per month.

Costs of raising pig:	Purchase	500p
	Feed	1,080p
	Medicine, lime, etc.	<u>220p</u>
		1,800p

The sales price was lowered by these costs to estimate the profit to the family. Profits for possessing a breeder sow were estimated at 357 pesos per month.

The value of cow milk production was calculated by:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{sales} &= \frac{6 \text{ pesos times number of liters per day}}{\text{times number of days milked}} \\ \text{costs} &= \frac{\text{Number of days milked}}{\text{times 10 pesos for food}} \end{aligned}$$

An average cow would produce three liters for 200 days.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Sales} &= 3,600 \\ \text{Costs} &= \underline{2,000} \\ \text{Profits} &= 1,600 \text{ pesos } (\$70) \end{aligned}$$

Those animals (cows, pigs, mules, etc.) which were not sold but kept as security against an emergency were not counted either as a loss or gain. It was assumed that costs were exactly balanced by the increased value of the animals.

Days Worked in the Corn/Beans Cycle

It is very difficult to estimate the number of days it takes to produce the yearly crop of corn, beans, and fodder. It is a family enterprise with children as young as five years old straightening-up corn stalks knocked over by the work animals in the fields. Fertilizer is thrown by children and women; hoe weeding is also done mainly by women and children. Still, in figuring out the number of days spent in the crop, I asked for the number of days spent by males sixteen years or older. This was a number that could be easily calculated by the respondents.

APPENDIX E
EXPLANATORY NOTES

Table III-1, p. 57 (Subsistence Budget)

The basic subsistence living standard in Las Animas involves buying corn, other grains, beans, lard, sugar, sweet bread, some fruits and vegetables, some meat and canned goods. Also, it is expected that the family can go out to a restaurant once a week for an inexpensive meal. In addition, modest clothes, furniture and other household needs must be met. Entertainment and transportation into the nearby town (Nochistlán) are part of the expected minimal living standard. Finally, medicine is an expensive if sporadic cost that villagers must endure.

To estimate the average subsistence line budget, seven village families of modest means (none were among either the richest or poorest in the sample) were asked what they spent on the basic necessities mentioned above. Their responses for each category were averaged for the 49 individuals in this subsample to determine the individual subsistence level. The result was multiplied by seven to estimate the amount spent by an average family on its basic needs.

Families that earn less than the subsistence level (54.2 percent of the sample, see Table V-3) eat mostly corn and beans, rarely go to town for entertainment, and must go in debt or sell their animals if illness strikes.

Table IV-1, IV-12, and Graphs 9a, 9b (Initiated stays)

These tables and graphs record the percentage of men in the sample who migrated from elsewhere to a given place during a given year. For example, in 1954 (see Table IV-1) 25.6 percent of the 74 men moved from Mexico to the U.S. and initiated a stay in the U.S. of a month or more. Also, in 1954, 43.2 percent of the 74 men returned to Las Animas during the year and initiated a one-month or more stay.

Tendency 1, p. 90 (Maturation Tendency)

The shift away from agricultural work is in part a function of growing demand for Mexican workers in urban areas. However, many immature migratory networks still specialize in agricultural work (see Stuart and Kearney, 1981; Reichert, 1979; Wiest, 1973). Changes in immigration law also affect tendency 1. Since 1976, the Mexican quota has been limited to 20,000 (excluding non-quota close relatives of U.S. citizens). This policy encourages illegal entry, consequently it produces a counterforce to tendency 1.

Tendency 8, p.101 (Spurt Hypothesis)

This tendency operates within the constraints of global economic, political, and climatic events. Droughts and devaluations in Mexico tend to increase migration while economic downturns and policies of expulsion of unauthorized residents in

the U.S. tend to decrease the cross-border-movement. However, within the migratory networks, tendency 8 has independent force. If outside pressures allow, it will express itself. For example, the period 1960 to 1973, one relatively unperturbed by outside disturbances, witnessed an entrenchment period in the first years, followed by a spurt period in the last years.

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