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## DIALOGUES AS A FOUNDATION FOR INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC

### SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

The principal content of this article is a (new) foundation for intuitionistic logic, based on an analysis of argumentative processes as codified in the concepts of a *dialogue* and a *strategy* for dialogues. This work is presented in Section 3. A general historical introduction is given in Section 2. Since already there the reader will need to know exactly what a dialogue and a strategy shall be, these basic concepts are defined in the (purely technical) Section 1.

### 1 BASIC CONCEPTS: DIALOGUES AND STRATEGIES

I consider a first-order language, built with variables  $x, y, \dots$  and terms  $t$ ; formulas shall be constructed from atomic formulas with the propositional connectives  $\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \neg, \perp$  and the quantifiers  $\forall, \exists$ ; I shall also consider  $\forall, \exists, \perp, \rightarrow, \neg$  as *special symbols* in their own right. By an *expression* I understand either a term or a formula or a special symbol. I introduce two further symbols  $P$  and  $Q$ ; taking two new (and disjoint) copies of the set of expressions, I form for every expression  $e$  two new expressions  $Pe$  and  $Qe$ , the *P-signed* and the *Q-signed version* of the expression  $e$ .

The symbols  $P, Q$  shall symbolise two persons engaged in an argument or in a dialogue; I shall use  $X, Y$  as variables for  $P, Q$  and shall assume  $X \wedge Y$ . An *argumentation form* is a schematic presentation of an argument, concerning a logically composite assertion; it describes how a composite assertion made by  $C$  may be *attacked* by  $Y$  and how, if possible, this attack may be *answered* by  $A$ . As the logical form of the composite assertion shall completely determine the argument, each of the four propositional connectives and each of the two quantifiers determines an argumentation form:

A:	assertion:	$Xw \setminus A \bullet w_2$	
	attack:	$Y \wedge_i$	(i.e., $Y$ chooses $i = 1$ or $i = 2$ )
	answer:	$Xw_i$	
V:	assertion:	$Xw \setminus V, w_2$	
	attack:	$YV$	
	answer:	$Xw_i$	(i.e., $X$ chooses $i = 1$ or $i = 2$ )
$\rightarrow$ :	assertion:	$Xw \setminus \rightarrow w_2$	
	attack:	$Yw \setminus$	
	answer:	$Xw_i$	
$\neg$ :	assertion:	$x^w$	
	attack:	$Yw$	
	answer:	<i>no answer possible</i>	
V:	assertion:	$XVxw$	
	attack:	$Yt$	(i.e., $Y$ chooses the term $t$ )
	answer:	$Xw(t)$	
$\exists$ :	assertion:	$X\exists xw$	
	attack:	$Y\exists$	
	answer:	$Xw(t)$	(i.e., $X$ chooses the term $t$ ).

In the last two answers I have written  $w(t)$  for the substitution instance obtained from  $w$  if the term  $t$  is substituted for the variable  $x$ .

A dialogue shall be a (finite or infinite) sequence  $\delta$  of statements, i.e., signed expressions, stated alternately by  $P$  and  $Q$  and progressing in accordance with the argumentation forms; I shall consider only such dialogues which are begun by  $P$ . Since it is necessary to distinguish carefully between attacks, answers and the assertions they refer to, I shall introduce besides 5 an accompanying sequence  $rj$  of references, and there I shall use the symbols  $A$  for *attack* and  $D$  for *answer (defense)*. For notational convenience, I shall assume that a natural number is the set of all smaller natural numbers (whence 0 is the first natural number), and a *sequence* shall always be a function, defined on either a natural number or on the set  $u >$  of all natural numbers. The precise definition then reads as follows:  
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A *dialogue*  $\delta$ ,  $rj$  consists of two sequences such that

$\delta$  is a sequence of signed expressions,

$rj$  is a function defined on the *positive* members of  $\text{def}(\delta)$ , and if  $n$  in  $\text{def}(\delta)$  is an ordered pair  $[m, Z]$  such that  $m$  is a natural number less than  $n$  and  $Z$  is either  $A$  or  $D$ ,

satisfying the properties (D00)-(Z?02):

- (DOO)  $\delta(n)$  is F-signed if  $n$  is even and Q-signed if  $n$  is odd;  $\delta(0)$  is a composite formula.
- (D01) If  $T(n) = [m, A]$  then  $\delta(m)$  is a composite formula and  $\delta(n)$  is attack upon  $\delta(m)$  according to the appropriate argumentation form.
- (D02) If  $r(p) = [n, D]$  then  $\mathcal{T}(n) = [m, \wedge^4]$  and  $\delta(p)$  is the answer to the attack  $\delta(n)$  according to the appropriate argumentation form.

The signed formulas occurring as values of  $\delta$  are called the *assertions* of the dialogue while the remaining values of  $\delta$  are *symbolic statements* or, more correctly, *symbolic attacks*. The numbers in  $dei(\delta)$  are called the *positions* or *places* of the dialogue. If  $Pv$  is the assertion  $\delta(0)$ , the dialogue is said to be a dialogue *for* the formula  $v$  (or, sometimes, for  $Pv$ ).

Assume now that a particular class  $H$  of dialogues is given, defined maybe by additional conditions, which has the property that, for every position  $n$  of an  $//$ -dialogue  $\delta, \mathcal{T}$ , the *restrictions* of  $S, \mathcal{T}$  to positions  $i$  such that  $i \leq n$  form an  $//$ -dialogue again. Assume further that a subclass of  $H$  has been defined, consisting of certain *finite*  $//$ -dialogues which then are said to be the  $//$ -dialogues *won* by  $P$ . Let  $v$  be a composite formula; to say that  $P$  has an  $//$ -strategy shall mean that  $P$  is in possession of a system of information, consisting of possible choices of F-statements in dialogues, such that every  $//$ -dialogue for  $v$  is won by  $P$  if only  $P$  chooses, after every statement made by  $Q$ , its own statement from this system of information. In order to formulate a more precise definition, recall that a *tree*  $\mathcal{S}$  is a partially ordered set of elements called *nodes* with the following properties: there exists a *largest* element  $e_s$  (the top node), and for every node  $e$  the number  $\|e\|$  of nodes  $/$  such that  $e < / < e_s$  is *finite*; every node except  $e_s$  has exactly one *upper neighbour* but may have arbitrarily many *lower neighbours* (i.e., the tree is branching downwards). A *path* in  $S$  is a linearly ordered subset of nodes which, together with each of its elements  $e$ , contains all the preceding nodes  $/$  with  $e < /$ ; a *branch* is a path which is maximal. If  $A$  is a branch of  $S$ , let  $a_A$  be the unique order-preserving bijection which maps either a natural number or all of  $u$  onto  $A$ , i.e.  $\|a_A(i)\| = i$  holds for every node  $a_A(i)$  in  $A$ . Consider now a tree  $\mathcal{S}$  and functions  $\delta, r/$  where  $\delta$  is defined on all nodes of  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $r/$  on the nodes different from  $e_s$ ; for every branch  $A$  define  $\delta_A = S \cdot a_A, \mathcal{T}_A = V \cdot a_A$ . The triplet  $S, \delta, \mathcal{T}$  then is an *H-strategy* for  $v$  if

- (50) For every branch  $A$  of  $S$  the pair  $\delta_A, \mathcal{T}_A$  is an  $//$ -dialogue for  $v$  which is won by  $P$ .
- (51) For every node  $e$  of  $\mathcal{S}$  the following is the case. If  $\|e\|$  is odd then  $S$  does not branch at  $e$ . If  $\|e\|$  is even then  $e$  has as many lower neighbours as  $Q$  has possibilities to extend, by adding a new position, to an  $//$ -dialogue the (restricted) dialogue leading to  $e$ ,

and  $\delta, r$ ) assign these lower neighbours the values which realise these possibilities.

The general definitions having been established, particular classes of dialogues can be introduced. To do so, I shall need the following terminology. Let  $S, rj$  be a dialogue, and let  $S(n)$  be one of its attacks. The attack  $S(n)$  will be said to be *open at a position*  $k$  with  $n < k$  if there is no position  $n'$  with  $n < n' < k$  which carries an answer  $S(n')$  to that attack. In particular, an attack upon a formula  $X < v$  remains open at all later places. A *D-dialogue* shall be a dialogue  $\langle S, rj \rangle$  satisfying the following properties (D10)~(D13) :

- (D10)  $P$  may assert an atomic formula only after it has been asserted by  $Q$  before: if  $S(n) = Pa$  and  $a$  is atomic then there exists  $m$  such that  $m < n$  and  $S(m) = Qa$ .
- {D11} If, at a position  $p-1$ , there are several open attacks suitable to be answered at  $p$ , then only the *latest* of them may be answered at  $p$  : if  $v(p) = K-C$  and if  $n < n' < p, n'-n = 1 \pmod{2}, \mathcal{T}(n) = [m, A]$  then there exists  $p'$  such that  $n' < p' < p, f(p') = [n', D]$ .
- (D12) An attack may be answered at most once: for every  $n$  there exists at most one  $p$  such that  $r(p) = [n, D]$ .
- (Z)13) A P-formula may be attacked at most once: if  $m$  is even then there exists at most one  $n$  such that  $\mathcal{T}(n) = [m, A]$ .

A D-dialogue is said to be *won by P* if it is finite, ends with an even position and if the rules do not permit  $Q$  to continue with another attack or answer. In that case the last position carries an atomic formula asserted by  $P$ .

The importance of Z?-dialogues rests in the fact that the formulas for which there exist  $\mathcal{L}$ -strategies are precisely those provable in intuitionistic logic. This follows from the following, stronger

**EQUIVALENCE THEOREM.** *There exist recursive algorithms which, for every formula  $v$ , transform a proof of the sequent  $\Rightarrow v$  in Gentzen's calculus LJ (for intuitionistic logic) into a D-strategy — and vice versa.*

Contrary to first appearances, a proof of this theorem is by no mean obvious; it cannot be pursued here and may be found in Felscher [1981; 1985].

An *E-dialogue* shall be a Z?-dialogue satisfying the additional condition that  $Q$  can react only upon the immediately preceding utterance of  $P$ :

- (E) For every  $n$  in  $\text{def}(\langle S \rangle)$ : if  $n$  is odd then  $S(n)$  is either attack upon  $6(n-1)$  or answer to  $S(n-1)$ .

An *i?-dialogue* is said to be *won by P* if, again, it is finite, ends with an even position and if now the rules for  $\wedge$ -dialogues do not permit  $Q$  to continue

with either an attack or an answer. There will be occasion to refer to the following result which is auxiliary to the proof of the Equivalence Theorem.

**EXTENSION LEMMA.** *There is a recursive algorithm by which every E-strategy can be embedded into a D-strategy.*

It follows from this lemma that the Equivalence theorem holds also for E-strategies in place of D-strategies.

Readers not familiar with the use of dialogues may appreciate the following *examples* in which  $a, b, \dots$  are assumed to be atomic formulas.

(1a)

	0. $P(a \wedge A b) \rightarrow (a \wedge A b)$		
	1. $\bar{Q}(a \wedge A b)$		[0,4]
	2. $PA_i$		[i,4]
	3. $Qa$		[2,0]
	4. $FA_2$		[1, A]
	5. $\bar{Q}b$		[4,0]
	6. $P(a \wedge A b)$		[1-0]
7.	$QA!$ [6,Q]	7.	$QA_2$ [6,Q]
8.	$Pa$ [7,0]	8.	$P6$ [7,0]

(1b)

	0. $P(a \wedge A b) \leftrightarrow (a \wedge A b)$		
	1. $\bar{Q}(a \wedge A b)$		[0,4]
	2. $P(a \wedge A b)$		[1,0]
3.	$QA_i$ [2,4]	3.	$QA_2$ [2,4]
4.	$PA_i$ [1,4]	4.	$PA_2$ [1,4]
5.	$\bar{Q}a$ [4,0]	5.	$\bar{Q}b$ [4,0]
6.	$Pa$ [3,0]	6.	$Pb$ [3,0]

Here we have two different Z?-strategies for the same formula.

(2a)

	0. $P(a \rightarrow \neg a)$		
	1. $\bar{Q}a$		[0,4]
	2. $P\neg ya$		[i,0]
	3. $\bar{Q}\neg a$		[2,4]
	4. $Pa$		[3,4]

(2b)

	0. $P(\wedge a \rightarrow a)$		
	1. $\bar{Q}\neg a$		[0,4]
	2. $P\wedge a$		[i,4]
	3. $\bar{Q}a$		[3,4]