Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America

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The Latin American *dependentistas* produced a knowledge that criticized the Eurocentric assumptions of the *cepalistas*, including the orthodox Marxist and the North American modernization theories. The *dependentista* school critique of stagism and developmentalism was an important intervention that transformed the imaginary of intellectual debates in many parts of the world. However, I will argue that many *dependentistas* were still caught in the developmentalism, and in some cases even the stagism, that they were trying to overcome. Moreover, although the *dependentistas*' critique of stagism was important in denying the "denial of coevalness" that Johannes Fabian (1983) describes as central to Eurocentric constructions of "otherness," some *dependentistas* replaced it with new forms of denial of coevalness. The first part of this article discusses developmentalist ideology and what I call "feudalmania" as part of the *longue durée* of modernity in Latin America. The second part discusses the *dependentistas*' developmentalism. The third part is a critical discussion of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's version of dependency theory. Finally, the fourth part discusses the *dependentistas*' concept of culture.

Developmentalist Ideology and Feudalmania as Part of the Ideology of Modernity in Latin America

There is a tendency to present the post-1945 development debates in Latin America as unprecedented. In order to distinguish continuity from discontinuity, we must place the 1945–90 development debates in the context of the *longue durée* of Latin American history. The 1945–90 development

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debates in Latin America, although seemingly radical, in fact form part of the *longue durée* of the geoculture of modernity that has dominated the modern world-system since the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century. Before I can elaborate this further, I must, however, clarify some historical and conceptual points. The idea that anything new is necessarily good and desirable because we live in an era of progress is fundamental to the ideology of modernity (Wallerstein 1992a, 1992b). This idea can be traced to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, which asserted the possibility of a conscious rational reform of society, the idea of progress, and the virtues of science vis-à-vis religion.

The modern idea that treated each individual as a free centered subject with rational control over his or her destiny was extended to the nation-state level. Each nation-state was considered to be sovereign and free to rationally control its progressive development. The further elaboration of these ideas in classical political economy produced the grounds for the emergence of a developmentalist ideology. Developmentalism is linked to liberal ideology and to the idea of progress. For instance, one of the central questions addressed by political economists was how to increase the wealth of nations. Different prescriptions were recommended by different political economists; namely, some were free-traders and others neomercantilist. In spite of their policy discrepancies, they all believed in national development and in the inevitable progress of the nation-state through the rational organization of society. The main bone of contention was how to ensure more wealth for a nation-state. According to Immanuel Wallerstein,

> This tension between a basically protectionist versus a free trade stance became one of the major themes of policy-making in the various states of the world-system in the nineteenth century. It often was the most significant issue that divided the principal political forces of particular states. It was clear by then that a central ideological theme of the capitalist world-economy was that every state could, and indeed eventually probably would, reach a high level of national income and that conscious, rational action would make it so. This fit very well with the underlying Enlightenment theme of inevitable progress and the teleological view of human history that it incarnated. (1992a, 517)

Developmentalism became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy. In the Latin American periphery these ideas were appropriated in the late eighteenth century by the Spanish Creole elites, who adapted them to their own agenda. Since most of the elites were linked to, or part of, the agrarian landowner class, which produced goods through coerced forms of labor to sell for a profit in the world market, they were very eclectic in their selection of which Enlightenment ideas they wished to utilize. Free trade and national sovereignty were ideas they defended as part of their struggle against the Spanish colonial monopoly of trade. However, for racial and class reasons, the modern ideas about individual freedom, rights of man, and equality were underplayed. There were no major social transformations of Latin American societies after the independence revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Creole elites left untouched the colonial noncapitalist forms of coerced labor as well as the racial/ethnic hierarchies. White Creole elites maintained after independence a racial hierarchy where Indians, blacks, mestizos, mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom. This is what Aníbal Quijano (1993) calls "coloniality of power."

During the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the new core power and the new model of civilization. The Latin American Creole elites established a discursive opposition between Spain's "backwardness, obscurantism and feudalism" and Great Britain's "advanced, civilized and modern" nation. Leopoldo Zea, paraphrasing José Enrique Rodó, called this the new "northernmania" (*nordomanía*), that is, the attempt by Creole elites to see new "models" in the North that would stimulate development while in turn developing new forms of colonialism (Zea 1986, 16–17). The subsequent nineteenth-century characterization by the Creole elites of Latin America as "feudal" or in a backward "stage" served to justify Latin American subordination to the new masters from the North and is part of what I call "feudalmania," which would continue throughout the twentieth century.

Feudalmania was a device of "temporal distancing" (Fabian 1983) to produce a knowledge that denied coevalness between Latin America and the so-called advanced European countries. The denial of coevalness created a double ideological mechanism. First, it concealed European responsibility in the exploitation of the Latin American periphery. By not sharing the same historical time and existing in different geographical spaces, each region's destiny was conceived as unrelated to each other region's. Second,

living different temporalities, where Europe was said to be at a more advanced stage of development than Latin America, reproduced a notion of European superiority. Thus Europe was the "model" to imitate and the developmentalist goal was to "catch up." This is expressed in the dichotomy *civilization/barbarism* seen in figures such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina.

The use of both neomercantilist and liberal economic ideas enabled the nineteenth-century Iberoamerican elites to oscillate between protectionist and free-trade positions depending on the fluctuations of the world economy. When they were benefiting from producing agrarian or mining exports in the international division of labor dominated at the time by British imperialism, liberal economic theories provided them with the rational justification for their role and goals. But when foreign competition or a world economic crisis was affecting their exports to the world market, they shifted production toward the internal markets and employed neomercantilist arguments to justify protectionist policies. In Chile, Argentina, and Mexico there were neomercantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school[1] and by some of the *dependentistas* (Potasch 1959; Frank 1970; Chiaramonte 1971). For example, the 1870s developmentalist debate was the most important economic debate in Argentina during the nineteenth century and one of the most important in Latin America. An industrial development plan using protectionist neomercantilist policies was proposed. This movement was led by a professor of political economy at the University of Buenos Aires and member of the Cámara de Diputados, Vicente F. López. López's group was supported by the agrarian landowners, artisans, peasants, and incipient industrial capitalists. Although all of them were protectionists, not all were economic nationalists. The protectionist position of the agrarian landowners was due to the 1866 and 1873 world economic crises, which had negatively affected export prices on wool, Argentina's major export item at the time. Thus López promoted the development of a national cloth industry as a transitional solution to the world depression. The movement ended once the wool producers shifted to cattle raising and meat exports.

However, the group of deputies led by López developed neomercantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL

school and by some of the *dependentistas.* Influenced by the late 1830s Argentinean romantic generation (e.g., Juan Bautista Alberdi, Esteban Echevarria), López defended a historicist/idiographic approach against the universalism of liberal political economists (Chiaramonte 1971, 128–29, 133–34). According to López, the idea of free trade is not an absolute principle; rather, its application depends on the particular conditions of each country. If free trade was beneficial for the industrial development of foreign countries, in the Argentinean case, where different industrial and economic structures were present, free trade was not a solution. In the first phase of industrial development, industries need protection from foreign competition. As one of the protectionist group members, Lucio V. López, said in 1873, "It is a mistake to believe that political economy offers and contains inmutable principles for all nations" (Chiaramonte 1971, 129–30). This critique of the nomothetic/universalist approach of core state intellectuals is even stronger in the thesis of one of Vicente F. López's disciples, Aditardo Heredia, who attacked European intellectuals' social conceptions as ahistorical and metaphysical. Heredia criticized in particular the European Enlightenment thinkers for aspiring to develop a social science guided by universal and inflexible principles, similar to geometric theorems or algebraic formulas, without attention to the peculiar historical conditions of each nation (130). Carlos Pellegrini, one of the leading protectionist deputies, said as early as 1853 that Adam Smith's beautiful deductions did not pay enough attention to an aspect that influences all human institutions: time (133). The debate was a classical nomothetic-idiographic confrontation. The Argentinean scholars opposed a theory based on a concept of an eternal time/space with more particularistic and historicist arguments.

The originality of their arguments was to articulate an economic policy in support of a nationalist industrialization project in the periphery of the world economy and to identify relations with England as part of the source of Argentina's underdevelopment. The economic nationalism of Vicente F. López and his group offered a critique of the dependent relations of Argentina with England and other European centers as early as the 1870s (Chiaramonte 1971, 192–93). Regarding this point, we can quote the following statements made by this protectionist group, which can show some similarities with certain CEPAL-*dependentista* positions one hundred years later:

> It is very beautiful . . . to speak of free trade . . . this word *freedom* . . . is so beautiful! But we must understand freedom.

For the English who favor free trade, freedom is to allow English factories to manufacture the foreign products, to allow the English merchant to sell the foreign product. This type of freedom transforms the rest of the world into tributary countries; while England is the only nation that enjoys freedom, the remainder are tributary nations; but I do not understand free trade in this manner. By *free trade* I understand an exchange of finished goods for finished goods. The day our wool can be exported not in the form of a raw material, but rather as a finished frock coat in exchange for England's iron needles or clock strings, then I would accept free trade, that is, a finished product from our country for a finished product from England. But if free trade consists of sending our wool . . . so England may wash it (when I speak of England I also mean Europe and the rest of the world), manufacture it, and sell it to us through English merchants, brought on English ships and sold by English agents, I do not understand; this is not free trade, this is making a country that does not possess this industry a tributary country. Thus, let's follow the path of protectionism, given that if we see the history of the manufacturing countries, we will find that their progress is due to protectionism. (Speech by Finance Minister Rufino Varela in the legislature in 1876; cited in Chiaramonte 1971, 182–83)

In the English Parliament, one of the illustrious defenders of free trade said that he would like, upholding his doctrine, to make of England the factory of the world and of America the farm of England. He said something very true . . . that to a great extent has been realized, because in effect we are and will be for a long time, if we do not solve this problem, the farm of the great manufacturing nations. (Speech by Carlos Pellegrini at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 189)

It is impossible to be independent when a country is not self-sufficient, when it does not have all it needs to consume. . . . I know well what the remedies are: they are to have capital to pay ourselves for the elaboration of products and their adaptation for consumption. Only in this way would the country have independence and credit and be saved through its own efforts.

> (Speech by Vicente F. López at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 27)

> It has been recognized that political independence cannot exist without industrial and mercantile independence. (Speech by a protectionist deputy in 1874; 192)

> (It is not necessary) to be permanently dependent on foreign capital. . . . I am completely opposed to the establishment of companies with foreign capital. (Deputy Seeber in 1877; 185)

Although this nationalist group was questioning the tenets of traditional liberal political economy and the location of Argentina within the world division of labor (Chiaramonte 1971, 193), it is important to indicate that they were committed to a nationalist liberalism. They defended protectionism as a transitory, although necessary, stage to direct the country toward economic liberalism. They criticized the supporters of the free-market doctrine because this policy maintained the subordination of Argentina to England. They wished to restrict momentarily the full implementation of economic liberalism as a means of achieving it later: The newborn industries needed protection, but once they grew, free markets should be encouraged (191). This doctrine is very close to those of the German political economist Frederich List and the North American Casey, who also promoted protectionism against England as a necessary developmental stage. However, although their names were mentioned several times during the 1870s parliamentary debate (135), the dominant influence upon the Argentinian protectionists in the 1870s came from their own intellectual tradition (134–35). In sum, they were commited to national capitalist development through the formation of a local industrial bourgeoisie.

Other countries in Latin America, such as Mexico (Potasch 1959) and Chile (Frank 1970) had similar debates during the nineteenth century. Probably the most extreme case in terms of the free-trade and protectionist debates was nineteenth-century Paraguay, where a protectionist regime led by Dr. Francia and the López family was destroyed by a military intervention of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, aided by the British, to install a free-trade regime. Six out of seven Paraguayan males were killed in the Triple Alliance War. This war was a turning point for the triumph of the free-trade doctrine, which dominated in Latin America during the nineteenth century, the period of British hegemony. Agrarian and mining

capitalists profited from selling raw materials or crops to, and buying manufactured products from, the British, rather than attempting to compete with them through industrialization.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Spencerian evolutionism and Comtian scientism joined forces to form the Latin American version of positivism, which provided the ideological justification for both the economic subordination to the "empire of free trade" and the political domination of the dictatorships of "order and progress." Scientism, progress, truth, property, evolutionary stagism, and order were all Enlightenment themes reproduced in Auguste Comte's positivist and Herbert Spencer's evolutionary doctrines. They were both used in the Latin American periphery to justify the penetration of foreign capital investments and to promote economic liberalism against "backwardness" and "feudalism." Evolutionary stagism, inevitable progress, and optimism in science and technology combined to form a teleological view of human history that strengthened the basis of developmentalist ideology. As a result of the U.S. military invasions in the region, the Mexican revolution in 1910, and the disillusionment with liberalism during the First World War, a new wave of nationalism emerged among Latin American elites. Once again, after the First World War, there was a radical questioning of economic liberalism, this time focused against the new *hegemon* in the region, the United States of America.

The nationalists promoted protectionist policies and state intervention while the positivists defended free market policies. Yet between the nationalist ideology of the Mexican revolutionaries and the positivism of Porfirio Díaz's dictatorship, there were more continuities than is commonly accepted. Both promoted the feudalmania ideology and believed that the implementation of the proper policies would move the country away from its backwardness toward progress. Both nationalism and positivism asserted faith in progress and science and in the rational control/development of the national economy through a strong nation-state. Both shared a developmentalist ideology. Each made use of feudalmania's representation of past regimes as "backward" and "barbaric" to gain legitimation.

Similar debates emerged from the world's revolutionary experiences in the 1910s, anticipating once again some of the arguments developed in the post-1945 debates. The most important was that between Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre and José Carlos Mariátegui in Peru during the 1920s. The influence of Marxist ideas following the Russian Revolution set the terms of the debate. This time the problematic of development was centered around the character of the revolution. The belief in accelerating the historical

processes toward progress through revolutionary upheavals could be found in Latin American elites since the nineteenth century (Villegas 1986, 95). But it was twentieth-century Leninism that popularized the idea of a rational revolution enlightened by a scientific theory and implemented by a revolutionary party.

Both Haya de la Torre and Mariátegui reproduced some of the nineteenth century's favorite liberal concepts (e.g., the feudal character of Peru), but with a Marxist flavor. The revolution was a radical means to achieve the project of modernity: national development, a rational control of society through a scientific theory (Marxism), the eradication of ignorance and "feudal" backwardness. They both condemned imperialism and the landlord class, favoring agrarian reform and industrialization as a solution for Peru.

Haya de la Torre, applying his particular version of Marxism, concluded that capitalism in Latin America did not follow the same trajectory that it had in Europe due to the "feudal" backwardness created by centuries of Spanish colonialism. If imperialism was the last stage of capitalism in Europe, it was just the first stage in Latin America. Thus, the Aprista revolution[2] should pursue the constitution of an anti-imperialist nationalist capitalism allied to an independent bourgeoisie and led by the petite bourgeoisie (Villegas 1986, 96–97). Due to the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, he proposed the need for a strong interventionist anti-imperialist state to lead economic development.

Mariátegui believed that the feudal latifundio and capitalist relations form part of a single capitalist international system, opposing Haya's dualism (Quijano 1981; Vanden 1986). Accordingly, there could be no progressive role for capitalism in Peru. Capitalism as a system would not allow the development of an independent national capitalism. Moreover, international capitalism was linked to and reproduced the precapitalist relations in Peru. This is the first Latin American attempt to break with the denial of coevalness within the Marxist tradition. Rather than characterizing semifeudal forms of labor as part of a "backward" and "underdeveloped" mode of production, Mariátegui conceptualized them as produced by the international capitalist system. In this conceptualization, semifeudal forms are not a residual from the past, but a labor form of the present world capitalist system.

Mariátegui proposed a socialist revolution as the only solution for Peru's underdevelopment. It was through the Indians' *ayllu* (communal

property) that Peru could skip the capitalist stage and make a direct transition from feudal forms to socialism. This revolution should be organized by a broad alliance between workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals led by a proletarian party. The so-called national bourgeoisie had no revolutionary role to play.

This debate would again reappear in quite similar terms between some Communist parties and *dependentista* intellectuals during the 1960s and 1970s. The Haya-Mariátegui debate had profound effects on the *dependentista* positions and on the political programs of many political parties in Latin America.

In sum, contemporary developmentalist choices between free trade and protectionism have a long history in Latin America. These debates have emerged several times in the last two hundred years with different programs and political projects. The *dependentista* school was a radical version of the protectionist program in Latin America. Their solution for dependency was to delink from the capitalist world system and to organize a socialist society insulated from the influence and control of metropolitan capitalism. As we will discuss below, the *dependentista* school reproduced a particular version of developmentalist ideology. Needless to say, nineteenth-century developmentalist themes continue to be very much alive today.

Dependentismo and *Cepalismo*: Same Developmentalist Assumptions?

Three important events in the early 1960s provided the social context for the emergence of the dependency school: (1) the crisis of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy in Latin America; (2) the Cuban Revolution; and (3) the concentration of an important generation of exiled left-wing intellectuals in Santiago due to the wave of military coups that began in 1964 with the Brazilian coup.

First, the import substitution industrialization crisis initiated a debate questioning some of the sacred principles of the CEPAL school. All the problems that the ISI strategy was supposed to solve had been aggravated instead. Rather than importing consumer goods, Latin America started importing capital goods in the early 1950s. The latter were more expensive than the former. Moreover, most of the new industries were created by multinational corporations in search of Latin America's local markets. As a result, by the early 1960s, after a decade of import substitution industrialization, balance of payments deficits, trade deficits, increased marginalized populations, and inflation continued to affect the region.

Second, the Cuban Revolution transformed the political imaginary of many Latin Americans. The Communist parties had been arguing for years that Latin America's "feudal" character required a capitalist revolution under the leadership of the local bourgeoisie. Following that logic, Communist parties supported populist regimes such as that of Getúlio Dornelles Vargas in Brazil and dictators like Fulgencio Batista and Anastasio Somoza. Castro ignored the orthodox Communist dogmas. In spite of how we may conceptualize the Cuban Revolution today, at the time it was considered to be a socialist revolution. For many, Cuba was living proof of the possibility for an alternative path of development "outside the world capitalist system." This provided the political basis for questioning the characterization by the Communist parties of the region as "feudal." Instead, the new leftist movement claimed that Latin America's priority should be not to develop capitalism in alliance with the "national bourgeoisie," as the Communist parties alleged, but to start immediately armed struggles for the socialist revolution. Guerrilla movements proliferated all over the region, attempting to repeat the Cuban experience.

Third, due to the military coups in the region, a young generation of left-wing intellectuals were exiled in Santiago where they worked at the CEPAL and in Chilean universities. This generation, critical of the Communist parties' orthodox version of Marxism and influenced by the new leftist ideas inspired by the Cuban Revolution, contributed to the critical revision of the CEPAL's doctrine. This generation of intellectuals came to be known worldwide as the dependency school.

The dependency school waged a political and theoretical struggle on three fronts: against the neodevelopmentalist ideology of the CEPAL, against the orthodox Marxism of the Latin American Communist parties, and against the modernization theory of U.S. academicians. Though these three traditions were diverse, they shared a dualistic view of social processes. Accordingly, the problem of Latin American societies was understood to be the archaic, traditional, and/or feudal structures that needed to be overcome in order to become more advanced, modern, and capitalist. This "time distanciation" reproduced the nineteenth-century Eurocentric feudalmania. Latin America was supposed to be lagging behind the United States and Europe due to its "archaic" structures.

By contrast to the *cepalistas*, the *dependentistas* criticized the import substitution industrialization model and the role of the "national" bourgeoisie. Prior to 1950, Latin American anti-imperialist movements struggled for the industrialization of the region as a so-called solution to

the subordination to the capitalist centers. The imperialist alliance between foreign capital and the local landed oligarchy was an obstacle to the industrialization of Latin America. The peripheral role assigned to Latin America in the international division of labor was to export primary products to the centers. However, as of 1950, with the proliferation of multinationals and a "new international division of labor," industrialization to produce goods for the internal markets of Latin America was not in contradiction with the interest of international capital. The protectionist tariffs of the import substitution industrialization strategy and the search for cheaper labor costs increased foreign industrial investments in the Latin American periphery. Thus the nature of dependency was not any longer an industrial dependency, but a technological dependency. The problems with the balance of payments that the import substitution industrialization attempted to solve were dramatically aggravated due to the technological dependence on the centers. Rather than importing consumer goods, Latin Americans were forced to import machinery, new technologies, patents, and licenses for which they needed to pay still more. The "national" bourgeoisie became associated with multinational corporations. They were dependent on foreign capitalists for technology, machinery, and finance. Thus, according to the *dependentistas*, the "national" bourgeoisie did not represent a progressive or reliable ally to dismantle the structures of the world capitalist system that reproduce "underdevelopment" in the periphery.

The *dependentistas* challenged the orthodox Communist parties' portrayal of Latin America as feudal. According to the orthodox Marxist dogma, all societies had to pass through successive fixed stages to achieve socialism. It followed that Latin America, to the degree that it was not yet capitalist, had to first reach the capitalist stage of development. It could do so by an alliance of the working classes with the "national bourgeoisie" in order to eradicate feudalism and create the conditions for capitalism, after which the struggle for socialism might begin. This theory assumed an eternal time/space framework by generalizing the purported stages of national development of European countries to the rest of the world. Rather than stimulate capitalism, dependency scholars prescribed a radical and immediate transformation of the social structures toward socialism. According to their analysis, if the region's underdevelopment was due to the capitalist system, more capitalism is not a solution. The solution is to eradicate capitalism through a socialist revolution.

The *dependentistas* also criticized the modernization theories. Although this is not the place for a detailed exposition of the modernization

approach to development, it is important to introduce some of its most influential authors. Modernization theorists such as Bert F. Hoselitz (1960) and Walt W. Rostow (1960) assumed the Eurocentric denial of coevalness. They divided societies into modern and traditional sectors. Hoselitz, using the Parsonian pattern variables, developed a classificatory schema to define each sector. In modern societies, relationships tend to be universalistic, functionally specific, and people are evaluated by their achievements. In traditional societies, relationships are particularistic, functionally diffused, and people are evaluated by ascribed status. Accordingly, development consists of changing cultural values from the latter to the former.

In Rostow's schema, development is a five-stage process from traditional to modern society. Using the metaphor of an airplane, Rostow's stages are as follows: stationary (traditional society), preconditions for takeoff, takeoff, drive to maturity, and high mass-consumption society (modern society). In terms of our topic, Rostow and Hoselitz universalized what they considered to be the cultural features or the more advanced stages of development of the United States and Western European countries. Thus, similar to the orthodox mode of production theory of the Communist parties, the modernization theorists assumed an eternal/universal time/space notion of stages through which every society should pass. Moreover, they assumed the superiority of the "West" by creating a time/space distanciation between the "advanced" modern societies and the "backward" traditional societies.

The struggle between the modernization and the *dependentista* theories was a struggle between two geocultural locations. The "locus of enunciation" (Mignolo 1995) of the modernization theorists was North America. The Cold War was a constitutive part of the formation of the modernization theory. The ahistorical bias of the theory was an attempt to produce a universal theory from the experience and ideology of the core of the world economy. On the other hand, the *dependentistas* developed a theory from the loci of enunciation of the Latin American periphery. The attempt was not to universalize but to produce a particular theory for this region of the world.

Five important *dependentista* authors developed an extensive and detailed critique to modernization theory; namely, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1964, chap. 2), Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1969, 11–17), André Gunder Frank (1969, part 2), Aníbal Quijano (1977), and Theotonio Dos Santos (1970). These intellectuals raised the following critiques to the modernization theory:

1. Development and underdevelopment are produced by the center-periphery relationships of the capitalist world-system. *Dependentistas* contended that development and underdevelopment constituted each other through a relational process. This is contrary to the modernization theories' conceptualization of each country as an autonomous unit that develops through stages.

2. The modern-traditional dichotomy is abstract, formal, and ahistorical. This modernization theory dichotomy does not characterize correctly nor explain adequately the social processes underlying development and underdevelopment. The modern-traditional opposition refers to descriptive categories (cultural or economic) at the national level that obscure structures of domination and exploitation at the world level.

3. The foreign penetration, diffusion, and acculturation of modern values, techniques, and ideas from the centers to the periphery does not necessarily produce development. In most of the cases, this process contributes to the subordination of the underdeveloped countries to the centers.

4. *Dependentistas* consider incorrect the assumption that equates development to passing through the same "stages" of the so-called advanced societies. Since historical time is not—as the modernization theories presuppose—chronological and unilinear, the experience of the metropolitan societies cannot be repeated. Underdevelopment is a specific experience that needs to be analyzed as a historical and structural process. Development and underdevelopment coexist simultaneously in historical time. The coevalness of both processes is overtly recognized.

5. *Dependency* is an approach that attempts to explain why Latin American countries did not develop similarly to the center. Dependency is understood as a relation of subordination in the international capitalist system rather than as a result of archaic, traditional, or feudal structures. The latter is a result of the modern, capitalist structures. Thus underdevelopment involves an interrelation of "external" and "internal" elements.

6. The correct approach to explain the underdevelopment of Latin America is not the structural-functionalist method, but the historical-structural methodology.

Dependency writers basically agreed on these points. They all criticized the universalistic, eternal time/space framework of the modernization theories. The interesting questions for our topic are: Did the *dependentistas* break completely with the Eurocentric premises of time distanciating and

denial of coevalness presupposed by the modernization and mode of production theories? Did they successfully overcome developmentalism as a geoculture of the world system?

One of the major weaknesses of the *dependentista* approach was that their solution for eliminating dependency was still caught in the categories of developmentalist ideology. The boundaries of the questions asked limit the answers found. Dependency questions were trapped in the problematic of modernity: What are the obstacles to national development? How to achieve autonomous national development? Dependency assumed the modernist idea that progress was possible through a rational organization of society, where each nation-state could achieve an autonomous national development through the conscious, sovereign, and free control of their destiny.

The main difference between the developmentalist ideas of *cepalistas* and *dependentistas* was that for the former, autonomous national development could be achieved within capitalism, while for the latter, it could not be achieved under the capitalist world-system. The establishment of socialism in each nation-state was the *dependentista* prescription for the rational organization of autonomous national development. The "national" bourgeoisie, allied to foreign capital interests, represented a reactionary force, as opposed to the exploited classes, which would purportedly lead the revolutionary struggle for socialism. The Cuban Revolution became the myth of socialist national development. Thus, for the *dependentistas*, the major obstacle to autonomous national development was the capitalist system, and the solution was to delink and build socialism at the level of the nation-state.

This position is summarized by the Brazilian radical *dependentista* Vania Bambirra. Here Bambirra responds to Octavio Rodriguez's cepalist critique of the *dependentistas*' denial of autonomous national development under capitalism:

> None of the [*dependentista*] authors "analyzed" by Rodriguez deny the possibility of autonomous national development, since that would be absurd. Yet they do demonstrate that autonomous national development cannot be led by the dependent bourgeoisie. This leads them to the logical conclusion, implicit in some, explicit in others, that the historical necessity for the

> development of the productive forces in Latin America be impelled by a superior socioeconomic system, that is, socialism. (Bambirra 1978, 88)

> The struggle for socialism in countries such as those of Latin America is within the framework of the struggle for autonomous national development that capitalism cannot achieve. (99)

Dependency ideas must be understood as part of the *longue durée* of modernity ideas in Latin America. Autonomous national development has been a central ideological theme of the modern world-system since the eighteenth century. *Dependentistas* reproduced the illusion that rational organization and development can be achieved from the control of the nation-state. This contradicted the position that development and underdevelopment are the result of structural relations within the capitalist world-system. The same contradiction is found in André Gunder Frank. Although Frank defined capitalism as a single world-system beyond the nation-state, he still believed it was possible to delink or break with the world system at the nation-state level (Frank 1970, 11, 104, 150; Frank 1969, chap. 25). This implied that a revolutionary process at the national level could insulate the country from the global system. However, as we know today, it is impossible to transform a system that operates on a world scale by privileging the control/administration of the nation-state (Wallerstein 1992b). No "rational" control of the nation-state would alter the location of a country in the international division of labor. "Rational" planning and control of the nation-state contributes to the developmentalist illusion of eliminating the inequalities of the capitalist world-system from a nation-state level.

In the capitalist world-system, a peripheral nation-state may experience transformations in its form of incorporation to the capitalist world-economy, a minority of which might even move to a semiperipheral position. However, to break with or transform the whole system from a nation-state level is completely beyond their range of possibilities (Wallerstein 1992a, 1992b). Therefore, a global problem cannot have a national solution. This is not to deny the importance of political interventions at the nation-state level. The point here is not to reify the nation-state and to understand the limits of political interventions at this level for the long-term transformation of a system that operates at a world scale. The nation-state, although

still an important institution of historical capitalism, is a limited space for radical political and social transformations. Collective agencies in the periphery need a global scope in order to make an effective political intervention in the capitalist world-system. Social struggles below and above the nation-state are strategic spaces of political intervention that are frequently ignored when the focus of the movements privileges the nation-state. The social movements' local and global connections are crucial for effective political intervention. The *dependentistas* overlooked this, due in part to their tendency to privilege the nation-state as the unit of analysis. This had terrible political consequences for the Latin American left and the credibility of the *dependentista* political project. The political failure contributed to the demise of the *dependentista* school. The decline of this school enabled the reemergence of old developmentalist ideas in the region. Although the outlined problem was shared by most *dependentista* theorists, some *dependentistas* reproduced new versions of the Eurocentric denial of coevalness. Cardoso's version of dependency theory is a good example.

Cardoso's Developmentalism

Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto together developed a typology to understand the diverse national situations of dependency. They make an analytical distinction between autonomy-dependency relationships, center-periphery relationships, and development-underdevelopment (Cardoso and Faletto 1969, 24–25). *Dependency* refers to the conditions of existence and function of the economic and political systems at the national level and can be demonstrated by drawing out their internal and external linkages. *Periphery* refers to the role underdeveloped economies play in the international markets without addressing the sociopolitical factors implied in the situations of dependency. *Underdevelopment* refers to a developmental stage of the productive system (forces of production) rather than to the external (e.g., colonialism, periphery of the world market) or internal (e.g., socialism, capitalism) control of the economic decision making. Thus, the dependent-autonomous continuum refers mostly to the political system within the nation-state; the center-periphery continuum addresses the roles played in the international market; and the development-underdevelopment continuum refers to the developmental stages of the economic system. These analytical distinctions allow Cardoso to state that a nation-state can develop its economic system, even to the extent of producing capital goods, despite not having an autonomous control over the decision-making process—that is, while being dependent. This is what he

calls "dependent development." The reverse is also possible—that is, autonomous underdeveloped nation-states. This schema serves as the basis for the following typology of national societies:

1. Autonomous-Developed (centers): For example, the United States and Western Europe

2. Dependent-Developed (peripheral): For example, Brazil and Argentina

3. Autonomous-Underdeveloped (nonperipheral): For example, Algeria, Cuba, and China

4. Dependent-Underdeveloped (peripheral): For example, Central America, the Caribbean, Bolivia, and Peru

The countries at levels 2 and 4 are peripheral because they are still subordinated to the central economies in the international capitalist system. The social mechanism for this subordination is the internal system of domination or the internal relations of forces that produced dependency rather than autonomy in the political system. If, through a reformist or revolutionary process, a country achieves autonomous decision making at the nation-state level, then it can stop being a peripheral country in the capitalist world economy, even if it still continues being a one-crop export economy. The difference among dependent societies is whether they are developed (industrialized) or underdeveloped (agrarian), and this is related to processes internal to the nation-state in terms of who controls the main productive activities (enclave economies vs. population economies) and of the "stage of development" of the productive system. The countries at level 3 are nondependent because they have broken their links with a particular internal system of domination through a revolutionary process that, according to Cardoso, liberated them from being incorporated to an imperialist system of domination. Although they are still economically underdeveloped because they have not industrialized, they enjoy autonomous decision making over their economic system. Thus, these countries are nonperipheral in that they are not politically dominated and economically subordinated by the metropolitan centers in the international market. For Cardoso, nation-states can achieve an autonomous decision making and a nonperipheral location in the international system without yet achieving development (level 3 countries). The reverse is also possible: nation-states can be dependent, peripheral, and still achieve development (level 2 countries). Level 1 nation-states are the centers because they are in the only group of countries that has a developed economic system together with an

autonomous political system. This enables the centers to have a dominant and powerful position in the international market.

Since all Latin American societies, with the exception of Cuba, are classified in levels 2 and 4, Cardoso and Faletto's book concentrates on the different situations of dependency among these countries. They developed another typology for the bifurcation of dependent societies' trajectories between those that industrialized and those that remain primary producers (agricultural or mining).

Enclave economies are those where the production for export is directly controlled by foreign capital (financial dependency), originating the capital accumulation externally. *Nationally controlled export economies* are those where the production for export was controlled by "national" capital (commercial dependency), originating capital accumulation internally. *New dependency* is the post-1950 form of dependency wherein the multinational corporations invest directly in the industrialization of the periphery, not for exports but to conquer their internal market (financial/industrial dependency or technological dependency). Although capital accumulation often originates, similar to the enclaves, in the exterior, there is a major difference: most of the industrial production is sold in the internal markets. These diverse forms of dependency articulate with the "external" phases of capitalism in the centers, such as competitive capitalism, monopolic capitalism, industrial capitalism, or financial capitalism (Cardoso 1973, 96; 1985, 141–42).

The dependent societies that industrialized were those with nationally controlled peripheral economies. According to Cardoso and Faletto, they industrialized during the 1930s world depression when a developmentalist alliance emerged due to the crisis of the agrarian oligarchy. The local capitalists spontaneously developed an import substitution industrialization program. However, after 1950, once the centers recovered from the world crisis, these same countries were dominated by multinational capital. The latter established alliances with the state and factions of local capitalists to control the Latin American internal markets. According to Cardoso, only at this phase can we talk of an international capitalist mode of production; before this phase it was only an international capitalist market (Cardoso 1985, 209). The diverse forms of dependency (enclave, nationally controlled export economies, new dependency) are not stages, but characterizations of national social formations (147). Sometimes, these three forms can coexist with a hierarchical articulation within a nation-state, that is, one form dominates and subordinates the others.

For Cardoso it is the internal processes of the nation-state and not the cultural/structural location in the international division of labor that determines if a country is peripheral, dependent, and underdeveloped. The proposition that an autonomous decision-making process at the nation-state level is possible for every country to achieve, that dependency is mainly an internal relation of forces in favor of foreign actors, and that underdevelopment is a backward stage of the productive system leads Cardoso to developmentalist premises. For Cardoso development and underdevelopment are defined in terms of the advanced or backward technology in the productive system within a nation-state. European and American standards of industrialization are what serve as a parameter for development and underdevelopment. The deficiencies of capitalist development and the presence of precapitalist forms of production within the boundaries of the nation-state are what prevent Latin American societies from completing the expanded reproduction of capital (Cardoso 1985, 50). These deficiencies contribute to a subordinate position in the international division of labor. Thus the explanation is centered on the political dynamics internal to the nation-state, not in the global/international capitalist system.

Accordingly, for Cardoso there are three ways of achieving development for dependent societies. The first path to development is when a dependent nation-state achieves an autonomous decision-making process and reorganizes the economy in a nonperipheral way. This could be done through a revolution or a political reform that transforms the internal relation of forces creating the possibilities for advancing the stages of development. The second path is when nationally controlled export-oriented dependent economies generate an internal capital accumulation that allows them to industrialize. Although they may experience trade dependency, still there is some process of "national" capitalist accumulation that fosters industrialization. The third path of development is when a country that is dependent, meaning being nonautonomous in the decision-making processes internal to the nation-state, and peripheral, meaning economically subordinate in the international market, achieves development by the industrial expansion and investments of multinational corporations. This new character of dependency comes through the control and creation of new technologies by multinational enterprises, which ensures them a key role in the global system of capitalist accumulation (Cardoso 1973, 117; 1985, 210–11). In this manner, for Cardoso, peripheral industrialization depends on the centers for new technologies and advanced machinery. However, in his opinion, this new character of dependency is equivalent to development

because it contributes to the expansion of industrial capitalism (i.e., growth of wage-labor relations and development of the productive forces).

In Cardoso's view, the inequalities and "underdevelopment" of the productive process at the national level foster the inequalities and dependency at the international level. The capitalist world market is conceptualized as an international (multiple national social formations) unequal structure of dominant and subordinate nations wherein the centers' capital penetrates dependent societies. Thus, although for Cardoso capitalism has laws of motion that remain constant in the centers and the periphery, a single capitalist social system in which every country forms an integral part does not exist. There are as many capitalist systems (or capitalist social formations) as there are nation-states in the world. The trade and capital investments among different nations and corporations with uneven levels of capitalist development are responsible for an "inter-national" unequal capitalist market. For Cardoso the main goal is to achieve development, meaning to industrialize. Cardoso's proposition of stages of development of the productive forces assumes a denial of coevalness. There are advanced and backward stages of development internal to a nation-state. This is related to Eurocentric premises where the models of so-called advanced societies are the United States and Europe, while the rest of the world is conceived as "backward." Cardoso replaced the old stagism of both modernization and mode of production theory with a new form of denial of coevalness based on the technology used in the productive system within a nation-state.

Dependentistas' Underestimation of Culture

Dependentistas developed a neo-Marxist political-economy approach. Most *dependentista* analysis privileged the economic and political aspects of social processes at the expense of cultural and ideological determinations. Culture was perceived as instrumental to capitalist accumulation processes. In many respects *dependentistas* reproduced some of the economic reductionism that had been criticized in orthodox Marxist approaches. This led to two problems: first, an underestimation of the Latin American colonial/racial hierarchies; and second, an analytical impoverishment of the complexities of political-economic processes.

For most *dependentistas*, the "economy" was the privileged sphere of social analysis. Categories such as "gender" and "race" were frequently ignored, and when used they were reduced to class or to an economic logic.

Aníbal Quijano is one of the few exceptions to this. He developed the concept of "coloniality of power" to understand the present racial hierarchies in Latin America. According to Quijano, the social classification of peoples in Latin America has been hegemonized by white Creole elites throughout a long historical process of colonial/racial domination. Categories of modernity such as citizenship, democracy, and national identity have been historically constructed through two axial divisions: (1) between labor and capital; (2) between Europeans and non-Europeans (Quijano 1993); and I will add (3) between men and women. White male elites hegemonized these axial divisions. According to the concept of coloniality of power developed by Quijano, even after independence, when the formal juridical/military control of the state passed from the imperial power to the newly independent state, white Creole elites continued to control the economic, cultural, and political structures of the society (Quijano 1993). This continuity of power relations from colonial to postcolonial times allowed the white elites to classify populations and to exclude people of color from the categories of full citizenship in the imagined community called the "nation." The civil, political, and social rights that citizenship provided to the members of the "nation" were never fully extended to colonial subjects such as Indians, blacks, *zambos*, and mulattoes. "Internal colonial" groups remained as "second-class citizens," never having full access to the rights of citizens. Coloniality is a sociocultural relationship between Europeans and non-Europeans that is constantly reproduced as long as the power structures are dominated by the white Creole elites and the cultural construction of non-European peoples as "inferior others" continues.

What is implied in the notion of coloniality of power is that the world has not fully decolonized. The first decolonization was incomplete. It was limited to the juridicopolitical "independence" from the European imperial states. The "second decolonization" will have to address the racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, and economic hierarchies that the "first decolonization" left in place. As a result, the world needs a "second decolonization" different and more radical than the first one.

Many leftist projects in Latin America following the *dependentista* underestimation of racial/ethnic hierarchies have reproduced, within their organizations and when controlling state power, white Creole domination over non-European people. The Latin American "Left" never radically problematized the racial/ethnic hierarchies built during the European colonial expansion and still present in Latin America's coloniality of power. For instance, the conflicts between the Sandinistas and the Misquitos in

Nicaragua emerged as part of the reproduction of the old racial/colonial hierarchies (Vila 1992). This was not a conflict created by the CIA, as Sandinistas used to portray it. The Sandinistas reproduced the historical coloniality of power between the Pacific coast and the Atlantic coast in Nicaragua. The white Creole elites on the Pacific coast hegemonized the political, cultural, and economic relations that subordinated blacks and Indians on the Atlantic coast. The differences between the Somocista dictatorship and the Sandinista regime were not that great when it came to social relations with colonial/racial others. Similarly, Cuban white elites hegemonized the power positions in the postrevolutionary period (Moore 1988). The historical continuities of the coloniality of power in Cuba are also greater than the discontinuities. The number of blacks and mulattos in power positions is minimal and does not correspond to the demographic fact that they are the numerical majority. The old racial/ethnic hierarchy in Cuba has not been significantly transformed during the Castro regime. Afro-Cubans are continously harassed in public spaces, stereotyped (with racial slanders such as "criminals" and "lazy"), and marginalized from power positions.

No radical project in Latin America can be successful without dismantling these colonial/racial hierarchies. This affects not only the scope of "revolutionary processes" but also the democratization of the social hierarchies. The underestimation of the problems of coloniality has been an important factor that contributed to the popular disillusionment with "leftist" projects in Latin America. The denial of coevalness in developmentalist dependency discourses reinforces the coloniality of power within the nation-state by privileging white Creole elites in the name of technical progress and superior knowledge. Poor and marginalized regions within the nation-state, where black, mulatto, and Indian populations frequently live, are portrayed by left-wing regimes as "backward" and "underdeveloped" due to the "laziness" and "bad habits" of these regions' inhabitants. Thus *coloniality* refers to the long-term continuities of the racial hierarchies from the time of European colonialism to the formation of nation-states in the Americas. When it comes to the coloniality of power in Latin America, the difference between the left-wing and right-wing regimes is not that great. Today there is a coloniality of power in all of Latin America even when colonial administrations have disappeared.

The second problem with the *dependentista* underestimation of cultural and ideological dynamics is that it impoverished their own political-economy approach. Ideological/symbolic strategies, as well as Eurocentric

forms of knowledge, are constitutive of the political economy of the capitalist world-system. Global symbolic/ideological strategies are an important structuring logic of the core-periphery relationships in the capitalist world-system. For instance, core states develop ideological/symbolic strategies by fostering "occidentalist" (Mignolo 1995) forms of knowledge that privileged the "West over the rest." This is clearly seen in developmentalist discourses, which became a "scientific" form of knowledge in the last fifty years. This knowledge privileged the "West" as the model of development. Developmentalist discourse offers a recipe about how to become like the "West."

Although the *dependentistas* struggled against these universalist/Occidentalist forms of knowledge, they perceived this knowledge as a superstructure or an epiphenomenon of some economic infrastructure. *Dependentistas* never perceived this knowledge as constitutive of Latin America's political economy. Constructing peripheral zones such as Africa and Latin America as regions with "problems" about their stages of development concealed European and Euro-American responsibility in the exploitation of these continents. The construction of "pathological" regions in the periphery, as opposed to the normal development patterns of the "West," justified an even more intense political and economic intervention from imperial powers. By treating the other as underdeveloped and backward, metropolitan exploitation and domination were justified in the name of the civilizing mission.

Moreover, the Euro-American imperial state developed global symbolic/ideological strategies to showcase a peripheral region or an ethnic group, as opposed to a challenging peripheral country or ethnic group. These strategies are material and constitutive of global political-economic processes. They are economically expensive because they entail the investment of capital in nonprofitable forms such as credits, aid, and assistance programs. Nevertheless, symbolic profits could translate into economic profits in the long run.

How to explain the so-called Southeast Asian miracle without an understanding of global ideological/cultural strategies? Since the 1950s, the United States has showcased several peripheral countries in different regions of the world where Communist regimes represented a challenge, such as Greece vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, Taiwan vis-à-vis China, South Korea vis-à-vis North Korea; in the 1960s, Nigeria vis-à-vis Tanzania, Puerto Rico vis-à-vis Cuba; in the 1980s, Jamaica vis-à-vis Grenada, Costa Rica vis-à-vis Nicaragua. Other showcases in the region include Brazil in the 1960s (the so-called Brazilian miracle) and, more recently, Mexico and Chile in the

1990s as post–Cold War neoliberal showcases. Compared to other countries, all of these showcases received disproportionately large sums of U.S. foreign aid and favorable conditions for economic growth, such as flexible terms to pay their debts, special tariff agreements that made commodities produced in these areas accessible to the metropolitan markets, and/or technological transfers. Most of these showcases' success lasted for several years, subsequently failing. However, they were crucial to produce an ideological hegemony over Third World peoples in favor of pro-U.S. developmentalist programs. Developmentalist ideology is a crucial constitutive element in the hegemony of the "West." The capitalist world-system gains credibility by developing a few successful semiperipheral cases. These are civilizational and cultural strategies to gain consent and to demonstrate the "superiority" of the "West."

It would be extremely difficult to answer the following questions without an understanding of global symbolic/ideological strategies: Why did U.S. officials in Taiwan and South Korea implement, finance, support, and organize a radical agrarian reform in the early 1950s while in Guatemala a much milder agrarian reform put forward by the Arbenz administration during the same years met with a CIA-backed coup d'état? Why did the U.S. government support an agrarian reform in Puerto Rico that forced U.S. corporations to sell all land in excess of five hundred acres (Dietz 1986)? Why was the U.S. government willing to sacrifice its corporate economic interests in Taiwan, South Korea, and Puerto Rico, but not its economic interests in Chile or Guatemala? Why did the import substitution industrialization in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea not lead to deficits in balance of payments as it did in Latin America? An economic reductionist approach to political economy simply cannot answer these questions. *Dependentista* analysis, by not taking into consideration global symbolic/ideological strategies, impoverished the political-economy approach.

Conclusion

Developmentalism, the denial of coevalness, and the concealment of coloniality of power in Latin America are three conceptual limitations of the *dependentista* school addressed in this article. These three conceptual processes are historically interrelated in the geoculture of the capitalist world-system. The construction of the other as inhabiting a distant space and a past time emerged simultaneously with the formation of a "modern/colonial capitalist world-system" (Mignolo 2000) with its colonial/racial hierarchies. This

created the historical conditions of possibility for the emergence of developmentalism, proposing that the solution to backwardness in time is to develop, to catch up with the West.

Dependentistas form part of the *longue dureé* of the ideology of modernity in Latin America. One of the main arguments of this article is that *dependentistas* were caught up in developmentalist assumptions similar to the intellectual currents they attempted to criticize. By privileging national development and the control of the nation-state, they reproduced the illusion that development occurs through rational organization and planning at the level of the nation-state. This emphasis contributed to overlooking alternative and more strategic antisystemic political interventions below (local) and above (global) the nation-state. Moreover, *dependentistas* underestimated the coloniality of power in Latin America. This obscured the ongoing existence of the region's racial/ethnic hierarchies. Power relations in the region are constituted by racial/ethnic hierarchies that have a long colonial history. Leftist movements influenced by the *dependentista* paradigm reproduced white Creole domination when in control of the nation-state. Thus there can be no radical project in the region without decolonizing power relations.

Finally, both the developmentalist assumptions and the underestimation of coloniality of power, together with the production of new forms of denial of coevalness, led some *dependentistas* such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Eurocentric assumptions about technical progress and development. This contributes to an understanding of the current complicity of many old *dependentistas* with the recent dominant neoliberal global designs in the region.

Notes

1. CEPAL was the Comisión Económica para América Latina (known in English as ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America) created by the United Nations in 1948. Raúl Prebisch was an Argentinian economist, first director of the CEPAL, and leading theorist of the first school of economic thought in the periphery, known worldwide as the Prebisch-CEPAL school (Grosfoguel 1997).
2. APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) was the party founded by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Peru.

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