

Introduction

In the era of welfare state retrenchment, the social question “who should get what and why?” comes back to the fore (van Oorschot, 2000, p. 34). In this context, the notion of distributive justice, which pertains to how the resources of our welfare state should be distributed appropriately, structures contemporary discussions (Mau & Veghte, 2007). Generally, the social justice literature refers to three principles of distributive justice: equality, equity and need, with each principle implying a different logic of allocating benefits, goods and services (Clasen & van Oorschot, 2002; Deutsch, 1975). The logic of equality (of outcomes) means providing social welfare for all citizens when they are confronted with a certain risk, while disregarding additional requirements. The principle of equity conceives contributions as a prerequisite for having access to the resources of the welfare state, while the need principle entails a selective concern to those highest in need of assistance.

Besides the extensive body of normative theories of social justice (see Cullen, 1992 for an overview; Miller, 1999; Rawls, 1972), an increasing number of studies investigate which principles of social justice are preferred by the public at large (Aalberg, 2003; Liebig & Sauer, 2016; Mau & Veghte, 2007; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013). Although the existing research evidences what types of welfare distributions are considered as just by the public and how normative principles are applied in practice (Miller, 1992; Swift, 1999), it fails to fully grasp to what extent individuals’ social justice preferences depend of the particular distribution at stake. Notwithstanding Walzer’s (1983) and Miller’s (1999) call for a pluralist conceptualization of distributive justice, the explicit connection between contexts and preferences has only seldom been empirically examined (Bicchieri, 2006; Scott & Bornstein, 2009). True, various studies, especially qualitative research, have illustrated the co-existence of various justice ideals in societies (i.e., the multidimensionality of justice; Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2007; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). Other studies focus on individual allocation decisions in different circumstances and relationships (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981; Deutsch, 1975; Hegtvedt & Cook, 2001; Mikula, 1980; Miller, 1992; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). Yet, empirical work that systematically dissects how preferences regarding the distribution of collectively available resources are context-dependent is largely lacking (Bicchieri, 2006; Sachweh, 2016; Scott & Bornstein, 2009). This is unfortunate, because the assumption that people apply the same distributive justice principles universally across different welfare distributions (e.g. Aalberg, 2003; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; D’Anjou, Steijn, & Van Aarsen, 1995; Marshall, Swift, Routh, & Burgoyne, 1999) is questionable, as interpretations of and preferences for justice principles can depend on the welfare domain under consideration (Hochschild, 1981; Mau & Sachweh, 2014; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013).

Our study examines to what extent different popular preferences on the distribution of welfare state resources are context-dependent, combined with each other, and socially and ideologically stratified. To begin with, we analyse citizens’ preferences for the principles of equality, equity and need in the three welfare domains of health care, pensions and unemployment benefits (cf. Walzer, 1983). This allows us to answer a first research question, namely *to what extent are preferences for the social justice principles dependent of the welfare domains?* Second, our analysis goes beyond the idea that individuals use a single rule, criterion or principle in their justice-related assessments, and investigates the combinations of multiple distributive rules or standards that persons apply, which offers a much more realistic perspective of justice preferences (Leventhal, 1980). Using a person-centred approach (cf. Collins & Lanza, 2010; Meeusen, Meuleman, Abts, & Bergh, 2018) we construct a typology of

social justice configurations that answers the question *how individuals combine preferences for the social justice principles across welfare domains* (cf. Franke & Simonson, 2018). Third, we investigate *how particular configurations of social justice preferences are related to structural positions and ideological dispositions* (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; D'Anjou et al., 1995; Ng & Allen, 2005). Focusing on the traditional explanatory frameworks of the welfare state attitudes literature, i.e. self-interest and ideology, (Jaeger, 2006; Roosma, Gelissen, & van Oorschot, 2013; Roosma, van Oorschot, & Gelissen, 2014) allows to gain better understanding of what motivates individuals to combine justice principles simultaneously in distinct ways.

To answer the research questions, we use Belgium as a research site, which is a federal state in Western-Europe with a relatively extensive welfare state that is characterized as a conservative welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In particular, we employ survey data of the Belgian National Elections Study 2014 (Abts et al., 2015). Questions regarding social justice preferences in the domains of pensions, health care and unemployment are analysed by means of three-step Latent Class Analysis (LCA). This allows us to explore the domain-specificity of the social justice principles, construct a typology of configurations of distributive justice preferences and investigate their social-structural and ideological determinants.

1. Equality, equity or need? Distributive justice preferences in the welfare domains of health care, pensions and unemployment benefits

The social justice literature generally identifies three principles of distributive justice (Deutsch, 1975), which not only refer to more abstract ideal types of welfare distribution, but are also strongly embedded in institutional designs of European welfare states (Clasen & van Oorschot, 2002; Sachweh, 2016). While distributive justice preferences have been defined in various ways (see for instance Sabbagh & Schmitt, 2016), we use the concept to refer to fundamental and long-lasting beliefs on the legitimacy of the various distributive logics through which a welfare state allocates benefits and services. First, the principle of equality, here understood as equality in outcomes rather than equality in opportunities (Sachweh, 2016), posits that all citizens should be treated equally within welfare distribution and receive the same level of social welfare when confronted with a certain risk, without reference to additional requirements. Second, the principle of equity makes distributions dependent on previous contributions to the common good. Equity can mean that benefits are proportional to one's paid taxes, welfare contributions and/or labour market participation. Third, the principle of need entails a primarily and selective concern to citizens highest in need. Need-based distribution focuses exclusively on groups in need (such as the disabled or the poor) with the goal of providing sufficient resources to alleviate their basic needs.

A growing body of public opinion research tries to uncover which of these three principles receives most public support to form the basis of welfare systems. Although most studies assume that citizens put forward a single principle that they apply uniformly to various domains or social risks, Michael Walzer (1983) argues in favour of a broader context-dependent account of distributive justice, which recognizes that different criteria are applicable to the distribution of distinct social goods. Walzer's concept of '*spheres of justice*' implies that social justice principles are specific rather than universal in the sense that their concrete meaning and interpretation depends crucially on the contexts and cases they are applied to (Konow, 2001, p. 139). Although the idea of pluralism has been embraced by various justice scholars (Deutsch, 1975; Hegtvedt & Cook, 2001; Mikula, 1980;

Miller, 1992; Tyler et al., 1997), context-dependency has only seldom been systematically tested in the field of the welfare state attitudes (Bicchieri, 2006; Sachweh, 2016; Scott & Bornstein, 2009).¹

In this study, we translate the idea of context-dependency to the realm of the welfare state by focusing on domain-specificity and investigating how distributive justice preferences vary across the domains of health care, pensions and unemployment benefits. Applied to these domains, (1) equality implies that everyone receives the same health care, pensions or unemployment benefits, irrespective of requirements or contributions (equality of outcomes); (2) equity indicates that those who have contributed more to the system receive better state-provided health care, higher pensions and more generous unemployment benefits; and (3) the distribution according to need allocates only health care, pensions and unemployment benefits to those who have insufficient resources to be self-reliant. To uncover which principle(s) prevail in each of the domains, we focus on their corresponding social risks, i.e. sickness, retirement and unemployment. These risks are characterized by very distinct modes of operation and conceptions of social justice (Bonoli, 2006; Mau, 2003) and could therefore invoke differential justice norms and legitimize different types of distribution (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 1992; Hegtveldt & Cook, 2001).

In particular, the three social risks differ in terms of perceived level of predictability, locus of control and prevalence. First, risks that are considered *predictable* facilitate a logic of making distribution conditional on previous contributions – i.e. the equity principle (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013). Income losses can be foreseen when risks are predictable, which stimulates individual responsibility and precautionary actions like ensuring a consistent labour market trajectory (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013). Second, the *locus of control* deals with the question whether individuals are responsible themselves for their needy situation. The expectation that benefit claimants are personally responsible for their own situation fosters the belief that they are undeserving of generous welfare support and that distribution should become more selective, as reflected in the principles of need and equity (Clasen & van Oorschot, 2002; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lepianka, van Oorschot, & Gelissen, 2009). Third, risks that are believed to be *prevalent* facilitate the introduction of equal distribution of resources, as these risks affect almost the entire population and equality-based systems are meant to promote the general well-being (Clasen & Van Oorschot, 2002). Similarly, in case of high risk exposure, individuals are more likely to distribute broadly and to insure collectively (Cusack, Iversen, & Rehm, 2006; Sëva, 2009).

Sickness is largely considered *unpredictable*, as it is labelled as an ‘external risk’ that befalls individuals unexpectedly (Giddens, 1999; Hinrichs, 1997). Although the development of genetic research and screening has rendered disease increasingly predictable and preventable (Bernts, 1988), the population at large still perceives an important element of (un)fortune in matters of sickness and health. The impossibility of fully predicting sickness decreases the support for a system that restricts health care on the basis of previous contributions (equity). Despite the increasing privatization of health insurance and growing emphasis on individual responsibility (Paz-Fuchs, 2011; ter Meulen, 2015; ter Meulen & Maarse, 2008), there is still a fundamental normative standard that the sick are generally not held accountable for their disadvantageous situation (Jensen & Bang Petersen, 2017; Mau, 2003,

¹ This is in part because the concept of pluralism has been conceived in many different ways, but only seldom in terms of the context-dependency of justice principles (De Bres, 2012). Instead pluralism commonly refers to various grounds of justice-related judgements (ground pluralism; De Bres, 2012; Rippon, Theuns, de Maagt, Zala, & van den Brink, 2018), to multiple actors who can be subject of justice decisions (subject pluralism; De Bres, 2012) or to the mere co-existence of various justice ideals in societies (multidimensionality of justice; Cappelen et al., 2007; Leventhal et al., 1980; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018).

p. 166). This general perception of *limited internal control* decreases support for conditional health care arrangements. Moreover, sickness is a relatively unavoidable part of people's lifecycle and a *highly prevalent* risk (Green-pedersen & Jensen, 2019; Hinrichs, 1997; Jensen, 2012; Mau, 2003). This furthers the support for the egalitarian provision of health care. Thus, since sickness is mostly considered to be unpredictable, largely uncontrollable and highly prevalent, we expect strong public preferences for the principle of equality in this domain.

Because retirement is a *foreseeable* part of most people's life (Mau, 2003, p. 147), individuals are generally expected to anticipate this risk (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013), which legitimizes distribution based on previously earned rights. The idea of 'earned benefits' coincides with an equity-based logic that makes the level of pension benefits dependent on previous contributions (Mau, 2003). At the same time, while old age itself is unavoidable and retirement is *external to individuals' control*, individuals are held responsible to participate in the labour market or to accumulate individual savings to prevent the loss of a reasonable life standard after retirement (Hinrichs, 1997; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013). This component of individual responsibility is increasingly emphasized by focusing on active aging, which aims to maximize the well-being and participation of elderly citizens (Walker, 2009). However, a large majority of the population still believes that pensions should be collectively organized (Gelissen, 2001). Being an integral part of most individuals' life course, retirement is also *relatively prevalent* (Green-pedersen & Jensen, 2019), which implies that collective insurance schemes seem to be beneficial for almost everyone. As retirement is considered almost fully predictable and individuals are seen as personally responsible for building up pension rights, the principle of equity is expected to be preferred most.

Last, the risk of unemployment fluctuates according to macro-economic circumstances and is therefore, according to most people, largely *unpredictable* (Hinrichs, 1997; Mau, 2003). A considerable share of the population considers unemployment to be self-inflicted (Hinrichs, 1997; van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017), hold the unemployed responsible for their situation and blame them for not actively seeking a job (Dwyer, 2000). Although social opportunities and social exclusion in the labor market are to a certain extent socially stratified by age, social class and ethnicity (Mythen, 2005), many citizens perceive unemployment as something within individuals' control instead of being caused by social fate (Furåker & Blomsterberg, 2003). This perceived *high level of internal control* is expected to stimulate preferences for need- or equity-based distributions, as these entail a focus on individual responsibility through self-reliance and labour market participation respectively (Clasen & van Oorschot, 2002). In addition, unemployment is generally perceived as an anomaly rather than a normal part of people's lifecycle (Green-pedersen & Jensen, 2019; Jensen, 2012). Unemployment is generally *less widespread* than sickness and old age, which makes support for an extensive equality-based unemployment benefit system improbable (Hinrichs, 1997). As unemployment is largely considered to be within the control of individuals and as extensive government intervention is limitedly supported, the principles of need or equity are anticipated to receive more popular support over equality.

Table 1 summarizes the postulated relationship between perceived characteristics of social risks (predictability, locus of control and prevalence) on the one hand, and social justice preferences on the other. In the case of sickness, the high prevalence combined low predictability and external locus of control stimulates preferences for the principle of equality. In the case of old age, especially the predictability fosters support for equity-based distribution. In the case of unemployment the high perceived level of individual responsibility stands

out, which delegitimizes the principle of equality and makes preferences for equity and need more likely. Note that the expectations about the characteristics of these social risks are especially conceived in relative terms to the other two social risks and should not be interpreted categorically. The influence of these characteristics is not tested empirically, as they are used to formulate theoretical predictions about the preferred principles for each social risk or welfare domain.

Table 1. Perceived characteristics of social risks and social justice preferences per welfare domain

Welfare domain	Social risk	Predictability	Locus of control	Prevalence	Justice principle
Health care	Sickness	--	--	++	→ Equality
Pensions	Retirement	++	-	+	→ Equity
Unemployment benefits	Unemployment	-	++	-	→ Equity/need

2. Configurations of distributive justice preferences

Acknowledging domain-specificity is crucial, but it does not yet reveal the full variety and complexity of distributive justice preferences. While some individuals may apply the same justice logic universally across distributions, others call upon different criteria in their various distributive judgements (Franke & Simonson, 2018; Miller, 1992; Osipovic, 2015; Sachweh, 2012; Scott, Matland, Michelbach, & Bornstein, 2001). Franke and Simonson (2018), for instance, show that people often combine different and sometimes even seemingly ‘inconsistent’ or ‘contradictory’ social justice beliefs regard old-age provisions (cf. Converse, 2006). Ignoring this within-person diversity in opinions misrepresents the complexity of public support for different types of welfare distribution. More than merely mapping the within-person diversity in preferences for social justice principles, we aim to uncover the specific configurations or combinations of justice preferences. This enables to construct a typology of subgroups of individuals who combine distributive justice preferences across domains in similar ways. Contrary to so-called variable-centred approaches that consider support for particular principles or domains as separate dimensions (e.g. Hülle, Liebig, & May, 2018; Meuleman, Roosma, & Abts, 2020), this person-centred approach has the benefit of uncovering the ideological coherence of individuals’ justice preferences (Franke & Simonson, 2018). Because the person-centred paradigm is largely exploratory, it is difficult to predict exactly which configurations of interconnected principles will be retrieved. However, based on theoretical considerations, the following configurations seem likely.

First, in line with a great share of research into general support for social redistribution and the role of government (Jaeger, 2006, 2012; Roller, 1995; van Oorschot & Meuleman, 2012), we expect to find a subgroup of individuals who endorse the principle of equality across welfare domains. This is because various previous studies illustrate that large shares of the population endorses the reduction of inequalities and sees an important role for the government herein (Meuleman, 2019; Roosma et al., 2013, 2014). Regardless of the specific context, a majority of citizens endorses extensive government intervention across different welfare domains, including

health care, pensions and unemployment benefits (Jaeger, 2012). Although real equality in outcomes is unlikely to be broadly supported (Aalberg, 2003; Marshall et al., 1999), there is a relatively high support for reduction of social inequality and for bringing arrangements (more) in line with the principle of equality (Magni-Berton 2019; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013). This suggests that a subgroup of the population is likely to support the universal application of the equality principle.

Besides the uniform applicability of equality, we also expect more differentiated combinations of social justice principles. A second anticipated configuration combines a preference for equality in health care with preferences for equity in pensions and need or equity in unemployment benefits. This configuration takes the different expectations about predictability, internal control and prevalence of each social risk into consideration and prefers distinct principles accordingly. This profile may fit with the institutionalized differentiation of justice logics within the designs of health care, pensions and unemployment in conservative welfare state regimes. Access to health care is relatively universal, while the height of pension benefits is related to the contributions paid during the working years and unemployment benefits are initially proportional to the last earned income (equity) and decrease gradually to subsistence level (need) (Gerkens & Merkur, 2010; Gieselink, Peeters, Van Gestel, Berghman, & Van Buggenhout, 2003; Van Lancker, Marchal, Schuerman, Van Mechelen, & Van Kerm, 2015). Because welfare and justice beliefs are embedded in policy contexts (Elster, 1992; Hegtveldt & Cook, 2001; Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014), public opinion might partly be in line with the institutional design of each of these welfare domains.

A third configuration is expected to combine preferences for equality in the domains of health care and pensions with support for equity or need in the distribution of unemployment benefits. The logic of this configuration is in line with deservingness literature, which illustrates that a large proportion of people see the elderly and the sick as equally deserving of welfare support, while the unemployed are considered less deserving (Green-pedersen & Jensen, 2019; Laenen & Meuleman, 2017; van Oorschot, 2000). This distinction between sickness and retirement, on the one hand, and unemployment, on the other hand, coincides with the rationale behind *luck egalitarianism*, which only considers deviations from equality to be legitimate when the risk is within the control of individuals (Brouwer & Mulligan, 2018; Rippon et al., 2018). As the unemployed are especially considered to be personally responsible, this logic could only consider deviations from equality for the distribution of unemployment benefits to be just.

3. An explanatory account of distributive justice configurations

In addition to constructing a typology of configurations in justice preferences, this contribution also tries to explain why individuals adhere to a particular social justice configuration. Drawing on previous research into welfare attitudes and distributive justice preferences (D'Anjou et al., 1995; Meuleman et al., 2020; Ng & Allen, 2005; van Oorschot, 2010), we consider the impact of social structural characteristics as well as ideological beliefs. Contrary to previous studies, however, we identify the structural and ideological factors that explain why individuals opt for a specific combination of principles, rather than analysing the principles or domains separately. However, since our exploratory approach makes it difficult to formulate explicit hypotheses, we apply the explanatory frameworks to more general orientations towards equality, equity and need instead of to specific configurations.

A first line of argument stresses that distributive justice preferences are socially stratified and thus related to social structural characteristics of individuals (Aalberg, 2003; D'Anjou et al., 1995; Ng & Allen, 2005). Persons with a higher level of education and income were found to be more supportive of equity-oriented distribution, while individuals with a lower socio-economic status are more inclined to prefer equality- or need-based distribution (Aalberg, 2003; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013). This pattern of stratification in distributive justice orientations can be understood from self-interest mechanisms. The higher support for equity-based distributions among well-off groups can be related to their higher personal interest in distribution proportional to past contributions (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; D'Anjou et al., 1995; Miller, 1992; Ng & Allen, 2005). Lower-status groups, on the other hand, benefit more from equality- or need-based distribution (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; D'Anjou et al., 1995; Miller, 1992). Therefore, we expect higher status groups to be more likely to be equity-oriented in one or more domains, while lower status groups would be more likely to be directed at equality or need.

The second framework to explain patterns of distributive justice preferences refers to ideology (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Ng & Allen, 2005). According to this framework, social justice preferences are embedded in a broader system of coherent normative and political orientations (Jaeger, 2006; van Oorschot, 2006). To test the ideology hypothesis, most empirical studies have focused on left-right placement. As right-wing individuals are less egalitarian and adopt more conditional notions of solidarity (van Oorschot, 2006), they are expected to be more equity- and need-oriented. However, at least three other ideological dispositions - namely authoritarianism, economic liberalism and utilitarian individualism - can be linked theoretically to distributive justice preferences as these dispositions relate closely to the question of how to balance rights and responsibilities (Rawls, 1972).

Authoritarianism refers to an 'intolerance of deviance and a submissiveness to authorities' (Staerklé, Likki, & Scheidegger, 2012, p. 89) and is consequently related to support for distribution that is conditional on conformity to prevailing norms (Staerklé et al., 2012). By defending reciprocal duties, authoritarianists are more likely to be equity-oriented and to support welfare support contingent on labour market participation and the fulfilment of social obligations (Achterberg, van der Veen, & Raven, 2014). Economic liberalism encompasses a preference for limiting government distribution and allocating welfare through market mechanisms (Dwyer, 2000; Friedman, 1967; Nozick, 1974). Therefore, economic liberalism is conducive to distributing only to those who cannot obtain a reasonable living standard through participation in a market economy (cf. Friedman, 1967) and, hence the principle of need. Utilitarian individualists stress personal responsibility and the importance of rewarding hard work, accomplishments and merit (Halman, 1996; Mascini, Achterberg, & Houtman, 2013; Staerklé, 2009). As a result, persons with a utilitarian individualist disposition are more likely to be equity-oriented, as equity underlines the significance of achievements and performances. To make sure these ideological dispositions and the justice principles themselves do not just measure support for government involvement in different welfare domains, we also control for support for government intervention (Roller, 1995).

4. Data and method

4.1. Data

We use data from the Belgian National Elections Study of 2014 (BNES), which was conducted among Belgians who were qualified to vote in the federal elections of 2014. Respondents were selected through two-stage random probability sampling and data were collected by means of computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). The

National Register of Belgium served as the sampling frame. The data collection resulted in a total number of 1901 respondents (response rate: 47.5%). Cases with missing values on an independent or all dependent variables are excluded from the analysis, which results in a final sample size of 1898 respondents. Post-stratification weights for gender, age and education are applied to correct for differential non-response.

4.2. Indicators

Dependent variables

We use three items to assess which principle of justice people prefer in the domains of health care, pensions and unemployment benefits. For each domain, respondents are asked to choose between either an equality-, an equity- or a need-based distribution.² The question for each domain was formulated as follows: “*The government can organize health care/pensions/unemployment benefits in different ways. According to you, what should the government do?*”. Answer categories started with “*The government should (only) provide*” and the subsequent wordings are displayed in Table 1, together with the proportion of respondents opting for each principle. Note that responses to these items might be contaminated by support for government involvement in the provision of health care, pensions and unemployment benefits. To have a clearer interpretation in terms of justice principles, we control for this disposition in our explanatory analysis.

Independent variables

First, socio-economic status is operationalized by occupation, education, income and welfare dependency. Occupation is divided into five classes based on the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero class scheme, which distinguishes between: the service class, blue collar workers (reference category), white collar workers, the self-employed and the economically inactive (including students) (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). Education is divided into three distinct categories: lower secondary education or less, higher secondary education (reference category) and tertiary education. Income is measured as the net equalized household income and is divided into four quartiles. A separate category is added for the relatively large group of respondents with a missing value on income (11 percent of the sample). Welfare dependency is measured by asking respondents whether they or a household member received a welfare benefit, such as income support, an unemployment benefit or a work disability allowance in the last two years. Gender, age and region (Flanders vs. Francophone Belgium) are included as control variables.

Left-right placement is measured by a single item on a 11-point scale with higher values pointing to a higher identification with a right-wing ideology. The three other ideological dimensions are measured by means of

² Originally each question also included an answer category for people who thought the government should not organize any distributions. However, due to a very low proportion of individuals opting for this category (approximately 1 percent for each welfare domain), this option is converted to a missing value. Note that respondents can only mark one answer category for each of the three questions. Although it is possible for respondents to combine principles across the three questions, they cannot apply multiple principles within a welfare domain. This of course entails a more restrictive approach and ideally a differentiation within domains would have been enabled as well. For the purpose of this study, however, the operationalization suffices, as we want to comprehend which principles are dominant within domains and how people combine distributive criteria across domains.

multiple agree-disagree items (5-point scales). Authoritarianism is measured by three items that ask to what extent problems can be solved by getting rid of immoral people, obedience and respect for authority are important virtues and laws should become stricter. Economic liberalism is operationalized by two items gauging whether individuals think that the government should intervene less in the market and that businesses should get more freedom. Utilitarian individualism is measured by three items asking whether respondents believe that everyone has to defend their own interests, that personal success is more important than good relations and that everything resolves around one's own interest. Finally, government intervention is measured by three items (11-point scale) probing to what extent individuals believe that the government is responsible for providing a reasonable pension, affordable health care and a reasonable living standard for the unemployed, respectively. A simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the four latent concepts shows that the items measure the intended latent concepts adequately ($\chi^2=100.609$; $df=38$; $RMSEA=0.029$; $CFI=0.977$; $TLI=0.967$; $SRMR=0.028$) and that all factor loadings are sufficiently strong (see Appendix Table A1 for question wordings and more details on the CFA). To include these latent concepts as predictors of class membership, the factor scores of this measurement model are saved and included in the regression analysis.

4.3. Statistical modelling

To answer the research questions, we conduct a three-step latent class analysis (LCA) (Vermunt, 2010). This person-centred approach empirically constructs a typology of distributive justice preferences, uncovers how people combine different principles across welfare domains and shows how preferences with a particular configuration are linked to the structural and ideological predictors. A first step estimates latent class models and determines how many latent subgroups are required to represent the variety in justice preferences across welfare domains. After the determination of the best latent class solution, a second step consists of determining for every individual what the most likely class membership is. Third, most likely class membership is predicted in a multinomial regression model while considering the classification errors that are made when assigning respondents to classes. Specifically, we conduct a stepwise multinomial regression analysis first adding the structural characteristics and later including the ideological dimensions to uncover whether the social-structural effects are attributable to ideological differences between social strata. All analyses were conducted in Mplus 8.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017).

5. Results

5.1. Descriptive overview

Table 2 provides an overview of the preferences for the distributive justice principles across the three welfare domains. In line with some previous studies (e.g. Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2013) but in contrast to others (e.g. Aalberg, 2003), the principle of equality is widely endorsed across the welfare domains investigated here. The high level of support might be due to the relatively moderate description of equality in our items. Previous studies that probe support for equality in outcomes in a strict sense report lower levels of support (Aalberg, 2003; Marshall et al., 1999). In the domains of health care, pensions as well unemployment benefits, the egalitarian distribution clearly receives the highest level of support. Nevertheless, the distributions of justice preferences vary strongly across the welfare domains. While a vast majority (82.0%) prefers the equality-based distribution in health care,

just over half of the respondents opt for equality in the domains of pensions (58.4%) and unemployment (52.2%). The principle of equity is relatively popular in the fields of pensions (36.9%) and unemployment (29.0%). While the need principle is preferred only marginally in case of health care and pensions, almost one fifth of the sample prefers this social justice principle as a fundament for distribution in the field of unemployment.

Table 2. Question wordings and percentages of respondents opting for equality, equity and need in the three welfare domains

Question wording	Principle of distributive justice	Percentage of respondents
<i>Q67- Health care</i>		
“Minimal basic health care for people who are truly in need”	Need	8.1
“Better health care for people who have earned and contributed more”	Equity	9.9
“Equal and reasonable health care for everyone”	Equality	82.0
<i>Q93 – Pensions</i>		
“A minimal pension for the poor elderly, which only covers their basic needs”	Need	4.6
“A higher pension for people who have earned and contributed more”	Equity	36.9
“A reasonable pension for all, which is equal for everyone”	Equality	58.4
<i>Q113 – Unemployment benefits</i>		
“A minimal unemployment benefit for the unemployed who are in real need”	Need	18.8
“A higher unemployment benefit for people who have earned and contributed more”	Equity	29.0
“A reasonable benefit for all the unemployed, which is equal for everyone”	Equality	52.2

Percentages are weighted for age, gender and education

These differences show that distributive justice preferences are indeed domain-specific, and can be interpreted in terms of the predictability, locus of control and prevalence of the different social risks. That almost all respondents opt for the principle of equality in the domain of health care can be understood from the perceived low predictability and control combined with the high prevalence of sickness. The believed predictability of retirement might explain why a larger proportion of people prefers equity-based pension systems. Contrarily, the high level of perceived internal control and individual responsibility associated with unemployment (Dwyer, 2000; Hinrichs, 1997; van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017) might be responsible for driving a substantial proportion of respondents away from equality towards the principles of need and equity. It is also remarkable how public preferences seem to partly mirror the institutional designs of the three welfare domains (cf. Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018), pointing to potential feedback effects between welfare attitudes and social policies (Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014). While the high support for the principle of equality in the distribution of health care might be due to the large universality of the Belgian health care system, the relatively large proportion of preferences for equity in the distribution of

pensions might be connected to the strong contributory logic inherent to pension systems of conservative welfare states.

5.2. Construction of a typology of justice configurations: Latent class analysis

To see how justice preferences cluster together across domains, we use LCA. The best class solution is determined by comparing several fit indices of models with differing number of classes (Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007). We examine the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the sample size-adjusted BIC (aBIC) (which should all be as low as possible) and the entropy (which should be as high as possible). The Lo–Mendell–Rubin likelihood ratio test (LMR LRT) provides a formal statistical test of the fit of a given class model relative to a model with one class less. The fit indices of the different class models are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3. Fit statistics for different latent class solutions

	AIC	BIC	aBIC	Entropy	LMR LRT
2 Classes	8726.344	8798.475	8757.174	0.576	0.000
3 Classes	8650.136	8761.107	8697.567	0.672	0.000
4 Classes	8656.676	8806.487	8720.708	0.730	0.249
5 Classes	8669.990	8858.641	8750.623	0.715	1.000

Chosen class-solution in bold

The three-class solution has the lowest AIC, BIC and aBIC, and performs significantly better than a two-class solution (p -value LMR LRT < 0.05). While the four-class solution is characterised by the highest entropy, it does not perform significantly better than the three-class solution and it is characterised by higher values for the three information criteria. Although the three-class model contains a class that constitutes only 4.4 percent of the sample, this small subgroup is still theoretically meaningful (see below). Hence, the three-class solution is chosen as the final model.

Table 4. Class sizes and conditional probabilities of the three-class solution

	Egalitarian universalists	Meritocratic selectivists	Residual selectivists
Class size	0.666	0.290	0.044
Health care			
Equality	0.926	0.648	0.559
Equity	0.030	0.247	0.119
Need	0.044	0.106	0.322
Pensions			
Equality	0.788	0.157	0.441
Equity	0.196	0.843	0.038
Need	0.016	0.000	0.521
Unemployment			

Equality	0.753	0.085	0.195
Equity	0.129	0.689	0.139
Need	0.118	0.226	0.666

Table 4 displays the conditional probabilities and class sizes for each of the three classes. These conditional probabilities show what the probability is that members from a particular class prefer particular distributions and are thus helpful in determining the substantive interpretation of the classes.

The *egalitarian universalists* make up approximately 67 percent of the sample and are most likely to endorse the principle of equality across the three domains. This configuration encompasses an outspoken and universal egalitarianism that does not differentiate between target groups (cf. Nielsen, 1979). Choices for equity- or need-based redistribution are unlikely among this subgroup. That these egalitarians comprise more than half of the sample, is in line with the high prevalence of the principle of equality in each of the three welfare domains and with the existence of a substantial group that prefers to reduce inequalities and encourages extensive government intervention across domains (Jaeger, 2012; Magni-Berton, 2019).

We label the second group (29%) as *meritocratic selectivists*, as these respondents differentiate between welfare domains but also have an outspoken orientation towards the principle of equity. This group combines support for a system based on personal contribution for the distribution of pensions and unemployment benefits with support for egalitarian health care. Note that although the principle of equality is most popular for health care, the meritocrats have a higher probability of opting for equity in this domain compared to the other two classes.

The last subgroup, called *the residual selectivists*, was not anticipated and includes only about 4 percent of the respondents. The individuals who adopt this residual logic are strongly inclined to support need-based pensions and unemployment benefit systems. The focus on those in the highest need of assistance boils down to a residual welfare state that restricts its efforts to people who are absolutely unable to obtain a means of living via market mechanisms. However, this class is also selective, as it differentiates between domains and combines preferences for the need principle in pensions and unemployment with support for equality in health care (although less outspoken than for the two other classes).

The retrieved typology with three subgroups confirms partially, but is not fully conform to the profiles set out in the theoretical section. As expected, we do find a subgroup of individuals who consistently applies equality across welfare domains. Furthermore, the presence of the two other groups underscores our expectation that a considerable share of individuals indeed prefers different justice principles depending on the social risk. Yet, the existence of the residualist class was not anticipated. These results might, however, also partly be related to the question wording and format in our survey. The wording of the answer category referring to the equality principle mentions that everybody should get equal and reasonable health care, pensions or unemployment benefits. The reference to a ‘reasonable level’ of benefits might have stimulated respondents to select this answer category and lead us to overestimate the percentage of respondents preferring equality. Nevertheless, these results do illustrate that there is indeed a large proportion of respondents that systematically prefers equality as well as a substantial group of individuals that combines multiple principles across welfare domains.

5.3. Predicting class membership: Effects of social structural positions and ideological dispositions

Table 5 displays the results of the stepwise multinomial regression explaining class membership. The effects are displayed as logit parameters and as odds ratios, with the egalitarian universalists serving as reference category. In the first model, only the structural characteristics are included as predictors; in the second step the effects of ideology are added to the model. Note that the standard errors for the category of residual selectivists are relatively large because of the small size of this group.

Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression of social structure and ideology on latent classes (N=1898) (reference category = egalitarian universalists)

	Meritocratic selectivists						Residual selectivists					
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 1			Model 2		
	Logit	SE	OR	Logit	SE	OR	Logit	SE	OR	Logit	SE	OR
<i>Social structure</i>												
Gender												
Woman (ref.)												
Man	0.174	0.159	1.190	0.218	0.168	1.243	0.760*	0.351	2.139	0.852*	0.367	2.344
Age	-0.005	0.005	0.995	-0.008	0.005	0.991	0.000	0.011	1.000	-0.007	0.012	0.993
Education												
Lower (secondary)	-0.023	0.205	0.978	0.015	0.218	0.943	-0.595	0.523	0.552	-0.455	0.540	0.635
Higher secondary (ref.)												
Tertiary	0.026	0.199	1.027	0.130	0.209	1.333	-0.169	0.357	0.844	0.028	0.395	1.029
Income												
Quartile 1 (ref.)												
Quartile 2	0.625**	0.243	1.868	0.533*	0.247	1.679	-0.545	0.696	0.580	-0.531	0.660	0.588
Quartile 3	0.822***	0.247	2.275	0.641*	0.253	2.014	0.178	0.571	1.194	-0.047	0.538	0.954
Quartile 4	0.956***	0.268	2.601	0.786**	0.276	2.531	0.806	0.480	2.239	0.549	0.508	1.732
Missing	0.969***	0.297	2.636	0.886**	0.311	2.421	1.213*	0.501	3.364	1.268*	0.596	3.553
Occupation												
Blue collar (ref.)												
Service class	0.099	0.238	1.104	0.102	0.251	1.170	0.657	0.561	1.928	0.381	0.565	1.463
White collar	0.257	0.231	1.293	0.261	0.242	1.425	1.010	0.639	2.745	0.721	0.700	2.056
Self-employed	0.399	0.286	1.491	0.241	0.295	1.246	1.271	0.697	3.567	0.621	0.711	1.861
Inactive	0.260	0.281	1.297	0.147	0.307	1.213	0.947	0.547	2.578	0.473	0.616	1.604
Welfare dependency												
No benefit (ref.)												
Benefit	-0.146	0.189	0.864	-0.076	0.199	0.934	0.174	0.380	1.191	0.377	0.366	1.458
Region												
French region (ref.)												
Flanders	-0.995***	0.157	0.370	-1.115***	0.173	0.329	-1.173***	0.356	0.309	-1.289***	0.383	0.276

Ideology

Left-right placement	0.105**	0.038	1.111	0.214*	0.097	1.239
Authoritarianism	0.394	0.284	1.483	1.685*	0.765	5.391
Economic liberalism	-0.137	0.239	0.872	1.187**	0.432	3.276
Utilitarian individualism	0.103	0.160	1.108	-1.167**	0.390	0.311
Government involvement	-0.246**	0.087	0.782	-0.540**	0.188	0.582

SE= standard error; OR= odds ratio; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$;

The first model illustrates that structural characteristics only have limited power explaining social justice configurations. Nevertheless, some variables do have a significant impact, which shows that instead of judging from behind a 'veil of ignorance' (Rawls, 1972), the social position of individuals partly informs their distributive judgements. Individuals in higher income quartiles are more likely to adhere to the configuration of meritocratic selectivists than to the egalitarian universalist one. The highest income quartile, for instance, differs with almost 1 logit from the lowest quartile, which means that these high-income respondents are 2.6 times more likely to adhere to the meritocratic class instead of the egalitarian subgroup compared to the lowest income group. A possible explanation is that high-income groups benefit more from equity-based distributions, which inclines them to adopt more conditional notions of solidarity (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; D'Anjou et al., 1995; Miller, 1992; Ng & Allen, 2005). However, the impact of the income variable might also be related to the higher exposure of this group to competitive relationships, which fosters support for a principle that stimulates similar modes of conduct (Miller, 1992). The self-interest mechanism is not confirmed for education, occupation and welfare dependency, however. Men are more likely than women (2.1 times) to apply a residual selective instead of an egalitarian universal logic, which could be attributed to the higher support of women for an extensive government through their higher benefit from state-provided services (Sainsbury, 1996). In addition, Flemish respondents are less likely than Francophone Belgians to belong to either one of the differentiating classes. At first sight, this finding is surprising given the weaker economic situation in Francophone Belgium (Billiet, Maddens, & Frogner, 2006), which should heighten interests in equality-based distributions. However, higher unemployment rate in Francophone Belgium may increase also the visibility of people on social benefits and the worries about its effects (Billiet, Abts, & Swyngedouw, 2015). This concern about the dependency of benefit claimants might limit the willingness to provide extensive benefits and strengthen preferences for conditional or residual redistributions. The second model illustrates that the limited effects of these structural characteristics remain significant after introducing the effects of ideology, which indicates that the social stratification of justice preferences is not attributable to ideological differences.

The second model shows that ideological dispositions are of crucial importance to understand respondents' preferences for particular justice configurations. First, right-wing individuals are over-represented among the meritocratic and residual selectivists. This is in line with research suggesting that a right-wing ideology includes more conditional or residual conceptions of solidarity and a stronger reluctance towards egalitarianism and redistribution (Jaeger, 2008; van Oorschot, 2006). Second, authoritarianism affects the likelihood of belonging to the residual class most strongly (OR = 5.4). The more likely adherence to the residual selectivist class and the absence of a relationship with the membership of the meritocratic class is not conform our theoretical expectations. However, this might be because authoritarianism encourages a selective distribution to deserving individuals that comply with dominant norms (Staerklé et al., 2012), which might solely refer to those needy who truly cannot acquire a reasonable living standard. Third and as expected, with an odds ratio of 3.3, economic liberalism strongly heightens the probability of being residual selectivist (but has no impact on belonging to the meritocratic group). Individuals who underscore market-based allocation of goods prefer a more minimal form redistribution that targets only those who cannot gain a reasonable living standard through participation in the market economy (Friedman, 1967). Fourth, utilitarian individualism decreases the likelihood of adhering to residual selectivists (OR=0.3). We would expect utilitarian individualism, through its emphasis on individual responsibility, to heighten instead of lower support for moderate government intervention. However, this counter-intuitively

negative relationship might be related to the importance of rewarding hard work and personal success in utilitarian individualism, as this is believed to be realized to a larger extent when everyone receives equal benefits than if only the neediest or poor receive benefits. Last, support for government involvement lowers the likelihood of membership of both selectivist classes relative to the egalitarian universalist class. This is not surprising, as equality-based distributions often require more government involvement and welfare states that function in accordance to equality are characterized by a higher degree of decommodification (Clasen & van Oorschot, 2002; Sachweh, 2016). However, controlling for support for government involvement does not make the impact of the social structural and ideological characteristics insignificant. This indicates that, while our measurement of justice preferences is related to support for government intervention, the two instruments possess sufficient discriminant validity and that the reported effects of social structural and ideological variables are not driven by the overlap between both concepts.

While Table 5 compares membership of both selective classes to the egalitarian class (the reference category), the comparison of the meritocratic with the residual selectivist class gives some additional insights. The logit parameters, standard errors and odds ratios are displayed in appendix table A2. When comparing these configurations, the social structure does not have any significant influence, illustrating that the meritocratic and residual selectivist configuration have a similar socio-economic basis. The ideological variables differentiate more clearly, as economic liberalism stimulates and utilitarianism decreases the likelihood of adhering to the residual instead of the meritocratic selectivist configuration. This is in line with the emphasis in economic liberalism on a selective targeting at those who cannot acquire a reasonable living standard through participation in a market economy and the focus of utilitarian individualism on hard work and individual responsibility rather than on relieving the needs of the poorest groups.

Conclusion

The objectives of this study were threefold. First, we aimed to offer a domain-specific approach to distributive justice by recognizing that social justice preferences are dependent of the type of distribution at stake (cf. Walzer, 1983). Empirically, this paper investigated whether preferences for equality, equity and need diverge across the welfare domains of health care, pensions and unemployment benefits. Second, this paper sought to reveal to variety of distributive justice preferences by determining how people combine multiple criteria when making justice-related judgements. Using a LCA approach, we uncovered subgroups of individuals with different configurations of distributive justice preferences. Third and last, we tried to explain adherence to these differing configurations by focusing on two explanatory frameworks referring to social structure and ideology.

Our results illustrate that preferences for equality, equity and need can indeed be domain-specific. Although equality was the most popular principle in each of the welfare domains, the proportions of people opting for each principle varied substantially. The criterion of equity was preferred more for pensions and the principle of need received substantial support for the distribution of unemployment benefits. Domain-specific justice preferences could be summarized into three justice configurations, namely an egalitarian universalist, a meritocratic selectivist and a residual selectivist type. By uncovering the existence of multiple patterns of distributive justice preferences, our study demonstrates that the implicit assumption that all individuals apply one abstract social justice principle too all types of distributions is fundamentally flawed. Instead, we find that a substantial proportion of individuals

cares about which target groups or social risks are the subject of distributive judgements and adapts their preferences accordingly (Mau & Veghte, 2007). To provide insight into which types of welfare distribution people prefer, it is crucial that this domain-specificity as well as these patterns of distributive justice preferences are considered. Last, it became apparent that especially ideological dispositions, in terms of a right-wing ideology, authoritarianism, economic liberalism, utilitarian individualism and support for government involvement, drive these configurations of distributive justice preferences.

However, certain specific conclusions of this study should not be generalized too broadly. Although the Belgian case offers an interesting starting point to investigate distributive justice preferences in advanced welfare states, it is also embedded in a particular institutional context. To begin with, as mentioned, the Belgian social security system is organized in such a way that while equality is represented quite strongly in the provision of health care, equity is structuring the distributions of pensions and unemployment benefits (Gerken & Merkur, 2010; Gieselink et al., 2003; Van Lancker et al., 2015). In this regard, our results suggest some policy feedback effects (Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014) as the distributive justice preferences seem to be adaptive to the institutional context and individuals are internalizing the norms inherent to important welfare institutions (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Koster & Kaminska, 2012; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). For this reason, the particular context of our study may explain why there was a relatively large subgroup that preferred equality in health care and equity in the domains of pensions and unemployment benefits. In addition, Belgium is generally categorized as a conservative welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), which indicates that many of its institutions operate in a way closely related to the justice principle of equity (Clasen & Van Oorschot, 2002; Sachweh, 2016). Together with its high equality of benefits and a high social expenditure rate (Esping-Andersen, 1990; OECD, 2019), this might explain why most respondents preferred either equality or equity in the three welfare domains.

Besides, the presented research has some limitations because of the particular survey context. To begin with, our measurements of the distributive justice preferences might explain some of the unexpected results. The framing of the equality principle in terms of support for the provision of reasonable health care, pensions and unemployment benefits, might lead us to overestimate support for equality. Besides, individuals were also only allowed to choose one principle, which made combinations of distributive justice preferences within domains impossible. In reality, people might even combine principles within domains (Franke & Simonson, 2018), but this is invisible with this instrument. Because of this methodological restriction, we probably overestimate consistency in preference for a particular justice principle. In addition, we presented the principles as abstract ideas about preferred benefit allocation, disregarding the particularities and modalities of welfare distribution in concrete situations. The lack of reference to the modalities that activate the principles in particular and concrete situations, in terms of for instance the level of the benefit, the scope of justice or the production phase, might also explain the existence of a relatively large cluster of people who are in some way oriented towards the principles of equality and equity.

Notwithstanding these limitations, this study sheds light on possible directions for future research. First, it would be useful to explore how preferences for the three social justice principles or configurations of distributive justice preferences vary cross-nationally. This would also allow to further explore how the institutional context affects distributive justice preferences (cf. Arts & Gelissen, 2001). Second, future research would benefit from an analysis on how people combine principles not only across but also within domains (cf. Franke & Simonson,

2018). Last, a further exploration of the determinants as well as the consequences of distributive justice preferences would be fruitful. Of the explanatory factors put forward in this paper, only few proved to have a substantial impact and, as a result, deeper insight into the roots of distributive preferences is crucial. In turn, as distributive justice is central to so many contemporary welfare discussions (Mau & Veghte, 2007), these preferences and configurations are likely to shape more specific welfare attitudes or policy preferences.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Ethical approval

All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards

Informed consent

Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.

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Appendix

Table A1. Question wordings and standardized factor loadings for utilitarian individualism, authoritarianism and economic liberalism (N=1900)

	GI	UI	AU	EL
Q53 - Make sure that the elderly have a reasonable pension	0.751			
Q54 - Make sure that everyone has affordable health care	0.742			
Q55 - Make sure that the unemployed have a reasonable living standard	0.418			
Q64_1 - ‘Humanity’, ‘brotherhood’ and ‘solidarity’ are all nonsense. Everybody has to take care of themselves first and defend their own interests.		0.749		
Q64_2 - Striving for personal success is more important than ensuring good relations with your fellow man.		0.657		
Q64_3 - In our society everything revolves around one’s own interest, power and material success. That is why it is better to take care first and foremost of oneself.		0.717		
Q64_4 - Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked people.			0.481	
Q64_5 - Obedience and respect for authority are the two most important virtues children have to learn.			0.702	
Q64_6 - Laws should become stricter because too much freedom is not good for people.			0.629	
Q88_1 - Society would be better off if the government intervenes less in the market.				0.623
Q88_4 - Businesses should get more freedom. Therefore, regulations for businesses should be reduced.				0.624
Correlation utilitarian individualism	-0.070	1		
Correlation authoritarianism	0.143	0.503	1	
Correlation economic liberalism	-0.122	0.397	0.284	1

$X^2=100.609$; $df=38$; $RMSEA=0.029$; $CFI=0.977$; $TLI=0.967$; $SRMR=0.028$; GI=Government involvement; UI=Utilitarian individualism; AU= Authoritarianism; EL= Economic liberalism

Table A2. Multinomial logistic regression of social structure and ideology on the residual selectivist class relative to the meritocratic selectivist class (N=1898)

Residual selectivists						
	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>		
	Logit	SE	OR	Logit	SE	OR
<i>Social structure</i>						
Gender						
Woman (ref.)						
Man	0.587	0.351	1.798	0.635	0.361	1.886
Age	0.005	0.011	1.005	0.001	0.012	1.001
Education						
Lower (secondary)	-0.572	0.521	0.564	-0.470	0.531	0.625
Higher secondary (ref.)						
Tertiary	-0.195	0.354	0.822	-0.102	0.388	0.903
Income						
Quartile 1 (ref.)						
Quartile 2	-1.170	0.699	0.310	-1.064	0.657	0.345
Quartile 3	-0.645	0.582	0.525	-0.689	0.546	0.502
Quartile 4	-0.150	0.486	0.861	-0.236	0.500	0.790
Missing	0.244	0.514	1.276	0.382	0.593	1.465
Occupation						
Blue collar (ref.)						
Service class	0.557	0.563	1.746	0.279	0.562	1.322
White collar	0.753	0.633	2.122	0.460	0.677	1.584
Self-employed	0.872	0.700	2.393	0.380	0.711	1.463
Inactive	0.687	0.550	1.987	0.325	0.611	1.384
Welfare dependency						
No benefit (ref.)						
Benefit	0.321	0.380	1.378	0.453	0.362	1.573
Region						
French region (ref.)						
Flanders	-0.178	0.347	0.837	-0.173	0.372	0.841
<i>Ideology</i>						
Left-right placement				0.109	0.095	1.115
Authoritarianism				1.291	0.739	3.636
Economic liberalism				1.324**	0.445	3.758
Utilitarian individualism				-1.269***	0.377	0.281
Government involvement				-0.295	0.168	0.745

SE= standard error; OR= odds ratio; * p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p≤0.001;