10. Dignity, Face, and Honor cultures: implications for negotiation and conflict management

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Over the past three decades, the culture and negotiation research has contrasted strategy and outcome of negotiations in Western and East Asian cultures (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). There has been little research or theorizing concerning the nature of negotiations in Latino or Middle Eastern cultures. In this chapter, we review the implications for negotiation of theory and research concerning people's behavior in three types of culture: Honor, Dignity, and Face. We begin by identifying the key elements that distinguish Honor, Dignity, and Face cultures including the historical explanations for why these three types of culture are located in different parts of the world, e.g. Dignity cultures in Western Europe and North America, Face cultures in East and Southeast Asia, and Honor cultures in the Middle East and Latin America. Next, relying on theory and empirical research, we review the implications of these cultural differences for negotiation strategy and outcomes. As there is substantially more research on negotiation in Dignity and Face cultures than in Honor cultures, the implications we draw for negotiations in Honor cultures are decidedly more speculative and therefore ripe for future research.

Research in cultural psychology, challenged to understand differences between East Asians and Westerners, has relied heavily on the theory of individualism/collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) and its co-varying elements, for example, independence/interdependence theory (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), power distance (Hofstede, 1980), high versus low context communication (Hall, 1976), holistic versus analytical mindset (Nisbett et al., 2001). In this chapter we expand the horizon for comparative cultural research from its East/West origins to two other large geographical expanses of the world: Middle East and North Africa, Southern Europe and Latin America. Our theoretical lens is describing Dignity, Face, and Honor cultures (Kim and Cohen, 2010), our context is negotiation, and

the empirical settings in which we are doing research range from China to Qatar to Spain to the U.S. and Canada.

We begin by identifying the key elements that distinguish the less familiar Honor cultures from the more familiar Dignity and Face cultures. We expand upon the psychological principles that prior research and theorizing has proposed to distinguish Honor, Face, and Dignity cultures (Leung and Cohen, 2011). We identify the geographical locations of such cultures, for example, Honor cultures in the Middle East, Southern Europe and Latin America; Face cultures in East Asia, and Dignity cultures in Northern Europe, North America, and other British influenced English speaking countries like Australia and New Zealand. We also review the historical and anthropological explanations for why these different types of culture flourished in different parts of the world. We then turn to the implications of these three different types of culture for strategy and outcomes in negotiations with integrative potential, that is, negotiations that provide the opportunity to generate joint gains through insight to the other party's interests and priorities. We focus on this type of negotiation because *Pareto optimality*, a variant of joint gains maximization, has been the primary criterion for evaluating negotiation outcomes since Luce and Raiffa's (1957) *Games and Decisions*.[1] Economists and psychologists who study negotiations emphasize Pareto optimality and joint gains maximization for several reasons. Achievement of joint gains implies that value has not been left unclaimed on the table and tradeoffs satisfying both parties' interests have occurred, increasing the likelihood of harmonious and long-term relationships (Teucher et al., 2011).[2] The core of our chapter is an analysis of the implications of these three types of culture, namely, Dignity, Face, and Honor, for three factors that influence the use of strategy in negotiations; (a) trust (high versus low), (b) mindset (linear versus holistic), and (c) emotional expression (high versus low), and how the interplay among these three factors affects negotiators' strategy and outcomes.

THREE CULTURAL PROTOTYPES

What Is Culture?

Culture is the unique profile of a society, extending from easily observable behaviors and institutions, to less obvious psychological elements such as values, beliefs, and norms (Lytle et al., 1995). Culture emerges as a functional solution to the most commonly encountered dilemmas and problems of social interaction (Trompenaars, 1996). For example, different

cultures have different greeting behaviors, different driving rules, and use negotiation strategy differently (Brett, 2007). Accordingly, culture provides normative behavioral scripts that when enacted in the appropriate cultural context yield effective social interaction. We propose that Honor, Face, and Dignity cultures provide very different normative behavioral scripts and ideals for social interaction in general, and for negotiations in particular.

Defining Three Cultural Prototypes

The first cultural prototype introduced in this chapter is the *Dignity* culture which follows the logic of modern Western societies (Leung and Cohen, 2011). In Dignity cultures, a person's self-worth is primarily intrinsically derived; it is not conferred by others and cannot be taken away by others – and so is relatively stable; and is, at least theoretically, equal to that of every other member of the culture (Ayers, 1984). Dignity manifests in a reputation for independence and choosing one's own goals (Schwartz, 1994).

The second prototype is the *Face* culture. It follows the logic of East Asian societies that are traditionally known as collectivist cultures in cross-cultural literature (Schwartz, 1994). *Face* represents an individual's claimed sense of positive image in the context of social interactions (Oetzel and Ting-Toomey, 2003) and manifests in a reputation for social responsibility, respect for tradition, and honoring parents and elders (Schwartz, 1994). In Face cultures, self-worth is primarily extrinsically derived and is dependent on a person's relative position in a stable social hierarchy, and on fulfillment of the person's role obligations in that hierarchy (Heine, 2001). The different bases for self-worth in Dignity and Face cultures are familiar to cultural psychology in the distinction between the independent and interdependent selves (Markus and Kitayama, 1991).

Honor culture is the third prototype and is the characteristic of Middle Eastern and North African cultures, Latin American cultures, and to some extent, Southern European cultures. Self-worth based on *honor* is an individual's estimate of his own worth, as socially claimed from and recognized by society (Pitt-Rivers, 1968). Thus, self-worth in Honor cultures has elements of self-worth, as it is defined in Dignity cultures, as well as some elements of self-worth as it is defined in Face cultures. Honor manifests in a reputation for toughness in protecting self and family and not being taken advantage of by others (Cohen and Nisbett, 1997; Nisbett and Cohen, 1996), but also in trustworthiness and maintaining one's word (Miller, 1993) as well as warmth, hospitality, and strong family ties (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Pitt-Rivers, 1968; Rodriguez Mosquera et al.,

2008; Triandis, 1989). Furthermore, self-worth in Honor cultures is also much more fleeting than in Face cultures, because hierarchies are less settled and stable in honor than Face cultures. Therefore, to maintain self-worth people in Honor cultures can be quite aggressive or quite warm and hospitable, depending on the social context, whether norms of honorable toughness or norms of honorable hospitality are salient. There is substantial recent research that people in Honor cultures respond to insult aggressively, defensively and directly to protect their self-worth (Beersma et al., 2003; Bourdieu, 1977; Cohen et al., 1996; Ijzerman et al., 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a; 2002b). However there has been little research examining the friendly, hospitable and warm side of Honor culture (see Harinck et al., in press, for an exception).

We discuss the historical and geographical roots of these cultural prototypes in the next section.

Anthropological Explanations of the Origins of Honor, Face and Dignity Culture

Scholars who study culture have long been fascinated by the origins and correlates of cultural differences. Multiple complementary and supplementary explanations exist for historical origins of different cultures. These explanations are mostly based on geographical conditions (for example access to abundant versus scarce agricultural crops), political conditions (for example strong versus weak rule of law), and demographic conditions (for example high versus low population density) in which a culture was developed. This study of the origins of cultural differences, although fraught with alternative explanations, is nevertheless fascinating. It may also provide insight into different patterns of social inaction in modern cultures. Scholars primarily attribute the origins of Dignity, Face, and Honor cultures to (1) the historical basis of the culture's economy, and (2) population density. There is also some discussion of existence of centralized versus decentralized government and of scarcity versus abundance of natural resources. We discuss the impact of these factors in this section.

Historically, Honor cultures developed in regions with herding economies and low population density (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996). Herds are portable wealth, but also wealth that can be difficult to defend, since herds, unlike agricultural land, are very vulnerable to poaching. Under such conditions, a reputation for toughness in defending self and family, and intolerance of insult (i.e., establishing honor), could deter theft of portable wealth. Honor norms can also be reinforced in regions without a strong central state or a weak rule of law (Cohen and Nisbett, 1997; Leung and Cohen, 2011). For example in historically tribal environment

in the Middle East, clans and families with rough status equivalency tried to establish their public reputations and prove their strength, courage, and status through challenge and competition (see Bourdieu, 1977; Gilmore, 1991; Pely, 2011). Historically, the Middle East has been a region with relatively low population density and economies originally based on herding, and without a strong central state, hence a weak rule of law leading people to take the law into their own hands. The American South/Southwest (compared to the American North) also provided European immigrants with relatively similar environment in almost the first three centuries after the discovery of the American continent (Cohen and Nisbett, 1997; Leung and Cohen, 2011). In such dynamic economic and political environments, social power and status are unstable and one's perceived self-worth, as viewed by society, can easily be threatened or challenged and sometimes may need to be maintained through aggression. Such social norms persist in societies long after they may have lost economic value (Vandello and Cohen, 2004), and so there remain strong manifestations of honor norms in societies which today are highly modernized. For example, although much has changed in the American Southwest – herds are branded and fenced and there is stable central government – people living in this part of the United States resist government's interference in their self-protection rights, for example, carrying guns.

Unlike Honor cultures, Face and Dignity cultures were more likely to develop in societies built on agriculture. Face cultures were more likely to evolve when population density was high, and Dignity cultures were more likely to evolve when density was low (Flannery, 1972; Service, 1962).

In Face cultures, populations became dense in particular regions capable of producing food crops. The availability of food increases populations and increasing populations require increasingly organized food production. The need to increase food production generates a collective goal that is achieved through cooperation and organization that turn into norms for social interaction and strong central governments that promote, monitor, and sanction normative behavior. For example, this combination of an agricultural economy and high population density is characteristic of both ancient China and Japan. Those countries had strong collective norms manifested in the collective bonds of Confucian ideology (Ikels, 2004) and centralized, hierarchical governance structures. In such an environment people developed interdependent self-concepts and enhanced self-worth by maintaining harmony with others and conforming to the cooperative norms embedded in the hierarchical social system.

Dignity cultures are similar to Face cultures in their historical reliance on an agricultural economy. However regions that spawned Dignity cultures did not face problems of high population density. Availability of

agricultural land made production of food more of an individual than a collective effort requiring less coordination between food producers. This may be why Dignity cultures tend to generate more independent and egalitarian governance structures. In addition the market economies so characteristic of Dignity cultures can be traced to this confluence of agrarian economy and low population density. Because of the availability of abundant agricultural land, individuals were able to produce excess food. Yet, their environments did not have, because they did not need, the centralized cooperative organizational structures that were necessary for food production and sharing in Face cultures. As a result, in order to make effective use of excess food, systems of market exchange among social equals evolved in Dignity cultures (Ayers, 1984). These environments supported both ideas of *markets* and *dignity*: an egalitarian system of independent individuals, guided by conscience but also supported by an effective system of law that could protect an individual's property rights from violence (Leung and Cohen, 2011). Compared to people in Face cultures, those in Dignity cultures enjoyed the luxury of abundant environmental resources which provided them with strong external options that allowed them to opt out of cooperation[3] unless they genuinely wanted to cooperate. This luxury of resources helped actors develop an independent and internal sense of worth. Thus a strong market exchange system was needed to encourage individuals – who were not as dependent on each other as much as those in Face cultures – to accept interdependence and engage in market negotiations. Overall, this environment made the logic of dignity not only morally correct for an individual, but also rational to solve problems and prosper in a market-based society.

IMPLICATIONS OF CULTURAL LOGICS OF DIGNITY, FACE, AND HONOR FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The literature suggests that these three cultures differ on several psychological and sociological dimensions (for another typology of differences among these cultures, see Leung and Cohen, 2011). Our interest in negotiation and conflict management leads us to elaborate four key psychological concepts that we predict are manifested differently in Dignity, Face, and Honor cultures: (1) power and status, (2) sensitivity and response to insults, (3) confrontation styles, and (4) conciliation, warmth and hospitality. All of these four concepts are related to how self-worth is defined in each culture, are affected by the historical reasons underlying what norms and values developed in each culture, and have important implications for

Table 10.1 Cultural logics of Dignity, Face, and Honor for conflict management

Category	Dignity	Face	Honor
Self-worth	Mostly internal	Mostly external; Socially conferred and stable	Both; Socially claimed and dynamic
Power and Status	Egalitarian; Dynamic	Hierarchical; Stable	Hierarchical; Dynamic and contested
Sensitivity and Response to Insults	Low sensitivity; Ignore insult or refer to rule of law to punish	Medium sensitivity; Refer to social superiors to punish	High sensitivity; Take matters into your own hands
Confrontation Style	Direct; Rational (cost/ benefit calculations)	Indirect; Suppress negative emotions	Both direct and indirect; Express emotions
Reconciliation, Warmth and Hospitality	Rational; Express positive emotions	Short-term irrationality; Humility; Altruism to fulfill duty toward the collective	Short-term irrationality; Hospitality; Altruism to exceed the expectations of those in your close circle

conflict management. In choosing to elaborate on these four concepts, we do not mean to imply that these are the only psychological concepts that distinguish these three cultures, only that we view these four concepts as providing deep insights into how people in these cultures manage conflict and negotiate.

Table 10.1 is our summary of insights regarding the differences between these different types of cultures with respect to self-worth as well as the above four concepts. The table intentionally places Honor culture after Dignity and Face cultures, because Honor culture takes norms and values from both the independent Dignity culture and the interdependent Face culture to generate its own unique cultural prototype. In elaborating on each set of concepts, we usually discuss the cultures in the order of Dignity, Face, and Honor, unless a different order makes an argument more clear.

Following the approach suggested by Leung and Cohen (2011) and Weber (1997), we describe Dignity, Face, and Honor cultural prototypes as "ideal types". Ideal types rarely exist in the real world; most societies are a blend of different ideal types. However ideal types describe the logics of

thought and action that have developed and sustained historically in that culture and still hold normative valence, even though not practiced by all people in that culture. We neither assume that, for instance, people in a specific Honor culture society homogenously follow all ideals of Honor culture, nor suggest that all Honor cultures are similar across each of the concepts. We use the "*ideal types*" framework to capture some of the essential "family resemblance" features (Wittgenstein, 2009) for understanding conflict management in these cultures, recognizing that we are not capturing a complete profile of each of these cultural types. Within an ideal type, not only several sub-cultures (e.g., different nations) with distinct features may exist, but also individual members of each culture will vary in the extent to which they internalize or endorse the cultural ideals of their society.

Power and Status

Power and status are constructed differently in each cultural prototype. In particular, each prototype has its own specific norms for how egalitarian (versus hierarchical) and how dynamic (versus static) power and status are in a society.

Societies within the Dignity culture prototype such as the U.S., Canada, or the U.K. have developed egalitarian governance structures based on market economies (Ayers, 1984). This implies independence in social interaction, and indeed these societies are known for espousing egalitarian and independent values. The ideas of *markets* and *dignity* (i.e., intrinsic sense of worth) have developed together in such egalitarian environments that historically had abundant resources, low population density, and strong governments that could protect individuals' property rights from violence (Leung and Cohen, 2011).

In contrast, societies within the Face culture prototype like China and Japan evolved in densely populated areas that developed hierarchical social structures based on collective interdependency. Such stable and hierarchical structures facilitated the cooperative systems necessary for organized food production. Several East Asian societies have now established democratic governance structures, but their social structures remain very hierarchical. These modern societies are known for norms emphasizing *collectivism* and *power distance* (Hofstede and Bond, 1988). Such norms suggest members to enhance their self-worth by fulfilling duties in the stable hierarchy in general.

Finally societies within the Honor culture prototype, like countries in the Middle East, are also characterized by hierarchical structures – as manifested in their high *power distance* scores (Carl et al., 2004; Hofstede,

1980), yet unlike Face cultures, their social hierarchies are relatively unstable (Gilmore, 1991). Honor cultures developed in competitive social environments and herding economies where different tribes, clans, or groups competed and contested each other to establish dominance and exert control over resources (Leung and Cohen, 2011). Once a group dominated the other ones, strong hierarchies could be reestablished; however those in power were frequently facing the threat of being contested and overthrown by others eager to establish their honor. The history of several Middle Eastern and Latin American countries witnesses cycles of dictatorship and repression, followed by revolutions or reforms, short-term open political spaces, and then coups or other events to establish new structures of power and politics that were strongly hierarchical. Overall, obedience to and respect for high-status people, including the rulers and elderly, which exist in Face cultures are also visible in Honor cultures; however social hierarchies are much more dynamic, shifting, and contested than in Face cultures.

Sensitivity and Response to Insults

How people perceive insults and respond to them has important implications for conflict management in each culture. Here the primary mechanism for understanding cultural differences in sensitivity and response to insults is the extent to which insults threaten self-worth.

The inalienable and independent sense of worth in a Dignity culture suggests relatively low sensitivity to insults (compared to Face and Honor cultures) and relative toleration of insults. An *ideal* individual, defined by normative principles of Dignity cultures, can maintain his/her correct behavior independent of what others do (Kim and Cohen, 2010). If insulted, people in Dignity cultures should not feel obligated to reciprocate others' insults or even respond to insults to restore their sense of worth, which at least in theory is not touched by insult: *names do not hurt them* (Ayers, 1984). Indeed by ignoring the insult, members of Dignity cultures can turn the social denigration back on the insulter. Ideal members of Dignity cultures, feeling secure about their worth, can respond to insults by implying that it is the insulter who lacks dignity: "who are you to say that to me?" (Horowitz and Schwartz, 1974). By this argument, we by no means intend to ignore the rich body of literature on interpersonal and procedural justice in Western societies (see Bies and Moag, 1986; Lind and Tyler, 1988) which suggests the degree to which the people involved in a situation are treated with respect affects their emotional responses and overall performance and satisfaction. Rather we would like to emphasize that the internal and social consequences of insult are much stronger in

Face and Honor cultures and insults should have less ability to destabilize the power and status hierarchies in Dignity than other cultures. Overall, when self-worth is relatively inalienable as in Dignity cultures, insults, although unpleasant, do not much affect social standing.

However, this logic does not hold in Honor cultures. Insults take on special importance in Honor cultures, because they attack people's status in the social hierarchy and their sense of worth in the society. Honor norms require that an honorable person (i.e., ideal person in an Honor culture) will not tolerate even small insults and furthermore, respond aggressively to maintain his status. Aggression in response to an insult is historically justified in Honor cultures because toleration of insults to self or family signaled that the person could be taken advantage of. Maintaining one's social standing was particularly important in the fragile herding economies in which Honor cultures evolved, because of the absence of strong states that could protect individuals (Cohen et al., 1996).

Finally in Face cultures, insults should be experienced as more unpleasant than in Dignity cultures due to self-worth being externally conferred. Thus, people in Face cultures should be more sensitive to insults than people in Dignity cultures, as insults threaten people's social standing. However, the central value of harmony in Face cultures is associated with a norm of preserving face. This leads to three implications of insult in Face cultures. First, insults should be less frequent than in Honor cultures as the social hierarchy is stable and less challenged, and people are very hesitant to break harmony by insulting others. Second, because of the norm of harmony people in Face cultures may tolerate insults to preserve harmony – at least up to a point without erupting aggression. Finally, we argue that the strong and stable hierarchical structure of Face societies expects insulted individuals to defer to the hierarchy and wait for the higher status others, such as the rulers or the elderly to punish the insulters.

Confrontation Style

Each of the three cultural prototypes discussed endorses a different style of confrontation for managing conflicts. In particular, we argue that each prototype may enact rational (versus emotional) and direct (versus indirect) styles of confrontation differently.

Dignity culture norms encourage *rational* and calculated handling of conflict and discourage strong emotional reactions. Western Dignity cultures have many maxims that discourage reliance on emotions when making important decisions and approve of thoughtful and rational acts, for example, "look before you leap" and "think before you act" (Lieberman, 2000). Hirschman (1970) also argues that in American

culture – which is the hallmark of Dignity cultures in our framework – a unique paradigm of problem-solving was institutionalized because American settlers often had the *neat* option of *exiting* from conflict and moving further west in the continent. They thus preferred it over the *messiness and heartbreak of voicing* conflict, and this preference persisted throughout their national history. Therefore instead of engaging in emotional battles to dominate the counterpart (as was frequently the case in Honor cultures), or avoiding conflict to preserve harmony (as was frequently the case in Face cultures), people in Dignity cultures followed rational self-interest either by resolving conflict directly and unemotionally based on rights or interests (Ury et al., 1988) or by exiting. "Why raise your voice in contradiction and get yourself into trouble as long as you can always remove yourself entirely from any given environment should it become too unpleasant?" (Hirschman, 1970, p. 108). In general, Dignity cultures acknowledge the norm of self-interest (Miller, 1999; Tocqueville, 2010/1840) and tend to have well developed institutional structures, for example, rules of law, and conflict management systems, negotiation, mediation, court or arbitration to channel aggression and conflict into a logical (*rational*), yet *direct* confrontation to resolve conflicts.

Face cultures do not acknowledge the norm of self-interest to the same extent as Dignity culture. Face cultures address conflict management by deferring to the penultimate goal of preserving *harmony*. In these cultures high population density has historically obligated people to collaborate to work together. Norms of saving each other's face, following formalities, avoiding direct confrontation of conflict and deferring to authority are all highly important for preserving harmony in Face cultures (Oetzel and Ting-Toomey, 2003; Sanchez-Burks and Mor Barak, 2004; Tjosvold et al., 2004). Because overt conflict or aggression disrupt harmony, individuals who believe they have been transgressed against are still expected to avoid direct retaliation and address the conflict to higher status others. Furthermore, the norm to suppress negative emotions over openly expressing them (Matsumoto et al., 1998) is consistent with the norm for harmony preservation, although emotional appeals that indirectly remind counterparts of their status and responsibilities in the social order are common (Brett and Gelfand, 2006). Overall some famous Face cultures' maxims discourage direct and emotional confrontation that jeopardizes harmony and approve of indirect handling of conflict, for example "tooth for a tooth, lose-lose" (Chinese proverb) and "You can avoid even a murder if you try to be patient three times" (Korean proverb).

Finally in Honor cultures, direct and emotional confrontation is much more normative than in Dignity and Face cultures. Conflicts are easily viewed in these cultures as challenges to status and reputation.

The dynamic and competitive social environments of Honor cultures encourage individuals to act assertively and even aggressively in the face of conflict – to maintain self-worth and gain honor. There are famous maxims in Honor cultures of Middle East, such as Arab and Persian cultures, that appreciate and approve of direct confrontation and response to conflict to restore honor, for example, "One who throws a clod at you should be rewarded with a stone" (Iranian proverb). In a famous poem, Hafiz (fourteenth century), the most popular poet in Persian literature, describes the creation of man as God's *honorable* response to angels. When God showed a glimpse of His face to angels and found them not mature enough to experience love, He was offended and thus created man (Adam) from those flames of anger/love so that the man can appreciate His beauty appropriately. There is substantial research that people in Honor cultures respond to insult emotionally, aggressively, defensively and directly (Beersma et al., 2003; Bourdieu, 1977; Cohen et al., 1996; Ijzerman et al., 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a; 2002b). As we will argue later, an actual insult does not necessarily precede such emotional responses and people in Honor cultures may easily perceive insult out of the ambiguous cues in a conflict situation.

However honor is not only manifested in low tolerance for insult or for being cheated, but also in high standards for a reputation for being a trustworthy (honorable) person who keeps his word and can be counted on to pay his debts, in the absence of a state that forces him to do so (Miller, 1993). The implication of this aspect of honor for conflict management will be discussed in the next section on conciliation, warmth and hospitality.

Conciliation, Warmth and Hospitality

The flipside of overt confrontation and aggression is warmth, hospitality, and conciliation. Each culture has different norms for conciliation and the expression of interpersonal warmth and hospitality based on how self-worth is defined, maintained, and can be enhanced by pursuing such behaviors.

Warmth and reconciliation can be explained in Dignity cultures by the ideology of independence, rationality and protecting self-interest. As discussed earlier, the egalitarian and market-based economy of Dignity cultures – which has origins in individual's independent goals and is supported by an effective system of law – makes the goal of preserving dignity both moral and rational. Warmth and conciliation in Dignity cultures tends to be expressed in "swift" interpersonal trust: others deserve to be trusted until they prove otherwise (Dirks et al., 2009; Meyerson et al.,

1996; Weber et al., 2005), and in the frequent expression of positive emotions (Butler et al., 2007; Uchida and Kitayama, 2009). Swift trust and expressions of positive emotions and warmth are consistent with Western rationality (Tocqueville, 2010/1840), self-interest (Miller, 1999), and the cooperative motive (Messick and McClintock, 1968; Offerman et al., 1996) as they serve to enhance the welfare of others so long as doing so does not hurt one's own welfare. Even prosocial or altruistic moves (e.g., charity) may be framed as contributing to one's self-interest (e.g., receiving tax deductions) and thus *rational* in American culture (Miller, 1999). Therefore in Dignity cultures it is normative to pursue trust, warmth, conciliation, or hospitality to the extent that doing so is consistent with the norm of self-interest. Consequently, self-sacrifice or a purely altruistic act to increase the welfare of others, regardless of one's own welfare (see Offerman et al., 1996) is less normative in Dignity cultures than in Face or Honor cultures. Instead, people in Dignity cultures rely on positive reciprocity – often in the form of short-run tit-for-tat exchanges – both because it is morally correct (i.e., signal integrity and trustworthiness) and because it is rational (i.e., it pursues one's self-interest) (Tocqueville, 2010/1840). Reconciliation after disputes is also justified by the same ideology of rationality and problem-solving to benefit both sides of the conflict.

Obeying hierarchy, loyalty to institutions, and showing humility to others are three of the mechanisms that help to reconcile differences in Face cultures when interests conflict (Kim and Cohen, 2010; Leung and Cohen, 2011). In Face cultures, parties are expected to control their negative emotions and follow the directives of higher status others to conciliate and avoid escalating the conflict. Despite the normative value of emotional control in Face cultures, interpersonal and emotional concerns are found to be more important in work contexts in Face cultures than in Dignity cultures (Sanchez-Burks et al., 2008). Positive emotions are expressed, though not as commonly and as intensely as in Dignity cultures, with the goal of enhancing relationships (Lin and Yamaguchi, 2011), whereas negative emotions, in particular anger, are suppressed to avoid jeopardizing harmony (Matsumoto et al., 1998). Furthermore, self-sacrifice and altruism are justified as a fulfillment of duty to benefit society, a group, or other important collectives. In Face cultures, the five bounds of Confucian ideology emphasize that harmonious relationships extend beyond family or kinship, and the duties to develop and support those relationships spread to the entire society (Axel, 1995). In other words the prototypical family structure, with its unequal hierarchical relationships, is applied to social organizations in general; people accept or tolerate hierarchical and unequal relationships – that are common inside family – in the rest of society as well (Hofstede and Bond, 1988).

In contrast in Honor cultures, people are supposed to limit warmth and hospitality toward a selected group of others (particularly family, kin, and close friends), not toward society in general, and also limit tolerance for unequal hierarchy to such groups. Evidence for these Honor culture values are found in a survey of cultural values of middle managers in 61 countries across all six continents. For example Turkish and Iranian managers ranked 42nd and 48th respectively on *societal collectivism* (i.e., the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action), whereas they ranked 4th and 3rd, respectively on *in-group collectivism* (i.e., the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families) (Dastmalchian et al., 2001; Fikret Pasa et al., 2001; Gelfand et al., 2004). On the contrary, managers from Face cultures of South Korea and Japan ranked very high, respectively 2nd and 3rd, on *societal collectivism*, but not high on *in-group collectivism*, respectively 23rd and 44th (Gelfand et al., 2004).

To understand such differences, we may need to remember the basic elements of honor. Honor manifests not only in a reputation for toughness (Cohen and Nisbett, 1997; Nisbett and Cohen, 1996), but also as in trustworthiness and maintaining one's word (Miller, 1993) and warmth, hospitality, and strong family and friendship ties (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Pitt-Rivers, 1968; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008; Triandis, 1989). An *honorable* person gains others' respect by not tolerating being cheated or affronted; however, at the same time the honorable person keeps promises and can be counted on to pay back debts even in the absence of supervision of a strong state. An honorable person may even go beyond immediate expectations by building a reputation for noticeable warmth and hospitality toward others who are not a threat to his status or position. The importance of such a reputation for warmth and hospitality in Honor cultures justifies the normative plausibility of altruistic behaviors and self-sacrifice – which may seem *irrational* at first glance – but is consistent with a longer-term rationality. These strong norms for warmth and hospitality in Honor cultures may also serve to stop conflicts from surfacing or spiraling out of control (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996). Reconciliation after disputes is also likely in Honor cultures if the norms of honorable warmth, hospitality, and strong family or friendships can be promoted in the process of settlement. For example, elders or other higher status people can facilitate the process of reconciliation by persuading disputants that their honor will be restored and enhanced if they agree to forgive and reconcile (Pely, 2011). Finally when the relational context is strong at the first place, that is, when people have conflict of interests with close friends or family members, strong face-saving concerns (similar to Face cultures)

may stop them from surfacing their interests, and cause them to accommodate the interests of the other party by sacrificing their own interests (Aslani et al., 2011).

DIGNITY, FACE, AND HONOR CULTURE DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATORS' STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES

In this section, we introduce the research and theorizing concerning negotiation strategy and outcomes and then propose differences in strategy and outcomes associated with Dignity, Face and Honor cultures. We first discuss two major categories of negotiation strategy examined in previous research, namely information sharing, and substantiation and offers. In the subsequent sections we discuss Dignity, Face and Honor cultural differences in the frequency of use and the effectiveness of those strategies and the potential explanations for these differences in terms of trust, mindset, and negative emotional expression.

Negotiation Strategy

A negotiation strategy is a set of goal-driven behaviors used, consciously or unconsciously, by negotiators (Weingart et al., 1990). Research has identified two major strategic goals for negotiation, variously called integrative and distributive, value creation and value claiming, and the behaviors that negotiators use when pursuing those goals (Weingart et al., 1990). A recent conceptualization discusses these strategies in behavioral terms, namely "Question and Answers", and "Offers and Substantiations" (Teucher et al., 2011). In this section we rely on those concepts to explain cultural differences in negotiation strategies and outcomes.

The integrative goal and associated strategy correspond roughly to direct information-sharing and generally involve a process of asking questions and providing answers (Kimmel et al., 1980; Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al., 1990). Following Gunia and colleagues we label this strategy Q&A (Question and Answers). Questions are interrogative statements to elicit information-sharing, and Answers connote information-sharing about preferences, priorities and interests (Weingart et al., 2007; also Adair and Loewenstein, Chapter 12 this volume). This information provides insight for one party into the counterpart's interests, preferences, and priorities – which negotiators can then use to make proposals the create value (Teucher et al., 2011). The distributive or value-claiming strategy focuses on offers and arguments (Pruitt, 1981; Weingart et al., 1990).

Following Gunia and colleagues we label this strategy S&O (Substantiation and Offers). Substantiation refers to all forms of justification, rational and emotional appeals, arguments, and threats to support a party's own position and reject the other party's position (Olekalns and Smith, 2000). The goal of substantiation is to motivate the counterpart to make concessions and accept the focal party's demands. Commonly, parties use substantiation in combination with their own offers, justifying their positions while translating those positions into terms on the negotiable issues (Weingart et al., 2007). Negotiators who focus on S&O frequently are less likely to maximize joint gains (Olekalns and Smith, 2000; Weingart et al., 2007).

Cultural Factors that Influence Negotiation Strategy and Outcomes

Based on recent research and theorizing we suggest that three factors – which are influenced by culture – may affect the use of Q&A versus S&O strategy in negotiation: trust, mindset, and expression of negative emotions. Trust is one party's willingness to accept vulnerability based upon favorable expectations of the other party's behavior (Mayer et al., 1995). Mindset refers to a holistic versus analytical (also called linear) cognitive approach to reasoning. Finally negative emotional expression is the strategic or genuine communication of negative affect, especially emotions such as anger, disappointment, and frustration, in social interactions.

Trust is critical in negotiation because negotiators who trust and share information with a counterpart are vulnerable to the actions of their counterpart who can exploit the information that a negotiator shares (Butler, 1999; also Lewicki and Polin, Chapter 7 this volume). Trusting negotiators accept this vulnerability at least initially, presuming that their counterparts will use shared information in a mutually-beneficial way, and reciprocate (Butler, 1999; Gunia et al., 2011). Low-trust negotiators, fearing that their counterparts will take advantage of them, are less likely to engage in reciprocal Q&A in order to reduce vulnerability (Butler, 1999). For low-trust negotiators, engaging in Q&A may seem as an irrational invitation to take advantage of them, because Q&A discloses information about their interests and priorities (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt and Lewis, 1977; Walton and McKersie, 1965; Weingart et al., 2007). Instead, they rely on S&O to pursue their own gains. Offers give information directly about positions and only indirectly about interests and priorities (Adair and Brett, 2005) which may be why the S&O strategy is heavily utilized by low trust negotiators (Gunia et al., 2011).

A mindset is a systematic approach to attention and reasoning. Two fundamentally different types of mindset have been identified in cultural psychology: holistic and analytic (also called linear) (Nisbett et al., 2001).

People with a holistic mindset tend to focus their attention on the relationships between focal objects and their contexts (Hansen, 1983). To explain and predict the behavior of an object in its context, they use associative and dialectical reasoning. For example, they rely on metaphors and stories to cue associations, and they engage in dialectical analysis. Dialecticism recognizes the legitimacy of contradictory perspectives and searches for means of transcending contradictions (Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005). In contrast, people with an analytic mindset primarily pay attention to the object and its attributes, as opposed to its surrounding context (Hansen, 1983). Analytic thinkers assign objects to categories based on the object's attributes and use formal logic and rules to explain and predict the object's behavior. Analytic reasoning is generally intolerant of contradictions because contradictions are inconsistent with the linear nature of formal logic. Thus, faced with contradictions, analytic thinkers prefer choosing one perspective over another (Nisbett et al., 2001).

Recent conceptual theorizing proposes holistic versus analytic mindset as a general, theoretical explanation for cultural differences in the use of negotiation strategy (Teucher et al., 2011). These scholars suggest that when utilizing a holistic mindset negotiators focus their attention on the relationships between issues, and in doing so may transform the information contained in patterns of S&O into the insights necessary for realizing joint gains (Brett, 2007; Teucher et al., 2011). In contrast, negotiators with the linear/analytic mindset need to detect possible tradeoffs from direct information exchanged via Q&A. These negotiators should be more comfortable moving sequentially through a set of issues to discover fundamental interests rather than making indirect inferences from surface-level positions (Teucher et al., 2011). Thus, according to this theorizing S&O strategy should be compatible with a holistic mindset and Q&A strategy should be compatible with an analytic mindset.

There are major cultural differences in expressing negative emotions in general, and anger in particular, at negotiations. Emotional expression refers to the positive or negative affect conveyed in interpersonal interactions. Cultural psychology documents that different cultural rules make it relatively normative to express or even exaggerate emotional expressions in Western, individualistic cultures, but to de-amplify or suppress emotional expressions in East Asian, collectivistic cultures (Matsumoto et al., 1998; Matsumoto et al., 2008; Matsumoto et al., 2005; Yuki et al., 2007). Furthermore, because anger is particularly confrontational and socially disengaging, it threatens the East Asian emphasis on social harmony and thus should be suppressed (Adam et al., 2010; Kitayama et al., 2006).

In negotiation, emotional expression can be spontaneous, but it can also be strategic (Barry et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 1999), that is,

intentionally expressed by a focal negotiator to achieve a desired outcome. For example, negotiators in a positive mood may achieve more in integrative and distributive negotiations than negotiators in neutral or bad moods, because they are more trusting and engage in less S&O and more Q&A (Carnevale and Isen, 1986; Kopelman et al., 2006; Maddux et al., 2008).

The empirical research studying the impact of negative emotional expression in negotiation presents a less consistent picture than the positive emotion research (also Van Kleef and Sinaceur, Chapter 5 this volume). It appears that the effect of the expression of anger depends on the context of the negotiation. For example, in the paradigm of research that Van Kleef and colleagues have employed, that is, a computer simulated, single issue, one-time, deal making negotiation, expressing anger typically elicited larger concessions and more cooperative responses from negotiation counterparts than not expressing an emotion or expressing other emotions, such as happiness or regret (Sinaceur and Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004a; 2004b; Van Kleef et al., 2006). However, when East Asian participants engaged in this research paradigm, expressions of anger backfired and elicited smaller concessions (Adam et al., 2010; Sinaceur and Tiedens, 2006; Steinel et al., 2008). Further, anger can backfire and hurt joint gains, as evidenced in a study of disputes between eBay buyers and sellers, when expressions of anger were reciprocated and predicted impasse (Friedman et al., 2004). However it is also possible that anger facilitates more effort for creating value. In a study of value creation in dyads where power was unequally distributed, expressing anger not only helped value-claiming, but also it facilitated value creation especially when the more powerful negotiator was angry (Overbeck et al., 2010).

We propose that in general the expression of negative emotions in negotiations with integrative potential will tip negotiation strategy toward reliance on S&O and generate poor insight and low joint gains, with some cultural differences, to be discussed in subsequent sections. We argue that when faced with an angry or threatening counterpart, a negotiator who was ready to use Q&A, because of a priori trust, will largely abandon those information sharing behaviors and use S&O in order to block the counterpart's power moves and protect his/her own interests. Expression of anger in negotiation cues the counterpart's affective reactions as well as inferential processes (Van Kleef and De Dreu, 2010). The perceiver may experience negative affective reactions (e.g., the desire to retaliate) that lead to smaller concessions (Adam et al., 2010) or make inferences (e.g., the counterpart is tough and there is a real threat of an impasse) that lead to larger concessions (Sinaceur and Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

Table 10.2 Cultural factors that influence negotiation strategy

Category	Dignity	Face	Honor
Trust	High	Low	Low
Mindset	Analytic/Linear	Holistic	Moderately linear
Negative Emotions	Suppress	Suppress*	Express
Dominant Strategy	Q&A	Cold S&O	Hot S&O

Note: * We propose that, in general, negotiators from Face cultures use S&O (including emotional appeals such as reminding counterparts of their duties, or asking them for sympathy) frequently; however, they do not express negative emotions as frequently as those from Honor cultures.

Although we noted above the substantial evidence supporting Van Kleef and colleagues' conclusion within the context of his paradigm, we argue that in a negotiation that provides the potential of joint gains via information sharing, the counterpart's expression of negative emotions like anger reduces trust, thus the willingness to engage in Q&A, and increases reliance on defensive S&O. In addition, since negative emotional expression in negotiation is typically reciprocated, a focus on negative emotion in negotiation may crowd out the cognitive effort (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994) required to draw inferences from S&O and cause poor insight and low joint gains.

Table 10.2 summarizes how these three factors play out in Dignity, Face, and Honor cultures. We elaborate on each culture in the subsequent sections.

Negotiation Strategy and Outcomes in Dignity Cultures

In Dignity cultures, trust tends to be high, mindset tends to be analytic, and rationality tends to be favored over emotionality which suggests negotiators control their negative emotions. This profile fits with the Q&A strategy, where negotiators exchange information early in the negotiation, try to generate insight into each other's priorities and interests, and then use this insight to exchange offers and obtain joint gains.

Broadly speaking, people in Dignity cultures (e.g., North Americans, Western Europeans) tend to make the "swift trust" assumption: others deserve to be trusted until they prove otherwise (Dirks et al., 2009; Meyerson et al., 1996; Weber et al., 2005). The interpersonal trust characteristic of Dignity cultures should facilitate sharing information about interests and priorities via the Q&A strategy. The analytic mindset characteristic of these cultures (Nisbett et al., 2001) should help to make

good use of information about the attributes of issues, including own and counterpart's interests and priorities. Finally, the focus on rationality, as opposed to emotionality, in these cultures (Sanchez-Burks, 2002) should also facilitate the utilization of information about interests and priorities to gain insight and negotiate joint gains.

There are several empirical studies supporting the conclusion that Q&A is supported by trust, leads to joint gains via insight, and is the dominant negotiation strategy in Dignity cultures compared to Face cultures (Adair and Brett, 2005; Adair et al., 2001) or Honor cultures (Aslani et al., 2011; Gunia et al., 2011; Ramirez-Marin et al., 2012). There is also evidence from two rather different studies that when Dignity culture negotiators fail to use Q&A they frequently are unable to reach agreements that capture tradeoffs and joint gains. Adair et al. (2007) showed that when American negotiators failed to use Q&A early in their negotiations their joint gains were low. Ramirez-Marin et al. (2012) also showed that when Americans were negotiating intra-culturally with other Americans, they used Q&A, but when negotiating inter-culturally with Spanish negotiators (in the Spanish language), they switched to S&O (which was dominant in Spanish intra-cultural negotiations), and not only failed to realize joint gains but also were claimed upon.

Negotiation Strategy and Outcomes in Face Cultures

In Face cultures, trust tends to be low; mindset is holistic and negative emotions are suppressed. This profile fits with the S&O strategy, where negotiators make and substantiate offers from the outset of the negotiation, may draw inferences from patterns of offers and substantiation, and use that insight to identify joint gains.

Interpersonal trust appears to be low in Face cultures perhaps because historically, it was not needed in everyday, social relationships as much as in Dignity cultures. Social interaction in Face cultures is governed by norms that are provided by social institutions, like religion, family, community or the state. People's conformity to those norms is monitored and, if necessary, managed by institutional sanctioning (see Takahashi et al., 2008; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Yamagishi and colleagues suggests that the presence of institutional monitoring and sanctioning reduces the society's need for interpersonal trust by affording a reliable external guarantor of behavior. So long as institutional monitoring is in place, they argue, there is little need to rely on interpersonal trust.

The problem of course is that even in Dignity cultures, where interpersonal trust is the lubricant of social interaction, norms and sanctions only weakly govern behavior in negotiations (e.g., Brett, 2007; Fisher and Ury,

1981; Robinson et al., 2000). For example, norms about deception do not keep negotiators from bluffing about their bottom line, and the sanctions commonly associated with these norms rarely apply in negotiation (Robinson et al., 2000). Overall Yamagishi and colleagues' comparative cultural research on behavior in trust games shows that the Japanese and Chinese (Face cultures) trust less than Americans (see Kiyonari et al., 2007; Kiyonari et al., 2006). We argue that because trust is low in Face cultures and institutional monitoring and sanctioning is low in the negotiation context, Face culture negotiators are likely to rely heavily on S&O. Past research supports this proposition (Adair et al., 2004; Adair et al., 2001; Brett, 2007).

Empirical research contrasting negotiators from Dignity and Face cultures documents major differences in the use of negotiation strategy and outcomes, consistent with the proposition that Face cultures tend to have low trust and holistic mindset compared to Dignity cultures (high trust and analytic mindset). For negotiators from Japan, Hong Kong, and Thailand the dominant strategy over the course of the negotiation was S&O, and still they could generate the same level of insight and joint gains as negotiators from Germany, Sweden, and the U.S who dominantly use Q&A (Adair et al., 2001; Brett, 2007; Brett and Okumura, 1998). Furthermore, Japanese negotiators who make offers early in the negotiation are more likely to reach high joint gains than those who delay making offers (Adair et al., 2007) which provides further evidence that negotiators from Face cultures can use holistic reasoning to infer priorities and preferences from the pattern of offers in the negotiation. The holistic mindset that is dominant in Face cultures may lead negotiators to view substantiation and offers as a whole, systemic source of information in negotiation.

There is a fascinating conundrum concerning the role of negative emotional expression in Face cultures. Negative emotions are more suppressed in Face cultures than in Dignity cultures (Matsumoto et al., 1998; Matsumoto et al., 2008; Matsumoto et al., 2005; Yuki et al., 2007) perhaps because they may seem too confrontational and socially disengaging and thus threaten the emphasis on social harmony in Face cultures (Adam et al., 2010; Kitayama et al., 2006). Yet, the negotiation research suggests that Face culture negotiators rely heavily on substantiation and offers and still can negotiate joint gains at the same level as Dignity culture negotiators using Q&A (Adair and Brett, 2005; Adair et al., 2001).

We argue that such substantiation efforts do not necessarily distract Face culture negotiators from obtaining insights so long as they do not overtly express negative emotions. There is evidence that the positive effects of the expression of anger for concession making – which is common in Dignity cultures – do not hold in Face cultures. Because the

expression of negative emotions is not normative in Face cultures, expressions of anger does not elicit concessions as much as it does in Dignity cultures (Adam et al., 2010). This implies that Face culture negotiators may still obtain insight despite engaging in S&O without getting intimidated, insulted, or distracted as much as Dignity or Honor culture negotiators do. Furthermore, Face culture negotiators not only *express* negative emotions less frequently than those from Dignity or Honor cultures at the negotiation table, but also probably *experience* less negative emotions. Recent data by Gallup (2012), about experiencing negative emotions on daily basis in different countries of the world shows low levels of negative emotional experiences (anger, stress, worry, sadness, and physical pain) among people from Face cultures compared to those from Dignity and Honor cultures. Among 148 countries surveyed, only one country from East or Southeast Asia (Philippines) ranked among the first 70 countries.

Overall, we argue that Face culture negotiators who use S&O to infer information may not experience the same emotional and cognitive reactions to substantiation as Dignity and Honor culture negotiators. However if they engage in expressing and experiencing negative emotions, their ability to generate insight and joint gains from S&O diminishes. The data we have collected in China, but have not yet had the opportunity to publish, shows that Chinese dyads who expressed anger could not reach high joint gains.

Negotiation Strategy and Outcomes in Honor Cultures

Past theory and research in anthropology and cultural psychology as well as recent negotiation research provide insight into negotiation strategy and outcomes in Honor cultures, though the research on Honor cultures is not as abundant as the research on Dignity and Face cultures. Therefore our arguments in this section are more conceptual and less empirical than the arguments on negotiations strategy in Dignity and Face cultures.

Overall, we suggest that trust tends to be low in Honor cultures and expression of strong negative emotions is acceptable at the negotiation table. There is little evidence on the type of mindset (linear or holistic) that people in Honor cultures hold, but we speculate that their mindset should be somewhere in the middle of the continuum from Western analytic to Eastern holistic, though roughly leaning more toward the linear mindset. This profile fits with the S&O strategy, where negotiators make and substantiate offers from the outset of the negotiation, but may easily get involved in heated arguments and thus not draw inferences from patterns of offers and substantiation, which leads to low insight and joint gains.

It seems likely that trust is lower in negotiations in Honor cultures

than in Dignity cultures (see Alon and Brett, 2007 for a study on trust in Arabic-speaking Islamic culture). As discussed in the section on the origins of Honor culture, there can be severe economic, social, and self-image costs for appearing weak or being taken advantage of in Honor cultures. By trusting the counterpart a negotiator risks being taken advantage of (Butler, 1999). Thus it seems likely that in the competitive context of negotiations, people from Honor cultures exhibit low trust to avoid the social and/or emotional costs of honor loss. There is some empirical evidence supporting this assertion. For example, a six culture study, comparing people from the U.S., Brazil, China, Turkey, Switzerland, and Oman, found that Arabs (i.e., Omanis) expressed the highest level of *betrayal aversion*, that is, the tendency to avoid extending interpersonal trust (Bohnet et al., 2008). In another study negotiators from the U.S. (Dignity culture) had higher pre-negotiation trust in their counterparts than the negotiators from India (Honor culture) (Gunia et al., 2011). This tendency to extend low trust to others does not contradict the warmth and hospitality common in Honor cultures, as Ali ibn Abi Talib (the first Imam of Shia Muslims and the fourth Caliph of Sunni Muslims) said: "Give all your love, but not all your trust, to your friend" (Majlisi, 1983, Vol. 71).

As a result of low trust, Honor culture negotiators can be expected to rely more on S&O than Q&A. Recent empirical research comparing Qatari with American negotiators (Aslani et al., 2011) and Spanish with American (Ramirez-Marin et al., 2012) negotiators suggests that the Qataris and the Spanish relied more heavily on the S&O strategy than did Americans.

It also seems likely that mindset in Honor cultures will be more linear/analytic than in Face cultures, though perhaps more holistic than in Dignity cultures. Although there is a little research in cognitive or social psychology on the mindset of people in Honor cultures, several key features of the holistic mindset seem to be absent in Honor cultures. For example, using dialectical reasoning – which recognizes the legitimacy of contradictory perspectives and is common in East Asian cultures – is not common in either Middle Eastern or Latin American cultures. Instead, using formal logic and rules to explain and predict objects' behavior has been a fixture of Middle East and India for thousands of years (Gabbay and Woods, 2004). There has been little influence of Confucian thought – which strongly influenced the holistic mindset in East Asian cultures – in Middle Eastern and Latin American cultures. Indeed, just the opposite; both areas of the world were influenced by the ancient Greeks mode of thought. The Middle East (and major parts of India) was conquered by Alexander the Great, was once part of the Hellenistic civilization, and was influenced by Greek logic (O'Leary, 1957; Versteegh, 1977), and

Latin America was heavily influenced by the logic and philosophy of the Catholic Church (Gill, 1998). By this analysis, we do not mean to ignore the impressive independent intellectual and artistic heritage of Islamic culture, which spread throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Spain; yet, we point out that that heritage still appears to be grounded in analytic, not holistic reasoning. Furthermore, recent evidence from experimental research in cognitive psychology suggests that communities founded on farming exhibit greater holistic thinking tendencies than those founded on herding (Uskul et al., 2008a; 2008b) which is consistent with our note that Honor cultures are less Holistic than Face cultures. Finally, although communication in both Middle Eastern and Latin cultures appears to be more contextual than Western European and North American cultures, we are not sure that there is necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between *holistic reasoning* and *high context communication*, and *analytic reasoning* and *low context communication*. Based on definitions (Hall, 1976), communication in low context cultures is relatively explicit, with meaning clearly contained in the words or the surface of a message, whereas in high context cultures, communication is more indirect and implicit, with subtle meaning embedded behind and around the spoken or written words. These two concepts (holistic and high context cultures, linear and low context cultures) correlate strongly in the classic East–West dichotomy. However, it is possible to have a culture that is high context and linear, or low context and holistic. Researchers should avoid conflating these two concepts.

Overall, we expect the mindset in Honor cultures to be roughly in the middle of the continuum between the mindset in Dignity and Face cultures, but leaning more toward the linear mindset. Just as in Table 10.1 where we intentionally described Honor culture as more similar to Face culture on some dimensions and more similar to Dignity culture on others, we suspect that mindset in Honor culture is more likely analytic than holistic.

Relative to people in Dignity and Face cultures those in Honor cultures should display negative emotions more openly (see Ijzerman et al., 2007, for an empirical study contrasting emotional expression in Latin American Honor cultures and U.S. Dignity cultures; also see Bar, 2004 for a discussion on open expression of negative emotions in Iran which is Middle Eastern Honor culture). The goal of some emotional expression may be pragmatic as it declares to the audience that the individual is hurt, insulted, and angry, and that he must be appeased (Bar, 2004). This willingness to display negative emotions in social interactions between members of Honor cultures is consistent with the heavy use of substantiation in negotiations in these cultures (Aslani et al., 2011; Gunia et al., 2011;

Ramirez-Marin et al., 2012). It is also consistent with research showing that, upon perceiving insult, people from Honor cultures experience more intense negative emotions (Beersma et al., 2003), more anger and shame (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b), become more upset and more physiologically primed for aggression (Cohen et al., 1996) than people from non-Honor cultures. In the recent data reported by Gallup (2012) about experiencing negative emotions on a daily basis in 148 countries, 20 of the first 30 countries in the ranking belonged to either the Middle East or Latin America, the two major clusters of Honor cultures in our framework. Furthermore, if we classify African and Southern European countries in the Honor culture cluster, 27 of the first 30 countries in this ranking will be from Honor cultures.

The tendency to experience negative emotions frequently and take insult personally suggests that even if reasoning were holistic in Honor cultures, Honor culture negotiators can be easily distracted from the cognitive work of making inferences from offers to the emotional work of protecting honor. Indeed, the empirical research contrasting Honor culture Qataris (Aslani et al., 2011), Spanish (Ramirez-Marin et al., 2012), and Indians (Gunia et al., 2011) to Americans shows that in Honor cultures, emotional tactics were used much more frequently and insight about priorities and preferences was significantly lower. As we have seen in research globally when insight is low, the short term economic joint gains are limited. Therefore spending time to develop trust and manage negative emotions – which is important in all cultures – becomes more crucial in Honor cultures so that negotiators can exchange information more openly and focus their attention on the cognitive work necessary for creating joint gains.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this chapter we discussed three major cultural prototypes of Dignity, Face, and Honor and the implications of this framework for understanding negotiators' strategy and outcomes. We do not mean to suggest that our three-culture model covers all of the cultural prototypes in the world. We are aware that some geographic areas in the world are not easily classified within this model. However, this provides an opportunity for future research to examine current cultural norms and values and historical background of regions of the world and national cultures for the purpose of understanding modes of social interaction. For example, future research may show that certain logics of Honor culture are salient in southern African countries as well as the northern African ones. In order to extend and enrich this categorization, we may need to understand the subtle yet

important differences among cultures within each prototype, such as different Face cultures (see Lee et al., 2012) or different Honor cultures.

For example, there is a wide geographic variation among Honor cultures and it would be naïve to equate cultures as different as those in the Middle East and those in Latin America even though they share certain logics of honor. In addition to the generic notion of honor as *the reputation for toughness or not being taken advantage of by others*, at least four other dimensions have been identified for honor (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b): (1) *social interdependence* (generosity, honesty, warmth, and hospitality), (2) *family honor* (caring for social evaluations of one's family and the defense of one's family's name and reputation), (3) *masculine honor* (being concerned with one's family's well-being, the maintenance of authority over one's family, and virility), and (4) *feminine honor* (modesty in behavior and dressing, a sense of shame in women's social relations with men, and decorum in dress, and sexual shame). Considering the wide geographic variation in Honor cultures, it is likely that these four dimensions will receive different weights in different Honor cultures and thus have different implications for negotiations in different cultures.

Future research can also develop scales to measure dignity, face, and honor cultural values and norms. Such an empirical measure would allow researchers to examine the effects of different dignity, face, and honor dimensions in more detail, distinguish between different nations or subprototypes, and certainly go above and beyond the classic individualism/collectivism model. In fact recent research suggests that national borders are strong factors in clustering cultural values and norms (Minkov and Hofstede, 2012) and thus differences among nations within each cultural prototype demands more attention from researchers. This approach would also allow us to examine more closely how different facets of each cultural prototype interact with the negotiation context (e.g., transactional versus disputes, business versus political, personal versus not personal, solo versus group).

According to our model on the impact of three cultural factors (trust, mindset, and emotional expression) on negotiations strategies and outcomes, Honor culture negotiators are most likely to fall prey to distributive negotiation traps and leaving value on the table. This may be consistent with the cliché that some of most complicated and escalated conflicts in the world are now happening in the Middle East – the hallmark of Honor cultures.[4] However, researchers should be aware that every culture, society, and civilization that has managed to sustain itself throughout history and especially to achieve major successes must have developed effective ways to resolve conflicts and move on. (See Pely, 2011, for examples of how reconciliation could happen and how disputants' lost honor could be restored

after severe honor-related conflicts happened in Arab communities in Israel.) Understanding differences between the conflict management logics of honor with those of dignity and face (Table 10.1) can be a first step in designing effective conflict management mechanisms in these cultures. For example, the strong norms for hospitality and warmth, along with the pessimism toward strangers and low trust suggest that extra time and effort should be allocated for building trusting relationships when one or both parties at the negotiation table are from Honor cultures. After building such relationships, negotiators should be willing to exchange information more openly and use their mindset, whether linear or holistic to obtain insight and joint gains.

In general, the Honor norms for warmth, hospitality, and strong family ties are among the most understudied areas of conflict research. Most of the research in cultural psychology on Honor cultures has focused squarely on reaction to insults in aggressive behaviors and strong emotions. However warmth and hospitality can also have major implications for conflict management and so demands researchers' attention. For example, whereas high levels of emotionality in Honor culture can work as a threat to making inferences and obtaining insight, it can also act to lubricate the contentious environment of negotiations with small bargaining zones and help negotiators in reaching win-win deals (see Harinck et al., in press, for "the good news about Honor culture").

Another important area for future research is the implication of Dignity, Face and Honor cultures for intercultural negotiations. When negotiators from different cultural prototypes come to the table, they do not necessarily adhere to their intra-cultural negotiation styles and may change their negotiation behavior and perceptions depending on the negotiation context (Adair et al., 2009). Studying dominant strategies and outcomes in intercultural negotiations between Dignity-Face, Dignity-Honor, and Face-Honor dyads is a fascinating area for future research. Considering the rapid growth of transactions in the global economy and the emergence of new economic and political powers such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey, research in this area can have very important implications for both business and politics.

Finally, from the educational research perspective, negotiation pedagogy – which was basically founded on Western principles and practices of negotiations – can benefit much from understanding conflict management styles of people in other cultures. We have already learned from past research on negotiation styles of people in Face cultures that in environments of low trust, exchanging offers and substantiations, instead of directly exchanging information about priorities and preferences, may help negotiators to obtain insights. Even if a negotiator does not have a

holistic mindset, s/he can draw inferences from patterns of offers received from a counterpart. Along the same line, researchers and teachers of negotiation can learn much from the conflict management styles of people in Face and Honor cultures to improve negotiation training.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Current theory and research in cultural psychology distinguish three different types of cultures: Dignity, Face, and Honor, as opposed to the dichotomy of independent/interdependent or West/East that has dominated cultural analysis for the last 25 years. These three cultural types provide a strong basis for reorganizing our thinking about culture, negotiation strategy and joint gains. In this chapter we discussed the historical and environmental origins of these cultures and the psychological concepts that shape their conflict management logics. We have proposed three cultural factors: trust, mindset, and emotional expression that vary between Dignity, Face, and Honor cultures and argued that these cultural factors provide a theoretical explanation for the pattern of current negotiation research findings contrasting negotiations in North America and Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East and Latin America.

Overall, we suggest that negotiators in Dignity cultures tend to have high trust, use an analytic mindset, and rely on rationality over emotion in negotiations. This pattern of cultural influences is consistent with the Q&A negotiation strategy, accurate insight and high joint gains. We also suggest that negotiators in Face cultures tend to have low trust at least in the beginning of negotiations, use a holistic mindset, and generally suppress negative emotions in negotiations. This pattern of cultural influences can be consistent with the S&O strategy, yet accurate insight and high joint gains may depend on how emotions are managed. Finally we suggest that negotiators in Honor cultures tend to have low trust in the beginning of negotiations, use a relatively linear mindset, and express negative emotions in negotiations. This pattern of cultural influences is consistent with the S&O negotiation strategy, and creates a challenging environment for obtaining insight and joint gains compared to Dignity and Face cultures. Therefore it is crucial to spend time to develop trust and manage negative emotions so that negotiators can exchange information more openly and focus their attention on creating joint gains instead of getting trapped in zero-sum honor contests. Implications of this framework for understanding past research on culture and negotiations as well some avenues for future research were discussed.

NOTES

1. Pareto optimality and joint gains are not synonymous. A Pareto optimal decision, a negotiated outcome from which one party cannot improve the outcome for itself without hurting the outcome for the other, does not necessarily optimize joint gains. However, joint gains outcomes are Pareto optimal and the strategy and insight that is needed to generate Pareto optimal outcomes are the same that are needed to generate joint gains. For the purpose of this chapter, we use the more general terms joint gains.
2. Of course, not all value can or should be quantified. For a review of subjective value in negotiations see Curhan et al. (2006).
3. This is similar to the notion of having strong BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) in negotiation literature.
4. In defining and elaborating on the meaning of the term honor, Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argue that Honor is well captured by ethnographer David Mandelbaum's characterization of the Arabic and Persian word for honor, "izzat".

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