

DEVELOPMENTAL PATTERNS OF ASIAN NATIONALISM FROM A POINT OF VIEW OF CULTURE CONTACT*

By YOICHI ITAGAKI**

Introduction

My focal problem centers around the problem of the transmission of national values and ideologies in the context of culture contact and acculturation in terms of "challenge and response" between civilizations in general and between the Western and non-Western civilizations in particular, with a view to making clear the nature and consequences of "Westernization" and also some remarkable reactions and responses as seen both in the pre-independence and in the post-independence development of nationalism in South and Southeast Asia.

In my first attempt to build a frame of reference within which the issues of the problem are to be adequately dealt, I have examined some representative theories of civilization which are, in my view, relevant to the study of cultural contact and transmission, such as Oswald Spengler, Alfred Weber, Arnold Toynbee and Nikolai Danilewsky. In my second attempt to confirm the concept of "Westernization", in distinction with that of "Modernization" in a broad sense, as a specific aspect of culture contact and acculturation between the modern West and the non-West since the sixteenth century, I focused attention on the historical fact that "Westernization" was a form of transmission of values and ideologies under persistent colonial pressure or colonization. In this connection, I most emphatically stressed that it is of great importance for the forms of cultural transmission and reception to draw a clear distinction as to whether the concerned society accepting western cultural values is autonomous under colonial pressure or dependent under colonial rule. In this context, I tried to show what were the consequences of "Westernization" associated with colonization in the aspect of political acculturation and how did the Asian nationalism respond to them in its historical development.

* The first draft of this article entitled "Theories on the Transmission of National Values and Ideologies and the Patterns of Nationalism in non-Western Countries" was prepared for and presented at the International Conference on the Nation and the Political Alternatives of Development, which was held under auspices of the American Universities Field Staff at Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio on Lake Como, Italy, March 8-20, 1964. A Conference report has been published with a title of *Discussion at Bellagio: The Political Alternatives of Development*, compiled and edited by K. H. Silvert, American Universities Field Staff, Inc., New York 1964, 191 pp.

** Professor (*Kyōju*) of Economic Policy and International Relations.

I. *The Basic Reflections on the Theories on Culture Contact and Acculturation*

1. *Culture and Style*

It is commonly observed that whenever there is a contact or encounter between two cultures, there take place certain changes through the process of their interactions. These changes may be interpreted as "acculturation" in a broad sense. In our attempt to obtain a fundamental understanding of contacts and transmissions of cultures, it is of great importance to make a thorough and analytical study of what is transmitted and how it is received through their interactions.

First of all, we should ask ourselves what is really meant by culture. Almost all of the scholars of culture agree that it is to be generalized as "a social-cultural unity", e.g. as "a meaningful totality" which has its own individuality and its own character. Apart from the question of whether this unity or totality should be regarded as "an organic whole" (*ein organische Ganze*),¹ as Spengler and Toynbee observed, it is generally expressed by a "style" concept.

Spengler describes the "true style of history" (*der wahre Stil der Geschichte*)² as a "physiognomy of culture", Frankfort as a "form",³ Benedict as a "pattern of culture",⁴ Kroeber as a "total-culture style",⁵ and Sorokin as a "cultural supersystem".⁶ These are nothing but attempts to emphasize the importance of style in culture. It is in this sense that the concept of "style" has become so important in our study of civilization.

Although many scholars have emphasized the importance of the individuality of each culture, very few have placed as much emphasis on it as Spengler.

Spengler with deep insight discerned the "historical-relative character" of culture by seeing human history as a process of the "Werden" of the mighty "Leben" and by understanding it as "an organic whole". Spengler regarded the expressions of "*Gestaltung und Umgestaltung des Lebens*" as morphological changes of an organic unity and tried to confirm comparatively the symbolic meanings of "*Formensprache*" by employing the logic of analogy. Thus he attempted to establish "comparative historical morphology" (*die vergleichende historische Mor-*

¹ Toynbee, Arnold, *The World and the West*, Oxford University Press, London 1953, p. 75; Spengler, Oswald, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, Erster Band: *Gestalt und Wirklichkeit*, München 1923. [Erste Aufl. 1918] SS. 137, 141.

² Spengler, *op. cit.*, S. 65.

³ Frankfort, Henri, *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington 1951, p. 2.

⁴ Benedict, Ruth, *Patterns of Culture*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1961 (1st ed. 1935).

⁵ Kroeber, Alfred L., *Style and Civilizations*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1963 (paper ed.), p. 152 (1st ed. 1957). Kroeber points out that there are different meanings in the usages of the word, "style", and undertakes to make clear the essential points implied in the concept of "style" for the common understanding "However, all the more central usages of the word [style] refer first to *form* as against substance, *manner* as against content. Second, they imply *some consistency of forms*. And third, they may suggest that the *forms* used in the style *cohere* sufficiently to *integrate into a series of related patterns*." (*op. cit.*, p. 4.) "Let us then...return to the construal of style as something concerned essentially with *form*, and possessing *some consistency of the forms* operated with; plus a *coherence of these into a set of related larger patterns*." (*op. cit.*, p. 26).

⁶ Sorokin, Pitirim A., *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, Adam & Charles Black, London 1952, p. 276.

phologie) and his method of "Physiognomik".⁷ To Spengler "physiognomy of a Culture" was above all expressions of the "Urphänomen" as the *Idee* of a Culture. The "Idee" of a Culture which is the sum total of its inner possibilities realizes itself in history as a fulfilled actuality. His view of "physiognomy of a Culture" — the way it looks, acts, walks, and behaves — enabled him to comprehend thoroughly the unique style of *Leben* itself by means of "Physiognomik". Spengler asserts that "in the general historical picture of a Culture there can be but one style, the style of the Culture".⁸ In other words, it is the *Urphänomen* of *Idee* that gives uniqueness to the styles of all cultures. However, it must be noted that it is only a rare genius like Goethe, who can clearly see and grasp with a penetrating insight the *Urphänomen* as a living *Idee* of *Werden*. Spengler himself confessed that he owed his "Morphologie" to Goethe.⁹

In this manner Spengler developed his theory that the essence of a Culture is its *Urphänomen* which has its unique form of expressing itself in "physiognomy of a Culture" or "style" and, therefore, that a Culture is an organic unity within which spirit (*Geist*) and a living body (*lebendige Körper*) are inseparably combined.

We should admit that Spengler made a great contribution to our study of culture by pointing out that the style of a Culture has its own properties, individuality, and destiny, which are not comparable to those of other culture. However, it seems that he overgeneralized or oversimplified his observation, which in my view has led to his concept of culture as too isolated, too self-contained, too self-consistent, and too-closed a system. It is my impression that the greatest drawback of his theory is that it left no room for the consideration of cultural transmissions and interactions between cultures or civilizations.

However, we would not hesitate to agree with Spengler in so far as he points out that the *Urphänomen* (which forms the deepest core of a Culture) and the "style" (as a unique expression of it) are not transmissible to another. Even Danilewsky, whose penetrating study is focused on the possibility of transmission of civilization, admits the impossibility of transmission of the "basic principles" of civilization. He writes as follows: "Die Grundlagen der Zivilizationen eines kulturhistorischen Types werden den Völkern eines anderen Types *nicht übermittelt*."¹⁰ Furthermore, Alfred Weber, who was critical of the concept of Spengler, describes as follows:

"Diese Sphäre vielmehr ist und bleibt hier alles was entsteht, zunächst *seinem Wesen nach eingeschlossen* in den Geschichtskörper, in dem es entsteht, mit ihm *innerlich verbunden*. Es entsteht...ein *seelisch bedingtes Nebeneinanderstehen von Symbolen*. Eine solche jedesmal *selbständige* Welt von Symbolen, die ihren *eigenen im Letzten unübertragbaren Gehalt* hat."¹¹

⁷ Spengler, *op. cit.*, SS. 3, 54, 31, 36, 4, 42, 136.

⁸ Spengler, *op. cit.*, SS. 266, 65, 142, 143.

⁹ Spengler, *op. cit.*, *Vorwort* IX, SS. 142, 143. "Goethe gave me method, Nietzsche the questioning faculty". "Culture is the *Urphänomen* (prime phenomenon) of all past and future world-history. The deep, and scarcely appreciated, *idea* of Goethe, which he discovered in his 'living nature' and always made the basis of his morphological researches, we shall here apply—in its most precise sense—to all the formations of man's history".

¹⁰ Danilewsky, Nikolai Jakowlewitsch, *Rusland und Europa: Eine Untersuchung über die kulturellen und politischen Beziehungen der slawischen zur germanisch-romanischen Welt*, übersetzt und eingeleitet von Karl Nötzel, Stuttgart und Berlin 1920, S. 61.

¹¹ Weber, Alfred, *Prinzipien der Geschichts- und Kultursoziologie*, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, München 1951, S. 66.

And he suggests that what belongs to the spiritual cultural sphere (such as religion and the arts) have an inherent content that is not finally transmissible.

In this connection, Spengler's view should be justified as far as he deems that the style of a Culture is a totality inseparable from the core of culture. However, he was so intent on sticking to his own concept of style he was forced into a static view of culture and failed to deal with a dynamic aspect of cultural transmission. Those who attach importance to a dynamic view intend to grasp the importance of recognizing exactly what is meant by effects, consequences, and varied patterns of acculturation, etc., between cultures by accepting the reality of transmission that takes place in the process of contacts between cultures. For this purpose it will be necessary to make an effort to understand culture as a totality on the one hand and, on the other, to discern what is transmissible from what is not, by analyzing the inner structure of the components or contents which constitute a culture.

2. *Style and Value in Transmission*

Now let us turn to Alfred Weber who conducted a more systematic study of the inner structure of civilization.

Weber, first, closely analyzed the inner structure of the great "*historisches Geschehen*" of human beings and then divided it into three spheres, namely, "*Gesellschaftsprozess*", "*Zivilisationsprozess*", and "*Kulturbewegung*".¹²

According to Weber, *Gesellschaftsprozess* is the process of "*die körperhaften Formationen der historischen Schicksalsgebilde*", which is carried out by the natural forces of the instinct and the will of human beings, and which, depending on certain natural conditions (biologic, geographical, climatic, and so forth), gives a specific form and direction (*Form u. Richtung*) to the historic entity in which it takes place.¹³

It is important to note that Weber has also pointed out that, alongside the social sphere described above, there exists a spiritual cultural sphere in any historic entity, each of which develops itself on its own principles.

This spiritual-cultural sphere is subdivided into two parts, according to Weber. One is named the *Kulturbewegung* sphere, which is essentially spiritual, containing such elements as "*Ideen*", artistic intuition, religious beliefs, etc. These are internally tied up with the historic entity itself, conditioned by its soul, symbolizing and providing it with unique contents.

The other sphere is what Weber defined as *Zivilisationsprozess*. Rather than relating to strictly cultural properties *a priori* such as religion and the arts, this relates more directly to the formations and courses of events of *Gesellschaftsprozess*. This forms what he named "*ein intellektueller Kosmos*" which is "a spiritual intermediary zone" (*ein geistiges Zwischenreich*).¹⁴ In the formation of social process, this *intellektueller Kosmos*, on the one hand, provides for practical and technical means whereas, on the other hand it seems to be a basis on which cultural phenomena stand. For this *Zivilisationsprozess*, if observed and analyzed more closely and in detail, consists of the following three processes. The first is the one which is most "*innerlich*" (spiritual) of the three, and in which the development of human consciousness (*Welt-und Ich-Bild, Makro-und Mikrokosmos*) is dealt with. The second is the process in which the systematization of *intellektueller Kosmos* tends to relate itself ultimately to the more

¹² Weber, Alfred, *op. cit.*, SS. 44, 45.

¹³ Weber, Alfred, *op. cit.*, S. 50.

¹⁴ Weber, A., *op. cit.*, S. 52.

practical. The third sub-process, by providing for practical means and techniques which actually affect and condition reality, gives concreteness to the practical *intellektueller Kosmos* and thus enters directly into the *Gesellschaftsprozess* and regulates it.

In short the *Zivilisationsprozess* consists of three sub-processes: one, the "*Intellektualisierung*" which deals with the development of consciousness in the inward aspect of the historical entity, and the others, the "*Rationalisierung*" which involves the practical observation and building of reality in the outward aspect of the historical entity. Thus the *Zivilisationsprozess* through the *Intellektualisierung* and *Rationalisierung* occupies an inherent sphere which has its own principles of development and which should be considered in distinction from *Gesellschaftsprozess* and *Kulturbewegung*.¹⁵

Thus Weber viewed historical phenomena as an integrated whole composed of spheres of "*Gesellschaftsprozess*" of historic entity, "*Zivilisationsprozess*" which involves science and techniques, and "*Kulturbewegung*" which is related to religion and the arts. And making clear that each of the three spheres has its own meanings and principles of development, at the same time he attempted to comprehend each sphere not as isolated but as interacting dynamically with the others.

Now, getting back to our original theme of what can be transmitted from one culture to another, it should be obvious that those that belong to the "*Zivilisationsprozess*" (such as science and technology) can be transmitted. Weber has explained that what is formed and developed in this sphere has universal validity ("*Allgemeingültigkeit*") based on "logical causality" and therefore can be transmitted and accumulated. Carrying this explanation still further he contends that although religion and the arts that belong to "*Kulturbewegung*" are intransmissible in their basic forms. However, "*Weltreligionen*" such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism have a certain possibility of being transmitted beyond their places of origin. It should be noted, however, that according to Weber this is true only when and if (*wenn und weil*) their essential religious truth has such inner "universality" as the salvation of the human soul. But we have to ask ourselves: what is it that is transmitted in such a transmission? Weber has clarified the meaning of transmission by explaining as follows:

"Ihre Übertragung auf andere Geschichtskörper und Zeiten ist immer nur eine Übertragung

¹⁵ Weber, A., *op. cit.*, SS. 53-58. Kroeber makes clear three components of culture, social culture, reality culture and value culture in his approach different from Weber's. He writes as follows:

- a. "A style is a self-consistent way of behaving or of doing things. It is selected out from among alternatively possible ways of doing. And it is selective with reference to values; that is, the things the style does and the way it does them are felt by the doers as intrinsically valuable."
- b. "This most characteristic part of civilizations, which we may call *value culture*, is not their only component. There is also what may be called *reality culture*, concerned with finding out mastering, and directing fellow-men as well. Technology, the useful arts, ways of successful practical living, are the avenues by which reality culture is expressed."
- c. "There is a component, social structure and relations, which in principle might be thought to be independent of the rest of civilization or culture, because it also occurs well developed among cultureless, nonsymbolizing animals, especially the social insects. But since human societies always operate with symbols and thus possess culture, their social structure and relations are channeled into variable cultural forms instead of being constant, autonomous, and mainly hereditary. *Social culture* is therefore in man always interwoven with value and reality culture." (Kroeber, Alfred L., *The Nature of Culture*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1952, p. 402.)

ihres Ausdrucks und seelischen Erlösungswertes, eine *Wertübertragung*, die zu den sogenannten 'Ausbreitungen' führt."¹⁶

In general, the "transmission of value" takes place because the value itself has a certain universality. However, Weber has clearly pointed out that the essential element of the universality of value remains in this case on the "metalogical" level. Therefore the transmission of value, although made possible because of the universality of value, should be distinguished from that of science and technology which is based on their "logical and universal validity" (*logische Allgemeingültigkeit*).¹⁷

So far we have been inclined to discuss Alfred Weber somewhat in detail. We should not be reluctant to recognize the valuable contribution that Weber has made to our study of cultural transmission. Actually it is Weber who, while recognizing the intransmissibility of the style of a culture, has at the same time so clearly pointed out the two kinds of values, logical and metalogical. Thus he has succeeded in overcoming the one-sided view of Spengler and shed light on the problem of "style" and "value" in transmission.

3. *Logic and Psychology in Transmission*

Among many scholars of civilization, Arnold Toynbee has made a remarkable contribution by introducing his thorough-going observations in the area of dynamics of civilization and acculturation, instead of being entangled with the problems of style of civilization or culture-pattern. He analyzed the problems of contact and transmission between civilizations in the context of the logical and psychological consequences which result in the process of "challenge-and-response"¹⁸ when two civilization *encounter*.

As Toynbee elucidates, all the different elements in a culture-pattern have an inner connection with each other and form "an indivisible whole" or "an organic whole". Furthermore, Toynbee maintains, in the process of contact and transmission between civilizations, there begins to work a "law of governing process of cultural radiation and reception".¹⁹ This means that when a culture-ray of a radioactive civilization gets diffracted into its component strands (economic, political, linguistic, intellectual, technological, scientific, philosophical, artistic, religious and so forth) by the resistance of a foreign social body, those strands that are the most trivial in the cultural value receive the least resistance from the society impinged upon and tend to penetrate faster and farther than the others. This explains the commonly observed fact that technology, for instance, achieves a faster and wider penetration than religion.

One tends to think that technology affects only the superficial layers of life posing little danger against the inherent value system of the native body which has adopted foreign technology. However, this is not always so. When traditional technology is replaced by foreign technology, its effects are not limited on the surface of the native life, but begin to penetrate gradually into its inside, and erode the whole structure of cultural tradition within the nation. This is inevitable because of the indivisible interconnection of the elements that make up a

¹⁶ Weber, A., *op. cit.*, S. 69.

¹⁷ Weber, A., *op. cit.*, S. 67.

¹⁸ For the general explanations on the theme of "challenge-and-response", see: Toynbee, Arnold, *A Study of History*, Vol. II, *The Geneses of Civilizations*, Part Two, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, London 1935, pp. 1-394.

¹⁹ Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. VIII, *Heroic Ages, Contacts between Civilizations in Space*, O.U.P., London 1954, pp. 514, 530.

culture. This process may be more clearly described by the following paragraph:

"The whole of the foreign culture has been given entry, bit by bit, through the gap made in the outer ring of one's cultural defences by the foreign technology's entering wedge."²⁰

In a Toynbeean phrase, such a phenomenon in the game of cultural intercourse is referred to as the process of "One thing leads to another" and called "the second law of cultural radiation and reception."²¹

The "first law" which Toynbee has discovered is also summarized by him in another proverb: "One man's meat is another man's poison."²² The implication is that "a culture element which has been harmless or actually beneficial in the body social in which it is at home is apt to produce novel and devastating effects in an alien body in which it has lodged itself as an exotic and isolated intruder."²³ Toynbee maintains that above two laws are working in the process of the "Diffusion and Transmission of Culture".

Toynbee then analyzes the psychological consequences of encounters between different civilizations. In his analysis he gives separate considerations to the receptive effects on the parties playing the antithetical roles of "agent" and "reagent", or "assailant" and "assaulted". Examining the effect on the agent first, he sees it in terms of "dehumanization."²⁴ That is, the agent is apt to look down on the reagent as an under-dog. And when he turns to examine the response of the assaulted party, he finds two alternative possible reactions which look at first sight as if they were not merely diverse but antithetical: "Zealotism" and "Herodianism."²⁵

Reactions of the Zealotist type are to refuse extensively and even more fanatically an intruding alien civilization. They try to stick strictly to the traditional way of living their own lives and, furthermore, to guard their own indigenous civilization. However, their reactions are destined to fail in the long run. It is because their way of life is inferior in terms of effectiveness to that of the intruders' civilization, which is the object of their resistance.

In contrast to this, reactions of the Herodianist type are to utilize the weapons of the intruding alien civilization, and furthermore to prove themselves equal to the invading civilization by using the borrowed weapon to protect themselves from the intrusion by the original inventors and owners of the weapon. Contrary to the fanatical attitude of Zealots, Herodians behave in a dispassionate and calculating way. However, we have to remember that, even if Herodians could escape from the destiny of defeat — which is the Zealots' lot — they are also doomed to conversion in the end to the way of life of the alien civilization, through the process of Toynbee's laws of "cultural radiation and reception". Cultural borrowing does not remain within the limits of mere borrowing; a borrower will eventually have to sell his own cultural treasures to another in order to clean up his debt. This will cause pain of its own and exert a harmful influence on society.

With respect to the psychological reactions to the intrusion of an alien civilization, it seems that there is a great contrast between Zealots and Herodians; one is passive, the other active. But, in fact these two reactions are nothing but "two variations on an identical theme."²⁶

²⁰ Toynbee, *The World and the West*, p. 55.

²¹ Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. VIII, pp. 542-564.

²² Toynbee, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 530-542.

²³ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, VIII, p. 536.

²⁴ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, VIII pp. 564-580.

²⁵ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 580-623.

²⁶ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, VIII, p. 621.

The only difference between the two is in the sphere of policy, because the principle itself is the same. But Herodians merely intend to introduce the minimum instruments and means required for the purpose of survival. However, it will bring about a certain danger that once certain alien elements are introduced, it would gradually become difficult for them to make a selection of elements.

Aside from the self-defeat of both Zealotism and Herodianism, "there also lies open a middle way of salvation in which a mutual adjustment between the old order and the new departure can arrive at a harmony on a higher level".²⁷ Toynbee writes about the possibility of choice, which is, so to speak, a "synthesis of culture", as "Evangelism", but it will become feasible only by the emergence of some new dynamic force or creative movement from within the society concerned.

4. *Forms of Transmission*

It was Danilewsky (1822-1885) who played the role of pioneer in the field of study which is concerned with matters of cultural-historical patterns of civilization and their movements or transmissions. He divided the patterns of civilization into two types, namely the "*alleinstehende Typen*" and the "*Uebernommene Typen*",²⁸ making a distinction between them, especially emphasizing the latter. The typical types of the former are represented by the civilizations of China and India, while Egyptian, Assyro-Babylonian, Phoenician, Greek, Roman, Hebrew, German-Roman or European civilizations belong to the latter type. The latter type is one the results of whose various activities are transmitted from one civilization to another as the nutrition or fertilizer which gives life to the soil of civilization.

Danilewsky classifies the transmissions of civilization into three forms: (1) *Verpflanzung* (2) *Aufpfropfung* od. *Einimpfung*, and (3) *Bodenverbesserung* od. *verbesserte Ernährung*.²⁹

First, the *Verpflanzung* (transplantation) is the most simple form of transmission and means the transplantation of civilization from one area to another as, for example, the emigration of English people into North America or Australia and the transplant of their own civilization there.

Second, *Aufpfropfung* od. *Einimpfung* (implantation or inoculation) is the type of transmission of civilization which is comparable to the grafting of apple-tree onto a pear-tree. In this case the grafted alien civilization dwells parasitically in the indigenous civilization. In other words, the former blooms and bears fruit at least, getting nutrition from the latter. But in many cases it reduces the development potential of the indigenous civilization. However, the grafted tree (alien civilization) never changes the character of its substance in the least. At any rate the apple-tree is an apple-tree and the pear-tree is a pear-tree. Specifically, in the case of *Aufpfropfung*, the indigenous tree is merely the means of giving nutrition to the newly implanted tree. And the newly implanted tree grows richer and richer from the nutrition of the native tree. The native tree only transfers nutrition to the implanted one and gets no advantage; in the end it is depressed. Therefore, this can be called the most miserable and unproductive type of transmission of civilization.

²⁷ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 624-5.

²⁸ Danilewsky, Nikolai J., *Russland und Europa*, S. 57, 61. The contents of the book were originally published in a form of ten articles appeared in the monthly journal "Zarya" in 1869, in a book form first in 1871 (*Rossiya i Europa*) which was translated by Karl Nützel into German in 1920.

²⁹ Danilewsky, *op. cit.*, S. 69-73.

Contrary to the second form, the third form of transmission, the *Bodenverbesserung* od. *verbesserte Ernährung* (soil improvement or improved nutrition) is the productive one, in which some alien civilization has a favorable effect on the indigenous civilization. The process is as follows: namely, the native civilization takes nutrition from the alien civilization and assimilates, and improves the native soil and utilizes it as the most important component for the *Bodenverbesserung* od. *verbesserte Ernährung*. By doing so, the self-establishment of the promising native civilization on its own soil would get the great profit. In this case, the various results of alien civilization serve for the development of the indigenous one as materials and means. The more transmission varies in both quality and quantity the more it produces remarkable results.

However, it is notable that, as Danilewsky insists, the civilization of the *übernommene Typen* becomes one of the types above mentioned only when it has an exceedingly free relationship to other civilizations and keeps *die ganze Ursprünglichkeit*³⁰ for its civilization, and accepts them with autonomy.

As I have mentioned before, Danilewsky denies the possibility of transmission in so far as *die Grundlagen* (basic principles) of civilization is concerned. However, he acknowledges that the results and methods of science and technology can be transmitted from one civilization to another but what is concerned with the understanding of human beings and society, and the practical application of that understanding never become the object of borrowing because they are associated with *die ganze Ursprünglichkeit*.

Danilewsky writes as follows:

“Unter solchen Bedingungen können und sollen sich die Völker eines Kulturtyps mit den Ergebnissen fremder Erfahrung bekannt machen, indem sie aus ihr das annehmen und sich anpassen, was sozusagen ausserhalb der Sphäre des Volkstums steht, d.h. Ergebnisse und Methoden der exakten Wissenschaft, die technischen Brauche und die Vervollkommungen der Künste und der Industrie. Alles andere aber, insonderheit alles, was sich auf die Erkenntnis des Menschen und der Gesellschaft bezieht und um so mehr auf die praktische Anwendung dieser Erkenntnis, kann überhaupt nicht Gegenstand der Entlehnung sein, vielmehr nur zur Kenntnis genommen werden”.³¹

Accordingly, in order to solve this kind of problem the transmission should be done creatively, standing on the recipient's own *ganze Ursprünglichkeit*. By doing so the recipient will be able to obtain a fruitful effect (*fruchtbringende Einwirkung*) through contact with alien civilizations.

II. *Developmental Patterns of Nationalism in South and Southeast Asia*

1. “Westernization” in terms of Colonization

It was our intention of trying to set up a frame of reference to approach our subject and this is why we have examined in some detail representative theories on culture contact and

³⁰ Danilewsky, *op. cit.*, S. 72.

³¹ Danilewsky, *op. cit.*, SS. 72, 61.

acculturation. Now we shall proceed to explore the developmental patterns of nationalism in non-Western world, especially in the South and Southeast Asian countries, in terms of the frame of reference that we have just built.

The first and foremost thing is that any of the problems of encounters between civilizations after the sixteenth century in these areas can be considered as a problem between the modern West and the non-West. And any impulse of challenge was given from the Western side, to which response was made from the non-Western side.

The second important thing is that the processes of challenge and response were historical facts backed by conquests and colonizations, not by free and peaceful relations, in spite of being recognized as Westernization of the non-West in terms of cultural transmission. Even in the countries which had kept themselves from the fate of being colonized, it seems to me that their windows were opened towards Westernization only for their own survival under the persistent threat, pressure, and fear of colonization. Under the circumstances Westernization was inevitable for them. While Zealot countries were defeated and hence colonized, Herodian countries could manage to continue to exist and remain independent and autonomous. The term "Westernization" actually means, in any case, Westernization associated with colonization.³²

Thirdly, in connection with the second part, it is of importance for the forms of cultural transmission and reception to know whether the society accepting Western cultural values is autonomous or under colonial rule. The former has a somewhat greater spontaneity and free choice in cultural reception, while the latter has no opportunities of choice under colonial force and coercion. Accordingly, cultural transmission in the colonial societies had no alternative but to take the form of *Aufpfropfung* (implantation) in the terminology of Danilewsky. In this case Westernization did not discharge any productive function. On the contrary, it may be considered that the autonomous societies, such as Russia in the eighteenth century, Japan in the nineteenth, Turkey in the early twentieth, and so on, had greater opportunities to realize Westernization in the context of *Bodenverbesserung* (improvement of the soil). In this sense, as we take up the problem of Westernization of the non-Western world, we cannot come to a true knowledge of cultural acculturation in the non-West, without drawing a clear distinction between the two fundamentally different patterns of societies; namely, autonomous vs. colonial society.

2. *Cultural Dualism as Colonial Vestiges*

Proceeding from the fundamental reflections based on the premises stated above, we shall observe, in the main, what has come into existence as a result of cultural transmission in the form of "implantation" mainly in the colonial societies. It may be summarized as follows: what Westernization as colonization has produced, is cultural, social, political and economic dualism or pluralism.

The concept of "dualism" used here is not in the broad sense as applied to both autonomous

³² Lucian Pye clearly points out that "the pattern of the Western impact in Southeast Asia was most conspicuous in the form of colonial rule". Pye, Lucian W., "The Politics of Southeast Asia", *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, ed. by G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1960, p. 99. In his article, Pye analyzes varied patterns of colonial government in Southeast Asian countries.

and colonial society by Almond and Coleman.³³ If I should comply with Almond-Coleman's concept of cultural dualism, I will confine my concept almost entirely to the last one of the three patterns which they discerned; namely, "fusional", "isolative" and "incorporative" patterns of dualism. They speak of their concept of incorporative pattern of dualism in which "the modern and pre-modern (traditional) elements have not combined, or fused, and at the same time they are not sharply antagonistic. Two systems exist side by side."³⁴ It must be admitted that Almond and Coleman are correct in advancing an incorporative dualism hypothesis for some non-Western countries where a modern culture has been introduced. But they regard it as merely transitional in its nature by saying that as "the acculturative process continues, the outcome may turn out to be fusional or isolative, depending on events". Thus they failed to conceive incorporative pattern as a categorical concept and this indicates nothing but a logical consequence of lack of deep understanding of the nature of dualism caused by colonialism.

Incorporative dualism produced by Westernization associated with colonization should be conceived, as Eisenstadt properly suggested, "the specific heritage of unbalanced and uneven change inherent in the colonial and contact situations".³⁵

It was Boeke who first contended a strict concept of incorporative dualism in the context of "social dualism" in which two different social systems exist side by side simultaneously and there take place no transition from one to another in its progression.³⁶ He attached paramount importance to it as a concept basic to the analysis of the social and economic system in Indonesia during the colonial period. He observed, however, the nature of incorporative dualism from a social-psychological point of view and not from that of Dutch colonial impact. Herein lies the limitation of his "dualistic theory".

Why such dualism arose in every sphere of the society is fundamentally due to the fact that colonial policies and administration carried out by the colonizing powers were based upon the two basic principles of "divide-and-rule" and "indirect rule". Both patterns of the principles of colonial rule and of social dualism vary in great measure in accordance with the different conditions of the colonizing powers and with those of the various colonial societies. In any case, it makes no difference that they are all incorporative patterns of dualism. And it is of special interest that they are natural products of the "implantation" form of transmission.

3. *Transmission of National Political Values*

In the next place, what are the characteristics of the political aspects of acculturation? And, what kind of national political values were introduced into dependent societies? To my way of thinking the most basic national political values implied in the idea of the modern nation-state of the West seem to be the three-fold concept of "national independence", "political unity", and "democratic freedom". These value concepts had been established in the historical process of endogenous development of Western societies during about three hundred and fifty

³³ Almond writes as follows: "This dualism of political structure is not only characteristic of modern Western political systems but of non-Western and primitive ones". (Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 23.)

³⁴ Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

³⁵ Eisenstadt, S. N., "Approaches to the Problem of Political Development in Non-Western Countries", *World Politics*, Vol. IX, No. 3, April 1957, p. 452-453.

³⁶ Boeke, J. H., *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia*, N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953, pp. 3-5. And see my article: "Some Notes on the Controversy Concerning Boeke's 'Dualistic Theory': Implications for the Theory of Economic Development in Underdeveloped Countries", *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics*, Vol. I, No. 1, October 1960, pp. 13-28.

years from the Renaissance and Reformation in the fifteenth and sixteenth century to the French Revolution and Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century. When the Western colonial empires engaged in colonizing activities in a most systematic way, these three basic concepts had been already self-evident for them. But, the concepts of national independence and political unity were excluded from transmission, because it was the first principle of colonization not to give these two concepts to colonies. However, there was inevitably a transmission of the concept of democratic freedom to the colonial societies as a concomitant of having introduced economic liberalism in these areas in order to pursue the economic interests which were the original purpose of colonization. But it should be noted that the concept of democratic freedom transmitted into colonial societies had nothing to do with the problem of legitimacy of political power or authority of colonial rulers, because it had to be intact or tabu among themselves. In this sense the transmission of the concept was rigidly in the form of "implantation". Accordingly, any form of democratic political institutions established in the colonial societies for the implementation of democratic freedom was distorted. Nevertheless, it can safely be said that the concept of democratic freedom was the only one which was transmitted in the course of Westernization during the colonial period.

4. *Developmental Patterns of Asian Nationalism*

(a) *Colonial Period*: Asian nationalism arose generally from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century and, as a whole, followed a two-phase development in the colonial period. The early phase of development of colonial nationalism bears the following two aspects: The first is that of "cultural nationalism",³⁷ in which the very early political leaders initiated movement of appreciating and spreading the colonist concept of democratic freedom as their own problem. And the second is that of a movement that demanded from their colonial rulers the removal of obstacles to sound development of the concept. Their demand was, in a word, nothing but a desire for social equality or a desire for social non-discrimination in terms of democratic freedom.

The later phase of colonial nationalism was promoted by political leaders who had realized that wholesome development of democratic freedom could not be fully achieved without attaining national independence and political unity. For this reason they were fervently aware of no alternative to removing the colonial rulers in order to achieve the sovereign independence of their own nation. "Political nationalism"³⁸ allied with a desire for political independence developed in this phase, and irreversible anti-colonialism proceeded.

Needless to say, the promoters of these movements were indigenous intelligentsia. They were those who had fully learned the intrinsic national political values of Western nationalism. In this way almost all colonial countries in Asia achieved independence after World War II.

³⁷ *The early leaders of cultural nationalism*: José Rizal in the Philippines, Phan Boi Chau in Vietnam, U Ottama and U May Qung of Y. M. B. A. in Burma, Kaum Muda in Malaya, Raden Adjeng Kartini and Wahidin Soediro Hoesodo of Boedi Oetomo in Indonesia, Raja Ram Mohun Roy in India, Sayyid Ahmad Khan in Pakistan.

³⁸ *The early leaders of political nationalism*: Emilio Aguinaldo in the Philippines, Nguyen Thai Hoc and Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi-minh) in Vietnam, Thakins in Burma, Ibrahim bin Jaacob in Malaya, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta in Indonesia, B. G. Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi in India, Mohammad Ail Jinnah and Mohammad Iqbal in Pakistan.

(b) *Post-Independence Period*: The problem of periodization of this stage seems to be difficult for us because the independence of new states in Asia was achieved successively from 1946 (the Philippines) to 1957 (Malaya), and they are still in fluid transition. If I may venture to generalize, it should be noted that the year of 1958 is supposed to be a remarkable watershed in the political scenes of most Asian countries. "The pre-1958 phase" was the period during which political democracy had been tested, and "the post-1958 phase" is the period during which a remarkable tendency can be seen towards authoritarianism, symbolized by the emergence of a "modernizing military oligarchy"³⁹ substituted for a decaying constitutional democracy. Let us now consider the alteration of political systems from the one to the other in the context of transmission of national political values.

The problem which post-independence nationalism in Asia confronted was the achievement of national political unity and democratic freedom. At this moment, it should be recalled clearly that political institutions of the Western democratic pattern had been already implanted to a greater or lesser degree before independence and had operated in a limited and distorted form within an iron frame of political unity imposed by the colonial power. In addition, it has also to be recalled that the preservation and maintenance of constitutional or parliamentary democracy had been, so to speak, imposed by suzerain powers upon the new states as one of the essential conditions of transfer of sovereign power. As a matter of fact, almost all independent countries in Asia made efforts in the direction of democratic ideas and institutions based on Western patterns of constitutionalism: government, parliament, political parties, general elections, and so forth. But it became clear between 1956 and 1958 that Western political institutions were neither workable nor effective in these new states.⁴⁰ A major cause is the lack or weakness of national political unity, which is an essential precondition of democratic freedom.

For the establishment of national political unity, there must exist an authority of some kind, and this authority must be a symbol of national cohesion or national political consensus. Here arises one of the basic political problems, namely that of legitimacy of political authority. The Western pattern for the solution of this problem of legitimacy has been to establish representative institutions on a basis of political competitiveness, political participation, civilian rule, public liberties, and so on, which are closely associated with democratic political values. But historically it took no less than three hundred years to achieve. Moreover, a two-stage development was required. The first stage was that of centralized unity called "absolutism" in the political sphere, and "mercantilism" in the economic sphere. The next stage of democratic freedom was called "democracy" politically, and "liberalism" economically.

Not only has the independence of Asian countries not automatically brought about political unity, it is also nearly impossible to create political unity from prejudiced ideas and distorted institutions of democratic freedom inherited from the pre-independence period, for they were only the products of "implantation". The primary and pressing task for the new states is the creation and strengthening of political unity. But for the sake of its ultimate realization, it is

³⁹ Shils, Edward, *Political Development in the New States*, 's-Gravenhage, Mouton & Co., 1962, pp. 67-75; Johnson, John J. (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1962, pp. 49-59.

⁴⁰ For the analysis of the causes of the breakdowns of political modernization in the new states, see: Eisenstadt, S. N., "Breakdowns of Modernization", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. XII, No. 4, July 1964, pp. 345-367.

rather necessary to attach less value to democratic freedom, regarding it as second in importance to political unity. This is clearly illustrated by the decline of constitutional democracy in 1958.⁴¹ As a consequence, the strengthening of charismatic leadership or the rise of military oligarchy as a substitute has come to the foreground. Attention is, at present, focused on national political integration⁴² rather than legal legitimacy.

In spite of this prevailing situation, however, it seems worthwhile to note that it should not be considered that the new states abandoned political democracy, regarding it as valueless in the sense of principle. Rather it should be interpreted that the implementation of democracy was postponed to the next phase in the light of the nature of challenging task of national integration. Stated another way, people did not make any "substitution-choice" in terms of political alternatives either democracy or authoritarianism, but they made only "postponement-choice"⁴³ of democracy in terms of stagewise development. It was not for them the problem of value order, but that of sequential order of development. It is only in this sense that the political system of the new states in Asia rapidly and strongly inclined to the authoritarian pattern.

In short, it may be concluded that the historical development of Asian nationalism has been passing through the following two stages with four phases in terms of national political values during the colonial period and the post-independence period.

A. *The Developmental Patterns of Asian Nationalism*

I. Colonial Stage

1. Early Phase: Desire for Social Equality
(Cultural Nationalism)
2. Late Phase: Aspirations for National Independence
(Political Nationalism)

II. Post-Independence Stage

1. Pre-1958 Phase: [semi-enforced] Desire for Democratic Freedom
(The Decline of Constitutional Democracy)
2. Post-1958 Phase: Aspirations for Political Unity and National Integration
(The Rise of Charismatic or Military Authoritarianism)

B. *The Developmental Patterns of Western Nationalism*

| | I Authoritarian Stage | II Democratic Stage |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Political Values | Political Unity | Democratic Freedom |
| Political System | Absolutism | Political Democracy |
| Economic Values | National Economic Integration | Social Economic Differentiation |
| Economic System | Mercantilism | Economic Liberalism |
| | Political-Economic Centralization | Political-Economic Competitiveness |

⁴¹ For an excellent case study for that, see: Feith, Herbert, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1962, 618 pp.

5. *Revolutionary and "Eclectic" Character of Asian Nationalism*

Lastly, I would like to refer briefly to two distinguishing characteristics of Asian nationalism in the post-independence period.

The first one is its *revolutionary* character, determined chiefly by the following three causes. Firstly, there is a psychological climate of impatience among people, who can no longer rely upon the orderly process of gradualism. Because no noticeable improvement of living conditions has taken place after independence, an urgent need for economic development is emphasized. Secondly, chasms and rigidities of social-economic dualism (which are in large part colonial vestiges) seem the major impediments to the rapid realization of national economic values in terms of national economic integration.⁴⁴ That is why revolutionary measures, as illustrated by hastily executed nationalization policies, are occasionally adopted. Thirdly, there is little relief from discontent and frustration about present conditions as long as they follow the same principles of capitalism and liberal democracy as the Western nations. In this case, as an effective counterattack to Westernization, they search for alternative means and may adopt socialism, communism, and totalitarianism based upon principles contrary to those of Westernization. This can be thought a kind of "futurism",⁴⁵ a concept from Toynbee which means taking a flying leap out of the present into uncertain future.

The second distinguishing characteristic of Asian nationalism is, to use Francis Carnell's terminology, that of "eclecticism".⁴⁶ This eclectic character has not yet become a definite pattern in those countries still in a process of transition. This "eclecticism" is to be understood as an attempt to bring about what may be called a new "synthesis of culture"⁴⁷ by renovating their own traditional value system and combining it with the values of foreign culture. A new political system in Asia should not always be just a simple copy of the Western political one. There should be some searching for a new form that differs from both Western and indigenous forms. Although difficult, efforts in this direction have already started.

To take an example, we might call attention to the ideologies of "Guided Democracy" (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) and "Socialisme à la Indonesia" advocated by Soekarno in Indonesia. Regardless of whether it is realistic or unrealistic, *Konsepsi Soekarno* attempts to create a new form of democracy based on a democratic and co-operative spirit and *gotong rojong* way of

⁴² With regard to this point, the following articles are very suggestive: "Political Integration and Political Development", by Myron Weiner and "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders", by Ann Ruth Willner and Dorothy Willner, *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science* (New Nations: The Problem of Political Development) Vol. 358, March 1965, pp. 52-64, 77-88.

⁴³ These terms are used by Professor Hirschman, Albert O. in his work, *The Strategy of Economic Development*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1958, p. 77.

⁴⁴ Myrdal placed much emphasis upon a building-up of "national economic integration" for economic development in underdeveloped countries. He writes as follows: "The relations between relative lack of national economic integration and relative economic backwardness run both ways." (Myrdal, Gunnar, *Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions*, Gerald Duckworth, London 1957, p. 51.)

⁴⁵ "Futurism attempts to break with an irksome Present by taking a flying leap out of it into a Future." (Toynbee, Arnold, *A Study of History*, Vol. VI, p. 97.)

⁴⁶ Carnell, Francis, "Political Ideas and Ideologies in South and South-East Asia", *Politics in Southern Asia*, ed. by Saul Rose, Macmillan, London 1963, pp. 279-295.

⁴⁷ "It is one of our major assumptions that the acute consciousness of a specifically Asian predicament, which has led either to search for satisfying synthesis of Asian and Western ideologies or to search for alternative Asian political ideologies (what we might call Asian romanticism), has been strongest in countries like India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma". (Carnell, *ibid.*, p. 268.)

life that is indigenously Indonesian and can be seen in the villages in Java, where any dispute among people is settled by means of *musjawarat* and *mufakat*, or unanimous consent by free talking. Soekarno insists that such a traditional democratic institution should be applied to modern national politics. Naturally, there must be great practical difficulties in extending this political institution from the village level to the national level. Furthermore, there are other difficulties involved in the concept of "guided democracy" in the sense of how the concept of guidance will theoretically be reconciled with that of democracy. Nevertheless, it should be clearly noted that Soekarno intends to achieve a synthesis between Western political institutions and the political ideas and institutions of the Indonesian political tradition. It would not be proper to condemn Soekarnoism as mere dictatorship or a disguised Oriental despotism. But still it is doubtful whether Soekarnoism will ever lead to a new cultural synthesis. It is my opinion that it should properly be understood as the "eclecticism" that emerges in transitional societies.⁴⁸ In general, I feel it is premature rather than wrong to make any definite assessment of the pattern of political acculturation of Asian countries in transition.

In view of my examination of theories of civilizations, it should be particularly emphasized that any transmitted political and cultural values, with the exception of technology and science, will remain an *imitation déformé* and will be unable to fulfill socially productive functions unless the transmitted values are imbued with the style of the receiving indigenous culture and hence endowed with a dynamic creativity from within

⁴⁸ Many cases are presented before us. Ayub Khan's "Basic Democracies" and "Islamic Socialism" in Pakistan, Burma's "Burmese Way to Socialism", India's "Democratic Socialism" or "Sarvodaya Socialism" (Vinoba Bhave), Nepal's "Panchayat Democracy", Cambodian "Sangkum Reastr Niyum" (People's Socialist Community) or "Royal Democracy" based on the political ideas of "True Socialist and Egalitarian Democracy", and so on. They are all searching for a new pattern based on a new appraisal of traditional values and the unique style of national life. We cannot disregard the reality of that sort, even it might be called "Asian romanticism".