



Catholic Bridging Efforts with China*

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Introduction

After the expulsion from Nanjing in 1951 of the papal nuncio, Archbishop A. Riberi, formal diplomatic relations between China and the Vatican broke down. With Mao Zedong's intolerance towards ideological matters and his emphasis on class struggle, it was not possible during this time to have a Sino-Vatican dialogue which would eventually lead to rapprochement. However, in the 1980s the Vatican saw within Deng Xiaoping's 'open-door' policy an opportunity to initiate a dialogue. Unfortunately this dialogue experienced a setback in 1981 when Bishop Deng Yiming was appointed archbishop of Guangzhou unilaterally by the Vatican. When the Chinese government furiously put an end to all formal contacts, Pope John Paul II suggested initiating a bridge of informal contacts between the Universal Church and the local Church of China.¹ For nearly 20 years this bridge has been effective in reviving the Catholic Church and its activities despite the fact that it was built at a time when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) knew its paramountcy was weakening, and felt threatened by any seeming provocation.

In this paper I discuss the interchurch exchange between mainland Chinese and overseas Catholics within the Universal Church, analysing the evolution and impact of the bridging efforts over the past 20 years and identifying uncertainties and difficulties. I use the environmental, institutional-organisational and behavioural (EIB) model to interpret in a Chinese context interchurch relations within the Universal Church.

The Environmental, Institutional-Organisational and Behavioural (EIB) Model

Social scientists suggest that policy making, policy implementation and social development are seldom influenced by one single factor.² Ferrel Heady devised the EIB model for the purpose of analysing the effects of policy and policy implementation. Heady argues that there are three fundamental factors affecting the implementation of public policy.³ These are:

- 1 the environment or ecology of administration
- 2 the institutional arrangements, and
- 3 the characteristics and behaviour of public administration.

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The combination and interaction of these factors provides a basic framework for the analysis.⁴

Environmental Analysis

First we need to look at the internal environment within China. The launch of the Catholic Church's bridging efforts coincided with the launch of the 'open-door' policy of Deng Xiaoping's modernisation programme which began in 1979. Since then the revival of religion in general and of the Catholic Church in particular have been taking place at a time when the CCP has been suffering its own crisis and communism as an ideology has been eroding. During the 1990s the Party has been increasingly preoccupied with the problems of the decline of socialist values and of 'spiritual pollution', both of which have been the direct and indirect results of Deng's decision in 1979 to unleash the pursuit of money through economic liberation. For many years now the Party has failed to cope with the resulting socio-political problems, including the abuse of privilege and corruption by government officials and by the 'princeling' generation.⁵ The introduction of a market economy has decentralised the power which in Mao's time was held exclusively by the Party. This central government is now weaker and less able to control the activities of religious groups.

As for the external environment, in the world at large, the party leaders believe that religion has been employed by international subversive forces to 'westernise' and 'divide' China,⁶ and that since the 1980s a key means employed by the capitalist West to topple socialist states has been to link religious education with internal dissent and to support subversive underground forces.⁷ It is believed that foreign forces are attempting to attain political goals through religious pluralisation. Specifically, it is feared that underground Catholic bishops appointed by the Roman Curia have been trying to prevail against the government-appointed bishops, making it possible for the underground churches to flourish once again.⁸

Scholars around the world argue that it was the Polish Solidarity Movement, backed by the Roman Catholic Church, and in particular by the Polish Pope John Paul II, that led to the fatal assault which first brought about the decisive rejection of the Communist Party in Poland, and then ultimately the collapse of communism throughout Europe.⁹ The Party's general secretary, Jiang Zemin, appears to agree with this view.

Proposition 1: In China's present political environment, the revival of the Catholic Church, brought about with the help of the bridging efforts, exposes many underlying conflicts between the Party and religion.

A letter written by Chen Yun, the second most powerful figure in the CCP after Jiang Zemin, reflects the Party's anxiety over the spread of religion:

I am deeply troubled when I read about the ever-increasing infiltration by religious groups, especially the antirevolutionary activities that are undertaken under the cloak of religion. This has long been an established technique employed by our class enemies, both within and outside the country, to use religion to turn our young people against us. This is a painful lesson and we must learn from the experience of other communist states. The Party Central Committee must grasp this issue firmly. It is important not to allow this issue to contribute to social instability. Though you may have

already read all of these documents and reports, I will send them to you again for a second reading.¹⁰

A letter of this kind from such a prominent figure is remarkable testimony to the fear felt within the leadership about the potential for religion to undermine the Party's leadership and ideological authority. The socio-political environment in the 1990s has been less secure than it was in the past. The Party is losing self-confidence as the state's role in the economy declines, and corruption, illegal dealings and abuse of privilege by the offspring of party leaders is rampant. Students returning to China in the 1990s after studying abroad are also far less willing to comply with the Party.¹¹ While the country has enjoyed exceptionally high economic growth since the beginning of the reforms in 1979, the population is deeply troubled and lacking the anchor of traditional morality. It yearns for a moral framework such as that presented by the Falungong Movement (The Law of the Wheel Breathing Exercises).¹²

In Mao's era, the head of the United Front Department, Li Weihan, aimed to make use of religion to serve the interest of the Party in the short run and to render it extinct in the long run.¹³ However, the implementation of this policy depended on the political and ideological climate. Despite maintaining high-handed suppression for 30 years in Mao's time, especially during the Cultural Revolution, the CCP proved unable to stamp out religion, and harsh measures caused religion to go underground, the last thing Beijing wanted.¹⁴ Under the more pragmatic policies of Deng, the treatment applied to religion was slightly relaxed and Document 19 was promulgated in 1982 to assure that religion would function within the orbit set by the Party.¹⁵ Despite this, Ye Xiaowen, head of the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council, acknowledged a still latent desire to eliminate the influence of religion, including that of the Catholic Church, in the socialist era.¹⁶

Proposition 2: The Party desires to eliminate the influence of Catholicism in China.

After establishing regulations on the registration of religious and social organisations (6 May 1991) the State Council took a step further in January 1994 to eliminate the activities of foreigners in China (Regulation 144), by demanding registration of places for religious activities (Regulation 145).¹⁷ Stricter rules and guidelines were laid down by provincial governments in line with these two national regulations.¹⁸ At the same time, foreign administrators of major bridging projects were not allowed to enter China. Official Chinese clergy were sent to seminars and conferences for indoctrination, while church activists and non-official clergy were arrested. The bridge-building activities were curbed by enforcing national laws and local regulations and rules. Ye Xiaowen, the head of the Religious Affairs Bureau, declared that religion should adapt to the socialist regime.¹⁹ Jiang Zemin explored the term 'adaptation' in a working group meeting of the United Front Department in 1993:

This type of adaptation does not require religious adherents to abandon theism and religious beliefs. However, adherents are required to be patriotic in political matters, to embrace socialism, and support the Communist Party leadership. They should alter those religious systems and doctrines which do not go along with socialism, while the positive elements of religious systems, religious doctrine and religious morality should be utilised for the service of socialism.²⁰

This is a candid, practical guideline on how religion should adapt to socialism, even

to the extent of altering the foundations of religion, doctrinally and institutionally.

Twelve months before Hong Kong's reversion to China, Ye Ziaowen visited Hong Kong and told Hong Kong Catholics indirectly that the Party was not intending to make Hong Kong people conform to the position on the mainland. However, he frankly reminded them that after the transfer to Chinese rule in 1997 they should observe the principles of mutual non-subordination, mutual non-interference and mutual respect as stipulated in Article 148 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC).²¹ This was the first call by the PRC to the HKSAR to dismantle the bridging endeavour.

After the transfer of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, Bishop Joseph Zen, the coadjutor bishop of Hong Kong who had taught in mainland seminaries for 10 years, was politely but firmly refused a visit to Chinese seminaries in February 1998.²² In October 1998 he was summoned by Ye Xiaowen, head of the Religious Affairs Bureau in Shenzhen, across the border from Hong Kong, for a private meeting. In that meeting, apart from discussing matters relating to the Hong Kong Catholic Church, Ye let Zen know indirectly that Beijing's attitude towards Hong Kong's bridging efforts was not positive.²³ Though Hong Kong and Macau were separated politically and institutionally from China before their return to Chinese rule in 1997 and 1999 respectively, bridging efforts with Catholics on the mainland were feasible, indeed fruitful. However, Ye's words were taken as an order from Beijing to stop the bridging efforts and to curb the growth of Catholicism in China.

Institutional–Organisational Analysis

Overseas church communities were invited by Pope John Paul II in 1982 to assist in bridging efforts between the Church in China and the Universal Church as a means of connecting the Chinese Church to the Holy See. In actual fact, as early as 1978 Hong Kong Catholics were taking advantage of Deng Xiaoping's open-door policy to begin initiating contacts with mainland Catholics. With their geographical proximity at the southern tip of China, Chinese and non-Chinese Catholics in Hong Kong initiated the bridging endeavour, and those in Taiwan and Macau followed later. From 1979 it was maintained through visits and discussions involving Hong Kong Chinese clergy and laypeople and Catholics on the mainland. The message of the Holy See in 1979 concerning the bridging efforts attracted many overseas Catholics, especially missionaries whose mission societies had had connections with China before 1949. These groups aimed at providing professional and intellectual services, particularly at the tertiary education level. Overseas Catholics in Europe and North America also gradually began participating in the bridging endeavour by providing financial sponsorship in socio-medical projects, cultural and academic assistance to Chinese clergy and facilities for young intellectuals travelling to Europe and North America for further education.

Various types of assistance have also been provided to the Catholic Church in China (to both the official and non-official sectors) and to Chinese society generally, in the form of the training of church personnel, the constructing and repairing of churches and chapels, the provision of religious literature and financial aid to various types of social services and church-related enterprises in rural and urban areas. The bridging efforts were indispensable in the revival of the Catholic Church which had been almost completely destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Even after the Tiananmen Square incident on 4 June 1989, when many international NGOs pulled

out of China, Catholic social assistance continued. Most of this assistance was funded by foreign Catholic resources with the blessing of the Vatican.²⁴

Proposition 3: There is effective coordination among international bridge-builders.

It has been the policy of the Universal Church to keep the coordination among the bridge programme administrators loose, because the different missionary societies are in different locations in China: the Scheut Fathers originally set up in Inner Mongolia, for example, and the Fathers of the Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris went to Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong. Coordination of the bridging efforts started in 1980, with initial exchanges between programme administrators from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore. In the mid-1980s annual meetings were convened by the Hong Kong Catholic Church with the support of the Philippines' papal representative stationed in Hong Kong. These meetings resulted in systematic discussion and evaluation of the bridge projects and better distribution of resources. They represent the highest level of co-ordination. Participation is by invitation. Unfortunately, some uninvited bridge workers within Catholic circles have been unhappy that they have not been asked to participate in these important meetings that have traditionally been attended by the Vatican official stationed in Hong Kong and representatives of major funding agencies. They began to query the criteria for participation, given that a representative from the Protestant bridge administrators from Britain was invited. Paradoxically, the coordination which aimed at unity created some divisions.

Within the Hong Kong diocese, it was decided that coordination of seminary teaching should rest in the dean's office at the Holy Spirit Seminary College, that liturgical matters should be coordinated by the director of the Diocesan Liturgical Commission, that general church matters should be coordinated by the auxiliary bishop and that projects at the grassroots level should be coordinated by the diocese.

Proposition 4: Development of the bridging efforts poses a great demand on church personnel.

Many foreign missionary societies have been making their bridging efforts with China the focus of their missionary activities. There is tangible progress in the revival of the Catholic Church. In 1983 there were 300 Catholic churches in China and 2100 by 1987, despite Chen Yun's policies of active discouragement. The numbers rose to 3900 in 1992 and 4600 in 1998. Laypeople, including those in both the official and the unofficial/underground churches, are estimated to have increased from 3.3 million in 1986 to over 10 million in 1998. In 1998 there were 138 dioceses with 67 bishops in open churches and 53 in underground churches. In 1992 there were 1200 priests in the official church, 435 having been ordained to the priesthood since 1979. There were also 1000 sisters and 1000 seminarians studying in the official seminaries. There is no figure for personnel in the unofficial sector.²⁵ In 1998 there were 1500 priests in the official sector and 850 in the underground sector.²⁶ In the official sector there were one national, six regional and seven provincial seminaries, as well as 10 diocesan seminaries with 1000 major seminarians and 600 minor seminarians under training. There were 10 training centres in the underground sector with 800 seminarians (major and minor) under training and 40 noviciates with 1500 sisters under training in the official sector. In the underground sector there were 20 noviciates for 1000 sisters under training.²⁷

The great expansion of churches and chapels in both urban and rural areas was the

result of huge donations. What is now needed most in China is pastoral care. The building of churches and chapels provides only the hardware. Until recently, only one third (1500 out of 4600) of the churches in China could afford to station a priest for pastoral care. Many churches and chapels have been ready but it has not been possible to provide pastoral care satisfactorily because of the lack of well-trained priests and sisters. (See Proposition 6.)

Proposition 5: The current government's policy towards religion necessitates increasing the role of North American and European Catholics in the bridging efforts.

Given Hong Kong's proximity to China, it was the obvious choice for the location of the initial bridging efforts in 1978 and continues to be a centre for overseas bridge worker meetings. The Holy Spirit Study Centre sponsored by the diocese provides excellent services to overseas bridge workers, especially its research section, which has good data and background information on religions in China. The staff assist in various ways, including accompanying overseas visitors making their first trips into China. Before the transfer of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, the senior staff feared that the Study Centre might have to close after the handover. For this reason, the Jesuits' bridge work was moved from Hong Kong to Manila and Taiwan in 1995.²⁸

Although the HKSAR government has not issued any regulation which curbs the bridging efforts, the initial interactions between church and state leaders after the handover indicate that Hong Kong's position as a major bridge faces new challenges in the new political environment. If it seems that the assistance offered by the Hong Kong/Macau bridge is being curbed, overseas Chinese Catholic communities in North American cities such as Vancouver, Toronto and San Francisco are planning to provide substitution. Many of the Chinese Catholics in these cities originally came from China, Hong Kong and Macau. When Bishop Zen toured the USA and Canada he spoke about the needs of the Catholic Church in China, and at the 21st Annual Meeting of the Chinese Catholic Clergy and Religious Association in North America, held in Vancouver, 12–16 April 1999, as the guest keynote speaker I deliberately chose the theme 'The Catholic Church in China: surviving the difficulties', in order to alert Chinese Catholics in North America to their role in the bridging efforts. These were the first steps in preparing North American Catholics for future involvement in these efforts.²⁹

Chinese Catholics in North America and Europe are showing their initial interest by donating funds for small projects. Though it is too early to know exactly how much these overseas Chinese Catholics can offer, it is a good beginning. They need further guidance from the Hong Kong/Macau Church.

Behavioural Analysis

In the 1980s the new head of Propaganda Fide, Cardinal Tomko of the Vatican, invited various international missionary societies to consider making work for the Chinese Church a first priority.³⁰ Bridging efforts are regarded as modern missionary functions. However, the results are coloured by hermeneutic factors. The various groups engaged in the work have had different results, reflecting their particular understandings of Chinese society and culture, approaches to Catholic theology, and affinities with local Chinese churches.

Proposition 6: There are hermeneutic problems in responding to the needs of Chinese Catholics.

(a) The need to balance church construction with training of church personnel

There is no doubt whatsoever that all those involved in the bridging efforts try to do as much as they can for the Catholic Church in China. They have very often responded to requests from laypeople, priests and sisters on the mainland for practical assistance and cash donations. The overconstruction of churches and chapels is illustrative, as it has far outpaced the speed at which priests and sisters have been ready. In many rural and suburban areas of southern and southwestern China there are several newly built churches and chapels which are virtually empty, and little pastoral activity is taking place. Often the buildings are opened only when priests and sisters make periodical visits to conduct the eucharist and administer other sacraments. Thus the reappearance of church buildings in the late modernisation era has often done little to foster Christian life among Catholics, particularly when the catechetical and pastoral training of aged parish priests and sisters are of the pre-Second Vatican Council type and younger clergy have not yet received adequate training for pastoral care. Often the clergy are far from capable of helping Chinese Catholics cope with the fast-changing socio-economic conditions of the country, conditions which generate so many social problems and challenge the Catholic faith, for example the one-child policy. The problem of redistributing the limited resources available towards the training of personnel and away from church construction is not easy to solve.

(b) Hermeneutic problems in seminary teaching

Overseas theology teachers are permitted to teach in seminaries in various parts of China on a temporary basis. Nearly all the teaching materials, curriculum and course deliberations are copied from western types of seminary training. Even short supplementary courses for in-service training are of the western type.³¹ Problems of hermeneutics arise from time to time when teachers and course contents from a western Christian cultural heritage come up against the prevailing local ideology: a mixture of Marxism–Leninism and Confucianism. On one occasion, for example, a group of novices and young sisters on the mainland were shocked by an overseas teacher's reference to 'Biblical criticism' (*pipan xue*). For any western scholar biblical and literary criticism are very common academic exercises. However, in the Chinese political environment the word 'criticism' is a loaded term causing fear.

Feng Congde, a young Chinese intellectual now living in the USA, who was a student leader at the time of Tiananmen Square, has a special perspective on the difference between Chinese and Western cultures. He believes that the unconditional acceptance of western culture and knowledge by the Chinese is not in the best interests of the development of China and that positive elements of Chinese culture such as humanity and forbearance are in fact very much needed in western society.³² Power struggles, violence and hegemony may lead to wealth and strength, but not to happiness.³³ Can Catholicism in China become a promoter of these two virtues? What kind of seminary training would help in this task? The problem needs attention.

The Falungong Movement has attracted about two million people in China. It has caused extreme nervousness among the political leadership, which is using all possible means to eliminate the movement completely.³⁴ A mixture of *qigong* (breathing exercises) and Chinese mythology, it offers calm and hope in a society which has lost its bearings.³⁵ Political analysts note that nearly 50 years of communist rule have completely erased the fundamental values of Chinese society. During the Cultural Revolution family members even had to denounce each other or risk execu-

tion. Nowadays it is all too easy for Chinese citizens to believe that only money has value. The leader of the Falungong Movement, Li Hongzhi, writes mainly science fiction, and when he explains morality in daily life he uses a simple folksy style that appeals to a public which for too many years has been subjected to meaningless communist jargon. Possibly without realising it himself, Li has become the healer of millions of wounded souls. He conveys the reassuring assertion that truth, dignity, energy and health can be found within each individual. He claims that his meditative breathing exercises can lead to a life of bliss. For many Chinese, this forceful message answers a basic psychic need.³⁶ Li Hongzhi was sensitive enough to recognise these yearnings in Chinese society. Unlike Christianity and other world religions Falungong has been able to attract the average person on the street, including retired and semi-retired party members and senior military personnel. Apparently the permitted religious organisations in China, including the Catholic Church, missed this opportunity to provide the needed message of salvation. How can the bridging efforts help the Catholic churches heal this wounded society? This is a problem of urgent importance which deserves serious consideration by bridge workers.

Proposition 7: The increased involvement of Catholic laypeople in the bridging efforts has transferred much of the work to the grassroots level.

In the 1980s most of the bridge workers were clergy and religious men and women. Later on, more and more qualified laypeople joined the team, and groups were formed at the parish level. Through visits to Chinese dioceses and Catholic communities, overseas Catholics have formed interpersonal relationships with Catholics in China. During the summer, Christmas and Chinese New Year vacations they have been going to parishes and seminaries in the mainland to give short Bible training courses or instruction in parish management, pastoral skills and catechetical methods. They have been making donations to finance priests and sisters or church-related projects. More and more overseas Catholic laypeople are thus becoming involved in the bridging efforts, transferring ever more of the work to the grassroots level. The parish system, pastoral care and Catholic involvement in community building are essential for the building of local churches. Assistance from overseas Catholic laypeople substitutes for a lack of priests and sisters who have traditionally been the main bridge workers.

Conclusions: Discussion

It is clear that the bridging effort has made a positive contribution to the Catholic Church over the last two decades at various stages in its revival during Deng's modernisation era. My seven propositions cover the main aspects of the achievements of the bridging effort within China. It has facilitated the revival of the Catholic Church in China, it has attracted young people to the church because of its foreign links and has improved the available training and leadership with help from priests and sisters trained overseas.

However, research findings affirm that in the present political environment of China conflict between the Communist Party and the Chinese Catholic Church is becoming more intense. The bridge administrators now find themselves at a crossroads. It seems that they will increasingly be challenged in a China under the leadership of Jiang Zemin as the CCP consolidates its policy of tightening up religious rules and regulations and requesting all religions within China to adapt to a socialist

society.³⁷ The gradual moving of bridging efforts away from Greater China means that new deployment within the Chinese Catholic communities in Europe and North America is needed. Seminary teaching in China is facing hermeneutic problems, so the training of future candidates should emphasise oriental culture and Chinese philosophy, preparing the church leadership to integrate Christianity and Chinese culture. However, many church leaders in China have an inclination to prefer western philosophy and occidental studies rather than oriental studies.³⁸ Bridge administrators are thus faced with an important question: how can they have a dialogue with church leaders in China in order to reach a consensus on this matter? At this critical stage in the development of the Chinese Church, long-term planning in the preparation of future leadership will be decisive for the church's future development.

The bridge builders are facing a huge task: how are they to continue their projects in China with the aim of enhancing the influence of the Chinese Catholic Church in a society with a legacy of indoctrination in Marxism–Leninism and Confucianism which is heading for the status of a great world power? We may assume that future developments will produce pressure for the modification of unpopular party policies such as those on ethnic minorities, birth control and religion.³⁹ According to political analysts, China is heading towards a new phase of socio-political development; its resurgence will be one of the most significant world phenomena at the start of the new millennium.

Notes and References

- ¹ Pope John Paul II made this request when he received the Taiwan bishops who made their *ad limina* visit to the Holy See in February 1984. For details see Beatrice Leung, *Sino–Vatican Relations: Problems of Conflicting Authority 1976–1986* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992), pp. 189–256.
- ² Merrill Grindle (ed.), *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980); David Lewis and Helen Wallace (eds), *Policies into Practice: National and International Case Studies in Implementation* (St Martin's Press, New York, 1984); Paul Wilding, 'Social policy and social development in Hong Kong', *The Asian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1996, pp. 46–60.
- ³ Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, 3rd ed. (Marcel Dekker, New York, 1984).
- ⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
- ⁵ 'Princelings' are the sons and daughters of top CCP leaders. At the general assembly of the CCP on 1 September 1982 the late general secretary, Hu Yaobang, warned party members of the seriousness of the crisis of faith within the Party. Hu's speech was reported in *Renmin Ribao*, 2 September 1982. No successful solution to the problem has yet been found.
- ⁶ This argument prevails in internally circulated documents. See Luo Shugang, 'Zhongjiao gongzuo gangmian de yixie redian wenti' ('Some popular issues in religious work'), *Neibu wengao* (internal document), no. 5, 1996, pp. 11–13.
- ⁷ *ibid.*
- ⁸ *ibid.*
- ⁹ George Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1992), p. 143; Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985), p. 72.
- ¹⁰ Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of the Religious Affairs Bureau (ed.), *Xinshiqi zongjiao gongzuo wenxian xuanbian* (*Selected Documents on Religious Work in a New Age*) (Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, Beijing, 1995), p. 177 (translation by the author).

- ¹¹ He Pin and Kao Xin, *Zhonggong de taizidang (The Princelings of the Chinese Communist Party)* (Mirror Books, Hong Kong, 1994).
- ¹² In the summer of 1999 there was wide coverage of the Falungong Movement in international newspapers and magazines including *The Times*, *New York Times*, *Asiaweek*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *The Strait* and *Asian Wall Street Journal*.
- ¹³ Li Weihai, *Tongyi zhangxian wenti yu minju wenti (Problems of the United Front and Problems of Nationalities)* (Renmin chubanshe, Beijing, 1981), pp. 506–7.
- ¹⁴ Merle Goldman, 'Religion in post-Mao China', in Robert J. Myers (ed.), *Religion and the State: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Power (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 483) (Sage, Beverley Hills, 1986), pp. 150–1.
- ¹⁵ Document 19 is an official document recorded in *Xinshiqi zongjiao ...*, pp. 53–73.
- ¹⁶ Ye Xiaowen, 'Danqian de zongjiao wenti' ('Contemporary religious questions of the motherland') in *Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao baocao xuen (Selected Reports of the Party Central School)*, vol. 101, no. 5, 1996, pp. 9–23 (internally circulated document).
- ¹⁷ Regulation 144 and Regulation 145 are recorded in *Xinshiqi zongjiao ...*, pp. 273–77.
- ¹⁸ See *Xinjiang waiwuer zhizhicu zhongjiao huodong guanli zhanxing guidaing (Temporary Regulations on the Management of Religious Activities in Xinjiang Autonomous Region)*; *Zhejiang sheng zhongjiao huodong guanli guidaing (Regulations on the Management of Religious Activities in Zhejiang Province)*; and *Henansheng zhongjiao huodong changshuo guanli guidaing (Regulations on the Management of Religious Activities in Henan Province)*.
- ¹⁹ Ye Xiaowen, 'Zongjiao yu pufa' ('Religion and popularisation of law'), in Policy Section of the Religious Affairs Bureau (ed.), *Zongjiao gongzhuo pufaduban (Readings on Religious Works in the Context of Popularisation of Law)* (Religious Cultural Press, Beijing, 1997), pp. 1–8.
- ²⁰ Jiang Zemin, 'Kaodu zhongshi minchu gongzhuo he zongjiao gongzhuo' ('Highly regard the works on nationalities and religion'), in *Xinshiqi zongjiao ...*, pp. 249–55.
- ²¹ *Sunday Examiner* (Hong Kong Catholic weekly), 5 July 1996; *Yi: China Message*, vols. 15–17, no. 6, August 1996, pp. 12–13.
- ²² The details of this event were reported to the author by a private source in November 1998.
- ²³ See note 21.
- ²⁴ Ye Xiaowen, 'Danqian de zongjiao wenti'.
- ²⁵ These figures are from 'A chronology of the Catholic Church in China in the context of selected dates in world and Chinese history', *Tripod* (Hong Kong), vol. 13, no. 76, July–August 1993, pp. 19–76.
- ²⁶ *Tripod*, vol. 18, no. 108, December 1998, p. 39.
- ²⁷ *ibid.*
- ²⁸ Beatrice Leung, 'The uneasy balance: the Sino–Vatican–Hong Kong relations after 1997', in Beatrice Leung and Joseph Cheng (eds), *HKSAR: In Pursuit of Domestic and International Order* (Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1997), pp. 97–117.
- ²⁹ I was invited to give this keynote speech on 12 April 1999. The organiser of the meeting explained that the theme was to focus on building a bridge between Chinese and North American Catholics.
- ³⁰ Superiors General stationed in Rome were invited in 1980 by Cardinal Tomko, the new head of Propaganda Fide, to discuss the mission strategy of the church. At that meeting they were requested to consider making the China mission the first priority of their congregations.
- ³¹ *Kung Kao Po* (Hong Kong Catholic weekly), 15 August 1999, p. A6.
- ³² Feng Congde, 'Chuangtong liazhi de zai renshi' ('Reunderstanding traditional values'), *Ming Pao Monthly*, June 1999, pp. 14–16.
- ³³ *ibid.*
- ³⁴ *Ming Pao*, 12 August 1999; *Renmin Ribao*, 4 August 1999, 15 August 1999.
- ³⁵ Sin-ming Shaw, 'Breathing's easier than believing', *Time*, 9 August 1999, p. 17.
- ³⁶ *ibid.*

- ³⁷ Ye Xiaowen, 'Guanyu zongjiao wenti de san juhua' ('On three sentences about religion'), *Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao baocao xuen* (*Selected Reports of the Central Party School*), no. 6, May 1999, pp. 1–18.
- ³⁸ Bridge administrators say that this has become evident when they have discussed problems of priest formation with Chinese bishops in recent years.
- ³⁹ Michael Oksenberg, 'The long march ahead', *South China Morning Post*, 1 October 1999.